Caesar 49 - Soviet Policy and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War

8/2/2019 Caesar 49 - Soviet Policy and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War

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SOVIET POLICY AN D THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELIWARMEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS

The course of events befwe, during,and after the Arab-Ismeli War of 1967p v i d e s a apse srrcdy o f th e dilemmas and dangers which raise when th e SovietUnion seeks to implement it s basic Middle f i s t strategy of support for the ArabMtionalist movements. Moscows policy record in the Middle Eiast i s mixad. andevents unforeseen by the Soviet ledem haw forced sig ni fim t and awkward shaftsin Soviet policy emphasis.In the period before the sixday war in 1967. Soviet policy shifted f tom

support of moderate Amb policy to espousal of the mficul Arab he, herebyencouraghg a sequence of events that M o s m could not control. After the defecrtof the Ambs, Soviet policy shifted back aguin to support of moderate Arabpolicies. But current trends in Soviet policy are again towlytrd support of Ambmdimlism, despite the seeming likelihood of a new ww in the MWle Eost andthe possibility of another Arab defecrt. These policy &fts reveal how resistantMoscow is to any fun&mental departure from it s instinctive tendency to supportmilitant Arab nationalism in hopes of Soviet politicul gains and/or Westernpoliticul losses in the Middle East.

Tiris research study hrrs been reviewed in the approplate Soviet and MiddleEojtem bmnches of the Office of W e n t Inte lligence, and the Office of NationalEstimates. Although not in agreement with every statement or judgment, they arein general accord with the major thrust and mnclusions of the study.

The reseurch analyst in charge ws Mrs. Cmolyn Eke&hl, with assistancefrom Mr. Gar1 Linden.

John Kerry KingChief, DD/I Special Research Staff


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CONTENTS.

PageABSTRACT OF SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . BEFORE THE WAR

SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY UP TO THE RISISSoviet Comm itment to Political Support of Syria: Spring 1966Th e Soviets Urge Syrian-Egy ptian Unity: Late 1966-Early 1967 . . . . . .. . . . .PRELU DE TO WAR-MAY 1967Rumor Feeds Tension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Build-up of UAR Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Soviets Appear Sanguine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Nasir Closes the Gulf of Aqaba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8The USSR and the Closure of th e Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ON THE BRINKNature o f Soviet Sup port for the Arabs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Soviets Urge Restraint-Too Little T oo Late . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Positions H arden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

THE IX-DAY WAR AN D ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMAT HTHE OUTBREAK OF WARIsrael Attack s; the USSR R eacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Charges of US-UK Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Soviets Urge Acceptance of Cease Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Threat of Soviet Interventionand theMoscow Conference . . . . . . . 19

' SOVIETS REACT TO DEFE ATAttempts to Reassure Arabs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Efforts o Regain Interna tional Prestige: Propaganda in the UN . . . . . 24SHIFT IN SOV IET TACTICS-TOWARD MODERATIONSoviets Urge Restraint on Arabs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 More Flexible UN Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 CROSS CURRENTS IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP DURING THE CR ISISTh e Yegorychev Affair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Th e Politburo C onsensus and D ifferences Within I t . . . . . . . . . . 34


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SOVIETS SHIFTSUPPORT FROM SYRIANS TO EGYPTIANSMoscow Endorses Nasir's Postwar Moves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Soviets Urge Restraint on Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 The Lever of Military Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 SOVIET MANEUVERS ON ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENTPosition on Withdrawal Amb iguous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Soviets Support Arab Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Increased Tensio n and Nasir's Ambivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 Toward a UN Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 Soviets Play a Double Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

THE SOVIETPOSITION-NOVEMBER 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

SUMMARY A ND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

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Abstract of Summary and Conclusions

The Arab-Israeli w ar of June 1967 was both a humiliating defeat fo r theArabs and a major setback for Soviet prestige. The Soviets had committedsubstantial quantities of aid and political suppor t to the Arabs, and theactivist policy w hich they ado pted in mid-1 96 6 contrib uted significantly topre-war tensions. In the hope of ensuring the support and survival of a newSyrian regime, the Soviets at th at time began t o voice a more militant,anti-Israel line an d, more impo rtantly, to encourage unity between their allyNasir and the Syrians. While both Nasir and the Soviets might have hopedthereby to gain increased control over the fanatical Syrians, the net result ofthe policy was to push Nasir toward greater militancy against Israel. TheSoviets failed to foresee the results of this policy. When they lost control ofthe situatio n, they were reluctant to spend their influence trying to restrainNasir.

The embarrassing results of their pre-war policy led the Soviets to makesome changes in their Middle East approach. Before the war they gave vocalsupport to the more extreme anti-Israel positions of the more militant Arabregimes. Afterward, they retreated to a more moderate, though still anti-Israel, line. Their willingness to take considerable risks in a situation theycould not control, in order t o achieve short-term goals, gave way in the warsaftermath to a somewhat more cautious, gradual approach. The dangersinherent in becoming overly committed to a radical leftist regime hadbecome obvious. Before the war they underto ok only perfunctory efforts toprevent Syrian provocations; now they began t o urge restraint in earnest. Inplace of the demago gic ambivalenc e which had marked th eir pre-war state-ments, with pledges of support left purposely vague and undefined, theSoviets now clarified the limits of their support for the Arabs. And, as aresult of the Arab military debacle, the USSR now asked that in exchangefor aid, Soviet military instructors and advisers be given authority to trainand organize at all levels of the Syrian and E gyptian armed forces.While the Soviets had shifted t heir tactics , they remaine d wedded to thestrategy which had helped produce the Arab fiasco in the six da y war. Theycontinue to believe that the maintenance of Arab-Israeli tension at a highpitch augments Soviet influence in the area. However, they evidently h ope tosucceed where they failed in June 1967, Le., to make their control over theArabs efficacious and th us avoid a repetition of th e June disaster. The result

has been t o give Soviet Middle East policy a schizophrenic appearance.

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cor example, t he Soviets have made clear to the Arabs that they d o notintend to become involved militarily in a future conflict. On the other hand,Moscow has increased sub stantially th e size of its Mediterranean fleet andhas s tr iven to restore Arab confidence in the f m e s s of its support throughthe prolonged visits of Soviet naval vessels to Syrian and Egyp tian ports. T hepresence of large numbers of Soviet advisers and m ilitary personnel in the

area, although possibly designed to ensure tha t th e situation do es not againget ou t of hand, has increased the dangers of the Soviet involvement in theevent of war. Sufficient materiel to rebuild the Arab armed forces (andpossibly confidence) continues to move into th e area. Despite the increasingthreat to peace in the Middle East tha t the growth of the Arab terrorist andguerrilla organizations poses, the Soviet Union has avoided any moves whichmight endanger its standing with these groups. It has funneled military aid toseveral guerrilla organizations through the UAR and Iraq, using its EastEuropean allies as arms agents. While the Soviets may hope thereby togainsome control over the guerrilla Icadership, they seem t o have forgotten thefailure of a similar policy toward the Syrian militants prior to the June war.Whatever may be th e case, there has been a shift in emphasis in the lastyear away from the notable sobriety and caution shown by the Soviets afterthe June war, and toward renewed and overt support of Arab militancy.Recently the latte r trend was highhghted by Kosygins remarks asserting aline of active aid to the Arab anti-Israeli struggle (10 December) and byincreasing reportage in Soviet propaganda o f the activities and exp loits of theguemlla movement.The post-war Soviet receptivity to a negotiated political settlement inthe Middle East at the same time has not completely evaporated. However,MOSCOWS m t consideration appears-just as it was before the June war-once more to be consolidation of its position as champion of the Arabnational liberation and anti-imperialist movement. It thus has patron-ized the growing guemlla movement. The Soviets see, it seems, in such apolicy prospects for long-range gains for Soviet influence in t he region whichoutweigh the chronic danger of events ge tth g out of control again as theydid in Jun e 1967. Hence the Soviets have acceded to the Arab preconditionsfor a Middle East settlement, though they would not be unreceptive to U.S.proposals w hich they though t the Arabs could be persuaded to accept. Whilethe Soviets seek to avoid a confrontation in the area, they may judge thatthe renewed support of Nasir and gue rrilla militancy involves little cha nce ofsuch a confrontation. Moreover, the Soviets once again seem confident that

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they can control Nasir and avoid another full-scale Arab-Israeli war. Thedangers of the policy may be greater than the Soviet leadelship assumes,given Nasirs tendency, amply illustrated in May 1967, to act in an unpre-dictable, erratic, often bellicose, and sometimes politically suicidal manner.

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SOVIET POLICY AND THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WARBEFORE THE WAR

SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY UP TO THE CRISISSoviet Commitm ent to Political Support of Syria: Spring 1966

In the mid-1950s the Soviets began to cultivate the newly emergingnationalist Arab regimes, taking advantage of growing anti-Western sentimentcommon among them. Nasir, the most impressive of the new breed of Arableader and head of t he strongest A rab sta te, was th e Soviets primary target.The USSR invested heavily in the UAR, and by 1 96 5 Cairo was almostcompletely dependent on Moscow for military aid. Arab fears that Soviet aidto the Middle East might be curtailed as a result of Khrushchevs ouster werenot borne out.After t he 195 4 overthrow of Colonel Shishakli in Syria, the Soviets hadan on-again, off-again relationship with t hat nation. T he February 19 66 coupby the extremist wing of th e ultra-nationalist Baath Pa rty resulted in a rapidrapprochement in Soviet-Syrian relations, and the inclusion of a Comm unistin the new Syrian cabinet was particularly gratifying to the Soviets.Thereafter, the USSR increased greatly its military and economic aid toSyria, and concern for the survival of the radical Baathists became a majorconsideration in Soviet Middle East policy.In an effort to capitalize on the situation in Syria, the Soviets beganpublicly to end orse an increasingly militant anti-Israel line, and t o issuewarnings against any interference in the internal affairs of her new client.Apparently concerned that Syrias neighbor Jordan might take some actionagainst the new Syrian regime, the Soviets privately warned the Jordaniansno t to d o so. On 28 May the Soviet Ambassador to Jordan, Slyusarenke,reportedly delivered such a message to King Husayn, stating that Sovietintelligence re port s indicated such an intervention was in the wind. Publicly,on 7 May 1966,an Izvesriyo article attacked Israel for armed provocationsagainst S yria aimed at overthrowing th e new regime and warned Israel notto intervene.A 27 May TASS item implied increased Soviet political supp ort for th eSyrian regime. According to this statement, the Soviet Union would not


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remain indifferent to a ttemp ts at violating peace in the region in immediateproximity to the frontiers of the USSR.This statement specifically at-tacked extre mist forces in lsrael and charged that reactionary quarter sin Jordan and Saudi Arabia, backed by the United States and United King-dom, were plotting against Syria. The effect of the Soviet statement-despitethe diplomatic impression of the language-was to encourage a still mo reactivist Syrian policy against Israel. During this period the Syrians werebacking guerrilla raids into Israel from Jordanian territory. While the numberof these raids was not comparable to t he postwar level of guerrilla attacks, itmarked a significant increase over what had gone b efore.The Soviets Urge Syrian-Egyp tian Unity: Late 1966-E arly 196 7

In ad dition t o issuing warnings against interven tion, the Soviets soug htto secure the new Syrian regime by urging reconciliation betwe en the Syriansan d the Egyptians; the two nations had been estranged since the 1961secession of Syria from its union with Egypt. Kosygin, in a speech to theUARs National Assembly in mid-May 19 66, appealed for unity among th eprogressive Arab states. The Soviets may have hoped that in exchange forprotection through an alliance with the U AR, the Syrians would adopt a lessprovocative stance. Yet, the eventual result seems to have been t o encourageNasir to a dopt a more m ilitant line.During the fall of 1966 and continuing in to 1967, Arab terrorist raidsinto Israel from Syria and Jordan intensified. Israel reciprocated with reprisalraids. Syrian Prime Minister Zuayyin, in October, announced that Syriawould never take measures to curb the fedayeen. The United Nations

Security Council (UNSC)met several times between 14 October and 4November at the request of Israel, bu t the USSR veto preven ted passage of aresolution condemning the terrorist raids.Soviet behavior in the fall of 1966 set the pattern for the subsequentperformance in the spring of 1967. On 12 October Israel received a notefrom the Soviet Union charging that a concentration of Israeli troops hadformed along the Syrian border and that the Israelis were preparing for an airattack which would be followed by the penetration of Israeli troops deepinto Syria. Soviet Ambassador Fedorenko repeated the charge two days laterat the UN. A UN investigation failed to suppo rt the Soviet charges. Mean-while, on 14 and IS O ctober, Moscow sought to disabuse the Arabs of anythought of responding in an adventurist manner. Thus, Moscow simulta-neously urged the Syrian and Egyptian governments to stay calm and avoid

giving Israel a pretext for aggression.

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On 8 November 196 6, some three weeks after the Soviets pressed theirallegation of an imminen t Israeli invasion of Syria, the UAR signed a m utualdefense pact with Syria. The timing suggests tha t th e Soviet-sponsored repo rtof a threatened Israeli attack may have encouraged the two Arab regimes tosign the pact. Certainly the Soviet report must have given the Syriangovernment added incentive to seek the protection of an alliance with N asir,and Nasir may have hoped to acquire some control over the Syrians inexchange. The Soviet objective of Egyptian-Syrian rapprochement had beenwell served by the false report of Israeli mobilization. A similar false report,disseminated in May 196 7, backfired and helped t o precipitate th e chain ofevents that led t o war.The USSR apparently hoped that the UAR-Syrian alliance would pro-

vide greater security for the radical regime in Syria and dampen the Syrianregimes tendency to undertake ad ventures on its own. However, Nasir didnot succeed in moderating the provocative Syrian policy toward Israel. Onthe contrary, Nasir, tied to the far more militant Syrians, became morevulnerable in the face of demagogic Syrian appeals to anti-Israel passionsamong the Arab nations.*In early 1967 the tension along the Israeli-Syrian border was high asartillery exchanges increased. Syria (clearly not strong enough to handleIsrael alone) put considerable pressure on Nasir to demonstrate his leadershipof the Arab world and to prove the worth of the November defense pact.During this period the Soviets warned the Syrians on at least two occasionsthat they did not want the situation to get out of hand. But the Soviet desireto capitalize on the prevailing tension in order to increase their influence a t

the expense of the United States prevented them from taking any strongposition with the Syrians and led to somewhat contradictory actions. Forexample, on 3 February, a few weeks after the Soviets privately cautionedthe Syrians against precipitating a war, f zves t iya published an article chargingIsrael with concen trating large forces on t he Syrian border, calling upreservists, and putt ing th e m ilitary forces on alert.On 7 April 1967, following a border exchange of fire, Israel launchedthe deepest air strikes into Syria up to that time. This may have marked a

*Nosir ws vulnerable to chargesof naction from both left and night. A n Israeli raid onthe Jordmtion border iown ofAs-Samu on I3 November 1966 causedJordansHusayn tostart taunting Nosir.

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major change in Israels retaliatory policy, as its pilots were authorized topenetrate deep into Syria. The Syrians were humiliated and the Soviets, whohad supplied Syria with aircraft, were embarrassed by Israels success. Fivedays later th ere was ano ther fierce gun batt le across the Israeli-Syrian border.The Arab state s criticized the UAR for remaining relatively silent and passiveduring t he period. Moscow Radio, on t he ot her hand , was shrill in charges ofU.S. leet moves and conspiracies and warnings of Israeli plans to invadeSyria. The 7 April battle revealed to the Soviets and the Syrians thevulnerability of Syria t o Israeli attac ks, and t he Soviets may have concludedthat in order to deter Israel, Egypt must make a firmer commitment toSyria.In mid-April the Soviets sent Israel a warning note, stating that Israelmust bear full responsibility for her actions and hoping that Israel wouldnot pe rmit herself t o be used by those who w ould make her the puppet offoreign enemy forces. Soviet propaganda continued to link Israel and theUnited States as plott ers against Syria. On 24 April, Brezhnev called for thewithdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Med iterranean.

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PRELUD E TO WAR-May 196 7Rumor Feeds Tension

In a speech on 2 M ay, Nasir, perhaps responding t o Arab criticism andSoviet nudges, attacked imperialism and the United States in unusuallyviolent terms. On 12 May Israeli Prim e Minister Eshkol, in a shar ply word edstatement,warned Syria that it faced severe conteraction if it did not haltterrorist incursions into Israel. Shortly thereafter, word spread through thearea that Israel w a s concen trating forces on t he Syrian border and was poisedto launch an attack on Syria. The report was untrue. In fact Israel did notreinforce its frontie rs and m obilize its reserves until af t e r the UAR began itsmilitary build-up.

The origin of the rep ort is not clear; it apparently did not originate witheither the Syrians or Egyptians, both of whom were given the informationby th e Soviets. It is possible that the Israelis themselves floated th e rumorhoping to induce th e Soviets to persuade the Syrians to stop their provoca-tive actions. In any e vent, th e Soviets did not appear particularly concernedabout establishing the validity of the report. They had made similar un-founded claims in October 1966 and February 1967 and were the maindisseminators of this report. In a speech on 22 May Nasir said th at

on I 3 Mqv we received accurate infomation hat Ismel ws concentrating on the

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Syrian bonier huge armed forcer ...The decision made by Israel at this time was tocnny out an aggression against Syria as of May 17.

In speeches on 9 June and 23 July, Nasir cited the Soviets as the source ofthis accurate information and claimed that the information had beenpassed to an Egyptian parliamentary delegation which visited Moscow inMay.On 13 May a message was sent throug h Egyptian chan nels to Cairofrom Moscow. It stated that Soviet Depu ty Foreign Minister Semenov hadtold the Egyptians that Israel was preparing a ground and air attack onSyria-to be cam ed out between 17 and 21 May. It stated that the Sovietshad advised the UAR to be prepared, to stay calm, and not t o be drawn intofighting with Israel, and that they had advised the Syrians to remain calmand not give Israel the opportunity for military operations. The message alsosaid that the USSR favored informing the Security Council before Israeltook military action against Syria. According to the message, Anwar al-Sadat, head of the Egyptian delegation then in Moscow, had been given thisinformation. This intercept confirms Nasirs statement that the Soviets hadpassed the information to the UAR and adds the fact that the Soviets at thesame time urged caution. The Arabs were to take the information but notth e advice.

rom 15 through 19 May Sbviet ForeignMinisterccordingromykt%zlzIzrab am bassador accredited t o Moscow ofan impending Israeli attack on Syria and offered every assistance, includingconfirmed that such assurances had beengiven in Moscow byQvery Soviet political officer. It is highly unlikely,military. Anotherhowever, th at such a blanket assurance was ever given. Th e report of allegedIsraeli plans fo r an attack was subsequently repeated at t he UNSC meetingon 29 May by UAR Am bassador al-Quni and was echoed by Soviet Ambas-sador Fed oren ko, who said that the A rabs had precise inform ation of Israelitroop concentrations and an Israeli intention to attack on 17 May.Soviet motivation for spreading a flimsy and u nsubstantiated report asexplosive as this one is not clear. Even if they knew the facts of the story tobe untrue, the Soviets might in fact have feared that, as a result of Eshkolsspeech, an Israeli reprisal attack of some sort against Syria was likely tooccur shortly. If so, they may have hoped to push the UAR toward a firm

and open commitment to come to Syrias aid, reasoning th at such a commit-ment might deter Israel from further raids. It is also possible that the Sovietshoped to frighten the Syrians into modifying their policies by convincing

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Nasirs demand that the UN forces be withdrawn and U Thantscompliance served several purposes. With the UNEF buffer removed,Egyptian forces could respond more quickly in case of an Israeli attack onSyria. Nasits demand also undercut Jordanian charges that the UAR hadbeen hiding behind a UN shield. And, getting UN forces out of the UAR,particularly out of the symbolic and strategic post at Sharm ashshaykh,bolstered Nasirs prestige and Arab pride.Soviets Appear Sanguine

While Soviet press support for the UAR build-up conveyed an impres-sion of Soviet approval of develoDments. there were some indications ofSoviet appreh ension . oviet UNAmbassador Fedoren o expressea some concern at me speea 101 m E Fwithdrawal, and on the same day Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin told Ambas-sador Thompson that he thought the Soviets could match the United

I Synan-brae war.

On 18 May a Moscow Domestic Service broadcast charged that Israelitroops were being concentrated on the Syrian frontier and that someobservers were comparing the situation with that on he eve of th e Suezoperation. According t o th e broadcast, the Syrians had had no choice but toput their army on alert in view of th e thr ea ts from 1srael:The bro adc ast alsostated t hat the provisions of th e Syrian-Egyptian mu tual aid treaty had beenapplied, that UAR forces were on stand-by alert, and that Cairo had statedthat it would intervene in th e event of Israeli aggression against Syria.On 19 May the Novosti Press Agency went further. Th e dispatch,distributed in Arab cou ntries but no t carried in th e Soviet press, stated thatthe USSR would no stand idlv bv if Israel attacked Syria. I

ne net errect os sucn

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Nasir Closes the Gulf of A qabaBy 2 2 May 1967, the day the small UNEF force was withdrawn fromSham ash-Shaykh, Nasir announced. that the UAR had closed the Gulf ofAqaba to Israeli shipping and t o ships qf all other countries bringing strategiccargoes to Israel. The next day, Eshkol repeated the Israel position that

, Egyptian interference with Israeli shipping in the Gulf would be consideredan act of aggression. On 26 May Israel warned that it would not waitindefinitely for an end t o the Egyptian blockade and the w ithdrawal of Arabtroop concentrations on its borders. By then, the Israeli armed forces werenear peak mobilization.Nasirs actions during the month of May probably were influenced by

bad information concerning Arab military strength and the extent of Sovietbacking. But the false report of Israels plans to attack Syria, by triggeringNasirs decision t o mobilize, played a major role in Nasirs actions. If hebelieved that Israel planned an attack on Syria and tha t the UAR would haveto respond, his mobilization and his demand for a withdrawal of UNEFforces might have been intended as deterrents.

However, Nasirs decision t o blockad e the Gulf of Aqaba raised thepitch of th e crisis to new an d dan gerous levels. His speeches indicated that hebelieved Israel would respond to the blockade and that the UAR wasequipped t o handle an Israeli attack. On 26 May he stated.... ecent& we have elt strong enough that r f we w e o enter a ba ttle w ith Israel,with Godshelp, we coukl triumph On this basis we decided t o take actual steps ...Taking over Shann ashShykh..meant that we were r d y o enter a geneml warwith Ismel

Though he indicated that the UAR would not initiate an attack, he declaredthat if Israel attacked either Syria or the U AR.....The bottle will be a geneml one and our basic objective will be to deshvy IsmeL

While Nasir was publicly stating that Israel would have to respond and thatthe UAR could t hen h andle Israel militarily, it seems likely that Nasir in factbelieved tha t Israel would no t attack and that he would make major politicalgains for only a mo dest risk.m e USSR and Closure of the Gulf

The Soviets, the evidence suggests, were taken by surprise when Nasirclosed the Gulf. Not only was their disapproval indicated by the absence of8


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explicit expressions of support, but the reaciion of the Soviet press wasmuted and delayed. This was a sign of either a lack of advance notice, orabsence of a prepared official position, or both. On 23 May TA SS reportedNasirs statement on theclosing of the Suez canal and several hours laterissued a Soviet governmen t s tatemen t repeating much of th e previous Sovietpropaganda line, but failed t o ment ion th e closure of th e gulf.*The first semi-official comment on the closure of the gulf came threedays later in a Prauda article. The article recalled that Israel had not used thegulf before 1956, thereby intimating she had no right t o use it. However, theSoviets were at this poin t evidently reluctan t t o suppo rt Nasirs act.The Soviet attitu de toward the Middle East situation seemed to be

summed up in a rhetorical question posed on une by a Soviet DeputyForeign Ministe e asked if ther e was anyreason why the V D D R s ed States in the MiddleEast. That the Soviets had not yet seen any reason to do so was demon-strated by th eir positio n at t he United Nations, where efforts to resolve thesituation were lukew arm, ineffective, and slow. The USSR had rejectedrequests for four-power talks. On 24 May Soviet UN Ambassador Fedorenkotemporarily barred the way to Security Council discussion of the developingcrisis by refusing to participate. On 29 May, when a Security Councilmeeting was a t last held o n the crisis, Fedo renko added nothing constructive.ON THE BRINK

Nature of Soviet SuDDort for the ArabsReports on specific Soviet commitments to the Arabs are confusing; itappears th at Soviet assurances were always kept vague and thu s were open tomisinterpretation by the Arabs. The only fairly clear commitment theSoviets made was to support the Arabs if the United States intervened onbehalf of Israel-and even here the exte nt and type of assistance were not

m e oviet government of 23 Mo y accused Israel of prepring to attack Syr&7 andstated that Western Simperinlist circles were responsible for inciting Israel. The tate-ment concluded b y wzm ing that the aggtessorswould meet not only united Arab strm gthbut also strong oppositio n from the Soviet Union and all pecrce-loving states.

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clear. According to one report, in mid-May Nasir asked what the SovietUnion would d o if t he United Sta tes came to Israels aid in the event of war.Kosygin reportedly replied th at th e Soviets in turn would aid the Arabs.*Confusion in the Arab world ab out th e extent of Soviet support for theArab cause is demonstrated by the varying official reports made to theSyrian and Egyptian governments in mid-May. On 15 May the SyrianAmbassador in Moscow reported generalized Soviet assurances of supportand said that he felt this was mean t to include even military interventio n. Onthe following day th e Egyptian Am bassador in Dam ascus also reported t oCairo that Moscow would support Syria to the extent of military inter-vention. Subsequ ent clarification from the Syrian Amb assador in Moscowcontained the information that Soviet assistance will not, repeat not, reach

the poin t of m ilitary intervention. It is not clear from the reportingwhether or n ot this clarification was conveyed t o the Egyptians; th e Syriansmight have preferred to keep it t o themselves so that the Egyptians wouldnot back off. In short, s far as we know, th e Soviets tried t o avoid ma king aclear-cut statement concerning the nature and extent of their assistance inthe event of war.From 25 to 28 May the Egyptian Minister of War, Shams Bad ran, wasin Moscow where he met with Kosygin, Gromyko, and Grechko?*ln his 29May speech Nasir said that Kosygin had sent a message back with Badranstating that th e Soviet Unionstands with us in this battle and will not allow any counny to intervene,so that thestate ofaffairs prevailing before 1956may be restored.This statem ent, together w ith Nasirs claims regarding Egyptian strengthvis-a-vis Israel, suggests that Nasirs expectations of Soviet support in the

*According to a Sovier officil, in late May the Soviets had told Nasir that they werecommitted only to neumlizing the US-that they wuld respond to any escnhtionWashhgtonmight undertake b ut woukinotgo beyond that.* * U . mbaswdor to Moscow Ghaleb stated after th e w r hat the Soviets had neverpromised mlitaty aid to the Arabs, but that a young and inexperienced Minister ofDefense (Badran) who visited Moscow short& before the uur had misunderstood andreported that he wos sure Moscow would help the Arabs in the event ofwar. Badran wosone o f the fust to be disinissed after the wr; it is probable that he had overstated theSoviet commitment.

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event of war included only materiel 2nd the necessary Soviet actio ns to deterU.S. in terven tion in Israels behalf. Nasir surely did no t anticip ate wh at infact occurred-a disastrous fi ved ay war. He mo re likely foresaw a prolongedconflic t in which Soviet aid-in th e form of military equipment, not actualphysical support-might well play an imp orta nt part .Whatever his interpretation of the actual Soviet commitment, Nasirapparently felt that it was sufficient. He seems to have believed that Sovietsupport would only be needed to prevent a recurrence of 1956-whenWestern forces assisted Israel. He apparently felt th at th e United Stat es couldrestrain Israel and also seemed confident that the Arabs could cope withIsrael militarily if necessary. Nasirs confidence in E gypts military capabilityseems to have been a t least partially shared by th e Soviets. I

owever, tne most lmportant Soviet error at thispomt would appear t o haye been their failure to foresee an Israeli attack .Soviets Urge Restraint-Too Litt le Too Late

During the period between the announcement of the blockade of theGulf of Aqaba and the outbreak of war, Soviet policy apparently was basedon the asumption tha t Israel would not attack if the situation remainedstatic. On the on e h and, th e Soviets gave encouragement to the Arabs andleft open the possibility that they would support the Arabs in the event ofwar; on the other hand, they sought gently to restrain the Arabs fromfurther provocative actions. There is no indication that they ever attemptedto persuade Nasir to lift the blockade. Anxious to avoid war and a t th e same

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time retain the atmosphere of tension from which they felt they couldbenefit, th e Soviets urged upon the Arabs only that degree of restraint theyfelt necessary to keep th e situation from boiling over into war.The Soviets, in their post-war accounts, have claimed that before thewar they urged the Arabs to refrain from actions which could be used byIsraeli ruling circles as a pretext to launch hostilities. Nasir has supp orted thisclaim, stating that on 26 May the US. Government had given the SovietAmbassador in Washington a message asking that the Soviets urge the UARto use restraint and not be the first to open ftre.

ISoviet attem pts t o restrain the Arabs were limited, however, andsuggest that they were concerned not so much about a possible Israeliretaliation for closure of the Gulf of A qaba, as they were about further Arabactions which in turn might lead to war. Their late May attem pts t o convincethe Arabs that Israel was not going to attack**apparently referred back tothe original untrue report of a planned Israeli attack on Syria, rather than tothe possibility of a retaliatory attac k for closure of the gulf.

Positions Harde nIn the last days of May, Nasir began to settle his differences with themore conservative Arab nations, a situation most feared by Israel and, by thebeginning of June, the Egyptian and Israeli positions were completelyintransigent. On 1 June Israeli Labor Minister Yigal Alon insisted that someprotection of Israels borders from terrorist attacks, the withdrawal ofEgyptian troop concentrations along the border, and the lifting of the

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blockade were necessary con ditio ns t o avoid an inevitable military clash.On 2 June UAR Foreign Minister Riyad announced that the Suez Canalwould be closed t o anyone who tried to break the blockade.

1 TheMost available information indicates th at th e Israeli att ack at dawnton5June came as a complete surprise to the Soviets. I - 1

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THE SIX-DAY WAR AND ITS IMMED IATE AFTERMATHTHE OUTBREAK OF WAR

Israel Attacks; the USSR Re actsIsrael's attack on the UAR came in the morning on 5 June 1967.Surprise enabled the Israeli air force to virtually eliminate th e Egyptian airforce on the ground, and Israeli forces advanced with little trouble into Sinaiand the Gam Strip. By 6 une Israeli forces were well on their way to theSuez; on 7 June they captured Sharm ashsh ayk h; and on 8 June Israelclaimed complete control of Sinai. The war with Jordan began later in the

da y of 5 June. After Jordanian forces seized UN headquarters in Jerusalem,Israel launched air and ground attacks along the armistice line and Israeliforces swept tow ard the J ordan River. Israel had virtually destroyed th eSyrian air force on 5 June, but did not begin her ground a ttack against Syriauntil 9 June; by the time of cease-fue with the Syrians, Israeli forces hadpenetrated about 10miles into Syria and occupied the Golan Heights.Soviet press organs, also taken by surprise, continued their pre-warpropaganda themes. On 5 June l r v e s t i y a and TASS both charged thatJohns on and W ilson, at their recent Washington conference,' had workedout an anti-UAR strategy and that they had spurred Israel on. That after-noon a Moscow broadcast in Arabic said that Israel would not have attackedwithout U.S. instigation, that the Arabs were ready to reply to the imperial-ists, and that the Arabs were not alone in their just struggle. Some hours

later, in a French-language version of the same commentary beamed to th eMaghreb states, the following line was added :A s the Sone t government$tressedrecent&. the ogonirers will b e oface no t onlythe united strength of the Amb counmi?s.but a b he fm esponse to thisawession by the USSRand all other peuce-loving states.

The co mm entary did no t e laborate, leaving the threat of Soviet interventionvague.

*The Johnson-Wkonmeetinghad ended on 3 June.

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A Soviet government statement, issued late on 5 June was even moreimprecise. It demand ed that Israel ,hal t military actions immed iately andwithdraw behind the truce line, stating that the Soviet governm ent reservedthe right to take all necessary steps. It called on the UN to condemn Israelsactions and to try t o restore peace in the Middle East.These statements revealed the Soviet fear of becoming militarily in-volved. Th ere w ere several reports th at th ey considered a military response,*but their actions suggest that this was not a serious alternative at this point.Within hours of the outbreak of war, according to a State Departmentreport, Moscow made use of the hot-line teletype to Washington, probablyfor two reasons-to make sure no accidental confrontation with the UnitedStates occurred and to try to stop the war, which they quickly realized theArabs could not win.

C h m e s of US-UK InvolvementSoviet restraint was also dem onstra ted in Moscows reaction to theArab charge that the U nited S tates and Great Britain had actually partici-pated in the air strikes against the UAR. The original source of the report isnot clear. According to an Egyptian source, Cairos charge was based on th ebelief that more aircraft took part in the attack than Israel possessed; itseems likely that the Arabs misread the origins of the aircraft, which the.Israelis had sent in at low altitud es from the M editerranean to e scape radar

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detection. Nasir, for one, seems to have believed the report.* On 7 June hesent a message to Jordan, Syria, and Algeria, in which he claimed that theUAR high command had confirmed beyond any doubt the collusion of th eUS and England with Israel.The implications of this charge f or the Soviets could have been serious,if they in fact had m ade a commitment to assist in the event of an actual USintervention. The Soviets never officially accepted the accusation of USparticipation as valid althoug h t he Soviet press did, in several instances,repeat the charges.**

uring Boumeaiene sUS aircraft had not participated in the Arab-Israeli war and asked him topass this information to Nasir. Furthermore, no authoritative Soviet sourcegave public credence to the Arab charge. The Soviets were clearly unwillingto fall for what they may have felt was an Arab effort to drag them into the .war.

1 0 M 1L t0 1 edly emphasized that

Soviets Urge Acceptance of C ease FireAgitated conversations were reportedly held between the Soviets andEgyptians after the outbreak of war-in Cairo between Nasir and Pozhidayev,and in Moscow betw een G haleb and to p Soviet leaders. Th e Egyptiansdemanded tha t th e Soviets immediately replace their demolished air forcebut were told that there was no place to land planes as the airfields too had

been destroyed. In response to the E gyptian accusation th at t he Soviets were%is chrge uu s consistent wi th Soviet prewar press charges that USandBritish M W ~forces were being builr up n the Maditmanetrn and with p m w r Soviet charges that theUS nd Britain plan ned to support Im el mili tady.

**A 6 June doniestic broo&ast repaated the Amb Command statement thathhad proofof Western puticipztion. As late as 11 June a Soviet domestic commentator said thatwhile the IIS w a s w i n g to repudiate reports o f pprticipztion. the fact remained that onthe eve of the w r , US and British mrriers pmed th u gh th e S u e z and stationedthemselves in th e Re d Sa, rom where their planes w vem d Ismelsair sppcc.

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deserting them in their hour of need, the Soviets said that they werecommitted only to supporting the Arabs against the United States-not

catastrophic. They felt that the Egyptians could not respond successfully asthey had no planes; however, Nasir did not acce pt this line of reasoning andlaunched a counter-offensive which failed.The Soviets for a brief time refused to accept the simple cease-fireresolution put forth at the UN and instead urged adoption of a resolutioncombining a cease-fire with the call for withdrawal of troops to prewarpositions. Israel refused to accept this condition and the UAR refused to

accept a cease-fire without it. On 6 June Soviet Deputy Foreign MinisterSemenov ordered Soviet UN representative Fedorenko to accept the simplecease-fire in spite of the Arab position. However, the UA R was not yetprepared to accept and without Egyptian approval the Security Councilunanimously passed a simple cease-fire resolution .For the next two days the Soviets apparently attemp ted to persuadeth e UAR to accept a simple cease-fire, althou gh they w ere also pushing acease-fire with conditions.[.

I On 7 June a UAR Embassy spokesman in Paris said th at Egyp t rejectedthe UN resolution calling for a simple cease-fire. The Soviets requested animmediate meeting of the Security Council that afternoon and tabled asecond cease-fire resolutio n, simply calling on the gov ernments concerned tocease ftring at 2000 GMT hat night. It was unanimously adopted. Jordanand Israel agreed, but the UAR still rejected it.**On this I r e Radio Moscow broadtnst the text of a Soviet government statement t oIsrael charging that the failure of Israel to comply with the UN l l for a cease-fire w.s

further proof of Israels uggressive .po&y and rhreutening to b m k dipromtic rektionswith Israel.

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1 IG iur LIar e t pressure t o accept a cease-fire had beenconsistent and perhaps effective, but it is more likely that Nasir saw thehopelessness of Egypts military position and finally decided to accept.On 8 June, at the same Security Council meeting at which U Thantannounced that the UAR w ould abide by a cease-fire if Israel would do thesame, the Soviets tabled a draft resolution calling for a condemnation ofIsrael and the withdrawal of troops behind the truce line. This resolution wasnever passed but was to become the basis of Soviet demands in the monthsahead. On 9 June a resolution was unanimously passed, demanding fulfill-ment of the previous resolutions (of 6 and 7 June) calling for a cease-fire.Two hours after passage of the resolution, Syria and Israel had accepted it.

Threat of Soviet Intervention and the Moscow ConferenceIn spite of th e form al agreement to cease fire, Israeli troops continuedto advance into Syria on 9 an d 10 June. At this point, th e Soviets began tothreaten some (undefined) action if Israel did not stop. Reports indicate thaton 9 June several Soviet diplomats warned that if Israel did not observe thecease-fire in Syria, the Soviets might intervene. A CPSU document preparedin October 1967 stated that on the morning of 10 June the Soviets sent anurgent message to President Johnson, warning that if Israel did not stop theUSSR would be compelled to take unspecified necessary action. This isprobably a reference to the use of the hot-line between Moscow and

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Ther e were indications tha t t he Soviets were in fact making prepara-tions for limited intervention. On 11 June there were several reports ofSoviet military preparations-one involving the possible landing of 400Soviet sailors near L atakia, Syria, and the o ther involving th e possiblelanding of paratroops in Syria to halt the Israeli advance toward Damascus.These reports reveal the extent of Soviet concern for Syria and its regime,but the amount of support being considered was token only. I t is notimpossible that these reports were circulated by the Soviets in an attempt toscare the Israelis int o stopp ing their advance in Syria.After the war the S oviets were to claim that th e Israeli halt was a directresult of the USSRs determined stand. While it is possible that the Sovietthreats played a role in Israels decision to stop, the fact that Israel hadagreed to a cease-fire before th e USSR began to make threats suggests thatthe Soviet threats were not so important; furthermore, there is little toindicate that Israel had planned to take Damascus in any event.Tw o or three days after the start of the war, the Soviets summonedtheir East European allies to Moscow to discuss the situation. The leadersmet on 9 Jun e and t he following day released a statement warning that if th eUNSC did not take proper measures and if Israel did not withdraw to thearmistice lines, the signers would d o everything necessary t o help thepeoples of the Arab countries administer a resolute rebuff to the aggressor.This belated and again vague verbal threat indicated that the Soviets andtheir allies had no inten tion of becom ing militarily involved. On 10June theSoviet Union did, however, break diplomatic relations with Israel, and in thedays that followed the other Moscow signatories followed suit.*Various other agreements not included in the public statement weremade at the Moscow C onference.Y I f as agreed

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that the Soviets would be the spokesmen for all and that they would presentaid the meetingIountries and toa united f ron t on th e Middle East problem.*recognized the need to repair the war damagesupply th e Egyptian armed forces with replacements for lost tanks, aircraft,and other materiel.** But limits to this aid were also discussed.the weaknesses in the UAR military s tructure revealed by the warreported, the Soviets decided they must exercise control of Egyp ian use oSovietsupplied military equipment. It was agreed that all of Nasir's requestsfor military aid would be met, but that the Sovietswould demand that theyparticipate in any fut ure UAR decision concerning major military actio ns tobe launched with Sovietsupplied arms. While the Soviets may have requestedthat they be involved in such decision making, it is not likely that Nasirwould have agreed t o w eaken his own prerogatives. T he Soviets did, how-ever, acquire a greater role in Egyptian military training and organization.

0SOVIETS REACT TO DEFEAT

Att em pts to Reassure ArabsThe Soviets, shocked by the magnitude of the Arab defeat, reactedinstinctively. First, they tried to salvage what they could from a badsituation. They were particularly vulnerable to charges that they had failedthe Arabs; they also were sensitive t o rumors that the Chinese were going tomove in to the area w ith offers of aid and even more sensitive to theprospects of a Chinese propaganda heyday at their expense. Their immediate

a im s were t o restore their damaged prestige in t he eyes of th e world and t ore-establish their credibility as friends of th e Arabs. The emergency airlift of

*The Soviets agreed to mntact Cairo immediately in beharf of the Eastern Europeancounm .es; this ws the first time the Soviets had thus represented the fi st er n Europeanmunm 'es in negotiations with the U AR.

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aid begun by the Soviets on 6 June* (the largest such operation Moscow hasever conducted) and the 10 June statement of the Moscow conference werethe fist steps in this direction. Subsequent high-level visits and assurances ofcontinuing military aid were a vital element in their efforts to restore theirinfluence with the Arabs.The A rabs were stunned by defeat and w ere at once gripped by shock,humiliation, and anger. They looked for scapegoats and found a number; theUnited States and Great Britain whom th ey said had aided Israel, some oftheir own leaders-particularly military-who m they felt had failed them ,**and the Soviet Union which they felt had let them down. Their frustrationand anger with the Soviets was openly expressed in the press as well asprivately. Among the most vehement was Algerian President Boumediene,who at one point apparently considered ordering all Algerian students in the

USSR to return home. O n 12 June B oumediene flew to Moscow where hereportedly attack ed t he Soviets for their failure to assist. He was reminded ofthe dangers of nuclear war and was somewhat mollified by promises ofcontinued aid. Syrian President Al-Atasi visited Moscow shortly after th ewar and charged tha t on the second day of the war the Soviet Ambassadorto Damascus had promised technical military assistance which was thennot provided. The Soviets reportedly responded that the military situationhad developed so swiftly that the Soviet aid program had been thrown offbalance.Probably because they realized their need for Soviet aid and support,the Arabs anti-Soviet line of the first few days faded fairly quickly. Pressarticles lost their anti-Soviet tones and,l

*Although the Soviets had begun to a irkft rephcement equipment t o the Arabs whilethe mur ws still in progress, aid alone ws fer from enough to reverse the tid e of the war.In the Hor the UAR lost about tuv-thirds of its fighters , four-fifths of it s bombers.andone-half of its tanks; the Syrians lost most of the irkhters and one-fourthof their tanks.The Iraqis and Algerians lost only smll amounts of materiel.**On 9 June Nasir issued his officior resignation. At the same time Cbnmander-in-tXefAmi? and Wm Minister Badmn also submitted their resignations os did 11 otherhh-ranking military commanders. Nasir h ter relmcted hh resignation, but the othersheld.

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me same aay YozNdayev nad nanded Nasu an important message fromthe Soviet government. Possibly this contained promises of further Sovietsupport.*A major move in the Soviet e ffort t o assuage the Arabs was the tour ofSoviet President Podgornyy to A rab capitals in late June. Podgorn yy himselfdescribed the trip as a calming mission. He undoubted ly gave reassurancesof continued support, both military and economic, but the exact amountpromised and th e quid pro quo (if any) were not so clear. It seems likely th atat this tim e th e Soviets committed themselves at least to the replacement ofall Egyptian equipment lost in the war. The Podgornyy-Nasir talks appar-ently were not completely smooth and t i ~ lgreement on all issues was

Podgornyy did return to Moscow before visiting Syria, and his visit toSyria may have been particularly unsatisfactory. T he commu niquC issuedafter this visit was somewhat chillier than those following his trips t o Cairoand Baghdad,** and the Syrians were very upset bythe extent of Soviaynans not to cons ion of hostilities. His promiseof aid to support an eventual resumption of war was said to be offset by a

*In fa ct, Arab resentment nus to continue for a long period;opencriticism stopped,however, bemuse of the need for Soviet aid.. .**The f w m e r orrid simp& that offichltpIks were held and that Podgomyy expressedheartfelt gmtitude fo r the hosp italiv shown him. The others stressed the spirit offriendshipand understanding which prew iled a t the meetings.

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war. He stressed the dangers of a world war which he said would be nuclearand , in a st atem ent not included in a later Moscow Dom estic Service version,said th at every state should refrain from further com plicating the situation.Kosygin the n presented the Soviet Unions dra ft resolut ion whichcontained four provisions:(1 ) Con dem nation of the aggressive actions of Israel and t he con tinuingoccupation by Israel of part of the territory of the U AR, Syria, an dJordan;(2 ) Immed iate and unconditional w ithdrawal of all Israeli forces fromthe occup ied territory t o positions behind t he armistice lines;(3) Restitution in full by Israel of the damages inflicted by its aggres-sion;(4) Immediate effective measures by the UN Security Council toeliminate all consequences of Israels aggression.Kosygin met with President Johnson at Glassboro on 23 and again on25 June, then held a press conference to discuss the meetings. He hinted atSoviet flexibility in his statement that after Israeli withdrawal the SecurityCouncil could consider all other questions arising in the Middle East. TheTASS version of the press conference omitted this stateme nt but said simplythat all other solutions (other than withdrawal) to the crisis were unrealis-tic.* Kosygins formula was to be the basis of the July 1967 Soviet proposal

which never came t o a vote.**SHIFT IN SOVIET TACTICS-TOWARD MODER ATION

Soviets Urge Restraint on ArabsWhile the desire to restore their reputation with the Arabs and toensure against Chinese inroads in the area was stimulating the Soviets tocontinue active support of the radical Arabs, they also had seen the

*See pps. 31-37for discussion of le d e n h ip differences on the Middle East.

**See page 3a

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disastrous results th at policy had helped cause in June. T he Soviets, however,tried t o straddle both sides of the problem. They continued t o supply largequantities of aid-both military and economic-but they also tried t o estab-lish greater control over its use. In addition, they would moderate theirsupport of the radical Arab line.Soviet political restraint reflected an urgent desire t o avoid a repetitionof the June War.The Soviets at the time made it very d ea r to th e Arabs thatthey would not come to their assistance in the event of renewed hostilities.This shift from a somewhat vague to a clear-cut position emerged in earlyJuly. From 10-12 July East European leaders with the exception ofRomanias leaders met in Budapest; their communiqu6 promised continuedaid as well as steps aime d at strengthening th e Arabs defens e potential. It

contained no implied threat of action by the socialist states in the event ofrenewed hostilities. *During this same period the Arab leaders were meeting in Cairo in afutile effort t o plot a comm on course.** The Soviets reportedly sent wordto this little summit that the Arabs should expect no Soviet armedintervention if hostilities were resumed, although aid and diplomatic supp ortwould continue. Only if clear-cut in tervention by t he United Statesoccurred (and this would be determined by the Soviets) would the USSRbecome directly involved. \

*In addition, according to a CPSU document preplved in October 1967 or distributionto delqutes to the November anniversmy celebmtions in Moscow fsee page 51), theconference also decided that a more realistic stand HOS needed on the part of the Arabsand that an immediate step should be to combine demands for immediate Isiueli with -drmool with a fo nn uh fo r terminating the state ofw.**On 1 July Boumediene, Nasir, and Husayn mef inam bu t were reportedly unablet o reach m m e n t o n a common appmach The next dayBoumediene met in DamascuswithS y h eaders, and they issued a statement promising resistance to compromise. A tthis time Husayn wos trying to promote an Arab summit-which w u l d be modemte mapproach The Syrirrns and Algerians wre opposed,and th e U AR w s luctuating. On 23Jury Nasir indicated that the UAR w u l d attend an Arab summit.

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Soviets also proposed a compr omis e plan-if the Arabs would acceptimplicitly the existence of Israel as a state and end the state of belligerence,the USSR would intervene with the United S tates to pressure Israel t o giveup most of the te m tor y occupied during the war.In addition to top-level consultations and communications, numerousmilitary delegations were traveling back and forth in an effort to work outpriorities and conditions for aid. Syria n dissatisfaction wi th Soviet aidoffers had been indicated after Podgornyys visit to that country early inJuly. Toward the end of that month Egyptian disappointment began toshow. When Egyptian Chief of Staff Riyad visited Moscow in late July, theSoviets reportedly presented a counterproposal to his, offering less than theEgyptians had expected. Riyad reportedly indicated that the Soviets were

not prepared to do more than replace what had been lost. He said that theSoviets supported the expulsion of Israel from Sinai but would not supporta war to destroy Israel. Another source reported that the Soviets promisedonly enough t o enable the UAR to defend itself.Reports of conditions demanded by the Soviets in return fo r aid havevaried. Some sources have state d th at the Soviets agreed t o replace lostmaterial with no strings. But it is clear that they were pressing for somethings in exchange for aid.The most obvious condition demanded and agreed upon was thestationing of Soviet advisors in th e Arab armed forces. Soviet advisors beganarriving almost immediately in the UAR. They arrived somewhat later inSyria and Algeria, possibly reflecting earlier unhappy Syrian reaction to

Podgornyys visit. I l h s tated that by late

*Soviet First Deputy Defense Minister Znkharov nus n Gzirofrom20 June to I July.Lute in June the Algerkzn Defm se Minister mer with Brezhnev and Gredtko.and in earlyJtdy Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Pavlovskiy spent several weeks in Algeria. Sovietmilitary delegations also amved in Syria short& after t h e w . On 14 3Ury Crechkometwth a UAR military delegation led by Chief of Staff Rba d and h e n July SovietPolitburo member Maziuov met wirh Imqi and S dz ne se military delcgations.

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June about 100 Soviet officers had already been attached to the UAR rm yat brigade level and had already caused dissension in the UAR military.* Inlate June Nasir told7hat:I IFor the first time Soviet advisors have been integrated into the organic structure ofthe UAR Arm y at the lowest level. I amsow about this but I had to do it.The seoond Soviet condition most frequently reported was the acquisi-tion of naval facilities in the Mediterranean. Such facilities are essential tothe maintenance by the Soviets of a sizable fleet in the Mediterranean, andthe Soviets demonstrated in 1967 their fitm intention of becoming andremaining a Mediterranean power.+* At the same time Soviet condemnationof Western bases in the area made their own acquisition of bases anembarrassing proposition. Hence, their demands may have centered on theuse of facilities rather than their acquisition. Nasir, in talks with Husayn inearly July, said that he was prepared to sign a defense pact with the Sovietsgiving them whatever bases in the UAR they needed. This statement issomewhat suspect, however, as it smacks of a Nasir effort to push the West(which he may well have assumed would receive this information) into

*On 29 June about 20 mjors and colonels were reportedly pensioned off after theyvoiced disapproval of the amval ofSoviet officers.This action M S reportedly reversed byNasir in early July and about 50 pensioned officers were reinstated.

**The Soviets began building up their Meditevanean fleet shortly after the w r . In lateJune they sent their first landing ships through the Bosporus into theMeditenunean. andin midJulyMoscow took overdirect communications with its wrs hip s there. During theyear th e size of he Sov iet fleet continued togrow.

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reports that Nasir had rejected requests by Podgornyy and Zakharov

More Flexible UN PostureIn addition to modifying their policy of supporting the Arabs by urgingrestraint and imposing conditions on aid, the Soviets, in July, began movingtoward a more flexible stance at the UN. Their position, as reflected by the10-12 July Budapest Conference, was th at a more realistic Arab position wasneeded and that demands for immediate Israeli withdrawal should be sup-plemented with a formula fo r terminating the state of w ar.Having made their propaganda points with the Arabs, the Soviets

dropped the hard-line resolution proposed by Kosygin on 19 June and gavetheir support to a nonaligned nations resolution sponsored by Yugoslavia;this draft was somew hat m ore mo derate than th at of the Soviets. While itcalled for the immediate withdrawal of all troops behind the armistice linewith UN supervision, it did n o t demand condem nation of Israel, did n o t callfor reparations, and d i d suggest that after withdrawal had occurred theSecurity Council might consider all aspects of the situation in the area. Inaddition, it requested that the Secretary General designate a personal

*Nasirs deviousness is reflected in wrious other reports. He used Chinese offm ofassistance. fo r exam ple, t o ny to obtain further comm itments from the Soviets. me factthat China had made offers uus, according toone source, supposed to leak to the Soviets,as MS the fact that Nasu had Ejected the offer-at leust for the time being.- reported that fuvs of Chinese movement into the area hzd added ithe Soviet poshwr aid progmm

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representative to work for compliance. On 3 July Grom yko praised theresolution and condemned any other approach. However, the draft failed topass in a vote on 4 July 1967.*In mid-July the Soviets indicated their willingness to compromise still

Israeli withdrawal, they did not put withdrawal and ending the state ofbelligerency on the same level. Rather they called for Israeli withdrawalunder UN supervision and f or referral of th e Arab-Israeli questio n t o theSecurity Council, which would be enjoined to decide on issues concerningtermination of the state of belligerency, free passage through internationalwaterways, and the refugee problem.

Inat tn e Egyptians ana lraqis naa agreed t o the Soviet draftr, Boumediene and the Syrians issued a statement on 12July promising to resist any compromise. The Soviets were unable to changeBoumediene's mind when he visited Moscow in mid-July, and the radicalArabs prevailed. The USSR never presented its draft and on 21 July theGeneral Assembly's emergency session was adjourned.no

Thu s t he Soviets had cornered them selves by restricting their freedomto maneuver in the UN. Their initial call for a General Assembly sessionreflected their desire for a public propaganda forum. In Ju ly, when they had

*The emergency UNSC ession considered seven & aft resolutions and adopted two-allothers fai lins to gain the required two-thirdsmajority. The US dmft. which along withthe Soviet draft failed to pss, crrlled for negotiated amangements with thid pmtyassistance based on five principles: mutwl recognitwn o f the political independence andtdtorial integriry of all counmks in the a m ; e c w k d boundaries to accompanydisengagement and withdmuzl; rcadom of innocent muritime passage;a just solution o fthe refugee problem.recognition of the right o f all sovereign nations to exist in peuceands ecun '~ ~ .he h u ~esolutions which were pssed called for adoption o f humanitmianprinciples and fo r Israel to take no action to alter the s ta tus of Jerusalem.

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become more serious in their efforts to work out a compromise UN resolu-tion, they were trapped by the fact that in the General Assembly, whereeach Arab nation had a vote, in order to push their resolution through theywould have had to actively and pu blicly oppose the radical Arabs.They were still unwilling to do this. Their exasperation was voiced byseveral high-level Soviet figures in late July.

~ Also in late Ju ly , in his meeting with Italian Communists, PonomJrev criticized the Arabs ferociously, calling them fanatical andirrational.CROSS CURRENTS IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIPDURING THE CRISIS

While the war had produced severe, if momentary, strains in theSoviet-Arab alliance, it also produced pressures in Soviet internal politics. Atone point even the performance of the t op leaders in crisis came under anapparent attack. That attack appears to have echoed the views of an elementwhich was critical of the cautiousness of official policy moves in the crisis.Both during and after the crisis, such a view remained outside the consensusin the leadership-in fact was firmly rejected by it. However, within theconsensus which opposed direct involvement in the crisis but favored con-tinued support of the Arabs, differences over the extent of such aid in th efuture as well as more or less flexible positions concerning a diplomaticsettlement of the conflict were discernible. Not only the difficult Arabs butthe lack of complete unanimity within the top Soviet echelons was acomplicating fac tor in Soviet policy-making.Th e Yegorychev Affair

The activist viewpoint, which r was in fact consideredby some leaders but was arscaraea, cauea IO limited military riskand cautiously challenging the United States in the crisis. Whether or notsuch a view was advanced in the Politburo d uring the heat of th e crisis whenthat body met in frequent session, it may have been raised by Moscow partychief Yegorychcv when he spoke to the Central Committee plenum con-voked after the June War to endorse the Politburos actions in the crisis.Accord ing-to some -reports, he criticized the leadership for a lack of forceful-ness in the crisis, and though he subsequently suffered for his temerity by

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losing his post, it seems unlikely that he would have raised his voice if therehad been no sup por t f or his views at th e highest levels. In any case, a policyof calculated risk was shunned by the consensus that emerged in thePolitburo during th e crisis.While a more aggressive view m ay have had some sup por ters within th ePolitburo itself, the evidence contains little direct indication as to who theymight have been. Shelepin, of course, is one suspect since Yegorychev, whovoiced the criticism of leaderships crisis actions at the June plenum,can becounted a mem ber o f the coterie arou nd th is leader. How ever, there weresigns that the militant view had sup porters amon g elements on the peripheryof th e inner-leadership, especially am ong th e military. For example, R e d Starwas one of the few Soviet organs which openly defended the UARs closure

of the Straits of Tiran (28 Jun e) and w as particularly insistent in it s calls forthe immediate and unconditional withdrawal of lsraeli forces from occu piedterritories. Fu rther , it was close to a month after th e war before any Sovietmilitary leader explicitly endorsed Soviet handling of the crisis. Only on 5July did D efense Minister Grechk o d o so-the day Brezhnev also presented avigorous public defense of Politburo policy in the crisis.Brezhnevs speech on 5 July bore all the earmarks of a general apologiafor Soviet Middle East policy, past, present, and f utu re. Th is was his firstpost-war speech and probably was designed to counter both foreign-particularly Arab -and intern al criticism. He first tried to counter argumentsthat a more assertive policy should have been followed in the crisis. Heinsisted on the correctness of Moscows energetic moves to sto p Israeland pro tect A rab interests. He then moved on to defend the continuing

strong Soviet support for the Arabs; while careful to say-in line withPolitburo p olicy-that the struggle in the present phase was political, heemphasized the demand for Israeli withdrawal from occupied lands andpointed to the material aid the USSR was rendering the Arabs. Whilealluding to efforts a t resolving the crisis in the UN, he dwelt on the purposeof Podgornyys missions to the UAR, Syria and Iraq; namely, strengtheningties and coordinating common action in the defense of Arab interests. Thespeech contained little hint of any interest in promoting a compromisesettlement in th e area. In general the speech seemed to be a defense ofMoscows pro-Arab policy. From the perspective of Soviet internal politic s itappeared to reflect Brezhnevs awareness of the danger of an alliance ofmilitary* and p art y elements joining together in opposition to official policyin the mid-East.The speech wasdelivered to P gmduating military clnss.

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Tliz danger was already implicit in the Yegorychev affair. Yegorychev,the Moscow party chief and thus a preem inent figure among the partysmiddle-level executives, launched his criticism of official policy when tw o ofits prime promoters and agents, Podgornyy and Kosygin, were away fromhome implementing th at policy, the first in Cairo and the second in NewYork at the UN . This left Brezhnev, the third of the triumvirate in charge ofexecuting the adopted poljcy in Moscow, to bear the brunt of this evidentlyunexpected attack.1 . - - . - -- . 71ne precise content 01 me r egorycnev criticism r e m m s unclear .

*A similar criticism-but from figuws linked with refon mther than hard-linepositions-ws discernible in a 17 June Fhn& article by Rumyantsb. Bwlatskiy undBestruzhev. This article while devoted to the need for more intensive study of broodsocial ond political t rends contoined o pofnted call for better politid predictionsespecially with regard to pmpectsof developing intemationol tehtion s. Th egkuingm e n point- the lead u p to and outbreak of the Arab -Im eli wpr-could scarcelyfail tocome o mind in an informed reader.

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equipment and that further improvement of military preparedness de-pended to a great extent on the practical activity of the military itself.Further, the introduction of a Soviet naval force into the Mediterranean inthe wake of t he crisis served, among oth er things however belatedly, t o coverthe leaders flank against charges of passivity in crisis situations.I n any case, Brezhnev administered a severe rebuff to Yegorychev byrelegating him to a lesser post-presumab ly as an objec t lesson to any whoassumed his policy or leadership was easily challengeable-and obtain ed anexpress stamp of approval from the Central Committee and the Moscowparty organization among othe rs for the Politburos actions during the crisis.Indeed, the display of his organizational power was essential to Brezhnevsimmediate prestige and authority. Brezhnevs elaborate defense of policy in

the crisis in the 5 July speech also mirrored his awareness of th e danger of anerosion of his authority resulting from-publicity within the regime of theview that the leadership was not sufficiently forceful in foreign affairs.Fur ther, it is possible tha t the main motive behind th e Yegorychev foray wasto undermine confidence in the leadership; Brezhnevs rapid response sueceeded in rebuffing this attempt.Th e Poli tbur o Consensus and Differences Within I t

The quick disposal of Yegorychev underlined the agreement am ong thetop figures in the Politburo on the need for caution and strict avoidance ofany direct Soviet involvement in the military side of the conflict. Theevidence contains strong indications that the latter view was unanimouslyheld by the four ranking members of the Politburo: Brezhnev, Podgornyy,Suslov, and Kosygin.

For example, both Brezhnev and Suslov during the wars early stagewere critical of Nasir in remarks to visiting delegations. Brezhnev stressed.that the USSRs first aim was to avoid world war and if it had only thesmallest alternative to war it would choose it. Further,Ihe Middle East crisis and to ok Nasir to task for complaining th at th eSoviets were n ot supplying him enough weapons. Suslov said tha t Nasir hadpursued shortsighted and provocative policies prior to the crisis, that theUSSR bore no responsibility for the military defeat of the Arabs, and thatthe only course open to the Arabs was to secure an immediate peace. Hestated that the USSR could only assist them to the latter goal and that theUSSR would n ot interfere o r intervene directly in th e region in opposition tothe United Nations.he was quite undisturbed and uncritical regarding t34


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Both Kosygin and Podgornyy indicated their commitme nt t o a peacefulresolution of the crisis. Further, the tenor of Kosygins statements andactivities at the UN and Glassboro and Brezhnevs treatment of Podgornyy asa confidant regarding the Yegorychev affair deepens the impression thatthese figures were working in close conc ert to minimize the effects of th eArab setback.Yet within this area of agreement at least two diverging positions werevisible as well as differing nuances in the views expressed by individualfigures. The differences suggest that policy in the crisis was formulated by acoalition rather than by a coterie of like-minded men. For, on the one hand,Kosygin seemed to represent a more flexible position than his colleagueswith regard to seeking a major political settlement in the Middle East, while

Brezhnev, and even more distinctly Podgornyy, assumed less flexible pos-tures o n a postw ar settlement. The latter seemed m ore intent o n refurbishingthe Soviet image as the Arabs champion and restoring them to their prewarpositions than on altering the basic conditions that had helped produce thewar. It should be noted, however, that these views reflected the differentforums to which these men were speaking-Kosygin to an internationalaudience, Podgornyy to the Arabs, and Brezhnev to party and militarygroups. However, their views were compatible with the differing outlookseach had displayed earlier.I Ireported th at Kosygin even thre atened to resign at onepoint as. a result of his disagreement with oth er Politburo members. T ha t hemay have represented a position of greater flexibility than the other leaderswas suggested by the conciliatory shadings of his statemen ts during his UN

trip in contrast to the uniformly harsh-toned. anti-Israeli, anti-Western prop-aganda in Soviet media. Inde ed, passages in Kosygins sta tem ent s whichcould be interpre ted as conciliatory were excised from Soviet press accoun ts.Editorial trimming of such passages was evident, for example, in Kosygins25 Jun e statement tha t a fter an Israeli withdrawal all oth er questions arisingin the Middle East could be considered by th e Security Council.Any hints of a softening of Soviet demands regarding a Middle Eastsettlement or of the possibility of compromise were absent from Brezhnevsmajor speech on S July. He also did not reiterate Kosygins support at theUN of Israels right to exist as an element of Soviet policy. no r the Premiersreference t o t he responsibility of the great powers t o contrib ute to peace in

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the Middle East.* Similarly, the Central Co mm ittee resolution which, ineffect, approved Brezhnevs unpublished report to the plenum also omittedthese points. In other respects, however, the resolution paralleled the mainlines of Kosygins UN speech-though, as might be expected, defining Sovietpolicy positions in a more thoroughgoing ideological form. Similarly,Podgornyy in a conversation IHe in dicate d th at he was no t sure a compromis! was possible, tho ugh he saida peaceful solution was necessaqr. He emphasized that aggression could notbe rewarded and that Israels withdrawal from occupied Arab territories wasthe precondition of any negotiations. That this position may have been adiplomatic stance rather than ironclad policy was at least suggested whenot to take w hat the Arabs and theomprom ises were necessary. Yet,in a conversation in late July, Kosyginilitarily in the MiddleEast was out of the qu estion fro m the Soviet viewpoint and th at a peacefulsolution, preferably in the UN , must be found. Thus, the relatively con-sistent difference in emphasis between Kosygin and his two colleaguesemerges in the available evidence and suggests that he was an advocate of amore flexible policy designed t o increase chances for a political settlem ent inthe Middle East.

ssumed an intransigent tone. too mefarrp ana rn

While detailed evidence on the views of other P~litburc~leveligures onMiddle East policy during the crisis period is scanty, one notable m oderate-sounding voice emerged in th e Central C omm ittee Secretariat. T h e audienceto which it was addressed probably in part accounts for i ts tenor. In lateJuly, in his meeting with Italian Communists, party secretary Ponomarevexpressed sharp criticisms of the Arabs for refusing Moscows counsels ofrestraint before the war and for taking such unilateral actions as closing thegulf. He charged tha t th e A rab governments were fanatic and irrational, andthat Moscow was forced to give aid to Nasir as he was the mo st reasonable ofthe Arab leaders; he was particularly critical of Boumediene, a view a pparently not previously held by Brezhnev, who in early June had stated that

*Kosyginf assertion of Ismels right to exist ws implicit in the statement that everypeople had the right t o establish an independent state of it s own. LikeBrezhnev. otherleaders did not mention this right w ith reference to the Middle East, though presumab lyrecognition of Israels right to statehood has remained a prom ise of Soviet policy.

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Boumediene was the most reasonable of the A rab leaders. Ponomarev com-plained that the Arabs were bleeding the socialist states and criticized theEgyptians for keeping the Suez closed. He was quite pessimistic, stating thatthe cease-fire had left the crisis unresolved and the S oviets did n ot k now howit could be resolved; he expressed alarm that the situation might lead to adirect confrontation among the great powers.In sum, it would appear that during the crisis a perhaps uneasy con-sensus existed, based on th e desire to kee p losses to a minimum and avoidany direct involvement in the conflict. While some leaders may have urgedstronger action than was in fact taken, support for such a course seems tohave been slight. However, once the actual crisis had passed the differenceson Middle East policy surfaced-most explosively in the Yegorychev atta ck.

A consensus approach again prevailed, aimed at preserving with minimal lossthe Soviet role as champion of Arab interests. However, on one side of theconsensus may have been a hard-line, activist position, and on the other amore moderate one. Differences over the extent of commitment t o be madeto the Arabs most probably have persisted. These countertrends within theleadership probably have been partly responsible for the schizophreniccourse of Soviet conduct since the war; they also suggest a potential forchange in Soviet Middle East policy.SOVIETSSHIFT SUPPORT FROM SYRIANS TO EGYPTIANS

Moscow Endorses Nasirs Postwar MovesSoviet policy underwent a gradual, hesitant shift away from the radical

Arab position toward the Egyptians in the months immediately followingthe June war. During this process Soviet policy makers experienced repeatedfrustration both because of the imperviousness of the Syrian radicals andtheir Arab abettors to any notion of compromise politics in the UN an dbecause of their own self-imposed inhibition against pressuring the radicalsto the point where they might turn in anger against Moscows sponsorship.Despite the part hasir had played in precipitating the June war, he was byway of contrast less fanatical than the Syrians and the more amenable toSoviet counsel and admonition. In fact, after the shock of the Arab defeathad lessened and Nasir had survived the crisis of his own leadership, Moscowdid not hesitate to aim public criticism at the Egyptian failures and byindirection at Nasir himself in press articles in late June. T he Soviets wereeven more explicit in their criticismsimpatience with Arab hotheadedness i n d r e te r r~ng 0

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as case in point . Evidence th at Nasir had been chastened-at least tempo-rarily-by his experien ce and saw the need for political flexibility was firs treflected in his decision in mid-July to attend an Arab summit meeting.Since the meeting was endorsed by the conservative Arabs and boycotted bythe radicals, the decision marked a shift away from his prewar alliance withthe Syrians. Nasirs decision to side with the conservative Arabs was un-doubtedly tied to an effort to find sources of relief for the UARs criticaleconomic situation. Loss of revenue from the closing of Suez as well as thegeneral dislocation caused by t he war had created a monet ary crisis and Nasirneeded m oney. A t th e conference, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Libya join tlyagreed to provide the UAR and Jordan with quarterly aid payments, inexchange for which these three nations were to resume oil shipments to theUnited States. Th e conference rejected the c on ti nu e- td gh t policy recom-mended by Syria (which refused to attend the conference), Algeria, and thePalestine Liberation Organization, and gave Nasir and Husayn a mandate toseek a political settlement; it termed a Yugoslav compromise proposalreasonable.*

*In mid-August Tito had visited the LIAR. Syria, and Iraq in an effort to win Am bsupport fo r his proposal. This five-point plan did not include a nonbelligerency clause asNasir had said, indicating that Nasir wyls prepared to go further in compromise than theTito p b n . As published in Tanyug on 16 September i t s provisions were:1. The pullback of all troops from temtories occupied since 4 June, with UNobserverson hand.2. A UN Security Council or big-four powerguamntee of the security and frontiersof all countries in the area until a final olution ws found.3. Free passage through the Strait of Timn pending a ruling by the InternationalCourt o f Justice.4. Restomtion of all forces b t Suez on the eve o f 5 June.5. A s soon as the above ws done, the UNSC w u l d t ake steps to resolve other .issues.

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In th e first week of Sep temb er Moscow som ewh at belatedly voiced itsapproval of the Khartoum conference. At the same time Soviet propagandachanged it s tune on Middle East issues. As la te as 31 August Soviet prop-aganda continued to echo the hard line taken in Pravda an d Izvestiya early inthe month. Radio Peoce and Progress carried a report urging continuedembargo of US oil, withdrawal of Arab currency from Western banks,and ageneral boycott of the West. Also Moscow had been critical of the idea of anArab summit prior t o Nasirs announcement of his decision to support theKhartoum summit on 23 J ~ l y .Now Pravdo endorsed the Khartoum conference on 5 September as astep forward in Arab unity; it said that the view held by various Arabs thatthe resumption of war was the only way out had been replaced by a more

sober approach. Radio Peace and Progress. on the same day, noted theabsence of the Syrian leaders who consider military operations the mainmeth od but said that the Syrians had agreed to support all positivemeasures drafted in Khartoum. Pruvdo an d Izvestiya now praised theresumption of oil shipments to the United States as a necessary source ofArab revenue. N o v o y e V r e m y a in Septem ber called th e Syrian and Algerianadvocacy of continu ous struggle unrealistic, an d praised the Egy ptian publicfor reacting favorably to suggestions that the slogan of destruction of Israelbe dropped. The article held out hope for settlement by saying that theKhartoum conference had rejected direct nego tiations at the present stage,thereby leaving open the possibility t ha t this might change.The Soviet decision to change the propaganda line evidently came afterNasirs own switch to support of Khartoum and somewhat tardily. Despite

the delays, the Soviets had taken a major step in their policy of supportingthe less militant Arab line. Each step in this direction cost the Sovietsinfluence in the more radical Arab camp, and each.step was made reluc-tantly. A public Soviet position on the summit conference was necessary,and , as the radical Arabs vigorously oppo sed the conference w hile Nasirsupported it, a Soviet position was bound to alienate one or the other. Thefear of a renewed war and ano ther setback was consistently pushing theSoviets toward the m oderate Arab line and aw ay from their previous support for the radicals.Soviets Urge Restraint o n Syria

Pravda s endorsement of the Khartoum summit registered Moscowsreadiness to su ppo rt the relatively mod erate p osition now assumed by Nasirand t o criticize the more radical Arabs in public. Th e Soviet policy of urging

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Egyptian-Syrian unity before the war had helped to push Nasir towardgreater militancy with disastrous results. Now the Soviets were prepared tomake clear their support for a more rational Arab line and to risk alienatingth e Syrians as a result. Their efforts to pull the Syrians in that direction metwith n o success.

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The arguments used by the Soviets clearly indicated

Documents

Caesar 49 - Soviet Policy and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War