Caesar 20 - The Ties That Bind: Soviet Intrabloc Relations

8/4/2019 Caesar 20 - The Ties That Bind: Soviet Intrabloc Relations

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APPROVED-TOR RELEASE , .,DATE: J U N 2007

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29 July 1958oCI N o . 1960/58COPY No9

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SOVIET STAFF STUDYTHE TI E THAT B I N D S - SOVIET INTRABLOC RELATIONSFeb 1956 to Dec 1957

(Reference 'titles: CAESAR V I - A and VII-58)

Office of Current IntelligenceCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATESWITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,TITLE 18,USC, SECTIONS 93 AND 794,THETRANSMIS-SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TOAN UNAUTHO RIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.


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SUMMARY INDEXPage

. ' I v'$ .4JIntroduction .......................................... 1

I . STALIN'S DEATH AND THE NEW LOOK IN THE BLOC. :(1993-1956) ...................................... 2

# -* IOrigins of the radical reversal of Soviet blocpolicy from extreme centralism under Stalin to severedecentralization following the 20th Soviet party congress.

Economic Relaxation ............................t

Moscow disengages itself from the mechanics ofday-to-day planning while retaining over-all controlof the satellite economies. The last of the stockcompanies are dissolved, and the USSR take steps todecrease the dependence of the satellites on Sovietaid.Political Relaxation ............................Moves taken to foster an illusion of satelliteindependence and sovereignty. Eastern Europe imi-tates the USSR. Liberalization gives rise to pop-ular criticism of Communist regimes and the firstovert display of dissatisfaction over Soviet domina-

tion in East Germany.First Steps Toward Belgrade ....................Khrushchev and Bulganin attempt a rapproche-ment with Tito in May 1955 and recognize as validthe Yugoslav doctrine of "different roads to so-cialism. 'Effects of the Interregnum .....................Eastern $urope--Moscow's Pandora's box. Short-Effectsightedness of Soviet leaders in retrospect.of 1i.beralization at the start of 1956.

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PageChina (1953-195s) ................................ - 4MOSCOW'S debt to Peiping in 1953. The SovietsPeipingccept Chinals place in the Communist sun.is givRn a free hand in qkia.and Mikoyan visit Peiping in tribute to Chinese pres-tige'and extend long-term economic assistance to Mao.The Kremlin recognizes Communist China as "coleader"

0% the bloc in February 1955. Peiping postpones itsTLiwan ambitions as a concession to Moscow. Soviet-Chinese relations are undisturbed at the start of 1956.

Khrushchev, Bulganin,

11. THE 20TH PARTY CONGRESS: ITS PURPOSE AND ITSRESULTS (FEB-OCT'19s6) .......................... 6Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia is cemented

The 20th congress fails to unify the blocKhrushchev theses as presented to' heby a broad economic agreement on the eve of the con-gress.ideologically,congress.viet foreign policy and pledges Soviet friendship toall socialist parties of the non-Communist world.Khrushchev's secret 8-hour polemic against Stalinbrands orthodoxy as sinful.

Molotov admits past inflexibility of So-

Satellite Reaction to 20th Congress ............. 8Satellite Communist leaders sense impending tri-umph of liberal factions in national Communist par-ties. Failure of the congress to fix the nature andlimits of change results in a policy gacuum in Eastern

Europe.Yugoslav Reaction to 20th Congress .............. 8Yugoslav position is upheld by the congress.Belgrade warmly endorses 20th congress resolutionsbut privately admits astonishment at the magnitudeof Stalin denunciation.Effect of 20th Congress in Satellite Parties...., 9"National Communists" gain new influence inthe satellite parties.of Nagy grows in Hungary. Large bloc of Polish cen-

tral committee members demands the return of Gomulkato the politburo. "Stalinist" Bierut dies, and newparty secretary Ochab allows the official regime

Pressure for reinstatement

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Pagenewspaper t o a i r K h r u s h c h e v ' s i n d i c t m e n t of S t a l i nf o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n p u b l i c . B u l g a r i a a n d Cze ch-o s l o v a k i a unmask " S t a l i n i s t s " i n A p r i l . P o l i s hp a r t y t@es o n l y t o k e n s t q p s t o c u r b freedom ofexpress ' ion.. 9

Cominform Dissolved ............................... 10' Communis t " i n fo rm at io n bureau" had become a ne m b a r r a s s i n g r e m i n d e r t o Khrushchev a nd T i t o of 1948r u p t u r e of r e l a t i o n s . B e t t e r o r g a n i z a t i on s f o r han-r n g b l o c b u s i n e s s had rendered t h e Corninform obso l e t e .P ro pa ga nd a v a l u e o f t h e d i s s o l u t i o n r e c o g n i z e d by b o t hS o v i e t U nio n a n d t h e West.

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S a t e l l i t e s C o n t i n u e L i b e r a l i z a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 11R e a c t i o n t o " S t a l i n i s m " i s w i d es p r ea d i n t h es a t e l l i t e s b y s p r i n g 1956. E v e n i d e o l o g i c a l l y r i g i dregimes make t o k e n c o n c e s s i o n s t o 2 0 t h c o n g r e s s doc-t r i n e . USSR announces a t roop c u t i n E a s t Germany.Y u g os l a v -S o v ie t R e l a t i o n s B l o s s o m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11T i t o v i s i t s Moscow i n J un e 1956 t o cement agree-ment of p r e v i o u s y e a r . B a s i c i d e o lo g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e semerge c l e a r l y a s K hru shc he v a n d T i t o f a i l t o agree onwhe the r Yugos lav ia i s a g a i n a m e m b e r of t h e bloc.ference communique i s a p a t e n t c o n c e s s i o n t o Yugoslavi d e o l o g y , t h e f o r e r u n n e r o f f u t u r e a g r e e m en t s be tw ee n

Soc ia l i s t and Communis t p a r t i e s : W s t e r n sou rce sees T i t o ' sw i l l i n g n e s s t o v o l u n t a r i l y " l i n e up i n t h e S o v i e t c olumn"a p o t e n t i a l l y n e g a ti v e f a c t o r i n f u t u r e Western r e l a -t i o n s w i t h Yugoslavia . Impor tance wh ich Kreml in a t t a ch e st o good r e l a t i o n s w i t h T i t o i n d i c a t e d by Molotov o u s t e r .

Con-

Rakosi O u s t e d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12P a r t y first s e c r e t a r y of t h e H u n ga r ia n p a r t y w a sa n u n r e co n s t ru c t e d " S t a l i n i s t " s t a n d i n g i n f i r m oppos i -t i o n t o "T i to i sm.??t h e H u ng a ri a n p a r t y . S u s lo v p r o b a bl y served him a n u l -t im at um i n J u n e p r e s a g i n g h i s d em o ti o n i n J u l y .t h e new f i r s t s e c r e t a r y , a p o l o g i z e s t o t h e Y ug os l av s f o r

" s l a n d e r s " of t h e p a s t . L i b e r a l f a c t i o n of t h e Hungar ianp a r t y c o n t i n u e s t o press f a c t i o n a l s t r u g g l e f o r p a r t yc o n t r o l t h r o u g h ou t summer a nd e a r l y f a l l of 1956.

Rakosi w a s no l o n ge r i n c o n t r o l ofGero,

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PagePoznan R i o t s . . . . . . ................................ 13D i b t u r ba n c e s i n Polaid d r i v e a wedge between t h eM olot ov a n d Kh ru sh ch ev f a c t i o n s i n t h e S o v i e t h i e r a r c h y .K h r u s h c h e v t h e s i s on l i b e r a l i z a t i o n is u p h e l d b y a res-o l u t i o n on 30 J un e, j u s t i f y i n g t h e d e n i g r a t i o n of S t a l i na n d d e n y i n g $ h e e x i s t e n c e of a c r i s i s i n i n t e r n a t i o na lcommunism,i n c i t e s t h e Poles s t i l l f u r t h e r . The S o v i e t leadersblame t h e worker r i o t s o n " We st er n a g e n t s " ; t h e P o l i s hp a r t y ' s c e n t r a l committee c o n f i rm s t h e l e g i t i m a c y o fworkers' g r i e v a n c e s .

Tobr of Pola nd by Khrushchev and Bulg anin

,Belgrade R e f l e c t s B l o c C r i s i s . . . . . . . . .............. 15B e l g r a d e c o n t i n u e s t o h a i l s a t e l l i t e i ndependenceas rumors c i r c u l a t e of t h e S o v i e t c e n t r a l c o m mi t te e 'swarn ing t o t he Eu ropean s a t e l l i t e s a g a i n s t i m i t a t i o n oft he Yugos lav "road." K hr us hc he v f l i e s t o B e l g r a d e w i t h -o u t w a rn i ng i n S ep te mb er a n d u r g e s T i t o t o w i t h h o l d s u p -p o r t f r o m t h e b l o c ' s " r e v i s i o n i s t " s t a t e s . T i t o r e t u r n st o C r i m e a w i t h K hr us hc he v f o r c o n f e r e n c e s w i t h S o v i e t p r e -s i d i u m , and H u n g a r i a n p a r t y boss Gero. Belgrade's Borbas i g n a l s f a i l u r e of t a l k s .European s a t e l l i t e s . T i t o c o n t i n u es t o woo t h e E a s tThe Lid B l o w s O f f . . . . . . . . . ......................... 17T h e P o l i s h October . Gomulka rega ' ins par ty c o n t r o land d e f i e s S o v i e t i n te r f e r e n c e i n i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . Pol-ish p a r t y c l i n g s t o a l l i a n c e w i t h USSR a s " i n d i s p e n s a b l e

' p r e r e q u i s i t e of t h e P o l i s h r o a d to soc ia l i sm." C at ho l i cChur c h reaches working agreement w i t h t h e new regime.MOSCOW'S R e a c t i o ns t o P o l a n d .. ..................... 17K hr us hc he v c a u g h t by s u r p r i s e . T he S o v i e t pressd i s p l a y s i n d e c i s i o n o v e r p r o p e r a t t i t u d e t o w a r d P o l i s he v e n t s . A Western Source i n Moscow d i sc lo ses MOSCOW'Sd e c i s i o n t o make t h e b e s t of t h e s i t u a t i o n .

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Hungary Revolts .................................... .Page18

Gdro's speech extolling Soviet Union touches offa spon'taneous uprising. l'Deviationistll m e Nagy sweptback into power. Revolt directed against communism it-self. Nagy promises multiparty system, withdrawal fromtKe Warsaw Pac,t and neutralization of Hungary. Suslovand Mikoyan arrive in Budapest on 31 October. The mythof independence in the satellites comes to an end.30 October 1956 Declaration ...................... 19The USSR's declaration on the satellites is themost definitive since the 20th congress. Moscow declares

its intention of playing a more active role in bloc af-fairs in effort to re-establish unity. "Liberalization"defended as correct. Moscow admits "outright mistakes"in past dealings with bloc countries. All satellites toremain on equal status with U S S R , provided that they main-tain "continuing bonds of interest" with one another andwith the Soviet Union. Eventual withdrawal of Soviettroops from the satellites is held possible.a Soviet attempt to reassert control in bloc and salvagelost prestige and influence before world.Document

The End of the Rebellion ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20A l l bloc countries recognize Kadar regime. Pei-

ping hails Soviet military intei-vention in Hungary asthe "second liberationff f the country. Few detailsof the revolt are available in the bloc.New Problems to Be Faced.......................... 20Soviet Union placed reliance on a "hard core" oforthodox Communist leaders in 1956 attempt to sponsor''liberalization" in the satellites. Policy details wereleft to local party cadres. The satellite parties be-came engrossed in internal disputes and factional strifeand failed to agree, even individually, on meaning andpractical application of "liberalization." Moscow under-estimated anti-Soviet opinion and overestimated the abil-

ity of Communist politicians in the satellites.of overtures toward Yugoslavia left a powerful, rivalforce free to subvert the satellites from a position ofcomparative sanctuary.Failure

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Page111. THE RETURN TO ORTHODOXY (NOV 1956 - NOV 1957) . . . . . 21I . '

& t e r the Polish a nd Hungarian debacles, So-viet %astern European policy was directed primarilyat the re-establishment of bloc stability. Subor-dination of national interests to those of the USSRwas called fol;. A new policy combining political re-pression and economic concession began to emerge.Soviet policy occupied a position midway between"Stalinism" and 20th congress reformism.Repression in Hungary ............................. 22,Kadar abandons hope of ruling by popular consent.General strikesungary again becomes a police state.and sporadic armed resistance continue into December, butthe revolt has been crushed.Stabilization in Poland .......................... 22Internal freedom marks the atmosphere in Poland,The Polish press attacks Soviet actions in Hungary andaccuses present Soviet leadership of sharing guilt forthe uprising with Stalin.government delegation to Moscow on 14 November to reg-ularize relations with the Soviet Union. 18 Novembercommuniqu6 grants Poland political and economic conces-s i ons in return for Gomulka's promise,to keep Poland inthe bloc.disposition toward pragmatism.

Gomulka leads a party and

The agreement again demonstrates Khrushchev'sPeiping Warns M Q S C O W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23Chinese regime's official press organ counselsU S S R on 21 November against the possibility of fu turemistakes in the "proper relations between socialistcountries." Peiping calls "great-nation chauvinism"the chief stumbling block to good relations betweenmembers of the Communist camp.Yugoslavia Reacts... .............................. 24Moscow deliberately stalemates relations with Bel-grade in November 1956 in an effort to isolate ideo-logically the "Yugoslav virus" in Eastern Europe. Titofights back and accuses Soviet collective leadership of

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Pagelack of progress beyond the negative condemnationof the .':cult of Stalin." ..The Yugoslav leader dis-closes,qthe failure of his'september conferences withSovie6 presidium members. Pravda castigates Titofor "meddling" in another party's affairs.. 'PoliticFl Stick and Economic.Carrot . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Increased hostility toward local Communist par-ties reported in the satellites as the regimes simul-taneously tighten political controls and relax eco-nomic restrictions. Terror increases in Rumania andBulgaria. "Soft-liqe'' economic policies dictated asmuch by Soviet self-interest as by the state of unrestin the bloc. All East European countries announce con-sumer concessions in the months following October.

Mosc,ow's New Conservatism................... . . . . . .Khrushchev admits in December that 20th congressfdecisions might 'have contributed to turmoil in thebloc, and promises a special plenum of the central com-mittee to "adapt" the decisions. At the end of 1956Poland alone remains an unorthodox satellite. Gomulkacontinues to withhold recognition of the USSR as ideo-logical leader of the bloc, and persists in the liberal-ization of Polish society. Moscow sets about the polit-ical isolation of Poland as a Czechoslovak - East German

party communique on 21 December'l956 pledges the twocountries to combat "Polish. ..reaction." Yugoslavsoffer Gomulka support.

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Peiping's Road to Socialism...................... 26People's Daily on 29 December publishes an elabo-ratestatement on the Chinese "road to socialism." TheChinese party concedes the existence of "contradictions"between Communist states and parties, but holds that the"fundamental experiences" of the Soviet Union shouldguide all Cm mu nis t parties. The article criticizesYugoslavia for challenging the rectitude of the Sovietsystem. Peiping reiterates its belief that the two

Qrincipal dangers to good intrabloc relations are"great-nation chauvinismP1and narrow "nationalism.

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Liberalism on the Rocks............................Soviet-satellite pasty conference in Budapest inJanuary 1957 ends three y e p s of "national Communist"experimentation in Eastern Europe.tiont1oP he Communist camp is called for under sloganof "proletarian internationalism"--subservience to thewill of the USSR. Kadar announces re-establishment ofa ;'pfoletarian dictatorship" in Hungary. Poland isthe only expdnknt of 'Iliberalism" in MOSCOW'S Europeanbloc.

"Further consolida-

Chinese Influence........ .........................Mao's "hundred flowers" speech of May 1956 andhis February 1957 definition of contradictions within

communism created enormous interest in Eastern Europe,particularly in Poland.stake in satellite stability. Peiping a logical medi-ator of Soviet-satellite differences. Chou En-lai'strip to Moscow and Warsaw in January an attempt to com-promise differences between the USSR and Poland.mulka pledges his regime to the principle of "prole-tarian internationalismv' nd praises bloc unity. Mos-cow accepts Mao's beliefs on "great-nation chauvinism"and %at ionalism

The Chinese have a serious

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. Polish-Soviet Understanding ....................... 29November agreement and Chinese good offices re-

sult in a modus vivendi between,Moscow nd Warsaw. Threeoutstanding points of difference remain. High-level Pol-ishpraise fo r Gomulka's post-October program. Gomulka walksa tightrope between placating Soviet demands and preserv-ing his October program.delegation to Peiping in April 1957 garners Chinese

Yugoslav-Soviet Relations Freeze and Thaw Again . . . 29Khrushchev sets about isolation of Tito at the startof 1957. Shepilov deliberately provokes the Yugoslavs.Party relations practically terminated by the end of Feb-ruary. Moscow follows ideological insult with economichurt. Peiping remains neutral. Decline of satellite un-rest in April encourages the Soviet Union to woo Titsagain. The Albanian party is again the intermediary. Bel-grade responds after the Yugoslav party learns that Moscowhas advised all satellite parties to strive.for a rapproche-ment with Belgrade. A joint declaration of desire for clos-er relations is issued On 6 June.


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P r es i di u m P ur g e i n t h e USSR ........................The ex pu ls io n of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, an dS h e p il o v , fr o m t h e S o v i e t p a r t y ' s p r e s i d i u m g i v e s K hrush-chev a ,d r e e h an d i n h i s Y hg os la v o v e r t u r e s .c r e d i t & t o Yugos l av i a are "th aw ed " i n J u l y . T i t o a n dKhrushchev kneetron 1 August .

S o v i e t

. 'Ti to-Xhrushchev M eet ing i n Rumania.................The Communist l eaders a g r e e o n l i k e views and ove r -look d i f f e r e n c e s . The S o v ie t -Y u g os l av declarat i .on of1956 e n d o r s i n g " d i f f e r e n t roads" is r e v a l id a t e d . J o i n tc a l l f o r " co n cr e te forms of coopera t ion" among a l l Com-m un is t p a r t i e s l e a v e s door a j a r f o r p o s s i b l e Y ug oslavp a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l Communist o r g a n i z a t i o n a t

a f u t u r e d a t e .Tito-Gomulka Me e t ing ...............................September confe rence goes down t h e l i n e i n f a v o rof S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y . T i t o a n d Gomulka e n d o r s eb i l a t e r a l p a r t y m e e t in g s r a t h e r t h a n the m u l t i l a t e r a lm e e t i n g s f a v o r e d by t h e USSR. Gomulka cont inues t ow i t h ho l d r e c o g n i t i o n of USSR as t h e leader o f t h e bloc.Both Ti to-Khrushchev and Tito-Gomulka co nfe ren ce com-muniquQs demon st ra te t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t q u a r r e l s s h o u l dbe k e p t i n t h e f a m i l y in a n e f f o r t t o p r es e n t a s o l i di deo l og i ca l f r o n t t o t h e c a p i t a l i s t world.Gomulka Tightens Up. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Gomulka is forced t o b a l a n c e dilemmas i n P o la nd .The f i r s t s t eps t o muzzle press c r i t i c i s m of th e S o v i e tUnion a re t a k e n i n F e b ru a ry 1957. I n March t h e P o l i s hleader r e f e r s t o t h e Hu ng ar ia n r e v o l t as a " c o u n t e r r e v o l u -t i o n , " r e v e r s i n q h i s p o s i t i o n . P o l i s h p a r t y di sa vo ws t h eterm "n at io n al communism." Gomulka vi go ro us ly de fen dsh i s October program a t a May plenum of t h e Polish p a r t y ' sc e n t r a l committee, and emphasizes impor t ance of a l l i a n c ew i t h t h e USSR. I n a n e xt em p or an e ou s r e p l y t o c r i t i c i s m ,Gomulka . reca l l s t h e rava ges wrought by t h e Sov ie t Uniont o R oland d u r i n g a n d a f t e r t h e war, and claims t h a t h i sprogram is d e s i g n e d t o p r e v e n t a r e c u r r e n c e o f s i mi l a r

e v e n t s . P o l a n d ' s p r o bl e ms are p r i m a r i l y e co no mi c i n n a-t u r e . Gomulka and E a s t Germany's U l b r i c h t m e e t i n Jun eand Gomulka exacts payment f o r U l b r i c h t ' s e a r l i e r r e f e r -e n c e t o " P o l i s h r e a c t i o n . 1 1 \ P o l i s h leader c a l l s f o r a" B a l t i c Sea of Peace" a nd e xp r e ss e s f r i e n d s h i p f o r " a l lt h e people" of Germany, a r e f e r e n c e o b v i o u s l y d i r ec t ed a tBonn.. .

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O rthoc 3x Sa_ ~ e l . l i t e s T i g h t e n P liI -s...............Throughout the winte$ ,of 1956-57 t h e h a r d -l i n es a t e l l l k ' e s r e s o r t more and more t o p o l i t i c a l r ep re s-s i o n a n d t e r r o r .f o l l o w M os co w' sa le ad a nd u r g e m u l t i p a r t i t e p a r t yconferences as opposed t o t h e b i l a t e r a l d i s c u s s i o n sfavo red by th e Po le s and Yugos lavs .p u b l i s h e s t h e e d i t e d v e r s i o n of Mao Tse- tung ' s "100f lower s" speech on 21 June 1957. P a r ty s e c r e t a r yHendrych t e r m s i t s p r o v i s i o n s " i n a p p r o p r i a t e " f o rCzech oslova kia . The Hungar ian pa r t y grows more S t a l i n -i s t .

The Czech and Hungarian p a r t i e s

The Czech press

IPost -Pres id ium Shake-up . . . . ........................A l l t h e s a t e l l i t e s e n d o r s e t h e purge of t h e So-v i e t c e n t r a l committee. Bulgar ia and Rumania under -t a k e l o c a l p u r g e s . P o la n d a n d Y u g o s l av i a i n t e r p r e tKhrushchev ' s v i c t o r y as t h e f o r e r u n n e r of a more l i b e r a lS o v i e t p o l i c y toward t h e b l o c c ou n t r i e s - - a h op e n o t t obe r e a l i z e d . F a i l u r e of Mao's l i b e r a l e x p e r im e n t i nC hi na i n t h e s p r i n g of 19 57 s t r e n g t h e n s P e i p i n g ' s s up -p o r t f o r t h e new S o v i e t l i n e i n E a s t e r n E u ro pe .

MOSCOW'S p o i n t of v i e w , t h e r e i m p o s i t i o n of a h a r d l i n ei n t h e s a t e l l i t e s h a s b e e n s u c c e s s f u l .From

Mao Grows Some W e e d s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Ch inese r e ap t he b i t t e a f r u i t ' o f t h e i r p o l i c yof l e t t i n g 100 f lowers bloom.c r i t i c i s m f r o m p a r t y members s h o c k s t h e regime. Thep a r t y ' s " r e c t i f i c a t i o n c a m p a i g n " of A p r i l 1957 l e a d st o t h e c u r t a i l m e nt of p u b l i c c r i t i c i s m i n J u ne . " A nt i -r i g h t i s m " a nd " r e c t i f i c a t i o n " become a s i n g l e campaignd e s i g n e d t o s q u e l c h a l l d o m e s t i c o p p o s i t i o n . As a re-s u l t of b i t t e r e x pe ri en ce Mao a nd o t h e r C h in e s e l e a d e r sare more s y m p a t h e t i c t o Moscowos problems i n E a s t e r nEurope.

The s p r i n g f l o o d of

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PageThe .Pol ish Except ion ................................ 39Labor u n re s t l and- econ,omic d i s t r e s s s e v e r e l y t e s tt h e G o d l k a regime i n midi11957. Gomulka t i g h t e n s p r e s sc e n so r bh i p . Plenum of P o l i s h p a r t y ' s c e n t r a l committeei n October a t t e m p t s t o r e v i t a l i z e t h e a p a t h e t i c P o l is hCommunists. Gomulka ann oun ces a blood less " v e r i f i c a -t i o n " of a l l party members.p a r t y s o l i d a i i ' t y , a c c o r di n g t o Gomulka, i s " r e v i s i o n i sm ."The g r ea t e s t t h r e a t t oThe Bloc--One Year A f t e r Hungary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40Unity is re f lec ted o n t h e su r f a c e . Diss idence i su nd er c o n t r o l . S t a b i l i t y i n c r e a s e s . ' f L i b e r a l i sm l l i sc o n f i n e d t o economics.

IV. 40 YEARS OF COMMUNISM AND A NEW COMINTERN.. . . . . . . . . 40The month-long co ng re ss of world communism i nMoscow.Lacking a name a nd n e bu lo u s i n o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e ga ther -i n g w a s t h e 1957 ver s io n of th e e a r l i e r Comintern c o n -g r e s s e s . P r o v i s i o n s made f o r f u t u r e me e ti n gs . 21 No-v e m b e r p o l i c y d e c l a r a t i o n i s s igned by a l l bloc p a r t i e s .The document coo rd in a tes a t t i t u d e toward " rev i s ion i sm"and formalizes t h e l e a d i n g r o l e of t h e USSR i n Communistp a r t y a f f a i r s . E vi de nc e of some compromise i n t h e doc-ument 's vague a n d of ten ambiguous phraseology of t h ebasic p r i n c i p l e s of commbnism. D e c l a r a t i o n i t s e l f com-

m i t s t h e bloc p a r t i e s t o a narrow d o c t r i n a l channe l .The Moscow confe rence d i d n o t a c t u a l l y s o l v e a ny of t h eb l o c ' s problems. T i t o ' s a bs en ce an i n d i c a t i o n of h i sr e f u s a l ' t o accept Soviet s o v e re i g n t y i n p a r t y mat tersat t h e r i s k of f u r t h e r a l i e n a t i n g t h e West. The Novembere v e n t s reasser ted S o v i e t i d e o l o g i c a l p ri ma cy i n t h e blocand marked t h e r e tu rn of c e n t r a l d i r e c t i o n t o t h e worldCommunist movement.

The c e n t r a l " p a r t y l i n e " emerges v i c t o r i o u s .

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Intr 'duction

On the eve of Stalin's death in 19q3 the Soviet empire ex-tended half way across Europe to the West and included the''heartland" of Asia to the east. . With the dictator's demisethe USZSR was forced to take cognizance of an historical truism.No empire in the history of the world had managed to survivesolely through force of arms.lived precursor of Soviet expansionism, had been prudent enoughto solicit the voluntary cooperation of its .subject peoples inthe Romanization of its hinterlands.rendered only lip service under Lenin and Stalin. The SovietUnion, after World War 11, ruled its Eastern European provincesby military might and the frank use of terror. It economicallyexploited a sullen, ,uncooperative group of captive states.Productivity in the bloc remained marginal, public opinion wasanti-Soviet, and in much of the outer world communism itself ,was regarded as a distasteful foreign philosophg. The U S S R ,as the self-styled heir of Marxism, was committed to the ul- .timate communization of the world and yet had been unable tocommunize the disgruntled proletariat at its own doorstep. Thecorrection of this situation posed a major problem for Stalin's

The Roman Empire, the longest-Such a policy had been

successors ,The USSR's post-Stalin policy thus was designed so as totransform its slaves into willing allies, and, coincidentally,to render international communism more palatable to the non-Communist world. This paper will examine the manner in whichthis policy was implemented from the time of Stalin's deaththrough the end of the year 1957, with particular emphasis onthe events followinec the 20th congress' of the Soviet Communist Aparty in February

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1. STALIN'S DEATH AND THE N E W LOOK IN THE BLOC

The Sovie t empire wh ich S t a l i n r u l e d a f t e r W orld War 11was a s up re me ly c e n t r a l i z e d p o l i t i c a l , e conomic ,and admin i s t ra -t i v e e a t i t y . Y e t o n l y two y e a r s a f t e r h i s d e a t h , t h e 2 0 t h co n-gress bf t h e S o v i e t Communist p a r t y e n u n c i a t e d a d o c t r i n e of" l i b e r a l Communism" based on t h e sw e ep i ng d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n ofpowers among the c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t i e s of t h e bloc. The immediateor,igins of t h i s r a d i c a l change were two n e g a t i v e c i r c u m s t a n c e sp r e v a i l i n g a t B t a l i n ' s d e a th i n March 1953:c l e a r - c u t l a w of s u c c e s s i o n t o power i n t h e USSR, a n d t h e s t a t eof c h r o n i c c r i s i s which c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e p o s t w a r S o v i e t e conomy.The new S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p w a s i n i t i a l l y p reo cc up ie d w i t h i n -t e r n a l a f f a i r s t o a f a r greater degree t ha n had been t h e l a t t e r -d a y S t a l i n regime.y e a r s from 1953 t o 1956 a t i m e of d r i f t a nd u n c e r t a in t y f o r t h ec o u n t r i e s o f E a s t e r n E ur op e. S i mp l e r e a c t i o n t o " S t a l i n i s m , "r a t h e r t h a n a p o s i t i v e a p p r o a c h t o t h e problems of t h e b loc ,was t h e common denominator of S o v i e t - S a t e l l i t e r e l a t i o n s du r in gt h i s t h r ee - y ea r s p an .

t h e lack of a

T hi s s h i f t ' i n p o l i t i c a l a c c e n t made t h e

Economic Relaxa t ionMoscow's t endency t o w i t h d r a w i n t o i t s e l f w a s most e v i -d e n t i n t h e economic f i e l d . The K r e m l i n r e t a i n e d over-a l l p o l i c yc o n t r o l of t h e s a t e l l i t e e co no mi es , w h i l e s t r i v i n g to d i s e n g a g ei t s e l f from t h e m e c h a n i c s of d ay -t o- da y p l a n n i n g i n t h e bloc.In 1953 a n d 1 9 5 4 t h e U S S R s o l d i t s i n t e r e s t s i n t h e l a s tr e m ai n i ng j o i n t s t o c k c o mp an ie s i n E a s t G ermany, B u l g a r i a ,

Hungary an d Rumania.a s t a n d a r d t e x t t ' P o l i t i c a l Economy," i t tokl t h e c o u n t r i e s o f E a st -e r n Europe to use local r e s o u r c e s more i n t e n s i v e l y a nd decreasep r o p o r t i o n a t e l y t h e i r d ep en den ce o n S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e . Eachc o u n t r y was to base i t s economy on t h o s e f a c t o r s wh ic h i n f l u e n c e di t s " i n d i v i d u a l h i s t o r i c a l d ev elo pm en t ... h e l eve l of i t s ownp r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s ... p e c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of i t s c la s s re-l a t i o n s h i p s . "n i c i a n s i n t h e s a t e l l i t e s c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e i m p r e s s i o n of ar e t u r n of n a t i o n a l p r e r o g a t i v e s t o t h e bloc c o u n t r i e s .

I n September 1954, i n t h e new e d i t i o n of

A g r a d u a l r e d u c t i o n of S o v i e t a d v i s e r s a n d tech-

P o l i t i c a l R e l a x a t i o nB e g in n i n g i n t h e s p r i n g o f 1 9 54 , when i t r e c o g n i z e d t h e

s o v e r e i g n t y of t h e German Democratic ( E a s t German) Republ ic ,t h e USSR t oo k s t e p s t o f o s t e r t h e i l l u s i o n of i n c r e a s e d p o l i t i c a lindependence i n the bloc. A g re a t dea l of l i p s e r v i c e w a s p a i d t o

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t h e e q u a l i t y of a l l s o c i al i st c o u n t r i e s .leaders v i s i t i n g Moscow were a f f o r d e d VIP t r e a t m e n t n o t a t a l lc o ns o na n t w i t h t h e i r f o rm e r s t a t u s as Kreml in f l unkeys .S a t e l l i t e p o l i t i c a l

There were no " l i b e r a l i z a t i o n d i r e c t i v e s " i n t h e s a t e l -l i t e s , , I t was a period o f . t r i a l and error , w i t h E a s t e r n E ur op ef o l l o w i 6 g Moscow's lead wsenever p o s s ib l e . The Ber ia p u r g e ,s u b o r d f n a t i o n of t h e s e c u r i t y p o l i ce t o p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l , a n demp h as i s on " s o c i a l i s t l e g a l i ty " i n t h e USSR produced counter-pa r t . c ampa igns a t n a t i o n a l l e v e l s a l l across Eas t e rn Europe.c r i t i c i s m of t h e l o c a l a n d S o v i e t regimes became more outspoken.The East German up r i s i ng i n June 1953 w a s t h e most s e r i o u s e x-p r e s s i o n of t h e v i r u l e n t a nt i - S o vi e t f e e l i n g s w h i c h l a y j u s tbelow t h e s u r f a c e i n t h e s a t e l l i t e s . Th e USSR p r u d e n t l y choset o reg a rd t h e develqpment i n E a s t Germany as a remnant of t h eS t a l i n e r a , and fo l l owed armed s u p p r e s s i o n of t h e demons t ra t i onsw i t h a number of economic co nc es sio ns desig ned t o a s s u a g e t h ed i s c o n t e n t of t h e E a s t German workers and t o p r e s e n t t h e newS o v i e t h i e r a r c h y i n t h e best p o s s ib l e l i g h t before t h e world a tlarge .F i r s t S t e p s Toward Belgrade

cAs I t h e i e i a x a t i o n of c o n t r o l s became more g e n e r a l , p o p u l a r

In l a t e May 1955 Khrushchev and Bulganin f l e w t o Belgradet o do publ i c penance f o r t h e a l le g e d s i n s of B e r i a and t ol a y t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r a new Soviet-Y ugoslav rapproch ement.The communiqu6 which ended t h e me et in g on 2 June announced t h a t" d i f f e r e n t f o r m s of t h e development of socialism a re t h e ex-c l u s i v e b u s i n e s s of t h e peoples of t h e r e s p e c t i v e c o u n t r ie s . "T h i s w a s a major and f a r - r e a c h i n g c o n c e s si o n f o r t h e K re mlinl e a d e r s h i p t o make. N o t o n l y d i d i t ehdorse T i t o ' s h e r e t i c a lbrand of Communist ideology, but i t i n v i t e d na ti ona l-Communis td e v i at i o n s i n t h e c o u n t r i e s of t h e bloc.E f f e c t s of t he In t e r regnum

Moscow had opened a P a n d o r a ' s bo x i n E a s t e r n Eu r op e , andt h e S o v i e t leaders f a i l e d c l e a r ly t o f o r e s e e t h e consequencesi n t h e f i r s t f l u s h of t h e i r r e a c t i o n to t h e S t a l i n era . Ther a p i d i t y w i t h which t h e d o c t r i n e of " l i b e r a l Communism" l a t e rswept Eas t e rn Europe cou ld o n ly have been con j ec t u re d i n m i d -1955. The p o l i c y s o u g h t t o f o s t e r w i l l i n g c oo p e ra t io n in t h eb u i l d i n g of t h e S o v i e t e mp ir e by g r a n t i n g a semblance of inde-pendence t o t h e b u i l d e r s . The r e s u l t was, a t t h e s t a r t of 1956,a facade of national-Communist s t a t e s i n E a s t e r n E ur op e whosel e a d e r s were both confused as to, h e i r precise r o l e in t h e p o s t -S t a l i n S o v i e t em p ir e a nd u n w i l l i n g t o exercise p o l i t i c a l i n -i t i a t i v e i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o u n t r i e s .

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Cbina--1953-1956I f t h e r e was u n c e r t a i n t y i n t h e s a t e l l i t e s a f te r t h e d e a t hof S t a l i n , t h e r e w a s none i n Commun i s t China . The Chine se

seized t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n c r e as e t h e i r s t a t u r e p o l i t i c a l l yand econQmica l ly 2F u l l paymen t had no t y e t been made f o r Communist China 's par-t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e Korean War, a n d P e i p i n g was i n a p o s i t io n t ocrea t e a n i n c i d e n t o v e r F o rm os a wh ic h would e a s i l y lead t o ag e n e r a l war. T h i s l a t t e r e v e n t u a l i t y w a s t o be a v o i d e d a t a l lc o s t s , an d i n i t s e l f was enough t o g u a r a n t e e a s y m p a t h e t i ch e a r i n g for C hi ne se p e t i t i o n e r s i n Moscowa.of f i r m as s ur an ce s f',rom th e USSR t h a t t h e b i l l w ould be p a i dby t h e S o v i e t s i n t h e form of 8 modern a rmy and inc reased eco-n o m i c a s s i s t a n c e . Par t of t h e a c c o u n t ha d b e e n p r ep a i d i n 1950when S t a l i n g u a r a n t e e d t h e C hi n es e a g a i n s t a t tack by J a p a n ori t s a l l i e s and ex tended an economic deve lopmen t loan of $300,-000,000 t o P e i p i n g . The C h in e s e c o n s i d e r e d t h e b a l a n c e of t h ed e b t due on S t a l i n ' s dea th .

/ I .i,,I b 1953, Moscow found i t s e l f d o u bl y i n d e b t t o t h e C h i n e s e .

P e i p i n g h ad e n t e r e d t h e K orean c o n f l i c t o n l y a f t e r r e c e i p t ,

The per iod from 1953-1956 was marked by s p o r a d i c d i s p l a y sof ill temper on b o t h s i d e s as P e i p i n g ' s pres t ige in Asia andc o n s e q u e n t l y i t s b a r g ai n i n g p o s i t i o n i n Moscow c o n t i n u e d t ogrow. T h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e , h ow ev er , was g r a d u a l l y accepted byt h e Kremlin and was b a l a n c e d by t h e USSR's c o n v i c t i o n t h a tc o n c e r t e d d i p l o m a t i c and economic e f f o r t s i n A s i a a n d t h e blocwere m u t u a l l y a d v a n t a g eo u s .regime as t h e f i r s t great-power Communist s t a t e i n Asia and i t sco nt in ue d acknowledgment of t h e S o v i e t U n i on 's ro le as leaderof t h e s o c i a l i s t camp redounded t o MOSCOW*S b e n e f i t i n t h epropaganda b a t t l e w i t h t h e West. A d e c i s i o n w a s made to goa l o n g w i t h P e i p i ng so long as t h e C h i n e s e r em a i ne d in closepoli t ical a l l i a n c e w i t h , and econom ica l l y dependen t on , $he So-v i e t Union.

Moreover t h e s t a t u r e of t h e P e i p i ng

In May 1953, t h e 1950 economic agreement w a s expanded t op r o v i d e f o r S o v i e t a i d i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of 141 basic i n -d u s t r i a l e n t e r p r i s e s i n China.I n Janua ry 1954 th e Cominform jo u rn a l formalized t h e USSR'sa c c e p t a n c e of C h in a 's new p l a ce i n t h e s u n i n h a i l i n g Blao Tse-t u n g as "an o u t s t a n d i n g c a p t a i n ... ho c r e a t i v e l y a nd i n a new

way has c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e C h i n e s e r e v o l u t i o n as a specia l t y p e ,now t y p i c a l f o r t h e r e v o l u t i o n i n c o l o n i a l a n d se m i c o lo n i a l-4-


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countries." For the first time Moscow conceded that a modelother than its own might be appropriate for a country seekingthe "road to socialism." This relaxed attitude gave the Chi-nese CommunislSa free hand in Asia and set up spheres of in-fluence within the bloc. This was more than Tito had been ableto achieye in almost s i x years of wrangling with the Kremlin.Clearlyi/the Soviet Union had recognized and accepted the limita-tions.$mplicit in any European power's attempt ideologically toproselyte the Asian countries. The Kremlin's collective leader-ship was more willing to compromise in Peiping than in Belgradefor it stood to lose far more through exacerbation of the Chi-nese than theough antagonizing Tito, the lone heretic on thefringe of the European satellites.threw its full weight behind Communist China's new stature inthe bloc. Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan led an impressivearray of doviet dignitaries to Peiping simultaneously to saluteRed Chinese sovereignty and to conclude a comprehensive agreement' on Soviet concessions. The industrial construction program of1953 was extended to include 15 new projects. An additionallong-term loan of $130,000,000 was written into the agreementfor the purpose of equating China's level of production in 1959with that of the Soviet Union in 1932; and an extensive programof Soriet-staffed technical assistance was set up. Joint con-struction of two new strategic rail links with the USSR andthe return of the Port Arthur garrison t o the Chinese were pro-vided for. In keeping with the precedent it had set in theEastern European satellites, Moscow agreed to sell back to Pei-ping its shares in four remaining joint stock companies.

In October 1954, Moscow's new collective leadership publicly

MOSCOW'S acceptance of the Chinese lead in Asia was under-lined in February 1955, after Bulganin. and Khrushchev hadsucceeded the "inexperienced" Malenkov. The Chinese People'sRepublic was thenceforth hailed by the Kremlin as tlcoleader"of the Communist camp. The mantle of authority bore with it,however, an implication perhaps not to Peiping's taste. Asequal partners, neither Moscow nor Peiping was directly responsi-ble for the acts of the other. The Soviet Union could con-veniently deny responsibility for Ma 's Formosa policy, forexample, should the international clqmate so dictate.connection it is worth noting that t4e Communist Chinese con-tinued to cite the Soviet Union as s le leader of the bloc ,reaffirming Peiping's role as the ju ior partner.

In this

I .

MOSCOW'S coolness toward the Taiwan adventure eventuallyhad its desired effect.Peiping's propaganda preparation for an offshore invasion.the spring of the year Moscow could assume that those ChineseCommunist leaders who may have favored an early assault onTaiwan had been effectively reoriented.

Early 1955 was the high-water mark ofBy


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A t t h e b e g i n n in g of 1956 the S o v i e t U ni on and CommunistChina had reconci led t h o s e d i f f e r e n c e s c a r r i e d o v e r f r o m t h eS t a l i n era.e c o n o m i c a s s i s t a n c e a t a r a t e and volume commensurate with Chi-n e s e des i re s , and c on t i n ue d t o s u p p or t Mao's p o s i t i o n i n i n -t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . T h e , C hi n e s e Communists reciprocated byprocla$iming t h e close a n d ' % i n d i s s o l u b l e n a t u r e of t h e i r a l l i a n c ew i t h t h e USSR, by c e d i n g f i r s t place i n bloc a f f a i r s t o t h eUSSR , and by a v o i d i n g e x p l o s i v e s i t u a t i o n s w h ic h m i gh t lead t oa g e n e r a l war. T h e r e were no known an t i - S ov ie t leaders o rf a c t i o n s i n $h,e C h i n e s e p a r t y , an d t h e Moscow-Peip ing a l l ianceshowed no s i g n s o f c r a c k i n g i n t h e f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e .

Moscow o f f e r e d P e i pi n g s t r a t e g i c mater i a l s a nd

XI. THE 2 0 t h PARTY CONGRESS: ITS PURPOSE AND ITS RESULTS(Feb-Oc t 1956)A t t h e b e g in n i qg of 1956 t h e S o v i e t U n io n seemed t o bemore conce rned with n o r m a l i z i n g i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h Yugos lav ia

a n d t h e West t h an wi t h t h e o r e t i c a l d i s s e r t a t i o n s w i t h t h e s a t e l -l i t e s o v er " l i b e r a l i z a t i o n . 'II n F e b ru a r y 1955, Bulganin and Khrushchev d isp laced GeorgiMalenkov, a nd c o l l e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p i n t h e USSR e n t e r e d a newp h a s e . A t y e a r ' s e n d t h e y were s t i l l i n t o x i c a t e d w i t h t h e" s p i r i t of Geneva." I n a Mew Year 's Eve add res s , t h e p a r t yf i r s t s e c r e t a r y a nd pr em i er j o i n t l y c a l l e d f o r a v a s t l y i n -creased program of East-West c u l t u r a l a n d commercial c o n t a c t s ,c i t i n g t h e f o l l y o f w a r i n t h e l i g h t of Soviet deve lopmen ts i nt h e atomic a n d rocket f i e l d s .I n e a r l y September 1955 t h e USSR and Yugo sla via lau nch eda broad new program of economic co op er a t io n . Agreements were

s i g n e d p r o v i d i n g f o r i n c r e a s e d t r a d e , ' s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a lexchanges be tween t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s , a n d a long-term programof S o v i e t a i d i n i n d u s t r i a l c o ns t ru c t i o n . A d r a f t a gr ee me nto n n u c l e a r c o o p e r a t i o n with t h e Yugoslavs was concluded on 3January 1956. Ideologica l d i f f e r e n c e s r e m a i n e d a p o t e n t i a l ob-s t ac l e t o a complete r a p pr o c he m e nt , b u t t h e i m p r e s s i on pre-v a i l e d t h a t a p o l i t i c a l me et in g of t h e minds had only t o awaitt h e n e x t c o n f e r e n c e b et we en t h e l eaders of t h e t w o Communist. s t a t e s .The S o v i e t 2 0 t h p a r t y c o n g r e s s co nv en ed on 1 4 F e b r u a r y1956. The cong ress l eg i t im ized t h e exp res s i on of a n e g a t i v e re-ac t ion to 1 7 S t a l i n i s r n , "bu t didnot uniQ thebloc i d e o l o g i c a l l y as mayhave been hoped f o r b y t h e Sov i e t p a r t y . S a t e l l i t e p o l i t i c i a n s

had been too long d e p r i v e d of i n i t i a t i v e i mm ed ia te ly t o a p p l yt h e broad g e n e r a l i t i e s of t h e Khrus hc hev l i n e to c o n c r e t e n a -t i o n a l p o l i c y . The c o n g r es s , t h e r e f o r e , accelerated d i v i s i v ei n f l u e n c e s a l r e a d y a t work i n t h e bloc .-6-


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T h i s , i n e s s e n ce , was t h e Marxist world o u t l o o k whichKhrushchev p resen ted t o i n t e rna t iona l ommunism a t t h e p a r t yc o n g r e s s :11) A l l c o u n t r i e s of t h e world are moving toward social ism.R e g a r d l e s s of n at .i on a1 c h p r a c t e r i s t i c s , a r e v o l u t i o n mu st d e n o t et h e enelof capi ta l i sm i n b a c h c o u n t r y . T h i s c r i s i s , however,need wt be v i o l e n t i n n a t u r e , b u t may assume t h e form of a" p a r l i a m e n t a r y r e v o l u t i o n , " i . e . , C o m m u n i s t i n f i l t r a t i o n of agovernment a s i n C z ec h o sl o v ak i a i n 1948. Once a workers ' gov-e m m k n t h as gained c o n t r o l of a c o u n t r y , i t i s obl iged t o s e l e c tt h e method of ' b u i l d i n g socia l i sm which b e s t c o r r e s p o n d s w i t h t h eeconomic, s o c i a l , and p o l i t i c a l c o n di t i o ns of t h e p a r t i c u l a rc o u n t r y .

2) The " f a t a l i n e v i t a b i l i t y " of war between Communist andc a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s no l o ng e r e x i s t s s i n c e t h e s o c i a l i s t bloci s i n p o ss e s si o n of t h e weapons and t ec hno log y necess a ry t o pre-v e n t s u c h a n o c c u r r e n c e , a n d di s av o ws war as a n e f f e c t i v e i n -s t r u m e n t of n a t i o n a l p o l i c y .

3) The world is d i v id e d i n t o t w o o p p o s i n g blocs--Corn-m u n i s t and c a p i t a l i s t , p l u s a number of no nbl oc "pea ce-l ovin g,"non-Communist s t a t e s , chief among which a re : Ind ia , Bu rma ,A f g h a n is t a n , E g y pt an d S y r i a , F i n l a n d , a n d A u s t r i a .4) L t i s e s s e n t i a l i n t h e i n t e r e s t s of p r e s e r v i n g p e a cet h a t t h e Communis t camp of n a t i o n s ass umes t h e i n i t i a t i v e oni m p r o v i n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e c a p i t a l i s t c o u nt r i e s of th e West.The S o v i e t f i r s t s e c r e t a r y ' s a n a l y s i s of domestic i s s u e swas a n o t h e r g u i d e p o s t t o t h e f u t u r e c o u r se of e v e n t s iri t h e

s a t e l l i t e s . Khrushchev c a l l e d f o r a s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n oft h e campa ign t o s u b o rd i n a t e t h e s t a t e s e c u r i t y a p pa r a t u s t op a r t y c o n t r o l a n d t o res tore " s o c i a l i s t l e g a l i t y " t o t h e coun-t r y ' s n a t i o n a l l i f e , promised a c o n t i n u a t i o n of " c o l l e c t i v el e a d e rs h i p " i n t h e Kreml in , and emphasized t h e f a c t t h a t ,a l t h o u g h he av y i n d u s t r y was t o m ai nt ai n f i r s t p l ac e i n t h eSo vi e t economy, consumer wan ts would he nc ef or th "no t be ne-glec e d . ''Molotov, on 18 F e b r u a r y , admi t t ed t h a t S o v i e t fo re ignp o l i c y i n t h e p a s t had be en i n f l e x i b l e and t h a t h e, a s f o r e i g nm i n i s t e r , had b e e n g u i l t y of " u n d e r e s t i m a t i n g t h e n e w p o s s i b i l i -t i e s of t h e p o s t w a r per iod . " He pledged t h e S o v i e t Union t oe x t e n d t h e h a n d of f r i e n d s h i p t o a l l c o u n t r i e s of t h e world

which "opposed m i l i t a r y b l ocs , " and t o a l l s o c i a l i s t p a r t i e sof t h e non-Communis t c ou nt r i es .

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20/55

\Khrushchev 's violent 8-hour polemic a g a i n st S t a l i n de-l i v e r e d t o a closed s e s s i o n of t h e c o n g r e s s ma n i f e s te d t h ei m po r ta n ce w hi ch t h e S o v i e t s a t t a c h e d t o a c ha ng e i n p a r t yp o l i c i e s a t home and i n t h e b l o c .u n p l e a s a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s for t h o s e bloc Communists who i n t h ep a s t had , been the , most conp c ien t ious adh ere n t s o f th e S ov i e tpar ty &$ne.Marxi&-Leninism.congress r e a c t i o n i n t h e s a t e l l i t e s .Sa$el l i te R e a c t i o n t o 20 th Congressi s t or thodoxy had been rendered even more v u l n e r a b l e t h a n be-f o r e t h e c o n gr e s s t o i n c u r s i o n s b y t h e l i b e r a l f a c t i o n s oft h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s . The o t h e r impress ions which t heycar r i ed home were less d e f i n e d . " T i t o i s m " was now a r e s p e c t a -b l e credo, a l i v i n g ' e x a m p l e of a " s e p a r a t e ro ad " t o social ism.Theref ore , as "S ta l in i s t " Communis t s were purged, "Ti t o i s t ,or na t i on al Communists shou ld now be r e h a b i l i t a t e d .

The sp e e c h was r i f e wi thPas t o r thodo ty sudden ly became a n o f f e n s e a g a i n s tTh i s speech evoked t h e m o s t dramatic pos t -

S a t e l l i t e C o m m u n i s t leaders l e f t Moscow f e e l i n g t h a t Marx-

Khrushchev had decr ied t h e n e g a t iv e f e a t u r e s of t h e r i g i dS o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c y of t h e past, and had i n di c at e d t h a t i nt h e fu tu re ideo logy would more t ha n e v e r r e f l e c t , r a t h e r t ha nshape , po l i c y . P ragmat i sm, t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r ' s f o r t e , hadbeen r econf i rmed .Bloc Communists could conclude t h a t p o l i c y c h a n g e s as w e l las p e r so n n e l s h i f t s were i n o r d e r . The new p o l i c i e s must be t h ea n t i t h e s i s of S t a l i n ' s r i g i d r u l e by t e r r o r . This, augured t h edawn of an era of liberal Cornn?unjsm i n E a s te rn Eur ope, w i t h twoi m p o r t an t q u e s t i o n s l e f t un an sw er ed by t h e congress--how much

change was t h e re t o be, and what were t h e l i m i t s of change?Moscow had t o l d t h e b l o c what it sh o u l d-o t do, bu t had no td r a f t e d a p r a c t i c a l t h e s i s on what it sh o u l d do.was a pol icy vacuum i n E a s t e r n E u r o p e w h i c h p e r s i s t e d t h r o u g ht he f a l l of 1956. For almost a y e a r , e v e n t s r a t h e r t h a n p o l i c yr u l e d t h e s a t e l l i t e s a n d e v e n t u a l l y f o r c e d t h e USSR t o suspendi t s promises of s o c i a l i s t e q u a l i t y i n a d e s pe r at e e f f o r t t okeep t h e Communist b l o c i n t a c t i n Ea s t e r n Eur op e. The r e s u l tYueoslav React ion t o 2 0 t h Cong r e s s

The Y u g o s l a v s , a f t e r t h e c o n g r e s s , were i n an "1 t o l d youso" mood. P o l i t i k a , i n B el gr ad e, termed t h e Khrushchev programa "new p a ge i n S o v i e t h i s t o r y , a t e ch n i ca l and modern, p ro -g r e s s i v e and e l a s t i c , and a l s o more humane s t age t h a n t h e pre-v i o u s o n e . " The ne wspa pe r p a r t i c u l a r l y e n d o r se d t h e c o n g r e s s '

-8 -


21/55

f o r m u l a t i o n of " a d m i n i s t r a t i v e socialisan" and communism throughp a r l i a m e n t a r y forms, and added t h a t these t e n e t s h a d a l w a y sformed t h e b a s i s of Yugoslav communism.t i o n , h o w e v e r , Vice P r e s i d e n t K arde l j a d m i t t e d t h a t h e ha d b e en"astounded" a t t h e magn itude and sc a l e o f t h e S o v i e t i n d i c t m e n tof S t a l i p . K a r d e l j i ns is $e d t h a t t h e T i t o regime had n o t hada n i n k z i n g i n a dv a nc e of ,the scope of t h e d e n i g r a t i o n c a m p a i g n ,and reballed t ha t Khrushchev and B u l g a ni n h ad a c t u a l l y d e f e nd e dS t a l i n ' , w h i l e b e r a t i n g B e r i a , d u r i n g t h e i r v i s i t t o Belgrade i n1955.E f f e c t of 2 0t h' C on gr es s i n S a t e l l i t e P a r t i e s

N a t i o n a l i s t e l e m e n t s i n t h e s a t e l l i t e p a r t i e s began t od e m o n s t r a t e t h e i r n ew ly a c q u i r e d p r e s t i g e i n March. There werer e p o r t s t h a t a l i b e r a l bloc i n t h e H u n g a r i a n p a r t y ' s c e n t r a lcommittee h ad s t r o n g l y b ac ke d a p e t i t i t o n f o r r e i n s t a t e m e n t i nt h e government s ubm it t ed by ex-Premier Imre Nagy. Nagy ha db e e n o u s t e d by a r c h - S t a l i n i s t P a r ty F i r s t S e c re t a ry Ra ko si i n1955 as a n a t i o n a l d e v i a t i o n i s t . Under c o n t i n u i n g p r e s s u r et h e Rakosi regime on 29 March c e r e m on i o u sl y r e h a b i l i t a t e d ad e v i a t i o n i s t l e s s l i k e l y t o embarass t h e p a r t y , Lazlo R a j k ,former H u n g a r i a n i n t e r i o r m i n i s t e r executed as a " T i t o i s t " i nt h e S t a l i n era.

I n p r i v a t e c on ve rs a -

; ,

Bn Poland a group of a b o u t 250 c e n t r a l committee memberswere r e p o r t e d by the Western press to have demanded the returnto t h e politburo of the p ur ge d r i g h t d e v i a t i o n i s t , WladyslawGomulka. The p r ot o ty p e P o l i s h S t a l i n i s t , B ol es la w B i e r u t , diedon 12 March and was r e p l a c e d a s p a r t y f i r s t s e c r e t a r y by EdwardOchab, a r e l a t i v e l y orthodox, Sovie t - t r a ined Communis t , Moscow-o r i e n t e d b u t f r e e from t h e t a i n t of p e r so n a l a s s o c i a t i o n w i t hthe excesses of the Stalin era. Fol lowing Ochab 's ascen t t othe top p a s t y post, Trybuna Ludu, Warsaw's regime newspaper ,a i r e d Khrushchev's indictmen- Stalin for t h e f i r s t t i m e i npublic. After quoting Khrushchev 's d ic tum t h a t from t h e e a r l y1930"s onward S t a l i n ' s r u l e pr od uc ed "p ro fo un d d i s t o r t i o n s ,damage and crimes," Trybuna went a l o n g s t e p f u r t h e r a nd askedwhere t h e other l e a d e r s of the S o v i e t p a r t y had been dur ingt h i s p er io d.

The sentiment $OF l i b e r a l i z a t i o n i n t h e s a t e l l i t e s begant o c r y s t a l l i z e i n A p r i l 1956 and r e s u l t e d i n a number of a c t i o n sd i r e c t e d a g a i n s t p o l i c i e s an d i n d i v i d u a l s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h eS t a l i n era. B u l g a r i a became t h e f i r s t s a t e l l i t e t o unmask ahome-grow " c u l t of p e r s o n a l i t y " when t h e p a r t y s c e n t r a l com-mit tee l e v e l e d the c h a r g e agains t Vulko Chervenkov, outspo kena n t i - T i t o p r e m i e r . In mid-April , Chesvenkov w a s o u s t e d fromhis government posts and replaced by Anton Yugov,who had narrowlye s c a p e d l i q u i d a x i o n as a " T i t o i s t " d u r i n g t h e B u l g a r i a n p u r g et r i a l s of 1949.

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sOn 25 April, the Czechs offered a sacrificial lamb toMoscow when they removed Defense Minister and First Vice Pre-mier Cepicka from the government. A son-in-law of KlementGottwald, deceased ?arty chairman and president, Cepicka hadbeen a "hard-line" Communist, but no more so than many of hisaccusers, in the "model saqellite" regime.T h e dismissal of three top-level Polish security policeofficials on 20 April echoed Khrushchev's call for a "return tosocialist legality" in the USSR. One of those ousted wasRadkiewicz, Tormer minister of state security, who from 1944to 1954 personified "Stalinist" police terror in the country,having supervised the arrest of Gomulka and his supporters in1948.

4: 'i

Poland was also the first Eastern European satellite toadmit that the publi,c clamor for further reform menaced partycmtrdc&U~ccunhy. n mid-April the government announced the re-moval of the minister of culture Ior failure properly to control"freedom of expression" in Poland. On 27 April the Catholicbloc of deputies openly challenged an abortion law submitted tothe SeJm for approval, and a mass meeting of Warsaw writersaccused the regime of harboring "Stalinist remnants." Thewriters demanded the election of a new party politburo, an un-heard-of appeal in the Communist world, one which would havebrought instant suppression s i x months earlier. In late Aprilit evoked only a stern rebuke from Party First Secretary Ochabwho, on 29 April, cautioned the "politically unstable" elementsin the Polish party against further attacks on party policy.Cominform Dissolved

On 18 April, satellite Communists were nominally castadrift from the parent Soviet party when the Cominform was dis-solved by Moscow to "facilitate cooperation with the Socialistparties" of the non-Communist world. This move had been antici-pated in the West following the 20th congress. The Communist"information bureau" was an embarrassing reminder to both Khrush-chev and Tito of the B48 rupture of relations, and provided thenon-Communist countries with a tangible whipping boy for anti-- Communist propaganda. The actual business of the bloc couldbe more efficiently handled by existing organizations such asthe Warsaw Pact and CEMA groups, while the current emphasis on"peaceful coexistence" made desirable a de-emphasis of ideologi-cal clannishness on the part of the bloc countries. The demiseof the Cominform was in the nature of an addendum to Khrush-chev's keynote speech at the Moscow congress, and was recognizedon both sides of the "iron curtain" as one more tactical ma-neuver in the Soviet Union's war of words with the capitalistworld.

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23/55

S a t e l l i t e s C o nt i nu e L i b e r a l i z a t i o nBy t h e end of May ev en t h e m o s t i d e o l o g i c a l l y r i g i d S o v i ets a t e l l i t e s had made a t l e a s t t o k e n c o n c e s s i o n s t o 2 0 t h c o n g r e s sd oc tr in e. Hungary removed i t s barbed wire a n d m i n e f i e l d s fromt h e Aus t , ri an and Yu go s l a v . f r on t i e r s , Rumania reduced i t s s e c u r i t ypo li ce . :By 10 pe rc en t , t h e 'Ea s t Germans announced t he i r i n t en t i onst o l i f t r e s t r i c t i o n s o n t r a v e l t o West Germany. Poland, Hungary,Bulgar ia , Rumania , a n d Czechos lovak i a p romulga t ed i n t e rn a l am-n e s t l e s and i n v i t e d t h e i r p o l i t i c a l L e x i l e s abroad t o r e t u r n homewi.thout prejyd$ce. The Hungarian Government pardoned and re-s t o r e d t o h i s former pos t as cha i rman of t h e Bench of Bishopst h e s e co n d- r an k in g C a t h o l i c p r e l a t e i n t h e c o u n t r y , A rc hb is ho pGroesz, s e n t e n c e d to life impr i sonment i n 1951 f o r c o n s p i r a c ya g a i n s t t h e s t a t e . The Po l e s ous t ed Jakub Berman, deputy pre-m i e r and long-t ime associa te of S t a l i n , from t h e government andpo l i t bu ro . The Rumanians s i mi l a r l y d i sposed of t h e i r deputyp r e m i e r , P e t r e s c u , a f t e r a c c u s i n g him of a whole ca t a logue of

crimes a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e " c u l t of p e r s o n a l i t y . " The S o v i e t sannounced a r e d u c t i o n of forces i n E as t Germany which pr ovidedf o r t h e w i t h dr a wa l by May 1957 of 30,000 So vi e t g round and a i rf o r c e t r o o p s fr om t h e e r sa t z s o v e r e i g n r e p u b l i c .Yugos l av-Sovie t Re l a t i ons B l o s s o mP r e s i d e n t K a r d e l j and Fore ign M i n i s t e r Popovic t o p l a c e t h ef i n a l s e a l on t h e Soviet -Yugoslav rapprochement ou t l in ed a tBelgrade i n J u n e 1 95 5. T i t o had n o t addressed t h e R u s s ia n sas "comrades" s i n c e 1 9 4 8 . He u s e d t h e t e r m in g r e e t i n g h i sh o s t s a t t h i s m e e t i n g , s a y i n g t h e t i m e had a r r i v ed when a l lt h a t " s e p a r a t e s u s w i l l be overcome and when ou r f r i en d sh ip w i l lr e c e i v e a new and s t i l l f i rmer f o u n d a t i o n . "

On 2 June 1956, T i t o a r r i v e d i n Moscow with Yugoslav Vice

The outcome of T i to ' s v i s i t t o Moscow, however, w a s n o tq u i t e t h e c o m p le te a g r ee m en t t h a t t h e Yu g os la v l e a d e r h a d pre-d i c t e d . The c o n f e r e n c e p o i n t e d u p t h e f a c t t h a t basic ideologi-c a l d i f f e r e n c e s s t i l l e x i s t e d between the two a n t a g o n i s t s ofthe Communist world. Khrushchev, speaking a t Moscow's DynamoStadium on 19 June , announced t h a t Yugos l av i a had once againt aken its place " w i t h i n t h e camp of soc ia l i sm , " and spoke oft h e " m o n o l i t h i c u n i t y of t h e s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s " w hic h t h i sdeve lopment ensured. T i t o s p e a k i n g n e x t r e i t e r a t e d h i s con-v i c t i o n t h a t " o u r way is d i f f e r e n t from y o u r s . " The " d i f f e r -e nc e" i n b u i l d i n g socia l i sm, T i t o s t a t e d , was no ba r t o coopera-t i o n be tw ee n t h e two c o u n t r i e s , b u t t h e i m p l i c a t i o n was i ne scapa -b l e t h a t Y u g o sl av i a s t i l l c h o s e t o disassociate i t s e l f from t h enew Communist commonwealth of n a t i o n s .

...

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S T


24/55

This i m p r e s s i o n was s u b s t a n t i a t e d by th e d e c l a r a t i o ni s s u e d j o i n t l y by t h e t w o p a r t i e s a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of d i s -c u s s i o n s on 20 Jun e. The comuniqueS was a p a t e n t c o n c e s s i o nt o Yugoslav ideo logy . Unl ike Xhrus hchev 's Dynamo spee ch, t h ecommunique r e f r a i n e d f ro m a s s i g n i n g Y u g os la v ia a place i n t h ebloc , a nd wen t ev en f u r t h g r t h a n t h e 2 0 t h c o n g r e s s i n i t sa s s er t , &o n t h a t " t h e r o ad s' an d c o n d i t i o n s of s o c i a l i s t develop-ment ore d i f f e r e n t i n d i f f e r e n t c ou n tr ie s . " I n t e r pa r t y co-o p e r a t i o n , the communique went on to s a y , " s h o u l d be based oncomple t e freedom of w i l l a n d e q u a l i t y , o n f r i e n d l y c r i t i c i s m ,and on t he cpmradely cha ra c t e r of exchange of views on d i spu t e sbetween our p i r t i e s . "f o r t h e deve lopment of b roa de r r e l a t i o n s be tween Communists ta tes and "p ro gr es si ve movements" i n t h e non-Communist world.

B ot h p a r t i e s r e c o gn i ze d t h e n e c e s s i t y

A r e l i a b l e Western obse rve r i n Moscow a t t h e t i m e of t h eTito-Xhrushchev meet inga s a f o r e r u n n e r of c lo se r t i e s between the s o c i a l i s t p a r t i e s oft h e f r e e world and the Communist p a r t i e s of t h e Sino-Sovie tblot=, a model f o r f u tu r e agreemen ts among npro gres s ive ' l move-ments of t h e world . H e s a w t he Yugos l avs a s w i l l i n g t o " l i n eu p i n t h e S o v i e t column" as a r e s u l t of Khrushchev ' s a ccep t anceof T i t o ' s " d i f f e r e n t road" t o soc i a l i sm . The USSR's amenityto i deo log ica l compromise foretold a p e r i o d of even more l i b e r a lr e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e s a t e l l i t e s . T h i s t u r n of e v e n t s , t h e com-mentary conc luded, w a s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a n " u n a l l o y e d a d v a n t a g et o t h e West': s i n c e Y u g o s l a v i a , faced w i t h a l i b e r a l S o v i e tp o l i c y , h ad v o l u n t a r i l y ch o se n t o i d e n t i f y i t s e l f w i th t h eUSSR's a i m s and p o l i c i e s .

c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e p a r t y d e c l a r a t i o n

T i t o ' s . g o o d - w i l l v i s i t t o t h e S o v i e t U n i o n was pa ra l l e l edby a n i n c i d e n t i n d i c a t i v e of t he impor t ance which t he Kreml ina t t a c h e d t o cement ing good r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Yugoslavs.t h e o l d B o l sh e v ik f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r who h ad so b e d e v i l e d T i t od u r i n g t h e S t a l i n e r a , w a s dropped f r o m h i s f o r ei g n a f f a i r spost a n d r e p l a c e d by S h e p i l o v , a c a n d i d a t e more a c c e p t a b l e t ot h e Yugosl av leader .

Molotov,

Rakos i OustedA second occur rence a t t h i s t i m e was l ess p u b l i c i z e d b u teven more s i g n i f i c a n t i n terms of S o v i e t - b l o c r e l a t i o n s . W hi leT i t o was i n Moscow, S o v i e t p a r t y p r e s i d i u m a n d secre tar ia t mem -ber S u s l o v , t h e USSR's f o r e i g n p a r t y t r o u b l e s h o o t e r , j ou rn ey edt o Budapes t t o e v a l u a t e t h e p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n Hungary a tf i r s t hand.

t h a t t h e Hu ng ar ia n p a r t y w a s s e r i o u s l y f a c t i o n a l i z e d , or t h a tt h e p a r t y f i r s t s e c r e t a r y , R a k o s i , w a s a n u n r e c o n s t r u c t e dS t a l i n i s t w h o . w a s despised both w i t h i n a nd o u t s i d e h i s p a r t y .The importance of t h i s t r i p l a y beyond t h e f a c t

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The P o l i s h p a r t y , t o o , was f a c t i o n - r i d d e n , a nd C z e ch o s lo v a ki aand Ea s t Germany bo th were headed by pa r ty secre tar ies n o morel i b e r a l t h a n Rakosi . B u t whereas Novotny and Ul b r i c h t ma in ta ine da t i g h t g r i p o n t h e i r p a r t y c o n t r o l me chanis ms , Rakosi had l o s tcon- of t h e H u n g a r i a n p a r t y . H i s i n f luence , even among thehard-lin,e CommunAsts who ,had once su pp or te d h im, w a s now nega-t i ve . .ran ad d i t i on he was \. an implacable enemy of Tito , a n d t h i swas n d t t h e t i m e f o r a m a n i f e s t a t i o n of a n t i - T i t o s e n t i m e n t i nE a s t e r n E u ro p e. T h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e p r o b a b l y e x p l a i n s t h e t i m i n gof t h e S u sl ov t r i p .

c The Sov' idt em is sa ry may ha ve served Rakos i w i t h a n u l t i -matum, or may a c t u a l l y ha ve a r r a n g e d for h i s r e pl a ce m en t . Amonth after S u s l o v ' s s u r p r i s e v i s i t t o t h e H un ga ri an c a p i t a l ,on 18 J u l y 1956, Rakosi was deposed a s f i r s t s e c r e t a r y of t h eH un ga ri an p a r t y a n d replaced by Ern0 Gero, a h a r d - l i n e Com-m u n i s t as o r t h o d o x as R ak os i i n h i s i d e ol o gy , b u t more accepta-b l e t o c o n s e r v a t i v e Hu ng ar ia n p a r t y members and l e s s o u t s p o k e ni n h i s condemnation of T i t o . O n e of Gero's f i r s t ac ts i n h i sn e w o f f i c e was t o a nn ou nc e t h a t a n o pe n l e t t e r would be im -m e d i a t e l y d i s p a t c h e d t o t h e Yugoslav Communist pa r t y exp re ss in gHungary ' s "p ro found regre t" f o r t h e " s l an d e rs " of the pas t .

The l i b e r a l f a c t i o n of t h e H un ga ri an p a r t y won s e v e r a lp o l i t b u r o s e a t s i n t h e wake of Gero's e l e c t i o n , b u t g a in e dl i t t l e i n t h e way of r e a l p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e . I n h i s i n i t i a l ,s p e e c h as f i r s t s e c r e t a r y , Gero s t r e s s e d t h e need f o r s t i l lt i gh t e r p a r t y d i s c i p l i n e ; r e a f f i r m e d a 30 J un e c e n t r a l committeer e s o l u t i o n c o nd em ni ng t h e " m a l i g n a n t a n t i p a r t y mavement formeda round ex -Premie r Nagy," Hungary ' s o u t s t an d i ng na t i on a l Com-m u ni s t p o l i t i c i a n ; e n do rs e d t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e Hu ng ar ia np a r t y ' s l i n e s i n c e t h e 2 0 t h c o ng r es s ; a nd promised modest i m -p ro ve me nt s i n t h e s t a n d a r d of l i v i n g a nd i n w or ki ng c o n d i t i o n s .Gero w a s n o t t h e i ndependen t - ty pe Communist th a t t h e l i b e r a lwing of t h e H u n g a r ia n p a r t y h a d ho pe d f o r , a nd t h e f a c t i o n a ls t r u g g l e c o n t i n u e d un a ba t e d t h r o u g h ou t t h e l a t e summer and e a r l yf a l l of 1956.Poznan R i o t s

The s e c o n d v i o l e n t o ue b r ea k of w o rk e r d i s c o n t e n t i n t h es a t e l l i t e s a f t e r t h e d e a t h of S t a l i n o cc ur re d a t Poznan , Poland ,on 28 J u n e 1956. S t r i k i n g w o rk er s , d i s t u r b e d o v er p o l i c e de-t e n t i o n of severa l members of t h e i r g r i ev an ce committee, r i o t e di n t h e c i t y , damaging p a r t y b u i l d i n g s a n d a t t a c k i n g t h e regime'ss e c u r i t y t roops .

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The Poznan r i o t s a p p e a r e d t o c o n f ir m t h e o p i n io n of t h a tf a c t i o n i n t h e S o v i e t p a r t y l e d b y M ol ot ov w hi ch had a r g u e de ve n b e fo r e t h e 2 0 t h c o n g r es s t h a t a l i t t l e f re ed om i n t h es a t e l l i t e s w a s a d a n ge r ou s t h i n g . F i r s t S e c r e t a r y K hr us hc he v,however, could s t i l l muster a m a j o r i t y of t h e p r e s i d iu m b e h i n dh i s t h e s i s of cont ro l led J A b e r a l i z a t i o n . On 30 J un e t h e c e n t r a lcommit,&& of t h e S o vi e t p a r t y i ssued a r e s o l u t i o n e x p l ai n i n ga nd j u g t i f y i n g t h e d e n i g r a t i o n of S t a l i n a nd r e a f f i r m in g t h ec o r r e c t n e s s of t h e campaign a g a i n s t t h e " c u l t of t h e p e r s o n a l i t y . "The c e n t r a l committee d e n i ed t h e e x i s t e n c e of a cr i s i s i n i n -t e r n a t i o n a l soc ia l i sm , b u t w ar ne d of t h e d a n g er s of d i s s e n s i o namong Communist p a r t i e s , c i t i n g P oznan as an example of t h econsequences . It a p p e a r e d t h a t t h e R u ss i a ns were c o n t e n t , f o rt h e t i m e b e i n g , t o c o n t i n u e t h e m yth of s a t e l l i t e autonomy.

Bu lgan in and Khrushchev sp en t t h e l a s t week of J u l y i n a n da b o u t Warsaw on a f ence -mending , f ace - sa v ing mis s io n des ig ned t ob o l s t e r Communist p r e s t i ge i n Po land . The time-tested S o v i e tt a c t i c of: t h e "car ro t a nd t h e s t i c k " w a s n e v e r more i n e v i d e n c e .T h e S o v i e t leaders for t h e f i r s t t i m e p u b l i c l y i m p l i ed t h a t t h eUSSR w o u l d g u a r a n t e e t h e Oder-Neisse border w i t h Germany, butwarned t h e P o l i s h press aga i ns t p u r s u i n g d e - S t a l i n i z a t i o n tooa v i d l y .

B u l g a n i n ' s address i n Warsaw on 23 J u l y was to h a u n t S o v i e tl e a d e r s h i p t h ro u gh o ut t h e n e x t y e a r .a f f a i r s a s i f h e were a m em b e r of t h e regime, h e blamed t h eP oz na n d i s t u r b a n c e s o n We st er n a g e n t s a n d p r o v o c a t e u r s , made nomen t ion of t h e workers ' l eg i t im a te g r i e v a n c e s w h i c h t h e P o l i s hp a r t y had al re ad y acknowledged , and warned t h a t t he So v ie t Armys t o o d r e ad y to i n t er v e ne i n t h e e v e n t t h a t reform s h o u l d t u r nt o c o u n t e r r e v o lu t i o n i n P ol an d. The P o l i s h p a r t y ' s c e n t r a lcommittee m e t i n e x e c u ti v e s e s s i o n e v en as t h e S ov ie t v i s i t o r swere l e a v i n g Warsaw, a n d i s s u e d a r e s o l u t io n r e s t a t i n g t h e re-gime's i n t e n t i o n of p r o c e e d i n g w i t h l i b e r a l i z a t i o n a nd correct-i n g t h e low l e v e l o f l i v i n g w hi ch h a d c a u s e d t h e P oznan i n c i d e n t .

Speak ing of P o l i s h i n t e r n a l

P o l a n d ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o re s i s t t h e i d e o lo g i c a l brow-b e a t i n g wh ic h t h e S o v i e t U ni on s o u g h t t o a d m i n i s t e r was empha-sized i n two s t a t e m e n t s wh ic h h i g h - l e v e l P o l i s h Communi st sv o l u n t e e r e d t o a Western o f f i c i a l i n Warsaw. Deputy Fore ignMin i s t e r Win iewicz asserted t h a t h i s c ou nt ry was s t e a d i l y acquir-i n g grea te r independence of a c t i o n a n d c o u ld be u s e f u l t o t h eWest i n a l i a i s o n r o l e w i t h t h e bloc c o u n t r i e s . J u l i u s Katz-Suchy , Po land ' s ECE delegate i n 1956, r e i n f o r c e d t h i s v i ew andadded , "Po land has more freedom of a c t i o n t h a n t h e West knows,"a nd t h i s is " o n l y t h e b e g i n n in g . "

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Belgrade Reflects Bloc CrisisSoviet-Yugoslav r e l a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e e a r ly f a l l of 1956g av e t h e . b e s t i n d i c a t i o n of a change i n Moscow's E a s t e r n

European pol icy .l i t e s th . roughou t . the sp r ipg a n d summer a n d the Poznan r i o t s i nl a t e July had convinced the Kremlin t h a t i t was necessa ry , a f t e ra l l , .ti0 d e f i n e t h e l i m i t s of t h e p o l i t i c a l thaw i n t h e bloc--as e r i o u s o m is s io n of t h e 2 0 t h c o n g r es s . Over t h i s p o i n t Moscowand Be lg rade found each o the r a t odds. T i t o wanted Moscow t okeep . 'hands o f f th e i n t e r n a l p o l i c i e s of the in di vi du al Com-m u n is t c ou nt5i 'e s. I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e Y ug os la v leader encourageda f r e e hand f o r loca l p o l i t i c i a n s i n Poland a n d Hungary, thev e r y c e n t e r s of r e v i s io n i s t un re s t whfch most conce rned Khrusk-chev. As t h e Y ug os la v p r e s s c o n t i n u e d i n September t o h a i li n c r e a s i n g i n d i c a t i o n s of s a t e l l i t e independence and "d i f fe ren tr o ad s t o social ism, ' : i t w a s apparent t h a t MOSCOW'S p o s t - S t a l i np o l i t i c a l and economic w o o i n g of Yugos lav ia had ne i t he r lu re dTito back i n t o t h e b l o c n o r a l t e r e d h i s desi re f o r more i n -f l u e n c e i n t h e c o n du c t o f Ea s t e r n Eu ro pe an a f f a i r s .

I n c r e a s i n g i n t e l l e c t u a l f e r m e n t i n t h e sa te l -

The new phase of s t r a in e d Sov ie t- Yu go sl av t i e s was i n t r o -duced by rumors i n ea r l y September t h a t t h e S o v ie t c e n t r a l com-mit tee h a d c i r c u l a t e d a l e t t e r t o a l l European s a t e l l i t e s wa r n -ing them a g a i n s t i m i t a t i o n o f t h e Yugoslav "road t o social ism."A f t e r t h e 2 0 th c o n g r e s s T i t o had resumed contac ts w i t h t h eP o l i s h , Czechoslovak, and Rumanian p a r t i e s and cou ld cons ide rsuch a warning only as f r e s h e v id e nc e of MOSCOW'S d i s t r u s t ofh i s p o l i t i c a l c ou rs e.c o n c lu s io n . A f t e r a f l u r r y o f p r a i s e f o r t h e S o vi et -Y ug os la vJune par ty communiqu6, which conf i rmed t he co rr ec tn es s of T i t o ' s" s e p a r a t e r o a d , " i t f e l l s i l e n t on t h e s ub j ec t u n t i l l a t eAugust when Pravda and J z ve s t i a l b l as t e d na t io na l communism andp r a i s e d t h e -of t h e Communist b l o c i n Europe.ma in ta ined a w a tc hf ul s i l e n c e i n t h e a b se nc e of d i r e c t a c t i o nby Moscow.t h e bl oc f o r T i t o t o r i s k p r e c i p i t i o u s a c t i o n o ve r n ot hi ngmore concrete t h a n an i d e o l o g i c a l a b s t r a c t i o n . By t h e end oft h e summer of 1956, 30 p e r c e n t of h i s c o un t ry ' s f o r e ig n t r a d ewas conducted with bloc c o u n t r i e s .

The S o v i e t p r e s s c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h i s

BelgradeThe Yugoslav economy was now t i e d t o o c l o s e l y t o

On 19 September, Khrushchev flew t o Belgrade on 48 hours 'n o t i c e .days a t T i t o ' s B r io ni v i l l a o n t h e p ro bl em s t h a t h ad d r iv e n awedge between t h e sometime a l l i e s . D u rin g t h i s u n u su a l meet-i n g , t h e S o v ie t f i r s t s e c r e t a r y a p p a r e n t l y wa rned T i t o t h a t he(Khrushchev) a l o n e managed t o r e s t r a i n t h e S o v i e t pr es id iu mfrom a more ov er t denunc i a t ion o f Yugoslav tac t ics i n E a st er n

The Soviet and Yugoslav leaders c o nf e rr e d f o r e i g h t


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Europe, Reliable Yu go slav o f f i c i a l s l a t e r r e p o r t e d that Khrush-chev adamant ly re fused t 9 compromise on a s i n g l e p o i n t a t i s suea nd a l m o s t c o m p l e t e ly r e p u d i a t e d 2 0 t h c o n g r e s s d o c t r i n e o n" d i f f e r e q t roads $0me n t fogi re v i s io na ry movetdents i n t he s a t e l l i t e s would costKhrushGhev h i s ma jo r i ty in t h e p r e si d iu m , t h e S o v i e t l e a d e rasse r ted , a n d T i t o would once again f i n d h i ms e lf d e p r i v e d oft h e ideologica l and economic su pp or t which Khrushchev pergoni-f i ed : T h e s e t h r e a t s were h a r d l y c a l c u l a t e d t o i n s p i r e T i t o ' sc o o p e r a t i o n i.n* q u e l l i n g t h e r u s h t ow ar d n a t i o n a l c o m u n is m , 8movement which he had a l r ea dy pu bl ic ly sanc t io ned . The samesou rce s which had saved Yugos l av i a i n 1948 were s t i l l a t hand,t h e l i f e l i n e to t h e West w a s s t i l l open and, even i n t h e caseof a n o th e r o u t r i g h t b r e ak i n r e l a t i o n s , r ' T it o is t s ' Y ug os la vi awould survive .

The impasse i n v ie ws a t which t he two Comuni s t l eadershad ar r i v ed may have prompted T i t o to accept Khrushchev 's ia-v i t a t i o n t o r e t u r n w i t h h i m t o t h e S o v i e t Union f o r c o n t i n u e dd i s c u s s i o n s w i t h o t h e r members of t h e So vie t p res id ium and Gero ,h i s H u ng ar ia n c o u n t e r p a r t . T h i s m e e ti n g , b e g i nn i n g o n 27 Sep-*mber1956 i n t h e C r i m e a , a p p a r e nt l y s e r v e d o nl y t o d e f i n e morec l e a r l y t h e areas of disagreement be tween t h e t w o a n t a g o n i s t s .The d i f f e r e n c e b a s i c a l l y w a s t h e same o n e t h a t was f o u g h t o u ti n P ol an d and Hungary i n Octobe r , "ha rd- l i ne" vs. " s of t - l i n e "c o mu n is m i n t h e s a t e l l i t e s . Moscow was i deo log i ca l l y compro-mised i n its a t t e m p t t o q u e l l t h e f o r c e s w hich i t had unleasheda t t h e 2 0 t h c o n g r e s s , and t h i s p o l i t i c a l em barrassm ent con-t r i b u t e d t o t h e i n d e c i s i o n w h i c h i t carr ied o v e r i n t o t h e Oc-tober e v e n t s .T h e f a i l u r e of t h e Sovie t -Yugos l av d i s cus s io ns to a l t e rT i t o ' s Eas t e r n European po l i cy was conf i rmed on 7 October, wh&nBorba, Belgrade 's most impo rtant newspaper , pra ised t h e s t r u g g l ef o r e v i s i o n i n Hungary a nd t h e r e p l a c e m e n t o f S t a l i n i s t n o r m sby "n ew , f r e s h tend enc ies " which made ?'any attempt t o r e t u r n t othe o ld ways" e x t r e me l y d i f f i c u l t . A t a b o u t t h e same t i m e Bel-grad e announced t h a t a H u n g a r i a n p a r t y d e l e g a t i o n i n c l u d i n gGem and Kadar w o u l d a r r i v e on 15 October f o r b i l a t e r a l t a l k s .A B u l g a r i an p a r t y d e l e g a t i o n h ea de d by P a r t y F i r s t S e cr e ta r yZhivkov was w a i t i n g i n Belgrade when T i t o r e t u r n e d from t h eUSSR, and, on 7 October, s i g n e d a d e c l a r a t i o n r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g.par ty r e l a t i o n s wi t h t he League of Yugoslav Communist s, a ni n d i ca t i o n t h a t MOSCOW'S September warning t o t h e b l o c h ad n o tbeen f u l l y h ee ded .

Continued Yugoslav encourage-

I

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. .. .

The Lid Blows OffWhatever further-action he Soviet Union may have antici-pated taqing to neutralize Yugoslav influence in the bloc wasburied $?neath the rush of


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S*

w i t h s e e k i n g t o "undermine socialism" and t o "shake t h e founda-t i o n s of t h e peo p l e ' s democra ti c sys t em." The Sov ie t papera c cu s e d t h e P o l e s of pu bl ic ly ren ouncing Marx and Lenin, andc a l l i n g f o r , t h e r e s t o r a t i o n of c a p i t a l i s m .pronouncdments arb t o be bea rd , " P ravda con t in ued , a f a c t which" p a i n s #'%heSovie t people ." 'ch ev BBck home and Gomulka r i d i n g t h e c re s t of a wave of pop-u l a r a p p ro v a l i n Po l an d , b o t h Pr av da a nd I z v e s t i a r e p u b l i sh e da n e d i t o r i a l f rom t h e 22 October Trybuna Ludu i n Warsaw whiche x' pl ai ne d t h e d e t a i l s of the new "Pdlish road t o social ism, ' 'a n d d e c l a r e d t h a t th e keys tone of t h e P o l i s h p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r ewas f i r m f r i e n d s h i p wi t h t h e USSR, "based o n t h e i d e o l o g i c a lu n i t y of Communist p a r t i e s , complete e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s , andt h e f u l l s o l i d a r i t y of our na t i on s . " West ern sou rce s in Moscowand Warsaw r e p o r te d t h a t t h e USSR,caught unawares, had de cid edt o make t h e bes t of & he s i t u a t i o n i n P ol an d a nd p u b l i c l y t oapprove t h e Gomulka regime a t a n oppor tune t i m e .

"Even ant i -Sovie tOn 23 O dt o be r, however, wi th Khrush-

Hungary Revol tsI n H un ga ry , u n l i k e P o l a n d , e v e n t s were allowed t o proceedtoo fa r f o r any "n at io na l Communist ," however mod erate , t o s t e mt h e flood of a n t i -S o v i e t f e e l i n g . P a r t y F i r s t S e c r et a r y Gero ' sspeech t o t h e n a t i o n o n 23 October e x t o l l i n g t h e c o n t i n u i t y of. Hungary's t i e s t o t h e "g lo r ious" So vi e t Union t ouched off aspontaneous revo lu t i on which forced t h e Hunga r i an pa r ty t o re-s to re " d e v i a t i o n i s t " Imre Nagy t o power as premie r , and t oe l e c t Janos Kadar, w i t h a r e p u t a t i o n as a moderate Communist,p a r t y f i r s t s e c r e t a r y . The r e v o l t , h ow ever, was d i r e c t e d a g a i n s tcommunism i t s e l f ra the r t han a ga in s t abuses i n t he Communists y s t e m , and Nagy, wha tever his c o l o r a t i o n , was a Communist poli-

t i c i a n .he w a s forced t o concessions which would have removed Hungaryfrom the Communist bloc i f th ey had been implemented. On 30October, Nagy ca l led f o r r e s t o r a t i o n of a m u l t i p a r t y p o l i t i c a lsys tem and on 1 November informed t h e So vi et ambassador ofHungary 's wi thdrawal f rom th e Warsaw P a c t a nd t h e n e u t r a l i z a t i o nof t h e c o u n t r y . S u s lo v and Mikoyan had a r r iv ed i n Budapes t on31 Octobe r , p ro bab ly wi th advance i n forma t io n of Nagy's ideo-l o g i c a l d e f e c t i o n .

His a p p e a l s t o end t he 'upr i s i ' ng fell on deaf e a r s , and

On 4 November, a s t h e S o vi et Army renewed i t s a s s a u l t onthe Freedom Fighters , Nagy w a s r e p l a c e d b y Kadar who, regard-l e s s of p a s t l e a n i n g s , was so compromised i n t h e e y e s of t h ep o p u l a t i o n as t o be u s e l e s s i n a ny role except t h a t of a S o v i e tp u p p et . I n c r u s h i n g t h e Nagy regime, t h e S o v i e t Union a l s odes t ro yed t h e myth of t he i ndependence of s a t e l l i t e governments.

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31/55

Reform without Moscow's blessing was not to be tolerated, andevery government in Eastern Europe in the fina!analysis wouldcontinue to owe its very existence to the whim of the SovietUnion. Gomulka reiterated this truism frequently during thenext ye64 and used it to %is advantage in restraining Polishflrevis+onism" hich, in its more outspoken forms could haveseriously threatened the stability 01 his regime.30,October 1956 Declaratiop

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On 30 October 1956, Moscow made its most definitive declara-tion of satellite policy since the 20th congress. Although for-mulated against a backdrop of revolt, the statement was morethan a Soviet response to the urgent problem of revolution inHungary; it was a reassessment of 20th congress doctrine, theoperations annex so conspicuously absent from the original reso-lutions of the congress. The paper represented a Soviet attemptto wipe the mistakes of the previous year from the slate andmake a clean start. Moscow now declared its intent to play amore active role in the direction of bloc affairs. Unity was tobe re-established at all cost. The statement reaffirmed thecorrectness of "liberalization" in Eastern Europe, but the USSRadmitted it had made a number of "outright mistakes" in itsdealings with the countries of the bloc. All satellite stateswould continue to enjoy "equality" in negotiating with the So-viet Union, the declaration continued, provided one vital con-diti

Documents

Caesar 20 - The Ties That Bind: Soviet Intrabloc Relations