Caesar 34 - Trends in Soviet Thought on Limited Warfare

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE

16 December 1963

TRENDS IN SOVIET THOUGHT ON L I M I T E D WARFARE

DD/I STAFF STUDY

. CIA/RSS

REFERENCE TITLE: CAESAR X X I___...-



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. . . . .. .CAESAR XXIO f f . S e r . No. 15

TRENDS I N SOVIET THOUGHT ON LIMITED WARFARE

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T h i s is a working pape r, prepared in suppor t o fN IE 11-14-63, "C apa b i l i t i e s o f . t he Sov ie t Genera l Purpose

Forces , 1963-1969," Pr im ar i l y on t h e b a s i s of open Sovie tm i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l w r i ti n g s, t h i s r e p o r t a t te m pt s t oi d e n t i f y new t r e n d s in S o v i e t t h i n k i n g on l im i t e d w a r f a r eand to p r ob e t h e i r p o s s i b l e c on se qu en ce s f o r S o v i e t m i l i -

t a r y p o l i cy , or f o r e i g n p o l i c y as i t r e l a t e s t o t h e manage-ment of l o c a l c r i s e s .

Although the writer has benef i t ed f rom the sugges -t i o n s and r e s e a r c h findings o f c o l l e a g u e s , h e is s o l e l yr e s p o n s ib l e f o r t h e p ap er a s a whole. The DD/ I ResearchS t a f f would welcome comment on t h e pap er, ad dr es se d t oI rwin P. Aalpern, who wrote it, o r t o the Chie f or DeputyC hief o f t h e S t a f f .

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TRENDS I N SOVIET THOUGHT ON LIMITED WARFARE

Page-. THE EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE 1

Toward Greater T a ct i ca l F l e x i b i l i t y

Toward Strategic Nuclear S ta lemate

Motivating F a c t o r s

11. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

The European Theater

The Nuclear Problem

Distant Limited M il i ta r y Action

E f f e c t on Weapons and T r a i n i n g

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TRENDS # I N SOVIET THOUGHT ON LIMITED WARFARE

Summary

Responsive t o a changing world around them and seek-ing new oppo r tu n i t i e s t o advance t h e power and p re s t ig e oft h e USSR, t h e So vi e ts have embarked on a new cou rse i nt h e i r t h i n k i n g on t h e q u e s t i o n o f l i m i t e d warfare. Whereast h e S o v i e t s h ad e a r l i e r assumed a r i g i d n e g a t i v e s t a n c e on

d i r e c t involvement i n l i m i t e d w a r fa r e , e s p e c i a l l y i n E ur op e,they now appear t o wish t o h av e t h e o p t i o n t o u s e t h e i rm i l i t a r y f o r c e s on a s u b - s t r a t e g i c sca le . In g e n e r a l , t h e ye v in c e a s t r o n g i n t e r e s t i n g ai ni ng g re a t e r f l e x i b i l i t y i nt h e management of l o c a l c r i s e s and, i n r e c e n t m i l i t a r ywr i t ings , have sough t t o communicate t h i s i n t e r e s t t o t h eWest, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e U ni te d S t a t e s , which h a s a l soe v in c ed an i n t e r e s t i n r ed u ci n g t h e r i s k s o f r a p i d escala-t i o n f r o m small-scale warfa re i n Europe as w e l l as i n o t h erc r i t i c a l a r e a s of t h e world.

There is no i n d i c a t i o n , ho wever, t h a t t h e S o v i e t sare i n t e r e s t e d i n b r i ng i ng greater f l e x i b i l i t y t o t h e realm

of s t r a t e g i c warfare. On t h e c o n tr a ry , t h e S o v ie t s co n s i s t -e n t l y r e j ec t as imprac t icab le , immoral, and unacceptablet o them U.S. t h e o r i e s o n c o n t r o l l e d s t r a t e g i c wa r fa r e.R a the r , t h e S o v i e t s stress t h a t t h e a d v e r s a r i e s w i l l f i g h tt o a d e c i s i o n i n a g e n e r a l n u c l e a r w a r ; t h e y dramatize t h eh o r r o r s of s uc h a w a r and t h e c e r t a i n t y t h a t none w i l lescape widespread nuc l ea r des t ru c t i on . The Sov i e t s , hence ,wish t o p r e s e r v e t h e i d e a of n u c l e a r stalemate or s t r a t e g i cm i l i t a r y s t a b i l i t y - - n o t t o undermine i t . This closes t h ec i r c le , f o r t h e f r e e z i n g of s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y power t e n d st o make t h e l oca l u s e of m i l i t a r y f o r c e p o s s i b l e w it h a lowr i s k of e s c a l a t i o n . In s h o r t , g r e a t e r " t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y "and mutual ly- acknowledged " s t ra te gi c in f l e x i b i lity" appeart o b e c o r r e l a t i v e o b j e c t i v e s of t h e S o v i e t l e ad e r s h i p .

I t is p er ha ps t o o e a r l y t o estimate with conf idencet h e impac t which th e observed t r en d i n Sov ie t though t w i l l

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have on m i l i t a r y p o li c y , b ot h i n re g ar d t o t h e managementof crises a nd t h e t r a i n i n g and e q u ip p in g of ' S o vi e t t r o o p s ,F or o ne t h in g , S o v i e t d o c t r i n e s t i l l appears t o be in afo rmat ive s t a t e , as is U.S.-NATO d o c t r i n e o n t h e p r ob le mof l i m i t e d w a r f a r e i n t h e E ur op ea n t h e a t e r . Even i fe n t i r e l y f i r me d up, t h e d o c t r i n e w o u l d be an inadequateb a s i s f o r f o r e c a s t i n g S o v ie t b eh av io r in a l o c a l cr is isbecause, i n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , how S o v i e t l eader s reac tw i l l depend no t on any es ta b l i s he d doc t r i ne bu t on t h e i rassessment a t t h e c r i t i c a l t i m e of t h e r i s k s i n v o lv e d a n dof t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s t o e x e r c i s e v a r i o u s o p t i o n s . T h att h e S o v i e t leaders a pp ea r t o b e r e ac h i ng f o r t h e o p t i o n t ou s e e lements o f t h e i r m i l i t a r y f o r c e s t o r e so l v e l o c a l

i s sues does no t , o f course, mean tha t the Sov ie t s w i l l u s ethem f o r t h a t purpose . But they p robab ly c a l c u l a t e t h a tsuch an op t ion is i n d i s p e n s a b l e in an environment ofmutua l ly acknowledged s t ra teg ic stalemate.

Where increased t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y is l i k e l y t oa f f e c t S o v i e t p o l i c y i n Eu ro pe , i n t h e absence of a n i d e a lstalemate, is i n s i t u a t i o n s i n w hich t h e U.S. and Sovie ti n t e r e s t i n p r e ve n ti n g e s c a l a t i o n t a k e s precedence overt h e i s s u e immedia te ly a t s t a k e . Thus, it is u n l i k e l y t h a tt h e So vi et s would a t tempt t o s e t t l e t h e B e r l i n q u e s ti o nby m i l i t a r y means a s l o n g a s t h e United S t a t e s makes c l e a rand c r e d i b l e i t s d e t e r m in a ti o n t o d ef en d t h e Western s t a k ei n B e r l i n w i th s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y power, if necessa ry .

S i m i l a r l y , it i s u n l i k e l y t h a t t h e S o v i e t s would launchan a l l - ou t conven t iona l a t t ac k aga ins t Europe as long ast a c t i c a l n u c l e a r w e a p o n s are o n s t a n d b y i n NATO forcest h e r e , and U.S. d o c t r i n e s t a t e s t h a t t h e s el f- im po se darmaments res t ra in t would be abandoned i f i t i n t e r f e r e sw i th t h e b u s in e s s of winning. Rath er, under s u c h c o n d i t i o n s(of a n i m p e r f e c t s t r a t e g i c s talemate) S o v i e t e x p e c t a t i o n sf o r Western acceptance at' t h e i r b i d f o r " t a c t i c a l f l e x i -b i l i t y " seems t o b e i n t h e s p h e r e o f p l a i n l y d e f e n s i vea c t i o n s , such as a rebuf f o f a West German a t ta ck a ga in s tEast Germany.r i s k s of r a p i d e s c a l a t i o n t o gener a l war -- r i sks the y hadp r e v io u s ly r e g a r d ed a s so g r e a t as t o i n h i b i t even a S o v ie td e f e n s i ve o p e r a t i o n i f t h i s meant engaging t h e a t t a c k e r s

i n a l a r g e s c a l e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n Europe.

Thu s,' .th ey now appe ar t o b e r e a s s e s s i n g t h e

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I t is hard t o e s t i m a t e t h e s c a l e of l i m i t e d w a r fa r ei n Europe on which t h e S ov ie ts wo u l d be w i l l i n g t o f i g h tw i t h o u t r e s o r t i n g t o s t r a t e g i c weapons. Ful l -scale conven-t i o n a l war i n Europe, whi le t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s are a v a i l a b l et o both s i d es , seems improbable as a S o v ie t e x p e c t a t i o n .The deep-grained f e a r of t h e consequences of a di rec t mas-s i v e conf ron ta t ion between S ov ie t and American t r oops i nEurope w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y c o nt in ue t o work t o avoid sucha c la sh . I t is still n o t c l e a r whether the Sovie t concep-t i o n of t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y e xt en ds t o t h e u s e of t a c t i c a ln u c l e a r s i n l i m i t e d warfare i n Europe. Do ct ri na l pronounce-ments on the problem tend t o be ambivalent. While somes t a t e m e n t s c o n s id e r t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s a r e a l i s t i c poss i -

b i l i t y w i t h which Sov ie t fo rce s m u s t be p r e pa r ed t o d e a li n a l o c a l c r i s i s , most stress t h e l i k e l i h o o d of e s c a l a t i o ni f nuc lea r weapons are employed. The amb iva len ce may, onth e one hand, be in tended s imul taneo usly t o deter t h eUnited St a t e s from r e s o r t i n g t o t a c t i c a l nuc lea rs and ,f a i l i n g t h a t , t o avo id conf ron t ing t h e United St a t e s withan unambiguous promise of es ca la ti on ; on t h e o th e r h a n d ,i t may r e f l e c t d i f f e r e n t a s se s sm e nt s -by S o v i e t s p e c i a l i s t sof t h e r i s k s in vol ved i n e i t h e r i n i t i a t i n g t h e u s e oft a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s , o r r e sp o nd ing i n kin d t o t h e opponent 'si n i t i a t i v e i n a l oc a l co nf l i c t . Outs ide th e European f rame-work, i n l i m i t e d c o n f l i c t s i n un de rd ev elop ed areas wheret h e r e is no d i r e c t c o n f r o n t a t i o n b e tw e e n U , S . and Sovie tf o r c e s , t h e S o v i e t s , b y o mi s sio n o f s t a t e m e n t s t o the con-

t r a r y , s e e m t o regard t h e u s e of t a c t i c a l nuc lea rs by oneof t h e major powers as a l ess dangerous course of a c t i o n .

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D is t a n t L i m i t e d Mil i ta rv Ac t ion'. _.. ..:

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The So v ie t sea rch f o r g r e a t e r t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t yi n t h e Middle E a s t and Southeast Asia h a s a l r e a d y a f f e c t e dpo l icy . . Beginning i n 1962 , th e So v ie t s have demons t rateda w i l l i n g n e s s t o u s e S o v i e t t r o o p s i n combat s i t u a t i o n s i nl o c a l c r i s e s on an unacknowledged b a s i s .ence i n t h e Indonesian-West New Guinea cr i s i s and the UAR-Yemen w a r r e f l e c t s a t t h e ve ry l e a s t a p o l i c y d e c i s i o n t o

u s e t r a i n e d S o v i e t crews while indigenous crews are s t i l li n an e a r l y s t a g e o f t r a i n in g . Beyond t h i s , h ow eve r, it

The Sovi e t exper i -

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ss d i f f i c u l t t o s a y how much S ov i e t ph i l o sophy r ega r d i ng

t h e u s e of S o v i e t t roops i n local wars in underdevelopedareas has a l ready been changed or w i l l change. W e do notknow, f o r example, whether t h e So vi et s would f av or t h e u s eof t h e i r t roops on an acknowledged b a s i s , under any c i r c um -st an ce s, nor how l a rge a m i l i t a r y fo rce they would be w i l l -i ng t o commit i n a l o c a l c o n f l i c t in t h e Middle E a s t orSoutheas t Asia. In a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , t h e S ov i e t s have no ty e t changed t h e i r es t imate t h a t d i r e c t involvement of S ov i e ta n d U.S. forces e ve n i n d i s t a n t areas , wou l d be ex t remelydangerous. (There was ev i den t l y neve r any p l an t o employS ov i e t t roops based in C u b a . i n a s t r i c t l y l oc a l w a r betweent h e United S t a t e s and Cuba.) There is no t on l y t h e f e a r of

e s c a l a t i o n t h a t r e s t r a i n s t h e Soviets . There is a l s o t h ef a c t t h a t t h e USSR has a ve ry l i m i t e d c a p a b i l i t y fo r con-duc t i ng warfare a t any d i s t ance f rom t h e bloc. Therefore,un l e s s and un t i l t hese r e s t r a i n t s are l i f t e d , t h e USSRw i l l probab l y t ry t o avoid (1) any di rec t involvement w i t hU.S. forces in d i s t a n t areas , and (2) any p u b l i c knowledgeof t h e employment of S ov i e t t roops i n combat in d i s t a n tareas.

S o v i e t t h i n k i n g on l i m i t e d warfare seems t o be movingin t h e d i r e c t i o n of a t t a i n i n g s t i l l greater p o l i t i c a l - m i l i -t a r y m a ne uv er ab il it y i n d i s t a n t areas. B e c a u s e t h e S o v i e t sare s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d i n a i r l i f t , s e a l i f t , and naval s u p p o r ts u i t a b l e f o r d i s t a n t m i l i t a r y a ct i on s , t h e y might f i n d t h e

idea of a system of fore$@;n bases a t t r a c t i v e from t h e s t and-po i n t o f t h e i r u t i l i t y in enhanc ing Sovie t l i m i t e d warfarec a p a b i l i t i e s . Indones ia , f o r example, could prov i de a valu-a b le l o g i s t i c base i f t h e S o v i e t s dec ided t o g i v e more opensuppor t t o rev olu t io nar y movements i n Sout heas t Asia. How-e v e r , t h e leaders of t h e young s t a t e s , jealous of t he i rnewly acqui r ed sov erei gnty , are loa the t o have i t compro-mised; and , fo r t h a t reason among o t he r s , we are u n l i k e l yt o see t h e e s t ab l i sh m e n t o f f u l l - f l e d g e d S o v i e t m i l i t a r ybases in Asia, Afr ica or t h e Middle E a s t . I f , on t h e o t he rhand , the USSR manages t o win over one of t h e s m a l l coun-t r i e s as an a l l y or t o s u b v e r t i ts government, or i f a s m a l lcoun t ry s h o u l d despera te ly need Soviet a i d i n a c r i s i s ,t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e c r e a t i o n of a S o v i e t base on t h a t

c o un t r y 's t e r r i t o r y wou l d become q u i t e r e a le

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E f f e c t on Weapons

While t h e change i n S ov i e t t hought on l i m i t e d war-f a r e might have an important impact on t h e t r a i n i n g a n dequipp ing of S o v i e t forces, t h e basic o r i e n t a t i o n of t h earmed forces t oward genera l nuc lear war w i l l almost cer-t a i n l y be r e t a i n e d .if $he i dea of l i m i t e d w a r f a r e p r e p a r a t i o n s becomes f i r m l yimplanted, is i n t h e one-sided emphasis on n u c l e a r warfaree v i d e n t i n S o v i e t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e , p l a n ni n g and t r a i n i n g .B e c a u s e of t h e S o v i et e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t a major c o n f l i c t i nEurope w o u l d e i t h e r be nuc l ea r from t h e s tar t o r w o u l d

r a p i d l y esca l a t e i n t o a g loba l w a r , v i r t u a l l y t h e f u l lweigh t of p r o f e s s i o n a l S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h i n k i n g on l a rge-s ca l e combat i n Burope h a s up t o now been brought t o bearon problems of n u c l e a r war. Now, however , So vie t mi l i t a rys p e c i a l i s t s may be concerned t h a t the overwhelming emphasisi n S o v i et d o c t r i n e on gene ra l nuc l ea r w a r i s e r o d i n g t h eUSSR's con ven t ion al war-making c ap ab i l i t y , and t h a t i n af u t u r e s i t u a t i o n of a s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r stalemate or s t and -off t h i s could be d i s a s t r o u s f o r S ov i et f o r e i g n p o l i c y .The dilemma of ha vin g t o prepare t h e armed forces simul-t a n e o u s l y f o r nuclear and l i m i t e d warfare may, i n terms oft h e idea l , be ins olu ble , inasmuch as t h e nuclear and conven-t i o n a l b a t t l e f i e l d s make v e r y d i f f e r e n t , and a t times, con-t rad ic tory demands as regards mode of opera t ions and equip-

ment . And t h e USSR is bound t o be more c o n s t r a i n e d inrespect t o s a t i s f y i n g dua l fo rc e r equ i rem en ts t han t h eU n i t e d S t a t e s because of more l i m i t e d resources. B u t acompromise may be reached i n S o v ie t m i l i t a r y p l a nn in g ,whereby t h e e r o s i o n of c o n v e n t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s is s loweddown or arrested and s p e c i f i c ki n d s of c a p a b i l i t i e s f o rl i m i t e d warfare are added t h a t do no t now e x i s t . The r e c e n tappearance, a f t e r a long absence, of a s p a t e of a r t i c l e si n t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y press on t h e s u b j e c t of amphibiouslan din gs may be a n i n d i c a t i o n of such a r e ad j u s tmen t .

Where we might expedt to see change,

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I . THE EVOLUTION OF DOCTRIME;

In r e c e n t ye a r s , S o v i e t d o c t r i n e on l i m i t e d warfarehas been i n t h e proces s of adjustment t o new s t r a t e g i cob j ec t i ve s and oppo r t un i t i e s . The fo ca l po i n t o f changewhich at t imes has been so gradua l as t o be bare ly per -c e p t i b l e , has been t h e c r i t i c a l ques t i on of e s c a l a t i o nfrom a loca l c o n f l a g r a t i o n t o gene ra l nuc l ea r w a r . Therehas been a d i s t i n c t if somewhat tortuous movement awayf r o m e a r l i e r ca tegor i ca l p o s i t i o n s on t h e danger of escala-t i o n from l i m i t e d warfare i n v a r io u s p a r t s of t h e wo r l d .The major watersheds in t h i s process have tended t o fol low,

u s u a l l y a f t e r a good i n t e rva l , i m por t an t s h i f t s i n U.S.f o r e i g n p o l i c y and s t r a t e g i c t h o u g h t bea r i ng on l i m i t e dwarfare. Though re f l ec t ing t h e keen respons iveness ofS ov i e t leaders t o s u c h developments in t h e Wes t , , t hechanges i n S ov i e t doc t r i ne have been no t i m i t a t i v e b u tsi n gu la r l y op po rt un is t ic . Thei r common purpose appearst o be t h a t of a f f o r d i n g S o v i e t l eaders g r e a t e r f l e x i b i l i t yand m aneuve rab i l it y i n dea l i n g w i t h l o c a l issues, p a r t i c u l a r l yi n p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y c r i s e s . B u t there may be o t h e r ,more paroch ia l r e a s o n s f o r changing t h e d o c t r i n e , s u c h ast h e d e s i r e of v a r i o u s m i l i t a r y l eader s t o j u s t i f y t h e main-t enance of l a rge and v e r s a t i l e c o nv e nt io n al f o r c e s .

In t h e mid-and l a t e f i f t i e s , t h e Soviets assumed ave ry r i g i d p o s t u r e i n Europe where t h e y d e l i b e r a t e l y f o s t -ered a p o l i t i c a l l y t a u t s i t u a t i o n . If Europe becomes an"arena of war, I) t h e USSR Supreme Soviet solemnly dec la redi n F ebu rary 1955, such a w a r l Jwou l d i n e v i t a b l y d e v e l o p i n t oanother world war.M The Soviets were con t en t t o l i v e with-o u t any m i l i t a r y f l e x i b i l i t y i n Europe and w i t h t h e a l t e r -n a t i v e s o n l y of al l -out n u c l e a r w a r o r h u m i l i a t in g s u r r e n d e ri n t h e e v e n t of a se r i ous Wes t e rn m i l i t a ry p robe or p o l i t i -c a l cha l l enge . They d i d no t seem t o f i n d t h i s an unaccept-able p o s i t i o n because, a t t h e t i m e , t h e U.S. w a s s i m i l a r l ycons t r a i ned .

O u t s i d e Europe, i n Asia , t h e Middle E a s t , and A f r i c a ,t h e S o v i e t s saw a less r i g i d p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y envi ron-ment and consequently greater oppor t un i t y f o r expanding

S ov i e t i n f l uence i n t h o s e a r e a s . In t h e f a l l of 1955, t h e

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... ..._...... .....slliawz 1

USSR ( th ro ug h t h e Czec hs) made i t s i n i t i a l arms d e a l w i tha non-bloc c oun try , Egypt, a t E g y p t ' s i n i t i a t i v e , a t at i m e when t h e p r im ar y S o v i e t o b j e c t i v e i n t h e Middle E a s twas t h e d e s t r u c t on of "aggress ive mi l i t a ry b locs l' - -no tab lyt h e i i ew Baghdad Pac t . In 1956 , th e Sov ie t s o f fe re d t heIndonesian government arms f o r t he f i r s t t i m e , perhapss e n s in g a good op por tu n i ty th e r e t o have Sov i e t weaponsused di r e c t l y aga ins t NATO co un t r ie s i n th e area. M i l i t a r ya s s i s t a n c e t h e n became and h a s remained a major p a r t o ft h e S o v ie t a i d program t o non-bloc co un t r ie s .

. . . . .. .. , ..

. . . . . .

. .

._..._,.............

!i.,,

A t no time between t h e Korean War and 1962, however,d i d t h e USSR as s i g n e l e m e n t s of i t s own forces a combat r o l e

i n l oca l c o n f l i c e s o u t s i d e s a t e l l i t e c o u n t r i e s . S o v i e ti n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e Suez cr i s i s of 1956 took t h e fo rm ofs t r a t e g i c t hr ea t -- th e r a t t l i n g of mi s s i l e s c a pa b le of h i t t i n gBr i t a i n and France--and th e thr eat ene d di sp at ch of "volun-t eer s" t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e l o ca l c r i s i s . B u t i n a c tu a l i t y ,t h e S o v i e t s w e r e so anxious no t t o become involved m i l i -t a r i l y i n t h e l o ca l cr i s i s t h a t t h ey , f o r b a d e t h e E g y p t ia n st o u s e for ty-f ive IL-28 j e t bombers supplied e a r l i e r by theUSSR. Moreover, S o v i e t bloc a d v i s e r s and t e c h n i c i a n s i nEgypb were i n s t r u c t e d not t o t a ke p a r t i n t h e f i g h t i n g a n d ,im me di at ely a f t e r t h e f i r s t a i r at tacks , most of them werewithdrawn from the c r i s i s area. Thus, w hi l e th ey were w i l l -i n g t o e x p o r t arms ( a l b e i t o b s o l e s c e n t by S o v i e t s t a n d a r d s )t o s m a l l c o u n t r i e s w i t h t h e aim of a l t e r i n g t h e power balance

i n t h e area and t o run th e r i s k o f th ose weapons be ing useda g a i n s t m em b e r s of th e Wes te rn a l l i a n c e , t h e S o v i e t s n e v e r -t h e l e s s were ex t remely anxious ( e s p e c i a l l y i n t i m e of cr i s i s )t o a v o id becoming d i r e c t l y i n v olv e d i n a l o c a l war.

danger of d i r e c t involvement i n l o c a l w a r somewhat differ-ent ly when, i n t h e glow of t h e f i r s t s u c c e s s f u l ICBM t e s ti n A u g u s t 1 95 7, t h e y j u b i l a n t l y claimed t h a t t h e c o r r e l a - -t i o n of f o r c e s i n t h e world now favored t h e s o c i a l i s t campand t h a t t h e a dv en t o f s t r a t e g i c r o c k e t s n u l l i f i e d t h es t r a t e g i c ad v an t ag e s f o r m e rly p o s se s s ed b y t h e U n it e d S t a t e s .I n b r i n g in g t h e S y r i a n c r i s i s t o a p i t c h i n October 1957, .

t h e Sovie t s ev inced a new emboldened assessment of t h e r i s k s

of invo lvement i n l o ca l war : the y pub l ic ize d bo th t h e d i s -patch of Marshal Rokosovskiy t o t h e Trans -Caucasus Mi l i t a ry

The Sovi e ts might f o r a s h o r t t i m e have assessed t h e

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D i s t r i c t and t h e ho l d i ng of j o i n t maneuvers by th a t com-mand and t h e Black Sea F l e e t . A ga in st t h i s backdrop, '

Marshal Zhukov warned from Albania , where he was v i s i t i n g :"We are a l l ready t o s t r i k e a t a n y m i l i t a r y a d v e n t u r eorganized by t h e United St a t e s n e a r o u r s o u t h e r n border .S eve ra l days l a t e r , however, d iEGTly a f t e r r e c e i v i n g acommunique affirming U . S . - B r i t i s h s o l i d a r i t y w i t h Turkey,Khrushchev tu rn ed Up a t t h e Tu rk is h Embassy i n Moscdw i nan a f f a b l e dood and thereby ended t h e c r i s i s . And s h o r t l ya f t e r t h a t , on 2 November, t h e C e n t r a l Committee announcedt h a t it had e x p e l l e d Marshal Zhukov from t h a t body as w e l las from t h e Pres id ium on t h e grounds t h a t (1) he underminedP a r t y l e a d e r s h i p of t h e army and (2) he was "disposed t o

adven t ur i sm i n h i s unde r s tand i ng of t h e US SR ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y .1 9

Zhukov's heavy hand t h a t had steered t h e S o v i e t s towardm i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n in t h e Syrian-Turkish a i a i r W e

of course, do not know what r ea l l y happened , b u t i t : a p -pears from t h e immediate aftermath t h a t Khrushchev and h i sassociates a t l e a s t i n r e t rospec t r ega rded t h e moYes towardd i r e c t i n t e r v e n t io n i n s t r e n g t h as a se r ious mis take e n t a i l -i n g gr e a t r i s k s of e s c a l a t i o n t o s t r a t eg ic warfare. The

l e s so n s t h a t t h e S o v i e t s appea r t o have come away w i t h fromt h e cr is is are these: (1) I t i s one t h i ng t o in t ;ervene i nan upr i s i ng i n Hungary , a s a t e l l i t e ; it is q u i t e ano t he rt h i n g t o i n t e r v e n e in suppo r t of a sympathe t i c e l i t e i nS y r i a , which is n e i t h e r a s a t e l l i t e nor a contiguous coun-t r y , by making w a r aga ins t Turkey , a NATO a l l y of t h e UnitedSt a t e s . (2) The much vaunted demonstrad;ion of a S o v i e tICBM c a p a b i l i t y d i d no t m a k e t h e West any t h e l e s s r e l u c t a n tt o meet local S ov i e t cha l l enges head-on,, r i sk i n g s t r a t e g i cwarfare if neces sa ry . (3) New methods had t o be found t odefend p o l i t i c a l g a i n s a t a d i s t a n c e from bloc t e r r i t o r yw i t h o u t becoming invo lve d i n a d i r e c t c lash between Sovietand American forces.

The charge of *'adventurism" impl i ed t h a t it was

The impact of t h e cr is is on S o v i et d o c t r i n e was,re-f l ec ted i n t h e renewed emphasis by Soviet l eader s on t h es t r o n g l i k e l i h o od of e s c a l a t i o n from a l l t y p e s of lo ca l wars .Khrushchev, f o r example, declared i n an i nte rv iew i n November1957: "We mu s t n o t t h i n k t h a t u nd er p r e s e n t c o n d i t i o n sminor wars would be local ized . Should such wars break out ,

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.. ., . . .... . ..

t h e y could soon grow into a world wa r . ' ' A prominent Sovdetm i l i t a r y writer and mouthpiece f o r Khrushchev 's views;Major Genera l Ta lensk iy , was even more categorica l i n Marchof t h e fo l l ow i ng yea r :

....Contemporary s t ra tegy stressesw i t h a l l c l a r i t y t h a t t he al l -embracingn a t u r e of w a z is a n i n e v i t a b l e and l o g i c a ldevelopment. A t p r e s e n t a loca l w a r canbe n o t h i n g b u t t he i n i t i a l s t a g e of aworld war. (T l e n s k i y s emphasis)

Over t h e same span of t i m e , 1957-58, t h e U.S. d o c t r i n e

of "m ass i ve r e t a l i a t i on" w a s being kransformed a t t h e handsof t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , i n t o a more f l ex ib le po l i cy whichinvolved a new concept--the u s e of t a c t i c a l nuclear weaponsi n a l o c a l i z e d c o n f l i c t . T h i s d ev elo pm en t e v i d e n t l y s p ar k edconcern in S o v i e t m i l i t a r y q u a r t e r s .ove r i t s i m por t fo rS ov i e t doc t r i ne and m i l i t a r y capab i l i t i e s . A l t hough h i sw a s t hen a l o n e l y c r y i n t h e w i l d er n e s s , a Colone?. Petrb."i n asMay 1958 i s s u e of the now defunct newspaper scvietAviat ion had ca l l ed upon S ov i e t m i l i t a r y s ci e nc e t o v e l o pmethods and fo rces f o r conduct ing armed s t r u g g l e on anys c a l e .

Toward Greater T a c t i c a l F l e x i b i l i t y

. _.......

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An i m por tan t w a te r shed i n t h e t r ans f o rm a t i on o fS o v i et d o c t r i n e o n l i m i t e d warfare was r e a ch e d i n J a n u a r y1961, when Khrushchev d e li v e r e d one of h i s rare d i s c o u r s e son t h e sub jec t . In a speec h which h era lded a massive of-f e n s i v e aimed a t expanding Sovie t i n f l uenc e i n th e under:developed areas , Khrushchev de-emphasized th e pr ob ab i l i t yof e s c a l a t i o n of c e r t a i n t y pe s of l o c a l m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c t s .H e di s t ingui shed be tween "local wars'' and ' k a t i o n a l l i b e r a -

t i o n w a r s , l( d e s c r i b i n g t h e l a t t e r as "ine vita ble ' ' and imply-i n g t h a t So vi et bl oc encouragement of them (which he advo-cated) would not lead t o g e n e r a l war. S u b s e q u e n t o f f i c i a lSoviet pronouncements on t h e s u b j e c t of l o c a l w a r went even

fu r t he r i n de-emphas iz ing t h e danger of e s ca l a t i on . F orexample, t h e CPSU Program publis hed i n J u ly 1961 d i d not

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. ... .

. ... ... . .. . .

, .

.. ... ..

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even include a warning tha t loca l war might s p r e a d i n t ogepe ra l war.. N o r d i d Khrushchev himself refer t o t h edanger of e s c a l a t i o n f r o m loca l c o n f l i c t s ou t s ide Europet h e l a s t t i m e he made a po l i cy s t a t em en t on t h e s u b j e c tof l o c a l w a r s , a t t h e 22nd CPSU Congress i n October 1961.

. A l s o in 1961, i n open m i l i t a r y p u b l i c a t i o n s , s u ch"conservat ive" o f f i ce r s as Marshal Rotmistrov and GeneralKurochkin, began t o urge t h e s t u d y of l oca l wars of t h epostwar pe r iod as w e l l as World W a r 11, as a b a s i s f o r so l v -ing contemporary problems of m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e . This new

udy of l oca l w a r s was not however re f l ec tedm i l i t a r y w r i t i n g s

I I I I

... What t h e S ov i e t s were s u g ge s ti n g i n 1 961, i n e f f e c t ,w a s t h a t t h e danger of e s c a l a t i o n had dimin i shed in t h e un-derdeveloped areas, e s p e c i a l l y on t h e Asian periphery and

. i n t h e Middle E a s t , bu t t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n re-mained t a u t as eve r i n Europe, The new t u rn i n do c t r i neon l o c a l war was accompanied by a major change in t h e Sovie tm i l i t a r y a i d and a s s i s t a n c e program. I n e a r l y 1 96 1, t h eSov iet Union f o r t h e f i r s t time gran ted up- to-date m i l i t a r yequipment t o Indonesia . Since t h e n , Egyp t , Iraq, Finsand,S y r i a as w e l l as Cuba a l so have rece ived f i r s t l i n e S ov ie tequipment. That is t o s a y , m o s t equipment fu rn i shed themajor recipients of S ov i e t a id has b e e n i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h ematerial t h a t t h e USSR is manufacturing for i t s own armedforces , i nc l ud i ng equi pm en t no t y e t f u l l y dep loyed i n t h ebloc and not even made a v a i l a b l e t o Comunist China.

pub l i c s t a t em en t s , good co l l a t e r a l evidence that Khrushchevthought a l oca l w a r there t o be o u t of t h e q u e s t i o n i n1961. I

As regards Europe, there has b ee n i n a d d i t i o n 20

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.. .

Thea t any c imba ti l i t a r y , of c o u r s e , wou l d have preferred t h

m i l i t a r y w r i t i n gsbut GlJ s s i b i l i t y a t t h e

in Europe be l o c a l zed,a t t h e t i m e saw t h i s as o n l yvery l e a s t .

May 1962 marked ano ther watershed i n t h e e v o l u t i o n of Sovie td o c t r i n e on l i m i t e d warfare. I t revealed an awakened Sovieti n t e r e s t i n ex t en d in g t o t h e European t h ea t e r t h e f l e x i b i l i t y

which the USSR by then en joyed i n t h e management of l o c a lc r i s e s i n underdeve loped a re as . C e r t a i n S o v ie t l eader s hadev id en t l y come t o regard t h e e s t a b l i s h e d d o c t r i n e on l o c a lor conven t iona l warfare in Europe as to o dangerous and re-s t r i c t i v e fo r S o vi et p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y maneuver. Theirmalaise w a s probably one of envy of t h e United S t a t e s lead-e r s h i p , w h i c h more than a y e a r b e f o r e had d i s c a r d e d i t ss t r a t e g i c s t r a i t - j a c k e t and developed a t h e o r y of " f l e x i b l er e sp o ns e " a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e European t hea t e r . ( I n i t s A p r i l1961 s t a te m e nt t o t h e NATO Counc i l , t h e U.S . had ca l l ed f o r

I

The pub l i ca t i on of t h e book "Mi l i t a ry S t ra teg y" i n I

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.. .. .. .

c o n v en t i on a l f o r c e s a t l e a s t s t rong enough t o e f f e c t apause in t h e e v e nt of s u b s t a n t i a l S ov i e t conven t i ona lagg re s s i on . )

The f a c t t h a t t h e book, "Mil i tary S t r a t e g y , " ap-pears t o be a t cross -purposes w i t h i t s e l f on t h e q u e s t i o nof l i m i t e d warfare ( t h i s i s t r u e of t h e r e v is e d e d i t i o nas w e l l as t h e or i g i n a l ) may, i n p a r t , r e f l ec t a cont inu-i n g i n t e r n a l dialogue on t h a t q u e s t i o n , a nd i n p a r t , t h ecomplexi ty of t h e problem and t h e m u l t i p l e purposes whichp u b l i c l y enunc i a t ed do c t r i ne may be i n t ended t o s e r v e . I nsome places t h e book (in both i t s v e r s i o n s ) s t r essed t h ei m p r o b a b i l i t y of l i m i t e d warfare i n Europe, emphasizingt h a t if n u c l e a r powers are drawn i n t o an armed c o n f l i c ti t w i l l " i nev i t ab l y deve l op i h t o an a l l -o u t nuc l ear war, "and t h r e a t e n i n g t h a t a " d i r e c t a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e USSR oro t h e r s o c i a l i s t coun t r i e s . . .w i l l obv i ous l y l e a d t o a neFk'world w a r . " B u t elsewhere t h e book d i s c u s s e d l o c a l w a rs i t u a t i o n s and ope ra t i on s , i nc l ud i ng a h y p o t h e t i c a l l a rge-sca le non-nuclear " local war" i n c en t r a l E u rope , and urgedt h a t a p l a c e be c ar ve d o u t f o r l o c a l w a r i n S o vi e t m i l i t a r ys t r a t e g y . T h u s , t h e book s t rongly impl i ed a n a c t i v e r o l ein sm a l l - s ca l e w a r f o r t h e S o v ie t m i l i t a r y e s t a b li s h me n t :" S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y c a l l s f o r t h e s t u d y of t h e meansof conduct ing such wars in order t o preven t them f r o m de-ve l op i ng i n t o a world w a r and t o b r i n g q u i c k v i c t o r y o v e rt h e enemy." In an ot he r place t h e book (i i t s f i r s t e d i -t f o n ) c a l l e d f o r t h e s t u d y of l o c a l w a r on t h e groundst h a t "such a war might a l s o be t h r u s t upon t h e s o c i a l i s tcoun t r i e s t J by " i m pe r i a l i s t c i r c l e s f e a r i n g t h a t world w a r

might be completely d i s a s t r o u s fo r cap i t a l i sm . " (The r e f -e re nc e t o s o c i a l i s t c o u n tr i e s w a s dropped in t h e r e v i s e d

. ed i t io n , which ge ne ra l l y p l ayed down th e Western t h r e a t . )The f a c t t h a t f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n a l ong w h i l e t h e bookd i s c u s s e d types of o p e r a t i o n s t h a t w o u l d be d i s t i n c t l ya p p l i c a b l e t o l i m i t e d war, is a l s o s u g g e s t i v e of s t r o n gi n t e r e s t in t h e problem. Geographic areas are u n f o r t u n a t e l ynot mentioned in t h e c o n t e x t of s u c h d i s c u s s i o n s , as int h e fo l l ow i ng examples:

A l o c a l war might be ano t he r matter.H e r e , as before, t h e main events migh t

develop in t h e areas of m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n sn e a r t h e f r o n t , a l th o ug h t h e methods of armedc o n f l i c t in t h i s case as w e l l have been

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..., ............ . .

. . . .. . .I .. _.

changed considerably compared with t h epa st war,:. l jince t h e w a r wou l d be con-duc ted wi th d i f fe re n t weapons and th et h r e a t of n u c l e a r war wou l d hang con-s t a n t l y o ve r t h e w a r r in g c o u n t r i e s .

. . . . . . . . . .

Each of t h e s e t y p e s of s t r a t e g i c op er a-t i o n s w i l l be mani fes ted i n a world-widen u c l e a r w a r . In l o c a l w a r s , c e r t a i n of

t hese t y p e s of st-ic ope ra t ion s mayn o t be used o r w i l l be used on a l i m i t e ds c a l e . T h i s would be p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u eof m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s d e e p 'w i thin ehemyt e r r i t o r y . M i l i t a ry o p er a ti o n s in l a n dand naval t h ea t e r s acquire d e c i s i v e signi-f i c a n c e i n s uc h w a r s .

Although t h e rev i se d e d i t i o n of th e book , pub l i shedin autumn of t h i s year , a l s o appeared t o be a t cross-pur-p os es w it h i t s e l f , i t p l a i n l y s u s t a i n e d t h e previous empha-s is on t h e need t o p r e p a r e S o v i e t forces for l i m i t e d w a r -f a r e , e ve n i n Europe i f n e c es s a r y . E q u al l y s i g n i f i c a n tis t h e f a c t t h a t s i n c e l a s t winte r t he re have been a num-

b e r of a r t i c l e s i n t h e S o vi et m i l i t a r y p r e s s u rg in g t h a tS o v i e t forces be prepared for l o c a l w a r c o n t i n g e n c i e s , in-c l u d i n g t h e u s e of t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s . - Note how t h e s t a t e -ments , i n chrono lo g ica l p rogress ion , t end t o become mores p e c i f i c and c lear :

L a s t January, C o l . Gen. S.M. Shtemenko, chief oft h e main s t a f f of t h e g ro un d fo rces , c o u l d have had a non-nuc le a r c on f l i c t i n mind when he w r ote i n RED STAR t h a tSov ie t t ank and motorized i n f a n t r y t r o o p s c a n " o pe r at es u c c e s s f u l l y u n de r c o n d i t i o n s of t h e u s e of nuclear weaponsas w e l l as of t h e u s e of only convent ional means of d e s t r u c -t i o n . " H e a l s o wrote e lsewhere in t h e a r t i c l e i n a s i mi l a rv ei n t h a t f i e l d t r a i n i n g of ground t roops inc ludes cons id -

e r a t i o n of b o th t h e " c o n d i t i o n s of a m u t u a l and wide a p p l i -c a t i o n of nu cl ea r weapons, and of conveh t iopa l means of

I

- 8 -8



. .

combat." B u t aga i n t h e s t a t em en t s cou l d a l s o have r e fe r r edt o i s o l a t e d s i t u a t i o n s i n a n u cl ea r war in which b a t t l e sar e fought w i th co nvent iona l weapons a lone .

Commander of t h e Leningrad Mi l i t a ry D i s t r i c t , Army GeneralM . I . Kazakov, s t a t e d t h a t t h e USSR was deve lop ing i t s con-v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s because t h e West w a s planning t o f i g h tl oca l wars, presumably w i t h o u t nuclear weapons.

i nd i ca t ed t h a t b o t h schools of thought had a common i n t e r -e s t in a d j u s t i n g S o v ie t d o c t r i n e and c a p a b i l i t i e s t o l o c a lwar con t i ngenc i e s . In what was g e n e r a l l y a s t r o n g l y Khru -

s h c h e v i a n . a r t i c l e , Major D. Kazakov wrote in t h e No. 10i s s u e of KO116MUNIST OF TEIEi ARMED FORCES:

Th is ambiguity was removed i n Februar y when t h e

In May, a r t i c l e s by a ' * rad ica l " and a "conserva t ive '*

Based on t h e d i a l e c t i c s o f r e a l i t y ,S o v ie t m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e bel ieves t h a t af u t u r e war, i f it is imposs ib le t o pre - 'ven t , can beg in suddenly as a worldnuc lear and m i s s i l e w a r . However, t h i s .conc lus ion does no t exclude t h e p o ss i -b i l i t y t h a t under c e r t a i n c i rc um st an ce sa w o r l d c o n f l i c t may b u r s t f o r t h from al o c a l w a r . W s ho ul d a l s o n o t l o s e s i g h tof t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s , t e r -ror ized b ef or e t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y of a

m ight y r e t u r n nuc l ea r m i s s i l e s t r i k e , mayforce upon u s ano t he r f o r m of war, w i t h -o u t t h e u s e of nu cl ea r weapons. Thep r a c t i c a l c o nc l us i on h e r e i s t h a t o u rA r m e d Forces s h o u l d be prepared t o o f f e rp ro pe r r e s i s t a n c e w i t h convent ional weapons,m a i n t a i n i ng m i s s i l e s and nuclear weaponsa t t h e h i g h e s t degree of combat readiness .

And Mars'hal Rotmistrov, one of t h e l e a d i n g c o n s e r v a t i vespokesmen, wrote in t h e 11 May i s s u e of t h e E n g l i s h l a n -guage MOSCOW NEWS:

The Soviet Army has a t i t s command

an ab so l u te ly new ar se na l of weapons,

- 9 -



. . ,.

. . . .

. .

, . . . .

.. ...... ..

.. . . .

wi th wel l - t ra ined men ab le t o wage bo t hatomic and conven t iona l warfa r e , on al arge or smal l sca l e , i n any cl imate andon any t e r r i t o r y .

The f a c t t h a t t h i s s t a t eme nt appeared in a newspaper publ i shedon l y i n E ng l i sh mean t, o f course, t h a t t h e message was in -t e nd e d e x p r e s s l y f o r American and B r : i t i s h eyes. (Th'e i d ea

t o which R ot m i s t rov has a l l uded , of e m p l o y i n g t a c t i c a ln u c l e a r s i n a sm a l l - s ca l e w a r i s a ne t t l e som e and ev i den t l yh i g h l y c o n t r o v e r s i a l q u e s t i on f o r t h e S o v i e t s , and we s h a l ld i s c u s s i t i n v a r i ou s p la c e s i n t h i s p a pe r. )

t h i n k i n g on l i m i t e d w ar fa re is a l s o p e r h a p s t h e m o s t s t r i k -i ng . W e r e f e r h e re t o an a r t i c l e pub l i shed i n RED STAR on2 November 1963, i n which f o u r of t h e a u t h o r s of t h e book" M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y " lambasted t h e U.S . e d i t o r s of t h e E ng l i sht r a n s l a t i o n s (of t h e f i r s t e d i t i o n ) f o r t h e i r "s l anderous"commentaries on the work. E s c a l a t i o n and l i m i t e d w a r wereamong the quest ions on which t h e y showed s p e c i a l s e n s i t i v i t y .They i n s i s t e d , i n t h e f i r s t p l ace , t h a t t h e U . S . e d i t o r swere i n g r os s error i n s a yi n g t h a t " A r e t a l i a t o r y s t r i k eby t h e USSR as a r e s u l t of an a t t a c k aga i n s t one of t h es t a t e s whi ch are members of t h e S o v i e t bloc would-mean t h a tt h e S ov i e t Union w o u l d s t r i k e t h e f i r s t blow a g a i n s t t h eUnited S t a t e s I ' Obvious ly , t h e Sov ie t a u t h o r s r e t o r t e d ," t he un l ea sh i ng of war a g a i n s t t h e So vie t Union as a r e s u l t

of a n a t t a c k a g a i n s t on e of t h e s o c i a l i s t s t a t e s would no t'mean' a ' s t r i k e a g a i n s t t h e USA.O" They next s a i d tha t -t h e book t h ey were not speak ing about th e U.S. b u t abouta n a t t a c k by " i m p e r i a l i s t forces ." I f , of course, t h e U .S .i t s e l f were t h e aggressor, t he n t h e r e t a l i a t o r y blow wou l dbe s t r u c k a g a i n s t t h a t c ou n tr y . C l e a r l y , these wr i t e r s t oo ,a re t r y i n g t o g e t a message across t o t h e U .S . ; t h e y aremaking a p i t c h f o r f l e x i b i l i t y - - t h e y want i t known th a tt h e y , , . t o o , w is h t o respond t o a l o c a l m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i nE urope i n p ropo r t i on t o t h e s i t u a t i o n , w i t h o u t a u t o m a t i c a l l yp rovok ing an a t t a ck by U.S . s t r a t e g i c f o rc e s .

t o c l a r i f y t h e i r p o s i t i o n on e s c a l a t i o n . They desc r i bed

as an o u t r i g h t f a l s i f i c a t i o n a t r u n ca t e d st at e me n t l i f t e d

F i n a l l y , t h e most r e c e n t e v id e nc e of change i n S ov i e t

I n t h e same a r t i c l e , . t h e S o v i e t a u t h o r s a l s o sought

- 10 -



..... ,.

. ... ..... ... .... .. .. ... . . .

. .

:.,.,>... ..

. .. .. . . . .. . .

.. ... .

. ,.. .. . A . .... .

from the U.S. e d i t o r s ' a n n o t a t i o n s t h a t t h e S o v i e t s s a yt h a t l o c a l w a r w i l l i n e v i ta b l y t u r n i n t o a globaR war.Much e x e r c i s e d o v e r t h i s , t h e S o v ie t a u th o r s re tor tedt h a t nowhere i n t h e book was it s a i d t h a t '#any l oc a l warw i l l i n e O i t a b l y t u r n i n t o a g l o b a l war." This w a s an"absurd conclus ion, t h e y sa id--perhaps w i t h t h e Chinesein mind for t h e y are t h e ones who have accused t h e S o v ie t sof advancing such a l i n e . T h e authors then no ted t h a ts i n c e t h e Second World War, there had been some 70 m i l i -t a r y c o n f l i c t s a n d l o ca l wars. What w a s a c t u a l l y s a i d i nt h e book, they declared, was t h a t any l oc a l war "can" turni n t o a world war. "Obviously, t h e words ' i ne v i ta b l y ' and'can' have a different meaning. '! As i f t h a t were n otenough, t h e Sovie t au thors p roceeded t o rebuke t h e U.S.

e d i t o r s for s a y in g t h a t i n t h e Soviet v iew any war "mu s t . ..t ake t h e form of a world nuclear w a r . " (Their e l i p s i s andi t a l i c s . ) According t o the S o v i e t au t h o r s i n t h e i r a r t i c l e :"What is emphasized i n t h e book is n o t t h a t any w a r w i l lt u r n i n t o n u c le a r w a r , b u t o n ly s uc h a w a r i n which thenuclear powers a re involved.

The f o r e g o in g , i n s h o r t , are t h e bes t a v a i l a b l eexamples of t h e d a r t s a nd t u r n s i n r e c e n t S o v i e t w r i t i n g son t h e q u e s t i o n of l i m i t e d warfare. They are p l a i n l y sug-ge st iv e of new i n t e r e s t s , new ways of t h i n k i n g and planningfor loca l w a r con t ingenc ies . Y e t , th ey have appeared a lon gw i t h r e i t e r a t i o n s of elements of t h e e s t a b l i s h e d d o c t r i n et h a t t e n d t o sugges t t h a t l i t t l e i f a n y t h i n g has r e a l l y

changed i n Sov ie t exp ec t a t i ons abou t l i m i t e d warfare. Thecase i n p o i nt is t h e pe r i od i c r e i t e r a t i o n r i g h t up t o thep r e s e n t t i m e of t h e d o c t r i n a l f o r u m l a which s t a t e s t h a t ift h e major powers a re drawn into a l o c a l war (evident ly any-where i n t h e w o r l d ) t h e war w i l l i n e v i t a b l y escalate i n t oa g loba l nuc lea r war.

Because t h e p i c t u r e is n o t y e t c l e a r , t h e evidenceb e i ng n o t o n l y t h i n b u t mixed, w e cannot draw f i r m conclu-s io n s a b o u t t h e p r e s e n t s t a t u s of S o v ie t d o c t r i n e o n l i m i t e dw a r . What w e can say w i t h confidence, however, is a t l e a s tt h i s : S o v ie t t hought on l i m i t e d warfa re is i n a h ig h ly for -m a t iv e s t a g e ; p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y l eader s are s e n s i n gnew oppo r tu n i t i e s and requ irements i n response t o changing

p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c re la t ionsh ips . Above a l l , i t is

- ii -



. ..

. . .. . . ... . ., . .

...Ai

.. / . (

. .. ... .... . .... .

c lear tha t the compon d i rec t ion of t h e i r t h in k in g is towardi nc re as ed f l e x i b i l i t y i n s u b -s t ra t eg i c c r i s e s .

Toward St ra te gi c Nuclear Stalemate

There is a l so a n im po rt an t c o r o l l a r y t o t h e s e a r c hf o r greater t a c t i c a l f l ex i b i l i ty . The Sov ie t s have madeit abundan t ly c lea r t h a t t h e y have no i n t e r e s t wh at ev er i ni n t ro d uc i n g any f l e x i b i l i t y i n t o t h e realm of s t r a t e g i cw a r f a r e . They c o n s i s t e n t l y r e Sect as im p r a c t i c a b l e , im-moral , and thoroughly un ac ce pt ab le ' t o them ch rr en t U.S.t h e o r i e s on c o nt r ol l ed s t r a t e g i c warfare. In th e course

o f r e p u d i a t i n g these t h e o r i e s , t h e S o v i e t s u s u a l l y impugnU.S. mot ives , say ing t h a t t h e r e a l i n t e n t i o n of the "Pentagonbras s h a t s " is t o c o nv in ce t h e U.S. people tha t n u c l e a r w a rneed not be h o r r i b l e . The S o v i e t s , fo r t h e i r p a r t , drama-t i z e t h e hor ror s o f g e n e r a l n u c l e a r war a n d t h e c e r t a i n t yt h a t n e i t h e r s i d e w i l l escape widespread d es t ruc t io n ; t h e ys t ress , i n a dd i ti on , t h a t because of t h e ideo log ica l p rob-l e m , t h e a d v e r s a r i e s w i l l be bound t o f i g h t t o a d e c i s i o ni n s u c h a war.

1 n" our vi ew , t h i s p u b l i c s t a n c e is not s imply a pro-paganda harangue intended t o p or tr ay t h e USSR as a championof peace. The Sov ie t s obvio usly have a s t r o n g i n t e r e s t i na v o id in g g e n e r a l w a r . They have made i t c lea r t h a t t h e y

f u l l y u nd er st an d t h e s i z e and power of' Amer ican s t ra teg icf o r c e s . And t h e r e is no r e as on t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e y haveb e e n shaken of t h e mani feS t conv ic t ion t h a t a g e n e r a l n u c l e a rw a r wo u l d n o t s p a r e t h e USSR u n a c c e p t a b l e d e s t r u c t i o n , ir -r e s p e c t i v e o f t h e condi t ions under which the w a r had begun.A s s t a t e d i n a r e c e n t U.S. n a t i o n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e e s t im a $ e,t h e a v a i l a b l e e v id e n c e d o e s n o t s u g g e s t t h a t t h e S o v ie tl eaders a re b u i l d i n g t h e i r f o r c e s t o ach ieve a p o s i t i o nfrom which th ey could launch a del ibera te a t t a c k on t h eWest and count on r ed uc in g r e t a l i a t i o n t o l e v e l s t h a t wou l dbe i n any sen se to le rab le . U nles s and u n t i l t h e S o v i e t sachieve such a p o s i t i o n , t h e y a lm os t c e r t a i n l y w i l l n o tr e g a r d t h e i n i t i a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c w a r f a r e by t he m se lve sa r a t i o n a l co u r se of a c t i o n .

- 1 2 -



. . .. .

... .

. . .. .. . . . .. . .. .. . .

, . . .. ..

. :.... .:..:q. . ... .. .2,.*......

Whether or n o t t h e S o v i e t s r e a l l y b e l i e v e t h a t , oncet h e s t r a t e g i c t h r e s h o l d is c r o s s e d , t h e w a r cannot bebrought u n d e r c o n t r o l , is, of course, beyond our a b i l i t yto ' know. Whatever they believe now, t h e r e is always t h ep o s s i b i l i t y t h a t th ey might ac t d i f f e r e n t l y in t h e m i d s tof a r e a l emergency. A l l w e can say a t t h i s t i m e is t h a ti t is p l a i n l y n o t in t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e USSR t o adm i t tot h e p o s s i b i l i t y f c o n t r o l l i n g g e n e r al w a r once i t h a ss t a r t e d . To do so wou l d have the e f f ec t of underminingt h e n o t io n which t h e S o v i e t s a re t r y i n g t o p r e s e r v e of as t r a t e g i c s ta lema te . General war has g o t t o be t h o u g h t ofas an almost im pos s ib l e course of a c t i o n if t h e s talemateis t o be general 'ly acknowledged.

Motivat ing Factors

Apart f r o m t h e w i s h t o avo id genera l war and t h epropaganda benef i t s t o be d e r iv e d f ro m d e p lo r in g t h e i deaof making i t manageable, t here are a number of s t r o n g p o l i -t i c a l reasons why t h e S o v i e t s are s e e k in g t o make t h es t r a t e g i c power s i t u a t i o n more, n o t l e s s , r i g i d . For onet h i n g , t h e o r e t i c a l l y , a s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r stalemate--whichd i m i n i s h e s g r e a t l y t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of s t r a t e g i c t h r e a t s andt e n d s t o preven t t h e u s e of s t ra teg ic ,mi l i t a ry power - -makesp o s s i b l e t h e u s e of m i l i t a r y force on a sub-s t ra teg ic s c a l e( no t d i r e c t l y i n v ol v i ng t h e t e r r i t o r i e s of t h e major ad-

v e r s a r i e s ) w i t h a low r i s k of es ca la t i on . The achievementof " s t r a t eg i c i n f l e x i b i l i t y , " as i t were t e n d s t o be as i n e quo non f o r g r ea t e r " t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y " in t h es e n s e of l i m i t e d warfare p o s s i b i l i t i e s . T h e y are , in s h o r t ,c o r r e l a t i v e a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e S o v ie t regime.

f l e x i b i l i t y and s t r a t e g i c i n f l e x i b i l i t y is r e a d i l y u n d e r -s t a n d a b l e in terms of t h e E uro pe an s i t u a t i o n . I t is c l e a rt o t h e S o v ie t s t h a t t h e United Sta tes d e f e n d s i t s s t akesin Europe pr imari ly w i t h s t r a t e g i c power, and t h e l e s senedp o s s i b i l i t y of i t s u s e through acquiescense in a s t r a t e g i cn u c l e a r s ta lemate is th e r e f o re an impor tant Sov ie t goal .The Sovie ts are q u i c k to agree w i t h any American suggestion

t h a t a "balance" of m i l i t a r y power has been reached, whereby

A s a p r a c t i c a l p r o b l e m , t h e S o v i e t d e s i g n f o r t a c t i c a l

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I I



I . . . . . ,. . . ..... .. .

. ... .

.. ..., ...... \ . . . .. .. ... ... . .. .. . . .. .

n e i t h e r s i d e c a n impose i t s w i l l on i t s adve r sa ry by t h et h r e a t or u s e of s t r a t e g i c forces. A t o ne p o i n t , i n th e. f i r s t e d i t i o n of t h e book " M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y , " t h e a u t h o r s

wrote t h a t American s t r a t e g i s t s "have begun t o understand"t h a t t h e m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c nuc lear weapons i n th eU.S. and USSR has a l re ady brought about a n u c l e a r stalemate. '

The o r i g i n a l e d i t i o n went so f a r as t o s a y ( im pl yi ng t h a tt h e S ov i e t s endo r sed t h i s no t i on ) t h a t " t h e growth of nuc l ea r -missile power is i n v e r s e l y p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t yof i t s u s e . " To sugges t t h a t t h e massing of weapons has I r

i nc re as ed s t a b i l i t y , of course, c o n t r a d i c t s t h e t r a d i t i o n a lS ov ie t l i n e t h a t t h e arms race i n c r e a s e s t h e danger of w a r ;i t w a s probably f o r t h i s r ea son t h a t t h e r e v i s e d e d i t i o nof t h e book dropped t h e s e n s i t i v e s t at e me n ts , b u t neverthe-

l e s s r e t a i n e d r e f e r e n c e s t o s t r a t e g i c stalemate. In add i -t i o n , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e v i s e d v e r s i o n dropped a r e f e r e n c et o a st at em en t by P r e s id e n t Kennedy (November 1961) on t h eneed f o r t h e United Sta t es t o have a choice somewhere be-

tween "humil ia t ion and holocaust" a l so seew t o p o i n t u pS o v i e t s e n s i t i v i t y on t h i s q u e s t i o n : f o r t h i s is p r e c i s e l yt h e predicament in which t h e So vie t s now f i nd themselves .

T h i s l eads u s t o a n o t he r c o n s i d e r a t i o n : S o v i e t en vyof t h e new m i l i t a r y f l e x i b i l i t y s o u g h t and p a r t i a l l y a t t a i n e dby t h e U ni te d S t a t e s i n t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a , p a r t i c u l a r l yi n Europe . The Cuban experience may have underscored t h eneed t o preven t t h e United Sta tes from a c q u i r i n g i n Europet h e advantageous pos i t ion i t en joyed in Cu b a , of be i ng ablet o

u s e super io r forcesi n

a loca l i zedc o n f l i c t w i t h

f a i rconf idence t h a t t h e opponent would not expand t h e c o n i i c tt o s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a r warfare. The Sovie t s s e e m t o envy a l sot h e p o l i t i c a l advantages which t h e United S t a t e s might gainfrom m i l i t a r y f l e x i b i l i t y , s uc h as i n c r e a s e d c r e d i b i l i t yf o r i t s t h r e a t s of coun t e rac t i on and grea te r m aneuve rab i l i t yi n loca l c r i s e s . There i s , f o r example, I an unmistakablea i r of s e r i o u s n e s s in S ov i e t c r i t i c i s m of t h e United S t a t e sf o r abandoning t h e lJ ma ss iv e r e t a l i a t i o n " d o c t r i n e a nd d e3v e l o p i n g i n s t e a d i t s l oca l war theor ies f o r c a r r y i n g o u t"agg re s s i ve de s i gns" w i t h o u t r i s k i n g t h e col lapse of t h ec a p i t a l i s t sys t em in a world w a r . The envy. of which w espeak is p a r t i c u l a r l y i n e vi d en c e i n s t a t e m e n t s made byS o v i e t m i l i t a r y l e ade r s ove r t h e p a s t ye a r ( such as thosec i t ed e a r l i e r i n t h i s paper) p r o m i s i n g n o t e s c a l a t i o n , b u t

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I

an a p p r o p r i a t e r e b u f f - - i . e . , a response i n kind--to anyl oc a l a c t s of a g g r e s sio n by t h e im p e r i a l i s t s . A s e l f -consc ious power , th e USSR f e e l s ob l ig ed t o dec la re i t s ac-cep tance of t h e U.S. p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y c h a l l e n g e a n y -where i n t h e wor ld, and hence f in ds th a t i t mu s t claim o rimply a m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e and capabi l i ty commensurate wi tht h e c h a l l e n g e . Thus t h e a s s e r t i o n ( qu ot ed e a r l i e r ) byMarshal Rotmis t rov that the Sovie t army i s capab le of f i g h t -ing any kind of w a r , on any scale, anywhere in t h e w o r ld ,

The book "Military S t r a t e g y , " h a d e a r l i e r made c l ea r t h en a t u r e of t h e U.S. cha l lenge , as i n t h e f o l lo w in g q u o t a t i on :

, . is a d i r e c t r e p ly t o t h e c h a l l e n g e i m p l i c i t in U.S. d o c t r i n e .

. . .... . . .

. . .

The s t r a t e g i c c o n c ep t , t h e Dresi-. d e n t ' s 7 message of March 28, 1961,stresged, "mus t be b o t h f l e x i b l e anddetermined,"conduct of any war: g e ne r al o r l o c a l ,n u c l e a r or c o n v e n t i o n a l , l a r g e o r s m a l l .This concept is based upon the same ideaas a " r e t a l i a t o r y s t r i k e " t h e o n l y d i f -f e r e n c e b e i n g t h a t , whereas p r e v io u s lyt h e t h r e a t of such a s t r i k e implied t h eunl imited u s e of n uc le ar weapons regard-less of the sca le of /€he ex i s t i ng 7 con-f l i c t , . . i . e . , a g e n e r a r n u c l e ar war, nowt h e ' 'r e t a l ia t o r y s t r i k e " m u s t be appro-

p r i a t e t o t h e n a tu re of t h e p o t e n t i a lconf1 c t .

and mu s t p re pa re f o r t h e

The Soviets , by t h e way, have lo ng been re sp on si vet o deve lopments i n Wes te rn s t r a t e g i c th ink in g and doc t r ine ,as w e l l as t o m i l i t a r y h a rd wa re i n NATO arsena l s . Thus ,i t w a s above a l l owing t o t h e i r f e a r of s t rong Westernre l i ance on n u c l e a r s , i n t h e e v e n t of w a r i n E ur op e, t h a tt h e S o v i e t s t oo k a very d i m view of t h el i m i t i n g t h e s co pe of armed c o n f l i c t there .Sovie t mi l i t a ry documents (pub l i shed p r io r ta s s e r t e d t h a t NATO has no l i m i t e d war doc t r ine , t h a t i td oe s n o t p l a n t o f i g h t any s e r i o u s convent ional war, t h a tt h e ( im pu te d) i n f e r i o r co n ve n t io n a l s t r e n g t h of NATO is

compensated f o r ( i n Western plann ing) by nu cl ea r weapons,and . th at a l l c a l c u l a t i o n s of t h e NATO command are based on

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... .

\._.... .. . ... . ... ) _ .

. .. . ..

..... ,. . . .., . . . . ,

t h e u s e of n u c l e a r weapons. Now i t is t r u e t h a t t h e S o v ie tsh av e f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s c l o s e l y fo l lo w ed s t r a t e g i c d e b a t e si n t h i s c o u n t r y and h av e w i tne s s ed t h e b u i ld - up o f c e r t a i nc o nv e n ti o na l f o r c e s f o r s p e c i a l i z e d l oc a l w a r o p e r a t i o n s .B u t t h e y d i d n o t a s s o c i a t e t h e s e e a r l i e r developments withWes te rn s t ra tegy f o r Europe. In t h e i r v ie w, w h il e t h e U . S .

ma ss ive r e t a l i a t i o n s t r a t e g y was by 1958 a l l b u t dead andbur ied a s f a r a s t h e rest of t h e world was concerned, itwas still very much a l i v e as a s t r a t e g y f o r E u r o p e .

Since 1961, however, t h e So vi ets have been witnesst o c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t s b y U.S. l e a d e r s (as r e v e a l e d b speechesby t h e B e c r e t a r y of Defense among ot he rs ) i n r ad i ca l ly a l t e r -i n g NATO s t r a t e g y f o r Europe.s e r v e d a U.S. p r e f e r en c e f o r s t a g e d r e sp o n s e s t o S o v ie tbloc i n i t i a t i v e s and f o r s t r e n g t h e n i n g NATO conven t iona lfo rc es i n Europe' i n o rd er t o r e duc e NATO ' s dependence onn u c l e a r s . Other s t e p s t a k e n by t h e U ni te d S t a t e s may a l s ohave served t o c on fi rm i n S o v i e t ey e s t h i s t r e n d towarddeve lop ing concep ts and ca pa b i l i t i e s f o r non-nuclear warin Europe.

egy"--the Sov ie t s ind ica ted t h a t they unders tood t h a t t h ed o c t r i n e of "flexible response" was now being adapted t othe European t he a t e r :

S o v ie t p u b l i c a t i o n s h av e ob-

I n May 1962--with t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of " Mi l i t a r y S t r a t -

The s t ra tegy of " m a s s iv e r e t a l i a t i o n "which e x i s te d p r i o r t o 1961. in th e U.S.and NATO . has become obsolete and isbe ing rep laced by t h e s t r a t e g y of " f lex i -b l e response" which p rov ides f o r t h e p re -para t io n and conduc t no t on ly o f gener a ln u c l e a r w a r b u t a l s o of l i m i t e d w a r s w i thor without the u s e of nuclear weaponsa g a i n s t t h e s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s .

However, th e fa c t th a t th e U.S. s t r a t e g y of " f l e x i b l e re -sponse" has been the sub jec t of contro versy between t h eU n i t e d S t a t e s and some of i t s NATO a l l i e s who f e a r tha t ' . thes t r a t e g y w i l l undermine th e nuc lea r d e te r r en t , p robab ly haskept the Sovie ts f rom drawing f i r m c o n c l u s i o n s f o r t h e i rown m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e a n d e s t im a t e s .

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11. IbfPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

I t is perhaps s t i l l t o o e a r l y t o estimate with con-f id enc e the impac t which t h e obse rved t rend i n Sov ie tthought on l i m i t e d w a r f a r e w i l l have on S o v i e t m i l i t a r yp o l i c y , b o t h i n r e g a r d t o t h e management of c r i s e s and thet r a i n i n g and equipping of Sovie t t ro ops . What can be s a i da t th i s t i m e is l a r g e l y of a h y p o th e t i c a l order . There are ,i n a d d i t i o n , s e v e r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which bear d i r e c t l y ont h e r e l a t i o n s h i p 09 d o c t r i n e a nd p o l i c y t h a t m u s t f i r s t bes o r t e d o u t and acknowledged a s q u a l i f i e r s t o a n y c o n j e c tu r esubsequen t ly se t f o r t h i n t h i s p aper.

To begin, w e are most con st ra in ed when atte mpt ingt o fo recas t S o v ie t b eh a v io r i n a m i l i t a r y cris is on t h eb a s i s of e x p l i c i t S o v i et m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e . W hether andhow t h e S o v ie t l eader s w i l l reac t i n a m i l i t a r y way i n a nyc r i s i s anywhere i n t h e world w i l l undoubtedly depend noton any e s t a b l i s h e d d o c t r i n e , b u t o n t h e i r a s s e s s m e n t a t t h et i m e of t h e cr is is of t h e r i s k s involved--what th ey mayb e l i e v e t h e y s t a n d t o g a i n o r t o l o s e ; t h e l oc a l and s t r a t -eg ic apportionment of power; and how t h e y assess t h e ac t i onsa n d p o l i c i e s of th e opponent . Sure ly , Qrushchev w i l l n o tbe bound by any doctrine, b u t w i l l r e s e r v e max imum freedomof a c t i o n t o manage th e cr i s i s (as he d i d i n t h e case ofCuba), probably as any head of s t a t e wo u l d do.

. .

. .

In t h e case of cen t ra l Europe , at. t h i s j u n c t u r e, anySovie t assessment of t h e r i s k s of engag ing in l i m i t e d m i l i -t a r y act ions i n Europe is l i k e l y to .be complicated by anumber of fa c t o rs . There is f i r s t of a l l t h e u n c e r t a i n t yabou t how f a r th e Uni&ed S t a t es would be w i l l i ng t o go ina m il i t a r y engagement w i t h o u t u s in g i ts l o ca l n u c l e a r power.There is also th e unce r ta in t y abou t how ind i v id ua l NATOc o u n t r i e s wou l d r eac t when warfare i s conducted o r aboutt o be conducted on t h e i r s o i l . (What may be " tac t i ca l " t ot h e - U n i t e d S t a t e s and Soviet Union may be l ' s t r a t e g i c " t ot h e N A V a l l i e s . ) The Sovie ts are f u l l y aware of the pen-c h a nt o f c e r t a i n c o n t i n e n t a l NATO c o u n t r i e s f o r a f r o n t - l i n enuc le a r de fense and an independen t s t r a t eg i c nuc l ea r deter-

r e n t . We do not ye t have a c l e a r r e a d in g of how S o v ie tm i l i t a r y p l a n n e r s a r e r e a c t i n g t o t h e s e de ve lop men ts .

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YmJeREz

I



. .. .. . .. .. . ..':~..::

I II I

S econdl y, S ov i e t dec l a ra t o ry po l i cy on m i l i t a r ydoc t r i n e p l ays an im por t an t ro l e in t h e co n t es t of powerp o l i t i c s , East-West ad w e l l as Sino-Soviet . (MarshalSokolovskiy and h i s col leagues, i n t h e i r p r e fa c e t o t h esecond ed i t i on of "Mi l i t a ry S t r a t egy" made i t c lea r t h a tt h e book was i n t ended f o r Western eyes as w e l l as Communist.)C ons i de r t h e ques t i n n of es ca la t io n , a round which Sovie tdiscuss ion of l imi t ed warfa re has mainly revo lved . TheS o v i e t s o f t e n r e i t e r a t e t he doc t r i na l fo rm u l a w h i ch s t a t e st h a t i f t h e major nuclear powers are drawn into a l o c a lw a r , t he war w i l l i n e v i t a b l y esca la t e i n t o a g e n e r a l n u c l e a rw a r . Obviously (a l though pure de te rm in is ts 'may disagree) ,war w i l l not esca la t e a u t o m a t i c a l l y ; e s c a l a t i o n w i l l dependon t h e w i l l of t h e an t ag on i s t s . (The s t y l e of l e a d e r s h i pof t h e p r e s e n t S o v i e t regime i s sugges t i ve of supremepragmatism and opportunism i n re ach ing t h e Udetermined'lh i s t o r i c a l o b je c t iv e of a world-wide Communist -t riu mph.)The main purpose of r e i t e r a t i n g t h i s doc t r ine i n p u b l i cforums is t o deter t he Uni t ed Sta t es from undertaking m i l i -t a r y a c t io n s a g a i ns t t h e USSR i n l o c a l s i t u a t i o n s . Int h e i r propaganda , t h e S ov i e t s exploi t t h e danger of e,scala-t i o n i n s u c h a way as t o t h r e a t e n a would-be adve r sa ry w i t hmore serious coun t e rac t i ons t han he might w i s h t o accept ;t he y t r y t o i n s t i l l d oubt in his mind as t o t h e r i s k s oft h e v e n tu r e ; a nd , g e n e r a l l y , t h e y t r y t o deter him fromi n i t i a t i n g a m i l i t a r y a c ti o n i n a p o l i t i c a l cr is is o r , asi n t h e case of C u b a , t o i n h i b i t h i m from e f f e c t i v e l y r e s p o n d -i n g t o a l o c a l Communist challenge.

I t might have been the case, moreover , t h a t i n d e c i d -i n g t o under t ake t h e Cuban venture of 1962, the Sovietl eader s calculated t h a t t h e i r U. S. coun t e rpa r t s found c red i -

b le t h e S o v i e t t h r e a t of au tomat i c e s c a l a t i on from a l o c a lC o n f l i c t in which U.S. and Soviet t roops w e r e d i r e c t l y i n -volv ed. Khrushchev may have thou ght th a t U.S. f e a r t h a ta g e n e r a l w a r would r i se o u t of a c o n f l i c t o v er Cu b a , whereS ov i e t t roops were s t a t ioned , would deter t h e U.S. fromat ta c ki ng Cuba--or a t l e a s t w o u l d d e l a y U.S. m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s. long enough t o ga i n t i m e t o p la c e s t r a t e g i c miss i l e s i n Cub a .In f a c t , even now the Soviet leaders may c a l c u l a t e t h a t t h er e t e n t i o n of some Sovie t t r oop s i n Cuba a c t s as a s t r o n gde te r ren t - -a reminder t o the U.S. of t h e dange r of escala-

t i o n i n t h e event o f a U.S. m i l i t a r y i n i t i a t i v e a g ai ns t Cuba.

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O f course, t h e c o n ti n u ed t o ke n S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p r e s en c e i nCu b a is based on t h e sa fe assumption t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e sw i l l n o t a t t ack Cuba--at l eas t n o t w i t h o u t warning, i nwhikh case t h e t r o o p s cou l d be h a s t i l y w i th dr aw n or bedeclared ' Inon-bel l igerent .

A t t h e same time, t o be s u r e , t h e S o v i e t s are genu-ine ly concerned &bout t h e danger of escalat on--as manypeop le are i n t h i s country-- in t h e e v e n t of a d i r e c t m i l i -t a r y c l a s h between U.S. and Soviet forces . In t h i s respect ,t h e r e s i d u a l S o v ie t f e a r of g e n e r a l w a r s e r v e s t o r e gu l a t et h e peacetime e x p l o i t a t i o n of t h e c o u n t r y ' s m i l i t a r y power,es pe c i a l ly i n t he management of p o l i t i c a l or m i l i t a r y

c r i s e s . T h i s b u i l t - i n e le me nt o f r e g t r a i n t may even opera teindependen t ly of any expressed U . S . r e s o l v e t o esca la te ac o n f l i c t . T h e r e is a l so t h e p o s s ib i l i t y , d ep en ding upont h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e t h r e a t of " i n e v i t a b l e " e s c a l a t i o n ,t h a t once U.S. and Soyie t forces come d i rec t ly t o blows,

' t h e do c t r i ne would be a s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g prophesy. T h i s isbecause each a n t a g o n i s t might b e l i e v e t h a t t h e o t he r r e a l l yb e l i e v e s i n " i n e v i ta b l e " e s c a l a t i o n and wo u l d ac t on t h a tbe l i e f t o secure t h e grea t advantage of s t r i k i n g f i r s t .The ore t ic a l l y , however, i n a s i t u a t i o n of acknowledgeds t r a t eg i c s ta lema te , t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y is remote. Andp r a c t i c a l l y , in terms of t h e e x i s t i n g r e l a t i v e c a p a b i l i t i e sf o r t h e u l t i m a t e s i t u a t i o n , t h e Soviets would be s t r o n g l yr e l u c t a n t t o a s s um e t h i s " i n e v i t a b i l i t y I1

R e ce n tl y , i n u s i n g m i l i t a r y d o c tz i n e as an h s t r u -ment t o communicate in tent ions or t h r ea t s t o t h e West, t h eSovie ts have s l i p p e d i n t o a dilemma. On t h e one hand, t h e yw i s h t o deter t h e United S t a t e s , as sugges ted in t h e fore-

. . going paragraphs. W ith t h i s aim in view, t h e y stress t h edanger of e s c a l a t i o n f r o m l oc a l c o n f l i c t s . On t h e otherhand they wish t o a t t a i n grea te r f l e x i b i l i t y so as t o be

ab le t o u s e m i l i t a r y forces a t t h e i r d i s p o s a l i n a l o c a ls i t u a t i o n w i th ou t b r in g i ng on a d e v a s t a t i n g a t t ack by SACa g a i n s t t h e USSR I t is no wonder, then, t h a t Sovie t m i l i -t a r y writers o f t e n appear t o b e a t cross-purposes w i t h them-s e l v e s i n d e a l u g w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of e s c a l a t i o n f r o ml i m i t e d warfare.

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A good example of t h e c o n t o r t i o n s t o be found i nr e ce n t S o vi et l i t e r a t u r e is the disavowal in the November2 RED STAR of any i n t e n t t o a t t a c k t h e U.S . f i r s t i n th eeven t o f an a t t a ck by a NATO a l l y a g ai n st a S o v ie t s a t e l -l i t e , f o u r months a f t e r t h e as s e r t i o n by Marshal Yeremenkoi n an INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS a r t i c l e t h a t

The laws of modern war are implacable:no matter which NATO coun t ry sows t h e wind,t h e whole /RAT07 bloc would r ea p th e w h i r l -wind. This is-axiomatic nowadays.

. . .. . . . ... .. . .

.. . . . .. . . .

. . . .. . . .. . .. . .

T h i s is n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a c a s e of f l a t c o n t r a d i c t i o n , how-

ever, When read i n t h e g e n e r a l c o n t ex tof

h i s a r t i c l e ,Yeremenko 's s ta temen t ap pl ie s a lmost ex cl us iv el y t o a s i t u a -t i o n i n w hich a NATO country ("Federal Germany above all") .s t r i k e s a n u c l e a r blow a g a i n s t t h e USSR--hardly a " loca lw a r . " Yeremenko presumes a s i t u a t i o n i n w hich West Germanyhas a nu cl ea r ca pa bi l i ty . The motive behind Yeremenko'st h r e a t I s c l e a r : t h e S o v i e t s are i n t e n t on f o r e s t a l l i n gt h e c r e a t i o n of a mu l t i l a t e r a l n u c l e a r force (des i red bythe Uni ted States) or a m u l t i n a t i o n a l nu c l e a r f o r c e ( t h ev a r i a n t des i red by some West, European countr ies) . In f a c t ,i n t h e course of d i s c u s s i n g t h e i dea of "mul t ina t iona lnuclear forces," Yeremenko acknowledges t h a t the argumentsi n s u p po r t o f t h i s conce pt "might c a r ry some weight" i fi t w e r e a q u e s t i o n of conven t iona l arms.

F i n a l l y , w h i l e w e may benefit from t h e f a c t t h a tS o v ie t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e s e t s f o r t h t h e g u i d e li n e s f o r t h edevelopment of t h e m i l i t a r y e s ta b li s hm e n t, i t is still

hard t o est imate on t h a t b a s i s t h e f u t u r e course o f t r a i n -ing and equipping of S o v ie t t r o o p s . T h i s is because S o v ie td o c t r i n e is s t i l l very much i n f l u x , a f ac t which is sugges-t i v e o f i n d e c i s i on on a number of bas ic m i l i t a r y p o l i c yques t ions. (There is s u b s t a n t i a l c o r r o bo r a t i v e e vi d en c eof such i n d e c i s i o n , as f o r ex am ple, i n t h e c o n t i n u in g d i s -

p u t e o v er t h e p r e r o g a t i ve s of t h e m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a ll eade rs i n t h e s ph e re of d e f e n s e p a lm i n g , and i n t h e i n t e r -minable debates o v e r r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n s . ) That Sovie td o c t r i n e h as n o t y e t been worked o u t on a whole range of

q u e s t io n s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e c on du ct ofa

p o s s i b l e f u t u r ewar is made c l e a r i-n the fo l lowing paragraph found on ly i n

- 20 -



. .. .

. .<,

._ ... . . ..... .

. ... . . . .

t h e r e v i s ed e d i t i o n of t h e book "M i l i t a ry S t r a t eg y , " pub-l i s h e d t h i s f a l l :

These ques t ions are sub jec t t o PO-lemics, Es se n t ia l l y , '. the a rgument isover th e bas ic ways i n which f u t u r e warw i l l be conducted, whether t h i s is t o bea ground.war wi th t h e employment of n u c l e a rweapons as a means of sup por t in g t h e opera-t i o n s of the ground forces , o r a funda-mentally new w a r i n which t h e main m e a n sof d e c id i n g s t r a t e g i c t a s k s w i l l be nuc lea r -rocket weapons.

The European Theater

... . . ..

. .

..... . . . ......_......... . .. . ... . . . .

That t h e Sovie t l eader s appear t o be r e a c h in g f o rt h e o p t i o n t o u s e elements .of h e i r m i l i t a r y f o r c es t or e s o m c a l E a s t -W e s t c o n f r o n t a t i o n s e ve n i n s u c h ac r i t i c a l a rea as ce nt ra l Europe, does not mean, of course,t h a t t h e S o v ie t s w i l l u s e t h e i r forces f o r t h a t purpose;i t means a g r e a t e r l l i n g n e s s t o u s e them if t h e y r e g a r dt h e r i s k of e s c a l a t i o n f rom t h e i r a c t i o n a s low o r c on-t r o l l a b l e i n a g iv en s i t u a t i o n . Such an o p t i o n , i d e a l l y ,presumes (1) a d im in is he d c r e d i b i l i t y f o r s t r . a t e g i c m i l i -

t a r y t h r e a t s a n d (2) an unders tanding by the opponentst h a t t h e r e is room f o r f i g h t i n g t o a d e c i s i o n o v er t h el o ca l i s s u e w i t h o u t e i t h e r s i d e c a us in g t h e c o n f l i c t t oescalate . The o p ti o n a l s o p re su me s t h a t t h e i n t e r e s tw hich b o th s i d e s h av e i n p r e v e n t i n g e s c a l a t i o n t o s t r a t -e g i c p r o p or t i o n s t a k e s pr ec ed en ce o v er t h e i n t e r e s t i m -media te ly a t s t a k e .

I .

. . . ,.. . . . .. , .

Were t h i s s i t u a t i o n a pp li ed t o B e r li n , t o t a k e anextreme b ut c r i t i c a l c a s e , t h e S o v i e t s would c l e a r l y b ei n an advantageous pos i t i on , g iven th e p resen t dep loymentof forces on both s i d e s . The Soviets c o u l d u s e t h e i r

l oca l mi l i t a ry p roponderance t o r e s o l v e t h e B e r l i n q u e s -t i o n in t h e i r favor overn igh t . For what h a s made Kh r u -

s hc he v a c c ep t t h i s " bone i n h i s t h r o a t " f o r so long anda f t e r so many ultimatums is n o t t h e m i l i t a r y g a r r i so n i n

- 21 -



..- ........... . . . .

. . . .

.....................

. . . . . . . . .

West B e r l i n b u t t h e f e a r of U . S . d e t e r m in a t i o n t o d ef en dt h e W est er n s t a k e i n B e r l i n e ve n i f i t means r e s o r t i n g t os t r a t e g i c nuclear weapons. By t h e same token, as longas t h e U ni te d S t a t e s succeeds i n making credSble i t sde te rmina t ion t o p r o t e c t t h e i n t e g r i t y of West B e r l i nw i th s t r a t e g i c f ir ep ow e r, if n e c e s s ar y , S o v i e t p o l i c y re -g a r d in g B e r l i n is n o t l i k e l y t o be af fe ct ed by changes i nS o v i e t d o c t r i n e o n l i m i t e d warfa re i n Europe.

...........

As t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of an a l l -ou t Soviet conven-t i d n a l a t t a c k a g a i n s t E ur op e, g i ve n t h e p r e s e n t a r r a y ofm il i t a ry power and commitments , t h i s , too, seems out of

t h e q u e st i on i r r e s p e c t i v e of a s o f t e n i n g of the S o v ie t

p o s i t i o n on l i m i t e d w a r f a r e in Europe. As a prominentWestern s tudent of s t r a t e g y h a s p oi n te d ?ouf;,the inducemento f f e r e d t o t h e R u s si a ns t o s t a y n on -n uc le ar i n a n a l l -o u t premeditated a t t ack has been accompanied by the provisot h a t we w i l l abandon t h e armaments res t ra in t as soon asi t seems t o i n t e r f e r e w it h t h e ser ious bus iness of winning..As long as t h i s r em ai ns a c r e d i b l e U.S . d o c t r i n e , a n d aslong as t a c t i c a l nuclear weapons are on standby among NATOforces in Europe, t h e S o v ie t s w o u l d a l m o s t c e r t a i n l yestimate t h a t t h e t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r w e a p o n s w o u l d be u s e dt o Stem t h e aggress ion .

Where increased t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y w i l l have animpact on m i l i t a r y p o l i c y u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of an imperfect

s t r a t e g i c s t a le m at e is , as suggested e a r l i e r , i n t h os es i t u a t i o n s i n which t h e U.S. i n t e r e s t i n p r ev en t in g escala-t i o n p z a i a ly t a k e s p r e ce de n ce o v er t h e i s s u e a t hand. Ones u c h s i t u a t i o n might b e a n a t t a c k by West Germany againstE a s t Germany, or i n t e r v e n t i o n by West German troops int h e e v e n t of a m a j o r r e v o l t i n E a s t Germany. The f i r s tcase is no t o u r s c e n a r i o , b u t a Sovie t one . I t appearedi n b o t h e d i t i o n s of the book " M i l i t a r y Stra tegy."* Ins u c h a case, Sovie t bloc fo rc es would coun t e r th e aggress i on ,

*It has a l s o appeared in RED STAR on 26 December 1962,

w r i t t e n b y on e of t h e a u t h o r s of " Mi l i t a r y S t r a t e g y , ' ' Maj.Gen. A. A. Prokhorov.

- 22 -



....... ..:.,.

might s t r i k e c e r t a i n b as e s i n West Germany ("There may a l sobe a t t em pts t o s t r i ke rear o b j e c t i v e s w i t h t h e h e l p ofa v i a t i o n , a l t h o u g h it is d o u b t f u l whether such s t r i k e s w i l lt a k e p l a c e on a l arge sca le . . . I 1 ) , b u t probab ly w o u l d n o t"go beyond t h e Ya l u " i n t h e s e n s e of overrunning and occupy-i n g p a r t s of West Germany--for f e a r of t r i g g e r i n g e s c a l a t i o nt o g e n e r a l n u cl e ar war.

Another case i n p o i nt is t h e i l l u s t r a t i o n mentionede a r l i e r in RED STAR on November 2 , in which t h e S o v i e t sclaimed t h a t t h e y would r e b u f f an i mpe r i a l i s t a t t a ck"a g a i n s t a s o c i a l i s t coun t ry , b u t would not at tack the Uni tedS t a t e s u n le s s i t had f i r s t at tacked t h e S o v ie t homeland.

The point t o be made here, i t seems is t h a t up t onow, t h e Sov ie t s have been in c l i ned t o regard t h e r i s k s of

r a p i d esca la t ion ' t o g e n e r a l w a r , i n t h e e v e n t of an a t t a c kby one o r more European NATO c o u n t r i e s a g a i n s t an E a s tEuropean s a t e l l i t e , a s be i ng so gr e a t as t o i n h i b i t (ore v e n p r o h ib i t ) a s u i t a b l e r e b u f f , i f t h a t m e a n t engagingt h e at tackers i n a l a r g e - s c a l e : . m i i l i t a r y a c t i o n , Now, t h eS o v i e t s look a t t h e risks d i f f e r e n t l y a n d appear t o bee l i c i t i n g Western r e a c t i o n s t o t h i s change, I t i s , i ns h o r t , i n t h e sphere of p l a i n l y d e f e ns i v e a c t i on s o r in -a d v e r t e n t c o n f r o n t a t i o n s t h a t t h e Sov.iets would hope t oga in most from t h e i r b i d fo r " t a c t i c a l f l ex ib i l i$ a . " Andi t is probab ly on ly t h a t kind of f l e x i b i l i t y i n E urope t owhich t h e S o v i e t s might r e a l i s t i c a l l y e x p e c t t h e United

St a t e s and i t s a l l i e s t o accede.

. > . . .

. . .

The deep-grained f ea r of t h e consequences of a d i r e c tmassive confrontation between Soviet and American t roopsin Europe w i l l a lm os t c e r t a i n ly work t o avoid such a clash .Y e t t h e p r e s e n t r e a l i t i e s a r e such t h a t S o v ie t forces wouldn e c e s s a r i l y be drawn i n t o any ser ious m i l i t a r y c o n f l i c tbetween say, .W est Germany and Ea st Germany; i n t h a t e v e n t ,U.S. forces would also v e r y l i k e l y become involved.What t h e Sov ie t s migh t a t t empt t o do in such a s i t u a t i o n--if t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n p re v en t in g e s c a l a t i o n is s t r o n g e rt h an t h e i r i n t e r e s t i n t h e matter be ing fought over - - i s tod e p i c t t h e bloc m i l i t a r y f o r c e s e ng ag ed in t h e c o n f l i c tas a Warsaw Pact operation under t h e command of an E a s tGerman. Th is might s e r v e t o d e f l a t e t h e a n x i e ty on both

- 23 -



I I

s i d es a b o u t e s c a l a t i o n , for t h e o p e r a t i o n- - e s p e c i al l y i fit is a defensive one--would be d e p i c t e d as s e r v i n g a nEas t German po l i t i ca l a i m r a t h e r t h an a S o v ie t . T h a t i s ,i t would be a kind of S o v ie t p o l i t i c a l - s t r a t e g i c d is en ga ge -ment, d e s p i t e S o v i e t l o c a l m i l i t a r y i n vo lv em en t. I t w o u l dprobab ly be the closest t h i ng t o a proxy war i n Europe.

s u c h a p o l i t i c a l s a fe g ua r d, f l i m s y t hough it may seem, i ssuggested by a trend begun in September 1962, of p u b l i c l ynaming an East European off icer of m i n i s t e r i a l r a nk asbe in g i n command of a j o i n t Warsaw P a c t exercise. Therehave been three such exercises t o da t e .

That th e Sov i e t s migh t have g iv e n some though t t o

, The. N u c l e a r Problem

. . ,.

I t is n o t c l ea r whether t h e Sovie t aoncep t ion o f" t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y " i n cl u de s room f o r t h e t a c t i c a l em-ployment of n u c l e a r weapons. When t h e S o v ie t s a d d r e s st he ms el ve s s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e u s e of nu cl ea r weapons inl i m i t e d warfa re (we haye only open sources t o go on h e r e ) ,

the p ic ture becomes very hazy. W e have , aga in , on ly beenable t o p e r c e iv e t r e n d s . The S o v i e t s had c o n s i s t e n t l yd e p r e c a t e d t h e v e r y idea of ' J t z c t i c a l " nuc le a r weaponsu n t i l t h e y t h e m s e lv e s h a d succeeded i n e q u ip p ing t h e i r own

fo rc es wi th such weapons in" s t re ng th . S ince e a r l y 1961 ,t h e S o v i e t s h a ve t a k e n a more sober look a t t h e p r o s p e c tsf o r u s i ng t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s i n l o c a l w a r f a r e as w e l l as i ng e n e r a l war. They tend t o t r e a t the employment of n u c l e a r si n l oc lt l c r i s e s i n g e n er a l as a p o s s i b l e c o n ti n g en c y w i thwhich Sov ie t fo rces m u s t be prepared t o dea l . One wonderswhe*her some S o v ie t t h e o r i s t s might a l s o b e i n c l i n e d t osee it as a more probable development i n th e event of as t a b l e m u t u a l s t r a t e g i c d e t e r r e n t , which w e b e l i e v e is aSov iet goal (and an expressed American ex pe ct at io n) . Under.s u c h a cond i t ion , a s pe rsuas i ve ly po in ted ou t by some West-e r n a n a l y s ts , t h e f ac t o r s which i n h i b i t e s c a l a t i o n f r o m al i m i t e d w a r t o a g e n e r a l war should encourage t h e use of

t a c t i c a l nu cl ea r weapons i n l i m i t e d war.

- 24 -.... . .

. .



. .

I

The s t r i k i n g ambiva lence ev id ent e s p e c i a l l y s i n c el a s t f a l l i n S o v i e t s t a t e m e n t s on t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of e s c a l a -t i o n from a l o c a l n u cl ea r c o n f l i c t is p l a i n l y s u g g es t i veof a n i n t e n t t o keep t h e W e s t off balance and deter red fromi n t r o d u c i n g n u c l e a r s . ( I n t h e l a t t e r r es p ec t, t h e ambival-ence is probably seen as a way of d i s co u r a gi n g e s c a l a t i o nt o g e n e r a l war i n t h e e v e n t t h a t t h e a n t a g o n i s t f a i l s t obe deterred from r e s o r t i n g t o t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s i n a l o c a lcr i s i s . ) The ambivalence may a l s o r e f l e c t d i f f e r e n t assess-

ments among Sovi e t m i l i t a r y s p e c i a l i s t s of t h e r i s k s i n-volved in e i t h e r i n i t i a t i n g t h e use of t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s ,or re sponding ' in k ind t o t h e e n e m y ' s i n i t i a l u s e of n u c l e a r si n a l oc a l c o n f l i c t .

e n t l y p romise d automatic e s c a l a t i o n t o g l oba l w a r if t a c t i c a ln u c l e a r s were i n t r oduc e d i n a l o c a l war. B u t in Novemberof t h a t y e a r , Marshal Malinovskiy made a s t a t e m e n t i n anfmportaht p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r y pamphlet t h a t could be readt o mean t h a t t h e S o v i e t s w o u l d r e p l y i n k i n d t o t h e u s e oft a c t i c a l nuc l e a r s , b u t wou l d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y esca la te t h ec o n f l i c t . I n May, i n anothe r impor tan t pamphlet C o l . Gen.N .A . Lomov made t h e f o l l ow ing f l a t s t a t e m e n t wi thou t ac a v e a t a bo u t c e r t a i n e s c a l a t i o n : " In l o c a l war, which cangrow i n t o a world war, nuclear means of armed s t ruggle maya l s o b e used."

On t h e other hand, t h e older l i n e s k r e s s i n g t h e l i k e -

l i h o o d of e s c a l a t i m has also found i t s way i n t o p r i n t i nre ce n t months. Thus, t h e r e v is e d e d i t i o n of t h e book, " M i l i -

t a r y S t r a te g y " c a r e f u l l y w eighed t h e problem (as i f i n r e f u -t a t i o n of opposi te a rguments by e the r S o v i e t t h e o r i s t s ) andcame t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a t a c t i c a l nuc lea r exchange int h e course of l i m i t e d warfare w a s c e r t a i n t o cause escala-t i o n :

Up u n t i l 1962, Sov i e t m i l i t a r y w r i t i n g s had c o n s i s t -

I

I t cou ld also happen t h a t t h e antagon-is ts i n t h e course of t h e loca l war employnuclear weapons of opera t iona l t a c t i c a ld e s i g n a t i o n , w i th o u t r e s o r t i n g t o s t r a t e g i cnuc lea r weapons. This r a d ic a l ly changest h e character of m i l it a r y operat i ons , g iv -

i n g them grea t dynamism and dec is iveness .



. .. .. .

However, i t is doubf fu l whe ther the warw i l l be conducted with the u s e of ohlysome o p e r a t i o n a l - t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r means.Once i t has come to t h e p o i nt t h a t n u c l ea rweapons are. being used, t h e a n t a g o n i s t sw i l l be f o r c e d t o p u t i n t o a c t i o n a l lt h y i r n u c l e a r m ig h t .change in to a n u c l e a r world w a r .

The loca l w a r w i l l

B u t t h i s q u ot a ti o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y h a rk s b ack t o a s i t u a -t i o n i n which major nuclear powers are drawn into a l o c a lc o n f l i c t ; a n d on t h i s p o i n t , d o c t r in e ha s c o n s i s t e n t l ys t a t e d t h a t c o n f l i c t would i n e v i t a b l y s pr e a d i n t o a g lo b a ln u c l e a r w a r . Hence, t o t h e Soviet way of t h in k in g , t h e

most dangerous s i tu a t io n i n a l o c a l m i l i t a r y cr is is isWhen t h e USSR and t h e United Sta t es both resor t t o t a c t i c a lnuc lea r weapons t o defend t h e i r s t a k e s . T h i s v ie w, as isMnown, is shared by soLe f ramers of U.S. d e f e n s e p o l i c y .What remains--on a much less d an ge ro us l e v e l - - i s , t h e u s eof t a c t i c a l n u c l e a r s i n a cr is is i n which onl y one of t h emajor nuclear powers is invol ved. Thus, by omission of

s t a t e m e n t s t o t h e c o n t r a ry , t h e S o v i e t s ha ve l e f t a lowerr i s k o p p o r tu n i t y for the Uni ted St a t e s t o use i t s n u c l e a r si n l o c a l c r i s e s in such areas a s t h e Far E a s t and SoutheastAsia, w i th o u t t h r e a t e n in g immediate e s c a l a t i o n t o g e n e r a lw a r .

D i s t a n t L i m i t e d M i l i t a r y Action ,

. . ..... . . . ,. .

. .

The S o v i e t s e a r c h f o r t a c t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h eMiddle East and Southeas t Asia h w a l re a dy been r e f l e c t -ad in pol icy . . 'Bqg'innir?g i n 1962 *he So vi et s have demon-s t r a t e d a w i l l i ng n e s s t o u s e S o v ie t t r o o p s i n combat i nl o ca l cr- laes on an unacknowledged bas i s . From t h e t i m e oft h e Korean War t o 1962, t h e neares t t h a t t h e S o v i e t s camet o d i r e c t involvement i n lo ca l w a r o q t s i d e t h e E a s t Europeans a t e l l i t e s was i n t h e i r ' b a c k i n g of t h e Pat het Lao, Thate f f o r t , howeyer, was confhed t o t r a i n i n g and l o g i s t i csuppor t . There was never any sign of d i r e c t p a r t i c i p a t i o nof t r oo ps i n combat in . bao s , not even under t h e guise of

t r a i n i ng . However, as t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y a i d program

- 26 -

I I



. .. .

==Xc...

. . .

. . . .. , I . . .. . . .. .. . . . .

, .... , .. .......

. ..... .... . .. .. .

, _:.

expanded over t h e p a s t two years , i t added t h e f e a t u r e of1m i t e d , s ec re t i ve employment of S ov i e t t roops i n combats i t u a t i o n s on behal f of some s t a t e s r e c e i v i n g S o v i e t a i d .

The Indonesia-West New Guinea c r i s i s and t h e UAR-Yemen w a r r e f l e c t a t t h e very l e a s t a S o v i e t p o l i c y dec i -

s i o n t o u se t r a i n e d S ov ie t crews w h i l e i nd igenous crewsare s t i l l in an e a r l y s tage of t r a i n i n g . B u t beyond t h i s ,i t is d i f f i c u l t t o s ay how much S ov i e t ph i losophy regard-

i n g t h e u s e of S o v i e t t r o o p s i n loca l wars i n underdevelopedar ea s has a l r ead y been changed. W e do not know, f o r example,whether t h e So vi et s would f avo r t h e use of t h e i r t r o o p s onan acknowledged b a s i s , under any circumstances, nor howl a rge a m i l i t a r y force t h e y wou l d be w i l l i n g t o commit i n

a l o c a l c o n f l i c t i n t h e Middle E a s t or Southeast ASia.From t h e p o l i t i c a l s t a n d p o in t , t h e S o v i e t s ha ve p u b l i c l yp ledged themselves t o render s u p p o r t t o newly emergents t a t e s but have neve r e xp l i c i t l y ment ioned t h e p o s s i b l ecommitment of S ov i e t t roops .

The Cuban episode is of an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t order.I n t h i s case t h e deployment of combat r e a d y S o v i e t u n i t sw a s i n t ended no t for use in a s t r i c t l y l o c a l w a r betweent h e United Sta t es and Cuba, b u t t o s e r v e a l a rg e r S ov i e ts t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e which placed t h e USSR on t h e f i r i n gl i ne . By t h e same token, Sov iet pledge s made a f t e r t h ecr is is t o d ef en d C u b a impl ied d e f e n s e from afar - - involv ingt h e n a t i on a l s e c u r i t y of t h e So vi et homeland and no t S ov ie t

t r o o p s i n t h e Eocale a lone .

In a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , t h e Sov ie t s have no t ye t changedt h e i r estimate t h a t d i r e c t involvement of Sovie t and U.S.

, f o r c e s , even in d i s t a n t areas , wo u l d be ext remely dangerous.

There is not on ly the fear of e s c a l a t i o n t n a tt h e Sovie t s . There is a l s o t h e f ac t t h a t t h e

USSR has a ve ry l i m i t e d c a p a b i l i t y f o r c on du ct in g warfarea t any dis tance from t h e bloc, . Unless and u n t i l theser e s t r a i n t s are l i f t e d , t h e USSR w i l l no doubt t r y t o avoid(1) any d i r e c t involvement w i t h U.S. fo rces in d i s t a n t

areas , and (2) any p u b l i c knowledge of t h e employment ofSovie t t roo ps i n combat in d i s t a n t areas .

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I 1



. .. . .. .

. .... . . .

, . .. . ... . .. . ,

. . . ....~ . . ._. .

... . . .

. .

I 1

The march of S o v ie t t h in k in g on l i m i t e d warfa re seemt o be i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of overcoming the major o b s t a c l e si n t h e way o f a t t a i n i n g still g r e a t e r p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r ym a n eu v e ra b i li t y i n d i s t a n t areas , and consequen t ly g rea te rSov i e t p r es t i ge . The Sov ie t s have expressed concern overt h e development of U.S. c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r d i s t a n t a c t io n ;they have ca l l ed f o r c l o s e a t t e n t i o n t o be pa i d by Sov ie t '

m i l i t a r y s p e c i a l i s t s t o the problem of loca l w a r s ; - t h e yhave urged that l o c a l war problems be take n i n t o accountby S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y ; t h e y hav e o bs er ve d t h a t l oc a lwars are most l i k e l y t o b rea k o u t i n t h e n e ar and MiddleE a s t , Fa r E a s t , Africa and Cuba; and t h e y have acknowledged ,

t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s c ou ld be i nv ol ve d

i n l oc a l wars.The yearning f o r g r e a t e r m i l i t a r y prowess i n d i s t a n t

a reas may already have l e d t o a q u e s t f o r S ov ie t base

II

The Sovie ts might f i n d t h e idea of a sys tem off o r e i g n bases q u i t e a p p e a l i n g f ro m th e s t a n d p o in t o f t h e i rt a c t i c a l v a lu e -- n ot a bly t h e i r im po rt an ce t o t h e S o v i e t s i nr e g a r d t o enhanc ing S ov ie t l i m i t e d w a r f a r e c a p a b i l i t i e s .Indones ia , f o r example, cou ld p rov ide a v al u ab l e l o g i s t i c

b a se i f t h e S o v i e t s d e ci de d t o g i v e more open support t ore vo lu t i on ar y movements i n South eas t A s i a . A s o t h e r shave pointed o u t , the p lacement of med ium range m i s s i l e sin Indones ia under Sov ie t con t ro l cou ld have a g r e a t i n -f l u e n c e on developments i n Sout heas t Asia (depending noto n ly o n t h e U.S. response b u t on the Chinese Communistresponse as w e l l ) . The mere p r e s e n c e o f t h e S o v i e t m i s -

s i l e s w o u l d h a v e c o n s id e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e on e v e n t s : med iumrange missiles based on Java could cover a l l of S o u th e a s tA s i a ; and t h e Sovie t s cou ld see i n t h a t a us ef ul symbol f o rS o v i e t s u p p o r t of wars of l i b e r a t i o n a n d .a c o u n t e r t h r e a tt o U.S. i n t e r v e n t i o n i n s u ch wars.

. . . .

.The f l y in t he o in tment , however, is t h e p o l i t i c a l

r e a l i t y . T h e leaders of t h e young s t a t e s , j e a l o u sof

t h e i rnewly acquired s o v e r e ig n ty , are l oa the t o have it compromised.

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.... ...... .

....... . , .. \. ..... ., .:I. . . .. . .

... .:....... . .

. .. .. ..(..... .,..

Thus Indo nesia has re jec ted t h e idea of S ov i e t c on t r o l ofbases on i ts t e r r i t o r y . S y r i a wa nts a i d , b u t does not wantS ov i e t t e chn i c i an s and i n s t ru c t o r s i n t h e coun t ry . And so

forth . Under such c i rcumstances , we are n o t l i k e l y t o seet h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y bases i n , th e MiddleE a s t , Asia, o r A fr i ca . I f , however, t h e USSR manages t owin over one of t h e smal l c o u n t r i e s a s an a l l y or t o s u b v e r ti t s government, t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of t h e e c r e a t i o n of a S ov i e tbase on t h a t coun t ry ' s t e r r i t o r y would become q u i t e r ea l .

E f f e c t on Weapons and Training

The change i n Sov iet thought on l i m i t e d warfare w i l lprobably have an important impact on t h e t r a i n i n g and e q u i p -ping of S o v i e t forces . The b a s i c o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e armedf o r c e s toward gene ra l nuc l ea r w a r w i l l a lm os t c e r t a i n l y bere t a ined , however . Thus, w e expec t requ i rement s f o r gene ra ln u c l e a r w a r t o c o n t i n u e t o be t h e p r i n c i p a l f a c t o r s de te r -

mining t h e s t r u c t u r e and s i z e of t h e S o vi et t h e a t e r f o r c e s .The requi rements themselves have been t h e su bje ct of a l ongcon t rove r sy , b u t t h e under ly ing s t r a t e g i c assumption t h a tt h e armed f o r c e s mu s t be t r a i ned and equipped t o f i g h t e f -

f e c t i v e l y u n d e r t h e wors t condi t ions- -genera l nuc l ear w a r - -

has not been quest ioned.

Where we might expec t t o see change, i f t h e idea of

1 m i t e d warfare pre par a t io ns becomes f i r mly implan ted , isi n t h e one-sided emphasis on nuc lear warfare e v i d e n t i nS o v i e t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e , p l a nn i n g and t r a i n i n g . Up u n t i l1962 t h e S ov i e t s expect ed t h a t any major c o n f l i c t i n Europewould e i t h e r be nuclear f rom t h e s t a r t o r wo u l d r a p i d l yescalate i n t o a g l o b a l w a r , For t h a t r e a s o n , v i r t u a l l yt h e f u l l weight of p r o f e s s i o n a l S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h i n k i ngon lar ge- sca le combat in Europe has been brought t o bearon problems of n u c l e a r war. 1I I

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. ... . . I .

.... .

. . ..

.. . .. .. , . .

. ..

3

In s h o r t , t h e r e w a s no

ev idence of th e x i s t e n c e of a m l l it ' m y d o c t r i n e f o r t h et r a i n i ng and equ i pp ing of S o vi e t f o r c e s f o r l a r g e - s c a l e1m i t e d w ar fa re .

. I t may w e l l have occurred t o S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s p e c i a l -i s ts , as it has t o some of u s , t h a t t h e .overwhelming emphasisi n S o v ie t d o c t r i n e on g e n e r a l n u c l e a r w a r w i l l probablyerode t h e USSR's conve nt ional war-making c a p ab i l i t y ove rt h e l o n g r u n . (In a f u t u r e s i t u a t i o n of a s t r a t e g i c n u c l e a rstalemate q r s t a n d of f t h i s could be d i s a s t r o u s for S ov i e tf o r e i g n p o l i cy . ) T h i s e r o s i o n has al ready begun. Whilesome changes i n Sov iet fo rc e s t r u c t u r e have no doubt i m -

proved So vie t convent iona l war machinery (motor i za t ion ofi n fa n t ry and i nc rem en t s t o i n f a n t r y c o n ve n ti o na l f i r e p o w e r ) ,o t h e r measures ( s u c h as c ut ba ck s i n f r o n t a l a v i a t i o n andt u b e a r t i l l e r y ) ,ha ve te n de d t o have a d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c ton t h e c o n v e nt io n al c a p a b i l i t y of t h e t r o o p s . The s a m emay be s a i d f o r t h e p l a n ni n g of ope r a t i on s : do c t r i ne demands

t h a t nuclear weapons be t h e b a s i s f o r p l an ni ng of majorm i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s .

The dilemma of having t o prepare the a rmed forcess i m u l t aneous l y f o r nuclear and l i m i t e d wa rf ar e may, i n termsof t h e i d e a l , be an ins olu ble one, inasmuch as t h e n u c l e a r



.. ... ........ .. ... . . . .

. . ... ..

and convent ional b a t t l e f i e l d s make ve ry d i f f e r en t , and a ttimes, co nt r ad ic to ry demands as regards mode of operat i onsand equipment.i n respect t o s a t i s f y i n g d u a l force r equ i r em en ts t ha n t h eU.S. because of more l i m i t e d resources. But a compromisemay be reached i n S o vi et m i l i t a r y planning, whereby t h ee r o s i o n of c o n v e n t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s is slowed doyn or ar-res t ed and s p e c i f i c k i nds of c a p a b i l i t i e s fo r l i m i t e d wa r -f a r e are added that do not now e x i s t .

And t h e USSR is bound t o be more cons t r a i ned

. . . .. ..

The recent appearance, a f t e r a l ong absence , of aspa te of a r t i c l e s i n t h e S o v ie t m i l i t a r y press on t h e sub-j e c t of amphibious landings, may be a n i n d i c a t i o n of sucha read jus tment . /

I

IU n t i l t h i s t i m e , e v i d e n t l y , t h e S o v i e t s had no serious am-p h i b i o u s l a n d i n g c a p a b i l i t y . The a c q u i s i t i o n of one wouldi m por t an t l y add t o t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s i n some of t h e under-developed areas where t h e Soviets have demonst rated t h egr e a t e s t w i l l i n g n e s s t o become i nvo lved in l oc a l conf1 c t s .I t might have been t h i s ve ry c a p a b i l i t y , i n a d d i t i o n t o a

I

Inew kroop organizat ion, II

F i n a l l y , I t mlgntI

'cnaz me aoviezs nave ar; la begun t o develop am i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y t o defend t h e i r p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s i n

. d i s t a n t a r e a s , and p e rh a ps a d d i t i o n a l l y t o o f f e r new chal-l e n g e s i n t h e underdeveloped areas.

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Documents

Caesar 34 - Trends in Soviet Thought on Limited Warfare