Caesar 21 - The Failure of the Soviet-Yuogslav Rapproachment

8/4/2019 Caesar 21 - The Failure of the Soviet-Yuogslav Rapproachment

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: APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: J U N 2 0 0 7

--. Iovember 1 58SO VIE T STAFF STUDY

THE FA I bw -OF THE S O y S m S t A V * RAPPROCHEMENT. Reference ' T i t l e s 'CAESAR V).B and V I - A - 5 8 )

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYHR 7 0 - 1 4( U )


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CONTENTSPageIntroduction. .............................................. 1

The Genes i s of Party Rapprochement ........................ 2Yugoslavia's Role in New Soviet B l o c . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . 4Achievements and Obstacles in the First Year.............. 5Mounting Crisis in the Satellites......................... 7The Effect of Hungary...................,.....,........... 8A Pragmatic Rapprochement.................................llMoscow's Satellite Policy .................................12

. .The Yugoslav Party Congress..................................15Intensification of the Controversy .........,................16Conclusion ...............,...................,............21

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I . I


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. . .. . . . . . . . . . ,L,__ -___ -__ii__^_.-__ _ - . - .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. _ . -THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RAPPROCHEMENT

T h i s s t u d y is a working paper circula ted t o a n a l y s t s ofS o vi e t a f f a i r s as a c o n t r i b u t i o n to c u r r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ofS o v i e t p o l i c y . T h i s p a r t i c u l a r s t u d y i s par t of a se r i es pre-pared u n de r t h e g e n e r a l t i t l e "Project CAF,SAR," d e s ig n e d t oe n s u r e t h e systematic e x m i n a t i o n of inforhation on t h e ' l e a d i n gm e m b e r s of t h e S ov i e t h i er a rc h y, t h e i r p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s ,a n d t h e p o l i c i e s w i th wh ic h t h e y ha v e b e en i d e n t i f i e d .

--30 September 1.958

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-. .. .. . . . - - . - . . ..,c. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . I . .

THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RAPPROCHEMXNT

The breakdown of Sovie t -Yugos lav re l a t ions i n r e ce n t m on thscan be s t be approached by a review of Moscow's ex pe ct at io ns when-t h e rapprochement began a n d t h e uneven course of r e l a t i o n s s i n c e 't h a t t i m e . The d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t beset t h e rapprochement andt h a t h a v e l e d t o i t s f a i l u r e r e s u l t e d f rom N i k i t a Khrushchev'sp o li c y of t r y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h pa r ty r e l a t i o n s w i t h and t o i n -t e g r a t e Y ug o sl av ia i n t o t h e b l o c. If Moscow had been c o n t e n tt o accept Yugoslav ia bs' .an independent ne u t r al , and th e Yugo-s l a v s had r e f r a i ne d f rom m eddl ing t oo ac t i v e l y i n s a t e l l i t e .a f f a i r s , B e lg r a d e ' s d e mo n st ra te d w i l l i n g n e s s t o p u r s u e a fo re ignp o l i c y clos,e t o t h a t of t h e USSR would have prec luded ser iousc o n f l i c t s b etwe en t h e t w o s ta te s .

. . . .......

For over three years , even before Ehrushchev l ed a S o v i e td e l e g a t i o n t o B e l gr ad e i n May 1955, t h e a i m o f r e s t o r i n g i t t o 't h e bloc unde r l a y Sov i e t po l i cy toward Y ugos l av i a. E s se n t i a l l y ,t h i s w a s Khrushchev 's po l i c y , appar en t ly or i g i na te d by him andp u b li c l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h him e v e r s i n c e h i s v i s i t t o Belgrade.I t c o n t r a s t e d w i t h t h e views of Molotov, and perha ps ot he r So vi etl eade rs : t o t r e a t Yugoslavia s imply as a n e u t r a l a n d t h u s t oavo i d t he r i s k s of s e e k i n g i t s r e -en t ry i n t o " t he Sov i e t camp."3 June a t th e B ul ga r i a n pa r t y cong res s , gave a clear d e s c r i p t i o nof these two d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t iv e s .

A f t e r t h e p a r t y b r e a k i n 1958, Khrushchev, i n a speech on

I t is n o t d i s p u t e d t h a t t h o s e who s t r u g g l e f o rsocialism c o n s i s t e n t l y s t r u g g l e fo r the*:causeof peace. But many leaders who do not supportt h e p r i n c i p l e s of s o ci a li s m a l s o s t r u g g l e f o rpeace. . . . Thus i n t h e s t r u g g l e f o r p e a ce , forcesand o rgan i za t i ons o f v a r i ous v i ew s and p o l i t i c a lo p i n i o n s c a n be un i t ed . I t is a n o t h e r q u e s t i o nwhen w e s p ea k of t h e s t r u g g l e f o r t h e v i c t o r y ofsocialism.. . . I t is necessary t o s t r en g t h en i nev er y way c oo pe ra t io n between a l l s t i i t es i n t h es t r u g g l e f o r peace a n d f o r t h e s e c u r i t y of n a t i o n s .W e want t o m a i n t a i n s u c h r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Yugo-would l i k e more. We would l i k e t o reach mutualunde r s t and i ng and coopera t ion on t h e p a r t y p l a n e.

- s l a v Federa l Re pub l i c . But w e , as Communists,

Although when Khrushchev spoke he h ad i n f a c t g i v e n up t h e hopeof p a r t y t i e s w i t h T i t o , t h i s is a good desc r i p t i on of t he v i ew she had h e l d i n 1955.


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T h e f a c t t h a t Rhrushchev w a s c l o s e l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h epol i cy toward Yugos lav ia w a s probably a major reason why t h a tpol icy kemained.unchanged. ' for so l on g d e s p i t e t h e e v i de n c e t h a tTi to would n o t a s s o c i a t e h i m s e l f w i t h t h e b l o c on MOSCOW~S terms.There w a s s p e c u l a t i o n t h a t S o v i e t cr i t i c i sm of Yugoslav ia ( a f t e rt h e H un ga ria n r e v o l u t i o n i n d i c a t e d t h a t f o r a t i m e Khrushchevd i d not have c o mp le te c o n t r o l o ve r t h i s aspect of po l i cy , * but , ont h e ot he r hand, th e improvement i n Yugoslav-Soviet r e l a t i o n s l a t e ri n 1957 w a s a t t r i b u t e d t o h i s e f f o r t s .T he re fo re , t h e change i n S o v i e t p o l i c y toward Yugoslav ia i n

... l e a d e r s h i p wqs again bePng chal lenged or t h a t he w a s under heavyA p r i l a nd May 1958 i n e v i t a b l y raised s p e c u l a t i o n t h a t K h ru sh ch ev 'sp r e s s u r e f r o m o t h e r leaders t o s h i f t h i s p o l ic y. A r ev i ew o fSoviet-Yugoslav r e l a t i o n s sugge s t s , how ever , t h a t w h i l e suchp r e s s u r e on Khrushchev is a p o s s i b i l i t y i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y asa n e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e r e v e r s a l of Sov ie t po l i c y . Khrushchevon a number of occasions i n t h e l a s t three years h a s e x p r e s s e dv ie ws c o n c e rn i ng r e l a t i o n s w i th Belgrade t h a t w e r e c l e a r l y i nco n f l i c t w i t h Y ugosl av concep t s .t o impose much s t r i c t e r s t anda rds of con fo rm it y on t h e b l oc .m a j o r s t ep i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n was t h e meeting i n Moscow i n Novem-ber 1957 on t h e 4 0 t h a n n i v e r s a r y of t h e B ol shevi k R evo l u t i on andt h e r e s u l t i n g 1 2 -p ar ty d e c l a r a t i o n , a document not s i g n e d by t h eYugoslav party.a f t e r t h a t .

The break wi th Yugos lav ia w a s a by-product o f th e de c i s i onA

Sov ie t-Yugosl av r e l a t i o ns coo l ed no t i cea b l y

. ._ .... .. .

The break w a s p r e c i p i t a t e d by t h e Yugoslav par ty congressi n May 1958 and t he pa r t y p rog ram drawn up f o r a p p r o v al by t h econgress . Th e USSR w a s f o r c e d t o decide w he th er o r n o t t o s e n ddelegates. I t f e l t t h a t a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of i t s n e g a t i v e d e c i s i o nw a s n e ce s sa ry , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n o rd e r t o as su re com pl e t e bloc con-fo rm i ty w i t h t h e dec i s i o n . Moreove r, i t f e l t t h a t t h e Y u g o s l a vparty program w a s a n i d e o l o g i c a l t h r ea t t o t h e blo c. When ne-' go t i a t i o ns on t he p rogram f a i l e d t o move t he Y ugos lavs s i g n i f i -c a n t l y , t h e S o v i e t leaders f i n a l l y r e co gn iz ed t h a t Belgrade cou l dnot be s h a k e n from i t s i n s i s t e n c e on ind epe nd enc e. Moscow th e ndecided t h a t Belgrade must be d i s c r e d i t e d t o d eg tr o g i t s i n f l u e n c e ,e x i s t i n g o r p o t e n t i a l , i n t h e bloc . While S o vi et d i s s a t i s f a c t i o nw i t h Yugoslavia a n d c on c er n ov er b l o c d i s c i p l i n e had been growingf o r a l ong t i m e , t h e Yugoslav par ty congress forced a f i r m de-c i s i o n r eg a r di n g r e l a t i o n s w i t h Yugoslavia.

The G e n e s i s of Pa rt y Rapprochement: The norm a l i za t i on o fSoviet -Yugos lav governmenta l re l a t i o n s s t a r t e d soon a f t e r S t a l i n ' sdea t h a n d ga i ned momentum i n t h e l a s t hal f o f 1954. Although-2-


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p u b l i c S o v i e t s t a t e m e n t s i n t h i s p e r io d ce n t e re d on t h e n e e d f o rimproving s t a t e r e l a t i o n s , t h e re were i n d i ca t i o ns t h a t i n p r i -v a t e t a l k s t h e R u ss ia ns were a l r e a d y u r g in g a pa r t y rapprochemen t .Yugoslav Vice k e s i d e n t Kardelj t o l d a W estern j o u r n a l i s t t h a t , i n, numerous secret t a l k s i n 1 95 4, S o v i e t o f f i c i a l s ha d s ou nq ed t h eYugoslavs out on t h e p r o s p e c t f o r renew ed p a r t y r e l a t i o n s , h adr e c o g niz e d t h e Y ug os la v p r i n c ip l e o f "many roads t o social i sm,"and had so ug ht ways of drawing Yugoslavia back i n t o t h e bloc.T i t o s a i d p r i v a t e l y i n A pr i l 1955 t h a t th e Russ ia ns wanted Yugo-s l a v i a back i n th e Cominform. The Yugoslavs i n s i s t e d t o W e s t -e r n e r s t h a t t h e y were r e b u f f i n g s u c h a p p ro ac h es .

I

The S o vi e t i n t e r e s t 1 n . a p a r t y accord w i t h Yugoslavia wasmade p u b l i c in May 1955, when Khrushchev arrived a t Belgradea i r p o r t t o m a k e a plea f o r t h e " r e - es t a b l is h m e n t of mutual under-s tandfng l ' between th e two pa r t i e s . P lac i ng p r imary blame on :Ber ia , he went as f a r as c o u ld h av e be en e x p e c te d i n a d m i t t i n gS o vi e t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e breakdown i n r e l a t io ns . Khrushcheva p p a r e n t l y c o n s i d e r e d t h a t t h i s apology w a s t h e m aj or p r e r e q u i s i t et o re -e s t ab l i sh in g pa r t y co nt ac ts . How much t h i s s u b j e c t w a s d i s -c us se d d u ri n g t h e v i s i t i s not known. The Yugoslavs, who empha-s ized t o We s te r n e r s t h a t t h e y h a d resisted Sov ie t app roaches f o rp a r t y con tac t s , were p r o b a b l y o v e r s t a t i n g t h e i r case. The Rus-s i a n s a c c ep t ed a n im p o r t a n t Yu go sl av t h e s i s by a g r e e i n g i n t h ej o i n t communique t h a t "d i f f er en t forms of development of s oc i a l -ism are t h e e x c l u s iv e b u s in e s s o f t h e p eo pl es o f t h e r e s p e c t i v eco un tr ie s. ll The communique s a i d n o th i ng s p e c i f i c a l l y , h ow ever ,a bo ut e s t a b l i s h i n g p a r t y r e l a t i o n s a l th ou gh t h e r e w a s a r e f e r e n c et o coopera f ion be tween "soc ia l o r g a n i z a t i o n s." .d i f f e r e n c e s were n o t s e t t l e d bu t appea r t o have been ignore d bymutu al agreement. Khrushchev t o l d t h e B u lg a r i a n p a r ty c o n g r e s son 3 June 1958 t h a t T i t o agreed t o f o r g e t p a s t d i f f e r e n c e s a nde s t a b l i s h a new b a s i s f o r r e l a t i o n s between M o s c o w and Belgrade.Khrushchev s a i d t h a t t h e S o v i e t p a r t y w a s w i l l i n g t o do t h i s eventhough it r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e r e remained " i d e ol o g ic a l d i f f e r -ences on a number of impor tan t ques t ions . " H i s s t a t e m e n t makesit clear t h a t he expected the Yugos lavs g radua l ly t o conform t ot h e So v ie t v i e w p oin t on t h e s e i s s u e s .

During t h e Belgrade meeting , ou ts t and in g Soviet-Yugoslav

* Subsequent ly it has been r e p o r t e d t h a t Khrushchev o r ig ina l lyproposed t h a t bo t h D j i l a s and B e r i a be blamed f o r t h e break.-3-

?==.El


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Khrushchev h as claimed ( i n a speech to t h e E a s t G e r m a n p a r t ycongress in B e r l i n on 11 J u l y 1 958) t h a t dur ing t h e Belgrade meet-i n g t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s made it clear t h a t t he y f e l t t h e 1948Cominform .cri t icisms of Yugoslavia had been correct. There i so t h e r e v id e nc e t h a t w i t h i n t h e S o v i e t p a r t y a t l e a s t , t h i s pos i -t i o n w a s mainta ined a t t h a t t i m e . In accord w i t h t h e agreementt o ignore p a s t d i f f e r e n c e s , however, t h i s q u e s t io n w a s a p p a r e n t l yl e a d e r s h i p does appea r t o have been concerned a t t he B e l g rademeet ing wi th the problem of American a id t o Yugoslavia a n d isb e l i e ve d t o h a ve a s k e d . u n s u c c e s s f u l l y f o r Yugoslav a s s u r a n c e st h a t t h i s would soon end .

- n o t s jxessed and w a s ignored i n p u b l i c s t a t e m e nt s . The S o v i e t

Yugos lav ia ' s R o l e i n N e w S o v i e t B l o c : Khrushchev's dec is ionopenly to seek Yugoslav 'membersh ip i n " the s o c ia l i s k camp" was abold move and perhaps an impetuous one which he had not thoroughlyconsidered i n a l l i t s i m p l i ca t i ons . K hrushchev r ecogn i zed t h a tT i t o d i d n o t w a n t t o become dependent on t h e West and d i d n o tf e e l c o mf o rt ab le in h i s Western a l ignment . H e seems, however,t o have underes t imated Yugos lav ia ' s pass ion for independence. H eo v e r e s t i m a t e d - t h e a t t r a c t i o n s f o r Yugoslavia t o r e tu r n t o t h e" s o c i a l i s t " f o l d . An o p t i m i s t i c a nd m i l i t a n t Communist, Khrush-c h e v b e l i e v e d t h e r e was no p l a c e f o r "social i s t t ' s t a t e s o u t s i d e'?the s o c i a l i s t camp." A Pravda e d i t o r i a l on 16 J u l y 1 9 5 5 re-f l e c t e d h i s views.

Adherence t o t h e neces sa ry s o c i a l i s t foreFgn anddomestic p o l i c y , t h e ex p an s io n a nd s t r e n g t h e n i n gof p o l i t i c a l . an d economic t i e s , and coope ra t i onon t h e par t of Y ugosl avi a w i t h t he So v i e t Unionand t h e People ' s Democracies are of grea t i m -por t ance t o t h e fu r t he r developm en t of Yugoslaviaa l o n g t h e road of socialism. ~

Khrushchev's a i m s w i t h regard t o Yugosaavia cann ot be under-s t o o d e x c e p t in t h e c o n te x t of h i s p l a n s for r e p l a c in g t h e S t a l i n -i s t methods of c o n t r o l ov e r t h e s a t e i l i t e s . H e i n t ended t odevelop a more loosely k n i t bloc , w i t h con t ro l based l e s s onfo rce and economi c exp l o i t a t i o n . H e a p p a r e n t l y h a d n o t ' c a r e f u l l ythought ou t his pla ns , however , o r c l a r i f i e d h i s i n t e n t i o n senough so t h a t o t h e r bloc leaders knew w h a t t o expec t . H e hadc e r t a i n l y no t f u l l y appreciated t h e risks of t he new po l i cy .Khrushchev 's plan f o r t h e S o v i e t bloc b o th p e r m i t t e d a n dnecess i t a t ed t h e r e i n c o r p o r a t i o n of Yugoslavia . I n a morel o o s e ly k n i t b l o c , i t would be p o s s i b l e t o p e r m i t Yugoslavia--a t l e a s t t em pora r i l y - - an ex t r ao rd i na ry degree of freedom ofac t i on . C onver se ly , i n a per iod of l i b e r a l i z a t i o n , Y u g o s l a v i a

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might be a s o u r c e of d i s s e n s i o n i f it w e r e p e r m i t t e d t o remaina s a n i n de p en d en t c e n t e r of Communism. Khrushchev w a s t a k i n gt h e risk tha t Yugos lav ia migh t have a greater u n s e t t l in g e f f e c ti f i t were -encouraged t o expand i t s c o n t a c t s w i th t h e s a t e l l i t e swhi le t h e par ty rapprochement w a s i n % p r o c e s s n d Y u g os l av i a w a ss t i l l l a r g e l y i n d e p e n d e n t . Pa r e n th e t i c a l l y , it s h o u ld be n o t e dt h a t K hr us hc he v' s r e v i s e d c o nc e pt o f / t h e b l o c w a s n o t only in-tended t o accommodate Yugoslavia bu t t o reco gniz e t h e f a c t ofC h i n a ' s more independent pos i t ion . The t r i p t o Belgrade i n May1955 followed Khrushchev's and B ul ga ni n' s v i s i t t o P e ip i ng i nt h e - autumn of 1954.

*

The Soviet l eaders had o t h e r r e a s o n s f o r s e e k i n g a rapproche-m e n t w i t h T i t o . Th e i r a c t i o n , s h o w in g t h a t S t a l i n i s m w a s dead ,c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e general Soviet campaign for r e d u c e d t e n s io n sand im p r o v e d r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e West;but only temporary , e f f e c t o n world opin ion . . As t h e S o v i et ob- .j e c t i v e became more c l e a r l y o ne o f d r aw in g Y u go s la v ia b a c k a h t ot h e b l o c , i t appeared menacing r a t h e r t h a n r e a s s u r in g t o t h eWest. Th e e n t i r e ca mpa ign s t im u l a t e d Wes te rn d i s t r u s t of Yugo-s l a v i a and consequently weakened Yugoslavia 's t i e s w i t h t h e West,

This had an i m p o r t a n t ,

making Belgrade more dependent on t h e USSR.Achievements and O b s ta c l e s in t he F i r s t Year: I n t h e y e a rt h a t f ol lo w ed t h e Belgrade v i s i t i n May 1955, Sovjle -Yugoslavgovernmenta l re la t ions boomed.l o a n s , and n u c l e a r c o o p er a t i on . I d e o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s wereno t appa ren t i n t h e pr es s . Al though Yugoslavia s e n t no dele-g a t i o n t o t h e 2 0 t h pa t' ty c o n gr e s s , T i t o d i d d i s p a t c h a c o r d i a l

no f or ma l c o n t a c t s o r d i s c u s s i o n s a t t h e p a r t y l e v e l d u r i ng t h i sf i r s t year . Th e Yugoslavs warmly welcomed t h e d e c i s i o n s of t h epa r ty congress wh ich po in ted t o f u r t h e r l i b e r a l i z a t i o n i n So-v i e t p o l i c i e s and seemed t o cater t o Y ug os la v p r in c i p l e s . Thea t tack on S t a l i n r e v e a le d l a t e r w a s e s p e c i a l l y welcome t o Bel -grade .c o n s id e r e d t o be a c o nc e ss i on t o T i t o .

There were agreements Dn t r ad e ,

- message. While i n f o r m a l t a l k s may have occur red , the re w e r e

., - - The d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e Cominform in A p r i l 1 9 5 6 w a s a l s oI The f i r s t y e a r w a s c li ma xe d by T i t o ' s v i s i t t o t h e S o v i e tUnion in e a r l y Jun e 1956. Khrushchev a n d T i t o s i g n ed a com-

- munique c a l l i n g f o r t h e " f u r t h e r d evel opm en t of r e l a t i o n s a n dcooperation1' between t h e tw o p a r t i e s , im p ly in g the re had beensome previo us unpub l ic ize d re l a t i on s . The communiqu6 l i s t e dsome sp e c i f i c fo rms o f con tac t - -de lega t ions , exchange o f lit-e r a t u r e , a n d meetings of p a r t y leaders--and it s p e l l e d o u t i nmore d e t a i l t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h e Belgrade d e c l a r a t i o n drawnUP a y e a r e a r l i e r which were dear t o t h e Yugoslavs.

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. _. . . .

..

The ways of s o c i a l i s t deve lopment va r y i n d i f -f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s a nd co n d i ti o n s , t h e wealth offorms of the deve lopmen t of socialism con-. t r ibu tes t o i t s s t r e n g t b . ... Coopera t ions h o u ld be based on complete v o l u n t a r i n e s s a n de q u a l i t y , f r i e n d l y c r i t i c i s m , a nd c om rad el y* e x c h a n g e of views on t h e c o n t e n t i ou s i s s u e sbetween our p a r t i e s .

, .:. ,.

Behind t h i s facade of agreemen t, however , ce r t a i n majord isag reemen ts con t inued t o e x i s t between Tito and Khrushchev,some of which were s u g g e s t e d by e v e n t s d u ri n g t h e Moscow m e e t -i n g . The f un d am e nt al d i f f e r e n c e i n vo l v ed t h e q u e s t i o n of Yugo-s l a v p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e bloc. In t h e final speeches i n Moscow,Khrushchev spoke of a ' * m on o l it h ic c l o s i n g of r a n k s a n d u n i t yamong t h e s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s . " H e s t ressed the paramount im -por tance of uni ty among t h e bloc s t a t e s a n d t h e r o l e t h a t i n t e r -p a r t y c o o p e r a t i o n p l a y e d in c r e a t i n g s u ch u n i t y ; he i m pl ie d t h a tY ug os la v- So vi et p a r t y r e l a t i o n s w e r e e s s e n t i a l i n order t o a c h i e v ea s i m i l a r u n i t y b et we en t h e t w o s t a t e s . He asserted t h a t Western" f r iendsh ip" f o r Yugoslavia w a s f a l s e , i n t e n d e d o n ly f o r t h emal ic ious pu rpose of winning Yugoslavia away from llsocialism.'lT i t o , by c o n t r a s t , e m p h a s h e d t h a t there were d i f f e r e n t "roadst o socialism'* a D d t h a t "our w a y , , t o o , d i f f e r s somewhat from t h eroad you t raversed . ' ' H e s t res sed Yugoslavia ' s i n t e r e s t i n con-t i n u e d good r e l a t i o n s w i t h n o n b lo c c o u n t r i e s .

There were numerous r e p o r t s , some of them not r e ce i ve d u n t i ll a t e r , of spe c i f i c d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t un de rl ay t h e s e c o n t r a s t i n gspeeches. The USSR w a s c r i t i c a l of Yugoslav dependence on t radeand a i d from t h e West. There were s h a r p ideologica l debates i nMoscow.i n t e r n a t i o n a l Communist o r g a n i z a t i o n .c r i t i c i z e d Y u g o s l a v i a ' s f a i l u r e t o recogn ize E a s t Germany.

The USSR a l l e g e d l y pressed Yugoslavia t o j o i n a newMoscow a l so r e p o r t e d l yT i t o disclosed l a t e r i n h i s P ul a speech on 11 November 1956t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s over f o rm u l at i on s on p a r t y r e l a t i o n s i n t h eMoscow d e c l a r a t i o n were

ia l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t t o s e t t l e . Here w e c o u l dn o t completely agree b u t , n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h ed e c l a r a t i o n w a s i s s u e d w hich , in o u r o p i n i o n ,i s i n t e n d e d f o r a wider c i rc l e than Yugos lav iaa n d t h e S o v i e t U nion. We w ar ne d t h a t t h o s et e n d e n c i e s which once p rovoked such s t rong re-s i s t a n c e i n Y u go sl av ia ex is ted i n a l l c o u n t r i e s ,and t h a t one day t h e y m i g h t f i n d e x pr e ss i on i nmore d i f f i c u l t t o cor rec t .' o t h e r c o u n t r i e s , t oo , when t h i s would be f a r

-6-


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. . . , . . - -.r . . , . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... .... ...---- .. -----..-.---- -- _ _ . .:.. ..&--.:- - :..--. . . .. . . . . . . .,_ .---... ,

T i t o al so claimed t o have argued t h a t

. . ?

. . ..

Rakosli's regime and Rakosi himsel f had no- q u a l i f i c a t i o n s whatever t o lead t he Hungar i ans t a t e and t o b r i n g a bo u t i nn e r u n i t y , b u tt h a t , on th e c o n t r ar y , t h e i r a c t i o n s c o u ldo n l y b r i n g about grave consequences. Unfor-t u n a te l y , t h e Sov i e t comrades d i d n o t b e l i e v eus . . .. The Sovie t comrades s a i d he (Rakosi )w a s p r u d e n t , t h a t he w a s go i ng t o succeed,and th a t t heykuew of no one else on whom t h e yc o u l d r e l y s i n t h a t count ry .Mounting C r i s i s i n t h e S a t e l l i t e s : I n t h e l a s t h a l f of1956,whi le Yugoslavia was r e s i s t i n g S ov ie t e f f o r t s to c u r b i t s

i ndependence and avo i d i ng i n co r po r a t i o n i n " t h e s o c i a l i s t camp,?'T i t o a l so i n c r e a se d h i s pressure on Moscow f o r l i b e r a l i z a t i o n i nt h e s a t e l l i t e s . Yugoslavia d i d no t w an t t o be bound by t h e ob-l i g a t i o n s of a b l o c m e m b e r , b u t it w a s eager t o asse r t t h e p r i v -i l e g e of adv i s i ng Moscow on s a t e l l i t e problems. T hi s c o n f l i c to v e r t h e s a t e l l i t e s w a s a v e r y s e r i o u s obs tac le t o improvingSov i e t -Y ugos l av r e l a t i ons .T i t o l a t e r c h a r g e d t h a t Moscow had f a i l e d t o a p p l y t h e p r i n -c i p l e s of t h e B el g rade and Moscow d e c l a r a t i o n s t o i t s r e l a t i o n sw i t h t h e s a t e l l i t e s . I t is c e r t a i n t h a t Moscow had n o i n t e n t i o nof ex tending t o t h e s a t e l l i t e s t h e degree of freedom of a c t i o n

it w a s w i l l i n g t o e x t e n d , a t l e a s t t e m p o r a r i l y , t o Yugoslav ia .Yugoslav demands f o r l i b e r a l i z a t i o n i n E a s t e r n Eu ro pe u o in c id e dw i t h t h e f i r s t s p a r k of r e v o l t i n t he s a t e l l i t e s , t h e Poznanr i o t s i n Poland l a t e i n J un e 1956. T he se a n d o t h e r s i g n s ofu n re s t i n t h e s a t e l l i t e s , and t o a lesser e x t e n t t h e c ha os i nWestern Communist p a r t i e s f o l l o w i n g t h e d e n i g r a t i o n of S t a l i n ,i n s p i r e d a se r i e s of impass ioned ed ic t s by Moscow f o r u n i t y i nt h e Communist ra nk s.

A c e n t r a l committee r e s o l u t i o n i ssued i n Moscow on 30 June1956 warned tha t bourgeois ideo log is t s were s e e k i n g t o sow con-f u s i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l Communist r a nk s . On 16 J u l y , Pravdadenounced "n at io na l Communism." Bulga nin, sp ea ki ng i n W a r s a won 21 J u l y , warned t h a t o p p o r t u n i s t s i n some " s o c i a l i s t " coun-t r i e s were a i d i n g t h e i mp er i a l i s t s i n a tt emp.t s t o weaken in t e r -n a t i o n a l "social ism under t h e banner of so-cal led ' n a t i o n a lp e c u l i a r i t i e s . ' " Moscow r e a l i z e d t h a t i t had underes t imatedt h e c e n t r i f u g a l fo rces a t work w i t h i n t h e bloc and consequent lyt h e d an ge ro us r e s u l t s b o t h of i t s ow n s t eps t o r e l ax c o n t r o l sand of t h e t h e o r i e s advoca ted by Yugoslavia and g iven some l i ps e r v i c e by Moscow.-7 -


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._. ... . . . .. . . .. . . . , . . . . . .,, -- -- - ---11:"A.--L1. . ;;:.>:-- ... . . . , ._. ... . . .. - * - , :

. The r epea ted Sov ie t a t t acks on na-ional Communism anL t h es t e r n demands f o r u n i t y an d u n i f o r m i t y were viewed in Belgradew i t h s e r i o u s c on c er n. The f i n a l straw w a s a secret c i r c u l a rl e t t e r w hich t h e R u ss i a n s s e n t t o t h e s a t e l l i t e s i n ea r l y Septem-ber w a r n h g them aga i ns t fo l l owi ng th e Yugoslav example andc i t i n g t h e USSR as t h e p r o p e r model.Khrushchev and T i t o i n September 1956, f i r s t I n Yugoslavia andt h e n in t h e C r i m e a .j e c t of conver sa t ion .w a s a dv o ca ti ng f u r t h e r l i b e r a l i z a t i o n w h i l e t h e S o v i et l e a d e r sr es i s t ed .c l e a r l y p e rs i s t e d a t i t s en d . T i t o s u gg e s te d in h i s Pula speecht h a t d u ri n g t h i s meet ing " S t a l i n is t e lements"--presumably no tKhrushchev--were i n f lu e n t i a l i n th e Sov ie t l ead er sh ip . There isno evidence, however , t h a t Khrushchev had lost c o n t r o l of p o l i c ytoward 'Yugoslavia a t t h a t da te . On t h e c o n t r a r y , it seems e v i -den t tha t Khrushchev w a s j u s t as concerned over developments i nt h e s a t e l l i t e s and j u s t as r e l u c t a n t t o t a k e T i t o ' s a d v i c e aswere other S o v i e t leaders .

These d i f f i c u l t i e s p r e c i p i t a t e d a two-stage meeting betweenThe s a t e l l i t e s were presumably the main sub-T i t o l a t e r s a i d p u b l i c l y t h a t Y ug os la vi a

The se r i ohs d i f f e r ences which had l e d . t o t h e meeting .

The E ff e c t of Hungary: The upheaval i n P o l a n d a n d - e sp e c i a l l yth e r ev o lu t ion i n Hungary a t t h e e n d of October shoQk t h e founda-t i o n s of Soviet -Yugos lav r e l a t i on s . There followed s e v e r a lmonths o f po lemics , p r i ma r i l y i n the press, between the two coun-t r ies .d i f f e r e n c e s between Moscow and Bel gra de which had been aggr ava tedby th e upheava ls i n E a s t e r n Europe.t h e d i s p u t e s o v er c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e s a t e l l i t e s t h a t had precededt h e Po l i s h and Hungarian upheavals.l i t e leaders w i t h t i m i d i t y i n making reforms, con t inued su b -s e r v i e n c e t o S t a l i n i s t p r i n c i p l e s , a n d consequently,responsibil-i t y f o r t h e upheavals . H e claimed t h a t c ha ng es i n t h e S o vi e ts y s t e m i t s e l f were necessa ry if a r e v i v a l of S t a l i n i s m w a s t obe prevented . H e q u e s ti o n e d S o v i e t w i l l i n g n e s s t o c a r r y o u tt h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h e Belgrade and MOSCOW dec lara t ions as t heya p p l i e d t o t h e s a t e l l i t e s . O t h e r Yugoslav leaders emphasizedt h a t t h e pr imary i s sue was t h e S o v ie t i n s i s t e n c e o n b r i n g i n gYugos lav ia in to " t h e s o c i a l i s t camp" an d Belgrade 's d e t e r m i n a t i o nt o r emain i n d e p e n d e n t .

These a rgumen ts r e v e a l e d more c l e a r l y t h e u n d e r l y i ng

T i t o ' s f r a n k speech a t P u l a on 11 November 1956 l a i d bareH e charged Sov ie t and s a t e l -

In a ser ies of ne ws pa per e d i t o r i a l s . a n d h i g h- l e ve l s t a t e -m e n t s d u r i n g t h e w i n t e r of 1956-1957, t h e Sov i e t l ea der sh ip 's p e l l e d o u t i t s p o l i c i e s toward t h e bzoc an d Yugoslairia. Moscowelaborated a formula which recognized b o th t h e p r i n c i p l e s ofu n i t y among, " s o c i a l i s t " c o u n t r i e s a n d " n a t i o n a l v a r i a t i o n s I1 b u ti t gave grea te r e m p h a s i s t o t h e former a i m .-8 -

--

I


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Given un i ty of purpose wi t h a view it0 s e c u r -i n g t h e v i c t o r y o f s w i a l i s m , v a r y i n g formsand methods o f t h e s o l u t i o n of t h e c o n c r e t eproblems of Bocialislh may be a p pl i ed i n v a r i o u sc o u n t r i e 6 , i n ac co rd an ce w i t h h i s t o r i c a n d na-t i o n a l p e c u l i a r i t i e s . ( Pr av da , 23 November 1956).H e who, l i k e Rakosi and Gero, canno t and w i l ln o t cor rec t ly and c rea t ive ly app l -y the basicprinciples of.Communism t o n a t i o n a l s t a t e con-d i t io n s i n f l i c t s great harm on our cause . H ewho p u t s n a tiO na 3 s t a t e d i f f e r e n c e s i n firstp l a ce f o r g e t s t h e basic p r i n c i p l e s of t h e dic-t a t o r s h i p of t h e p r o l e t a r i a t and i n f l i c t s nol es s harm on t h e c au s e o f s o c i a l i s m . (Pravda,

*

.. .I 18 December 1956)C o n c r e t e a n d o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s d e t e r m in et h e crea t ive v a r i e t y o f t h e on ly road to so-c i a l i s t progress i n d i f f e r e n t c o un t r ie s .(Pravda, 23 November 1956) -

Pravda den i ed t ha t t h e USSR demanded submiss ion f rom anyoneand Yugoslavia had been corrected.s t r o n g e s t theme i n t h e So v i e t a r gu me nt .

Moscow emphas ized occas iona l ly the l ead ing r o l e o f t h eUSSR i n t h e bloc . Konhunist s a i d t h a t a l l Communist p a r t i e slooked t o t h e h i s t o r i c a l e x p e ri e n ce o f t h e S o v i e t Union a s anexample t o follow b ut t h a t some Yugoslavs took j u s t t h e o p po si tea t t i t u d e . A c c o r d i n g 't o P ra vd a o f 11 March 1957,

asser ted t h a t m i s ta k es i n r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e s a t e l l i t e sBut un i ty remained the

i n t h e mu tu al r e l a t i o n s o f s o c i a l i s t coun-t r i e s , r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Sov ie t Un ion ast h e f i r s t c o u n t r y o f v i c to r i o u s soc ia l i sm,as a s t a t e which has accumulated t h e r i c h e s te x pe r ie nc e i n s o c i a l i s t b u i ld i n g d u ri n g 40y e a r s o f i t s h i s t o r y , are of no s m a l l sig-n i f i c a n c e .Moscow's f e w r e f e r e n c e s o " n a t i o n a l Communism" were inc r i t i c a l t e r m s . In J an ua ry 1957 g h s h c h e v c a l l e d i t a d i v i s i v etoo l u sed by t h e enem ie s of t h e working c lass .t h e legitimate v a r i a t i o n s i n socialism i n d i f f e r e n t c o un t r i e smust n o t be g i ve n p r i o r i t y and c o ul d n o t i n v a l i d a t e t h e l 'basic .laws of th e S o c i a l i s t Revolu t ion ." The communiqu4,s igned in

H e warned:that

-9- I. .

. .. ,. .. .


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Budapest on 6 J a n u a r y by l e a d e r s of t h e USSR a n d f o u r s a t e l l i t e s(Hungary , Czechoslovakia , Rumania, and B u l g a r ia ) w arn ed t h a t t h e" fa3se s l og an o f t h e so -ca l l ed 'n a t i on a l Communism'" w a s b e i n gu s ed by i m p e r i a l i s t s t o undermine in ternat ional Communist uni ty .I n a d d i t i o n t o t hese genera l p ronouncement s wi th obvfousim pl i ca t io ns f o r th e Yugos lavs , Moscow d i r ec te d some .a t t ac kss p e c i f i c a l l y a t Belgrade. In November 1956, Pravda chargedYugoslavia w i t h c l a i m i n g t h a t i t s " ro ad t o so-m w a s t h ec o r r e c t o n e , i n t e r f e r i n g i n t h e i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of o t h e r "so-c ia l i s ' t " g t a t e s , a n d t r y i n g to d i v i d e - " t h e s o c i a l i s t camp."P ra vd a c r i t i C i z e d some a s p e c t s of t h e l'Yugoslav road," p a r t i c -

a n u n s t a b l e b a s i s on which t o "bu i ld soc i a l i sm. " The newspapera l s o sa id t h a t s o m e Yugoslav leaders were g u i l t y of d e v i a t i o n sf rom Marx i s t -Le n in i s t t heory and t h e p r i n c i p l e s of p r o l e t a r i a ni n t e r n a t i o n a li s m b u t s a i d t h a t Moscow would be t o l e r a n t andp a t i e n t in r e a c h i n g agreement on su c h q u e s t i o n s .

i t s dependence on Western a i d , which Moscow claimed w a s ,

The l ine t h a t Moscow was d e v el o pi n g: p u b l i c l y d u r i n g t h ew i n t e r of 1956-1957 w a s n o t a ne w one. But as long as t h e s ep r i n c i p l e s - h a d n o t been made e x p l i c i t , ' t h e y d i d n o t h ave a d i v i -s i v e e f f e c t on So.viet-Yugoslav re l at io n s . ' When t h e Hungarianr e v o l t s p l i t t h e USSR an d Yugoslavia , these u n d e r l y i n g i s s u e sr o s e t o t h e s u r f a c e an d made .it d i f f i c u l t t o r e p a i r t h e break.The views e xp res se d i n Moscow end ors ing un i t y and c r i t i c i z i n g"na t io na l " Communism probab ly r e f l ec te d r a th e r a cc ur a t e l y Khrush-chev ' s v i ews i n t h a t p er io d. A l l of t h e S o v i e t lehders. obv ious lythought it n e c e s s a r y t o d i s c r e d i t Y u go sl av ia i n t h e Communistw orld a nd t o i s o l a t e it from t h e E a s t European s a t e l l i t e s ascoo le d , and i n February 1957 p romised Sov ie t l oa ns w e r e i n d e f -' much as p o s s i b l e . A t t h e same t i m e g ov er nm en ta l r e l a t i o n s. . ixil.tely postponed.

Although it s e e m s l i k e l y t h a t K hrushchev a g re e d w i t h t h e 'd i r e c t i o n of t h i s p o l i cy as a temporary t a c t i c , it seems doubt-f u l t h a t he w a s r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e f u l l i n t e n s i t y of t h e a n t i -Yugoslav campaign. Th is w a s a t i m e when t h e r e were r e p o r t sth a t Khrushchev w a s under f i r e w i t h i n t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p fr oms u c h men as Molotov because of t h e a p pa re nt f a i l u r e of h i s , p o l i c ytoward t h e s a t e l l i t e s and Yugoslavia. Khrushchev's l a t e r p o l i c ys u g g e s t s he w a s probab ly still de t e rmined t o hea l t h e breachw i t h Yugoslavia and make ano th er a t t em pt t o r es to re it t o t h eb lo c. Some o f t h e S o v i e t t a c t i c s a f t e r t h e H u n g a r i a n r e v o l t ,however, seemed c a l c u l a t e d to d e s tr o y t h e p r o s p e c t s for a recon-c i l i a t i o n be tween Moscow and Belgrade. The po lemics a g a i n s t'Yugos lav ia l a s t e d as l ong as Moscow appeared s e r i o u s l y worr i eda bo ut r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g s t a b i l i t y i n t h e bloc an d n e a r l y as l o n g

-10-. .. .. . ... . .


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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . .- -................... . . .. ..- --_. -_I . -. . .

as Molo tov r e t a ined a place on t he p res id ium.of t h e c r i s i s i n t h e bloc, Khrushchev began again t o t a l k ofbe t te r r e l a t i o n s w i t h Y u go sl av ia .D urin g t h e v i s i t of Albanianleaders t o Moscow i n m i d - A p r i l 1957,gbrushchev emphasized theS o v ie t d e s i r e for a r e s t o r a t i o n of good r e l a t i on s w i th Yugo-s l a v i a . H e t h o u g h t t h i s could be accomplished by emphasizingpo in t s o f a g r e e m e n t r a t h e r t h a n d i f f e r e n c e s ; t h e l a t t e r hethought were grea t e s t i n t h e i d e o l o g i c a l f i e l d .t h i s theme on 2 June. This w a s t h e pr incip le t h a t w a s t o guidet he r ev iv a l o f Sov ie t -Yugoslav r e l a t ions . T h e o r e t i c a l dif-f e r e n c e s were i g n o r e d r a t h e r t h a n r e s o l v e d .newspapers of both c o u n t r i e s came t o a v i r t u a l h a l t . Jn m i d -May Moscow a l le g e d ly s e n t a d i r e c t i v e t o t h e s a t e l l i t e s a d v i s i n gthem,for ' . the t ime:being t o im prov e t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h Yugo-s l a v i a d e s p i te i deo l og i ca l d i f f e r e n c e s .

With t h e e a s i n g

A Pragmatic Rapprochement:

Pravda echoed

P ol em ic s i n t h e

The d i s m i s s a l of Molotov from t h e p a r t y p r e s i di u m i n J u ne1957 w a s a new spur t o the rapprochement .s t a t e m e n t on t h e Ju n e p u r g e of t h e "an t i -pa r ty g roup" of Molotov,Yalenkov, and Kaganovich i n Moscow c i ted Molotov 's mistakes inp o l i c y toward Yugos lav ia . Sh or t ly a f t e rwa rd , Khrushchev madea n impromptu speec h i n Czechos lovak ia th a t p rov ided a c lea rd e s c r i p t i o n of S o v i e t p o l i c y toward Yugoslavia.

T h e c e n t r a l committee

Marxist co nv ic t ion s demand th a t w e advancew i t h a l l r e v o l u t i o n a r y forces.t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y w o rk in g class must bebroadened, and Yugoslavia must no t be de-p r i v e d of t h i s f ro n t . So w e d i d e v e r y t h i n g .t o a c h i e v e that. I c o n s i d e r t h a t a t p r e s e n tc o n d i t i o n s are forming.between u s and Yugo-s l a v i a t h a t w i l l i mp ro ve r e l a t i o n s b o t h be-t we en o u r c o u n t r i e s a n d b et we en o u r p a r t i e s ,and w e w i l l make e v e r y e f f o r t t o reach comple te ,so t o s ay , u n i t y and i d e o l o g i c a l u n d e r st a n d i ngan d unan imi ty of a c t i o n of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r yforce and Communist par t i es of t h e whold world;i nc lud ing Yugos lav ia ! ... What do w e want? W e .w a n t u n i t y , closed r a n k s , and r a l l i e d fo rces .We acknowledge d i f f e r e n t p a t h s, comrades. B u tamong t h e d i f f e r e n t p a t h s, t h e r e is o n e g e n e r a lp a t h , a nd t h e o t h e r s are , as you know, l i k e af r i e n d ly r e l a t i o n s between t h e s o c i a l i s t coun-t r i e s , between our Communist and w o r k e r s ' p a r t i e s ,

The f r o n t of

big r i v e r w i t h t r i b u t a r i e s . . .. W e must devylop

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an d s t r e n g t h e n o u r s o c i a l i s t camp i n e ve ryway. Of c o u r s e , it is t r u e t h a t our f r f e n d s ,t h e Yugosl avs, somehow ba dly pronounce t h e-words "soc ia l i s t camp." However, Yu go sl av iai s a s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r y a nd t h i s f a c t r e ma in s.

Khrushchev warned t h a t t h e t w o c o u n t r i e s s h o u l d a v o id c r i i i c i s mof each o t h e r ' s i n t e r n a l pol ic ies and he again caut ioned Yugo-s l a v i a a bo ut i t s dependence on American a id .The next major s t e p i n t h e r ap pr oc he men t w a s t h e m e e t i n gbetween Khrushchev and T i t o i n Rumania e a r l y i n Augus t 1957.How much agreement r e s u l t e d from t h i s m ee ti ng is n o t c l ea r ; t h ep r e s s s t a t e m en t f o l l o w i n g it w a s vague, shedding no l i g h t ont h e outcome of t h e t a l k s . So vi e t propagancla conc ern i ng t h emeeting stressed the impor tance of t h e u n i t y of r s i m s a nd l n -teres ts between the t w o c o u n t r i e s a n d s a i d t h a t t h e prospectsfor c o o p e r a t i o n had been improved by th e ous te r o f Molo tov,Malenkov, an d Kaganovich. The fr eq ue nt ly well- in formed I t a l i a nCommunist paper L'Unita s a i d t h a t t h e t w o leaders discussedY u go s la v ia ' s r e l a t i o n s w i th '? th e s o c i a l i s t camp" a n d Belgrade ' seconomic t i e s w i t h t h e W e s t . .Yugoslav o f f i c i a l s conf i rmed t oWesterners t h a t Y u go s l av i a 's r e l a t i o n s w it h. the bloc were as u b j e c t of debate and a l s o s a i d t h a t t h e r e ' w e r e d i f f e r e n c e s o v e rth e s t a t em e n t i s s u e d a t t h e c o n cl u s io n of t h e m e e t i n g .Later , Khrushchev (in a 3 June 1958 speech in S o f i a ) claimedt h a t t h e Buchares t mee t ing l e f t c e r t a i n ideo log ical q u e s t i o n su n s e t t l e d . H e asser ted , however , t h a t th e Yugoslavs agreed t o

attend the November 1957 pa rt y m eeting i n Moscow and t o p a r t i c i -p a t e i n d ra wi ng u p ' t h e p a r t y d e c l a r a t i o n t h e r e .p e a r s l i k e l y t h a t t h e Yu go sl av ag re em en t t o recognize E a s tGermany, announced i n mid-October, w a s r e a c h e d a t t h e B u c h a r es tmeeting. Th e r e h a v e b e e n r e p o r t s t h a t t h e t w o s i d e s agreed t oavo id po lemics and keep any fu tu re d i sag reemen ts from becomingp u b l i c . Khrushchev s a i d i n h i s Sof ia speech t h a t he warnedthe Yugoslavs t h a t Moscow would reply t o any Yugoslav cr i t ic i smsof b l o c c o u n t r i e s or p a r t i e s . For a c o n s id e r a b l e t i m e a f t e rt h e Buchares t mee t ing , t h e two s i d e s d i d a v o id b i t t e r p u b l i cexchanges.e r n European s a t e l l i t e s has been a major d e t e r m in a n t of S o v i e tpol icy toward Yugoslavia. K h r u s h c h e v ' s l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of con-t r o l s o ve r t h e s a t e l l i t e s made p o s s ib l e t h e o r i g i n a l r a p p r o c h e -m e n t with T i t o ; t h e Hungar ian revo l t caused t h e f i r s t break-down i n r e l a t i o n s w i t h Belg rade ; and t h e e f f o r t t o i n t e n s i f yc o n t r o l s i n t h e s a t e l l i t e s h a s been a p r i m a r y c a u s e of t h e m o s trecent breakdown.

I t a l s o ap-

. ..

1

MOSCOW'S S a t e l l i t e Po l i c y : So v i e t p o l i c y t ow ar d t h e E a s t -

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. .

. .. . - . . .- --___.____..

. . .

While t h e U S S R h a d b e e n t r y i n g t o e s t a b l i s h s t a b i l i t y a ndu n i t y in t h e s a t e l l i t e s e v e r s i n c e t h e Hu nga ria n r e v o l t , t h em ost f o rm a l a nd i m p o r ta n t s t e p t a k e n i n t h a t d i r e c t i o n was t h eNovember 1957 co nf er en ce in Moscow. On t h i s o c ca s io n, t h e U S S Rsucceeded i n win nin g bloc-wide acknowledgment: of t h e n e c e s s i t yof bloc un i ty . Moreover , it created t h e p r e ce d e nt f o r sim$l%&m e e t i n g s i n t h e fu tu re - - such as t h a t he ld i n May 1958--as at echn ique f o r e n s u r i n g u n i t y . A t t h a t t i m e , a l s o , t h e p r e l i m i -n a r y d e c i s i o n w a s t a k e n t o p u b l i s h a t h e o r e t i c a l j o ur n al - -a l th o ug hi t d i d n o t a p p e a r u n t i l A ug ust 1958. While the U S S R would prob-a b l y ha ve p r e f e r r e d a more formal o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h i s a p p a r e n t l ywas r e s i s t e d by so,me Communist par t ies ; a s e r i e s of ad hoc m e e t -ings, however , sho u ld s e r ve most of Moscow's purposes....

M ars ha l T i t o ' s d e c i s i o n n o t to a tt e n d t h e November con-f e r e n c e in Moscow a nd t h e Yugoslav r e f u s a l t o p a r t i c i p a t e i nt a l k s on t h e 1 2 - p a r t y dec la ra t ion or t o sign i t undermined thenewly re bo rn Moscow-Belgrade rappr ochm ent. A t t h e E a s t Germanp a r ty c o n gr es s i n B e r l i n (on 11 July 1958) Khrushchev s a i d t h eYugoslavs had s e e n a n advance copy of t h e p a r t y d e c l a r a t i o n .Yugos lavs have r ecen t ly conf ided t h a t t h i s d r a f t was so b i t t e r l yan t i -Wes te rn tha t a t t h e t i m e t h e y r ea l i zed t h e y cou ld no t pos-s i b l y sign i t , s i n c e t h i s w ould commit them complete ly t o t h ebloc. There i s some e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e Sovi e t Union s ubseq uen t lymodi f i ed c e r t a i n f o r m u l a t i o n s f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t he Yugoslavs,b u t these m o d i f i c a t i o n s w e r e n u l l 5 f i e d by H a o ' s p r o p o sa l s a tthe November meeting which were u n a c c e p t a b l e t o t he -Yugos lavs .There were a l s o rumors t h a t S o v i e t l eaders h a d r e v i s e d a sp e e c hT i t 0 p ro p ose d t o make'in Moscow, which so provoked the Yugoslavleader t h a t he r e f u s e d t o a t t e n d . Whatever t h e reason f o r t h eY ug os la v a b s t e n t i o n , t h e a p p a r e n t l a c k of S o v i e t i n t e r e s t inn e g o t i a t i n g r e v i s i o n s in t h e d e c l a r a t i o n t o s u i t Y ug os la vi a l n -d i c a t e s how much greater w a s t h e p r io r it y .H o s co w a t t a c h e d t os o l i d i f y i n g bloc u n i t y . Th e d i s m i s s a l of Marshal Zhukov on h i sr e t u r n f ro m Y u g os l a vi a sh o r t l y before t h e Moscow confe rence hada l s o increased t h e f r i c t i o n between Moscow and Belgrade.

The

The S o v i et p o s i t i o n on i n t r a b l o c r e l a t i o n s w a s s p e l l e d O u ti n Khrushchev 's speech on 6 November and i n t h e 1 2 -p a rt y declara-t i o n Of 22 November: u n i t y a n d agreement on fundamentals aree s s e n t i a l w i t h i n t h e bloc. Th e v a r i a t i o n s t o be p e r m i t t e d arei n t h e d e t a i l s of ex ec u t i ng po l i cy . The Sov ie t Union , w i t h t h eh e l p of " o t h e r s o c i a l i s t " c o u n t r i e s , has a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d t h e" h i g h r oa d t o soc ia l i sm." For each c o u n t r y t o s t a r t l o o k i n g for" s o m e k i n d of c o m p l e t e l y new, a r t i f i c i a l road t o soc ia l i sm" wouldp l a y i n t o t h e h an d s o f t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s who are t r y i n g t o promotead i v i s i v e t h e o r i e s of "national Communism. * "Revisionism" is t h eg r e a t e s t danger i n t h e b loc , a l though i n some b loc pa r t i e s dog-m a t i s m may be a m o r e p r e s s i n g p r o b l e m a t a g iven t i m e . I n t r a b l o c-


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\

r e l a t i o n s are b a se d ,o n e q u a l i t y , i nd e pe n de n ce , n o n i n t e r f e r e n c ein i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s ' ; a n d m ut ua l a i d . A l l l 'social is t l ' c o u n t r i e smust' accep t c e r t a i n basic laws, i n c l u d i n g t h e l e a d e r s h i p of t h eCommunist party, pub l i c ownership of t h e basic means of pro-d u c t io n , g r a d u a l s o c i a l i z a t i o n o f a g r i c u l t u r e , a nd " p r o l e t a r i a na l so accepted the pre-eminence of t h e USSR i n *'the s o c i a l i s tcamp. "t e n s i f i e d i t s e f f o r t s t o keep the s a t e l l i t e s i n l i n e , and i t spropaganda l i n e reflected s t r o n g c o nc e rn w i t h t h e p ro bl em of"revis ionism."e f f o r t s t o c o l l e c t i v i z e a g r i c u l t u r e , and i n A pr i l Kommunistu rg ed t h a t t h e s e e f f o r t s be f u r t h e r i n t e n s i f ie d , e s p e c i a l l y i nthose s a t e l l i t e s which are f u r t h e s t a dv an ce d i n s o c i a l i z a t i o n .The Soviet bloc Counc i l of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)m e t i n December and h e l d a high- l evel meet ing i n May as t h e USSRsough t t o e f f e c t an i n c r e a s e in e co nom ic i n t e g r a t i o n a n d i n -d u s t r i a l s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i n t h e bloc t h a t would s e r v e p o l i t i c a las w e l l as economic ends . A meet ing i n May of bloc p a r t y a n dgovernmental l eaders a l s o appeared aimed a t a c h i e v i n g greaterp o l i t i c a l u ni ty i n t h e bloc. There were a series of v i s i t sw i t h i n t h e bloc by var ious bloc leaders, including Khrushchev--who went t o Hungary i n A pr i l , to B u l g a r i a in June , and t o E a s tGermany in J u l y .p o r t s of subsequen t t r i a l s i n Hungary p rov ided even s t ro ng erev idence of S o v i e t i n ' t e n t i o n s t o impose conformity on t h e bloc.Even i f the Hungar ian t r i a l s are n o t d u p l i c a t e d e l s ew h e r e , t h e yhave se rved as a s t e r n warning t o o t h e r Ea s t e r n Eu r o p e a n s ta tes .The bloc i s l i k e l y t o c o n t i n u e h o l d i n g more f r e q u e n t c o n s u l t a -t i o n s , as t h e USSR seeks t o m i n i m i z e p o l i t i c a l and economic con-troversy among the s a t e l l i t e sSoviet hegemony in p r i n c i p l e .

A l l t h e s i g n e r s of t h e Moscow D e c l a r a t i o n

Fol lowing t h e November 1957 m e e ti n g i n Moscow t h e USSR in-S e v e r a l of, t h e s a t e l l i t e s s t e p p e d up t h e i r

In June th e execu t ion of Nagy e t a1 and re-

a nd t o o b t a i n r e c o g n i t i o n ofP e r i o d of Watchful W a i t i n g : From t h e November1957 conferencei n Moscow u n t i l th e Yugoslav p ar t y p la t fo rm w a s p u b l i s h e d i n . m i d -March 1958, Soviet-Yugoslav r e l a t i o n s appeared t o be a t a s t a n d -s t i l l . There were no m a j o r s t e p s t ow ard i mp ro vi ng r e l a t i o n s ,such as h i g h - l e v e l v i s i t s o r p u b l i c l y a nn ou nc ed ag re em en ts --a l though on i n t e r n a t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s t h e Y ugo sla v F o re i g n Min-i s t r y appeared t o echo every Soviet p o s i t i o n .

hand, there were no o u t b u r s t s of polemics . The So vi et pressa n d r a d i o s t u d i o u s l y i g n o r e d Y u g o s l a v i a ' s - - a t a c t i c which T i t of i n a l l y c om pl ai ne d of i n mid-March.On t h e o t h e r

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.-. . . . . . . . . -_.:A+:: L: -A____-I----- ~ _.

-0

I

Khrushchev 5 remark, however, a t t h e E a s t German party con-gress, t h a t t h e bloc p a r t i e s " d r e w t h e i r own conclus ions" f romth e Yugoslav b ehavio r a t t h e t i m e of the November conference iss u p p o rt e d , b y o th e r r e p o r t s ? K hr us hc he v c l e a r l y se t great s t o r eby th e November conf e re nce , ' and by Yugos lav pa r t i c i pa t i o n i n i t .H e had t r i e d p a t i e n t l y b u t u n s u c c e s s f u l l y for w e l l o v e r t w oy e a r s t o b r i n g T i t o ba ck i n t o t h e bloc, even t o t h e p o i n t' o fr i s k i n g t h e u n i t y of " t h e soc ia l i s t camp." The November meet-i n g ac c o r d i n g l y ' r e p r e s e n t e d t h 8 cu lmina t i on of a l l h i s l o n g -drawn-out e f f o r t s , and he apparent ly had had reason t o b e l i e v ef ro m T i to ' s a s s u r a n c e s i n B u c h a r es t three months e a r l i e r t h a tY u g o s l a v i a w o u ld p a r t i c i p a t e i n some way i n ' . t h e bloc declara-t i o n . Thu s, h i s d i s a p po in tm e n t was t h e more extreme a n d , a s i n -d ica ted by h i s r e po r te d remark t o K arde l j , h i s a t t i t u d e towardYugos lav ia pe rcep t ib ly ha rdened .h is independence and e i t h e r j o i n t h e bloc on f a v o r a b l e terms o rbreak h i s l i n k s w it h t h e West w a s not clear. T i t o ' s r e l u c t a n c et o f or eg o Western aid w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y o f f e n s i v e t o Khrushchev,and Pravd a's emphasis on i t as an i s su e when t he break o c c u r r e di n M s u g g e s t s t h a t i t w a s one of t h e m a j o r r e a s o n s f o rS o vi et f r u s t r a t i o n w i t h Yu gos lav ia, The announcement i n D e c e m -ber t h a t Y u go s la vi a would n o t r e c e i v e f u r t h e r m i l i t a r y a i d w a sonly a l i m i t e d concess ion because it d id n o t app ly t o economicaid.w h ic h r e s u l t e d f r o m t h e e v e n t s in November, t h e SovJlet leaderswere determined t o l e a r n from S t a l i n ' s mistake of 1948 and avoidmaking a mar ty r of Ti to . Sov ie t- Yu go sl av r e l a t i o n s were t o con-t i n u e w i t h c o r r e c t b u t cool f o r m a l i t y u n t i l some Y ug os la v i n -i t i a t i v e s h ou ld p r e s e n t t h e S o v ie t l e a de r s w i t h a s u i t a b l e ex-c u s e t o make an open break.

T i t o ' s u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o abandon/

D e sp it e t h e h ar de ni ng i n t h e S o v i e t a t t i t u d e toward T i t o

when Kardel j and Rankovic

. . . . .. . . ...........'S. .. . .

The Yugoslav Party Congress: The p a r t y c o n g r e s s a n d par-t i c u l a r l y i t s p r e l im in a r y d r a f t pr og ra m p r o vid ed t h e chance f o rwhich t h e S o v i e t l eaders had been wa.iting. M o s c o w c o u l d n o ti g n o r e t h e c o n g r e s s ; i t w a s forced t o e e i t h e r s en d a d e l e g a t i o no r b o yc o tt it. Moreover, i f i t decided on a b o y c o t t , o t he rmembers of t h e bloc must be p r e v e nt e d f ro m a t t e n d in g i n ordert o m a in ta in bloc u n i t y . Moscow t h e r e f o r e c r i t i c i zed t h e Yugo-s l a v d r a f t p a r t y p rog ram , not only because it c h a l l e n g e d theSo v ie t gospel bu t because a p u b l ic j u s t i f i c a t i o n of t h e b o yc o ttwas r e q u i r e d .


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... .

Yugoslavia released t h e p a r t y program on 13 March. On 5A p r i l Moscow p r iv a t e ly i n f o r m e d Belgrade t h a t no S o v i e t dele-g a t i o n would a t t e n d t h e p a r t y congress ,but n o t u n t i l 18 A p r i ltiid the Soviet Kommunist a r t i c l e c r i t i c i z i n g t h e Yugoslav p a r t yprogram appear.comment. Iq t h e i n t e r i m , however, Moscow, and some of t h eE a s t e r n European pa r t i e s engaged i n p r i v a t e n e g o t i a t i o n s su p-posedly aimed'at o b t a in in g m o d i f i c a t i o n s i n t h e Y ugoslav program.Khrushchev m e t with the Yugos lav ambassador on 15 A p r i l a p -p a r e n t l y t o discuss the program. On 17 A p r i l t h e Yugoslavsannounced some mod if i ca t ion s , ap pa re nt ly in tend ed to m e e t s o m eof t h e S o vi e t p a r t y ' s o b j e c t i o n s and perhaps those of o t h e rCommunist p a r t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t he area o f f o r e i g n p o l i c yand i n r e f e r e n c e s t o the Sov ie t and Wes te rn blocs. Some of t h ep o i n t s Kommunfst c r i t i c i z e d had been r ev i s ed by the Yugoslavson t h e pr ev io us day. Kommunist had gone t o press on 15 A p r i l .P o s si b l y t h e Y ug os la vs h a d a l r e a d y o f f e r e d t h e s e r e v i s i o n s i np r i v a t e t a l k s w i th t h e R u s s i an s , o n ly t o have them re jec ted asina deq uat e. The Kommunist a r t i c l e d id i n c lu d e e x p r e s s io n s ofhope t h a t t h e Yugoslav cong res s would make changes i n t h e p r og ra m,b u t i t % u n li ke ly t h a t Moscow q t t h a t p o in t expected B e lg ra d e t or e t r e a t .

P r i o r t o tkat date t h e r e w a s no p u b l i c S o v i e t

I n t e n s i f i c a t i o n o f t h e C on tr ov er sy : In o r d e r t o est imatet h e p r e s e n t o b j e c t i v e s of Sov ie t po l icy toward Yugos lav ia , itis necessary t o s u r v e y b r i e f l y t h e d e v e lo p m e n t s f o l l o w in g t h eBelgrade congress in May 1958. On 5 May t h e C hine se Communistpa r ty newspaper, Peop le ' s Da i ly , p r in te d a s h a r p pe r s on a l a t t a c kon Tito , echoed verba$im t&T3!Zl lowing d ay i n P r av d a, t h a tl a b e l e dform r e s o l u t i o n b a s i c a l l y correct.committee probab ly d i s cus sed Yugoslav ia du r ing a p lena ry mee t ingon 6 and 7 May, a l t hou gh t h i s w a s never admitted p u b l i c l y . On9 May Pra vd a s h a rp e n ed t h e a t t a c k , c l e a r l y t h r e a t e n in g t o s t o pa i d t o m a v i a nd warnlng t h a t s t a t e r e l a t i o n s c o ul d n ot i m -prove if p a r ty r e l a t i o n s d e t e r i o r a t e d .po r ted ly s e n t a l e t t e r t o t h e Y ugoslav p a r t y s t a t i n g t h a t i t w a sup t o Yugos lav ia t o change i t s independen t p o l i c i e s if r e l a t i o n sw e r e t o be improved. On 11 May Belgrade announced t h a t Voro-s h i l o v h a d canceled a p r e v i o u s ly s ch e du l ed v i s i t t o Yugos lav ia ,a n d on 27 May t h e USSR announced a f ive-year pos tponement of i t sprogram of c r e d i t s f o r Yugoslavia .

Khrushchev b ro ke h i s c u r i o u s ly l o n g s i l e n c e on the Yugoslavd ispu te and for t h e f i r s t t i m e s a v a g e ly a t t a c k e d t h e Y ug os la vregime. Seeking t o overcome any impress ions of i n t r a b l o c d i f -ferences on Yugoslav pol icy , he ca l l ed t h e C h in es e a n d o the r

the Yugoslavs react ionar ies and callea3iF1948 Comin-The S o v i e t p a r t y c e n t r a l

The So v i e t p a r t y re-

On 3 June i n a speech t o t h e B ul g a ri a n p a r t y c o n gr e s s

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bloc c r i t i c i s ms of Y ug os lav ia f u l l y j u s t i f i e d . H e echoed Pei-p i n g ' s d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e 1948 Cominform resolution as funda-m e n ta l l y cor rec t a nd m a in ta in e d t h a t t h e Y u go sl av par ty platformr e p r e s e n t e d a f u nd a me n ta l r e v i s i o n of Ma r x i s t - Le n in i s t t h e o r yc o n ta i n in g i n s u l t i n g a p p r a i s al s of b l o c par t i es . Khrushchevasser ted, however, k?oscow's c o n t in u e d i n t e r e s t i n p a r t y c o n t a c tsw i th B e lg r ad e if the Yugos lavs y ie lded on p o i n t s of i d e o l o g y , .and i f p a r ty r e l a t i o n s w e r e im p o s s ib l e , t h e USSR would still" d ev e lo p n o rm al r e l a t i o n s w i th Y u go s la v ia o n t h e s t a t e p lane . "

I n s p e e c h e s o n 11 a nd 1 2 J u l y i n B e r l i n a nd M o s c o w , Khrush-chev aga in emphas ized tha t th e d i s p u t e w i t h Y u go s la v ia w a s a ni deo l og i ca l o ne i p v o lv in g B e lg r a d e ' s a t t e m p t t o s p l i t " t h e so-c i a l i s t camp" w i t h i t s " r e v i s i o n i s t " t h e o r i e s . H e avo ided anyt h r e a t of b r e a k in g s t a t e r e l a t ions and t r i e d t o r e b u t t h e c h ar get h a t Moscow had used t h e withdrawal of a i d as p r e s s u r e on B e l -grade . H e i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e s u s p en s i o n of a i d fol lowed n a t u r a l l ya n d n e c e s s a r i l y from what was i n e f f e c t Yugos lav ia ' s formal with-drawal from " t h e s o c i a l i s t camp." Except f o r c e r t a i n u nd er -developed areas , t h e USSR c o u l d n o t a f f o r d t o a i d nonbloc coun-t r i e s , a l t h o u g h it a lways welcomed mutua l ly p r o f i t ab le t r ad e .Y ug os la vi a, S o v i e t s e n s i t i v i t y t o t h e Yu go sl av p a r ty p l a t f o r m ,which was i n e f f e c t a n i n d i c tm e n t of much of S o v i e t p o l i c y a n dp ra c t i c e , i s not d i f f i c u l t t o e x p l a i n , p a r t i c u l a r l y when t h eS o v i e t p a r t y h ad f a i l e d t o come u p w i th a new pr ogr ? of i t sow n s i n c e 1919. The K r em li n' s i n i t i a l cri t icism w a s much morer e s t r a in e d , h ow ev er , t h a n what s u b s e q u e n t ly a p p e ar e d i n t h e USSRa nd o t h e r b l o c c o u n t r i e s , a nd i t avoided t h r e a t s t o damage s t a t e .r e l a t i o n s . Moreover, Moscow ha d o r i g i n a l l y a n no un ce d V o r o sh i l o v ' sv i s i t t o Y u g o s l a v i a , a p p a r e n t l y as ev idence of i t s des i re t om a in t a in good s t a t e r e l a t i o n s , s h o r t l y a f t e r in fo rming Be lg radep r i v a t e l y t h a t it c o u ld n o t s e n d d e l e g a t i o n s t o t h e Yugoslavp a r ty c o n g r e s s .why l a t e r bloc a t t a c k s o n Y u go sl av ia became so i n t e n s e a nd e m -b i t t e r e d a nd why Moscow t h en e xt en de d t h e p a r t y d i s p u t e i n t ot h e area of s t a t e r e l a t i o n s . While t h e s e t h e o r i e s h av e b ee n a ndmay y e t be e x t e n s iv e ly d e b a t e d , a f e w obse rva t ions he re may bep e r t i n e n t .

I n t h e l i g h t of t h e ev idence of t h e S o v i e t a t t i t u d e tow ard

Many theories have been developed t o e x p l a i n

I t i s p o s s i b l e , a l t h o u g h e x t r em e ly u n l i k e ly i n v i ew of pre -v ious even ts , t h a t Moscow f e l t i,ts p u b l i c a nd p r i v a t e cr i t ic i smswould lead t o a r e v e r s a l of Yugoslav pol icy a t t h e p a r ty c o n -gress . When t h i s d i d no t occu r , Moscow abandoned i t s r e s t r a i n t .I t may have been t h a t t h e i n i t i a l r e s t r a i n t w a s mere ly a t a c t i c a lpose of reasonab leness and t h a t Moscow intended t o i n t e n s i f y t h ea t t a c k l a t e r . The USSk could have been wai t ing f o r o t h e r b l oc

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. . - 1__. -.. ,.. ._.. .i... . ..

. . . ..

m e m b e r s , such as China, t o take t h e l e a d i n order t o a v o i d t h ei mp re ss io n t h a t t h i s was j u s t a b i l a t e r a l d i s p u t e . I t may, i na d d i t i o n , h av e a n t i c i p a t e d t h e s h a r p Yu gos la v react ion a t t h e .p a r t y c on g re ss an d f e l t t h a t t h i s would t h en j u s t i f y a s t r o n g e rS o v i e t l i n e o f a t t a c k . I t is a l s o p o ss i bl e t h a t t h i s d i s p u t ebegan t o snow bal l i n t o a major break because a more v i o l e n t Yugo-s l a v react ion m a t e r i a l i z e d t h a n Moscow h a d a n t i c i p a t e d .

T hese exp l an 8 t i ons ; a l l con t a i n some logic. Whi le Moscow mayhave be l i eved t ha t i t s o r i g i n a l cr i t ic isms w o u l d b e s u f f i c i e n tt o d i s c r e d i t Yugoslavia i n Communist eyes and t o i s o l a t e it fromt h e s a t e l l i t e s , t h e r e are o t h e r p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r t h ei n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of t h e d i s p u t e t h a t c o u l d h av e f a r - r e a c h i n g i m -p l i c a t i o n s .One p o s s i b i l i t y I s t h a t Khrushcp-ev w a s under pressure fromo t h e r S o v i e t l e a d e r s t o break more compzetely wi th Ti to . Khrush-chev w a s pe r so na l l y a s soc i a t e d w i t h t h e po l i cy o f r app rochem entwi th Yugoslavia from t he beg inning . I t seems l i k e l y t h a t t h i sf a c t a c co un ts i n l arge p a r t f o r t h e p e r s is t e n ce of S o v i e t a t t e m p t st o s a l vage t he r app rochem en t even a f t e r t h e H ungari an r e vo l t andrepea t e d Yugoslav r e fu sa l s t o j o i n t h e bloc had demonst ra t ed thefa i l u r e o f K hrushchev' s po l i cy . T h i s pape r has a l s o s o u g h t t o .demonst rate , however, t h a t Khrushchev 's views on Y ugos l av i a ' sr e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e bloc w e r e s h a r p l y a t v a r i an c e w i t h T i t o ' s a n dthat Khrushchev became i n c r e a s i n g l y d i s i l l u s i o n e d w i t h Y u g o s l a vp o l i c i e s . I t seems p r o b a b le , a nd h i s s u b se q u en t s t a t e m e n t s re-i n f or ce t he v iew, t h a t Khrushchev h imse$f con s ide red it neces sa ryt o a t t a c k t h e Y u g o sl av .p ar ty p l a t f o r m a nd t o b r a n d T i t o as a n

i d e o l o g i c a l h e r e t i c . H e may have been reluctant t o make a com-p l e t e s h i f t i n h i s p o l i c y , however, and t o f o r c e a ny more of abreak wi th Yugos lav ia than w a s n e ce s sa r y t o s a v e t h e s a t e l l i t e sfrom con tam inat ion by Belgr ade. Some of t h e s h i f t s i n Moscow's. t a c t i c s d u r i ng t h i s p e r i o d c ou ld h av e r e s u l t e d f r o m di f fe rencesi n s i de t he K reml in , n o t over t h e b a s i c d i r e c t i o n of p o l ic y to-ward Belgrade bu t over how f a r i t shou l d be car r ied . Khrushchev'smore recent speeches, which have avoided some o f t h e clear i m -p l i c a t i o n s o f a break i n s t a t e r e l a t i o n s e v i d e n t e a r l i e r , maymean that Khrushchev won a v i c to r y f o r a compromise posi t ion.I t c e r t a i n l y a pp ea rs t h a t , whatever disagreements he may haveencountered over Yugoslav po l i cy , Khrushchev main ta ined po l i t i -c a l au th or i t y i n Moscow.The harsh ness of Chinese a t t a c ks on Y u g o s l a v i a a n d t h e f a c tt h a t s e v e r a l s p e c i f i c c ha r ge s a g a i n s t Belgrade were made by Mos-cow only a f t e r they had been made by Peiping have led t o specu l a -t i o n t h a t C h i n e s e p r e s s u r e r e s u l t e d i n t h e i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n o f t h eSov i e t a t t a c k on Belgrade. H e r e a g a i n , t h e r e i s so much evidence

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- .. .. .. . .-...i.... .. . . _ _ -- . ._ .-:.. . . .~...., . .. .. .... ...I-.-.. .__... .. - .. - .... - - .^.____.___._l. . : .. . , . . , .. .

of g ro wi ng S o v i e t d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t w i t h Y u g os l av ia t h a t C h i n e sep r e s su r e is n o t n e c e s s a r y t o e x p l a i n t h e o r i g i n a l S o v i e t d e c i s i o nt o at tack t h e Y u go sl av p a r t y platform. I t ca n be argued t h a t t h epromptness-wi th which Moscow r e p r i n t e d C h i n e s e cri t ic isms of T i t o ,a nd Khrushchev ' s pu b l i c endor sement of t h e C h i n e se at tacks asj u s t , i n di c a t e some c o o r d i n a t i o n of Sino-Sov ie t t r ea tmen t qf t h ed i s p u t e w i t h Tito. I t is p o s s i b l e , t h a t Moscow p r e f e r r e d t o havet h e s h a r p e s t a t t ack s come f r o m other m e m b e r s o f t h e bloc. How-e v e r , t h e S o v i e t leaders may n o t h a ve a n t i c i p a t e d t h e degree ofsavagery of t h e C h i ne s e a t t a c k , w hic h seems m o s t p l a u s i b l yprompted by Peiping's own domestic c on ce rn s i n c e t h e s p r i n g of .1957, wi th th e danger s o f " r ev i s ion i sm. '* To p r e s e r v e a p p e a r a n c e sof u n i t y , t h e n , t h e K re ml in may have had t o i n t e n s i f y i t s ownp o s i t i o n b u t , a f t e r t h e p o i n t h a d be en made a n d it w a s p o s s i b l et o d i sc u s s t h e s i t u a t i o n a t l e n g t h an d w i t h c a l mn e s s , a g a i n ob-t a i n e d agreement f o r its more r e s t r a i n e d l i n e .no t seem r e a so n a b l e t o a s s i g n t o China a major r o l e in chang ingS ov ie t p o l i cy i n t h i s area of concern .c om bi na ti on o f t h e o r i e s i n r e p o r t s em an at in g l a r g e l y f r o m W a r -s a w :opponents i n t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p t o f o r c e a ch ang e i n h i spol icy toward Yugoslavia . The Chinese went ou t of t h e i r way i nNovember 1957 t o p r a i se a c l u s t e r of K h r u sh c h e v ' s p o l i c i e s , a n di n t h e fo l lo wi ng May t o approve h i s p a s t e f f o r t s ( w i t h whicht h e y had been associated) t o e f f e c t a rapprochement w i t h Yugo-s l a v i a .

Even though some such Chines e pre ss ur e is p l a u s i b l e it doesEven l ess l i k e l y is a

t h a t Chinese leaders p l o t t e d j o i n t l y w i t h Khrushchev 's

On e f u r t h e r e x p l a n a t io n is t h a t t h e r e l u c t a n c e of s o m e E a s tEuropean p a r t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e ' P o l i s h a n d t o some e x t e n tH u n g a r i a n p a r t i e s , t o j o i n i n t h e &attack n Yugoslavia l e dKhrushchev t o b e l i e v e t h a t h e m ust i n t e n s i f y h i s a t t a c k on B e l -grade i n o r d e r t o accompl ish h i s purposes in t h e s a t e l l i t e s .T h i s paper h a s eough t t o demons t r a t e t h a t S o v i e t p o l i c y towardYugoslavia i s i n e x t r i c a b l y t i e d to S o v i e t p o l i c y toward t h es a t e l l i t e s a nd t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n t o condemn th e Yugoslav p a rt yp la t fo rm w a s o r i g i n a l l y t ak en t o un de rm in e T i t o ' s s t a n d i n g i nE a s t e r n Europe and t o a s s u r e t h a t t h e s a t e l l i t e p a r t i e s wouldboycb t t t he Yugos lav congr ess as w e l l as c u t p a r t y t i e s w i t hBelgrade - ' The condemn ation of Yugoslav ia r ep re se n te d , abovea l l , a n increase i n pressure on Poland. Poland w a s s l o w andc a u t i o u s in j o i n i n g t h e c r i t i c i s m of Yugoslavia .p i n g may bo th have f e l t t h a t , as a r e s u l t , it w a s n e c e s s a r y t otake a more r i g i d s t a n d, an d t o make t h e condemnation of Yugo-s l a v i a so s t r o n g t h a t Poland would not dare t o t r y to f i n d am i d d l e ground on which t o s t an d .

Moscow-and Pe i -

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..,.

I n t h i s c o n n e c f i - n , too, t h e harsher l i n e adopted by th eChinese ag a in s t T i t o would demons t ra t e once and fo r a l l t o t h ePole s t h a t t h e y c o u l d n o t h o pe t o p l a y off C hin a a g a i n s t . t h eU S S R i n o r de r t o g e t s u p p o r t f o r t h e i r o w n po si ti on w i t h i n " t h es o c i a l i s t camp. "

.

.I .. .

The U S S R d i d n o t b e g in t o break w i t h Y u g o s l a v i a u n t i l ' i t w a sThe cri t$cisms of Yugoslavia were n o t made w i t he v i d e n t t h a t t h e p o l i c y of w i nn i ng t h a t c o u n tr y back i n t o t heb l o c had f a i l e d .t h e pr imary hope o f winn ing Yugos lav i a back , t he re f or e , nor i nt h e . h o p e of c r u s h i n g the Yugoslav par ty . Ra the r t h e y w e r e de-s ig n ed t o p r e s er v e i n t a c t w hat Moscow s t i l l had i n t h e bloc.There were p r o b a b l y p r i v a t e debates between Moscow and Warsaws t h a t r e v e a l e d more c l e a r l y t o Khrushchev than any publ ic d i s -pu tes how nece ssa ry it had become t o t i gh t en d i s c i p l i n e i n th e Ibloc.s t i l l n o t known.) The Hung arian ex ec ut io ns are t h e s t r o n g e s tpr oo f t h a t s u c h d i s c i p l i n e seemed necessa ry t o Moscow.Y u g o s l a v s i t u a t i o n is placed i n prope r pe r spec t i ve as p a r t oft h e broader s a t e l l i t e problem, and t h e dangers of Polish Don-conformi ty are k e p t i n m in d, t h e i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n o f t h e a t t ackson Yugoslavia appears t o have been mot iva ted pr imar i ly by ani n c re a s in g s t r u g g l e t o a s s e r t S o v i e t a u t h o r i t y o v e r t h e sa t e l -

(The subs t ance o f h i s t a l k s wi th Gomulka i n Janu ary areI f t h e

l i t e s .

* ..

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. .. .

- .- - - ~- . ..... .

3fH?K?

CONCLUSION

A t t h e e nd of Ju ly Khrushchev t ra ve le d t o Fkip ing f o r t a l k swith Mao Tse-tung and on 3 August 1958 t h e t w o i s s u e d a j o i n tcommunique which proc laim ed t h a tThe unshakable uni ty of t h e two Marxist-L e n in i s t p a r t i e s w i l l f o r e v e r be t h e r e l i a -b le g u a r a n t e e of t h e triu mph of ou r commoncause .The Communist party of th e S ovi e t Union andthe Communist party of C H i n a w i l l unf lagg ing lyg u a r d t h i s sacred u n i t y , w i l l f i g h t f o r t h epurity of Marxism-Leninism, w i l l uphold thep r i n c i p l e s o f t h e Moscow Decla ra t io n o f theCommunist a n d Workers ' Par t ies and w i l l wagea n i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e c h i e fdang er of t h e Communist movement, re vi si on is m.Th i s r e v i s i o n i s m h a s f o u n d clear express ion i nthe program of t h e League of Communists ofYugoslavia .

I .

. .

Follow ing t h i s s t at em en t of common purpose by t h e l e a d in gmembers, and d e s p i t e i t s emphasis on ideo logy , i . e . , " rev is ion -i s m , " bloc p o l i c y toward T i t o soon began t o s h i f t from ideo-l o g i c a l a t t a c k t o cr i t ic ism i n genera il O f 'Yugoslavia and i t sp o l i c i e s . By t h e e n d , oP t h e summer of 1958 the S ino -Sov ie tle ad er s may w e l l have f e l t t h a t t h e i r i d e o l og i c al a t t a c k s werebecoming counterproductive.s p e c i f i c a l l y t o Yugoslav th eo ry , they dec id ed - t o move i n t o th enext phase of th e campaign: coord inat ed p o l i t i c a l and economicp r e s s u r e on T i t o f o r t h e p u r p os e of f u r t h e r w ea ke ning h i s po-s i t i o n a nd i n f l u e n c e a t home and abroad.

The USSR, Communist Chi na, and Al ban ia under to ok t h e i n-i t i a l moves. Moscow r e s t r i c t e d t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of Yugoslavp u b l i c a t i o n s in th e USSR, va c i l l a t ed rega rd ing p romised sh ip -m e n t s of wheat and coal t o Yugoslav ia, and a t tac ked Belgradef o r a l l e g e d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t S o v i e t c i t i z e n s i n cus tomsprocedur es. The Chinese "rel ieved" t h e i r ambassador i n Belgrade,and , acco rd ing t o th e Yugoslavs , began t o boyco t t Yugoslav s h i psand por ts . Albania renewed i t s o ld t a c t i c s of d ip lo m a t i c p ro -t e s t s and r e t a l i a t i o n f o r a l l e g e d m i s t r e a t m e n t of i t s n a t i o n a l si n Yugos lav ia . Bu lg a r ia jo i ned A l b a n i a by reopening a t t acks onYugoslav ia' s ' ' chauv in i s ti c " po l i cy i n Macedonia. The o the rs a t e l l i t e s , excep t f o r Po land which was r e l a t i v e l y i n a c t iv e ,have c o n t r i b u t e d v a r y in g ly t o t h e anti-Yugoslav campaign.

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Documents

Caesar 21 - The Failure of the Soviet-Yuogslav Rapproachment