Caesar 12 - Recent Developments in Political Status of Soviet Armed Forces

8/4/2019 Caesar 12 - Recent Developments in Political Status of Soviet Armed Forces

1/68

I.. .k ,.

' _ CAESAR 12-6-

I: 4.

I

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICBL STATUSOF SOVIET ABMED FORCES

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This document contains information within the meaning of PublicLAW 513-81st Congress.c


2/68

- . .

I I

SOVXET STAFF STUW\. This study %s a worbfqg paper prepmad. By thqSoviet S t a f f , O C L , to gssAet goviqt Staff analystsin developing a common appreciataon of eone qf 'thebackground factors affecting Curnent intellggencetrends ia the Voviet field. This partiqvlar studyis the twelfth in a series prepared under fhq gen-eral title Vro ject Caesqr" to e4shre $he systemat-ic, xaminat$on of all available iafoIcmation OR theleading members of the Soviet hlarapchy, theirpolitical associations, snq the policiee Vith whichthey have beep i4entified.


3/68

CAESAE 1 2 CUTOFF DATq: 20,gept 1955R E C W DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL STATUS OFA I t m D T S---, so' ,. 7

PAGE-ABLE OF CONTENTS:PREFACE: Conte xt and Purpose of Paper . . . . . , . . 3--e'I. Apparent Gains. of Mf lit ar y UnderMalenkov Premiership . . . . , . . . . . . . 5

A. Se cu ri t y Relaxat ion i n Armed ForcesB. In t roduc t ion of New M i l i t a r y PerqonneJ,Pol c yC. G l o r i f i c a t i o n of Armed ForceqD. M i l i t a r y Bepresentat ion in Governpeot/

E. Reh abi l i ta t ion of Disgraced OffiqersF. Increased Number of Mil i t a ry Promoticme?G , Check on Military Gains

P a r t y P o s i t i o n sand Reassignments

XI. Apparent Losses of Mi li ta ry Under labenkov . . . . 17A. Administrat ive Consol idat ioqs iq DefenseB. Reductions i n M i l i t a r y PersonnelC . Evidences of Mi li ta ry EconomiesD.

MinistryE f f e c t of Yalenkov Economic Pql%c$' on

M i l t ary111. Role of M i l i t a r y i n L ig ht vs, Heavy Indust ryDispute and Fall of Malenkov , . . . , . . . 22

A. Probab le Di ssa t i s f ac t ion of W l i t a r yB. M i l i t a r y Aspects of DisputeC. Conclusions re Mil i t a ry Role $SI MalenkQvF a l l

(Continued)


4/68

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Contd)--IV. Posrition of Military Uqder Khrushchev/r,,;' Bulganih Leadership . . . . . . . 26.(:..

. ! A.. B.C .D.E.

F.G.

Review of Important Developments SinceParty Control in the Prrned FsrcesSecurity Control in Armed ForcesControl of ZhukovBuildup of Kcmev as Cgwteywe$ght t QProbable Appearance of MilitaryConclusions re Control of Military

Malenkov's *motion

ZhukovGroupingsand Military Groupings.

V. Probable Influence of Military oq SovietPolicy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2Appendix A'- Recent History of noctorg' Plot,Appendix B - Biographic InfQrmatlon 94 Selected"VictimsOfficers


5/68

- -

CAESAR 12RECENT DEVELOPMmTS IN POLITICAL STATUSc-F SOVIET-m-/ IPREFhCE: Context-nd Purpose of Paper:

f An examination of the political status of theSoviet armed forces during the period October 1952*' to December 1953, published in the ninth of theCaesar series under the title, "Politics and theSoviet Army," led to the following conclusions:

--

Caesar

that the military has in the past re-vealed a relatively passive attitude to-ward,interaal crises with a tendency to-ward fragmentation and inaction.that military freedom of action is re-stricted in a number of ways: by intar-locking networks of political and securityofficers operating within the ranks; bya tendency toward conformtty among offi-cers and men alike;caste system;officer corps of a high percentage ofCommunists subject to party discipline.

by a growing officerand by the presence in the

that in the post-Stalin period, the tradi-tionally passive position of the militaryin politics shifted to a more active role,with the armed forces participating inthe remowal and sentencing of Beria.that by the end of 1953, the politicalposition of the Soviet military leadersappeared better than it had for severalyears previously, and an uneasy alliancewas probably maintained between top pro-fessional officers and Party leaders.

9 also pointed out that despite evidencesuggesting greater freedom for the military leadergto run their own establishment without interference,and evidence suggesting greater importance of

- 3 -


6/68

t-e mil tary leadership in the formulation of theSoviet governmental policy, there was practicallyno evidence of any formal change i n the relationghipof the milftary forces to Other brancbes of theSoviet government. It,was postulated that somecl$qtles or groups of high-ranking officers had prof-ited. more than other@ by theqhanges in the regimeand hence were more loyal to certain of the new .political leaders, but very little evidence couldbe adduced to identify tbase military leaaers whodirectly supported or were supported by one oranother political factioq.

It is the purpose of this paper to summarizeall available information which would update theexamination of the role of the Soviet military inpolitics and place in perspective the position ofthe military within the context of Soviet leader-ship.army, possible groupings wlthtn the military leader-ship, and the probable influencp of the military onSoviet p o l i c y will be considered.

Questions concerning the control of the

i


7/68

. . .

1. Apparent --ains Of Mil i tary Under ldalenkov Premier-s h i p :- .Certain gains which were to result in the greatlyincreased prestige of the military began to appear asear1:g as July 1953. This may have been partly dye t othe) upport of the military in the Beria affair, butmay also have been due to the general conciliatorypolicy of the Malenkov regime.

the armed forces; the introduction of a new m ili tarypersonnel pol icy; the granting of honors; a limitedincrease in the number o f Officers in goarssnnaent andpasty positions;officers; and the unfreezing of promotions and re- ,assignments.

These gains took v m i -ous forms; a certain relaxation of security within

the rehabilitation of disgraced

1// as thrown some1ign.t; on tae army's ro l e . ne reptrted that on theevening of 26 June he had seen tanks, reportedly fromthe Kantemirovskaya Division, cruising around theMayakovskii Square and along; the Sadovoye Koltso.The next morning he learned from conversations thatBeria, upon being called to a meeting of the PartyPresidium on 26 June, had been placed under arrest.Source also reported this information, apparentlysecond-hand: that Beria, allegedly planning a coupfor 27 June, won the support of Col Gen Arterniev,the commander of the Moscow Military District andcommander of the MOSCOWGarrison, Artemiev wasallegedly Instructed by Beria to order all his troqpsout of the city on maneuvers, leaving Beria's MVDtroops in control. To counteract Beria's move,Bulganin moved the Kantemirovskaya Division intoMoscow as well as some o f Marshal Timoshenkov'stroops from the Belorussian Military District,.

- 5 -


8/68

A . Security Relaxation Among Military:

marry local nationals. In addition, officers of thecivilian clbthes off duty and to bring their wives and+rank of lieutenant and above were permitted to wear

. .8 . Introduction of- ew- ilitary Personnel Policy :-

. . The new military personnel policy apparentlyintroduced about July 1953 aimed primarily at correct-ing the abuses prevalent under Stalin by stabilizingand standardizing induction methods, service, and de-mobilization measures. There had been gross viola-tions o f the 1939 Universal Military Service Law,which provided that army privates and junior officers(NCO's), after serving a two- and three-year term

- 6 -


9/68

respectively, could be held i n service only in caseof need and for no mor0 than a 2-month period.infantry officer in comment-ing on the abuse;, reportea tnat maenlistees) served four to six years. The new policystandardized the term for army and air force con-scripts at three years, and the publication sinceSeptember 1953 of the Defense Ministry's annual mobili-zation order, ordering the release of a l l persons whoto prevent the recurrence of abuses.

Anny men' (non-re-

*h ad served,the term established by l a w , seemed designedOther aspects of the new policy includedgreater privileges for re-enlistees and a program todevelop the leadership abilities of NCO's. Accordingto a knowledgeable source, an attempt is underway tobuild up the leadership qualities of BCO's, who arenow to be assigned as platoon leaders.educated conscripts are to be sent to military schoolsfor three years instead of into military serrice;upon graduation, most of them will be placed i o ajunior officer (NCO) reserve. This report has beensubstantiated by the stress on leadership of sergeantswhich has recently appeared In troap propaganda; andcontrary to the general pattern of not mentioning acommander's name in broadcasts, the names of ser-geants showing exemplary leadership qualities are nowbeing mentioned.

policy may lie with the military leadersp who probablyrecognized its relation to troop morale; however, itis conceivable that the polftical leadership, withits stress on legality in all spheres of Soviet Idfe,encouraged the adoption of such a pragram.

The better

The responsibflity for the adoption of th.JLs

- 7 -


10/68

!

Military personnel policies qchieved s t a b i l i -zation by about mid-1954, and since that Sate therehave been no major'shifts, although specific militaryrequirements have evidently affected the length ofservice of certain critical specialties.1

Glorification -f Military Forces:A tendency to glorify the military forces has.become increasingly evident durfng the entire post-Stalin pefiod.to give the armed forces a sense of close identifica-tion with the regame and its political goals. Thiewas revealed by Voroshilov, who, while handing outawards on one occasion during 1953, stated, "The award-ing to you of orders and medals I s graphic testimonyof the love and concern with which our people, p w t y .

and government surround thefr armed forces, and amanifestation of profound confidence in your stauncb-ness and steadfastness," Afthough efforts were madeby the Malenkov regime to appease other groups by thegranting of awards, their honors were in no way asspectacular as those heaped upon the military. Asa contrast to the Stalin period of slighting the mili-tary, this rising prestige took on added significance.

[;;C.

This flattery was undoubtedly intepded

During the Malenkov period, 156 officers weresingled out for honors, inqluding 43 Orders of Leninand 11 Orders of the Red Banner; in addition, on atleast three occasions, awards have been made to un-named "generals, admirals, and officerst" f the armedforces .

1/ reports that an ed$ctwas Tsiued on 12 J lY 1954term of service for antiaircraft and early-warningpersonnel in the Soviet army. Another report states 'that radar and communications reserves of the signalcorps were being recallgd to active duty late in 1954and that civilian communications specialists were,also be ing drafted into service.

ing for one year the

\

"..


11/68

Busts of nine army off$cers who had twice wonthe title of Hero of the Soviet Union, includieg oneof Marshal Zhukov, were unvgiled during the Malenkopreign. Approximately 40 army offioers are entitledt o thks honor;according to Soviet press. This waqin miirked contrast to the [email protected] whic4'only a f e w of Stalin's known favprftes, quch asMarshal Konev and General Chuilrov, were so honored.In. ddition, 14 memorials were erected to Soviet/'Russian Military heroes.

1/ To honor traditional military heroes, agigaEtic equestrian statue of F i e l d Marshal Suvorovand a 100-foot status of Admiral Nakhimov with tele-scope were unveiled; and, apparently as a specialhonor to the Ukrainians, a statue to Schors, theBolshevist military hero from The Ukraine, was alsodedicated. A total of 11 memorials, honoring the eXrploits of Russian and Soviet military heroes, nine ofwhich were in the Orbit, were dedicated with Sovietand local dignitaries in attendance. T h e w monumentswere usually a f immense size . In Norway and Egypttwo monuments were erected by the USSR Ministry ofDefense to honor Soviet/Russian fa l l e n heroes. Inqi-dentally, this number included a statue erected inhonor of the 1939 defeat of the Japanese at Khalkh$p-G o l , the battle in which Zhvkov first won glory .


12/68

Minor military anniversaries received morethan customary publicity. The Soviet navy honoredevery possible anniversary, the InaJority of whichhad previously been unhera1ded.l Elements of thenavy ,made much-publicized state visits to Finland,England, Turkey, and Sweden, as well as to certainOrbst countries.academies received unaccustomed publicity, and bookexhibits and artillery exhibits showing the gloriogphi s t o r y of the Soviet armed forces appeared.

In addition, graduations from m i l i t a r y

A further manifestation of rising prestigewas the fact that the uniform was made t h e special .prerogative of the army.put civilians bqck into mufti.made their appearapces i n DRW uniforms of operaticsplendor.

An order of August 1954Army and air officprp

1/ These celebrations Itncluded, among others,the 100th anniversary of the defense of Sevastopolagainst the British and French in the Crimean war;the 240th anniversary of the Russian naval vietoryover Sweden near Gangut Island; the 100th anniver-sary of the defense of Petropavlovsk against Anglo-French forces; the 50th anniversary of the sinkingof the Russian cruiser, Varyag; the 250th anni-versary of the Kronstadt fortress; the 50th a ~ n f -versary of the Russian naval cowander Adm i r a lMakarov; the a m iv e r s a r y of the victory over the. Turks at Sinope.

\

- 10 -


13/68

D. MilitaryPositions: BepresentatYon -n Government/PartyIn the elections to the Supreme Soviet inM a r ~ h ~ 1 9 5 4 , deputy from nearly every fmportaptmilitary position was elected.11,347 deputies elected in 1954, 70 were militaryofficers as compared to 59 off icers out of a total Q$1,316 deputies elected in 1950.

sentation.government positions, like the Viving of awrds,was meant to identify the militqry with the aims ofthe regime was indicated by a Pravda statement thatthe electlons to the Supreme 3 have demonstrate4with new force the boundZess devotiop of the Soviet * tfighters to their government and the Communist Party,

Of a total ofTbis is in contrastto a drop,o$ approximately 60 percent in MVO repre-

That the electing of more military men to

1/ The 1954 military deputies included thefollowing: the defense minister, his first deputisgand all his know9 deputies;first deputy;the chief of the general staff and one of h i s deputleg;the inspector general;chiefs of cavalry, engineer; armored, artilrery an4airborne troops;all military district commanders. Only the chiefs a$the rear services and of the signal troops were notelected.their positions.deputies compared t o only one in 1950; the air forcerepresentation i s now headed by two marshal9 of av$a-tion whereas in 1950 it had none.

the navy chief and b$ethe air chief and a possible deputy;the chief of the ChPef Polit$-. cal Directorate; the chief of personnel, and the

four of the five fleet commandercP;The navy ana air force appear to have impwWedThe navy now has six identified

9 11 -


14/68

. . . , .-. . . .

More officers than formerly were elected memabers of commissions of the Supreme Soviet./ . , I -- Army General M , V. Zakharov, Commander!I I of Lemingrad military district, to

L the Credentials Commission, Councilof Nationalities.-- A r m y General A. S. Zheltoy, Chief, ChiefA i l Political Directorate, to Commission onDraft Bills, Council of Union.-- Army General A . A. Grechko, Commanderof Group of Soviet Forces, Germany,to Commission of Foreign Affairs,

' Couhcil of Union.A biographic check has revealed that only politicalofficers (Bulganin, Zheltov) ever served 54 such cap$rbilities previously.is believed to be primarily a prestige position.Membership on these commissions

In February 1954, at various republic partycongresses (exclusive, of couree, of the RSFSR), thenumber of military officers elected to the republiccentral committees and buros was conspicuously greaterthan in the past. From the 10 republics where thereare mador troop: headquarters, 32 military mea, includeing the 11 military district commanders involved, werqelected to the party central committees of their re-spective republics. With a f.ew exceptions, all wereelected full members. Although the actual militaryrepresentation increased, the significance is lesseneqsomewhat by t h e fact that the size of the republiccentral committees was in general increased; militaryrepresentation on the various republic central com-mittees varies from none (in republics where thereare no troopsconcentratlons) to five percent (in theUkraine)..

- 12 -TOP\ RET


15/68

Of the 11 military district commanders involvedin the areas affected by the elections, nine were ChQg8nas members of their republic buros.1 A check of bio-; 'graphic informatfon available indicates that previouslyonly four military district commanders (Grechko, Konev,Antonov, and Bagramyan) had served as members of thehighest party body in the republic in which they werestationed.

+ In the opinion of a bigh-level defector, thegiving of ad increasing number of important party andgovernment jobs to the military was an original moveof Malenkov, designed to subject the military to par$qdiscipline in a more fundamental sense by increasingtheir responsibility to the Party.E. Rehabflitation -f Disgraced Officers:

The regime's attempt to correct some of thewrongs suffered under Stalin wa s probably responsiblefor the rehabilitation of a number of military officgrq,some of whom are known to have undergone imprisonment,Stalin's jealousy of the glory justly earned by themilitary durlng the war led him to degrBde, on variouscharges, the outstanding leaders of all services. Al-though Stalin's death brought Zhukov's public re-appearance in Moscow2 and restored the naval chiefKuznetsov to his original rank of fleet admiral, themost remarkable restoration tn favor occurred in the

1/ Mention should be made of the two militarydistf;ict commanders who were nqt elected. Thtsoccurred in the Ukraine, whlch encompasses four milirtary districts. O f the four milltary district com-manders, two (Konev and Chuikov) were elected buromembers, To elect all four Ukrainian military dis -trict commanders to an 11-pan body would have g$venthe military a quite disproportionatg representation,2/ There is reason to belgeve that Zhukov wgsback-in Moscow a8 early as 1950, possibly taking theplace vacated by Konev as Commander in Chief of

Ground Forces. H i s return was not publicized.


16/68

case of air officers.practically all the top commanders of the variousair forces had been sent into obscurity.1953 apd 1954,.various disgraced air officers, withtheis;'original anks restored, were given awards andmedals "for long years of service.'!included the following who are listed wRith the posi-tions held duripg the l a s t w a r :

--' 'Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov,

At the end of World War 11,During

Those honored

Commander in Chief, Military Air Forces-- Marshal of Aviation G. A. Vorosheikin,1st deputy Commander in Chief, MilitaryAir Forces.-- Marshal of Aviation N. S. Skripko, Chiefof Staff, Long Range Bomber Forces.(Note: Skripko may have been in theAir headqumters in a subordinatepos i t i on ; he has become publiclyprominent osly since August 1953).

I

-- Col. Gen. A. I. Shakurin, head of avia--- Col. Gen. A. X. Repin, Chief Engineer oftion industry.the Military Air Forces.-- Col. Gem. N. 8 . Shimanov, Political deputy,

Military Air Forces. ,Baltic Fleet A i r Force,C o l . Gen. M. I.'Samokhfn, Commander,-

Zhakurin is now a first deputy mlnister of the Avia-be connected with the Airborne Forcbs; a,na novltov'is carried by an unconfirmed report as Commapder $nChief o f the Long Range Air Force.tion Industry; Skripko i s believed 0

- 14 -


17/68

... -P .;. _ - .

F. Increased Number of Military Promotions-n4The relaxation of the virtual freeze on

Reassignments:officer promotions which had existed under Stalinpregime was noted in Caesar 9 including two promo-tions to the rank of marshal and s i x to army general.In addition, certain other promotions have beennoted since 1953, and have presumably been accom-panied by unpublicized promotions in lower ranks.Among the hbre interesting have been those of N. I.Vinogradov to admiral and Y. A . Shalin to colonelgeneral. Vinogradov, a deputy to the Commander inChief of the Naval Forces, holds the title of Com-mander of Submarlnes of the USSR and his promotionis presumably related to the increased attention $0the submarine program.ligence Directorate of the General Staff.

Shalin is head of the Intel-.The greater relaxation of security underMalenkov, so unlike the secrecy of the Stalin regime,revealed a fluid situation relating to officer re-assignments.the public return of Zhukov, affected the followingThe more important changes, other thanpositions :-- Chief of Chief Political Pirectorate(with the Air and Navy politicalchiefs also undergoing changes)

Chief of DOSAAF (twice changed)Chief, Airborne TroopsCommander in Chief of AdministrationDeputy Commander in Chief (of NavalChief of Frunze Military AcademyCinC of Soviet Forces in GermanyCinC of Central Group o f Forces

of Armored Troops (probable)Forces

(twice changed)

- 15


18/68

--The greatest number of changes has occurredin the military districts. Of the 24 military dis-tricts existing at the-timeof Satlin's death, onlythree still have the same commanders. Of thesechanging commands, two military dietrict commander9moved into the Defeese Ministry, one (Konev) beCamet h e commander of the Soviet bloc combined command,three wers,reassigned as commanders of other mili-rtary districts; one was assigoed as chief of SovietForces in Germany, and four Jost their jobs whentheir military district headquarters were abolished.Of the commanders affected, only one--Artemyev--isdefinitely known to have suffered disgrace.The significance of these promotions and re-placements and their possible relation to the Sovietpolitical situation will be considered later.

Commanders of four of the five fleets1

G. --heck on Military Gains:In spite of the blandishments, honors andflattery heaped upon the armed forces under Malenkov,efforts were made to keep their popularity under con-trol.greater access to the public.tary candidate was broadcast over Radio Moscow. Bul-ganin, a political marshal, reviewed the parades gndgave the addresses on t h e mosf important militaryanniversaries in both 1953 and 1954 (1 May aad 7

November); it was customary previously to have pro-fessional go ld i e r s take these honors. In general, thevoice of the military was heacd only in coqneutionwith military anniversaries, with one exc.ep$ionwhere propaganda purposes were served--the letters ofVasilevski and Zhukov berating Montgomery and ChurchilTfo r allegedly ordering the stacking of German armsafter World War I1 for possible reissue to the Ger-mans for use against the Soviets.

Military men were not given significantlyNo speech by a mili-

1/ This list includes all changes since Staliaysdeat'ti-, ome of which were already summarized in .Caesar 9.

- 16 -


19/68

11. Apparent Losses suffered by Military-ader Malenkpv:The most obvious l o s s was the reduction in funds

---_I

available for military purposes as provided under the1953/1954 budgets. This cut was apparently necessaryto finance Yalenkov's Consumer goods program.1953 budget revealed a leveling off of military ey-penditures: the announced defenqe expenditures for1953 were 110.2 billion rubles as compared to 108.6billion rpblegs for 1952.increase for military expenditures of less than 2percent, qs compared to increases of well over 10percent per year since 1950.budget the announced aXloqaCion Zor milZtary pur po qwwas 103.3 billion rubles, a decrease of 9 percentfrom 1953. ,Ministry :Soviet government, was affected by the reorganizationinstituted by the Malenkov government after Stalin'sdeath.to improve efficiency, and to transfer an estimatedmillion workers from the adm$nistrative to the p r pductive sectors of the economy.

The first changeg in tbe military servicestook the form of consolidation of certain adminis-trative headquarters, with resulting reduction offunctions and pereonnel: Four of the 24 militarydistrict. eadquarters, an intermediate echelonheadquarters, and a f l e e t headquarter8 were probably

The

This represented a rate o fUnder the 1954 Soviet

A, Administrative ConsolAdations DefenseThe Defense Ministry, as all sectors of theThis program attempted to reduce expenditqres,

- 17 -


20/68

abo1ished.l. It is reasonable $0 aasume that someeconomy measures took place ip all military distr$ptheadquarters.qr Reductions cn MSlitary Personnel:.

Within the headquarters of the I)e$ense M h i s vtry, T/O cutbacks were ordered, with a commission sgtuw to work out proposals for a reorganization.*t he GeneraI.,Staff, the most sacred of all organq ofthe Defense Ministry, was subject to reductions, whichwere met with strang.resistance by senior officers.The Operations Directorate and the Intelligenoe Direc-torate quickly regaihed their original T/O's, although

Even

1/ In the Far East, the Beadquarters of theForcgs of the Far East, which pas serviced two mili-tary districts-the Far East and the Ma~ftime ili-tary districts-and the 5th and 7th Pacific Fleets,was abolished sometime in mid-1953.military district was absorbed by Far East militarydistrict, and the former commander of the Headquartersof the Forces of the Far East (Marshal Malinovsky)became the commander of the enlarged Far East mili7tary district. The 5th and 7th Pacific Fleets werecombined with headquarters at Vladivostok, and becamedirectly subordinate fo Moscow naval headquarters.merged to the Moscow military district:military district was joinedpto the North Caucasusmilitary district; and the East Siberian militarydistrict/ is believed to have Peen mergea witn'the Transbaikdl military district. A change in thename of two of the northern military districts alsotook place in 1953, the reason for which is not yetapparent.designated the Northern military district;Archangel military district was renamed the WhiteSea military district.

The Maritime

In addition, the Gorki military district wasthe Doq

The White Sea military district wasthe

- 18 c


21/68

the latter was downgraded from a Chief Directorate toa Directorate. The personnel strength of the Intel-ligence Directorate was initially reduced 30 percent;but was soon brought back to its original size and infact may have been increased.lofficer personnel was undertaken for reasons of econ-omy and efficiency: to reduce the office complemen$been commisbioned during the war. An attempt at fair-ness was made, as efficiency ratings and experiencewere to be considered in considering retirement. Twosources establish the percentage of retired officersas approximately 10 percent; a third says a 20 per-cent rad-action was ordered although this is considereddoubtful.2 One source reports that, contrary to plan,the demobilizatfon was carried out in an arbitrarymanner;cent of pay as a pension while those who were demsbil-ized with less than 20 yesrs service, the usual-retire-ment requirement, were retired without pensions. Thisis said to have wrought a particular hardship on theseofficers-, most of whom were without civilian special-ities, The source mentioned the case of an ex-officernow serving as a park guard. It I s impossible at thistime to assess the effect of these retirements onofficer morale.

, r. The demobilization of a percentage of the,and to weed out the semiliterate officers who had

that those who were retired received 40 per-

1/ Agents of the Intelligence Directorate areusuaTly publicly designated as military attach6s.Service attach& were sent for the first t i m e (1953-55)to the following : Yugoslpvia, Egypt, India, Pakistan,Greece, Belgium, theNetherlands, Lebanon-Syria.A 10- to 20-percent reduction would involvesome-25,000 to 50,000 officers.officer demobilization of this extent w?uld have cometo the attention of our military attaches. In thisconnection, however, I t should be pointed out that thereduct!o,ns were to take place outside of MOSCQW inmilitary district headquarters and in the field, whereMA's would be less likely to hear rumors or to identify

recently demobilized officers.

2/ It would seem that an %

I

- 19 -


22/68

in service beyond the term required by law.]

- 20 -


23/68

Irkutsk and Amur oblasts. 4s at l e a s t 65 percent ofthese funds are spent on the mainfenance and upkeepof troop unite, a personnel reduction lis indicated.

During the spripg and summer of 1953, knowndepartures of military passengers from the Chukotsbr,Magadan, and Kurils areas exceeded known arrivalsby about 25,000. (This figure includes uniformedpersonnel plus cjviliaas in the employ of the armedforces).

It also appears that since Apri l and May 1954,military construction activit9es have decreased soqe-what in the Chukotsk, Sakhalin, and Kurfls areas.This could represent a curtailment or simply thenormal completion of projects that have been inprogress for several years.Available data on union budget expendituresin some sections of the Transcaucasus and CentralAsia suggest that decreases have also occurred innoncivilian expenditures in those areas.in part have been related to abolition of the Donmilitary distrlct.

ThOs may

- 21 -


24/68

D. Effect c.p MalenkovrS Economic Policy -nMilitary:It cannot definitely be stated how the mili-tary leadership reacted to the retrenchment policiesof 1953 and early 195.4.. The evidence on Fetrenchmentitself shows only the direction of c h a w e , without,providing an accurate measure o f its extent. It sug-gests peripheral reductions and eg owmies withoutany serious reduction in the combat capabilities of

by other evidence that programs for re-equipping andreorganizing Soviet military forces proceeded inorderly fashion all through the period of changingpolitical leadership.trative consolidations came at a t i m e when the Sovietmilitary leaders apparently had achieved greaterfreedom to manage the agfairs of t h e i r own establish-ment (see Caesar 9) . Thus, these changes may in lapgepart reflect the attempt of Soviet military leaderst o systematize personnel poPioy and weed out in-efficient or surplus personnel, especially noncombaq-ants, who had-hung on sjlnce the end of World War 11.Such a program was undoubtedly favored by the Yalenkovregime in its desire to further its agricultural andconsumer goods programs and *o Cut unnecessary costgwherever possible.the price paid by the military leaders to increase theeffectiveness of their foroes despite budgetaryrestrictions.

the Soviet ,field foroes. This conclusion is supported

The changes in personnel policy and adminis-

It may also have been in part

,111. Role of Mdilitar in Light versus Heavy IndustryD i s p x a x &a ----In attempting to determine the role of th e pili-tary leadership in the light versus heavy industrydispute and the fall of Mqlenkoy, it is necessary $Qconsider certain questions: Bad the military beenpressuring the leadership for lacreased militarypreparedness?the support of the military for tbeir cauqse?the viewpoints of the two grpups happen to co inc ide .on the necessi*y of increased miliqary strength?

(Did Khrushchev and 4is followers woo01, id


25/68

A .

Probable Dissatlsfaction-f Military:Despite the gains achieved under Malenkov,there are reasons to believe that the militaryleaders may have been unhappy in 1954.have become convinced that Yalenkov w a s jeopardizingthe safety of the country by his readjustment of theeconomy and by what was thought to be the failureof his foreign policy. They were surely uneasy abput

strength of the West and the diplomatic success ofits position of strength; the possibility of theirChinese ally becoming involved in PBW military risk@;the increased military needs of the S a t e l l i t e s andChina, particularly as they related to the proposedSoviet counterpart to NATO. Such considerations mayhave forced the military to desire other leadership.In contrast to Malenkov, ghrushchev and hisfollowers, disappointed in a conciliatory foreignpolicy and believing through conviction and experiencethat military strength as an adjunct to diplomacyshould play a major role in foreign affairs, arguedfor the need of increased military preparedness.

They may

; t h e imminent rearming of Germany; the growing

There are hints that throughout 1954 theremay have been +-iunning argument os military yre-paredness. An FBIS study, in aaalyzfng the speechesof Party I?residium members until November 1954,concluded that the members were apparently dividedinto two groups on the question of allocation offunds to the armed forces: the more mili$ant group(Bulganin , gbrushchev, Kaganovich) which consistentJyemphasized Western aggressiveness in order to Beepmilitary expenditure at a high level; and the non-aggressive group (Malenkov, Saburov, Bervukhin)which was inclined to consider the financial needsof other sectors of the economy at the expense of themilitapy .

- 23 -


26/68

B. Military Aspects -f Dispute:Three developments point to the fact that

military considerations were closely bound up to tb9light,versus heavy industry dispute:-- the pointed relation fn public statementslof heavy industry pslority to defenseneeds, emphasizing the necessity forsuch priority to maintain the defensivecapability of the country;aganda related to the necessity ofmilitary preparedness was intensified;

strength occurred immediately beforeand after Malenkow's fall, both withinthe USSR and the bloc.urged the continuing development of heavy industry,the defense-related aspect did not receive as muchemphasis as later during the dispute.was to refer consistently to the defense aspect;has led to speculation that he may have been actingas a bridge for the military viewpoint.election speech of February 1954, he gave particularattention to heavy industry.further upsurge of our national economy always hasbeen and remains heavy industry ... eavy iRdustrp isthe foundation of the invincible defensive srbflPtg ofthe country and the might of OUP gallant amed forces,I*Phrases such a8 these were to be much in evPSdenceduring the subsequent argument over heavy versuslight industry.

cA t

during the height of the dispute, psop---- changes stressing increased military

Although in general during 1954 Soviet laa,dersOnly Bulganin.th$s

In hisIrTple basis for a

In the propaganda gield, the stress on nailitargpreparedness was exemplified durf,ng this period bytwo trends:-- increased references to %oarpriseattack" with its connotation of "BePrepared" ;

- 24 -TO


27/68

9P-- the reappearance of the theme thatwar would destroy only capitalism,repudiating Yalenkov's previous

stand.i ri tf ' Immediately precedipg and following Malenkomrogremoval as premier,, concrete indications of an em-phasis on increased military strength became evident,The 1955 Soviet budget, announced in February, re--vealed that, the Soviet government intended to returnto the 1952-53 level of apprQprlations for defense.The budget allocated 112.1 billion rubles for ex-plicit military expenditures, a 12-percent increaseover the 1994 allocation. If the allocation iscompletely utilized, these expenditures would be ata postwar high.

.

A s h i f t i n Soviet economic po l i cy regardingThe eleva-military preparedness may have been refl-ected in thegovernment changes of 28 February 1955.tion of V. A. Malyshev to a supraministerial posit$qnin charge of a group of ministries in th e machinebuilding field may indicate added attention to thearmament field. The appointment of Khrunichev, ax?individual connected with the aviation industry, tothe rank of deputy chairman of the Council ofMinisters points to increased attention to this sLdeof the defense picture. The background of P. N.Goremykin, named 3 April 1955 as head of the newlycreated Ministry of General Machine Building, hintsthat the new ministry may be dealing with guided

missiles. IWithin the bloc, miZitrtry preparedness wassuggested by the setting up of the muchcpublfcizedcombined Soviet-Satellite military command under thgWarsaw Agreement of 14 Ahy 1955. Although the prop+-ganda value of such a move, proclaiming the unityand determination of the "peace camp," was paramouqt ,military gains were also achieved. The creation 00a permanent staff, composed of representatives oftho staffs of the participating countries, probablyconstituted an administrative Improvement over theprevious Soviet system of bilateral control overSatellite military activities. The location of the

headquarters in Moscow and the sppolntment of a Sovietofficer as commander will provide firm Soviet coratrfilover day-to-day operation@.

- 25 -


28/68

C. Conclusions on Military Role in Malenkov Fall;:-T* -.c.R.3It is believed that the armed forces leaders

contributed to the presmre on Malenkov, probablybecause.of their dissatisfaction with his policiesand not because of any desire to seize power or $0 $nocrease their own pow-. I t is also quite possiblethat Khrushchev'q followers did seek the support ofthe military leaders, but it is extremely doubtfylbringing aWout the change. It appears most likelythat these two dissatisfied groups ($.e., the milirtary and ghrushchev*q followers) were brought to-gether, without the necessity 03: too much wooing oneither side, by similar viewpointsl on the failure ofMalenkov*s policy and the necessity of increasedmilitary strength .1

* i f the military w e r e the primary power factor in

IV. Position _ . ,f Military under, Khrushchev/BulganiaLeadership:A. Review of important developments-inoe

The governmental reorganization whic4 fotlowedMarshal Zhukov maved on 9 February intq

Y a l e n k o v n o w o n :the demotion of Malenkov in February 1955 broughtsignificant changes in the top leadership of the Sovietarmed forces.the position of minister of defense, which had beenvacated by Bulgaahn's rim to premier.first time since 1949 that a professional militaryofficer headed the combined.armed forces of the USSRa.

This was the

1/ See Caesar 11, The Resignation of Bdalenkov.-2/ During the previous period of unification(1945-1950), Bulganin, 4 politiual marshal, wagMinister of hmed Forces $porn 1946 until March 1949,when Marshal Varsilevsky, a professional officer, toakover.

TOP-


29/68

Although tbe influence of the professionalmilitary leadership in the government rose to a newhigh with ZhuBov's appaintmpnt, the political leadergtook pains to keep the power 04 the military wellwithi,n definite limgts. No representative of theprofessional military class was promoted in Februaryor subsequently to the highest policy-m&ing bodiesof the USSBr-the Presidium of the Party Central Com-mittee or the Presidium of the Council pf Ministers.-In the Part? Presidium, which presumably holds thefinal voice on policy matters, the armed forces willcontinue to be represented by Bulganin, a non-professional. Although recent events suggest thatsome decision-making power may now have been extendedto the Party Central Committee, the percentage ofmilitary figures,in the Central Committee does notgive them a decisive voice in that body.full members of the Central Committee, who would havethe voting privilege, only 8 (or 6.4 percent) aremilitary officers, and this number includes threewho would be considered noqprofessionals--Bulganin,Voroshilov, and Brezhnev. Only 20 military officersare included in the list of candidate members of theCentral Committee.a further rise iq military prestige was shown in 8.variety of ways:

Of the 125

That the new leadership was willing to permit,,

-- the continued glorification of the armedforces through the granting of awards,dedication of monuments, announcedplanned publication of works an m i l i -tary subjects, etc.-- the exploitation of the popularity ofmilitary officers by making greater. use of them as policy spokesmen.-- the ra&her obviqus egforts of the leader-ship to show the unity of the pprty-government-military leadership, suchas the gttendance at Govorov's funeralin Maroh 1955 and tbe telecast ofZhukov-Bulganin-Khrushchev for ArmedForces Day in February 1955.

- 27 -


30/68

-- the ostentatious mass promotion ofseveral officers to the highestranks in the USSB in March 1955.-- the granting of greater latitude ofpublic expression to militaryeven problems of grand strategy.

I officers on military subjects--_ .On 11 March 1955, six officers were promotedto the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union and five'to the ran& of chief marshal or marshal of a specialarm or service. This was the largest simultaneouspromotion to these high ranks ever made in the USSq.At special ceremonies, Voroshilov presented themarshal's star and patent to the newly aseated mar-shals, plus the two highest-ranking naval officgrs.1Certain high military officers in their turncontributed publicly to enhancing the reputation ofthe post-Malenkov political leadership, by acclaiminga select list of Party leaders who allegedly contrib-uted most to the Soviet military effort in WorldWar 11. A recent study has found that during theweeks immediately following Malenkov's resignation,six different military leaders paid public tributeto the part in winning the war played by Khrushchev,Bulganin and the deceased Zhdanov and Shcherbakov 2Those military men who spoke out in such fashion in-cluded Konev, Bagramyan, Zheltov, Moskovsky (theeditor of Red Star) and several lesser figures, Theuse of s e l m e d s t i n g s of this type had alreadyplayed a part in the discrediting of Malenkov,

although military leaders had not been importavt aspublic participants.

1/ For biographic d e t a i l s on these promotedoffizers, see Appendix B, The presence of navalofficers reveals an incident of interservice j e a l o u ~ yin the Soviet armed forces. Shortly after the masspromotion, it was made public that the highest navalrank had been changed from "admiral of the fleet" to"admiral of the fleet of the Sovaet Union." Thischange was apparently designed to correct any popularmisunderstanding that the hi ghes t naval title mightbe inferior to the highest army title, although, ac-cording to Soviet field service regulations, the twotitles had always been of equal rank.

24 FBIS, Polltics and MilPtary Doctrinal Differ-ences among the Soviet Military Elite, RS. 5, 27 July


31/68

During 1955 a total of 80 literary workson military sqbjects w i l l be issued by the MilitaryPublishing Office, according to a TASS announcementof 9 May 1955.the series is to include a number of books aboutoutstanding military leaders of the last war.writers have been instructed to write more booksfor children about the army and to make then as

Of special intereat is the fact thatSoviet

*romantic and inspiring as possible.e .

A t II Moscow conference 03 the Union ofSoviet Writers held in late Hay, in which the DefenseMinistry participated, public requests were made forless censorship Qf miAitary writing, mor0 accuracyin reporting, emphasls on better biographies ofprominent milita$g leaders, Bed, most significantly,a revision of the Stalinist versions of militwyhistory and strategic military doctrine which lhaddeveloped during World War I f .basic strategic doctrine this spring revealed a newpractice of public appraisal of world-wide m%litarpdevelopments, in contrast to the practice duringthe Stalin era of airing only those opinions whichconformed to the military views of Stalln. Recentpublic statements by Soviet military officers havechallenged the military genius of Stalin by callingfor a reappraisal of the traditional emphasis ofthose "permanently operating factors" i n warfarewhich had been stressed by Stalin as being thedecisive elements for victory and by asking fdr moreconsideration of the significance of the element of"surprise attack .''Ias the extremely active Khrushchev-Bulganin foreignpolicy unfolded, Soviet military forces at home andabroad were used as an important bargaining element

A discussion of

During the late spring and summer of 1985, i

1/ The five "permanently operating factors"whicK determine the outcome of war are, accordingto Stalinifit military science: stability of therear, morale of the army, the quantity and qualityof divisions, the armament of the army, and theorganizing ability of the command personnel.

- 29 -

. .


32/68

in the regime's campaign for relaxation of inter-national tensions. In contrast to the militancyof the period around the time of Malenkov's reaLg-nation, the Soviet leadershfp embarked on a pro-gram of concessions in which military leader@ wereprominent instruments.The rapid series of foreign policy moves

Soviet agreement in May t;o end the occupation of!Austria. Following final ratification of theAustrian treaty in July, Sovllet forces began towithdraw in August, and the withdrawal was virtual lycompleted by early September. Bulganin used tbis with7drawal at the Geneva conference as the opening gambitin a series of moves designed to prove to the Wegf tbatthe Soviet military threat had evaporated, when heannounced that the total strength of the Sovietmilitary establishment would be reduced by an amountequivalent to the strength o f the forces withdrawnfrom Austria.

affecting, he military establishment began with the1

This was followed within a month by thedraaatic Soviet announcement that as a result ofthe "relaxation of international tensions" follow-ing Geneva, the Soviet armed gorces w o u l d be reducedin size by a total of 640,000,000men (estimated tobe approximately 16 percent of total mllitary maa-power) by 15 December. All the guropean Satellitesexcept East Germany, which has no official militaryforce, have since followed shit with promises ofmilitary manpower reductions of roughly similar scope.

A continuation of such plowes was foreshadowedby a toast delivered by Khrusbchev in Bucharest OD25 August, in which he stated that the announcedSoviet reduction was .'not Qur last word" on the spb-ject of ipternational accord, an4 that if Sovietactions are followed by simslar Western actions, theUSSR will "continue to march on thfq road."

- 30 -

-


33/68

A further Soviet concession involving mili-tary forces abroad was made on 17 September, whenthe USSR agreed to return its base at Porkkala toFinlapd ., )

The degree of participation by Soviet militaryleaders i n these decisions is not definitely known,and there is very little information on which to baseMarshal Zhukov,as defense minister, logically signed the proclama-tions regarding the removal of Soviet forces fromAustria and the reduction in over-all military man-power.Soviet figures at Geneva, despite the fact that hisposition in the qoviet governmental structure w a slower than that of many persons not included in thedelegation, although his presence may well be ex-plained by his previous close association with Presi-dent Eisenhower.President at Geneva, Zhukov is reported to have dweltat length on the *kollegiality*' f present-day Sovietdecision-mztking.intended evacuation of Porkkala, Zhukov took occasionto inform Western press correspondents that (*wedecided that the time has come to liquidate our basesin general ,*) nd "the sooner the West follows s u i tthe better.'. (In this statement, Zhukov repeated atheme emphasized by him in an interview with Westerncorrespondents on 7 February 1955, just prior to hisappointment as defense minister.)

It must be emphasized that the use of mili-tary leaders and military forces as instruments ofthe present conciliatory Soviet foreign policy doesnot imply that the Soviet leadership is In its ownestimation reducing its over-all preparedness effort.The increased military budget announced in Februaryapparently remains in force, and the statements oflast winter regarding the need for a strong defensehave in no way been retracted.that have been announced refer only to aggregatemanpower and to bases of relatively little militarysignificance. The Soviet estimate, concurred in bythe military, may well be that the realities ofmodern warfare are such that other factors of

*a hypothesis regarding their role.

Zhukov himself was one of the four leading

At a private luncheon with theFollowing the announcement of the

The *'concessions"

- 31 -

-


34/68

military strength (e.g., nuclear weapons and themeans of delivering them) now outweigh sheer man-power strength, some of which can be channeled toeconomic production. ,It is too early to tell whatmeans the USSR will use to implement its announcedtroop reduction, but many possibilities are avail-able which would minimize its significance to over-all Soviet military capabilities. -*It.is, oreover,part an attempt to take belated credit for some ofthe reductions which took place in 1953 and 19%.Thus there is at present little reason to supposethat the concessions of the summer of 1955 wouldhave met with serious objections by informed mili-tary leaders. I

+ quite pos;sible that the 1955 announcement is in

B. Party Control in the Armed Forces:---The enormous prestige and improved statusnow enjoyed by the military raises the question oftheir contrbl in the future, Despite the impreFsivegains of the armed forces, the tradftional partyand security controls remain, and there are reasonsto believe that the leadership will attempt to keepthem as effective as in the past.It is possible that Party and Komsomolmembership in the military has increased recently.Molotov in his 8 February 1954 speech to the SupremeSoviet said that, for every 100 men in the army,there were 77 Party or Komsomol members. Earlier,in October 1952, Marshal Vasilevsky had stated that86.4 percent of the officers and generals were Partyor Komsomol members. As most of the senior offfcershave long been noniaal Party members, it is doubtfulif Party membership among the officer class has in-creased appreciably, Assuming the statements mentionedabove refer only to the army and assuming a 2,500,000-man army with a 12 percent officer component, thiswould indicate that approximately 75 percent of theenlisted men are either Party or Komsomol members.On the other hand, if the above statements refer tothe armed forces as a whole and assuming a force of4,000,000 ith the'same o f f i cer percentage, the num-ber of Party and Eomsomol members among the enlistedmen would be 61 percent of the total.

- 32 -


35/68

. . . ' I ..

Party figures are not available to ascertainif this represents a substantial increase in Partyand Komsomol membership. It is doubtful if morethan?la few percent of ,the enlisted men are Partymembers as most of them are in the age group forKomsomol membership (26 and under).emphasis being placed on NCO leadership, however,it is possible that more NCO's are now being admittedto the Party than formerly. In regard to Komsomolmembership; an analysis of information obtained from\ S o v i e t ilitary defectors reported thatheavy pressure is exerted on soldiers to join; andthat as a result practically all the troops have atleast gone through the formality of taking out member-ship.' It appears that the Komsomol organization inthe armed forces underwent a reorganization in thefall of 1954, but details are not available. A broad-cast of the armed forces radio service, i n September1954, spoke of the conversion of the lLomsornol organi-zation to a "new structureTv ith organizational meet-ings being held for that purpose in various armedforces units.

In view of the

In the matter of Party control of officers,a more liberal approach has been noted.the compulsory curricula ofbers of a military Party cell, instead of followingprescribed study assignments as An the past, werepermitted to use their initiative in the choice ofstudies.supervise the courses and to evaluate the work of

Accordingcal training wele relaxed in 1954, so that mem-

The deputies for political matters were to

1/ A Johns Hopkfns study of January 1953 onpoliTical operations in Soviet Armed Forces reachedthe conclusion that i n .peacetYne:. pproximately 22percent of the total military forces are party mem-bers.party members;the total Communist membership in the.USSB is lessthan 6,000,000.This would mean that 880,000 military men arethis figure is considered doubtful as

- 33 -


36/68

. .

each member.1 Evidence of the truth of this reporthas appeared in Soviet military publications. InRed Star, 22 March 1955, reference was made to the5 t - into!practice.of the principle of volun-tar&hess in party enlightenment." The articlepointed out that during the current training year,many officers have raised their ideological-political level by "independent" study; but un-- fortunateJy, the article continues, many of theseofficers had had insufficient experience in inde-pendent study. The article goes on to criticizepolitical organs and Party bureaus which verysuperficially fulfilled their responsibilities forresolving the difficulties of the officers.to improve the position of the commander for the sakeof military discipline;partially nullified by saddling the commanders w&tha greater sense of Party responsibility. Accordingto members of a militarypa!ty cell may not criticize t2eir commander, assuch action might undermine military discipline;official complaints of the military are forwardednot through political channels but through militarychannels; the position of political officer ex-tended as of 1954 down only to battalion level,whereas formerly it was found through company level,with the commander assuming political duties onlower levels.

Certain concessions appear to have been madebut these gains have been

1/ The new emphasis on independence in politicalactiTities has its parallel in the tactical field.Officers are now encouraged to use inltiative withthe service regulations only as 8 guide, whereasformerly strict obedience to regulations was expected.Earlier in this paper mention was made of the leader-ship program among the NCO's. It is tempting tospeculate on the long-range effects of such policyinnovations--whether initiative and leadership canbe localized only in the channels desired by theParty.

- 34 -


37/68

The numerous references to strengthening"one-mn command" show a continuing sensitivity ont h i s subject. For example, Red Star in Feburary1955,spoke of the necessity f'to explain morethoroughly the instructions of the Party in themat.ter of one-man command." It is not known whetherthis refers to some recent instructions or whetherit is an amplification of earlier directives onsthe subjeFt. As summarized in Caesar 9, the polit-ical offiders lost their command powers in 1942.Nevertheless, their continued interference in commandfunctions caused a directive to be issued in 1951limiting their work strictly to the political f i e l d .It would appear that the professional militaryofficers are parTicularly watchful for any encroach-ment in the command field.

There are hints of a more sophisticatedapproach to this problem of unity of command.political officers are to be kept definitely outof t h e command field, which is the acknowledgedbailiwick of the professional soldiers, but thecommander is to be made increasingly aware of th efact that the final responsibility for the politicaleducation of his troops rests with him.and military training are consldered to be of equalvalue. There have been a number of references tothis dual responsibility of the commander in themilitary and political f i e l d , as illustrated bya rather flatteping quotation from an article,dated February 1955, by the editoreof Red Star:"One of the most important measures ofthe=yand government introduced into the Soviet armedforces in recent years is the strengthening ofunity of command, This raised the authority ofcommanders still higher and improved disciplineand order in troop units. Our army and navy haveat their disposal the most experienced cadres ofofficers and generals, persons who are selflesslydedicated to the motherland, and who are capableof training and educating troops i n conformitywith present-day requirements. The m o s t valuablecommanders are those who skillfully combine the i rcombat activity with the political and militarytraining of their subordinates."

me

Political

- 35 -


38/68

, I ,', ,, ,. Tha t greater freedom of expression.. , on t h e whole problem of p o l i t i c a l con-t r o l i n t h e armed farces is now per-* Red'Star in January 1955 of an a r t i c l em h - rather s t a r t l i n g t i t l e ,"Party Work Should 'Be Subordinated tot h e I n t e r e s t s of t h e Uni t ' s B a t t l e -Beadiness. '

C.

e. mi t t ed is indicated by t h e appearance in

Sehuri ty Control ---n t h e A rm e dForces :

The mi l i t a ry coun t e r i n t e l l i genceapparatus , now con t ro l l ed by t h e KGB, isbel ieved to be as a c t i v e as formerly i nf e r r e t i n g ou t any "subve rs ive" ac t i v -i t i e s of t h e mi l i t a ry . I t is doubtfult h a t t h e s e c u r it y p o l i ce l o s t much oft h e i r inv es t i ga t i ve power by t h e execa-t i o n of Beria and t h e reorganiza t ion oft h e sec ur i ty appara tus . Publ ic criti-c i s m w a s d i r ec t ed no t aga i ns t t h e p o l i c es y s t e m per se , but against th e previousleaders-rand i t s methods of operat ions .B o t h former deputy MGB, minister Ryuminand former MGB minister Abakumov wereexecuted fo r t h e i r al leged e x t r a l e g a luse of police power. The s e c u r i t y ap-pa ra t us has been de f i n i t e l y subord i na t edt o t h e Par ty and l i m i t a t i o n s have beenimposed on i t s i nd i s c r i mi na t e u se, butt h e police organs surv i ve with theirvoluminous f i l e s and vast network ofinformers .

- 36 -


39/68

S ta l i n a lways main tained c ont r o lof t h e s e c u r i t y a p pa r at u s and nowKhrushchev appears t o be us i ng h i si n f l uence t o a s s i g n h i s followerst o t h e KGB. The chairman of t h eKGBand h i s two i d e n t i f i e d d e p u ti e sare known t o have had previous as-s o c i a t i o n s with Khrushchev. Thismay indicate that Khrushchev nowcommands loyal$; fest i n t h e BGB andis t h e re f o re i n f l u e n t i a l i n i t sopera t ions : It is unnecessary t oemphasize t h a t Khrushchev and t h eKGB, aware of t h e enormous p r e s t i g eof t h e m i l i t a r y , would be p a r t i c u l a r l ywatchful for any evid enc e of independ-e n t , t h i n k i n g or acting on t h e p a r tof t h e armed forces o r i n d i v i d u a l swi t h i n i t .D. Control -f Zhukov:

In cons i de r i ng t h e problem ofh i s pro-

army con t ro l , a t t e n t io n must be pa i dto t h e p e r s o n a l i t y of Zhukov. He isunique f o r sev e ra l r ea sons :fe ss io na l competence; , h i s a b i l i t y t oi n s p i r e alm os t f a n a t i c a l l o y a l t yamong h i s fo l l ower s ; h i s p o s i t i o n ast h e most popular f igure in t h e USSR,both w i t h t h e populace and t h e armedforces ; and a cer tain independence ofmind.There is no r ea son t o ques t i onh i s l o y a l t y , e i t he r t o t h e P ar ty or t ot h e government. He , like many of t h emore prominent S ovie t o ff ic e rs , haslong been a m em b e r of t h e Party, whichhe joined in 1919. Most of h i s : speecheshave followed the general p o l i c y l i n e of the

m om e n t + al though w i t h nota ble moderation ofphraseology. His l e t t e r a t t a c k i n g mat-gomery and Ch ur chi l l i n December 19541- 37 -


40/68

. .

was uxidoubtedly written at t h e bidding of t h e Par tyand was i n terms so v i t t f o l i e a s t o a ppear t o havebeen wr i t t e n by someone else .V-E my, 1955, he duly gave c r ed i t t o t h e P a r t y ast h e , i .nspirer and orga nizer of vic to ry . Nevertheless ,c e r t a i n h i n t s of independent thinking have appeared , 'p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h r e f e r e n ce t o h i s c o nc ep t of atomicw a r . There is r ea s on t o b e l i e v e t h a t he may share+ aviewpoint as t o t h e e f f ec t s of a t h i r d world warm o r e n e a r l y ' i n accord w i t h t h e opinion expressed byMalenkov in March 1954.

I n h i s speech fo r

On 9 May 1954, Zhukov i n h i s first Pravdaa r t i c l e a f t e r h i s r e t u r n t o prominence s m t h a t"war means heavy losses f o r b o th sides"; t h i s wast h e closest approach by any to p Soviet figure t oMalenkov's t h e s i s of destruction-of-world-eivili-za t ion . In a February 1955 i n t e rv iew w i t h Hearstre po r t er s , Zhukov again used th i s theme, s t a t i n gtha t l l a tom ic w a r is j u s t as dangerous t o t h eattacker as t o t h e attacked." Although Zhukov, i nh i s 23 February address on A r m e d Forces Day, madeno a l l u s io n t o p o s s i b l e Sovie t losses i n n new war,he f a i l e d t o r eas se r t f o r c e f u l l y t h e theme t h a t anew world war would destroy capi ta l i sm alone . Thisre t ice nce appeared unusual idi 'view of t h e b l u n t re-pud ia t ion of Malenkov's t h e s i s by Molotov on 8February and by Voroshilov on 26 March, as w e l l ast h e p resence of t h i s theme i n t h e S o v i e t press a tt h a t t i m e . In h i s V-E Day 1955 Pravda a r t i c l e ,Zhukov wrote: "One h a s t o be s u m d t t h ef ac t t h a t b ig m i l i t a r y e x p e r t s -- and espec ia l lyt h o s e of B r i t a i n -- have such an i r r e spo ns i b lea t t i t u d e toward th e problems of atomic and hydrogenwar. We, t h e m i l i ta r y , rea l ize more c le ar ly thananyone e l se t h e ext remely deva s ta t in g na t ure ofsuch a wa r . "

Zhukov h a s been described as an a rden t nation-a l i s t who i s . i n t e n s e l y i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e d e f e ns e ofh i s country. H e may have favored t h e more c o n c i l i -a t o r y f o r e i g n p o l i c y of Malenkov; however, thef a i l u r e of t h i s p o l ic y p l u s t h e imminent rearmament

- 38 -


41/68

I

Press Club, he e xp re ss ed c e r t a i n t y t h a t t h e Pres i -dent would do everything in h i s power to g iv e p r a c t i -cal a i d t o th e cause of peace, s t a t i n g th a t "newe f f o r t s are now needed t o avoid f ur th e r aggravat ionof i n t e r n a t i o n a l t en s io n. He a l so remarked t h a tw h i l e "some po l i t i c i ans wou ld l i k e t o i n s t i l l Sheidea t h a t w a r is i n e v i t a b l e , t h e common people of ,t h e world do not want bombs dropped on t h e i r homes."In t h i s l e t t e r Zhukov referred t o t h e des t ruc t iont h a t a new w a r might b r i n g t o * 'chi ldre n, mothersand wives" in "New York o r Moscow, London or Paris."

Iiis appointment as defense minis te r may wellhave been t o i nc rease t h e popu la r i ty of t h e partyand government a t a t i m e when a more austere i n t e r n a lpo l i cy was to be reintroduced. Although by h i sappointment his p r e s t i g e has i n c r e a s e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,h i s power is l i mi t ed . He w a s elecsed a f u l l memberof t h e P a r ty C e n t r a l Committee in mid-1953, but he *has not been e l e v a t e d t o the Pres id iun of t h e Par tyCen t ra l Committee, which is considered the f i n a lpolicy-making body i n t h e USSR, NOP was he electedt o t h e Presidium of the Counci l of Miniaters, whoseresponsib i l i t ies p resumably include some poliey-making functions. H e is one of t h e more than 50 .m i n i s t e r s w,ho form the Council of Minis ters .

I t was previously mentioned t h a t t h e KGB wouldcontinue t o r e s t r a in any ambit ions t o power on t h epart of thte m i l i t a r y . Ment ion should be made of therelations between Zhukov and t h e man apparent ly

- 39 -


42/68

handpicked by Khrushchev t o be head of t h e KGB,I . A. Serov, whose promotion t o Army General w a sreve aled i n August 1955. According t o re po rts ,Zhukov and Serov, who were bo th i n E a s t GermanyfoLlowing World War 11, thoroughly d i s l i k e d eacho the r . A t t h a t time, Serov w a s purging ant i-Sovietelements in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Reports@ i n d i c a t e ha t t h e i r pa ths may a l so have crossed a ta l a t e r dat'e. Se rov was sent as an MVD o f f i ce r t oth e Ukraine; a t t h a t t i m e Zhukov w a s m i l i t a r y d i s -trict commander at Odessa (Ukraine). In 1948,Zhukov w a s dispatched in to semiobscur i ty t o t h eUrals

There are ais0 i n d i c a ti o n s t h a t t h e p a r t yl eade r sh ip is t ak in g s t ep s t o ho ld Zhukov's p re s t ig ewi th in bounds by building up Marshal Ivan Konev 8sa poss ib le counterweight t o Zhukov and by b e l i t t l i n gZhukov's w a r t i m e successes.

E. Buildup of Konev as Counterweight 7o Zhukov:Marshal Konev, a l though s t a t ioned ou t s ide of

---Moscow from 1952 t o 1955, was a t t h e c e n t e r ofs e v e r a l m ajor p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o v e r s ie s i n r ec e nt years.He w a s named as a Doctors ' P l o t v ic t im i n January1953; he r epor t ed ly took pa r t w i t h Zhukov and Bul-ganin i n the ar res t of B e r i a in June 1953; and heserved as chairman of t h e s p e c i a l session of theSupreme Court which t r i e d B e r i a and his assoc ia t e s .

On 8 February 1955, he acted as spokesmanf o r the armed forces a t t h e Supreme Soviet session.H e w a s a l so p i cked t o write th e Pravda a r t i c l e f o rArmed Forces Day, 23 February 19- which hesingled out Khrushchev for s p e c i a l a t t e n ti o n .

k

Xn

1/ For information on t h e f a t e of the Doctors 'Plot '%ict ims, t ' see Appendix A.

- 40- -


43/68

do i ng ' t h i s , he departed from t h e customary alpha-bet ical l i s t i n g of w a r t i m e political off icers t oname Khrushchev ahead of Bulganin, Zhdanov, andShcherbakov.widely broadcast c-ary of the anniversary;in co nt ra st , . Zhukov's speech, which had been tele-vised , w a s not broadcast and only a b r ie f summary

B i s Pravda a r t i c l e was t h e most

e appeared in Pravda,. *Konev wa5 again chosen t o give t h e mainaddress at t he 1955 V-E ce l eb ra t i on a t t h e BolshoiTheatre, t h e f i rs t t i m e such ceremonies had beenhe ld on t h i s date. His speech, which has beencharacterized as being p a r t i c u la r l y S t a l i n i s t , wasgiven unusual prominence. Again he set W u a h c h e v

apart from the other political of f i ce r s by s t a t i n g ,"Comrade Khrushchev, comrades Bulganin, etcIt is noteworthy t h a t two o t he r mi l i t a ryfi gu re s, Bagramyan and Zheltov, subseque ntly copiedKonev's technique of l i s t i n g Khrushchev beforeBulganin, although t h e y did not go so f a r as t oseparate Ithrushchev from t h e o t he r s l i s t e d .Konev, descr ibed as ardent Communistand a devoted friend of Staxin, Joined the partyi n 1917 and was a c t i v e in organiza t iona l work,He began h i s military career as a g o 1 i t i c o l com-missar. He was elected a candidafe member of t h eCent ra l Committee, CPSU, in ,1949,achi ev i ng f u l lmembership in October 1952. Since h i s assignmentin 1952 t o t h e WsraLine, he M e been ac t ive inUkrainian p a r t y a f f a i r s . The Ge~manasdescribedXonev, whom they nicknsrrmed *'Butcher'' because ofh i s heavy troop 1os8ess as n m ~ ef 8 p o l i t i c i a nthan a soldier . wKonev was picked by Khrushchev to accompanyh i m t o Warsaw on t w o occsrsions in 1955: the ami-versary of t h e Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendshipand th e anniversary of t h e l i b e r a t i o n of Poland.

- 41 -


44/68

Konev was i d e n t i f i e d in A p r i l as a deputyminis te r of defense, only t o be named in May as t h ecommander of t h e Soviet -Satel l i te combined forces.

L i t t l e is known of t h e persona l re la t ion-ship between Konev and Zhukov.11, Konev p a r t i c i p a t e d in m i l i t a r y operat ionsYoscow antlethe reconque st of t h e Ukraine.apparent confiden ce i n Konev 85 a m i l i t a r y commanderis ind ica ted by t h e fact t h a t i n t h e d r i v e fromWa r s aw t o Ber l in , Zhulrov, then personal ly com-manding a front as w e l l as co-ordinating a l la c t i v i t i e s i n the area, cons i s t en t l y kept Konevon h i s l e f t flank. One area of conflict betweent h e two has been reported: Konev a l l e g e d l y favoredst rengthening t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l sys tem i n t h earmed forces in c o n t r a s t t o Zhukov's insistence ons t r i c t one-man command of un i t s . There may beprofessional jealousy between t h e two, since Konevsucceed ed Zhukov as commander i n c hi ef of t h eground forces i n 1946 when Zhukov w a s reduced toa m i l i t a r y d i s t r i c t commander.

. *

During World War~ coordinated by Zhvkov, serving in t h e defense ofZhukov's

In t h e buil d-up accompanying Konev's ap-pointment as commander of t h e combined Soviet-S a t e l l i t e forces, w a r t i m e h i s t o r y w a s d i s t o r t e dt o chal lenge the pre-eminent posit ion of Zhukov.Perhaps t h e most revealing exaggeration of Konev'spos i t i on w a s carr ied i n a Polish newspaper t h e daya f t e r h i s appointment: ''The f i g u r e of Marshal IvanKonev, t w i c e Hero of t h e Soviet Union, commander oft h e F i r s t Ukrainian Front during t h e war, 'conquerorof Berlin, and l i be r a to r of Prague, is growing t ot h e dimensions of a symbol -- t h e symbol of thei nv i nc i b l e might of t h e Soviet army and of oure n t i r e camp."ignoring t h e major role of Zhukov i n the conquestof Ber l in ; furthermore, t h e on ly m i l i t a r y figurei n t h e USSB who could approach t h e sta ture of asymbol is Marshal Zhukov. There were similar .dis-t o r t i o n s in t h e speeches of var ious Sate l l i te Par t y

(ZYCIE ARSZAWY, 15 May 1955).T h i s quo t a t i on d i s t o r t ed facts by

- 42 -


45/68

and government leaders, which magnified Konev'sw a r t i m e ro le a t t h e expense of Zhukov., A biography of,Xonev (Moscow, N ew s , No. 11,

This a r t i c l e s ta ted t h a t Konev's f o r c e s1955) fu r the r d i spa rages the m i l i t a ry r eco rd ofZhukov." in coordinat ion with those of Gen. N. F. Vatutin(deceased) , routed and smashed H i t l e r ' s Belgorod-Then followed the sweep acrosst h e Ukraihd, during which Vatutin and Konev exe-cuted t h e famous Korsun - Shevchenkovskii opera t ion,t h e "Second Stalingrad." From May 1944 onward,Konev's forces i n f l i c t e d major defeats on t h e Nazisin Poland and Czechoslovakia, and it was h i s t roops ,in conjunct ion w i t h those of t h e F i r s t B e l or u ss ia nFront , which took Ber l in on 2 May 1945. The con-c lud ing ope ra t ion of t h e wa.r, t h e t h r u s t i n t o t h eO r e Mountains of Czechoslovakia, w a s also t h e workof Konev, and it w a s highly characteris t ic of h i stype of generalship;" In t h i s write-up, i t iscompletely overlooked t h a t Zhukov as t h e r e p re -s e n t a t i v e of STAVKA (General Headquarters of t h eSuprem e Com m am co-ord ina ted a l l t h e ground anda i r a c t i v i t i e s of t h e opera t ions referred t o ;opera t ions such as these usual ly involved two t of o u r f r o n t s w i t h a t o t a l of t e n to twelve armies,p l u s a i r s up p or t. In addition, Zhukov had personalcommand of t h e Fi r s t Be lo russ i an Fron t ,

-Kharkov grouping.

A Pravda a r t i c l e on 2 May 1955 by GeneralV. I. Chuikov on t h e b a t t l e of Ber l in not onlyf a i l e d t o give Zhukov c r ed i t for planning randco-ordinat ing a l l opera t ions , bu t d i s to r t ed trutht o give Konev and Bokossovsky equ al c r e d i t wi thZhukov f o r t h e Be rli n captu re. Rokossovsky'scon t r ibu t ion was, i n f a c t , i n d i r e c t , as he remainedin northern Poland and northern Germany when Zhukovand Konev rushed from Warsaw t o B e rl in .

#

In a recent broadcas t on a m i l i t a r y ex-h i b i t i n Moscow, Zhukov's p a r t in t h e battle ofSta l ingrad was completely ignored, although hew a s t h e STAVKA repre sen ta t ive who planned theo p e r a t i o m w a s in t he f i e l d during the German

- 43 -l . OhH2EJT


46/68

offensive. Lesser i nd iv idua l s were mentioned, in-clud ing Colonel General (now Marshal) Vasilevskgwho, according t o t h e broadcast, was s e n t "by t h eParty.i". Khrushchev's part in t h e bat t l e of S t a l i n -grad, as a member of t h e Sta l ingrad m i l i t a r ycounci l , w s played up as it had been on previousoccasions.*had been sent by the State Defense Committee toInc iden ta l ly , t h e name of Malenkov, who+. Sta l ingrad , w a s also ignored.

a ,

, . .

I

1/ There has been some build-up of Khrudhchev'sr o l e as a p o l i t i c a l o f f ic e r i n t h e l a s t war. In t h epast it had been customary t o give t h e Sta te DefenseCommittee c r ed i t for v i c t o r y , l i s t i n g i t s con t r ibu t ionahead of t h e work of t h e p o l i t i c a l generals . Thefirst v a r i a t i o n in t h e o f f i c i a l order of precedencewas noted in March 1954; TRUD, on t h e anniversary ofS t a l i n ' s death , s t a t ed t b m h e Central Committee,without mentioning t h e S t a t e Defense Committee, sendComrades Bulganin, Zhdanov, Shcherbakov, Khrushchev,and others t o d i rec t mi l i t a r y work. The same fourwere named i n December 1954. Th i s may have been anattempt t o undermine t h e p r e s t i g e of Malenkov, whow a s a memb e r of t h e S t a t e Defense Committee, w h i l eKhrushchev was not . On 2 February 1955, on t h e 1 2 t hanniversary of t h e v ic to ry of Sta l ingrad , a Pravdaa r t i c l e ignored a l l m i l i t a r y heroes; b e s i d e s m n ,only Khrushchev was s ing led ou t and personal lyassocia ted w i t h vic tory .

..

I

- 44 -


47/68

3

F. Probable Appearance -f M i l i t a r y Groupings:I t hgs been sp ecu late d t h a t Khrushchev maybe at tempt ing to f r ac t 'i ona l ize th e lo ya l t i e s of them i l i t a r y by bui ld ing up h i s own c l i q u e among t h e pro-f e s s i o n a l class, in c o n t r a t to t hose who might becalled Zhukov *s followers .

, of f i ce rs promoted i n rank or p o s i t i o n s i n c e t h e f a l lof bfalenkov has th er ef or e been examined f o r evidenceon t h e fol lowing points:Khrushchev or Konev; (2) evidence of more than usualP a rt y a c t i v i t y ; (3) i n d i c a t i o n s of Ukrainian t i e s ,

The background of(1) p a s t a s s o c i a t i o n w it h

Of t h e eleven of f ic er s promoted t o t h erank of Marshalfon 11 March 1955, evidence wouldi n d i c a t e t h a t three possibly have l o y a l t i e s t oKhrushchev and Konev; t h e r e is a s l i g h t p o s s ib i l i t yt h a t t w o more ow e such a l legiance .f i v e , it is impossible t o advance an opinion re-garding four of them, but t h e f i f t h bas strong war-t i m e t i e s to Zhukov. No genera l i za t ion as toal legiance can be made i n regard t o t h e o f f i ce rpromoted a t t h e same time t o Army General.Appendix B, information pointing to these conclusionsis given. The l im i ta t io ns of a t tempt ing t o l i n e upfol lowers by t h e above-mentioned crite 'sia atre rec-ognized; nevertheless , t h e d e t a i l s as o u t l i n e d inAppendix B, p l u s the fact t h a t some of these o f f f c e r s

Of t h e remaining

In

. . .

1/ I t i s impossible to i so late Zhukov'sfol lowzrs on t h e b a s i s of associat ion, Duringt h e l a s t w a r he came i n c on ta ct e i t h e r d i r e c t l yor i n d i r e c t l y w i t h every prominent off icer and,during h i s period of e c l i p s e af t e r t h e w a r , hisinfluence would not have been f e l t in t h e assign-ment or promotion of off ice rs . The al legiancet h a t he commands would date primari ly from t h ew a r t i m e and post-S tal in periods.

- 45 -TOP T l - l


48/68

were promoted i n p la ce of men of equal or greaterq u a l i f i c a t i o n s , s u g g e s t t h a t some p o l i t i c a l in-f luence was exer t ed on t h e i r behalf . There w a sobserved a rather clo'se i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of W ~ P -t l m e t i e s among those promoted.

Promoted off icers who are considered~ poss ib ly to favor Khrushchev and Konev are:

Commander of Moscow M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t and Commanderof Moscow Garrison;' e -- IC. S, Moskalenko, hbrshal of SU,

-- A. A. Grechko, W s h a l of SO,Commander, Soviet Forces i n Germany;-- S. S, Varentsov, Marshal ofA r t i l l e r y , probably Chief of Main A r t i l l e r yDirectorate.

s l i g h t p o s s i b i l i t y of a l l e g i a n c e t o Khrushchev andKonev are:Promoted of f i ce r s whose careers i n d i c a t e a

-- A. I . Yeremenko, Marshal of SU,Commander, North Caucasus M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t ;-- I , K, Bagramyan, Marshal of SU,position unknown.Promoted of f i ce r s whose ' a l legiance, i f any,cannot be determined:-- V. I . Chuikov, Marshal of SU, Kiev

c- S. S . Biryuaov,. Marshal of SU,M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t .position unknown, possibly PVO c h i e f .Av ia ti on , Commander i n Chie f of M i l i t a r y A i s Force;-- P. F. Zhigarev, Chief Xarshal of

- 46 -


49/68

-- S. I . Budenko, Marshal of Aviation,Chief of S t a f f of Mi l i t a ry A i r Force;

I, * -- V, A; Sudets, Marshal of Aviation,pgriition unknown.Promoted of f i ce r w i t h major w a r t i m e t i e s t oZhukov:

Deputy Commander i n Chief of Main Directorate ofA r t i l l e r y Troops.4 , -- V. 1. Kazakov, Marshal of A r t i l l e r y ,

I t was po i n t ed ou t i n Caesar 9 t h a t Eonev'ssubordina tes during and after t h e w a r have risen,possibly through h i s inf luence.inc lude: These o f f i ce r s-- A. S. Zhel tov , Colonel General ,Ch i e f , Ch i e f Po l i t i ca l Directorate;-- G. IC, Malandin, Army General , Chiefof Staff , Ground Troops, and Deputy Chief*of GeneralS t a f f . -- A. S, Zhadov, Co lon el Ge ner al,formerly Comnander i n Ch ief , C en tr al Group of Fo rces;now poss ib ly a deputy t o Konev.

-- V. V. Kurasov, &my e n e r a l , Com-Bmandant, Voroshilov Mi l i t a ry Academy.Of t hose high o f f i c e r s who have advancedin p o s i ti o n s i n c e 11 March 1955, the advancements ofgOn8V and Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky are t h e mosts i g n i f i c a n t . Xonev's r i s e has been discussed.-/ For biographic d e t a i l s , see Appendix B.

- 47 -


50/68

. The Soviet press revealed in A p r i l 1955t h a t Sokolovsky is now a f i r s t deputy Minister ofDefepse and Chief of th e General Staff of t h eArmy and Navy. Sokolovsky, a b r i l l i a n t s ta f fof f ice r and army commander, was Xonev's chief ofs t a f f i n t h e dr i ve across Poland; he was r e l i e v e dbefore t h e Frankfur t iBer l in breakthrough, apparentlyt o be Zhukovls s t a f f co-ordinator for t h e BerlinSoviet Element, Allied Control Council, Ber l in .Western officers i n Be r l i n found h i m i n t e l l i g e n t ,hard. and s k i l l f u l i n c a rr y in g out Soviet policy,

,

operatioh: H e rep lac ed Zhukov i n 1946 as commanderof t h e Sovie t Forces i n Germany and as chairman,

n which he w a s a convinced believer. It w a s underh i s d i r e c t i o n t h a t t h e S o vi et s i n s t i t u t e d t h e Ber l i nblockade.H e became f i r s t deputy Minister of t h e A rm e dForces f o r General A f f a i r s in March 1949, whichpos i t i on he r e t a i ned af ter t h e separa t ion of t h eA r m e d Forces Minis t ry into t h e War and NavyMinis t r i es . In 1953, he was i d e n t i f i e d as chiefAn appa ren t f a v o r i t e of S t a l i n , he w a selected a f u l l memb e r of t h e Cent ra l Committee,CPSU, i n October 1952. I t is impossible t o a l l yhim t o any m i l i t a r y or p o l i t i c a l grouping.

f t h e General S t a f f and a deputy mi n i s t e r of w a r .

O f t h e s i x new m i l i t a r y ,d istr ic t commandersi n t h e western USSR, four have major w a r t i m e t i e s toZhukov; t h i s is a l s o t r u e of t h e of f ice r who hasbeen recently named chairman of t h e central commit teeof DOSAAF (All-Union Society for Cooperat ion w i t hthe A rm y , AVlatlOn, ana tne Navy), t ne so vi et para-m i l i t a r y and c i v i l defense organizat ion. Biographicde ta i l s are given i n Appendix 3. N e w l y assignedo f f i c e r s w i t h probable major Zhukov associationsinclude : -- A. V. Gorbatov, Colonel General,Commander, B a l t i c M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t ;

- 48 -


51/68

-- 1. I . Fedyuninski , Colonel General,-- A. 1. Badzievski , Colonel General ,

Commander, TransCaucasus Military D i s t r i c t ;C o G n d e r , O d e s s a M il i t a ry D i s t r i c t ;

. .,, -- V. Ya. Kolpakchi, Colonel General,Commander, Northern Military D i s t r i c t ;

Chairman, Central C omm i t t e e , DOSAAF.".

* -- P. A. Belov, Colonel General,In at tempting t o o u t l i n e t h e possibilitiesof groupings or c l i q u e s w i t h i n t h e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l is h -ments, t w o other recent developments must be takenin to account . The f i r s t , al ready d iscussed, is t h es i n g l i n g o u t by c e r t a i n m i l i ta r y leaders i n t h espring of 1955 of t h e se lec t grouping of Par ty leaderswho al legedly cont r ibuted most t o winning World War11. Konev, Bagramyan and Zheltov were chief amongt h e m i l i t a r y leaders who chose or were chosen t operform t h i s s e r v i c e for Khrushchev and Bulganin.Second, a c u r io u s p u bl i c a i r i n g of m i l i t a r ydoct r ina l problems apparent ly came t o a head i nMarch, Apr i l and May 1955, during which period i m -por t an t m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s made s ta tements regardingt h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of s u r p r i s e at tack and nuclearweapons in modern wa r . The ques t ion of th e impactof s u r p r i s e i n war goes back to S t a l i n ' s a s s e r t i o nfol lowing t h e ear ly German,victor$es i n 1941 t h a t

s u r p r i s e w a s not one of those f a c t o r s which deter-mine t h e f i n a l outcome of w a r .of t h i s theory has been evident s ince t h e y e a r ofS t a l i n ' s dea t h , but it now appears t h a t a n e n t i r ereworking of t h e theory has occurred and has beenbrought t o l i g h t i n r e c e n t S o v ie t p u b l i c a ti o n s .The f u l l i m p li c at i o ns of t h i s re-examination are notclear , p a r t i c u l a r l y since it has been interwovenwi th v ig i l ance p ropaganda , a s se r t i on s of Sovie tnuc lea r s t r en g th , and the deba te over the conee-quences of ato

Documents

Caesar 12 - Recent Developments in Political Status of Soviet Armed Forces