[1990] André Gunder Frank. East European Revolution of 1989. Lessons for Democratic Social Movements (In Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 25, n° 5, pp. 251-258)

8/12/2019 [1990] Andr Gunder Frank. East European Revolution of 1989. Lessons for Democratic Social Movements (In Eco

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East European Revolution of 1989: Lessons for Democratic Social Movements (And Socialists?)Author(s): Andre Gunder FrankSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 25, No. 5 (Feb. 3, 1990), pp. 251-255+257-258Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4395898

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doing work on issues specitic to India. Themoney could also be used for introducingsafety features like the laminated windshieldin Maruti cars. Another possibility wouldbe to substitute the Nlaruti 1000 body in theMaruti 800 and stop selliing the old tinymodel. The new Maruti 800 would be safer(being bigger) and roomier.The National Front government has toshow that it means business by taking tough

decisions on issues like the Maruti 1000.These would be symbolic decisions and sendclear signals to the non-yuppies in India thatthey can trust this government. If clearsignals are not given that society in Indiacannot be fragmented any more, the upperclass will be emboldened into becoming evenmore hedonistic and parasitic. It will makeeven stronger demands tor resources beingdiverted for production ot goods which onlya tiny minority can afford to use. Productionof such goods will then become politicallynecessary even at thCexpcnse of survival ofthe poor.It is assumed that the production and

possession of these goods wsillautomnaticallNmake us rpeotahlcl. \\'Wdon't really worryabout comparing \%at ought to be thilemoreimllpor-tantaspccts o() life-hUiman rights,civil rights, equalKit , h1Opealld taith t'or urpeople. 'T'hisis 01 crse puIttiu a mioregenerous interpretatiotnou the i-notixes of' thepowcrful.It is the nmore imitetr explanation whichis cause for worrv. 'h'l ric in this Countrvhave now little commnilitimieinto the countrv.If the nation cannot give them what theydeserve as 'hardworking' andihighly educatedindividuals then they say that they reallyhave no choice but to emigrate. Af'ter all theymust "give the best opportunities to theirchildren" An IIT graduate complains thatIndia does not of'fer the salaries, equipmentand jobs he deserves so hiecan best servehumanity by pursuing his interests in the US.This model has been absorbed by the elitein general. If you cannot go abroad then youcan at least create a little Ainerica here. Butthe only way possible to do this is to holdthe society to ransomn demanding tech-nologv transit'ers.

East European Revolution of 1989Lessons for Democratic Social Movements(and Socialists?)Andre Ctunder FranlkThe developmenits in EasterniEurope call for reappraisal of severalwidely held theories and deeply felt ideologies of socialisfn, socialdemocracy and social movements and offer at least a dozenimnportant essons.THE courseand speed of eventsin EasternEurope,which have surprisedeveryonein-cluding their protagonists, cry out for anagonising reappraisal.Wemust reappraiseseveralwidelyheld theories and deeply feltideologies of socialism, of course, but alsoabout democracyand/or social democracyand the role of social movements in both.Moreover,both the economic causes andconsequences of these socio-political pro-cessesmeritmoreattention han theyusuallyreceive n the euphoricreceptionwhich therevolutionof 1989has so far received.Theiranalysis offers at least a dozen importantlessons, whose key words are emboldenedbelow.Hopefully, they can also emboldenus all to face and act in the future.(1) The role of social movements ininitiating and carrying these events wasperhapsgreaterthan ever before. The roleof participatory ocial movements n socialtransformation requires reappraisal. Ourpreviouswritingsabout social movementsreferredo the ones in the Eastas pluri-classbased,but said littlemorethanthat theyaregrowingmassively and rapidly.The pluri-class participation in social movementsseemsto have continued in the East, whilein theWestparticipantsaredrawnpredomi-nantlyfromthe middleclass, especially the

intelligentsia,and in the South social move-ments include these but arepredominantlypopular/workingclass based (FuentesandFrank1989,FrankandFuentes1990).IntheEast,leadership n thesocial movementshasalso beendrawnfrom the intelligentsia,butparticipation seems also to have includedpeoplefrom othermiddleclassbackgrounds,as well as masses of working class people.As elsewherealso, womenhaveparticipatedmoremassivelyand in more mportantposi-tions in these n.w social movements.Thissocial composition of the movementsmayalso help account for theirless hierarchicaland moreanti-authoritarian haracter hanthe more traditional institutions whosepowerand legitimacy hey challenged.Thisclass and gendercomposition of the socialmovementsand their participationbeyondall expectations n social transformation nEastern Europe and parts of the SovietUnion now demands further analysis.(2) The peacefulcharacter f themomen-tous socialmovements nd political ransfor-mations in 1989 in EasternEuropemeritsspecial attention. That is, the movementsthemselvesweredeliberatelypeaceful, andlittleor no forceof armswas used to repressthem except in Rumania. There armedrepressionbythe securitatewassuccessfully

counteredby the army,which took the peo-ple'ssidein a (largely pontaneous?) prising.Not only the role of the army, but also thespontaneityand suddennessof this popularuprising n Rumania, hould be distiiiguish-ed fromthe social movements elsewhere nEastern Europe. These had much longer,deeper,and more organisational ootsin thechurches in East Germany, Carta 77 inCzechoslovakia, a multitude of peace andenvironmentalmovements n Hungary,andof course Solidarnosc and the CatholicChurchin Poland. Bulgaria,perhaps, wasbetweentheseand Rumania.Inthe Russianpartsof theSoviet Union, socialmovementsand a multiplicity of 'clubs' have also beenplayingmajorroles n promotingperestroikaand glasnost. Indeed, to permit 'his' perest-roikaandglasnost to progress,MikhailGor-bachevhas had to appeal over the headsofhis own party to social movementmobilisa-tion of people both outside and inside theparty. The efficacy of all these (differentkindsof) peacefulsocial movements n pro-moting social transformation requiresreevaluation.(3) The demand for democracywas andis so far-reachingand deep-going as to ex-pand the meaning of democracy tself. Wemust advancebeyondparliamentaryoliticaland stateeconomic democracy, lso include'civil democracy' in civil society. That is,democraticparticipationand demands in-clude,but also extend arbeyond, he institu-tional confines of parliamentarypoliticaldemocracy ndof economicdemocracy, g,throughthe rejectionof the corruptionandprivilegesof the nomenclatura.Streetleveland local democraticparticipationand par-ticipatorydemocracy xpressestselfthrougha myriadof other(e g, church) nstitutional,more and lessorganisational, ndevenspon-taneous and rapidly changing forms. Ourunderstanding f democracy, herefore, lsorequiresrevision and extension.(4) The role of party politics is downgrad-ed, at leastrelatively, ythesepeaceful ocialmovements and their demands for demo-cracy.Manymovementsand theirmembersrejectand/or redefineexclusiveor principalrelianceon party politics. Not only do theymobilise and organise people and theirdemands also throughothermobilisationalandinstitutional orms. Themovementsarealso consciously and explicitly 'anti-party'.Of course, they are especially against theCommunist Party; but they also reject(becoming) any other party. Several socialmovements reject(ed) transformingthem-selves into political partiesafter achievingtheir mmediategoals of liberation.At a na-tional activistmeeting of Neues ForutninEastGermany,80 percent of those presentwereagainst ransforminghe movement n-to a partyfor thecomingnational electionis.Czechoslovakia'sCivic Forum has a 'looseorganisation'with "no masterplan, no by-laws,and its strategy s not draftedbypaid(consultants" (New York Tinmes, Iiwrntwa-tional Herald 7ribune, December7, 1989).A founder f the LeftAlternativenHunzgarydeclares hat it iS "a theoreticalenldency,ot

Economic and Political Weekly February 3, 1990 251


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a party. On the contrary t is an anti-partyorganisation from the base of the society"(International Viewpoint, December 11,1989, p 13).However, he movementmembership n-cludes people who were or still are in (evenCommunist)parties;and the movements x-pect some of their membersto become ac-tive in newparties-but as individuals.Theorganisational independence of the move-ments, qua movements, was fought for toohardand is too precious o beeasily sacrific-ed to party political demands and exigen-cies. On the contrary,the movements arevery conscious of the contribution theymust, and can only, make to democracyassocial movements, and not as, or at least inaddition to, political parties.(5) Nationalism and ethnicity were alsofactors in all social movements in EasternEurope. Nationalism (if only against "theRussians") nd ethnic ssues helpedmobilisepeople into and in all of these social move-ments and then to define some of theirdemands. In the Baltic republics of theSoviet Union, nationalism is perhaps themajorforce in and of thesocialmovementsand their demands. Other ethnic, nationaland religiousdifferencesand demands aremobilising peopleagainstSoviet powerandagainst each other in ethnic/nationalist(social?) movements n the Transcaucasianand Central Asian regions of the SovietUnion. Of course,eachof thesemovementsis as different rom theother as each ethnici-ty and nation, and their circumstancesareunique.Moreover,heethnic andnationalistdemands of the moment areverymuch in-fluenced by each group's more and lessprivileged or underprivileged class andgeo/political/economic position of domi-nance or subordination, and by recentchanges in these, of which more below.Many of the more nationalist and ethnicbasedmovements nclude,or evenprioritise,demands for 'national' state power.Thesedemands also distinguishthem from othersocial movements, which do not aspire tostate power, of which also more below.(6) The problemof state power poses adifficult and partly novel challenge to thesocial movements and their relation withpolitical parties and the state. The revolu-tions of 1989 n EasternEuropeweremadeby largely peaceful social mover.ents thatsoughtandachieved he downfallof govern-ments andcrumblingof statepower,whichthey mostly did not want to replace them-selves. In the face of political state powervacuums, EastEuropeansocial movementshavefoundthemselves obliged' o (re)orga-nise to exercise state power. Lech Walesadeclared hat the greatesterrorSolidarnoscevermade was to take overthe governmentin Poland;but "it had no choice"' he said.Neues Forum in East Germanyand CivicForumin Czechoslovakia resist becomingparties, but they have to intervene inrebuilding and running the state anyway.Some of the socialmovements'membershipmust adopta sort of 'doublemilitancy'onein the movementand another in a political

party.Theleading Czech(movement)dissi-dent, VaclavHavel, became state president.Indeed, hemost urgentpoliticalproblemafter 'liberation' s widely presentedas whatto do about the state. Worries abound athome and abroad hatthe state s crumblingin East Germany,has already done so inRumania,and God forbid, threatens o doso in the Soviet Union armed to the teethwith nuclearweapons. Who will be 'respon-sible' formanaging henuclearbutton n theno longer responsiblesuperpower,or whoeven will keep 'publicorder'on the streetsof East Berlinand Bucharest?The fear forstability is expressed abroad. (For EastBerlin,FourPowercontrolhasbeenpropos-ed as a 'solution' abroadwhile for Moscowthe only one offered is a prayerfor Gor-bachev.) At home, however,the dilemmapresents tself in morepractical erms.If 'we'do not act to assumepositions of powerorat least to support our allies who have orwant some, then others will so act and/orsupport our enemies. Thus, liberation ornot, the 'liberating'social movements areobliged in one wayor another more to con-form to existing (state) institutions than toreform hem. Thehope for morecivildemo-cracy ies in new social movements o replaceold onesthatsuccumb o existing nstitutionsand theirown institutionalisationby them.The institutionalisation f movements n-to parties and state power is nothing newelsewhere,of course.Many political partiesstartedas socialmovements,and someend-ed up managing,or evenbecoming ndistin-guishable from, state power. The now60-year long all (state) powerful MexicanPartidoRevolucionario nstitucional PRI)even incorporates this transition into itsname. Indeed, some Communistparties inEasternEuropeand the Soviet Union andelsewherecould be said also to havebegunlife as a socialmovement,albeit more of the'old'petitbourgeois ed'working lass'kind.Evenso, they or their 'leader' endedup as'I'etat, c'est mnois'The conflict between 'fundi' (fundamen-talist movement goals and procedures) and'realo' (realistparty organisation and statepowercompromises),which is splitting theGreenMovement/party n WestGermany,is also built into the external(and perhapsinternal) circumstances of the socialmovements n EasternEurope.Thus, econo-mic, politicaland otherexigenciesmaypusbor pull the social movements in EasternEurope in the directions of state power-and thecompromisesof principleas well asthe politicalcost of failureagainst impossi-ble economic and other odds. In Poland,Solidarnoscnow has to push the bitter IMFmedicine and shock treatment down itsmembers' throats. Nationalist and someethnicmovements,however,often aspire to'independent' ational/ethnic tatepoweroftheir own and/or seek to share it in theirethnicneighbour tate,with whichthey wantamalgamation.Hardlyany of them seem toconsider theirown weakness n the face ofand to resolve the same economic crisis,which gave rise to and still propels their

movements in the first place.(7) The economiccrisishas beenexpandingand deepening in EasternEurope and theSoviet Union. The economic crisis and re-lated economic factorscontributedmaterial-ly to the desire and ability of these social(and also ethnic/nationalist) movements omobilise o manypeopleat this time for suchfar-reaching oliticalends. Thedecadeof the1980s, ndeedbeginning n the mid-1970s, snowcalled 'the period of stagnation' n theSoviet Union and generated acceleratingeconomic crisisand absolute deteriorationof living standards in most of EasternEurope (as also in Latin America, Africaand some other parts of the world, videFrank 1988). Significantly especially inEasternEurope, his period also spelledanimportantdeteriorationand retrocession nits relative competitivestanding and stan-dardsof livingcompared o WesternEuropeand, even to the newly ndustrialising oun-tries (NICs) in East Asia. Moreover,thecourseand(mis)management f the econo-mic crisis generated shifts in positions ofdominanceor privilegeand dependencyorexploitationamong countries, sectors, anddifferent ocial, includinggender,andethnicgroupswithin he Soviet Union andEasternEurope.All of these economicchangesandpressures eneratedor fuelled socialdiscon-tent, demands, and mobilisation,whichex-presses hemselves hroughenlivenedsocial(andethnic/nationalist)movements-with avarietyof similarities nddifferences mongthem. It is well known that economicallybased resentment s fed by the loss of 'ac-customed'absolutestandardsof livingas awhole or in particular temsand by relatedrelative shifts in economic welfareamongpopulationgroups.Mosteconomiccrisesarepolarising, urther nriching, elativelyf notalso absolutely,the better off; and furtherimpoverishing othrelatively ndabsolutelythose whowerealreadyworseoff, includingespecially women.This change may also generate resent-ments andmobilisation n both groups.Theless privileged mobilise to defend theirlivelihoodandits ravageby 'thesystem'andby those who benefit from it throughcor-ruption or otherwise. Among identifiableethnic groups, these include Turks inBulgaria,Hungarians n Rumania,Gypsiesand others n Hungary,Albanians n Serbia,Serbians in Yugoslavia, Bohemians inCzechoslovakia,Azerbaijanisand a hostofothers in the Soviet Union, who amongother problemshaverecentlybeen plaugedby massive unemployment. However,themore privileged also develop resentmentsagainstthe 'system',whichobligesthe richerto 'carry' r 'subsidise' t theirown 'exDense'their 'good for nothing' 'lazy' poorerneighbours.Morever,thesemoreprivilegedgroupssee evengreenerpasturesfor them-selves on the other side of some socialist/capitalistor other border.Among thesearemany Russians,Armenians nd others n theSoviet Union and especiallythe Estonians,Latviansand Lithuanians.They alsoincludethe Slovenians and to a lesser extent the

252 Economic and Political Weekly February3, 1990


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to the Kerenwki overnment. In October/November 1917, he initial aim was to exer-cise a peaceful hreat o influence heexistinggovernment;but the revolutionaryprocessacceierated nto an armed assault on statepower.It provedsuccessful but led to civilwar and subsequently the power of theSoyietCommunist'Party. he workingclass.(social) movements failed everywhere inpost-war Europe, and even in Russia theworkerswerea tinypercentage f the revolu-tionary forces,whichwas furtherreducedbytheirdecimation n the Civil War. Stilldur-ing WorldWarI, Leninhad made a separatepeace at Brest-Litovskand forfeited (nowSoviet)Russia's hareof the winners'spoils.However,as conqueroron the winningsideof WorldWarII and at Yaltaand Potsdam,Soviet Russia assumed and was awardedadominant role in Central-now 'Eastern'Europeand soon superpower tatus in theworld.)The 1968 revolutions'were argelypeace-ful social movements, which were oftenrepressed y forceof armseventhoughnoneaspired to or seriously threatened statepower.A particular istinguishing eatureofthe 'new' social movementswas that theywerenot workingclass led or based. On thecontrary,1968represents he acknowledge-mentthatsocial movementsmust reachandappeal far beyondthe 'traditional' indust-rial) working classes and their CommunistParty and/or unionised leadership. ThePragueSpring, f it be includedamong 1968'movements', ontemplated peaceful rans-fer of power within the existing state ap-paratus;but it wasreversedhroughmilitaryinvasionby the Soviet Army.The 1968 Tetoffensive n Vietnamwas,of course,anothermatter.(Soviet powerwas challenged hereand there, but survived.)The revolutions f 1989startedpeacefullyas widespreadand deepgoing social move-ments. They succeeded quicker and morethaneven theirprotagonists xpected n put-ting civil democracy n civil society to workto achieve political liberation. Finally,thedominotheory,which on previousoccasionsalreadywas fearedbut remainednoperative,worked his time, albeitratherunexpectedly.It did so in part because the social move-ments did not suffer armed repression,domestic or foreign(except n the more'in-dependent' Rumania, where however theArmy turned to support and save thepopular uprising). This generally mildresistancebythe top, of course,was condi-tionedby changes ncircumstance ndpolicyin the Soviet Union. Thecollapse at Lhe opin some casesin the faceof these movementsthen nearly undid the state power and in-stitutions that 'guaranteepublic order',somuch so that evencommentatorsn the Westtook alarm. Perhaps his alarm reflects thefailure,or let'shope it is onlya delay,to ap-preciate h) momentousde facto reformula-tion and exter&w-s.iof the democratic processwhen, to paraphrase.Abraham Lincoltn,tis extended 'by, of and tor the people'beyond parliamentarypolitical democracyto civil democracy in civil society. At the

N O T I C EITis hnereby notified for tne n-form-a::lonof the cblic that THERAVALGAON SUGAR FARMLIMITED roposes to mdak appilcatice1 to ttne Central Government in the Department ofCompany Affairs, New Delh under sub sect,ori (2 of Section 22 of the Monopolies andRestrict:ve Trade Pract ces Act 1960) +or . 'prrxlto the establishment of a new under-takings "un-litiv sion. Br:ef p orfcuc3rs of *:e proposal are as under

1. Name and Address of tne Applicant THE RAVALGAONSUGAR FARM LIMITEDConstruction House,Walchcind Hirachand Marg,Bombaiy 400 038.

2. Capital Structure of the applicant Preference Capital Equity CapitalorganisationAuthorised Rs 50,00(,000 Rs 54,00,000Subscribed & Paid-up Rs 20,00,000 Rs 34,00,000

3. Management structure of the app'icant organisa on :ndicalting the names of theDirectors, including the Managing/Whole time Directors and Manager, if anyThe Company is manaqed by Managing Director uinder the superintendence andcontrol of Boord of Directors consisting of:ShrirArvind R.Doshi ChairmainShri D.R JoshiShr GanSadhar G GaidgilShri Ajit GulabchandShri Chakor L.DoshiSri N.G.JoshiShr Harshavardhan B Dosh Managing DirectorShri Arvind G.DaftaryShri Ra+asR.Doshi

4. Indicate whether the proposal relates Trte proposal relates to mdnufacture ofto the establishment of a new under- nevw article viz. Industrial Alconol andtaking or a new unit/division,. hence a rew unit,/division.

S. Location of the new undertaking/ . Ravalgaon, 1al. Malegaon,unit/division Dist. Nasik, Maharashtra6. Capital structure of the proposed . Not applcabie

undertaking7. In case the proposal reJates to

production, storage, supply, distri-bution, marketing or control ofgoods, indicate.

i) Name of goods/articles Industrl- Alcoholii) Proposed Licensed capacity/ 30.000 i'res per day

turnover before expansion.iii) Estimated annual turn-over Rs.151.26 lacs ioprox. on the basis of

seasonal working of 160 days in ayear.

B. In case the proposal relates to Not Appilicableprovision of any service state thevolume of activity in terms of usualmeasure such as value turnover,income, etc.

9. Cost of ProJect s .230.00 acs10. Scherne of finance indicating the Internal Generation Rs. 60.00 lacsamour-its to be raised from each source Loans from financial

institutions Rs. 170.00 lacsAny person interested in the matter may make a representation in quadruplicate to theSecretary, Department of Company Affairs, Government of India, Shastri Bhavan, New Delhi,within 14 days froM the date of the publication of this notice, intimating his views onthe proposal and indicating the nature of his interest therein.Place: BOMBAY FOR THE RAVALGAONSUGAR FARMLTD.Date 31/1/1990 A.V. GaikwadRegistered Office GM (Finance) and Company SecretaryConstructior House,Walchand Hirachand Marc,Bombay 400 038 BAP'D64^.

254 Economic and Political Weekly February3, 1990


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same time, the economic structures nd pro-cesses underlying these socio politicaltransformationsalso have not receivedtheattention, which their importance merits.However, he hard knocks of economic lifestill threaten o divert, albeit hopefully notto revert, hese social movementsand poli-tical processesndangerousdirections. f like1789, 1989will go down in history as a yearof revolution, what portends for 1990 andits decade-also analogies to the 1790s?Whether some, and if so what kinds of,counter-revolutionary hermidorsmay stillbe in the offing, and when, we would notlike now to foresee. Beginningwith militaryfailure in Afghanistan [another CrimeanWar?], the 'imperial' reach of the SovietUnion is under effective political challengedue principally o economic failure,and the'Union' may effectively break up. Russia;whetherstill 'soviet' or not, may therebyberelativelyweakenedbut perhaps absolutelyrevitalised nd strengthened.)Onthe varietyof social movements and their nineteenthand twentieth century history, see SamirAmin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre GunderFrankand ImmanuelWallerstein1990. OnEast-West uropean eunification, ee Frank1983/1984.](11)Reallyexistingsocialismhas been im-portantly transformedby these events andalso requires econsideration. n accountingfor these events and transformations. themost determinantfailure of really existing(non)socialism in Eastern Europe and theSoviet Union has been its failure o competewell economically with the West. It is wellknownthat the centralisedplan economiesachieved elative uccess hrough heir forcedabsolutegrowth (mobilising more inputs toget moreoutput of sausage machines f notof sausages). Heavy industry,and in somecountries large scale industrial agriculture,boomed. Social serviceswere providedandassured,butnot so individual ervices. t hasbecomeequally apparent hat these inflexi-ble economieswereunable o promote nten-sive growth (making the sausage machinemore productive and producing more andmore variedoutputs with less inputs). It wasprecisely during the recent technologicalrevolutionand particularly omputerisationin the West, and indeed also in the EastAsian NICs,that the centralisedeconomiesof the Soviet Union and Eastern Europewereunableto keep pace.On the contrary,as alreadyobservedabove, theylost groundboth absolutelyand relatively.This was themost determinant starting point of thesesocial movements and revolutions. As aneconomic failuremoreover, socialism'hasproven o be no matchfornationalism.FirstYugoslav and Hungarian and above allPolish nationalism, and now nationalismandethnicityin the Baltics,Transcaucasus,CentralAsia, the Ukraine,and elsewhere nEastern Europe challenge the politicaleconomicorderanddemanddemocratic elfdetermination.Forwith economic success,neither these social and nationalist move-ments nor this (kind of) demand fordemocracywould havedeveloped,and much

less this move to marketisation of theeconomies.These observations about Eastern Europe,however, require a brief parenthetical com-parative glance at other parts of the wsorld.It is noteworthy that economies throughoutAfrica, most of Latin America, and partsof Asia have recently suffered the sane com-petitive failure as manifested in disastrouts-ly declining absolute standards of living andrelative marginalisation from the worldeconomy. Many of them more so even thanmost economies in Easterni Europe. 1'lcrlhapsPoland, Rumania, BoliNvia, Argcnltilnai,maybe Burma, and much of Africa top thesad list of greatest decline. Social imloNementshave also developed in many oft the othelcounitries outside Easterni Eiurope, yet innone of them with similar results or evensuch far-reaching goals. In Africa, there hasbeen considerable about face in politicaleconomic orienltation awa f'ronmocialisa-tion and the East and in Support of ethnicand national independenice at homiie, but nodramlatic changes. ln Latin America, therehas been a returnto political demnocracy; utit was only marginally carried by the mainysocial movements, somc ot their claimils tothe contrary notwithstanding. The mostdralmatic process of demociatisatioln, illArgentina, was tar less the resLult of thlehumanl right movement of the Niadresde laPlaza de Mavo and others thainit was of thcdefeat of the Argentine military forces bythose of Britain (with the miilitarvziidof theUnited States and thle political suppiort o0tall the \West).In Burma, the social mocnmentwas repressed by the torce ot ai ms. 'O oncdegree or another, so it was in manv othercountries, from Chile, to Mexico, to Jamaica,to Gabon, to Sri l,anka. Social movementsin any of these countries with the torce andthreat of those in Eastern Europe would ha\vbeen drenched in blood.Of similar significance is the tact that innone of these other countries has there beenany serious attempt, let alone any success,to replace the obviouily failing economicsystenmor organisation by anothcr radicallydifferent one, let alotncto replace the tfailuireof capitalismiihere bv socialismli.Onlthe con-trary, in tcrmnsof econonic organisationthere has been a right turn to marketisation('privatisation') everywNhere.Mloreover,thefailure of 'socialism' in Eastern Europe canonly accelerate the same and marketisationelsewhere, no matter how socially costly runaway capitalism has already been there.None of the new democratic regimes in LatinAmerica propose to reform, let alone to turnback, 'export led growth' (be it absolutegrowth as in Chile or absolute decline as inArgentina). On the corntrarv again, thedemocratic opening itself is under threatfrom the repressive economic measures thedemocratic governments are obliged (not theleast through the intervention of the IMF)to impose on their populations.Indeed, the only notable exception to allthese experiences has been that in Iran:There the armed to the teeth regime of theShah disintegrated as its Winter Palace was

stormed aind taken by ani unarmliedpeacet'ulcrowd as the spearhealdot'f deepgoinlg socialmovement. How'ever,ttlhemovement was ledby thec xiled t'utnldamiienltalisteligioLs leaderAyatollah Khomileinii, w,ho returnled inItrhiiilpll and channrlielled hlis religion ledsocial tiovemient into thie constr-uction ot aShiite Islamlic theocratic state. It renounilcedaniiddenlouinicedetually bothl Soviet comI-miunist aniidUS imperialist satains anld aitelnormioutissacri ticcs to its population foughta ten-year war agai nst its SunnilliIslinicIIieliglbotius In Iraq (hilch both finanilcedi \their sales ot oil on the world imarkct).

T1hu1S, 1Ct'h liiIlure Ot sOCialist, but ilso oftmiany capitalist and mli\d, econoIlmiies ismlarkeld abo\v all b\ thleir- inability andfrtil,,l.> ILaete(lllt\I to competc onl thle wNorldmlarlkle't.f oltr"c, tt is has alss\avsbeen theease; for it Is in tmti nzittir-e' oft' any coin -

'ctitisl\'cace thit o11v onleor a t'e\s ctanwilnaniidmiany muLstost. 'I'llis process of selec-tiotll operaites lar'ey irrespective of tie'system' wsithI\ itli thty comlipete,wiuch isat best a conutbiUtos ' mt.to(l ll tlc inmevitableselect iol ot s ilill t s nid losers. 1Tiereftore.thet CCOnomiC tfliluric anilcd oss otf 'sociallils'per *c is relati\e to botti the SuIccess anld alsothte 'ailture of' 'capiialisnll' to c-limpete ill tileseft' samiiie 'capitalist') world ima.lrket.Thereplacereilnt otf one 'systemil' by the'other is110 guiarateetce thatt atav ccononm will thllecoimpcte more successtfully; tor milost willhave to ConitIIueL losing the race.

The mnove massl-vfro 'so.iallim' adld togreater niarketisation of the East E-uropeaneconiomiliesarndtheir turther integra.tion inworld markct comilpetitionlnow come on theheels ot their recenittailur.eand at a time ottheir own recently increased anid still grow-ing ecotnomicweakness. Therefore, they posegreat econlomic arid political danigers, niotthe least of turther economic tailure atidof popular political disillusionment arldbacklash.The economilic crisis ini Eastcrn Europeand thc Soviet Unioti is alriiost certaini fur-ther to decepen in thc short run. Both thedeepening crisis and the marketisationrespotlse will resuilt n even greater shortages,new unemploymcilt, ramipant inflation aridthe disruption ot the \wclfare state. All ofthese, and particularly the latter, will be atthe special cost of swomenarid their childrern,whose already disproportionate burden willthereby incrcase still further. In the SovietUnion, Gorbachev was ill advised (by AbelAbegayan) to push for perestroika and ac-celeration ot groswth n the economy at thesame time. The result has been an economic(and political) disaster; because restructur-ing temporarily reduces grosvth instead ofincreasing it, and the simultaneouis attemptto accelerate threw an additional monkeywrench into the wsorks.In Eastern Europe a s) economic restruc-turing is bound to invol%e transitionaleconomic dislocation in different degreesand forms. It \. ill he absolutely the mostsevere in Poland, as well as in the South andEast in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union,which have the weaikest anld reccertfvmost

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weakened econromies. Rumania was alsoweakened, especially by Ceausescu's policyof exporting all to pay off the debt. Ceasingto export so much food can offer temporaryrelief, some resurrection of agriculture butnot of industry. East Germany faces the pro-spects of immediate 'Ausverkauf' sell out toWest Germans who come to buy alreadysubsidised consumer goods at 10 or 20 to1 exchange rates between the West and Eastmarks. However, East Germany, which haslong been a de facto silent member of theEC through its privileged access to the WestGerman market, also has the earlies; pro-spects of full integration in the EC. Theweakening of the state in East Germany andits dependent confederation with or even in-tegration into the West German state, how-ever will also leave the East Germans withscarce political economic bargaining powerin Germany, the EC and Europe. Czech andHungarian state power may offer more com-petitive bargaining.power and benefits to(parts of) their populations. Everywhere, thefirst steps toward productive integration,however, are likely to be the sale of EastEuxopean productive assets to West Euro-pean firms and others, for who in EasternEurope itself has the means successfully tobid for 'privatised' assets. Only some smallones could be run as 'co-operatives' whichare in reality firms that must compete in themarket as well.The political economic move to marketi-sation and privatisation, whether 'capitalist'or 'socialist', which is engendered by thesocial movements in Eastern Europe can atbest replace one economic and social polari-satiion by another. The corruption andprivileges, which was based on CommunistParty rule, can be largely but not entirelyeliminated. But marketisation and privati-sation engenders another more automaticeconomic and social polarisation of incomeand position, also between the genders, andamong class and ethnic groups and regions.A minority will float to the surface of aperhaps first ebbing and then rising tide; andthe majority will be sunk even further belowthe surface. This polarisation is likely to pro-gress both ethnically and nationally, and in-ternationally. Therefore, it will furtherexacerbate ethnic and national tensions, con-flicts, and movements within and amongstates. The now already more competitivelyprivileged regions and peoples are likely toimprove their positions further, perhaps evenby closer economic and political relations oreven integration with neighbours to the Westand North. Underprivileged minorities inthese, and underprivileged majorities else-where are likely to become increasinglymarginalised. The dream of joining WesternEurope may thus be realised for the few. Atbest, some parts of the East may becomeanother Southern Europe, albeit at the costto both of competing with each other, whichhas already raised fears in the South ofEurope. However, the many in EasternEurope and perhaps in the south-easternparts of the Soviet Union, however, ace the

realthreat nsteadof Latinamericanisation,which has already befallen Poland. EastEuropeari ountries facedomestic inflationand foreign devaluation, and then currencyreform perhaps by shock treatment. Thesocial costs are certain, but the economicsuccesses hereQf re not, as repeated ailuresin Argentina and Brazil have recentlydemonstrated. n somecases, particularlynthe Soviet Union, eveneconomicAfricanisa-tion or at least Mideasternisation andpolitical Lebanisation s a serious threat. Inthe short run, any breakup of the 'second'world will permit some of its members tojoin the (capitalist) 'first' world, but mostwill be relegated o the (also capitalist) third'world.

(12)So, is there another Socialism for thefuture?How and whatwould it come to be?An oft posed issue, at least by some whoconsider hemselves ocialists, s whether heSoviet Union and EasternEurope,or indeedany other place, has really been 'socialist'at all. Since theiranswer s a resoundingNO,they also argue that the long standingfailures and critiques of really existingsocialism, which finally gave rise to therevolutions of 1989, were not really of'socialism',but only of 'Stalinism'or someother aberration of or impostor for 'truesocialism'. The ideological implication ofthis argument is, of course, that thesefailures also do not comp omise the truesocialist cause anld do not oblige realsocialists to undertakeany agonising reap-praisal.Real socialiststhen nted only insistmorethaneveron theirowncritiques f real-ly existing non)socialism o differentiate us'goodies from'them'baddies.The 'practical'implication of this 'theory' is that, all ex-periencenotwithstanding, ruesocialismisstill around the corneror at least downtheroad.

However,the real practicalityand eventheoretical coherence of this perhaps wellmeaning argumentclashes with all worldsocio-political-economic reality. To beginwith,if thereeverwas an argument hatonlypreaches o thealready auto)converted,hisis it. It couldnot possiblyconvert hose whohave already experienced really existingsocialism,even f it wasreallynon-socialism:Those among themwho now rejectmost ofthe previously eallyexisting(non)socialismare likely also to continue rejecting anypotential 'real'socialism. Indeed, many ofthem are likely to put their faith insteadinthe magic of the market and some, alas,perhaps in far right politics. On the otherhand, those who now lose the benefits oftheirpreviousexperiencewillonly yearnfoithe 'good old days'of orderand stabilityofthe old (non)socialist ncientregime.Amongthese, thosewho had little and now lose eventhatwillrecall heir modestbenefitsand askfor renewedorder,if not of the old 'com-munist' variety, then perhaps of a new'fascist' one. Only those who receivedmuchfrom the old party may now, undera newdemocraticsocialist guise,try to hang on to

as much of it as possible. The social demo-craticargumentwillalso lack appeal o thoseelsewherewho neverwanted themselves orany one else to experience 'socialism' or'communism'of whateverkind. Therefore,it is wholly unrealistic to think that thedamageof the whole experience o the ideaof socialism, demo6ratic or of whateverkind, can simply be wished away by latterday professions of ones own purity againstothers' former sins.Secondly, howeveranti-Stalinistthe sub-jective intent of this argumiient,ts objectiveconsequence is to stick to the guns of theStalinist heoryof 'socialism n one country'or in some even smallercommunity.Beyonddisregarding he first problem ard that oftransition to this socialism in theory andpraxis, this argumentclashes with the samepractical reality of having to compete inpractice he whole worldover.Yet he inabili-ty to do so wasthe fundamental ailureandundoingof Stalinist 'socialism'or whlatcvcrit was. Whatever kinid of socialism,i.orcapitalism, or nlixed econiomy,o- Islamicpolitical economy, or whateverany pcoplemay 'choose', they cannot escape this \%otidt-Wideconiipctition,which is a fact of' ljiC.Co-operationias an 'alternatve' is all etwell-as long as it is tmore &ompetivi\e.Thirdly, hli(only'?) liiet at yventerpret.a-tion of 'teall socialisnms '\,orld' socialism.Beyond its unirealitytor any foreseeablefuture, it is difficult to imagine what this'socialism' might ever mean. What woulddistinguish this 'world socialism' from'world capitalism' as long as competitionreinsas (or the?) fact of life in the world inthe futureas it has for millennia n thepast?How aboutsocial democracyf not demo-cratic socialism?One time 'socialists' n theWestand East, evenincludingMikhailGor-bachev himself, have found new apprecia-tion for and interest n social democracyasthe desideratum,whichbestcomrbines oth'socialism'and 'democracy'.They,againin-cluding Gorbachev, look to Sweden, andsometimesAustria,as the model forFasternEurope and even for the SosvietUnion. Inthe architecturaldesign for the new (ioiin-mon EuropeanHome',manysocialists anidsocial democratswould furtherprovideforsocial democratic, f not democratic socia-list, influencesemanating romtheEast alsointo the West.Thus, the whole of Europewould become another Sweden writ large.As Gandhi answered when he was askedwhat he thought of Europeancivilisation:"It would be a good idea" Unfortunately,thesegood ideas take little accountof somehard realities.Thus,evendisregardingheSovietUnion,which is hardlvrealistic, the prospects forearly Swedishisation n EasternEuropearenot very bright.On the contrary, t will takemuch doing by all, including WesternEurope and even the, United States andJapan, only to lav some-indeed even toprotect already existing-economic (socialdemocratic) oundationsfor politicalsocialdemocracy n Eastern Europe. It is at best

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uincertain whether and how, much a Wxves(ierman/European 'Marshall' Plan wouldpromote social democracy in EasternEurope. Nor is it certain that such an enter-prise woutd further more progressive socialdemocracy (with small or large s/S d/Ds)and less conservative politics and parties inthe West. Investment in good btusiness (butnot in unprofitable social investinents) in theEast could as easily spell morc polztrisationin the \A'cst as well. RcaiTv new socialmovements, East and \VCst, could developboth to retlect and to propel si chacceleratcdpolarisation.ThLus, socialists' are indeed onli

Documents

[1990] André Gunder Frank. East European Revolution of 1989. Lessons for Democratic Social Movements (In Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 25, n° 5, pp. 251-258)