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Marketing  Democracy:    

The  Political  Economy  of  U.S.  Aid  for  Democracy  in  Egypt  and  Morocco  

 

 

 

Erin  A.  Snider  

Niehaus  Center  for  Globalization  and  Governance  

Princeton  University  

Texas  A&M  University  

 

 

Working  Paper:  Not  for  Circulation  or  Citation  

 

Abstract:  What   explains   the   limited   impact  of  U.S.   spending  on  democracy  promotion   in  

the  Middle  East?  The  results  of  a  cross-­national  study  commissioned  by  the  USAID  to  assess  

the  effectiveness  of  its  spending  on  democracy  in  its  programs  worldwide  found  that  such  

aid  works;  the  only  exception,  however,  were  programs  in  the  Middle  East.    Case  studies  of  

U.S.  democracy  programming  in  Egypt  and  Morocco  illuminate  reasons  for  this  exception.    

Most   states   in   the   region   are   governed   by   authoritarian   regimes   and   are   of   strategic  

importance   to   the   United   States.     Why   would   such   regimes   allow   external   actors   to  

promote  democracy?    This  paper  develops  a  framework  to  explain  the  interaction  between  

the   United   States   and   such   regimes   calling   attention   to   the   conceptualization   of  

democracy  promoted  and  the  motivations  for  its  acceptance.    

 

 

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Introduction  

Over   the  past   two  decades,   the  United  States  has  devoted  more   than  $4  billion  

toward  efforts  to  promote  democracy  worldwide.    In  2005,  the  United  States  Agency  for  

International   Development   (USAID),   the   primary   agency   managing   such   assistance,  

commissioned   a   cross-­‐national   quantitative   study   to   assess   the   effectiveness   of   its  

spending  for  democracy  in  its  programs  worldwide  from  1990-­‐2005.     In  contrast  with  

other   efforts,   the   study   was   the   first   to   distinguish   aid   for   democracy   from   that   of  

general   foreign   assistance   and   concluded   that   spending   for   democracy   works.    

Regionally,   the   study’s   authors   found   that   obligations   for   democracy   had   the   largest  

effects   on   democratization   in   Asia   and   Africa   and   that   democracy   funding   mattered  

more   “in   ‘difficult   contexts’   with   the   Middle   East   being   the   exception   to   this   general  

pattern.”1  

What  accounts  for  this  exception?    For  most  of  the  last  decade,  the  United  States  

devoted  more  than  $2  billion  on  efforts  to  promote  democracy  in  the  Middle  East.    This  

amount  marked  a  significant  shift  in  funding  levels  from  that  of  the  previous  decade  and  

reflected  the  Bush  administration’s  contention  that  aid  for  democracy  was  a  necessary  

tool  to  combat  extremism  and  hence,  terrorism  following  the  attacks  of  September  11,  

2001.2  Rhetorically   and   financially,   support   for  democracy   surpassed   that  of  previous  

administrations   and   featured   prominently   for   the   first   time   in   the   United   States’  

National   Security   Strategy.     New   initiatives   were   launched   to   augment   pre-­‐existing  

democracy   programs   administered   by   agencies   like   the   United   States   Agency   for  

International  Development  (USAID).3      

The   expansion  of   democracy   funding   in   the   region  has   since  been  matched  by  

the   growth   of   other   actors   such   as   for-­‐profit   and   non-­‐profit   companies   and                                                                                                                  1  Steven  E.  Finkel  et  al.,  "Deepening  Our  Understanding  of  the  Effects  of  U.S.  Foreign  Assistance  on  Democracy  Building:  Final  Report,"  (2008).  2  Thomas  O.  Melia,  "The  Democracy  Bureaucracy:  The  Infrastructure  of  American  Democracy  Promotion,"  Paper  prepared  for  the  Princeton  Project  on  National  Security  Working  Group  on  Global  Institutions  and  Foreign  Policy  Infrastructure  (2005),  14.    From  2000  to  2005,  democracy  assistance  funding  increased  from  $500  million  to  more  than  $2  billion.  Melia  notes  that  a  significant  percentage  of  this  figure  includes  spending  for  activities  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan.  3  In  2002,  the  U.S.  Department  of  State  launched  the  Middle  East  Partnership  Initiative  (MEPI),  a  small  grants  program  for  the  Middle  East.    

 

 

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organizations,   contractors,   international   and   local   NGOs,   and   academic   institutions  

comprising   what   Springborg   calls   the   ‘democratization   industry’.4   Despite   this  

expansion,   such   efforts   did   not   seem   to   have   a   demonstrable   impact   on   the   political  

landscape   in   the   region.     Efforts   to   promote   democracy   substantively   were   often  

undermined  by  the  United  States’  hesitancy  to  apply  pressure  on  regimes  in  the  region.  

For   skeptics  of   this   latest   effort  by   the  U.S.   to   aid  democracy   in   the  Middle  East,   such  

hesitance  was  proof   that   the  old   imperatives  of  stability  and  security   that  had   framed  

the   United   States’   relationship   with   the   region   would   continue   to   trump   this   recent  

push  for  democracy.  

Understanding   the   limited   impact  of  U.S.   aid   for  democracy   in   the  Middle  East  

necessitates  a  different   research  strategy   than   that  used   in  USAID’s  study.    One  of   the  

limitations   inherent   in   large  N  studies   like   that  executed  by  USAID   is   their   inability   to  

relay  anything  instructive  about  the  form  or  structure  of  democracy  aid  programs,  the  

context   in   which   they   were   executed,   and   the   negotiations   between   both   donor   and  

recipient  states  in  their  construction.5    Evaluating  the  impact  of  democracy  programs  on  

democracy—a  contested  concept  in  itself—has  been  a  notoriously  thorny  endeavor  for  

both  scholars  and  aid  practitioners.    Institutional  and  bureaucratic  pressures  to  produce  

results  often  involve  compromises  and  trade-­‐offs  to  generate  numbers  at  the  expense  of  

more  nuanced  understandings  of  the  indirect  and  time-­‐delayed  effects  of  such  aid.  

USAID’s  study  assesses  progress  on  democracy  using  the  Freedom  House  Index  

(FHI),   an   ordinal   scale   employed   frequently   by   scholars   as   a   measure   of   democracy.    

Ordinal  measures  such  as  the  FHI  though  mask  complex  changes  within  states  receiving  

aid  and  often  relay  a  superficial  understanding  of  reform  trajectories.6    USAID  has  since  

used   the   study’s   conclusion   that   spending   for   democracy   works   to   justify   further                                                                                                                  4  Robert  Springborg,  "The  Democratization  Industry  and  the  Middle  East"  (paper  presented  at  the  Inaugural  Professorial  Lecture,  School  of  Oriental  and  African  Studies  (SOAS),  London,  May  24  2005).  5  Data  used  for  the  study  was  organized  by  dollar  amount  and  divided  by  which  branch  of  democracy  aid  it  fell  under  (aid  for  governance,  civil  society,  rule  of  law)  and  was  solely  organized  by  the  study’s  Democracy  Fellow  working  at  USAID.  Details  about  program  descriptions,  grants,  and  recipients  were  not  included.  Author’s  email  correspondence  with  Andrew  Green,  USAID  Democracy  Fellow,  Spring  2007.  6  Carl  Henrik  Knutsen,  "Measuring  Effective  Democracy,"  International  Political  Science  Review  31,  no.  2  (2010).  

 

 

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expenditures   for   its  democracy  and  governance  programs.  The  study’s   findings   for   its  

programs  in  the  Middle  East,  however,  relay  the  importance  of  further  work  to  capture  

the  dynamics  and  processes   that  may  offer  more   instructive   insights   into  questions  of  

aid  impact  to  generate  more  useful  recommendations  for  aiding  democracy.  

This  paper  suggests  a  different  way  of  thinking  about  democracy  aid  beyond  the  

constructs  of  measures  such  as   the  FHI  and  underscores   the   importance  of   looking  at  

the   context   in   which   aid   programs   are   implemented   as   well   as   the   motivations   and  

imperatives   of   both   donors   and   recipient   states.     The   study’s   authors   and   one   of   the  

foremost  scholars  of  democracy  aid  emphasize   the  value  of  qualitative  case  studies   in  

capturing   the   complexity   of   aid   projects   on   the   ground   as   “the   only   way   to   gain   an  

understanding   of   political   events   and   effects   and   that   many   of   the   most   important  

results  of  democracy  programs  are  psychological,  moral,  subjective,  indirect,  and  time-­‐

delayed.”7  

As  such,  this  paper  develops  a  framework  to  explain  the  limited  impact  of  such  

aid   through   case   studies   of   past   efforts   in   Egypt   and   Morocco,   two   of   the   highest  

recipients  of  such  aid  in  the  region.    Egypt  and  Morocco  are  appropriate  states  in  which  

to  examine  U.S.  democracy  assistance.    Both  states  have  received  more  than  ten  years  of  

such   assistance   through   USAID.8     Having   a   longer   record   of   assistance   is   critical   for  

assessing   potential   patterns   and   trends   in   how   aid   has   been   formulated,   distributed,  

and   received   in   various   sectors   over   time   and   in   different   political   and   economic  

contexts.     Beyond   similarities   in   assistance   records,   both   states   represent   different  

types  of  authoritarian  regimes  with  Egypt  until  2011  classified  as  a  one-­‐party  dominant  

state  and  Morocco  as  a  constitutional  monarchy.  Both  states  also  vary   in  their   level  of  

dependence  on  the  United  States,  and  by  extension,  their  strategic  importance.    Egypt  is  

the  second  highest  recipient  of  U.S.  foreign  assistance,  receiving  an  average  of  $2  billion  

                                                                                                               7  Finkel  et  al.,  "Deepening  Our  Understanding  of  the  Effects  of  U.S.  Foreign  Assistance  on  Democracy  Building:  Final  Report.";  Thomas  Carothers,  Aiding  Democracy  Abroad:  The  Learning  Curve  (Washington,  DC:  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  1999),  340-­‐41.  8  The  scope  for  this  study  is  limited  to  U.S.  democracy  assistance  funding  administered  through  USAID,  which  executes  the  majority  of  such  aid.    Other  actors  include  the  U.S.  Departments  of  State,  Justice,  and  Defense,  and  the  National  Endowment  for  Democracy,  which  receives  money  from  the  U.S.  Congress.    

 

 

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annually   in   military   and   economic   aid   since   1979.9     This   amount   reflects   the   United  

States’   view  of  Egypt   as   a   vital   partner   in  maintaining   regional   stability  by   sustaining  

peace  with   Israel  and  acting  as  a  regional  arbiter.    Morocco   is  also  seen  by  the  United  

States  as  an   important  regional  ally   in  counterterrorism  efforts  and  trade,   though   less  

than  Egypt.      Morocco’s   assistance   from   the  United   States   reflects   this,   averaging   $40  

million   since   1979.10     Variability   on   both   regime   type   and   strategic   importance   may  

suggest  an  explanation  for  differences  in  the  execution  and  construction  of  programs  in  

both   states   and   offer   insight   for   other   states   in   the   region.   The   analysis   that   follows  

draws   on   archival   work,   Freedom   of   Information   Act   (FOIA)   requests,   extensive  

fieldwork   in   both   countries   as  well   as   in  Washington,   D.C.   and   over   90   interviews   in  

Arabic   and   English   with   activists,   diplomats,   development   practitioners   and  

contractors,  U.S.  Embassy  and  USAID  staff.    

Democracy  Aid  and  the  Authoritarian  State  

Though   the   study’s   authors   offer   no   explanation   for   the   limited   effect   of   U.S.  

democracy   aid   on   democratization   in   the   Middle   East,   two   observations   about   the  

orientation   of   states   in   the   region   provide   a   useful   starting   point.    Most   states   in   the  

region  have  been  governed  by  an  authoritarian  regime  and  the  United  States  views  the  

region   as   vital   for   its   national   security   interests.     Democracy   assistance   programs  

fundamentally  aim  to  challenge  the  structure  of  power  within  a  recipient  state.11    Given  

this,  why  would  an  authoritarian  regime  allow  an  external  actor  like  the  United  States  to  

promote   democracy?     Logically,   one   would   expect   such   regimes   to   protest   or   refuse  

efforts   by   an   external   actor   to   promote   reforms   that   aim   to   realign  power  within   the  

state.     At   the   same   time,   one   would   also   expect   caution   to   govern   a   donor   state’s  

democracy  strategy  in  areas  it  regards  as  strategically  important  where  concerns  about  

stability  would  be  paramount.    

                                                                                                               

9  Jeremy  M.  Sharp,  "Egypt:  Background  and  U.S.  Relations,"  ed.  Congressional  Research  Service  (Washington,  D.C.:  CRS,  2007).  10  Author’s  calculation  drawn  from  USAID’s  U.S.  Overseas  Loans  and  Grants  database.  Available  online:  www.gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov    11  Carothers,  Aiding  Democracy  Abroad:  The  Learning  Curve.  

 

 

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  That   authoritarian   regimes   in   the   Middle   East   have   allowed   democracy   aid  

programs   implies   that   some   benefit   is   derived   in   exchange   for   such   programs   to  

operate.    This  suggests   that  a  regime’s   level  of  dependency  on  a  donor  may  shape  the  

extent   to  which   that   regime   can   challenge   the   structure   and   substance   of   democracy  

programs.    Recipient  regimes  may  feel  obliged  to  allow  democracy  programs  if  they  rely  

on   a   donor   for   economic   or   military   support.     They   may   also   permit   democracy  

programs   if   their  acceptance  might  enhance   their  ability   to  extract  aid  or   concessions  

from  another  donor.    An  authoritarian  regime’s  decision  to  allow  such  programs  signals  

its   intent   to   reform.     Even   if   its   commitment   to   reform   is   suspect,   a   regime   could  

leverage   this   signal   to   enhance   its   credibility   internationally   in   the   hope   of   attracting  

further  assistance  and  investment.  

How   might   dependence   on   a   donor   then   shape   the   form   and   substance   of  

democracy   programs?     One   would   expect   a   recipient   regime’s   ability   to   challenge  

programs   to   be   a   function   of   their   dependence   on   the   donor.     Regimes   that   depend  

highly   on   a   donor   would   offer   less   resistance   to   aid   programs.   Those   that   are   both  

highly  dependent  on  a  donor  and  seen  as  strategically  important,  however,  may  tolerate  

democracy  programs  but  would  have  significant  leverage  in  shaping  such  programs.    A  

regime’s   strategic   importance   to   the   donor   thus   insulates   it   from   punishment   and  

affords  more   room   in  which   to   negotiate  with   the   donor.     In   turn,   donors   concerned  

with   preserving   stability   with   strategically   important   states   may   adopt   more   limited  

forms  of  democracy  assistance  to  limit  the  potential  for  uncertainty,  upheaval,  and  the  

rise   of   new   and   potentially   less   cooperative   political   actors.     Even   if   not   considered  

ideal,  though,  limited  forms  of  democracy  aid  could  be  seen  by  the  donor  as  a  foothold  

in  which  to  build  on  efforts  in  the  future  in  the  hope  that  more  conducive  conditions  for  

liberalization  might  later  exist.      

These   dynamics   suggest   incentive   structures   that   might   shape   interactions  

between   a   donor   state   and   an   authoritarian   regime   in   negotiating   democracy   aid  

programs   and   bring   attention   to   the   primacy   of   form   in   aid   construction.     In   the  

broadest   sense,   democracy   assistance   programs   are   those   that   aim   to   foster   and  

encourage  democracy  within  a  state.    Citing   the  work  of  DeZeeuw  and  Kumar,  Lappin  

defines  such  aid  specifically  as  “the  non-­‐profit  transfer  of  funds,  expertise,  and  material  

 

 

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to   foster   democratic   groups,   initiatives,   and   institutions   that   are   already   working  

towards   a   democratic   society.”12     This   expansive   definition   relays   the  multiple   forms  

that   such   aid   can   take,   with   resources   directed   to   local   government,   human   rights  

groups,   political   parties,   and   groups   comprising   civil   society   among   others.   Burnell  

classifies   such   forms   of   aid   into   supply   and   demand   components   of   aid   efforts.     For  

example,   aid   toward   the   supply   side   of   governance   includes   efforts   to   reform  

constitutions,  legal  frameworks,  and  enhance  government  organization,  while  those  on  

the  demand  side  focus  on  assistance  to  ‘pressure  group  networks’.  13      

The   combination   of   any   of   these   elements   should   reflect,   as   the   democracy  

assistance   literature   relays,   the   state   of   development   and   the   distribution   of   power  

within  a  recipient  state.    Ideally,  the  form  of  democracy  aid  chosen  by  the  donor  would  

reflect   both   the   development   of   the   recipient   state   and   the   opportunities   available   in  

which   to   maximize   the   potential   for   any   one   component   to   effect   change.     In  

authoritarian  states,  the  options  available  to  donors  are  limited.    For  donors,  the  allure  

of   privileging   economic   reform   as   a   part   of   a   democracy   strategy   in   an   authoritarian  

state   is   twofold:   Economic   growth   has   been   cited   extensively   as   one   of   the   variables  

most   likely   to   enhance   the   prospects   for   democracy   and   ensure   its   sustainability.14  

Further,  in  restrictive  states  where  the  parameters  and  opportunities  for  donors  would  

be  more   constrained,   strategies   that   emphasize   economic   growth  may   pose   less   of   a  

threat  to  regimes  already  engaged  in  economic  reform  efforts,  thus  offering  a  potential  

platform  from  which  to  expand  their  efforts  into  more  political  areas  of  support.    

                                                                                                               

12  Richard  Lappin,  "What  We  Talk  About  When  We  Talk  About  Democracy  Assistance:    The  Problem  of  Definition  in  Post-­‐Conflict  Approaches  to  Democratisation,"  Central  European  Journal  of  International  and  Security  Studies  4,  no.  1  (2010):  187.  13  Peter  Burnell,  "Democracy  Assistance:    Origins  and  Organizations,"  in  Democracy  Assistance:  International  Cooperation  for  Democratization,  ed.  Peter  Burnell  (London:  Frank  Cass  Publishers,  2000),  57.  14  Adam  Przeworski  et  al.,  Democracy  and  Development  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2000);  Edward  N.  Muller,  "Economic  Determinants  of  Democracy,"  American  Sociological  Review  60,  no.  6  (1995);  Seymour  Martin  Lipset,  "Some  Social  Requisites  of  Democracy:  Economic  Development  and  Political  Legitimacy,"  The  American  Political  Science  Review  53,  no.  1  (1959);  Ross  Burkhart  and  Michael  Lewis-­‐Beck,  "Comparative  Democracy:  The  Economic  Development  Thesis,"  American  Political  Science  Review  88,  no.  4  (1994).  

 

 

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Privileging  economic  growth  as  part  of  a  democracy  strategy  in  an  authoritarian  

state   though   presumes   that   regimes   in   such   states   are   committed   to   distributing   any  

gains   from   such   reform   and   are   invested   in   the  mechanisms   by  which   growth  might  

enhance  democratization.    The   literatures  on   the  durability  of   authoritarianism   in   the  

Middle   East   and   the   linkages   between   fiscal   crises   and   democratization   though  

underscore   the   limitations  of  assumptions   linking  economic  reform  with  a  diminution  

of  state  power.15    Fiscal  crises,  for  example,  served  as  motivation  for  many  authoritarian  

regimes   to   embrace   some   component   of   economic   liberalization.     The   notion   that  

economic   reforms   would   generate   political   reforms,   however,   underestimates   the  

imagination  and  pragmatism  of  authoritarian  regimes.      

Because  the  strength  of  the  authoritarian  state  is  rooted  not  only  in  its  monopoly  

of   force,   but   its   control   over   the   economy,   it   will   minimize   reforms   that   might  

undermine   its   influence   in   the   economy.16  Economic   crisis   and   reform  have  often  not  

resulted  in  the  state’s  retreat  but  rather,  as  Ayubi  reminds  us,  its  redeployment.17  States  

as  varied  as  China,  Egypt,  and  Syria  have  demonstrated  the  ability  of  regimes  to  control  

the   pace   of   reform,   implementing   measures   gradually   while   reinforcing   their   power  

through  patronage  networks  and  elites  within  the  state.18  As  their  experiences  indicate,  

privatization  and  other  tenets  of  economic  reform  do  not  imply  the  loss  of  state  control  

and  power  necessarily.    In  controlling  the  process  of  reform  and  reformulating  its  rules,                                                                                                                  15  Stephen  Haggard  and  Robert  R.  Kaufman,  The  Political  Economy  of  Democratic  Transitions  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1995);  Giacomo  Luciani,  "The  Oil  Rent,  the  Fiscal  Crisis  of  the  State,  and  Democratization,"  in  Democracy  without  Democrats?,  ed.  Ghassan  Salamé  (London:  I.B.  Taurus,  2001);  Iliya  F.  Harik  and  Denis  Joseph  Sullivan,  Privatization  and  Liberalization  in  the  Middle  East,  Indiana  Series  in  Arab  and  Islamic  Studies  (Bloomington:  Indiana  University  Press,  1992);  Nazih  Ayubi,  Overstating  the  Arab  State  (London:  I.B.  Taurus,  1995);  Mark  J.  Gasiorowski,  "Economic  Crisis  and  Political  Regime  Change:  An  Event  History  Analysis,"  American  Political  Science  Review  89(1995);  Eva  Bellin,  "Contingent  Democrats:  Industrialists,  Labor  and  Democratization  in  Late-­‐Developing  Countries,"  World  Politics  52(2000);  Ellen  Lust-­‐Okar,  Structuring  Conflict  in  the  Arab  World  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2005).  16  Luciani,  "The  Oil  Rent,  the  Fiscal  Crisis  of  the  State,  and  Democratization,"  134.  Paul  Brooker,  Non-­Democratic  Regimes:  Theory,  Government,  and  Politics  (London:  MacMillan,  2000),  34.  17  Ayubi,  Overstating  the  Arab  State,  329.  18  Mary  Gallagher,  "Reform  and  Openness:  Why  China's  Economic  Reforms  Have  Delayed  Democracy,"  World  Politics  54(2002);  Haroldo  Dilla  Alfonso,  "Cuba:    The  Changing  Scenarios  of  Governability,"  Boundary  29,  no.  3  (2002):  55-­‐75;  Charles  Tripp,  "State,  Elites,  and  the  'Management  of  Change',"  in  The  State  and  Global  Change:  The  Political  Economy  of  Transition  in  the  Middle  East,  ed.  Hassan  Hakimian  and  Ziba  Moshaver  (Richmond:  Curzon  Press,  2001),  223.  

 

 

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the  resulting  private  sector  can  become  a  mirror  of  the  regime  itself,  dependent  on  the  

state   for   protection   or   with   the   state   able   for   example   to   become   a   ‘majority  

shareholder  in  a  private  company’.19  

  Privileging   economic   reform   as   a   part   of   a   democracy   strategy   in   an  

authoritarian   state   may   be   the   only   avenue   available   to   donors.     The   process   of  

economic   reform   and   adjustment   in   such   states   though   can   often   have   undemocratic  

outcomes—a   point   under   examined   by   scholars   of   democracy   assistance.   Kurtz’s  

research   on   neoliberalism   and   democratization   in   Chile   relays   that   point   finding   that  

rather   than   serving   as   a   mechanism   to   weaken   state   dominance,   economic   reforms  

“produced  intense  social  atomization,  peasant  quiescence,  and  a  reconstruction  of  rural  

conservative   dominance.”20   Privatization   and   other   components   of   neoliberal   reforms  

adopted  served  to  enhance  the  dominance  of  the  agrarian  upper  class  in  Chile,  with  the  

effect   of   diminishing   rural   democratic   contestation.21     The   implication   of   such   an  

approach   is   that   donor   credibility   and   legitimacy   could   be   jeopardized   if   those  

marginalized  by   a   regime  perceive   such   efforts   to   reinforce   the   state   or   associate   the  

reform   process   with   hardships   that   may   occur   as   a   result.     The   assumption   that  

economic   reform  will   eventually   serve   as   a   catalyst   for  political   reforms   in   the   future  

also  presumes  that  the  beneficiaries  of  such  reforms  will  act  as  stewards  of  democracy  

and  have  an  interest  in  extending  political  reforms  to  the  rest  of  the  population.      

  The   discussions   above   help   elucidate   the   motivations   of   both   authoritarian  

states  and  donors  in  accepting  and  giving  democracy  assistance.    They  also  illustrate  the  

potential   for   such   assistance   to   become   irrelevant   for   its   intended   purpose   or   to  

strengthen   rather   than   challenge   the   structure   of   power   in   a   recipient   state.    

Dependency  on   a  donor  may   commit   an   authoritarian   regime   to   accept   some   form  of  

democracy   assistance.     In   the   process   of   negotiating   this   aid,   policies   and   strategies  

taken   by   donors   like   the   United   States   could   encourage   several   different   pathways  

through   which   such   regimes   are   able   to   manipulate   and   dilute   the   substance   of                                                                                                                  

19  See  Owen  in  The  State  and  Global  Change:  The  Political  Economy  of  Transition  in  the  Middle  East.  Hakimian  and  Moshaver,  eds.  Richmond:  Curzon  Press,  2001.  20  Marcus  J.  Kurtz,  "Free  Markets  and  Democratic  Consolidation  in  Chile:    The  National  Politics  of  Rural  Transformation,"  Politics  &  Society  27,  no.  2  (1999):  277.  21  Ibid.  

 

 

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democracy   programs.   Our   attention   now   turns   to   how   these   processes   interacted   in  

strategy  in  Egypt  and  Morocco.  

Case  Study:  Egypt  

When  USAID’s  democracy  program  began  in  Egypt  in  the  early  1990s,  the  state  

faced   enormous   economic   and   social   challenges.     After   years   of   declining   growth   and  

the  postponement  of  necessary  economic   reforms,  Egypt  experienced  a   fiscal   crisis   in  

1991.    The  crisis  marked  nearly  two  decades  of  sporadic  experiments  in  economic  and  

political   liberalization   first   launched  by  President  Sadat.     In   the  wake  of   the  1967  and  

1973  wars  with  Israel  and  the  economic  crises  that  ensued,  Sadat  introduced  a  policy  in  

1974   to   open   the   economy   to   foreign   investment,   marking   a   shift   from   the   socialist  

economic  policies  of  his  predecessor,  President  Nassar.    This  opening—infitah—of  the  

economy   and   the   resulting   policy   of   privatization   (khashkasah),   was   intended   to  

encourage  foreign  investment,  though  it  was  not,  as  Rutherford  notes,  Sadat’s  intention  

to   completely   restructure   the  economy.22    The  basic  purpose  of   the   infitah   policy  was  

“to   initiate   a   new   development   strategy   based   on   export-­‐oriented   policies,   a   more  

important  role  for  the  private  sector,  foreign  investment,  and  market  forces.”23  

  The   spirit   behind   infitah   created   the   expectation   that   political   reforms   would  

follow  those   in   the  economic  sphere.    Political   reforms  that  soon   followed  such  as   the  

establishment  of  a  multi-­‐party  system,  though,  were  motivated  by  the  need  to  manage  

and  minimize  opposition  resulting  from  the  embrace  of  a  new  economic  orthodoxy  and  

foreign   policy.24     The   shift   from   a   socialist   economy   to   one   based   on   the   market  

threatened  the  regime’s  stability  by  potentially  dislocating  its  social  base  of  support  and  

a   system  of  patronage   and   cooptation   already   established  under  Nasser.     Concern   for  

preserving   this   dynamic—and   implementing   the   bare   minimum   economic   reforms  

                                                                                                               

22  Bruce  K.  Rutherford,  Egypt  after  Mubarak  :  Liberalism,  Islam,  and  Democracy  in  the  Arab  World,  Princeton  Studies  in  Muslim  Politics  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  2008),  135.  23  Said  El-­‐Naggar,  "Prospects  and  Problems  of  Privatization,"  in  The  Political  Economy  of  Contemporary  Egypt,  ed.  Ibrahim  M.  Oweiss  (Washington:  Centre  for  Contemporary  Arab  Studies,  Georgetown  University,  1990),  54.  24  Bahgat  Korany,  "Restricted  Democratization  from  Above:  Egypt,"  in  Political  Liberalisation  and  Democracy  in  the  Arab  World,  Volume  2:  Comparing  Experiences,  ed.  Bahgat  Korany,  Rex  Brynen,  and  Paul  Noble  (London:  Lynne  Rienner,  1998),  47.  

 

 

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required—explains   the   erratic   trajectory   that   economic   and   political   reforms   took  

thereafter.    In  the  1980s,  political  reforms  and  liberties  such  as  the  expansion  of  press  

freedoms,   the   emergence   of   thousands   of  NGOs,   and   the   release   of   political   prisoners  

were  extended  in  what  Brownlee  calls   ‘democracy  in  doses’—actions  intended  to  ease  

the  state’s  economic  burden  and  minimize  the  impact  of  economic  adjustment.25  

  The  expansion  of   the  private   sector  under   infitah   over   the  1970s  and  80s  also  

gave  rise  to  a  new  class  of  businessmen  whose  benefits  depended  on  compliance  with  

the  state   for  access  to  support  and  protection.    The  concerns  and   interests  of   the  elite  

created  by   this  process  of  change   thus  revolved  around  preserving  such  access  rather  

than  advocating  for  its  extension  through  democratization.26    Economic  reform  became  

a  project  carefully  executed  and  controlled  by  the  state.    Instead  of  serving  as  a  catalyst  

for  political  liberalization,  the  state  used  the  process  of  economic  reform  to  strengthen  

itself  through  cooptation,  creating  disincentives  for  reform  beneficiaries  to  question  the  

system  sustaining  the  regime.    Beyond  the  beneficiaries  of  privatization,  Owen  remarks,  

“most   sections   of   the   Egyptian   bourgeoisie   …   share   an   interest   in   the   slow-­‐paced  

economic  reform  as  well  as  in  preserving  a  system  in  which  the  workers  and  peasants  

are  virtually  disenfranchised  and  unrepresented  at  the  political  level.”27      

These   developments   relay   the   state’s   imperative   for   undertaking   reform   and  

provide  insight  into  how  support  for  the  regime  was  managed  and  maintained.    By  the  

early  1990s,  fiscal  crisis  seemed  to  threaten  the  sustainability  of  the  status  quo.    Relief  

came   through   a   $25   billion   debt   relief   package   from   the   United   States   in   return   for  

Egypt’s   support   during   the   Gulf   War   and   a   structural   adjustment   program   with   the  

International   Monetary   Fund   and   the  World   Bank.   28   During   this   time,   the   state   also  

faced  increased  violence  from  Islamist  groups,  which  would  persist  throughout  much  of                                                                                                                  25  Jason  Brownlee,  "The  Decline  of  Pluralism  in  Mubarak's  Egypt,"  in  Islam  and  Democracy  in  the  Middle  East,  ed.  Larry  Diamond,  Daniel  Brumberg,  and  Mark  Plattner  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  2003),  49.  26  Nadia  Ramsis  Farah,  Egypt's  Political  Economy:  Power  Relations  in  Development  (Cairo:  The  American  University  in  Cairo  Press,  2009),  81.  27  Roger  Owen,  "Socioeconomic  Change  and  Political  Mobilization:    The  Case  of  Egypt,"  in  Democracy  without  Democrats?  The  Renewal  of  Politics  in  the  Muslim  World,  ed.  Ghassan  Salamé  (London:  I.B.  Tauris,  1994),  193.  28  Clement  M.  Henry  and  Robert  Springborg,  Globalization  and  the  Politics  of  Development  in  the  Middle  East  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2001),  140.  

 

 

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the  decade.    Against  this  backdrop,  USAID  first  began  to  develop  plans  for  a  democracy  

program  in  Egypt.    In  Washington,  D.C.,  Gerald  Hyman,  one  of  the  principal  architects  of  

USAID’s   democracy   and   governance   program   felt   that   there   were   serious   stakes   to  

democracy  in  Nigeria,  Pakistan,  Egypt,  and  Indonesia  in  the  early  1990s  because  of  their  

importance  regionally.    Egypt,  he  recalls,  was  one  of  the  early  cases  in  which  the  Agency  

tried  to  determine  how  to  approach  democracy  on  a  global  basis  and  develop  programs  

reflecting  the  political  context  of  the  recipient  aid  country.29  

The  decision  to  launch  a  program  in  Egypt  followed  USAID’s  efforts  to  capitalize  

on  political  developments  in  Eastern  Europe  in  the  late  1980s  by  establishing  a  formal  

democracy  center  within  the  Agency.    As  no  paradigm  existed  then  for  the  organization  

and   construction   of   democracy   programs,   Hyman   devised   four   areas   in  which   USAID  

would  focus  its  efforts:  elections  and  political  participation;  civil  society;  the  rule  of  law;  

and  governance.    These  four  areas  served  as  starting  points  for  the  Agency’s  programs  

and  were  chosen  to  reflect   the  academic   literatures  on  democratization  and  economic  

development.30     An   Agency   policy   paper   issued   in   1990   announcing   the   launch   of   a  

‘Democracy   Initiative’   provides   insight   into   the   Agency’s   early   conceptions   of  

democracy,   laying   out   a   broad   framework   for   its   promotion.   While   acknowledging  

inconclusive   debates   about   the   relationship   between   economic   development   and  

democracy,  the  paper  emphasizes  that  “democratic  institutions  and  a  strong  democratic  

political   culture   can  be  highly   supportive  of   efforts   to   address  development  problems  

and  establish  the  basis  for  sustained  economic  growth.”31  

The  policy  paper  emphasizes  that  Agency  efforts  to  promote  democracy  should  

be   seen   as   best   achieved   over   time   and   through   holistic   integration  with   its   existing  

assistance   programs.     For   example,   the   Agency   emphasizes   the   importance   of   input  

from  field  staff   in  program  development  along  with  USAID  staff   in  regional  bureaus  to  

ensure   that   local   needs   and   the   circumstances  within   a   host   country   are   reflected   in  

                                                                                                               

29  Gerald  Hyman,  former  director  of  the  Office  of  Democracy  and  Governance,  USAID.  Interview,  Washington,  D.C.  July  7,  2008.  30  Ibid  31  Directorate  for  U.S.  Agency  for  International  Development,  "USAID  Policy:  Democracy  and  Governance,"  ed.  United  States  Agency  for  International  Development  (Washington,  D.C.1991).  

 

 

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programs.32   Additionally,   the   paper   underscores   the   importance   of   considering  

different   paths   and   approaches   in   promoting   democracy.     While   acknowledging   that  

American   institutions   can   protect   human   rights   and   support   good   governance,   other  

paths  may  be  suitable,  emphasizing,  “the  Democracy  Initiative  does  not  seek  to  impose  

the  American  model  on  developing  countries.”33  

Efforts   undertaken   already   by   the   Agency’s   regional   bureaus   to   incorporate  

democracy   within   its   programs   are   addressed   and   provide   early   insight   into  

discrepancies   among   bureaus   on   the   subject   of   democracy.     For   example,   the   policy  

paper   states   that   its   Asia,   Africa,   and   Latin   America   and   Caribbean   bureaus   include  

specific   allocations   for   human   rights   and   democratic   development  within   its   budgets.    

With  regard  to  the  Europe  and  Near  East  bureau,  however,  the  paper  indicates  that  its  

“special  characteristics”  and  “special  authorizations  and  earmarks  may   limit   the  scope  

for  developing  approaches  in  these  two  regions.”34  

In   the   case   of   Egypt,   concerns   about   stability   and   whether   the   Egyptian  

government  would  move  on  any   type  of   reform  dominated  discussions  within  USAID.    

Opinion  within  USAID’s  new  Center  of  Democracy  and  Governance  in  Washington  was  

divided   about   what   elements   of   reform   to   push   and   conflicting   objectives   about   the  

appropriate   path   to   pursue.     While   some   in   the   office   acknowledged   the   need   for  

political   reforms   in   Egypt,   they   also   felt   that   issues   of   stability   and   security   were  

paramount   as   well.   Others,   however,   advocated   applying   more   pressure   on   the  

government  in  implementing  reforms.35  

That   Egypt   was   ambivalent   about   adopting   reform,   specifically   that   for  

democracy   was   not   unexpected.     Indeed,   tensions   first   encountered   at   the   outset   of  

USAID’s  democracy  program  were   a   continuation  of   those   that  have   existed   since   the  

beginning   of   USAID’s   general   foreign   assistance   program   in   Egypt.     In  many   respects  

USAID’s  possibilities  for  success  were  constrained  by  the  nature  of  the  frequently  cited  

                                                                                                               

32  Ibid.  33  Ibid.,  17.  34  Ibid.,  15.  35  Gerald  Hyman,  former  director  of  the  Office  of  Democracy  and  Governance,  USAID.  Interview,  Washington,  D.C.  July  7,  2008.  

 

 

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‘special   relationship’   between   the   United   States   and   Egypt.   States   that   receive  

democracy   assistance   funding   from   USAID   typically   receive   funds   from   the   Agency’s  

development   assistance   funds.   In   Egypt,   however,   democracy   aid   funding   has   been  

drawn  from  Economic  Support  Funds  (ESF).  

These   funds   were   established   under   the   Foreign   Assistance   Act   of   1961,  

reflecting   the   U.S.   Congress’   contention   that   “under   special   economic,   political,   or  

security  conditions,   the  national   interest  of   the  United  States  may  require  support   for  

countries  in  amounts  which  could  not  be  justified  solely  [for  development  purposes]”.36  

ESF  funded  programs  are  implemented  with  guidance  from  the  U.S.  Department  of  State  

and   are   used   to   support   several   objectives  many   of  which   reflect   the   contention   that  

support   for   a  market   economy   is   necessary   for   the   development   of   and   transition   to  

democracy.    

Both  Egypt  and   Israel  are   the   largest  recipients  of  ESF  Funding.    Following   the  

peace  treaty  between  the  two  countries  in  1979,  the  United  States  gave  both  significant  

assistance  packages  in  recognition  of  diplomatic  relations  between  the  two.    Since  1979,  

Israel   has   received   an   average   of   $3   billion   annually   in   aid   from   the   U.S.,   with   Egypt  

receiving  nearly  $2  billion.    The  terms  of  the  assistance  between  the  two,  however,  vary.    

Israel’s  aid  consists  of  direct  cash  transfers  to  the  government  while  Egypt’s  aid  must  be  

directed   toward   specific   programs   agreed   upon   by   both   the   United   States   and   the  

Egyptian  government.    

Variance   in   this   arrangement   has   long   been   a   source   of   tension   between   the  

United   States   and  Egypt.    A   former  director   of   the  USAID  Mission   in  Egypt  notes   that  

“the  bulk  of  the  ESF  was  supposed  to  go  for  projects  built  by  U.S.  contractors;  a  smaller  

amount  was  for  a  commodity  import  program,  to  provide  Egypt  with  essential  imports  

from   U.S.   suppliers;   and   a   much   smaller   amount   for   a   cash   transfer,   to   give   the  

Egyptians  a  little  cold  cash  and  AID  a  small  level  to  try  to  move  the  government  in  the  

reform  direction.     The  Egyptians   greatly   resented   the   arrangement:   the   flow  of   funds  

                                                                                                               36  "U.S.  Foreign  Assistance  Reference  Guide,"  ed.  United  States  Department  of  State  and  the  U.S.  Agency  for  International  Development  (Washington,  D.C.2005),  6.  

 

 

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was  slow,  and  highly  controlled  as  to  how  the  funds  could  be  used  and  [which]  they  saw  

accruing  to  U.S.  firms.”37    

Of   USAID’s   four   areas   of   democracy   assistance,  much   of   the   aid   distributed   to  

Egypt   fell   under   the   areas   of   civil   society   and   the   rule   of   law   for   the   first   half   of   the  

1990s.    In  the  latter  part  of  the  decade,  programs  were  expanded  to  include  assistance  

for   governance   and  media   programs.     Projects   initiated   in   the   early   1990s   were   not  

completely  now,  but  followed  similar  efforts  begun  in  the  early  1980s  under  the  general  

umbrella  of  development  assistance.  Further,  they  were  framed  in  terms  of  their  benefit  

to   the   economy.     An   Egyptian   project   manager   working   at   USAID’s   Institutional  

Development   and   Support   Office,  which  was   the   precursor   to   the   current   Democracy  

and  Governance  Office,  recalls  that  debates  among  staff  members  revolved  then  around  

market  freedoms  and  privatization.38  At  that  time,  he  notes,  when  both  USAID  and  the  

World  Bank  were  pushing  privatization,   no  one  questioned   the   logic   of   this   approach  

nor   did   they   consider   that   improper   management   might   be   the   problem   or   that  

worker’s   rights   were   not   incorporated   into   a   democracy   strategy.     Indeed,   as   one  

Egyptian  employee  currently  with  USAID’s  Democracy  and  Governance  in  Cairo  noted,  

“when   you   read   the   project   papers   for   democracy   at   this   time,   they   were   all   geared  

towards  improving  the  investment  and  economic  climate  in  Egypt.”39  

Former   USAID   staff   working   in   Cairo   felt   that   framing   civil   society,  

parliamentary   reform   programs   and   other   areas   of   democracy   programs   in   terms   of  

economic   benefits   reflected   the  United   States’   support   for   the   Government   of   Egypt’s  

economic   reform  program.40    Attempts   to   fund  programs  without   explicit   links   to   the  

economy   met   with   resistance   from   officials   from   the   Egyptian   government.     Such  

programs   were   never   rejected   or   ended   outright   but   negotiated   to   the   point   that  

USAID’s   original   objectives   were   diluted.     The   end   results   were   programs   seen   as  

impotent   from   the   perspective   of   USAID   but   often   ones   that   ended   up   fulfilling   an  

                                                                                                               37  Marshall  D.  Brown.  Director  of  USAID  Egypt,  1987.  U.S.  Foreign  Assistance  Oral  History  Program,  1996.  6.    38  Tamer  El  Meehy,  former  project  manager,  Office  of  Institutional  Development  and  Support,  USAID  Cairo,  Interview  with  the  author,  July  14,  2009.  39  Egyptian  staff  member,  USAID  Cairo.  Anonymous  interview  with  the  author.  May  6,  2007.  40  Former  USAID  staff  member.    Anonymous  interview  with  the  author.  May  30,  2007.  

 

 

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imperative  of   the  Egyptian  government.      For  example,  USAID’s   first  attempt  to   fund  a  

civil  society  project  in  1993  took  nearly  two  years  to  negotiate  with  the  government.    In  

that   period,   USAID   staff   in   Cairo   worked   to   gather   input   from   Egyptian   and  

international  NGOs  on  possible  components  of  a  new  program  with  the   idea  of  having  

stakeholders  design  a  project  together.      

One   of   the   holdups   to   discussions   between   Americans   and   Egyptians   lay   in  

defining   the   terms   of   ‘civil   society’   and   ‘participation’   underlying   the   project,   which  

varied   significantly   between   the   two.41     The   USAID   project   officer   assigned   to   the  

project   recalls   that  his   counterparts   in   the  Ministry  of   Interior  were  not   interested   in  

changes   proposed   by   USAID   and   came   up   with   their   own   program.     The   officer   was  

excused  from  negotiations  with  the  Egyptians  and  replaced  by  another  USAID  colleague  

who  had  the  backing  of  the  Interior  Minister  and  President  Mubarak.    Rather  than  incite  

tension  with  the  government,  USAID  compromised  and  abandoned  some  of  its  aims  to  

maintain  some  semblance  of  a  project.    In  the  words  of  the  excused  officer,  “I  think  the  

mission  people  did  what  they  felt  they  needed  in  order  to  continue  negotiating  with  the  

government…this   is  Egypt  and   the  program   is  going   to  be   there  no  matter  what.     It   is  

not  a  matter  of  ‘if’  you  get  the  money,  it  is  a  matter  of  when.”  42  

This   dynamic   characterized   programs   for   the   rest   of   the   decade   regardless   of  

which  form  of  democracy  aid  was  pursued.    Under  the  area  of  rule  of  law,  for  example,  a  

project   called   the   ‘Administration   of   Justice   Project’   (AOJS)  was   officially   launched   in  

1994,  but  its  actual  implementation  began  years  later.    Rule  of  law  projects  were  in  the  

words   of   an   Egyptian   USAID   employee,   ‘the   flavor   of   the   1990s’   in   terms   of   Agency  

preference.43     A   former   staff  member  with  AMIDEAST,   the   organization   contracted   to  

carry  out  the  project  recalls,  “that  it  took  ten  years  for  Egypt  and  the  U.S.  government  to  

agree   on   a   statement   of   work   says   a   lot   about   the   reality   of   much   it   took   for   the  

governments   to   be   on   the   same   page.”44   As   with   other   projects,   AOJS   framed   its  

                                                                                                               41  Frank  Pavich.  Supervisorial  Special  Projects  Office,  Office  of  International  Development  Support.  Interview.  U.S.  Foreign  Assistance  Oral  History  Program.  Georgetown  University,  1998.  42  Ibid.    43  Egyptian  USAID  employee.  Office  of  Democracy  and  Governance.    USAID  Cairo.  Anonymous  interview  with  the  author.  May  12,  2007.  44  Former  AMIDEAST  staff  member.  Interview  with  the  author.  May  31,  2007.  

 

 

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expected  benefits  to  democracy  in  Egypt  in  economic  terms.    For  example,  USAID  states  

that   “an   improved   court   administration   and   an   informed   judiciary   are   essential  

elements  without  which  democracy  will   falter  and  economic  growth  will  be   thwarted.    

Further,   USAID   notes   that   “as   Egypt   enters   a   period   of   economic   re-­‐structuring   and  

privatization,   there   is   pressing   need   for   an   efficient,   predictable,   and   timely  

administration  of  justice.”45  

The   assessment   process   USAID   relied   on   in   determining   the   suitability   of   the  

AOJS   project   for   its   democracy   program   in   Egypt   relays   the  Agency’s   narrow   view   of  

which  elements  within  Egyptian  society  it  saw  as  beneficial  for  democracy.    Interviews  

conducted  for  the  assessment  were  conducted  with  members  representing  the  private  

sector.46     Discussions   during   these   interviews,   which   were   undertaken   with   the  

Chamber  of  Commerce  and  the  Cairo  Businessmen’s  Association,   “all   indicate  a  strong  

interest   and   support   from   the   private   sector   for   judicial   reform   in   procedures   and  

regulations   that   adversely   affect   growth   of   private   enterprise…their   comments   are   a  

positive  indication  of  political  commitment  to  reform.”47  

At   the  end  of   the  decade,  USAID  resurrected  the   idea  of   funding  a  more  robust  

civil   society   program   in   Egypt   with   an   explicit   shift   in   funding   for   such   aid   under  

democracy  activities.    In  1997,  USAID  listed  as  one  of  its  strategic  objectives  a  desire  to  

increase   civil   society   participation   and   promote   an   improved   environment   for  

democracy.48    An  advisory  board  was  established  informally  to  gather  opinions  on  the  

type  of  activity   the  Agency  would   fund.     In  1998,  USAID   issued  a  competitive  Request  

for   Applications   (RFA)   to   establish   and   manage   an   NGO   Service   Center   designed  

increase  civil  society  participation  “by  building  strong  organizations  capable  of  voicing  

                                                                                                               45  USAID,  "Administration  of  Justice  Support  Project  Identification  Project,"  ed.  United  States  Agency  for  International  Development  (Washington,  D.C.1994).  46  Ibid.  47  Ibid.  48  ———,  "USAID/Egypt  Results  Review  and  Resource  Request  (R4),"  ed.  United  States  Agency  for  International  Development  (Washington,  D.C.1997).  

 

 

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citizen   concerns,   increase   the   frequency   with   which   they   voice   them,   and   to   secure  

recognition  of  civil  society  as  a  legitimate  voice  in  decision-­‐making.”49  

A  contractor  working  on  the  project  at  the  time  recalled  that  as  the  first  explicit  

democracy   project   for   civil   society,   anxiety   existed   about   the   Egyptian   government’s  

response  to  its  establishment.50    Any  initial  trepidation  the  Egyptian  government  had  at  

the  outset  of   the  project  dissipated.    A  steering  committee  comprising  representatives  

from  USAID  and  the  Egyptian  government  with  the  purpose  of  giving  policy  advice  and  

guidance   to   the   project   was   dissolved   a   month   after   its   first   meeting   by   Amina   El  

Guindy,   the   Minister   of   Social   Affairs,   seeing   no   need   for   its   continuance.51     The  

prospects  for  reform  and  space  for  civil  society  seemed  ripe.    As  USAID  began  reviewing  

applications   for   the   project,   civil   society   activists  were   already   engaged   in   a   dialogue  

with  the  Egyptian  government  to  change  Law  32,  which  governed  civic  associations  and  

was  seen  as  outdated  and  inappropriate.  52  

For  the  first  time,  the  Egyptian  government  sought  the  opinions  of  activists  and  

NGO  leaders  in  the  construction  of  a  new  law,  a  process  viewed  by  many  with  optimism  

in   reversing  years  of   government   suspicion   toward   civil   society.    USAID’s  project  was  

delayed  for  two  years  and   its  objectives  diluted   in  response  to  developments  with  the  

NGO   law.     Despite   consultations   with   civil   society   members   and   the   illusion   of  

government   concessions   to   civil   society,   the   government   replaced   Law   32   with   the  

more  restrictive  Law  153,  which  banned  registration  to  NGOs  “whose  activities  involve  

political  or  trade  union-­‐like  activities  which  are  exclusively  restricted  to  political  parties  

                                                                                                               

49  Request  for  Applications  (RFA)  No.  USAID/Egypt  RFA  263-­‐99-­‐008.    Internal  document  provided  to  the  author.  1.    50  Robert  Latowsky.  Director  of  Infonex,  Cairo.  Interview  with  the  author.    April  25,  2007.  51  Ibid.  52  Law  32  was  first  enacted  in  1964.  “The  Role  of  NGOs  in  Egypt”.  Internal  document,  USAID  Cairo.  According  to  Agati,  none  of  the  suggestions  given  by  NGO  representatives  to  the  Ministry  of  Social  Affairs  were  incorporated  prior  to  its  presentation  to  the  Parliament  and  its  provisions  enhanced  the  state’s  control  over  the  work  of  NGOs  by  restricting  their  access  to  foreign  funding  and  giving  wider  discretion  to  grant  or  deny  registration  to  organizations.    For  more,  see  Mohamed  Agati,  "Undermining  Standards  of  Good  Governance:  Egypt's  NGO  Law  and  Its  Impact  on  the  Transparency  and  Accountability  of  CSOs,"  International  Journal  of  Not  for  Profit  Law  8,  no.  2  (2007).and  Mariz  Tadros,  "Long  Way  to  Go,"  Al-­Ahram  Weekly,  18-­‐24  December  2003.  

 

 

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or   unions.”53     The   contracting   director   for   USAID’s   project   recalls   that   the   U.S.  

Ambassador  was  using   the  project  as   leverage   to   try  and  get  a  better  NGO   law;   in   the  

process,   modifications   were   made   diluting   the   scope   of   the   project’s   activities.     For  

example,   while   the   program   initially   aimed   to   “increase   citizen’s   participation   in  

decision-­‐making”  it  was  eventually  altered  to  the  less  aggressive  sounding  “supporting  

NGOs   and   development.”54     Activities   that   may   have   enhanced   political   participation  

were   removed  and   those   that   filled   a  development   function  useful   to   the   government  

were  retained.    In  the  end,  according  to  the  director,  “USAID  decided  not  to  be  an  extra  

political   liability   so   they   watered   [the   program]   down   to   what   the   Ministry   would  

accept.  We  were  told  to  keep  the  initial  vision,  but  to  be  more  low  profile  in  supporting  

it.”55    

Continuity  and  the  Illusion  of  Change:  Democracy  Aid  After  2002  

  With   the   Bush   administration’s   focus   on   democracy   in   the   Middle   East   after  

2002,   funding   levels   for   democracy   aid   in   Egypt   increased   from   annual   levels   of   $22  

million  for  much  of   the  1990s  to  nearly  $75  million  by  2005.56    With  the  expansion  of  

funds,   also   came   a   more   aggressive   approach   towards   democracy   promotion.   As   the  

most  populous  state  in  the  Arab  world  and  one  regarded  for  its  cultural  importance  and  

leadership  role   in   the  region,   the  administration  made  Egypt   the   focus  of   its  efforts   in  

the   region.     Initially,   actions   from   Washington   suggested   an   intention   to   more  

consistently  and  forcefully  pressure  the  regime  than  it  had  in  the  past.57    Extra  funding  

for  democracy  aid  came  through  the  Middle  East  Partnership   Initiative,  a  small  grants  

initiative  administered  by  the  State  Department  through  the  U.S.  Embassy  in  Cairo.    

                                                                                                               53  Ibid.  54  Patrick  Crump,  Director,  Save  the  Children.  Interview  with  the  author.  Cairo.  May  8,  2007.  55  Ibid.  56  Michele  Dunne,  "Evaluating  Egyptian  Reform,"  in  Democracy  and  the  Rule  of  Law  Project  (Carnegie  Endowment  for  International  Peace,  2006).  57  In  2002,  for  example,  Bush  criticized  the  Mubarak  regime  for  its  prosecution  of  Saad  Eddin  Ibrahim,  a  professor  and  human  rights  activist  sentenced  to  prison  on  what  were  regarded  as  trumped  up  charges  of  embezzlement,  tarnishing  Egypt’s  image  abroad,  and  receiving  funds  without  government  authorization.    Bush’s  criticism  was  followed  by  a  refusal  to  extend  additional  foreign  assistance  to  Egypt  beyond  that  already  allocated  in  a  move  that  Human  Rights  Watch  called,  “the  most  significant  step  the  United  States  has  ever  taken  to  defend  human  rights  in  the  Arab  world.”  Peter  Slevin,  "Bush,  in  Shift  on  Egypt,  Links  Aid  to  Rights,"  The  Washington  Post,  August  15  2002.  

 

 

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Prior   to   2004,   no   mechanism   was   in   place   to   ensure   that   the   Egyptian  

government  used  U.S.   funds   for  democracy  assistance.58  An  amendment  sponsored  by  

U.S.   Senator   Brownback   in   that   year,   however,   gave   USAID’s   Mission   in   Cairo   full  

oversight   of   funds   allocated   for   democracy   removing   the   power   of   the   Egyptian  

government   to   determine   how   such   funds   would   be   spent.59     Democracy   programs  

administered  through  a  bilateral  agreement  with  the  Government  of  Egypt  (GOE)  were  

designed   in   close   collaboration   between   both   governments.60     In   many   cases,   a   GOE  

representative   would   serve   on   panels   to   select   the   contractor   implementing   USAID’s  

democracy  projects.    

  As  a  result  of  the  Brownback  amendment,  USAID  added  a  direct  grants  program  

to   its   democracy   program   enabling   organizations   to   approach   USAID   for   assistance.    

USAID  only   informed   the  GOE  after   grants  were   issues   to   local   and   international   civil  

society  organizations.    Though  the  grant  program  was   intended  to  deliver  aid  without  

Egyptian   government   interference,   an   audit   conducted   by   the   Office   of   the   Inspector  

General   for   USAID   documented   several   instances   in   which   program   objectives   were  

compromised  by  the  government.    For  example:  “one  grantee  endured  a  six  month  delay  

in  beginning  activities  because  the  Ministry  of  Social  Solidarity  (MOSA)  did  not  approve  

the   project’s   activities   with   other   civil   society   organizations   …   [and]   the   Egyptian  

government  cancelled  a  grantee’s  training  event  without  providing  any  reasons  for  the  

decision.  The  grantee  had  planned   training  events   focused  on  corruption  and  political  

reform  activities.    As  a   result,   the  grantee  had   to   find  alternative  ways   to   continue   its  

activities.”61  

  Such   examples   relay   the   ability   of   the   Egyptian   government   to   challenge  

programs   it   finds   threatening,   despite   changes   to   the   administration   of   democracy  

assistance.    During   the  summer  of  2006,   for  example,   the  Egyptian  government  asked  

two  American  organizations,  the  National  Democratic  Institute  for  International  Affairs  

                                                                                                               58  Office  of  Inspector  General,  "Audit  of  USAID/Egypt's  Democracy  and  Governance  Activities,"  ed.  United  States  Agency  for  International  Development  (Washington,  D.C.2009).  59  Ibid.  60  Bruce  Abrams,  former  USAID  Democracy  and  Governance  Office,  Cairo.  Interview  with  the  author,  February  22,  2007.  61  General,  "Audit  of  USAID/Egypt's  Democracy  and  Governance  Activities,"  11.  

 

 

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(NDI)   and   the   International   Republican   Institute   (IRI)   to   stop   their   work   in   Egypt,  

accusing  them  of  interference  in  Egypt’s  affairs.      This  request  followed  comments  made  

in  an   interview  with   IRI’s   country  director   in  which   she   said   the  government  had  not  

undertaken   any   political   reform.62     The   government’s   response   demonstrated   its  

dexterity  in  containing  opposition.    The  government  could  have  forced  both  NDI  and  IRI  

to  leave  the  country—given  how  well  connected  both  organizations  are  in  Washington,  

however,   that   move   may   have   been   too   provocative.     All   foreign   organizations   are  

required  to  register  with  the  government,  a  process  that  can  be  held  up  for  a  variety  of  

reasons.     An   American   at   USAID’s   Mission   in   Cairo   relayed   an   example   of   this:   An  

organization  has  60  days  to  register  and  on  day  59  the  government  may  ask  for  a  piece  

of  documentation  or  have  an   inquiry,  which  would  then  start   the  clock  again.63    Egypt  

never  gave   formal   registration   to  NDI  or   IRI.    The   incident   thus   suggests   a  procedure  

that   gives   Egypt   leeway   so   that   organizations   it   deems  problematic  would   be   easy   to  

reject   or   dismiss   under   this   line   rather   than   by   drawing   attention   that   could   be  

construed  as  political.    

  Such   actions   relay   the   increasing   politicization   of   U.S.   democracy   aid   in   Egypt  

and   the   ability   for   a   strategically   important   regime   and   ally   to   push   back   against   aid  

programs   it   found  threatening  or  diluting  programs  to  maintain  components  useful   to  

the   state.     Despite   the   publicity   that   ensued   and   incensed   calls   from   members   of  

Congress   and  Egyptian   civil   society   to   cut   aid   or   impose   conditionality,   aid—military,  

economic,  and  that  for  democracy—continued  to  flow  to  the  regime.  

Case  Study:  Morocco  

Like   Egypt,   Morocco   entered   the   1990s   on   uncertain   economic   footing.   The  

situation  was  not  entirely  dissimilar  from  that  of  the  previous  decade.    In  the  late  1970s  

and  early  1980s  the  cost  of  financing  a  war  with  the  Polisario  front  over  the  fate  of  the  

Western   Sahara   and   declining   phosphate   prices   following   a  massive   reduction   in   the  

price  of  oil  worldwide,  created  a  strain  not  only  on  the  government,  but  on  the  ability  of  

                                                                                                               62  Gihan  Shahine,  "Two  to  Go,"  Al-­Ahram  Weekly,  June  15-­‐21  2006.  63  American  USAID  employee,  Cairo.    Anonymous  phone  interview  with  the  author.  November  8,  2006  

 

 

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the  population  to  survive  as  well.    In  1981,  a  severe  drought  pushed  the  country  into  its  

most  serious  economic  crisis  to  date  with  disastrous  effects  on  the  Moroccan  economy.    

Food   shortages,   rural   migration,   rising   unemployment,   drops   in   GDP   and   a   fall   in  

purchasing  power  forced  the  state  to  adopt  a  structural  adjustment  program.64  

Surviving   fiscal   crisis   in   the   1980s   necessitated   the   adoption   of   a   new  

development   strategy   that   forced   the   palace   to   reorganize   its   power   through   the  

extension  and  contraction  of   liberal  reforms  to  protect  a  system  of  rule  established  by  

King  Hassan   II.    Though  Morocco’s   constitution  describes   the   state  as  a   constitutional  

monarchy   with   an   independent   judiciary,   all   power   lies   with   the   king.     The   king  

appoints   (and   can   dismiss)   the   Prime   Minister,   the   Cabinet,   and   the   governors   of  

Morocco’s  provinces.  He  can  dissolve   the  parliament,  call   for  new  elections,   revise   the  

constitution,   and  declare  a   state  of   emergency.65    The  monarchy’s   legitimacy   is   linked  

both  to  its  lineage  to  the  Prophet  Muhammad  as  well  as  its  symbolic  representation  of  

the  state’s  struggle  for  independence  from  France.66      

Since   independence,   the   institution   of   the   monarchy   in   Morocco   has   been  

described   as   “an   evolving   political   construction”   to   denote   its   development   and  

relationship   with   Moroccan   society.67     The   regime’s   base   traditionally   derives   its  

support  from  Morocco’s  rural  notables.    Central  to  this  strategy  is  the  makhzen,  or  the  

network  of  elites  who  control  “bureaucratic,  administrative,  and  infrastructural  power  

and   therefore   the   state’s   power.”68   This   “makhzenian”   system   created   post-­‐

independence   became   the  most   important   ideological   and   institutional   component   of  

Hassan  II’s  legacy,  ensuring  support  and  deference  to  the  monarchy  through  cooptation  

                                                                                                               

64  Abdellatif  Moutadayene,  "Economic  Crisis  and  Democratisation  in  Morocco,"  Journal  of  North  African  Studies  6,  no.  3  (2001).  65  CEIP,  "Arab  Political  Systems:  Baseline  Information  and  Reforms-­‐-­‐Morocco,"  in  Arab  Political  Systems,  ed.  Carnegie  Endowment  and  Fundacion  para  las  Relaciones  Internacionales  y  el  Dialogo  Exterior  (Washington,  D.C.:  Carnegie  Endowment  and  FRIDE,  2005).  66  Omar  Bendourou,  "Power  and  Opposition  in  Morocco,"  Journal  of  Democracy  7,  no.  3  (1996);  Abdelhak  Azzouzi,  Autoritarisme  Et  Aleas  De  La  Transition  Democratique  Dans  Les  Pays  Du  Maghreb  (Paris:  L'Harmattan,  2006).  67Remy  Leveau,  "The  Moroccan  Monarchy:  A  Political  System  in  Quest  of  a  New  Equilibrium,"  in  Middle  East  Monarchies:  The  Challenge  of  Modernity,  ed.  Joseph  Kostiner  (London:  Lynne  Rienner,  2000).  68  James  N.  Sater,  Civil  Society  and  Political  Change  in  Morocco  (New  York:  Routledge,  2007),  13.  

 

 

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and   fragmentation  of   the  opposition.69    Though  a  multi-­‐party   system  was  established,  

political  parties  have  been  fragmented  with  little  ability  to  pressure  the  monarchy.    This  

design  was  set  by  the  king  to  maintain  rivalry  between  different  groups  so  as  to  “appear  

as  both  indispensable  mediator  and  unique  source  of  favors  and  pebends”70.    

Austerity  measures   implemented   in   response   to   fiscal   crisis   during   the   1980s  

generated  opposition  from  workers  to  which  the  palace  responded  with  arrests,  jailing  

opposition   leaders  and  suspending  party  newspapers.71    The  palace  did  not  acquiesce  

easily  to  demands  for  more  political  freedoms.    The  palace  was  more  willing  to  concede  

economic  reforms  to  the  opposition,  reducing  price  increases  and  “dangling  the  hope  of  

greater  political  inclusion”  in  exchange  for  not  participating  in  future  strikes.72      

Fiscal   crisis   in   1990   forced   the   government   to   enact   another   structural  

adjustment   program,   which   again   prompted   strikes   and   riots   in   Morocco’s   larger  

cities.73    The  King  responded  with  more  extensions  to  the  opposition,  inviting  members  

to   join   the   government   and   negotiating  with   the   unions.     Overcoming   past   divisions,  

members  of   five  opposition  parties   formed  the  Kutla  (block)   to  pressure  the  palace  to  

revise   the   constitution   and   reinforce   both   the   parliament   and   the   prime   minister’s  

power.74     The   palace   rejected   their   demands   and   again,   attempted   to   co-­‐opt  

dissatisfaction   by   offering  Kutla’s   leaders   cabinet  ministries.75   This   dynamic   between  

the   opposition   and   the   palace   continued   for   the   1990s.   The   result   was   the   gradual  

extension  of  liberal  reforms  marked  by  reversals  when  the  palace  perceived  its  stability  

or  interests  at  risk.  

Economic  and  political  reforms  initiated  in  the  early  1990s  were  followed  by  the  

palace’s   attempt   to   address   its   human   rights   record   for   the   first   time.   For   years,  

governments   and   human   rights   organizations   criticized   the   state   for   abuses,                                                                                                                  69  Abdeslam  Maghraoui,  "Political  Authority  in  Crisis:  Mohammed  VI's  Morocco,"  Middle  East  Report,  no.  218  (2001):  12-­‐17.  70  Abdallah  Hammoudi,  Master  and  Disciple:    The  Cultural  Foundation  of  Moroccan  Authoritarianism  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1997),  33.  71  Lust-­‐Okar,  Structuring  Conflict  in  the  Arab  World,  130-­‐31.  72  Ibid.  73  Ibid.  74  Moutadayene,  "Economic  Crisis  and  Democratisation  in  Morocco."  75  Lust-­‐Okar,  Structuring  Conflict  in  the  Arab  World,  136.  

 

 

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particularly   the   condition   of   political   prisoners   held   at   the   prison   in   Tazmamart,   the  

existence   of   which   the   palace   had   denied   for   years.76     After   pressure   from   abroad,  

notably   the   U.S.   government,   Hassan   II   finally   released   political   prisoners   and   closed  

Tazmamart.77     The   palace’s   adoption   of   economic   and   political   reforms   and   its  

acknowledgement   of   past   human   rights   violations   seemed   to   suggest   not   only   the  

embrace  of  a  new  development  path,  but  that  of  a  more  liberal  era  for  the  palace  as  well.    

This  context  sparked  USAID’s  initial  interest  in  starting  a  democracy  program  in  

Morocco.    Though  Egypt  was  highlighted  as  an   important  state   in  which  to  begin  such  

efforts,  discussions  between  USAID  staff  and  those  within  the  U.S.  Department  of  State’s  

Bureau   for  Near  East  Affairs  also  considered  establishing  a  program   in  Morocco.    The  

former   director   of   USAID’s   Office   of   Democracy   and   Governance   recalls   supporting   a  

democracy   program   in  Morocco,   citing   Hassan   II’s   actions   then   as   signaling   a   tide   of  

change.78      Given   that  similar  openings  did  not  exist  elsewhere   in   the  region,  and   that  

the  U.S.  had  leverage  with  the  king,  he  recommended  establishing  a  rule  of  law  program  

as  part  of  a  democracy  strategy  in  Morocco.79  

Support  for  a  democracy  program  in  Morocco  though  was  not  unanimous  within  

USAID’s  Washington   office   and   its   Mission   in   Rabat   whose   director   was   reluctant   to  

establish  a  program  in  the  country.    This  hesitancy  may  have  reflected  a  desire  to  limit  

U.S.   pressure   to   the   regime’s   human   rights   record,   especially   given   Morocco’s  

contribution  of   troops   in  1991   to   the  U.S.   coalition   in   Iraq  and   its  moderate  views  on  

regional   issues   like   the   Arab-­‐Israeli   conflict.80     Eventually,   recalls   USAID’s   former  

Democracy  Office   director,   a   deal  was   ‘cut’   in  which   “Washington   agreed   not   to   push  

bureaucratically  for  democracy  to  the  U.S.    Mission  in  Morocco  and  the  Bureau  for  Near                                                                                                                  

76  HRW,  "Human  Rights  Watch  World  Report  1992,"  (Washington,  D.C.1992).  77  Human  Rights  Watch’s  1992  report  suggests  that  the  amount  of  aid  allocated  to  Morocco  that  year  from  the  United  States  played  a  role  in  King  Hassan  II’s  decision.    In  1992,  the  Administration  requested  “$113  million  including  $40  million  in  foreign  military  financing,  $1.1  million  for  the  International  Military  Education  and  Training  Program,  $12  million  in  Economic  Support  Funds,  $23  million  in  development  assistance,  and  $36.7  million  in  food  aid.”  815.  78  Gerald  Hyman,  former  director  of  the  Office  of  Democracy  and  Governance,  USAID.  Interview  with  the  author,  Washington,  D.C.,  July  7,  2008.  79  Ibid  80  HRW,  "Human  Rights  Watch  World  Report  1992."  

 

 

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East  Affairs  in  exchange  for  the  right  to  look  at  this  [issue]  again  and  revise  [it]  for  the  

next  country  plan.”81  

When  democracy  programs  eventually  began  in  the  mid  1990s,  their  orientation  

mirrored  those   in  Egypt.    Strategy  and  concept  papers  at  the  outset  of  programs  relay  

the  Agency’s  vision  of  democracy  as  one  that  is  inextricably  linked  first  with  economic  

reform,   which   would   remain   for   the   rest   of   the   decade.82     In   1994,   USAID   began  

integrating  democracy  into  its  objectives  for  encouraging  economic  growth  in  Morocco.    

The   first   project   was   a   $19   million   Financial   Markets   Development   (FMD)   project  

whose   purpose   was   “to   increase   and   diversify   the   sources   of   finance   needed   by  

Moroccan  private  enterprises  at  all  levels  of  the  economy,  i.e.  large,  medium,  small,  and  

micro   enterprises.”83     One   of   the   project’s   aims   was   to   increase   the   number   of  

shareholders   of   publicly   held   stocks,   which   is   described   as   supportive   to  

democratization  in  Morocco.84    

The  approach   taken  at   this   juncture  with   its   emphasis  on  establishing   support  

for  market  reform  may  have  reflected  caution  on  the  part  of  USAID.    Given  the  state  of  

the  Moroccan  economy  at  the  outset  of  the  decade,  the  Agency  may  have  felt  it  had  more  

latitude  in  promoting  and  shaping  its  particular  vision  of  reform.    Introducing  reforms  

pressing   for   more   explicit   political   liberalization   when   Morocco   was   undergoing  

adjustment   may   have   threatened   stabilization   and   risked   alienating   the   regime   from  

future   efforts.   The   orientation   of  USAID’s   program  may   also   have   been   an   attempt   to  

push   for   an   open   door.    Morocco’s   incentives   for   cooperating  with   USAID   go   beyond  

ensuring  domestic  stability.    Efforts  to  strengthen  relations  with  its  neighbors  in  Europe  

were  then  underway  and  USAID’s  programs  may  have  been  to  mirror  similar  efforts  to  

                                                                                                               

81  Gerald  Hyman.  Interview  with  the  author.  82  USAID,  "Morocco  Fy1992-­‐95  Action  Plan,"  ed.  United  States  Agency  for  International  Development  (Rabat1991).  83  ———,  "USAID  Morocco:  1994-­‐95  Mission  Director's  Narrative  [Annual  Budget  Submission,  FY  1994-­‐95],"  ed.  United  States  Agency  for  International  Development  (Washington,  D.C.1994).  84  ———,  "USAID/Morocco  Country  Program  Strategy  1995-­‐2000,"  ed.  USAID  (Arlington,  VA1994).  

 

 

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capitalize   on  Morocco’s   desire   to   project   itself   abroad   as   amenable   to   both   economic  

and  political  liberalization.85    

By   1995,   for   example,  Morocco  was   accelerating   economic   reforms  within   the  

country   and   enhancing   trade   and   diplomatic   relations   with   Europe   by   joining   the  

Barcelona  Process  that  year.86    Morocco’s  participation  in  that  process  and  subsequent  

discussions   to   implement   free   trade   agreements   with   the   European   Union   and   the  

United   States   signaled   openness   to   economic   integration   and   the   ideas   of   political  

reform  pushed   by   both   the   EU   and   the  United   States.   Other   developments   seemed   to  

relay   the  King’s  willingness   to   expand   further   the  political   arena.     In  1996,   the  King’s  

policy   of   alternance   was   adopted   referring   to   reforms   “which   were   to   allow   the  

formation  of  governments  based  on  any  coalition  of  parties  in  parliament,  such  as  one  

formed  by  a  center-­‐left  coalition,  rather  than,  as  had  been  the  case  so  far,  governments  

formed   by   loyalist   right   wing   parties.”87   Shortly   after,   prominent   members   of   the  

opposition  in  Morocco  returned  from  exile.     In  1998,  the  King  nominated  the  formerly  

exiled  leader  of  the  Socialist  Union  of  Popular  Forces  (USFP),  Abderrahmane  Youssoufi,  

as  the  first  leftist  prime  minister  since  independence.  

Both   the   EU   and   the   United   States   applauded   this   development,   seeing  

alternance   as   the   first  major  political  opening   from   the   regime  and  a   sign   to   continue  

the   orientation   of   its   democracy   program.   Little   attention   was   given   in   project   and  

strategy  reports  to  the  motivations  and  context  for  the  launch  of  alternance.    As  Martin-­‐

Munoz   relays,   the   reforms   that   followed  were  motivated   by  multiple   factors   ranging  

from   the   country’s   economic   crisis,   the   persistence   of   the   Western   Sahara   conflict,  

enhanced   economic   relations   with   Europe   and   the   king’s   desire   to   leave   a   stable  

                                                                                                               85  For  an  extensive  account  of  domestic  politics  within  Morocco  and  efforts  by  the  regime  to  expand  economic  development  with  Europe,  see  Gema  Martin-­‐Muñoz,  "Political  Reform  and  Social  Change  in  the  Maghreb,"  Mediterranean  Politics  5,  no.  1  (2000).  86  The  EU  initiated  the  Barcelona  Process  to  strengthen  ties  between  Europe  and  the  Mediterranean  through  the  promotion  of  democracy,  civil  society,  and  economic  prosperity.  For  more  on  the  process  see  Said  Haddadi,  "Two  Cheers  for  Whom?  The  European  Union  and  Democratization  in  Morocco,"  Democratization  9,  no.  1  (2002).  87  Lise  Storm,  Democratization  in  Morocco  :  The  Political  Elite  and  Struggles  for  Power  in  the  Post-­Independence  State,  Routledge  Studies  in  Middle  Eastern  Politics  5  (London  ;  New  York:  Routledge,  2007).  

 

 

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political   legacy   to  his   successor.88    Alternance   thus   represented  more   than  a  desire   to  

liberalize   the   kingdom,   but   a   decision   done   to   ensure   the   economic   and   political  

survival  of  the  regime.  

The  orientation  of  USAID’s   democracy  program   continued   to   focus   on   support  

for  privatization  and  other  components  of  economic  reform,  mirroring  the  palace’s  own  

reform  agenda.    For  the  first  time,  however,  strategy  reports  detail  the  uneven  process  

of   economic   reform   and   the   effects   of   change   generated   by   its   supported   vision   of  

reform.    Regarding   the  pace  of   economic   reform   in   the   country,   the   report  notes   that  

reforms  to  date  “have  been  disproportionately  adverse  for  small  farmers  and  the  rural  

agricultural   labor   force,   the   urban   unemployed,   the   under   employed,   and  

women…financial  markets  are  not  delivering  access  to  credit  in  an  efficient  or  equitable  

manner—lower   income  groups  are   crowded  out  by   the  demands  of   established,  well-­‐

connected   private   businesses   and   public   enterprises.”89     Despite   these   observations,  

little   change   was   made   to   the   orientation   of   the   programs   and   objections   were   not  

raised  with   the  government  about   the  distribution  of   economic   reforms.     Indeed,   as  a  

Moroccan   working   with   USAID’s   Mission   then   recalled   there   was   an   unquestioned  

assumption   that   benefits   from   Morocco’s   economic   reforms   would   eventually   be  

distributed  throughout  society.90  

U.S.  Democracy  Assistance  after  2002  

Despite  the  expanded  focus  and  attention  on  democracy  in  the  region  after  2002,  

USAID’s  emphasis  on  economic  growth  continued  to  dominate   the  orientation  of   their  

democracy   program   in   Morocco.     Shortly   before   2001   though   budget   cuts   in  

Washington   forced   USAID   to   consider   cutting   its   program   in   Morocco.     As   a   former  

democracy   offer   recalls,   the   king   was   able   to   successfully   lobby   for   its   continuance  

viewing  its  presence  as  an  important  symbol  of  U.S.  cooperation  as  well  as  an  important  

source   of   potential   resources   with   which   to   leverage   against   its   dominant   trading  

                                                                                                               

88  Martin-­‐Muñoz,  "Political  Reform  and  Social  Change  in  the  Maghreb,"  97-­‐98.  89  USAID,  "USAID/Morocco  Country  Program  Strategy  1995-­‐2000."  90  Taha  Berrada,  current  staff  with  USAID’s  Democracy  and  Governance  Office  in  Rabat  and  the  former  Regional  Director  of  Urban  Planning  at  USAID’s  Mission  in  Rabat  in  the  early  1990s.  Interview  with  the  author,  Rabat.  May  21,  2009.  

 

 

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partners   in   the   EU.91     Post   September   11th   concerns   about   security   and   terrorist  

bombings  in  Casablanca  prompted  the  expansion  of  democracy  programs  though  ones  

that  continued  to  mirror  the  palace’s  own  reform  agenda.    A  Moroccan  USAID  employee  

noted   a   shift   in   that   programs   previously   oriented   toward   development   became  

political  due  to  heavy  influence  then  coming  from  Washington.92    Despite  little  tension  

with  the  government  in  executing  democracy  programs,  a  ‘branding  waiver’  was  made  

for   the   Agency’s   Parliamentary   Reform   Project.   Typically,   USAID   demonstrates  

ownership  of  its  programs  through  stickers  on  equipment  purchased  or  in  publications.    

The  Agency’s  democracy  officer  at   that   time  recalls   that   the  waiver  was  done  to  avoid  

political  baggage.93  

In   2005,   a   Local   Governance   Project   was   awarded   to   the   Research   Triangle  

Institute   (RTI)   a   contracting   company   based   in   the   United   States   to   train   and   give  

technical   assistance   to   nine   regional   audit   courts;   design   and   implement   a   national  

budgeting  system;  and  facilitate  access  to  long-­‐term  financing.94    Another  component  of  

the  project   called   ‘Cities  without   Slums’  was   launched   to   improve   living   conditions   in  

shantytowns   or   relocate   residents   to   formal   neighborhoods.     After   the   Casablanca  

bombings,   the  palace   amplified   its   efforts   to   eradicate   slums   seeing   their   growth   as   a  

security   threat   and   a   potential   incubator   of   terrorist   activity.     Focusing   on   slum  

eradication  thus  addressed  both  a  security  issue  close  to  both  Morocco  and  the  United  

States.    A  contractor   in  Rabat  criticized   the  orientation  of   such  programs   to   fix   slums.    

For   him,   such   programs   are   unsustainable   and   fail   to   address   substantive   issues  

underlying   the   persistence   of   slums   such   as   the   lack   of   jobs   and   escalating  

unemployment  in  the  country.95  

These  neglected  dynamics  of  Morocco’s   reform  program  seldom   feature   in   the  

Agency’s   project,   policy,   and   strategy   reports   for   its   democracy   program.     The   only  

                                                                                                               

91  Ted  Lawrence,  Democracy  and  Governance  Office,  USAID  Mission  in  Rabat.  Interview  with  the  author,  May  15,  2009.  92  Taha  Berrada.  Interview,  May  21,  2009,  Rabat.  93  Ted  Lawrence.  Interview,  May  15,  2009,  Rabat.  94  Research  Triangle  Institute,  "Local  Governance  Project  (LGP)  Final  Project  Report,"  (Research  Triangle  Park,  NC2009).  95  Jeff  England,  Chief  of  Party,  National  Democratic  Institute  for  International  Affairs,  Interview  with  the  author,  May  21,  2009.  Rabat.  

 

 

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suggestion   that   democracy   programs   oriented   to   support   the   palace’s   reform   agenda  

might   be   strengthening   rather   challenging   the   regime   came   in   a   2001   democracy  

assessment   commissioned   by   USAID.     A   scholar   of   Moroccan   politics   conducted   the  

assessment  and  criticized  the  entire  orientation  of  the  Agency’s  program.    In  particular,  

he   focused   on   the   Agency’s   preference   to   include   decentralization   projects   as   part   of  

their  democracy  strategy  in  Morocco,  challenging  their  supposed  link  to  political  reform  

in   the  country.     In  Morocco,  he  explains,   “the  process  of  decentralization   is  not  driven  

primarily   by   political   considerations—i.e.   by   a   desire   to   empower   populations   at   the  

local   level   and   increase   the   autonomy   of   communities   and   regions…authorities   seem  

interested  in  that  process  only  to  the  extent  that  it  can  serve  as  a  vehicle  through  which  

economic  development  might  be  spurred.”96      

The  assessment  recommends  discontinuing  decentralization  as  a  component  of  

democracy   aid   given  USAID’s   limited   resources   and   the   slow  pace   of   decentralization  

relative   to   other   forms  of   democracy   aid.     This   pace,   the   report   notes,   is   not   likely   to  

change  because  of  “strong  inertia,  the  centralized  mind-­‐set  of  key  decision  makers,  and  

the   resistance   of   powerful   interests   that   would   be   threatened   by   genuine  

decentralization.”97      Decentralization  programs  were  not  cut,  however,  and  continue  to  

comprise  a  core  component  of  the  Agency’s  democracy  program  in  Morocco.    

Conclusion  

  Over  the  last  decade,  the  United  States  has  devoted  significant  resources  toward  

democracy  promotion  in  the  Middle  East,  with  seemingly   little   impact   in  the  region  as  

concluded   in   a   recent  USAID   study   attempting   to   assess   such   efforts.     Case   studies   of  

past   efforts   in   Egypt   and   Morocco,   two   of   the   highest   recipients   of   U.S.   democracy  

assistance   in   the   region   illuminated   reasons   for   this   dynamic   focusing   on   how  

democracy   was   conceptualized   by   the   United   States   and   the   motivations   and  

capabilities  for  both  states  to  challenge  aid  efforts.    In  both  states,  democracy  programs  

were   framed   in   terms   of   their   benefit   to   the   economy.     This   orientation   reflected   an  

                                                                                                               96  Guilain  P.  Denoeux,  "Morocco  Democracy  Assessment  Update,"  ed.  Management  Systems  International  (MSI)  (Washington,  D.C.:  United  States  Agency  for  International  Development,  2001).  97  Ibid.  

 

 

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institutional  preference  for  a  market  oriented  democracy  as  well  as  a  strategy  used  to  

sell  democracy  programs  to  resistant  regimes.    Their  ability  to  resist   this  strategy  and  

dilute  programs  to  their  benefit  was  shaped  by  their  level  of  dependence  and  strategic  

importance  to  the  United  States.      

As   a   strategically   important   and   dependent   state,   Egypt  was   able   to   challenge  

efforts  by  the  United  States  to  promote  democracy.    Insulated  by  its  strategic  value,  the  

regime  could  safely  resist  such  efforts  to  extract  benefits  for  its  own  purposes  without  

fear  of  punishment.    By  contrast,  Morocco’s  lower  strategic  value  to  and  dependence  on  

the  United  States  enabled  it  to  evade  pressures  for  greater  political  reforms.    Assistance  

from  the  EU  exceeded  that  from  the  United  States,  offering  a  potential  leverage  point  for  

the   state   to   use   against   a   form   of   assistance   it   found   too   threatening.     Lacking   this  

relationship,   the   United   States   would   be   hesitant   to   push   Morocco   aggressively   on  

reform  and  risk  losing  a  foothold  from  which  to  advocate  for  reform  even  if  limited.    

These  dynamics  provide   insight   into  why  democracy  efforts  have  been   limited  

through   both   the   conceptualization   of   democracy   promoted   and   the   subsequent  

dilutions   regimes   have   been   able   to   make   to   aid   programs.     If   the   conception   of  

democracy   guiding   strategies   in   both   states   has   been   oriented   in   this   way,   then   the  

question   of   the   quality   of   democracy   promoted   in   supporting   this   mode   warrants  

further   attention.   The   socioeconomic   grievances   underlying   recent   uprisings   in   the  

Arab  world  are  testament  to  the  frustration  and  desperation  experienced  by  many  as  a  

result  of  reform  strategies  followed  by  regimes  in  the  region.    They  are  also  reminders  

for   more   deliberate,   restrained   efforts   in   constructing   future   democracy   strategies  

responsive  to  citizens  rather  than  the  predilections  of  authoritarian  regimes.  

 

 

.  

   

 

 

 

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