Security vs. Efficiency: Assessing Transportation Security Policies & Trade-Offs September...

Security vs. Efficiency:Assessing Transportation Security

Policies & Trade-Offs

Security vs. Efficiency:Assessing Transportation Security

Policies & Trade-Offs

September 19,2007

CE 5212

Anna Arciszewska, Jessica Horning, Patrick Phenow, Ryan Wilson

September 19,2007

CE 5212

Anna Arciszewska, Jessica Horning, Patrick Phenow, Ryan Wilson

OutlineOutline

Overview / History Current Issues Case Studies

Screening the Screeners The El Al Approach

Policies & Recommendations Discussion Questions

Overview / History Current Issues Case Studies

Screening the Screeners The El Al Approach

Policies & Recommendations Discussion Questions

Source: Associated Press

Establishing a balanceEstablishing a balance

Trade-Offs

Security

Efficiency

Where is the balance point?Where is the balance point?

Regulators Regulated Limited Resources Emotional / Political Arguments Different balance points for different

modes How to measure good/bad trade-offs

Regulators Regulated Limited Resources Emotional / Political Arguments Different balance points for different

modes How to measure good/bad trade-offs

Brief HistoryBrief History1960’s - 90’s Airline Hijackings

Airport security run by airlines and private contractors

Screening for weapons Photo ID “Who packed your bag and when?” “Did you receive anything from a

stranger?” “Have you left your bag

unattended at any time?”

1960’s - 90’s Airline Hijackings

Airport security run by airlines and private contractors

Screening for weapons Photo ID “Who packed your bag and when?” “Did you receive anything from a

stranger?” “Have you left your bag

unattended at any time?”

September 11, 2001September 11, 2001

Brief HistoryBrief History Aviation and Transportation Security

Act (Nov. 19, 2001)

Transportation Security Administration

(TSA) Secure all modes of transportation in U.S. recruit, assess, hire, train, and deploy

Security Officers for 450 commercial airports from Guam to Alaska in 12 months

provide 100 percent screening of all checked luggage for explosives by December 31, 2002

Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Nov. 19, 2001)

Transportation Security Administration

(TSA) Secure all modes of transportation in U.S. recruit, assess, hire, train, and deploy

Security Officers for 450 commercial airports from Guam to Alaska in 12 months

provide 100 percent screening of all checked luggage for explosives by December 31, 2002

Brief HistoryBrief History

Federal control of screening

Reactive carry-on restrictions and increases in screening

(security theater?) Shoe x-rays

Liquid/gel prohibitions (3-1-1 rule)

Passenger screening Passenger Name Record

Computerized Airline Passenger Screening (CAPS)

FaceIt

Federal control of screening

Reactive carry-on restrictions and increases in screening

(security theater?) Shoe x-rays

Liquid/gel prohibitions (3-1-1 rule)

Passenger screening Passenger Name Record

Computerized Airline Passenger Screening (CAPS)

FaceIt

Current IssuesCurrent Issues Budget Costs

$6 billion annually Airline industry lost $13 billion in 2001, $11

billion in 2002 Efficiency improvements reduced losses to

$3 billion in 2005

Time Costs Passengers must check in 75 minutes

before domestic and 2-3 hours before international flights

Avg. waiting time at BWI was 20 min, now 12

Privacy / Civil Liberties

Budget Costs $6 billion annually Airline industry lost $13 billion in 2001, $11

billion in 2002 Efficiency improvements reduced losses to

$3 billion in 2005

Time Costs Passengers must check in 75 minutes

before domestic and 2-3 hours before international flights

Avg. waiting time at BWI was 20 min, now 12

Privacy / Civil Liberties

QuickTime™ and aTIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor

are needed to see this picture.

Source: Johnston 2004

Security / Efficiency BalanceSecurity / Efficiency Balance

Cargo Transportation Containerized freight increases

efficiency, but introduces an additional security threat

Time & resources for additional security impact:

System cost Speed Efficiency Intermodal capabilities Global trade Economies of scale

Cargo Transportation Containerized freight increases

efficiency, but introduces an additional security threat

Time & resources for additional security impact:

System cost Speed Efficiency Intermodal capabilities Global trade Economies of scale

Risk ManagementRisk Management The nature of future risks cannot be

fully known, Not all risks can be addressed, New technologies aimed at reducing

risk inherently create new uncertainty,

Risk is reactive thus creating new uncertainties,

The complexity of risk management can result in unexpected concurrent failures,

Risk management measures may restrict freedom, invade privacy and discriminate. (Ericson 2006).

The nature of future risks cannot be fully known,

Not all risks can be addressed, New technologies aimed at reducing

risk inherently create new uncertainty,

Risk is reactive thus creating new uncertainties,

The complexity of risk management can result in unexpected concurrent failures,

Risk management measures may restrict freedom, invade privacy and discriminate. (Ericson 2006).

Case Study: Screening the ScreenersCase Study: Screening the Screeners Security must be effective to be efficient, but effective security

is not necessarily efficient

Screeners failed to detect 13% of dangerous objects in 1978

Failure rate increased to 20% in 1987 Declining performance noted by the 9/11

Commission

Newark International failed 20 of 22 tests in October, 2006

Albany International failed 5 of 7 tests in July, 2007

Security must be effective to be efficient, but effective security is not necessarily efficient

Screeners failed to detect 13% of dangerous objects in 1978

Failure rate increased to 20% in 1987 Declining performance noted by the 9/11

Commission

Newark International failed 20 of 22 tests in October, 2006

Albany International failed 5 of 7 tests in July, 2007

Case Study: Screening the ScreenersCase Study: Screening the Screeners

Single point of failure Threat that is undetected at

checkpoint is unlikely to be

detected at all

Only recourse to failure at one

point is evacuation of entire

airport

Causes time/budget

inefficiencies that affect all

airports

Single point of failure Threat that is undetected at

checkpoint is unlikely to be

detected at all

Only recourse to failure at one

point is evacuation of entire

airport

Causes time/budget

inefficiencies that affect all

airports

Case Study: Screening the ScreenersCase Study: Screening the Screeners

Prioritizing risks Attention is a limited

resource

Screeners removed

bottled water, but

didn’t detect bomb in

same carry-on

Prioritizing risks Attention is a limited

resource

Screeners removed

bottled water, but

didn’t detect bomb in

same carry-on

Case Study: Screening the ScreenersCase Study: Screening the Screeners

Investing in people vs.

technology Remove “human error”

Introduce “computer error”

Expense of technology

and training

Privacy / data security

Investing in people vs.

technology Remove “human error”

Introduce “computer error”

Expense of technology

and training

Privacy / data security

Case Study: El Al’s ApproachCase Study: El Al’s Approach

Israel’s largest airline

“World’s most secure

airline”

Emphasis on security &

counterterrorism since

formation

$80 million annual budget

Israel’s largest airline

“World’s most secure

airline”

Emphasis on security &

counterterrorism since

formation

$80 million annual budget

Case Study: El Al’s ApproachCase Study: El Al’s Approach

Multiple levels of security Vehicle checks outside airport

Plain-clothes officers in terminal

Baggage screening Low-pressure chamber

Sky marshals & pilots

Reinforced cockpit doors

“Explosion proof” cargo bay

Multiple levels of security Vehicle checks outside airport

Plain-clothes officers in terminal

Baggage screening Low-pressure chamber

Sky marshals & pilots

Reinforced cockpit doors

“Explosion proof” cargo bay

Case Study: El Al’s ApproachCase Study: El Al’s Approach

Explosives technology moves faster than security technology

Psychological profiling Passenger interviews

Body language

Suspicious behavior

El Al staff check baggage at

overseas airports

Explosives technology moves faster than security technology

Psychological profiling Passenger interviews

Body language

Suspicious behavior

El Al staff check baggage at

overseas airports

Policies & RecommendationsPolicies & Recommendations

Non-airline policies Again, primarily reactive Overwhelming focus on commercial

passenger air travel TSA purview - highways, railroads, maritime,

and non-passenger air travel $1.1 billion of $5.7 billion, fiscal 2006 Cargo transportation - efficiency > security

Non-airline policies Again, primarily reactive Overwhelming focus on commercial

passenger air travel TSA purview - highways, railroads, maritime,

and non-passenger air travel $1.1 billion of $5.7 billion, fiscal 2006 Cargo transportation - efficiency > security

Policies & RecommendationsPolicies & Recommendations

Commercial airline policies MIT Recommendations

Reduce “carnival booth”, flagging must be more discrete

Improve object screening through technology Merge passenger x-ray technology and standard

metal detectors Better train security employees, vary questioning,

improve screening

Commercial airline policies MIT Recommendations

Reduce “carnival booth”, flagging must be more discrete

Improve object screening through technology Merge passenger x-ray technology and standard

metal detectors Better train security employees, vary questioning,

improve screening

Policies & RecommendationsPolicies & Recommendations

Commercial airline policies GAO Recommendations

Internet/intranet connectivity to improve screener training.

Internal controls for monitoring and documenting completion of required training

Commercial airline policies GAO Recommendations

Internet/intranet connectivity to improve screener training.

Internal controls for monitoring and documenting completion of required training

Policies & RecommendationsPolicies & Recommendations

Commercial airline policies DHS Recommendations

Establish a system of procedures for cargo screening and inspection

Clearly written guidance and training on regulations, procedures to improve inspections, guidance on security program requirements, a quality control program, and sufficient resources for cargo inspection program

Improve PARIS - better guidance, detailed training, and greater funding

TSA Interpretation of new law

Commercial airline policies DHS Recommendations

Establish a system of procedures for cargo screening and inspection

Clearly written guidance and training on regulations, procedures to improve inspections, guidance on security program requirements, a quality control program, and sufficient resources for cargo inspection program

Improve PARIS - better guidance, detailed training, and greater funding

TSA Interpretation of new law

ConclusionConclusion

Discussion QuestionsDiscussion Questions Is security the enemy of efficiency?

How can we weight security concerns against efficiency needs?

Are we making good or bad security tradeoffs? Efficiency tradeoffs?

Is it possible to develop decision and/or performance criteria to define, achieve, and maintain a balance between security and efficiency?

How much risk is acceptable?

Is security the enemy of efficiency?

How can we weight security concerns against efficiency needs?

Are we making good or bad security tradeoffs? Efficiency tradeoffs?

Is it possible to develop decision and/or performance criteria to define, achieve, and maintain a balance between security and efficiency?

How much risk is acceptable?

Discussion QuestionsDiscussion Questions What are your thoughts on the terms “security theater” and

“carnival booth”? Can security theater help increase efficiency tradeoffs? Do these terms only add fuel to the fire?

Is a life-cycle approach a useful or practical way to describe policy?

Can systems be truly secure in the presence of uncertain risk?

To what extent does technology improve security versus add additional risk?

What are your thoughts on the terms “security theater” and “carnival booth”? Can security theater help increase efficiency tradeoffs? Do these terms only add fuel to the fire?

Is a life-cycle approach a useful or practical way to describe policy?

Can systems be truly secure in the presence of uncertain risk?

To what extent does technology improve security versus add additional risk?