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Security vs. Efficiency:Assessing Transportation Security
Policies & Trade-Offs
Security vs. Efficiency:Assessing Transportation Security
Policies & Trade-Offs
September 19,2007
CE 5212
Anna Arciszewska, Jessica Horning, Patrick Phenow, Ryan Wilson
September 19,2007
CE 5212
Anna Arciszewska, Jessica Horning, Patrick Phenow, Ryan Wilson
OutlineOutline
Overview / History Current Issues Case Studies
Screening the Screeners The El Al Approach
Policies & Recommendations Discussion Questions
Overview / History Current Issues Case Studies
Screening the Screeners The El Al Approach
Policies & Recommendations Discussion Questions
Source: Associated Press
Establishing a balanceEstablishing a balance
Trade-Offs
Security
Efficiency
Where is the balance point?Where is the balance point?
Regulators Regulated Limited Resources Emotional / Political Arguments Different balance points for different
modes How to measure good/bad trade-offs
Regulators Regulated Limited Resources Emotional / Political Arguments Different balance points for different
modes How to measure good/bad trade-offs
Brief HistoryBrief History1960’s - 90’s Airline Hijackings
Airport security run by airlines and private contractors
Screening for weapons Photo ID “Who packed your bag and when?” “Did you receive anything from a
stranger?” “Have you left your bag
unattended at any time?”
1960’s - 90’s Airline Hijackings
Airport security run by airlines and private contractors
Screening for weapons Photo ID “Who packed your bag and when?” “Did you receive anything from a
stranger?” “Have you left your bag
unattended at any time?”
September 11, 2001September 11, 2001
Brief HistoryBrief History Aviation and Transportation Security
Act (Nov. 19, 2001)
Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) Secure all modes of transportation in U.S. recruit, assess, hire, train, and deploy
Security Officers for 450 commercial airports from Guam to Alaska in 12 months
provide 100 percent screening of all checked luggage for explosives by December 31, 2002
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Nov. 19, 2001)
Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) Secure all modes of transportation in U.S. recruit, assess, hire, train, and deploy
Security Officers for 450 commercial airports from Guam to Alaska in 12 months
provide 100 percent screening of all checked luggage for explosives by December 31, 2002
Brief HistoryBrief History
Federal control of screening
Reactive carry-on restrictions and increases in screening
(security theater?) Shoe x-rays
Liquid/gel prohibitions (3-1-1 rule)
Passenger screening Passenger Name Record
Computerized Airline Passenger Screening (CAPS)
FaceIt
Federal control of screening
Reactive carry-on restrictions and increases in screening
(security theater?) Shoe x-rays
Liquid/gel prohibitions (3-1-1 rule)
Passenger screening Passenger Name Record
Computerized Airline Passenger Screening (CAPS)
FaceIt
Current IssuesCurrent Issues Budget Costs
$6 billion annually Airline industry lost $13 billion in 2001, $11
billion in 2002 Efficiency improvements reduced losses to
$3 billion in 2005
Time Costs Passengers must check in 75 minutes
before domestic and 2-3 hours before international flights
Avg. waiting time at BWI was 20 min, now 12
Privacy / Civil Liberties
Budget Costs $6 billion annually Airline industry lost $13 billion in 2001, $11
billion in 2002 Efficiency improvements reduced losses to
$3 billion in 2005
Time Costs Passengers must check in 75 minutes
before domestic and 2-3 hours before international flights
Avg. waiting time at BWI was 20 min, now 12
Privacy / Civil Liberties
QuickTime™ and aTIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
Source: Johnston 2004
Security / Efficiency BalanceSecurity / Efficiency Balance
Cargo Transportation Containerized freight increases
efficiency, but introduces an additional security threat
Time & resources for additional security impact:
System cost Speed Efficiency Intermodal capabilities Global trade Economies of scale
Cargo Transportation Containerized freight increases
efficiency, but introduces an additional security threat
Time & resources for additional security impact:
System cost Speed Efficiency Intermodal capabilities Global trade Economies of scale
Risk ManagementRisk Management The nature of future risks cannot be
fully known, Not all risks can be addressed, New technologies aimed at reducing
risk inherently create new uncertainty,
Risk is reactive thus creating new uncertainties,
The complexity of risk management can result in unexpected concurrent failures,
Risk management measures may restrict freedom, invade privacy and discriminate. (Ericson 2006).
The nature of future risks cannot be fully known,
Not all risks can be addressed, New technologies aimed at reducing
risk inherently create new uncertainty,
Risk is reactive thus creating new uncertainties,
The complexity of risk management can result in unexpected concurrent failures,
Risk management measures may restrict freedom, invade privacy and discriminate. (Ericson 2006).
Case Study: Screening the ScreenersCase Study: Screening the Screeners Security must be effective to be efficient, but effective security
is not necessarily efficient
Screeners failed to detect 13% of dangerous objects in 1978
Failure rate increased to 20% in 1987 Declining performance noted by the 9/11
Commission
Newark International failed 20 of 22 tests in October, 2006
Albany International failed 5 of 7 tests in July, 2007
Security must be effective to be efficient, but effective security is not necessarily efficient
Screeners failed to detect 13% of dangerous objects in 1978
Failure rate increased to 20% in 1987 Declining performance noted by the 9/11
Commission
Newark International failed 20 of 22 tests in October, 2006
Albany International failed 5 of 7 tests in July, 2007
Case Study: Screening the ScreenersCase Study: Screening the Screeners
Single point of failure Threat that is undetected at
checkpoint is unlikely to be
detected at all
Only recourse to failure at one
point is evacuation of entire
airport
Causes time/budget
inefficiencies that affect all
airports
Single point of failure Threat that is undetected at
checkpoint is unlikely to be
detected at all
Only recourse to failure at one
point is evacuation of entire
airport
Causes time/budget
inefficiencies that affect all
airports
Case Study: Screening the ScreenersCase Study: Screening the Screeners
Prioritizing risks Attention is a limited
resource
Screeners removed
bottled water, but
didn’t detect bomb in
same carry-on
Prioritizing risks Attention is a limited
resource
Screeners removed
bottled water, but
didn’t detect bomb in
same carry-on
Case Study: Screening the ScreenersCase Study: Screening the Screeners
Investing in people vs.
technology Remove “human error”
Introduce “computer error”
Expense of technology
and training
Privacy / data security
Investing in people vs.
technology Remove “human error”
Introduce “computer error”
Expense of technology
and training
Privacy / data security
Case Study: El Al’s ApproachCase Study: El Al’s Approach
Israel’s largest airline
“World’s most secure
airline”
Emphasis on security &
counterterrorism since
formation
$80 million annual budget
Israel’s largest airline
“World’s most secure
airline”
Emphasis on security &
counterterrorism since
formation
$80 million annual budget
Case Study: El Al’s ApproachCase Study: El Al’s Approach
Multiple levels of security Vehicle checks outside airport
Plain-clothes officers in terminal
Baggage screening Low-pressure chamber
Sky marshals & pilots
Reinforced cockpit doors
“Explosion proof” cargo bay
Multiple levels of security Vehicle checks outside airport
Plain-clothes officers in terminal
Baggage screening Low-pressure chamber
Sky marshals & pilots
Reinforced cockpit doors
“Explosion proof” cargo bay
Case Study: El Al’s ApproachCase Study: El Al’s Approach
Explosives technology moves faster than security technology
Psychological profiling Passenger interviews
Body language
Suspicious behavior
El Al staff check baggage at
overseas airports
Explosives technology moves faster than security technology
Psychological profiling Passenger interviews
Body language
Suspicious behavior
El Al staff check baggage at
overseas airports
Policies & RecommendationsPolicies & Recommendations
Non-airline policies Again, primarily reactive Overwhelming focus on commercial
passenger air travel TSA purview - highways, railroads, maritime,
and non-passenger air travel $1.1 billion of $5.7 billion, fiscal 2006 Cargo transportation - efficiency > security
Non-airline policies Again, primarily reactive Overwhelming focus on commercial
passenger air travel TSA purview - highways, railroads, maritime,
and non-passenger air travel $1.1 billion of $5.7 billion, fiscal 2006 Cargo transportation - efficiency > security
Policies & RecommendationsPolicies & Recommendations
Commercial airline policies MIT Recommendations
Reduce “carnival booth”, flagging must be more discrete
Improve object screening through technology Merge passenger x-ray technology and standard
metal detectors Better train security employees, vary questioning,
improve screening
Commercial airline policies MIT Recommendations
Reduce “carnival booth”, flagging must be more discrete
Improve object screening through technology Merge passenger x-ray technology and standard
metal detectors Better train security employees, vary questioning,
improve screening
Policies & RecommendationsPolicies & Recommendations
Commercial airline policies GAO Recommendations
Internet/intranet connectivity to improve screener training.
Internal controls for monitoring and documenting completion of required training
Commercial airline policies GAO Recommendations
Internet/intranet connectivity to improve screener training.
Internal controls for monitoring and documenting completion of required training
Policies & RecommendationsPolicies & Recommendations
Commercial airline policies DHS Recommendations
Establish a system of procedures for cargo screening and inspection
Clearly written guidance and training on regulations, procedures to improve inspections, guidance on security program requirements, a quality control program, and sufficient resources for cargo inspection program
Improve PARIS - better guidance, detailed training, and greater funding
TSA Interpretation of new law
Commercial airline policies DHS Recommendations
Establish a system of procedures for cargo screening and inspection
Clearly written guidance and training on regulations, procedures to improve inspections, guidance on security program requirements, a quality control program, and sufficient resources for cargo inspection program
Improve PARIS - better guidance, detailed training, and greater funding
TSA Interpretation of new law
ConclusionConclusion
Discussion QuestionsDiscussion Questions Is security the enemy of efficiency?
How can we weight security concerns against efficiency needs?
Are we making good or bad security tradeoffs? Efficiency tradeoffs?
Is it possible to develop decision and/or performance criteria to define, achieve, and maintain a balance between security and efficiency?
How much risk is acceptable?
Is security the enemy of efficiency?
How can we weight security concerns against efficiency needs?
Are we making good or bad security tradeoffs? Efficiency tradeoffs?
Is it possible to develop decision and/or performance criteria to define, achieve, and maintain a balance between security and efficiency?
How much risk is acceptable?
Discussion QuestionsDiscussion Questions What are your thoughts on the terms “security theater” and
“carnival booth”? Can security theater help increase efficiency tradeoffs? Do these terms only add fuel to the fire?
Is a life-cycle approach a useful or practical way to describe policy?
Can systems be truly secure in the presence of uncertain risk?
To what extent does technology improve security versus add additional risk?
What are your thoughts on the terms “security theater” and “carnival booth”? Can security theater help increase efficiency tradeoffs? Do these terms only add fuel to the fire?
Is a life-cycle approach a useful or practical way to describe policy?
Can systems be truly secure in the presence of uncertain risk?
To what extent does technology improve security versus add additional risk?
