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INTERNATIONAL OPINION ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE PART III

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TITLE PUBLISHER COUNTRY PAGE I. China needs to negotiate Bangkok Post Thailand 5 II. EU ready to play vital role in West

Philippine Sea dispute New Europe Belgium 7

III. Is China Changing Its approach to

Maritime Disputes The Diplomat South Korea 8

IV. China, Trying to Bolster Its Claims, Plants Islands in Disputed Waters

The New York Times United States

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V. China’s Information Warfare Campaign and the South China Sea: Bring It On!

The Diplomat United States

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VI. South China Sea disputes: what is in it for Europe?

European Geostrategy

Belgium 16

VII. Philippines protests over China’s ‘reclamation’ of McKeenan Reef

Australia Network News

Australia 20

VIII. Truth about South China Sea dispute: expert

Ministry of National Defense

The People’s Republic of China

China 22

IX. Xi of Two Minds: Be a Good Neighbor, or Assert China’s Power?

The New York Times United States

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X. China ‘Internationalizes’ South China Sea Dispute

The Diplomat United States

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XI. The Battle of the South China Sea Editorials

Opinio Juris United States

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XII. Beijing Applying ‘3 Warfares’ to South China Sea Disputes

Fortuna’s Corner United States

30

XIII. ASEAN South China Sea conundrum

The Brics Post United Kingdom

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XIV. Editorial: Review South China Sea policy

Taipei Times Taiwan 34

XV. Hagel: China destabilises Asia-Pacific region

Aljazeera Qatar 36

XVI. Template for the South China Sea The New York Times

United States

38

XVII. South China Sea oil dispute unlikely to have a winner

malaymailonline Malaysia 39

XVIII. China and Vietnam Point Fingers After Clash in South China Sea

The New York Times

United States

42

XIX. Conduct in the South China Sea The Japan Times Japan 44 XX. ASEAN unity and the threat of

Chinese expansion Aljazeera Qatar 46

XXI. South China Sea dispute: The Strait Times Singapore 48

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Asaen’sneutrality is its strength XXII. Japan, Vietnam blame China for

maritime tensions The Japan Times Japan 49

XXIII. Beijing ‘prepared to defend rights’ in South China Sea

DW Germany 51

XXIV. Beijing’s dangerous arrogance in the South China Sea

South China Morning Post

Hong Kong 54

XXV. Anti-Chinese Violence Convulses Vietnam, Pitting Laborers Against Laborers

The New York Times

United States

56

XXVI. Vietnam anger rises over South China sea

Aljazeera Qatar 59

XXVII. South China Sea Tensions Council on Foreign Relations

United States

63

XXVIII. Philippines Challenges China Over Disputed Atoll

The New York Times

United States

68

XXIX. Philippines: China may be building airstrip at disputed reef

The Times of India India 70

XXX. Asean’s firm stand on peaceful ways

New Strait Times Malaysia 72

XXXI. U.S., China spar again on South China Seas disputes

Reuters United States

74

XXXII. Trouble in the South China Sea The New York Times

United States

76

XXXIII. In High Seas, China Moves Unilaterally

The New York Times

United States

78

XXXIV. Philippines offers oil, gas exploration area in waters disputed with China

CNBC United States

79

XXXV. Christian Le Miere: Tempers flare in South China Sea

IISS Voices United Kingdom

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XXXVI. China, Vietnam, Philippines collide amid escalating South China tensions

CNN United States

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XXXVII. China Flexes Its Muscles in Disputed with Vietnam

The New York Times

United States

85

XXXVIII. US slams China over Vietnamese vessels dispute in South China Sea

Financial Times United States

88

XXXIX. Why U.S.-Philippines Military Accord Worries China

WorldCrunch United States

90

XL. Where Did All China’s Asian Friends Go?

Epoch Times China 93

XLI. Not playing China Martin Jacques United Kingdom

96

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XLII. Insight: Will US-Philippines pact sideline ASEAN’s normative order?

The Jakarta Post Indonesia 98

XLIII. China Reactions to Obama’s Asia Tour: Overwhelmingly Negative

Foreign Policy Association

United States

100

XLIV. A Guide to Understanding China's Regional Diplomacy

The National Interest

United States

102

XLV. Dismounting China from the South China Sea

Rappler (foreign authors)

United States

105

XLVI. Defending Japan and the Philippines is not Entrapment

The National Interest

United States

108

XLVII. Russia and Vietnam Team Up to Balance China

The National Interest

United States

111

XLVIII. Historical Fiction: China’s South China Sea Claims

World Affairs Journal

United States

114

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China needs to negotiate EDITORIAL Published: 30/06/2014 at 12:23 AM Newspaper section: News The disagreements between China and several members of Asean continue to fester. For most of the past month, Beijing has deliberately stoked disputes, particularly with Vietnam. Its chief instrument in pushing the envelope is an oil rig. A drilling platform seems a strange instrument of high-stakes diplomacy on the high seas. But China is using this unique weapon to further its own goals and confront those who dispute it. The latest chapter in the South China Sea quarrel started in May. China moved a billion-dollar deepwater drilling rig into waters claimed by Hanoi, about 240km off the Vietnamese coast. The rig dropped anchor and apparently started searching for oil. Vietnam complained China was breaking international law by drilling well inside its 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and actually on Vietnam‘s continental shelf. China, as usual, had its own unique maps ready, showing the CNOOC Group rig was working well within Chinese waters. For Beijing, this is standard fare. China claims it owns — clear and above board — about 90% of the territory of the South China Sea, and everything under the sea bed. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei (and Taiwan) all dispute this. China‘s standard method of dealing with the disagreements is to simply dismiss them, refuse to discuss them and, if necessary, use force to back them up. In the past 10 days, China has moved four more oil rigs into this unnecessary and ultimately dangerous situation. CNOOC, a true oil behemoth, announced that starting immediately, it is opening four new exploration sites in the western and eastern sectors of the South China Sea. Translation: At the orders of the Chinese government the state oil firm intends to further the regime‘s territorial claims by a combination of the economic search for oil and the military presence of Chinese navy and coast guard ships to guarantee the security of the rigs. The obvious targets of this 21st century form of gunboat diplomacy are Vietnam and the Philippines. They are by far the most active governments in confronting China‘s aggressive territorial claims, and therefore the countries that will see the oil rigs searching — some say ―pretending to search‖ — for oil under the seabed. The danger is obvious. Early this month, anti-Chinese demonstrations got out of hand in a major industrial zone near Ho Chi Minh City. Anti-Chinese protests turned into full-scale riots, with factories burnt, and several Chinese workers killed. Beijing made a big

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show of withdrawing workers from the Vietnamese economic zone, clearly appealing to its own jingoists. Vietnam last week tried to put the dampers on increasing anti-China feeling when it barred a Catholic Church ―exhibition‖ on the South China Sea. The church said it had documents and other proof that the Paracel Islands, captured and occupied by Chinese military forces in 1974, definitely are Vietnamese territory. In the Philippines, which has freedom of speech, there is no shortage of backing for the government‘s attempt to confront China over parts of the Spratly Island group. In the recent past, there have been numerous cases of violence over this dispute. The Chinese navy has attacked and assaulted Vietnamese naval vessels recently, although so far no actual battle has broken out. A new US base in the Philippines directly faces the Spratlys, adding even more tension and potential for deadly showdowns between the Chinese and other military forces. China needs to turn its hard-nosed oil rig diplomacy into real negotiations. By engaging in talks with Asean and its members, it could establish a more satisfactory way of settling the disputes.

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EU ready to play vital role in West Philippine Sea dispute

June 17, 2014

The European Union (EU) has indicated its readiness to be a useful element of ―balance‖ in the strategic situation in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) and may play a mediation role in the territorial dispute. Speaking on EU-Southeast Asia relations, the European External Action Service Southeast Asia Division Deputy Head Philippe van Amersfoort said: ―EU would welcome any request from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to help resolve the dispute. As this strategic situation develops EU may be a useful element of balance. EU is ready to play a role of mediation. That is a challenge on the side of EU. We are happy to do consider that. We really hope (there is) no further escalation.‖ The EU has the belief that territorial disputes should be resolved in accordance with international law through peaceful and cooperative solutions. EU-Asia Centre Director Fraser Cameron said during a forum in Manila that ―the EU supports a rules-based international system and liberty of navigation‖. According to the EU, the West Philippine Sea is a fragile environment, being the largest maritime route after the Mediterranean and a vital corridor for EU trade to and from East Asia where 25 percent of world maritime cargo transit. It is also an important source of protein for 300 million people in the region but fishing is not regulated and fishermen from all coastal states seem to exploit marine resources without any restriction. In addition, the sea is a sensitive military area because of US naval presence, and China is also expanding military capabilities in the region that is bordered by 10 countries with long-standing and competing historical claims covering islands, high seas and coastal areas, believed to be rich in oil and gas. The EU noted the geopolitical factors growing with the involvement of two nuclear powers, China and the US. ―The EU is not directly involved but keen to promote peaceful resolution,‖ Cameron said. Although far from Europe, the EU has important interests at stake in the region which can explain the active role it wants to take to resolve the issues on the table. Cameron stated: ―EU has ample expertise in sharing sovereignty, resolving difficult issues (common fishing policy, environment) that could be useful for interested countries as well as ASEAN as a whole.‖ Nevertheless, Cameron made clear that the EU model was still evolving and not really appropriate for Asia although principles are universally applicable. He said: ―EU is also not in a position to lecture Asians. But Asia could cherry-pick some aspect of EU integration (regional aid, monetary cooperation, internal market).‖ The bottom line is that the EU is willing to be a useful third party for technical assistance but pointed out that ―it is ultimately up to involved parties to resolve the disputes‖. Cameron concluded: ―The only viable solution in the long run is setting aside disputes and joint development.‖

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Is China Changing Its Approach to Maritime Disputes? JIN KAI June 17, 2014 China may be shifting its strategy from ―reactive assertiveness‖ to proactive engagement.

Since Japan nationalized the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 2012, China has adopted a policy of ―reactive assertiveness‖ on territorial disputes toward its neighbors – seeing their actions as unilateral changes to the status quo and making confident but more or less limited reactions. As Stephen A. Orlins, president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, recently said in an interview with People‘s Daily, if we fully analyze the Diaoyu/Senkaku issue and South China Sea disputes, we will find that China indeed is innocent. In each case, the other parties unilaterally changed the status quo first, compelling China to react. Unfortunately the U.S. and some other countries have rejected China‘s responses.

As the current tension drags on, it has also become more confrontational. As Japan takes firm action to lift the ban on collective self-defense, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has reopened old wounds by criticizing the issuing of the 1993 Kono Statement, which apologized for the abuse of ―comfort women‖ during World War II. Meanwhile Vietnam‘s actions in the South China Sea have been more direct – a number of ships and frogman teams with military background have been dispatched to sabotage China‘s oil rig. Plus, waves of anti-Chinese violence have caused injuries and economic losses to a large number of businesses from China, leaving four Chinese citizens beaten to death and hundreds wounded.

For the moment, China faces intensified dual challenges in both the East and South China Seas. There has been a growing coordination between Japan and Vietnam (and the Philippines as well), both of which intend to gain the advantage by joining hands. Given the circumstances, China seems to believe that the strategy and tactics of passive reaction must be swapped out for more comprehensive and more proactive engagement. In particular, China may reconsider its previous aversion to publicizing its territorial disputes with its neighbors in multilateral institutions, which had previously been ruled out due to China‘s concern over multilateral intervention.

There are recent signs that China is shifting its position. China‘s UN delegation presented the document ―The Operation of the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig – Vietnam‘s Provocation and China‘s Position‖ to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and asked for this document to be circulated among all UN members. Meanwhile, Japan and China are entangled in verbal accusations over some close calls involving aircraft over the East China Sea. In response, China released a video clip which shows that the

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Japanese F-15 jets flew abnormally close to a Chinese Tu-154, although this may not stop this on-going technical brawl over the exact distances involved.

The point is that as long as the tension endures, China‘s ―reactive assertiveness‖ sooner or later must evolve into a more proactive approach. It is still not clear yet whether China has decided to take a more comprehensive or even more risky approach to counter challenges in both the East and South China Seas. However, China does not seem to have much strategic room to maneuver while staying strictly within its preferred bilateral approach to solving territorial disputes. This can also be observed through the PLA‘s increasing involvement, especially in the South China Sea disputes. At this moment, China may particularly need a boost from international public opinion.

Although more proactively and more comprehensively publicizing the disputes to the international community may win China a certain degree of understanding or even support, there is also a risk. Such a move may indirectly help to further extend and internationalize the disputes, which is exactly what China has previously expressed concern about. Besides, China also needs to account for a certain preconception in world politics: that a rising state (quite often a great power) will see disputes with its smaller neighbors as opportunities to extend its growing power.

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China, Trying to Bolster Its Claims, Plants Islands in Disputed Waters

EDWARD WONG and JONATHAN ANSFIELD June 16, 2014 BEIJING — The islands have all that one could ask of a tropical resort destination: white sand, turquoise waters and sea winds.

But they took shape only in the last several months, and they are already emerging as a major point of conflict in the increasingly bitter territorial disputes between China and other Asian nations.

China has been moving sand onto reefs and shoals to add several new islands to the Spratly archipelago, in what foreign officials say is a new effort to expand the Chinese footprint in the South China Sea. The officials say the islands will be able to support large buildings, human habitation and surveillance equipment, including radar.

Chinese actions have also worried senior United States officials. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel scolded China for ―land reclamation activities at multiple locations‖ in the South China Sea at a contentious security conference in Singapore in late May.

Critics say the islands will allow China to install better surveillance technology and resupply stations for government vessels. Some analysts say the Chinese military is eyeing a perch in the Spratlys as part of a long-term strategy of power projection across the Western Pacific.

Perhaps just as important, the new islands could allow China to claim it has an exclusive economic zone within 200 nautical miles of each island, which is defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Philippines has argued at an international tribunal that China occupies only rocks and reefs and not true islands that qualify for economic zones.

―By creating the appearance of an island, China may be seeking to strengthen the merits of its claims,‖ said M. Taylor Fravel, a political scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

China says it has the right to build in the Spratlys because they are Chinese territory. ―China has indisputable sovereignty over Nansha Islands,‖ a Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Hua Chunying, said last month, using the Chinese name for the Spratlys. Chinese officials also contend that Vietnam and the Philippines have built more structures in the disputed region than China, so China is free to pursue its projects.

But analysts note that other countries did not build islands, and that they generally erected their structures before 2002, when China and nine Southeast Asian nations

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signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. One clause says the parties must ―exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities‖ that would escalate tensions and must refrain from inhabiting any currently uninhabited land features.

Although the agreement is nonbinding and does not explicitly ban building on the islands or the creation of new ones, some analysts say those activities are covered.

―It‘s changing the status quo,‖ said Carlyle A. Thayer, an emeritus professor of politics at the University of New South Wales in Australia. ―It can only raise tensions.‖

Since January, China has been building three or four islands, projected to be 20 to 40 acres each, one Western official said. He added that there appeared to be at least one installation intended for military use, and that the new islands could be used for resupplying ships, including Chinese maritime patrol vessels.

Last month, China set off alarms in the region and in Washington when a state-owned oil company placed an exploratory oil rig farther north in the South China Sea, by the contested Paracel Islands near Vietnam. The rig ignited diplomatic strife and violent anti-China protests in Vietnam.

But the island-building ―is bigger than the oil rig,‖ said the Western official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to avoid upsetting diplomatic discussions. ―These islands are here to stay.‖

Officials say Johnson South Reef, which China seized in 1988 after killing about 70 Vietnamese soldiers or sailors in a skirmish, is the most developed of the islands so far. ―It‘s Johnson Island now; it‘s not Johnson Reef anymore,‖ the Western official said. Filipino officials released aerial photographs last month showing structures and a large ship.

Le Hai Binh, a spokesman for the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, said in an email statement that Vietnam had sovereignty over the entire Spratly archipelago and that ―China has been illegally implementing activities of expansion and construction‖ around Johnson Reef and other sites claimed by Vietnam.

He said Vietnam demanded that China ―immediately stop illegal activities of expansion and construction‖ on the reef and ―withdraw its vessels and facilities from the area.‖

The Spratlys comprise hundreds of reefs, rocks, sandbars and tiny atolls spread over 160,000 square miles. Six governments have overlapping claims in the area. China and Vietnam also have competing claims for the Paracel Islands, in the area where the Chinese oil rig still sits. Both areas have abundant fish and some oil and gas reserves.

Jin Canrong, a professor of international studies at Renmin University of China, said he believed that the construction on Johnson South Reef was ―a technical test, to see if such things can be done.‖ Should China want to try island-building on a larger scale, he said, a logical choice would be Fiery Cross Reef, about 90 miles west of Johnson South.

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Last month, digital sketches of structures intended for the Spratlys circulated on Chinese news websites, including that of Global Times, a newspaper owned by People‘s Daily, the Communist Party mouthpiece. The sketches, labeled a research study, showed a new island with shipping docks, parking lots and an airfield with a runway, airplanes and hangars. Reports said the images were from the China Shipbuilding NDRI Engineering Company, in Shanghai. When asked about the sketches over the phone, a woman at the company said they were ―too sensitive‖ and had been taken off the firm‘s website. She declined to comment further.

Wu Shicun, president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, a government-linked research group on Hainan Island, said Chinese construction was intended mainly to augment the country‘s fisheries administration and humanitarian relief capabilities, not for military purposes.

―Our facilities are worse than those of both the Philippines and Vietnam,‖ he said. ―You see that Vietnam even has a soccer field.‖

Vietnamese and Filipino naval personnel played soccer during a June 8 conclave on Southwest Cay Island, which is controlled by Vietnam. ―Clearly this was meant to enrage the Chinese people,‖ Mr. Wu said. The island has been occupied by the Vietnamese military since the 1970s but is also claimed by China and the Philippines.

Christopher K. Johnson, the chief China analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, said China‘s recent moves were partly to make up for the fact that the Chinese military focused mainly on Taiwan for more than a decade while Vietnam and the Philippines developed facilities on shoals and reefs they controlled.

He said Chinese military officials were probably keeping in mind future long-range naval power projections. ―There‘s no doubt that they would love to have some kind of a naval facility on one of these things,‖ he said.

Chinese military leaders have talked in recent years of building up a navy that can operate beyond what is commonly called the ―first island chain‖ — islands closer to mainland Asia that include the Spratlys and Paracels — to penetrate the ―second island chain,‖ which includes Guam and other territories farther east.

Mr. Thayer, the Australian analyst, said he had seen no signs yet that China was building large military facilities or a runway on the new islands. But he said there was a clear conclusion to be drawn from China‘s actions in both the South China Sea and the East China Sea, where China contends with Japan over islands.

―None of this is an isolated incident,‖ he said. ―It seems to be a new plan to assert Chinese sovereignty. This isn‘t something that will go away. This is a constant thing that will raise tensions, and at the same time no one has a good response to it.‖

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China’s Information Warfare Campaign and the South China Sea: Bring It On! CARL THAYER June 16, 2014

The maritime confrontation between China and Vietnam over the placement of oil rig HYSY 981 in disputed waters in the South China Sea that began in early May is now entering its seventh week.

On June 9 China unexpectedly opened a new front when Wang Min, Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations, presented Secretary General Ban Ki-moon a formal position paper on the dispute with a request that he circulate it to all 193 UN members.

China‘s action in internationalizing its dispute with Vietnam does not represent a change in its long-standing policy that maritime disputes can only be settled bilaterally through direct consultations and negotiation of the parties directly concerned. A day after China submitted its position paper, Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that China rejected United Nations arbitration of its dispute with Vietnam.

Why then did China take its dispute with Vietnam to the United Nations?

In 2003 the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and Central Military Commission formally adopted the doctrine of ―three warfares‖ (san zhongzhanfa). The three warfares doctrine is an essential element of information warfare.

According to ―China‘s Three Warfares,‖ a 2012 study written by Timothy A. Walton for Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis, China‘s ―three warfares‖ comprises three components: psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare. It is the latter two components that shaped China‘s position paper.

Media warfare, according to Walton, is a strategy designed to influence international public opinion to build support for China and to dissuade an adversary from pursuing actions contrary to China‘s interests.

China‘s position paper was sent to the United Nations in order to outflank Vietnam‘s own propaganda effort and to isolate Vietnam. The vast majority of UN members have no direct interest in territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Many Southeast Asian states that hold concerns about China‘s actions would shirk at being forced to take a public stand on the issue.

Legal warfare, according to Walton, is a strategy to use China‘s domestic and international law to claim the legal high ground to assert Chinese interests. China‘s position paper is replete with selected references to international law to support China‘s stance.

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Initially, China defended its placement of the oil rig by arguing that it was within China‘s territorial waters. China noted that the HYSY 981 was located 17 nautical miles from Triton islet, the western most feature of the Paracel Islands. Under the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), territorial waters only extend 12 nautical miles from a state‘s coastal baselines.

China‘s June 6 statement amended this error by claiming that the HYSY 981 was within China‘s contiguous zone. This new claim, however, lacks legal foundation.

According to UNCLOS the sole purpose of the contiguous zone is to enable a coastal state to ―exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.‖

China has also attempted to obfuscate its dispute with Vietnam by advancing the argument that the location of HYSY 981 is closer to the Paracel Islands than to the Vietnamese coastline. China‘s position paper argues, for example, that HYSY 981 was operating 17 nautical miles from both Triton islet and the baselines drawn around the Paracels and 133 to 156 nautical miles from Vietnam‘s coastline.

At the same time, China claims sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, which is located closer to the Philippines than to the nearest Chinese land feature. Under international law, mere proximity is not sufficient to demonstrate sovereignty.

China‘s position paper to the UN actually undermines its use of legal warfare to advance its case. For example, China‘s position paper states:

The waters between China’s Xisha (Paracel) Islands and the coast of Vietnamese mainland are yet to be delimited. The two sides have not yet conducted delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf in these waters. Both sides are entitled to claim EEZ and continental shelf in accordance with the UNCLOS

If this is the case, China should have followed the provisions of UNCLOS to deal with overlapping claims. Both China and Vietnam should have entered into provisional arrangements over the disputed area until agreement was reached on delimitation. During this period each side was enjoined from altering the status quo and from the threat or use of force. Clearly China‘s placement of the oil rig in disputed waters violated international legal principles.

But China‘s position paper undermines its legal case by arguing that international law is irrelevant. The position paper states:

However, these waters will never become Vietnam’s EEZ and continental shelf no matter which principle (on international law) is applied in the delimitation.

China‘s Ambassador to Australia, Ma Zhaozu, contributed to Beijing‘s information warfare campaign by repeating the same argument in an op-ed article in The Australian on June 13. Ma argued that the disputed area has never been delimited and ―no matter

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which principle [of international law] is applied these waters concerned will never become Vietnam‘s part of EEZ and continental shelf.‖

China‘s formal tabling of a position paper with the UN Secretary General should be taken up by members of the international community that are concerned about escalating tensions between China and Vietnam and their possible impact on regional security. These states should argue that the matter be taken up by the Security Council.

China should not be permitted to pursue information warfare in order to have it both ways – circulating a position paper to the UN in order to demonstrate the serious nature of its dispute with Vietnam and rejecting UN arbitration. The United States and Australia should press for a UN Security Council debate. Japan and other maritime powers with a stake in stability in the South China Sea should join in.

China should be forced into the uncomfortable position of opposing any Security Council debate and thus scuttling its attempt to use UN for propaganda purposes, or to veto any resolution arising from a debate in the Security Council critical of China‘s action in the South China Sea.

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European Geostrategy

South China Sea disputes: what is in it for Europe? BRUNO HELLENDORFF June 15, 2014

In May 2014, Vietnam celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. National celebration and valorisation of the elders‘ heroic struggle against oppression were the order of the day. This year, however, past and present mingled in a rather disturbing way, with the appearance of a giant oil rig dispatched by Chinese state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) in contested waters of the South China Sea. Two years earlier, CNOOC Chairman Wang Yilin had called such oil rigs China‘s ‗mobile national territory and a strategic weapon‘. The rig was sent to the vicinity of Triton Island, one of the many islets, sandbanks and reefs that are collectively known as the Paracels (or Xisha in China, and Hoàng Sa in Vietnam), an archipelago over which both Hanoi and Beijing claim sovereignty. It was escorted by seven armed vessels of the China People‘s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), and more than sixty other ships of Chinese law enforcement agencies, recently merged in a unified coastguard. Many of these ships engaged in water cannon duelling and intentional ramming with the Vietnamese vessels sent into the area to defend Hanoi‘s claims of sovereignty. Furthermore, in reaction to what was perceived as an act of aggression, Vietnamese mobs took to the streets and sacked factories thought to be Chinese. At least one Chinese national died and many others were injured, causing China to evacuate thousands of its citizens, and bilateral relations to hit a new low.

While already worrying on its own, the Sino-Vietnamese spat was not the only event contributing to rising tensions in the South China Sea. In the same month, another row occurred between China and the Philippines after Manila arrested Chinese fishermen in the Spratleys, an archipelago of over 750 reefs, islets, atolls, cays and islands over which China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei all lay claim (in full or in part). These tensions have fuelled renewed attention over maritime security in the South China Sea, an area of considerable marine biodiversity, believed to be rich in hydrocarbons, and where a major share of global trade transits. China claims 80% of the South China Sea, including the Paracels, wrestled from Vietnam in 1974, and the Spratleys, considering its sovereignty and related rights and jurisdiction in the South China Sea ‗supported by abundant historical and legal evidence‘.

Vietnam and the Philippines, for their part, vocally contest the position of China, and defend their own, overlapping claims based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a convention to which all regional countries are parties. Both have tried on numerous occasions to internationalise the conflict, soliciting – with little success – Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) solidarity and appealing to external powers such as the United States (US). Malaysia and Brunei also lay claim to parts of the Spratleys, under their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), but have adopted a more discreet stance vis-à-vis China, quietly exploiting resources in the

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area while reinforcing their own military capabilities. Taiwan has a similar position to that of China; it is indeed the Chinese Nationalist government that was at the origin of the so-called ‗nine-dash line‘, and Beijing‘s position is based on the premise that Taiwan is part of China. It has however adopted a rather conciliatory tone throughout the last decades.

In addition to its hold on all of the Paracels, China controls eight islands of the Spratleys. Vietnam holds twenty-nine of them, the Philippines eight, Malaysia five, Brunei two and Taiwan just one – but the largest (Itu Aba).

Recent events do, as a matter of fact, point at a changing security architecture in the South China Sea. And this evolution is not without impact on the prospects of the European Union‘s (EU) security and prosperity. Due to major trade, financial, political and societal interconnections with countries of the region, there is little doubt that any conflict there would affect EU interests. European trade to and from East Asia mainly goes through the South China Sea, and thus depends on its stability. Furthermore, East Asia is home to several strategic partnerships of the EU, not to mention areas towards which the US has pivoted its strategic and military focus in the last few years.

The first element of change in the parameters of maritime security in the South China Sea is China‘s creeping assertiveness in the region. While a long debated argument, the rising assertiveness of China is certainly a tangible perception in the eyes of its Southeast Asian neighbours. Long bent on so-called ‗hedging‘ strategies, these countries seem to gradually be more inclined to consider balancing behaviorsvis-à-vis China, in a somewhat harder form. All have embarked, and this is the second element of change, on ambitious programmes of naval build-up. The military balance in the region is rapidly changing, making the South China Sea an increasingly competitive environment. Thirdly, great power rivalry is intensifying in the region, as would appear from the timing of the Sino-Vietnamese spat. It indeed came on the heels of Obama‘s visit to the region, during which he took a position on the Senkaku/Diaoyu issue, to the displeasure of Beijing which claims the Japanese-administered islands in the East China Sea. To several observers, the oil rig row was a comparatively low-risk Chinese gamble, seeking to challenge both ASEAN unity as well as US resolve.

While vectors of tensions seem to be on the rise, barriers and checks to escalation are, for their part, severely put to the test. Less and less incentives appear to exist for unilateral self-restraint. Confidence-building measures (CBMs), in the form of Track 1, 1.5 and 2 workshops on the issue, seem not to yield the expected stability-enhancing benefits but rather act as forums for parties to express their contending positions and seek outside support. The ASEAN track to resolve the disputes is fraught with uncertainties, due to the lack of unity of its members, and China‘s preference for bilateral channels. What is more, Indonesia, long considered the main broker in the disputes – for its sponsorship of a legally-binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea among other things – has seen its position challenged in recent months by increasingly clear assertions that China‘s claims indeed overlap with its EEZ (derived from its Natuna islands). International Law is of limited assistance in view of the contending interpretations the various countries have of their obligations and rights. A remaining option is joint resource exploitation as yet another form of a confidence-

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building measure. Still, it has so far been more often promoted as a way for one party to consolidate its own claims than as a vehicle for dispute management. The EU has long been a vocal supporter of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, and has reacted to the last events by encouraging self-restraint and respect of international law – customary or else. In so doing, Brussels only engaged with the narrow field of escalation countermeasures, whose efficacy is increasingly under strain, it appears. In light of its interests in the stability of the South China Sea, will this be enough?

Certainly, Europe is not able to compete militarily with the Asian giants on their own shores. In fact, even sustaining a significant military presence in East Asia seems out of its reach. However, the various hotspots the EU has to confront in its own neighbourhood require its attention and resources far more imperatively anyway. But the EU could weigh, even though not decisively, on the drivers of instability in the South China Sea. It could be more proactive than reactive. So far, the EU‘s grasp and engagement of great power dynamics in the region have been limited. The joint communiqué between Catherine Ashton and Hilary Clinton on the Asia-Pacific Region has failed to have any tangible follow up so far. Some additional thinking on transatlantic interests in East Asia and on the EU‘s relation to the US ‗pivot‘ would be welcome.

Secondly, European countries and companies are much involved in the military build-up processes of most Southeast Asian nations. Arms exports are being regulated by EU rules (the EU Common Position on Arms Exports), so these linkages could provide the EU with a possible lever of influence, if a consensus can be reached among and within its member states. The debates over the Mistral contract between France and Russia after the Crimea demonstrated that arms deals are not just about economics. Greater harmonisation in the implementation of the EU Common Position on Arms Exports would helpfully bring its part to the definition of EU interests in Asia. The ―tank deal‖ between Germany and Indonesia demonstrated this need; while both referred to the EU Common Position, The Netherlands declined to sell Jakarta Leopard II tanks, whereas Berlin agreed. Furthermore, arms deals often come with long-term commitments to technology transfers and offsets. A better integrated European defence sector, as evoked during the December 2013 summit (but far from sight, as demonstrated by the failed EADS-BAE merger), would help in capitalising on these long-lasting linkages, and potentially – although this is difficult in a buyer‘s market – draw red lines vis-à-vis customers.

Thirdly, the EU has long promoted institution-building, rule of law, and experience sharing in Southeast Asia. Its engagement with ASEAN is full of promises. Yet, neither ASEAN nor Indonesia – nor any other ASEAN member state – are strategic partners of Brussels. Partnering with Indonesia would probably open major opportunities in the region, should Jakarta be convinced of Brussels‘ interest and commitment. Something like dedicated summits, or intensified high-level contacts could help foster cooperation. Indonesia is not only the largest and most populated country of its region, it is also the main driver of ASEAN, and a proactive proponent of stabilisation in South China Sea disputes. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) the EU and Indonesia signed is a step in the right direction, and opens room of stepped up collaboration in key

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areas. It remains to be seen whether cooperation in maritime safety and security, institutional capacity-building, and in confronting ‗non-traditional‘ security threats will be given adequate means and support.

The EU has considerable stakes in the stability of the South China Sea, but little resources to devote to their protection. However, it has under-employed tools at its disposal that can help buttress its visibility and diplomacy. Maybe now is the time to make better use of them, and actually be serious about defining the role it wants to have in this ‗Asian century‘.

Bruno Hellendorff is a Researcher at the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP). His research focuses on defence and security issues in the Asia-Pacific and on the security dimension of natural resources management. He writes here in a personal capacity.

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Philippines protests over China's 'reclamation' of McKeenan Reef June 14, 2014 The Philippines said on Saturday it had filed a protest with Beijing for reclaiming land on a disputed South China Sea reef, the fourth such complaint in three months.

The new protest over reclamation at the McKeenan Reef in the Spratly Islands chain further heats up an increasingly tense dispute over the waters where China has been accused of using bullying tactics against other claimants.

Foreign department spokesman Charles Jose said the protest was filed last week. "They are doing reclamation work," he said in a brief statement.

He did not say if China had responded.

The Philippines previously filed an objection against China in April after monitoring large-scale reclamation and earth-moving activity on Johnson South Reef, which it said might be intended to turn the tiny outcrop into an island with an airstrip.

It later announced a similar challenge over Chinese reclamation at Gaven and Cuateron Reef. China has previously brushed aside such protests, saying the outcrops are part of its territory.

All four reefs were already occupied by Chinese forces but are also claimed by the Philippines.

China claims the Spratly Islands along with nearly all of the South China Sea, which contains vital sea routes and is also believed to hold large mineral resources.

The Philippines, along with Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan have conflicting claims to parts or all of the same territory, which has led to tense confrontations in recent years.

China denies warships claims

In recent weeks, China and Vietnam have traded accusations of their ships ramming each other after China set up an oil rig in a South China Sea area also claimed by Vietnam.

A Chinese official said on Friday that China will never send military forces to the scene of the increasingly ugly spat and accused Hanoi of trying to force an international lawsuit.

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A senior U.S. official in Washington dismissed the Chinese statement as "patently ridiculous" and said Beijing had been using air force and navy as well as coastguard assets "to intimidate others."

Scores of Vietnamese and Chinese ships, including coastguard vessels, have squared off around the rig despite a series of collisions after the Chinese platform was towed into disputed waters in early May.

Vietnam has accused China of sending six warships, but Yi Xianliang, deputy director-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs, said that Beijing had never sent military forces.

The Haiyang Shiyou 981 rig is drilling between the Paracel Islands and the Vietnamese coast. Vietnam has said the rig is in its 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone and on its continental shelf, while China says it is operating within its waters.

The United States has not taken sides in the territorial disputes but has been strongly critical of China's behaviour in pressing its claims and called for negotiated solutions.

The U.S. official called Yi Xianliang's statement "a weak attempt to obscure what China is really doing."

"China has maintained a robust and consistent military presence near the oil rig since its placement on May 2, including flying helicopters and planes over and around the rig. There are currently multiple military vessels in the vicinity of the rig," he said.

The official said that on any given day, there were also Chinese navy warships in waters disputed with the Philippines.

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Truth about South China Sea dispute: expert ZHANG TAO June 14, 2014 BEIJING, June 14 (Xinhua) -- Vietnam says it has evidence to prove its claim in the South China Sea but is ignoring its own historical documents that vindicate China's position, Ling Dequan, a researcher with Center for World Affairs Studies affiliated to Xinhua, said on Saturday.

The following is the full text of Ling's article titled "The truth about the sea dispute" and published on China Daily on Saturday:

Vietnam says it has evidence to prove its claim in South China Sea but is ignoring own historical documents that vindicate China's position. Vietnam has been using China-Vietnam clashes in the South China Sea, and distorting facts, fanning passions and playing up the "China threat" theory, to vilify China. Ignoring the overall development of Beijing-Hanoi relationship, Vietnam is pretending to be a "victim" in the South China Sea dispute, saying it is prepared to seek international arbitration on the issue.

Vietnamese leaders have said that they have enough historical evidence to justify Vietnam's sovereignty over "Huangsha" and "Changsha" islands, claiming that Vietnam has been the "master" of the two islands since the 17th century. It seems like they have lifted their remarks straight out of a white paper "Truth of China-Vietnam Relationship over 30 Years", issued by the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry in 1979 when bilateral ties were not normal. Worse, almost all the arguments in that 1979 document were copied from a "white paper" issued by the Saigon-based puppet South Vietnam regime (or the Republic of Vietnam) in February 1974.

Now the Vietnamese leaders, using the so-called historical documents, are trying to claim that Vietnam's "Huangsha" and "Changsha" islands are actually China's Xisha Islands and Nansha Islands. The fact is that, the islands recorded in Vietnamese documents refer to some other islands surrounding Vietnam instead of the Xisha and Nansha islands.

To encroach on China's territory in the 1970s, the South Vietnam regime distorted historical facts, which were adopted by later Vietnamese leaders for political purposes. This has complicated the issue and caused serious damage to Sino-Vietnamese ties.

A look at the evidence presented in China's diplomatic documents in the late 1970s and early 1980s will reveal the truth. In fact, even some Vietnamese scholars have said that the documents cited by Vietnam to claim sovereignty over the Xisha and Nanshaislands

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are not genuine historical records but edited versions of originals, confirming China's sovereignty over the islands.

Vietnamese leaders said China forcibly occupied the entire "Huangsha Islands" in 1974, which were then controlled by the Saigon regime. The Saigon regime had kicked up a row over the naval battle that broke out in 1974 in the waters around China's Xisha Islands and sought military support from its ally, the United States, and requested the UN Security Council's intervention. But neither the US nor the UN Security Council acceded to the Saigon regime's request. This means the international community, including the US, has never believed in Vietnam's complaints or claims.

On Sept 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh announced the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi. In January 1950, the People's Republic of China became the first country to establish diplomatic relations with Ho Chi Minh-led Vietnam. For China and a vast majority of the other countries, the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (later the Socialist Republic of Vietnam), was (and has been) the only legitimate government of Vietnam, and the government of South Vietnam, a puppet regime installed by French colonialists and American imperialists.

So now, about 39 years after defeating the Americans, why does the Socialist Republic of Vietnam want to use the Saigon regime's claim to create trouble in the South China Sea? Aren't the current Vietnamese leaders betraying Ho Chi Minh and other freedom fighters, profaning the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of their compatriots who laid down their lives to resist foreign aggressors, and negating the valued support of their allies in the battle against colonialism by citing the comprador Saigon regime's claim?

The Vietnamese government must not violate the principle of estoppel in the Xisha and Nansha islands' sovereignty issue. Vietnamese leaders claim that no country recognizes that the Xisha and Nansha islands belong to China. This is a brazen lie, because the Democratic Republic of Vietnam topped the list of countries that accepted China's sovereignty over the islands.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam's position was unequivocal in the 1950s and 1960s. The position remained unchanged even after the death of Ho Chi Minh and the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Documents with the Chinese Foreign Ministry from the 1970s and 1980s show the position of the Ho Chi Minh-led Vietnamese Communist Party on the Xisha and Nansha islands. The most important of these documents is a note given by former Vietnamese premier Pham Van Dong to Zhou Enlai and the declaration of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1965.

On Sept 4, 1958, the Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China said that the breadth of the territorial sea of the country shall be 12 nautical miles and that this provision should apply to all territories of the PRC, including all the islands in the South China Sea. On Sept 14, 1958, Pham Van Dong solemnly stated in his note to Zhou Enlai that Vietnam recognizes and supports the Declaration of the Government of the PRC on the country's territorial sea. On Sept 22, 1958, the diplomatic note was publicly published in Nhan Dan, the official newspaper of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

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On May 9, 1965, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam issued a statement on the US' definition on the "theater of war" in Vietnam. The statement said that by defining the whole of Vietnam and the waters up to 100 nautical miles off its coast as well as part of the territorial sea of China's Xisha Islands as the operational area of the US armed forces, Lyndon Johnson, then US president, has directly threatened the security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and its neighbors.

In recent years, however, some Vietnamese government officials and "scholars" have tried to "reinterpret" the two government documents, only to end up making fools of themselves. And after their attempts failed, the Vietnamese government started pretending as if the two documents never existed.

Vietnam has said that it is fully prepared with historical and legal evidence to prove its claim in the South China Sea, and it is waiting for the appropriate time to take China to the international court of justice. If that is so, then Vietnam should not forget to attach Pham Van Dong's note and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's statement, as well as the maps and textbooks published by Vietnam before 1975, with its complaint.

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Xi of Two Minds: Be a Good Neighbor, or Assert China’s Power? CHRIS BUCKLEY June 12, 2014

If you‘re sometimes discombobulated by China‘s foreign policy gyrations, there may be some consolation in knowing that so, apparently, is President Xi Jinping. A new report argues that China‘s external strategy under him remains an unstable compound of impulses: swelling ambitions that China will use its growing economic and military power to subdue rivals versus a longstanding desire for a stable, benign regional setting so that the ruling Communist Party can tend to domestic priorities.

Since taking over as the party leader in November 2012, Mr. Xi has brought urgency to building China into a ―great power,‖ respected and heeded by other countries, above all by the United States, says the report by Christopher K. Johnson, the main author, and other experts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. But ―aside from some general principles,‖ it says, ―Xi himself may not have a fully fleshed out worldview.‖

―The challenge is compounded by the many seemingly contradictory policy inclinations that appear to be guiding Xi and his colleagues at this point,‖ it says. ―Externally, leaders in China‘s neighboring countries are befuddled by the leadership‘s ostensible inability, at least so far, to sustainably reconcile the contending impulses to seek improvements in relations on China‘s periphery while simultaneously pushing hard to reinforce Beijing‘s sweeping territorial claims and to expand its military footprint.‖

Mr. Johnson parts company from experts who believe that China‘s external policy is at the mercy of factional divisions between, say, diplomatic moderates and military hard-liners. Mr. Xi has accumulated positions and authority with striking speed, suggesting that internal opposition is not a serious threat, the report says. China‘s foreign policy uncertainties instead center on how Mr. Xi intends to hone his broad ideas for ascendancy while maintaining China‘s self-assigned image as a paternal provider of economic good will, trade agreements, concessional loans and Confucius Institutes for language instruction.

Mr. Xi himself caught the paradox well when he described his country as a resurgent yet somehow cuddly beast of the wild.

―Napoleon said that China was a sleeping lion and when this lion awoke, it would shake the world,‖ Mr. Xi said in March while visiting Paris. ―The lion that is China has awoken, but it is a peaceful, amiable and civilized lion.‖

No country‘s foreign policy is free of contradictions and uncertainties, but now China‘s matters particularly for the world. Especially since Mr. Xi came to power, Beijing has set

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out hardened positions in territorial disputes with Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea and with Japan in the East China Sea. Chinese leaders appear to hope that their diplomatic showmanship, featuring vows of friendship and economic agreements, can ultimately settle such disputes in their favor.

Increasingly, though, economic salves are unable to win over neighbors caught in conflict with Beijing, the report says.

―Xi‘s unflinching assertion of China‘s sovereignty claims over disputed territories in both the East and South China Seas, however, is generating a pervasive level of insecurity among China‘s bordering nations that risks invalidating Beijing‘s good neighbor mantra,‖ it says.

The report sees little chance that Mr. Xi will revert to a more modest, compromising position on territorial disputes. China‘s policy changes reflect expectations, widely held by political elites and the public, that expanding economic and military power entitle the country to a bigger say. Still, the report suggests, the Communist Party‘s focus on domestic development is likely to discourage radical moves that entirely upend the region.

―As long as the concept remains in force,‖ it says, ―there will be hard limits on Beijing‘s willingness and ability to set out a truly revisionist course aimed at fundamentally reshaping the balance of power in East Asia.‖

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China ‘Internationalizes’ South China Sea Dispute ZACHARY KECK June 10, 2014 China effectively internationalized its dispute with Vietnam over an oil rig in the South China Sea on Monday by submitting its claim against Hanoi to the UN Secretary General.

As Shannon reported yesterday, on Sunday China‘s Foreign Ministry released a statement entitled, The Operation of the HYSY 981 Drilling Rig: Vietnam’s Provocation and China’s Position, which criticized Vietnam‘s alleged provocations over the oil rig and provided the ―most comprehensive outline to date of China‘s claims to the Paracel Islands.‖

Late Monday, that statement was posted on the website of China‘s permanent mission to the United Nations. According to the Associated Press, on Monday China‘s Deputy Ambassador to the UN, Wang Min, sent the paper to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and asked him to circulate it among all members of the UN General Assembly.

On the surface, China‘s decision to raise the dispute at the United Nations is rather puzzling. After all, China has repeatedly and consistently criticized other claimants in its various maritime disputes, as well as third parties like the United States, for what China claims are attempts to ―internationalize‖ the issue. Actions that won criticism from China included merely raising the issue at regional forums like the Shangri-La Dialogue or summits of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In addition, Beijing has refused to respond to the case the Philippines has filed with the UN‘s Permanent Court of Arbitration over Manila‘s own territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea.

Instead, China has advocated that the claimants to the South China Sea disputes settle outstanding sovereignty issues through direct, bilateral negotiations where Beijing‘s influence over its smaller neighbors will be greatest.

China‘s rationale for internationalizing the oil rig dispute with Vietnam near the Paracel Islands is likely that no territorial dispute exists in that case. China currently administers the Paracel Islands and has therefore refused to acknowledge that a territorial dispute exists at all. Instead, Vietnam‘s attempts to prevent China from setting up an oil rig are portrayed by Beijing as unbridled aggression, which makes the UN is the right venue to resolve the issue.

In reality, China‘s decision to raise the issue at the UN likely reflects Beijing‘s growing concern over its neighbors‘ use of international law to negate China‘s military superiority. Besides the Philippines‘ case mentioned above, Vietnam has threatened to appeal to international arbitration to resolve the Paracel Islands dispute ever since the

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oil rig row began last month. In doing so, it would likely have the full support of Japan, Australia, and the United States, among many others.

By proactively raising the issue at an international body and outlining its claims of sovereignty, China is likely trying to dissuade Vietnam from acting on its threats to appeal to international law. This strategy seems evident from the statement‘s extensive outline of the basis for China‘s sovereignty claims, as well as its effort to link these claims to various international treaties like UNCLOS.

On the one hand, this strategy makes sense for the Paracel Islands, where China‘s sovereignty claims are fairly strong. Thus, Beijing is almost certainly hoping that the prospect of losing will force Vietnam to back off from its international arbitration threat, and that the futility of Hanoi‘s attempts to use international law will deter other claimant states from doing likewise.

This is a dangerous gamble, however, as China is internationalizing the dispute and lending credence to international law as a basis for sovereignty claims and resolving disputes. While this might work in China‘s favor in its dispute with Vietnam over the Paracel Islands, Beijing‘s nine-dash line claim more generally is fundamentally at odds with international law. China therefore risks establishing a precedent that it will not want to uphold in many similar cases.

Interestingly, Deputy Ambassador Wang also delivered a speech on Monday at a meeting commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) entering into force. According to an English-language transcript published on China‘s UN website, Wang‘s speech did not directly mention Vietnam or the South China Sea. Instead, Wang praised UNCLOS and said that China fully abides by the treaty, before adding that it was the ―lawful rights of countries to independently choose a way to peaceful[ly]‖ resolve any disputes.

Right on cue, Wang clarified:

―The Chinese government believes that the most effective way to peacefully settle maritime disputes is negotiation and consultation between the parties directly involved in the dispute on the basis of respect for historical facts and international law. This is also what the majority of countries did in successfully settling their maritime disputes [emphasis added].‖

Wang‘s remarks clearly underscore that China has not changed its general position on maritime disputes, and the speech was likely an attempt to signal this fact to other states.

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The Battle of the South China Sea Editorials JULIAN KU June 9, 2014

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Beijing Applying ’3 Warfares’ To South China Sea Disputes

Staff Reporter June 9, 2014

China is expanding its ―three warfares‖ policy in dealing with Taiwan to its territorial disputes in the South China Sea, reports our Chinese-language sister paper Want Daily.

Richard Hu, deputy executive director of the Center for Security Studies at Taipei‘s National Chengchi University, told the paper that the People‘s Liberation Army first officially coined the political warfare concept of the ―three warfares‖ back in 2003, being public opinion warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare.

The three warfares strategy has long been adopted by Beijing for cross-strait affairs, but now the battlefield has shifted from the Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea, Hu said.

According to Hu, China has already begun adopting the strategy against the Philippines, which filed a 4,000-page arbitration case at The Hague under the United Nations Law of the Sea against Beijing‘s territorial claims to the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea.

On June 3, Manila requested that Beijing submit a response to the complaint by Dec. 15, but China has already stated that it will not participate in the arbitration, which Hu believes is a sign of the three warfares at work.

Even though China has refused to accept the case or participate in the arbitration, Hu said, it will acknowledge and grasp international discourse by utilizing academic research or documents to provide solid evidence to support its case through unofficial channels while also making strong statements in the international arena to influence public opinion.

In order to succeed, however, China still needs to seek assistance from Taiwan, Hu said. China had tens of thousands of historical files documenting its territorial claims in the South China Sea, but they were split with Taiwan during the civil war, Hu said. The Taiwanese government still has in its possession thousands of documents on the claims in its Ministry of the Interior, Foreign Ministry, Ministry of National Defense and research departments, all of which are invaluable to Beijing, he added.

The territory and natural resources linked to these claims affect sovereignty and national interests on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, but how they cooperate to use the documentary evidence to their collective advantage will be a test of intelligence for both governments, Hu said.

Six countries — Taiwan, China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei — claim in whole or part to the South China Sea and its island chains and shoals

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ASEAN’s South China Sea conundrum June 2, 2014 A number of countries have recently been causing trouble in the South China Sea. On May 6, the Philippines illegally seized 11 Chinese fishermen and a boat in waters off China‘s Half Moon Shoal in the Nansha Islands. Meanwhile, Vietnam continues to forcefully disrupt a Chinese company‘s normal drilling operations in the waters off China‘s Xisha Islands. In addition, enterprises in Vietnam invested by China and other countries have suffered from looting and arson.

While continuing their maritime confrontations with China, the Philippines and Vietnam have tried repeatedly to get the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to pass a resolution on the South China Sea issue, attempting to force ASEAN to take their side over the South China Sea issue with calls for the ―consensus‖ that ASEAN values.

However, this attempt to hijack ASEAN has disrupted the regional group‘s integration process, becoming the most prominent negative factor hindering regional peace, stability and development.

Since its founding in 1967, ASEAN has been committed to regional peace and stability and focusing on economic integration and development. Since the construction of the ASEAN free trade area began in 1992, ASEAN‘s economic development has attracted increasing attention from powers outside the region. With the establishment of free trade areas with countries such as China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand, ASEAN has become the center of East Asian regional economic cooperation.

According to ASEAN‘s development plan, the ASEAN economic community will be established in 2015, and strengthening regional connectivity, promoting foreign trade and attracting foreign investment have become the priority of ASEAN‘s current development. Most ASEAN countries are making efforts to accelerate community building and regional integration and to move forward to the realization of a master plan for the ASEAN Community.

However, at such a critical moment, the Philippines and Vietnam have gone against the trend of regional development and arbitrarily stirred up the South China Sea issue. By provoking maritime disputes under the pretext of so-called national interests, the Philippines and Vietnam attempt to hijack ASEAN in order to jointly confront China, resulting in escalating tensions in the South China Sea and greater risks to regional security.

These two unreasonably troublesome countries have distracted ASEAN from its focus on community building, spoiled the peaceful and stable environment that ASEAN needs for its development and hindered its integration process.

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What the Philippines and Vietnam have done not only goes against ASEAN‘s development process, but also undermines ASEAN‘s basic principles.

ASEAN is a relatively loose regional organization with a unique mode of operation. The principle of reaching consensus through consultation without mandatory constraints is the main feature of the ―ASEAN way‖.

The so-called non-mandatory consensus through consultation means that in the process of reaching consensus, ASEAN leaders should fully consult other decision-makers, take into account other decision-makers‘ opinions and feelings and, on this basis, leaders discuss and pass modest proposals and put forth comprehensive conclusions.

If unanimity cannot be achieved, ASEAN puts the ―Y-X‖ principle into practice – part of the members agree with the relevant proposal and are willing to take part in collective action, and a few members agree with the proposal, but don‘t participate in collective action, then ASEAN can also pass a relevant resolution.

Whether pursuing unanimity or the ―Y-X‖ principle, the core principle of ASEAN‘s decision-making mechanism is to seek common ground among member states, namely all member states must support the proposal, rather than ―the minority obeying the majority‖.

In other words, by forcefully and repeatedly promoting a resolution concerning the South China Sea at ASEAN ministerial meetings and summits, the Philippines and Vietnam have trampled the rights of countries that have no claim in the South China Sea and posed a challenge to ASEAN, which values mutual respect and equal consultation. The two countries‘ rude actions make ASEAN come under question in the international arena.

In 2012, Vietnam and the Philippines attempted to turn the disputes between them and China into a problem between China and ASEAN as a whole, which was unacceptable for the other members of the bloc, resulting in the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers‘ Meeting ending without the release of a customary communique showcasing common ground. The two countries should be blamed for the failure to issue a communique, which is rare in the past 45 years. As a result, ASEAN‘s international image was badly damaged.

The Philippines and Vietnam always claim that the South China Sea issue endangers ASEAN‘s interests, but China has never had nor will it have any sovereignty disputes with ASEAN as a regional bloc. It is ridiculous for the Philippines and Vietnam to draw Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Singapore and Indonesia into the South China Sea sovereignty dispute. These countries can only express concerns about the security situation in the region, rather than respond positively to Philippines and Vietnam‘s ―claims‖.

On May 10, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers‘ Meeting in Myanmar issued a statement on the South China Sea issue, appealing to all parties in the South China Sea to comply

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with the universally recognized principles of international law, maintain self-restraint, and avoid activities that might damage regional peace and stability.

It also asked all parties to settle disputes peacefully and not resort to force or menace with force, to safeguard peace, stability and safety in the South China Sea, and to ensure free navigation and overflight.

It calls for full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the conclusion of a code of conduct in the South China Sea as soon as possible.

China has reiterated that the ASEAN countries concerned should earnestly respect and implement the DOC and make positive contributions to peace, stability and maritime security in the South China Sea. In the final analysis, maintaining regional peace and stability is the common responsibility of China and ASEAN countries.

Contrary to this precept, the Philippines and Vietnam have taken the lead in violating the DOC, spoiled cooperation between China and ASEAN by transferring the South China Sea issue to ASEAN, stirred up tensions in the region and created obstacles to regional peace and development.

China respects the state sovereignty of ASEAN countries, but is opposed to any country that attempts to force ASEAN to take their side in the issue of the South China Sea. It is not in line with international practice to turn territorial disputes between China and specific ASEAN countries over certain islets and claims to particular areas of the South China Sea into a problem between China and ASEAN as a whole.

ASEAN and China are each other‘s important strategic partners, and maintaining regional stability and promoting common development are their consensus and the direction of joint efforts.

When China is making joint efforts with ASEAN to safeguard regional peace and stability, Vietnam and the Philippines‘ scheme to hijack ASEAN and spoil cooperation between China and ASEAN can never win support from other ASEAN countries.

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EDITORIAL: Review South China Sea policy June 1, 2014 The 13th Shangri-La Dialogue that began on Friday in Singapore comes at a time of increasing tension over disputed territorial claims in the South China Sea. This escalation has highlighted the importance of a review of the nation‘s policy on the area, which appears to be indistinguishable from China‘s, and this weakens Taiwan‘s position.

More than 400 top-ranking defensedecisionmakers from 27 countries attended the three-day Asia Security Summit to address an audience of defense officials and security specialists on major security developments in the region and to arrange private meetings with their counterparts on the sidelines.

Taiwan is not a full participant at this leading security forum. As in previous years, two academics from Taiwan were invited — this year, it was former minister of national

defense Andrew Yang (楊念祖) and National Chengchi University College of

International Affairs professor Arthur Ding (丁樹範).

The presence of academics in the regional Track One security dialogue mechanisms that deal with South China Sea issues, like the Shangri-La Dialogue, is the best Taiwan can hope for in such mechanisms. Participation of Taiwanese government officials at the Shangri-La Dialogue was possible only once, in 2003, when China boycotted the gathering.

Last year, the invitations extended to two other Taiwanese academics to participate in the third Jakarta International Defense Dialogue, which is of paramount importance for security dialogue, were withdrawn at the last minute due to opposition from Beijing. Taiwan did not make it to the fourth annual Jakarta dialogue in March either.

China‘s policy of limiting Taiwan‘s diplomatic efforts by blocking its participation in international affairs was not the only factor that has led to Taiwan‘s marginalization in the events that have shaped regional geopolitics. In the case of the South China Sea, over which Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, China, Malaysia and Brunei all have overlapping territorial claims, it can in part be attributed to the government‘s maritime security policy being based on the principle of not offending China, to avoid any risk to progress in cross-strait relations.

President Ma Ying-jeou‘s (馬英九) administration has been shying away from playing an

active, participative role in maritime disputes involving China. It has opted to keep quiet about Beijing‘s aggressive tactics in the area, in a manner distinctly different from how it has reacted to moves by other claimants. This policy has left claimants in the region in doubt about Taiwan‘s stance regarding cooperation with China over the disputed

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islands. Despite the Ma administration‘s repeated denial that it will aid China, the approach has made the parties concerned insecure.

The Philippines launched legal action against China before a UN tribunal in March, while Vietnam, which was conspicuously quiet about the move, has threatened to follow suit after China‘s recent deployment of a giant oil rig near the Paracel Islands (Xisha

Islands, 西沙群島). Due to its awkward position internationally, Taiwan is no match for

other countries when it comes to international arbitration on the matter, but that does not mean that it has no room for making its case.

While the Philippines continues to press ahead with the legal initiative at the UN, China and ASEAN countries have begun negotiations over a code of conduct in the South China Sea. Other players, including Japan, vowed at the Singapore summit to play a more active defensive role in the region.

Maritime disputes in the South China Sea will continue to take center stage, making it imperative that Taiwan reviews its South China Sea policy. If Taiwan clarifies its claims on the ―nine dash line,‖ it would be a starting point. It needs to differentiate its stance from that of China, which is considered to be inconsistent with international law. Doing so would also raise Taiwan‘s profile in regional security affairs.

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Hagel: China destabilises Asia-Pacific region

May 31, 2014 The US defence secretary, Chuck Hagel, has said China actions in the South China Sea are "destabilising" and "unilateral", rubbishing Beijing's description of the waters as a "sea of peace, friendship and cooperation".

Hagel made the remarks on Saturday at an Asian security summit in Singapore, during a time of increasing maritime tension between China and its neighbours including Japan, the Phillipines and Vietnam.

He said: "China has called the South China a 'sea of peace, friendship and cooperation'. And that's what it should be.

"But in recent months, China has undertaken destabilising, unilateral actions asserting its claim in the South China Sea.

"It has restricted access to Scarborough Reef, put pressure on the long-standing Phillipine presence at the Second Thomas Shoal, begun land reclamation at multiple locations, and moved an oil rig into disputed waters near the Paracel Islands."

The statement came a day after the US delivered the first of a fleet of Global Hawk drones to Japan.

While the US took no position on competing territorial claims, he told the audience: "We oppose any nation's use of intimidation, coercion or the threat of force to assert those claims".

"The United States will not look the other way when fundamental principles of the international order are being challenged."

Territorial tensions

China was quick to react to Hagel's speech. The deputy chief of the general staff of the People's Liberation Army called the remarks baseless, the AFP news agency reported.

"This speech is full of hegemony, full of incitement, threats, intimidation," said Wang Guanzhong, who is due to make his own speech at the summit on Sunday.

"Moreover [it] is public, several times criticising China by name, and these kinds of accusations are completely without basis, without reason."

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Wang's tone was markedly different from that of China's president Xi Jinping who, on Friday, promised not to "stir up trouble" in the South China Sea and would only "react as necessary" to the provocations of other countries involved.

Beijing's decision to deploy an oil platform in waters claimed by Vietnam provoked anti-Chinese riots, with thousands of Chinese citizens being evacuated from Vietnam as a result.

At the same Singapore-based security summit Japan's prime minister, Shinzo Abe, said on Friday that his country wanted to play a greater role in promoting peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

Abe said efforts "to consolidate changes to the status quo by aggregating one fait accompli after another can only be strongly condemned".

He did not identify China by name, but praised the Philippines and Vietnam for their efforts to resolve the disputes through dialogue.

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Template for the South China Sea

THE EDITORIAL BOARD May 29, 2014 On May 22, after 20 years of negotiations, Indonesia and the Philippines signed a maritime border agreement delineating the boundaries of their overlapping exclusive economic zones in the Mindanao, Celebes and Philippine Seas. President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines and the Indonesian president, SusiloBambangYudhoyono, hailed the accord as a model for peacefully settling the increasingly tense maritime boundary disputes in the South China Sea.

The spirit of compromise and cooperation in this agreement, however laboriously achieved, is very much needed to help settle the tangled web of conflicting territorial claims involving a seemingly endless list of Asian nations: the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, Vietnam and China. At issue is who controls what in the South China Sea, where large reserves of oil and gas are thought to be.

Tensions keep rising, and no quick resolution seems to be in sight. In the latest escalation, on May 1, China positioned an oil rig in waters claimed by both China and Vietnam. Chinese and Vietnamese fishing boats and warships have been jostling around the rig, leading to a Chinese vessel ramming and sinking a Vietnamese fishing boat this week.

These territorial disputes in the South China Sea have strong economic motives, but they also reflect a deep-seated nationalism. As the Chinese vice foreign minister, Liu Zhenmin, put it, the sea is central to China‘s very existence as a global economic power.

What is needed is an understanding that compromise and cooperation do not threaten national sovereignty. The quarreling states should return to the spirit of their 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, a lofty but nonbinding agreement that included a commitment to international law, a pledge to resolve disputes peacefully and a promise not to occupy uninhabited islands. As long as states continue to make maximalist sovereignty claims, there will be no agreed upon maritime borders and only missed opportunities to manage the resources of the sea for the benefit of all.

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South China Sea oil dispute unlikely to have a winner CLYDE RUSSELL May 29, 2014 MAY 29 — One of the lessons from recent history is that intractable disputes are rarely solved as long as one or more of the parties believe they can win.

This appears to be the case with the increasingly confrontational situation between China and its neighbours over the South China Sea, with all sides still pressing claims unacceptable to each other.

The latest flashpoint is the Chinese decision to position an oil drilling rig in the South China Sea in waters claimed by both China and Vietnam.

Vietnam claimed one it its fishing boats, operating near the rig, was sunk by Chinese craft on May 26, prompting Beijing to say it capsized after ―harassing‖ and colliding with a Chinese vessel.

And it‘s not just China and Vietnam, with the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan all claiming parts of the South China Sea, while rejecting China‘s assertion that 90 per cent of the waters belong to it.

China is also engaged in a dispute with Japan over small islands that lie between them in the East China Sea, with Chinese fighter jets flying in close proximity to a Japanese surveillance aircraft in the latest ratcheting up of tensions.

In trying to understand the dispute, it‘s always best to ask what‘s at stake.

On an economic level it‘s believed the South China Sea is rich in oil and gas deposits, with the US Energy Information Agency estimating 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of gas in proved and probable reserves.

For China, developing major oil and gas fields under its sovereign control has obvious appeal, but both Vietnam and the Philippines are also hungry for energy resources.

On the political side it appears that China is becoming more assertive, taking the view that its status as Asia‘s largest economy means it should take more of a leading role in the region.

Beijing is also investing heavily in boosting its military capabilities to give muscle to a more robust approach, and also to counter the influence of the United States, which counts Japan, the Philippines and Australia as firm allies in the region.

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For the smaller countries of Southeast Asia there appears to be a determination to stand up to what they see as Chinese bullying, using the tactic learned by children in playgrounds across the world that unless you stand up to the bully, he will continue his bad behaviour.

But this isn‘t a schoolyard and the legitimate fear is that the situation can move quickly from sinking fishing boats to armed skirmishes and ultimately all out conflict.

The main problem is that the countries involved haven‘t yet worked out that none of them can win.

While China would almost certainly win a military conflict, assuming no US involvement, it would lose politically and economically by becoming a pariah among its East Asian neighbours, and probably with major trading partners such as the European Union.

Likewise, Vietnam, the Philippines and the others have to recognise the reality of a powerful China and how it‘s better to build a working relationship with Beijing that allows for economic development without domination.The South China Sea has been a highly disputed area with many nations staking claims to various islands and atolls. — Reuters

The South China Sea has been a highly disputed area with many nations staking claims to various islands and atolls. — Reuters

Leadership lacking

The South China Sea dispute doesn‘t need to deteriorate into conflict, but it will take leadership and compromise by all parties, something that seems unlikely currently.

The Philippines is trying its luck by seeking arbitration at the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), seeking recognition of its right to exploit resources within a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone.

The convention allows countries a 12-mile zone of control with a claim to 200 miles to exploit resources.

The problem in the South China Sea is that several countries seek these rights from disputed small islands and reefs, creating a multitude of overlapping claims.

Even if Manila is successful at the UNCLOS, the value of any ruling is doubtful given the lack of any enforcement mechanism.

It seems to me that the best solution would be for the all the involved parties to sit down and work out a structure for everybody‘s benefit.

This could take the form of a transnational corporation with weighted shareholding that would be granted exclusive rights to exploit the resources, with the output and profits being shared.

Or a multinational agency could be set up to coordinate developments and provide a mutually-agreed dispute resolution process.

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But these sorts of steps first require a recognition that nobody is going to win outright.

If you look at some other long-running disputes since the end of World War Two, a clear pattern emerges.

As long as one side believes in total victory, the conflict drags on. The Israeli-Palestinian situation and Colombia‘s low-intensity but 50-year-old civil war are examples of this.

However, the resolution of decades of conflict in Northern Ireland and South Africa are examples of leaders from all sides coming to the conclusion that victory is unachievable and compromise is ultimately better.

But the cautionary lesson from those conflicts is that things often have to deteriorate to near the point of no return before true leadership emerges.

This is the real risk for the South China Sea and its vast reserves of oil and gas.

In trying to gain the prize for themselves, the countries involved will end up with nothing more than a costly and long-running dispute.

Perhaps they should refer to the Art of War, the renowned text by Chinese general Sun Tzu, in which he said: ―There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare‖. — Reuters

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China and Vietnam Point Fingers After Clash in South China Sea

JANE PERLEZ May 27, 2014 BEIJING — Tensions in the South China Sea escalated sharply on Tuesday as China and Vietnam traded accusations over the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing vessel in the vicinity of a Chinese oil rig parked in disputed waters off Vietnam‘s coast.

The sinking further aggravated the worsening diplomatic and economic frictions between China and Vietnam, whose relations have plummeted to the worst point in decades after anti-Chinese riots two weeks ago that killed at least four people and injured more than 100 in Vietnam. China evacuated several thousand workers from Vietnam last week.

In the latest incident, a Chinese vessel rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat about 17 nautical miles southwest of the oil rig on Monday afternoon, the state-run Vietnamese television network, VTV1, reported. All 10 crew members were rescued, the network said.

A Vietnamese resident of Hong Kong pasted Vietnamese flags on his face during a protest on Sunday against Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea.

But China labeled Vietnam as the aggressor, with the Chinese state-run news agency, Xinhua, saying the Vietnamese fishing boat ―capsized when it was interfering with and ramming‖ a Chinese fishing vessel from Hainan, a province of China. Then China accused Vietnam of sabotage and interfering with the operations of the oil rig, which has become a flash point ever since Vietnam learned that the Chinese had anchored the rig in waters contested by both nations.

At sea, armadas from both countries are jousting as the Chinese try to protect the $1 billion oil rig operated by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, known as Cnooc.

Chinese and Vietnamese boats have rammed each other in the area around the oil rig, and the Chinese have acknowledged that they used water cannons to keep the Vietnamese away from the rig, which stands as tall as a 40-story building.

The rig arrived in the waters off the Paracel Islands, which are claimed by both China and Vietnam, on May 1, a move that showed China was trying to establish its control of the waters without consulting other claimants.

Chinese social media sites lit up Tuesday with nationalistic postings about the oil rig and Monday‘s clash at sea. Users of ifeng.com, the website of Phoenix Television, a Hong

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Kong-based satellite network, sent congratulations to the Chinese ship for its action in sinking the Vietnamese vessel.

―Now this is showing some backbone,‖ said one anonymous user. ―Good going, finally seeing some news of concrete action,‖ said another.

And the depth of anti-Chinese sentiment in Vietnam was on stark display last Friday when a 67-year-old Vietnamese woman set herself on fire and died in Ho Chi Minh City, an echo of the self-immolations by Buddhist monks in South Vietnam in the early 1960s during the Vietnam War.

The woman burned herself at dawn in the center of the city and left behind papers imploring the Vietnamese government to act more aggressively against the Chinese oil rig, city officials said.

A report by Xinhua on Tuesday cited Cnooc as saying that the rig had finished its first phase of operation and would stay in the area until mid-August. The Vietnamese Fisheries Resources Surveillance Department said the rig was moved a few hundred feet north on Sunday, but the significance of the move was not immediately clear.

In a signal of how China, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, now views the South China Sea as a top foreign policy priority, the country‘s vice foreign minister said Tuesday that the sea was central to China‘s very existence as a global economic power.

―Being the lifeline for China, the South China Sea is far more important to China than to other countries,‖ the minister, Liu Zhenmin, told reporters in Beijing.

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Conduct in the South China Sea May 26, 2014 Tension continues to grip China-Vietnam ties after China brought a deep-water oil drilling rig early this month into an area near the Paracel Islands, which are under China‘s effective control but also claimed by Vietnam. The move triggered violent anti-China demonstrations across Vietnam, while ships from both countries rammed each other around the disputed islands.

Vietnamese demonstrators attacked factories owned by foreign capital. Beijing said two Chinese were killed in the attacks on Chinese businesses in Vietnam, and announced partial suspension of bilateral exchanges, including tourism.

The Vietnamese government should be praised for acting in a coolheaded manner to contain the situation. Fearing a negative effect on its economy, Hanoi clamped down on anti-China demonstrations. Vietnam apparently had no other choice, given its close trade ties with China — the destination of more than 10 percent of Vietnam‘s exports and the source of nearly 30 percent of its imports — and the huge gap in the two countries‘ military capabilities.

China for its part must exercise self-restraint and make serious efforts to peacefully resolve the dispute in cooperation with the international community. Beijing needs to realize that its drilling activities near the Paracel Islands constitute a unilateral move to change the status quo in the disputed area.

To keep fueling its economic growth, China has pushed to secure its interests in the South China Sea, which abounds in such resources as oil and natural gas, under the slogan of becoming a ―great maritime power.‖ It had adopted a U-shaped ―nine-dash line‖ that encircles a large area of the South China Sea and declared the sea inside the line as its territorial waters. The area inside the nine-dash line includes both the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands, the latter being claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. China has not shown any legal grounds to back up its claims to the whole area — which are not recognized internationally. Still, it continues to push for effective control of the area in an attempt to create a fait accompli.

China‘s drilling attempt near the Paracel Islands began after U.S. President Barack Obama wrapped up his visit to Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines in late April. The Obama administration tried to emphasize U.S. rebalancing military resources to Asia in support of allies in the region.

There has been speculation that China is trying to keep U.S. policy in check, and attempting to gauge its reactions by taking what Washington has called a ―provocative‖ move near the Paracel Islands.

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During his Asia tour, Obama reassured Japan that the Senkaku Islands, the source of a bitter territorial dispute between Tokyo and Beijing, is covered by U.S. defense obligations under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. He also concluded a new security pact with the Philippines — which has its own maritime dispute with China — that brings back the U.S. military to the country for the first time in more than two decades.

But the China-Vietnam spat may have highlighted the waning U.S. security influence in Asia. The Obama administration has called for self-restraint on the part of China, but does not appear to have any effective means to control the situation.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, meanwhile, has tried to play an active role in defusing the situation despite differences in its 10 members‘ attitudes toward China. At a summit held in the Myanmar capital of Naypyitaw on May 10-11, the ASEAN members issued a statement urging ―all parties concerned, in accordance with the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to exercise self-restraint and avoid actions that could undermine peace and stability in the area; and to resolve disputes by peaceful means without resorting to threat or use of force‖ — without singling out China.

China should positively respond to the ASEAN call and actively push negotiations with the group to conclude the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. China needs to recognize that as a major power, it has the duty to peacefully resolve disputes in the area.

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ASEAN unity and the threat of Chinese expansion RICHARD JAVADHEYDARIAN May 26, 2014 Are China's expanding territorial claims in the South China Sea going to bring Southeast Asian countries together?

Shortly after US President Barack Obama's recent visit to Asia, where he underscored Washington's commitment to remain as an anchor of stability in the region, a new crisis erupted in the South China Sea. Pressing its territorial claims in adjacent waters, China dispatched HYSY981, a state-of-the-art deep-sea rig, which belongs to the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), well into Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

Chinese officials tried to justify the move by describing it as a natural progression of CNOOC's surveillance operations in the contested waters, but most analysts believe that political considerations, as opposed to commercial calculations, were behind China's latest territorial manoeuvre. The HYSY981 was reportedly accompanied by an armada of Chinese para-military vessels.

Vietnam responded in kind by dispatching around 30 naval vessels to fend off what it saw as a de facto Chinese occupation of hydrocarbon-rich waters claimed by Hanoi. It didn't take long before Hanoi shared a video alleging Chinese harassment of Vietnamese naval vessels. Soon, large-scale anti-Chinese protests engulfed Vietnam, leading to massive destruction of factories owned by Chinese and Taiwanese investors, and precipitating an exodus of thousands of Chinese citizens.

Meanwhile, the Philippine marine forces apprehended 11 Chinese fishermen on charges of illegal capture of endangered species, and released photos alleging Chinese construction activities on the disputed Johnson South Reef in the Spratly chain of islands.

With Beijing openly challenging Washington's commitment to ensure freedom of navigation in international waters, the US State Department directly blamed China for sparking renewed tensions in the South China Sea. Concomitantly, up to 5,500 US and Filipino troops participated in the annual "Balikatan" joint-military exercise in the South China Sea - underscoring deepening Philippine-US military cooperation amid rising Chinese territorial assertiveness.

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The dangerous uptick in regional geopolitical tensions coincided with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Myanmar, the current chair of the regional body. Worried about the implications of ongoing territorial spats, the ASEAN expressed its "serious concern" and called for the resolution of maritime disputes in accordance to international law.

Long dismissed as a feeble regional body, the ASEAN has nevertheless emerged as a critical component of any prospective resolution of the South China Sea disputes in a peaceful, diplomatic fashion. But China's immense - and growing - economic influence over its Southeast Asian neighbours will continue to complicate efforts at establishing a unified ASEAN position on the issue.

A dynamic backyard

The establishment of the ASEAN was driven by the exigencies of the Cold War, with the West and its regional allies aggressively resisting communist expansion. Beyond serving as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism, there were also endogenous motivations in play: Leading Southeast Asian countries sought to put aside their territorial disputes and political differences in order to focus on nation-building and regional integration.

Richard JavadHeydarian is a specialist on Asian geopolitical/economic affairs and author of "How Capitalism Failed the Arab World: The Economic Roots and Precarious Future of the Middle East Uprisings"

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South China Sea dispute: Asean's neutrality is its strength May 23, 2014 HOST Cambodia was blamed when, for the first time in Asean's history, its foreign ministers failed to issue the customary joint communique following their meeting in Phnom Penh in July 2012. That spectacular departure from tradition was caused by differences over mentioning bilateral maritime disputes with China in the statement. China, which has close ties with Cambodia, was seen widely as the chief beneficiary of dissension in Asean. Now, the tables appear to have been turned, with Beijing reprimanding Asean Secretary-General Le Luong Minh for having said that Asean had to "get China out of the territorial waters" of Vietnam before formal talks could proceed in the South China Sea dispute. Beijing's argument, that the comments are inconsistent with the secretary-general's role, will resonate with those who believe that the leader of a regional grouping should not use the influence and dignity of his office to advance what essentially are national interests - in this case Vietnam's. His action has given a fillip to supporters of China, who note that the maritime dispute is not a China-Asean issue since Asean as a group is not claiming any territory. Hence, they argue, Mr Minh, who once served as Vietnam's deputy foreign minister, was wrong in investing the Vietnamese stand with the borrowed aura of an Asean position.

Much as the Phnom Penh failure reminded Asean members of the need to act together, the latest episode reiterates the importance of the association remaining neutral in its members' bilateral disputes. Indeed, Asean's credibility in engaging China depends on this neutrality. Asean is justified in adopting a common position on the South China Sea issue because it affects the grouping's common economic and security interests. However, these institutional interests are separate from the bilateral claims of its members, on whose merits Asean takes no stand. This distinction is essential and should be upheld. Asean should not give China reason to treat it as a hostile regional entity. A code of conduct for the South China Sea remains a possibility, but the likelihood of reaching such an agreement depends on Beijing remaining engaged in the discussions.

But Asean neutrality should not and does not mean caving in to Chinese maritime assertiveness. Beijing incurs needless diplomatic costs every time it ups the ante in its bilateral disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines in a way that could affect Asean as a whole. China-Asean ties benefit both. That is one reason why South-east Asian countries would be loath to choose sides between China and its rival powers. Beijing must not change its mindset.

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Japan, Vietnam blame China for maritime tensions

May 22, 2014 Japan and Vietnam agreed Thursday to enhance bilateral cooperation on maritime security, criticizing China for increasingly assertive actions that have led to clashes between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels in the South China Sea.

―I am concerned about tensions in the region resulting from China‘s unilateral drilling activity,‖ Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said at a meeting with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Vu Duc Dam in Tokyo, according to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

―Japan will continue to underscore the importance of observing law and being ruled by law,‖ Abe said.

Dam expressed appreciation for Japan‘s support, saying Hanoi has been making diplomatic efforts to peacefully resolve the issue and calling for Tokyo‘s continued support, the ministry said.

The meeting came after China increased tensions in the sea by deploying an oil rig off the Paracel Islands, which Vietnam also claims, leading to physical clashes between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels.

The development has added to Japan‘s concern about Chinese maritime policy at a time when Beijing is regularly sending patrol ships into the territorial waters around the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands, a group of uninhibited islets that it and Taiwan also claim, in the East China Sea.

Abe briefed Dam on Japan‘s ―policy of proactive contribution to global peace and stability based on international cooperation.‖

Dam, who was visiting Japan to attend a forum in Tokyo, conveyed a message from Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung expressing that the Southeast Asian country endorses Abe‘s policy.

The deputy prime minister also asked for Japanese companies to continue investing in Vietnam.

The clashes in the South China Sea have triggered violent anti-China riots in Vietnam in which some Japanese businesses were mistakenly attacked.

While Abe asked the Vietnamese government to protect Japanese companies in the country, Dam said the government has taken steps to prevent the violence from recurring.

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Also Thursday, government sources said Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida is planning to visit Vietnam from late June to early July to promote cooperation on maritime security in the East and South China seas.

At the meeting in Hanoi, Kishida and Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minster Pham Binh Minh are likely to agree to speed up consultations on Japan‘s provision of patrol ships to Vietnam to address China‘s maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea, the sources said.

In reference to China‘s muscle-flexing in both bodies of water, Kishida and Minh are expected to affirm that Tokyo and Hanoi will not tolerate any attempt to alter the status quo through coercion or force, according to the sources.

The two ministers are also likely to agree to increase communications with the Philippines and other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to keep Beijing‘s territorial ambitions in check, they said.

Claiming the South China Sea almost entirely, Beijing has been asserting control over the land features and waters encompassed by its U-shaped ―nine-dash line‖ in territorial disputes with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.

Kishida and Minh are likely to agree to urge 10-member ASEAN and other regional powers at a regional security forum slated for early August in Myanmar to act in unison in addressing China‘s moves.

Kishida might visit Cambodia as well, according to the sources.

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Beijing 'prepared to defend rights' in South China Sea GABRIEL DOMÍNGUEZ May 20, 2014 China's deployment of an oil rig in waters also claimed by Vietnam has escalated tensions in the region. Wu Sichun, head of Chinese think tank NISCSS, explains why Beijing argues its move was completely justified.

The Great Hall of the People, where the Chinese Communist Party plenum is being held, is seen behinds red flags in Tiananmen square in Beijing November 12, 2013.

The confrontation began on May 2 when the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) placed its deep sea drilling rig HD-981 in disputed waters of the South China Sea. Chinese and Vietnamese vessels have since been involved in several collisions, with the two communist countries trading accusations of responsibility. This triggered violent anti-Chinese demonstrations in Vietnam, leaving two workers dead and dozens of factories damaged. China has since evacuated more than 3,000 of its nationals from the Southeast Asian nation.

In a DW interview, Dr. Wu Sichun, president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS), accuses Vietnam of tolerating the protests in order to put pressure on China and warns that the involvement of the US in territorial disputes in the South China Sea will result in a power rivalry which will only worsen the situation.

DW: Why does China claim it has the right to dig for oil in those disputed waters also claimed by Vietnam?

Wu Sichun: The waters where the CNOOC is currently operating are only 17 nautical miles away from Zhongjian Island (also called Triton Island) which is part of the Xisha or Paracel Islands, the baseline of which was claimed by China in 1996.

According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Paracel Islands are entitled to 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Zhongjian Island is one of the base points of the Paracel baseline. As China's oil rig is located within the contiguous zone of this island, Beijing has the sovereign right to the natural resources. Under this backdrop, China has been expecting Vietnam's reactions and is well prepared to defend its sovereign rights in that sea area against any harassment.

Hanoi also claims sovereignty over this territory. What is your view on this?

If you take a closer look at history, you will find evidence which strongly supports China's sovereignty claim. In 1946, China resumed the control of these islands which had been seized by Japan during the World War II. In 1958, Vietnam's then Prime

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Minister Pham Van Dong recognized China's sovereignty over the Paracels and the Spratlys in his official note to China's then Premier Zhou Enlai.

Hanoi only changed its position after the country's reunification in 1975. However, in accordance with the principle of estoppels - whereby a party is barred from denying the truth of a fact that has already been settled - China does not believe Vietnam can change its position over the issue of sovereignty.

Recently, Professor Sam Bateman, a Senior Fellow in the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, presented another line of argument. He pointed out that China's oil rig is 120 miles from Vietnam's coast, and 80 miles from China's Woody (Yongxing) Island which is unquestionably subject to the island regime under the current UNCLOS provisions, and consequently entitled to its own EEZ and continental shelf.

Many experts claim there are not many crude-oil deposits at the current location of the oil rig. Was the decision to place the HD-981 in this precise spot mainly political?

The CNOOC has been operating in these waters for the past 10 years. It has a systematic plan of seismic survey and drilling field investigation. Now, it has come to the phase of setting up the oil rig. Of course, every dig has its commercial risk. In this sense, the exploration of energy sources in the South China Sea is a political decision. This is not to say such a move has no economic consideration. Every country needs diversified sources of energy.

The US and China have traded accusations over this latest dispute. What message does Beijing want to send Washington?

The US claims to be "taking no sides." However, it is clearly supportive of Vietnam's position and has accused China of being "provocative" and "aggressive" in the Sino-Vietnamese dispute over the oil rig. It is not objective to put the blame on China and depict Vietnam as the victim. It is not helpful to mutual understanding on this issue if the US is taking such a biased position.

The South China Sea has seen more disputes and rising tensions since the Obama administration declared its "pivot to Asia." I think the US should reflect upon its policies in the Asia Pacific, and ponder about what it should say and do to truly contribute to peace and stability in the region.

How have the latest dispute and the ensuing violence affected Sino-Vietnamese ties?

My personal observation is that the demonstrations against China were tolerated, if not encouraged, by Vietnamese authorities with the purpose of putting pressure on China. Unfortunately, the demonstrations quickly escalated and became riots targeting both Chinese people and companies in southern Vietnam. The direct loss of lives and property will certainly damage the bilateral cooperation and create insecurity within the Chinese community in the South Asian nation, which also reminds us of the anti-Chinese movement in the late 1970s.

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Many argue that the territorial disputes in the South China Sea can be partly traced to a map published by the Republic of China government in 1947 that included a U-shaped line stretching a long way south of the Chinese mainland, along the shores of Vietnam, down to Malaysia and Indonesia, and back up past the Philippines and Taiwan. Has this "nine-dotted line" been at the root of the dispute?

Current tensions in the South China Sea have definitely not been caused by the U-shaped line, but by the provoking actions of some of the South China Sea claimants in the Paracels and the Spratlys, violating the spirit of the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC).

Though the legal status of the U-shaped line hasn't been clarified by the Chinese government, the theory of "sovereignty + UNCLOS + historic rights" prevails among Chinese scholars. According to it, China enjoys sovereignty over all the features within this line, and enjoys both a sovereign right and jurisdiction as defined by the UNCLOS, for instance, EEZ and continental shelf when certain features fulfill the legal definition of Island Regime under Article 121 of the UNCLOS. In addition to that, China enjoys certain historic rights within this line, such as fishing, navigational and priority rights of resource development.

The Philippines has filed an arbitration case against China at a United Nations tribunal in The Hague, asking for clarification of the legal status of disputed territories. What is your view on this?

Protester Thao Theresa (C) holds a placard which reads, Down with Xi Jinping's gang during an anti-China protest in front of the Chinese embassy in Hanoi May 13, 2014.

China has made clear it will not participate in the arbitration and the rejection is solidly based on international law. The Philippines made several provocative moves to flare up the South China Sea dispute to get international attention and also tried to bring in the United States by strengthening the bilateral military ties and allowing the US to boost its troop presence in the country.

The involvement of the US and other non-regional powers will result in a great power rivalry and competition in the South China Sea that is not helpful and will only worsen the situation.

The Sino-Philippine dispute in the South China Sea boils down to a conflict over territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation, which involves historical, legal, geopolitical as well as factors. Hence, this issue is not about the interpretation and application of the UNCLOS. The core of the dispute is that the Philippines has illegally seized China's insular features in the South China Sea. China has indisputable sovereignty over Nansha Islands and their adjacent waters, which is based on sufficient historical and legal proof.

Dr. Wu Shicun is President of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS), a leading Chinese think tank specialized in interdisciplinary studies of the South China Sea.The interview was conducted by Gabriel Domínguez.

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Beijing's dangerous arrogance in the South China Sea PHILIP BOWRING May 18, 2014

China's current behaviour vis-à-vis its South China Sea neighbours is aggressive, arrogant and smacks of Han chauvinism and ethnocentrism. Far from being an expression of national pride, it is giving patriotism a bad name. Patriotic Hongkongers should recognise it for what it is: a dangerous ploy. Not only has Beijing bared expansionist teeth to Vietnam and the Philippines, it has now succeeded in shifting Indonesia from a position of trying to act as a moderator between China and the other South China Sea states to opponent. Twice in recent months, Indonesia has accused China of claiming part of its Natuna island archipelago. So much for a "peaceful rise" when you rile neighbours with populations of more than 400 million, who you assume to be weak. All China's sea claims are wrapped up in that nine-dash line which extends more than 1,000 nautical miles from the coasts of Guangdong and Hainan to close to Borneo, the island shared by Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei, and includes almost all the sea between Vietnam and the Philippines. This claim encompasses more than 90 per cent of the sea, even though China (including Taiwan) has only about 20 per cent of the coastline. All this on the basis of claims to history that conveniently ignore the very existence of other peoples and their histories of seafaring and trading going back 2,000 years, and pre-dating China's ventures in the south sea and beyond. Indonesians got to Africa and colonised Madagascar more than 500 years before Zheng He. In turn, the peoples of Southeast Asia absorbed more from India and the Islamic world than China. In the case of the current issue with Vietnam, brought about by China's movement of a drillship into waters due east of Danang, China has a small case, in that it does now own the Paracel Islands, which are closer to the drill location than to Vietnam. But the islands themselves have long been in dispute between the two, a matter settled for now by China's unprovoked invasion of them in 1974. But as they have never had permanent settlement, they make a very weak case for enjoying a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone compared with Vietnam. History also tells us that this coast was the heart of the Cham mercantile state, which for 1,000 years was the leading player in regional trade. There should surely anyway be a case for compromise between China and Vietnam. Malaysia and Thailand managed one over a gas-rich area between them in the Gulf of

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Thailand. Other regional states - Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia - have put island ownership issues to the International Court of Justice and accepted the result. But China remains unwilling either to compromise or submit to arbitration. Meanwhile, joint development is impossible because China makes it conditional on acceptance of its sovereignty. In the case of shoals off the Philippines, China's case rests on a mix of invented history and the fact that it filed claims first, a poor basis given that it had no continuous presence there and the Philippines initially inherited a treaty between two Western colonial powers. These shoals and other features claimed by China are so obviously within the Philippine exclusive economic zone and in waters long sailed by the peoples of that country that there should be no argument. Scarborough Shoal is about 200km from Luzon, 650km from China. The claim to Half Moon Shoal is even more outrageous. That is the reef where the Philippines arrested Chinese fishermen allegedly with a catch of giant turtles, a protected species. Knee-jerk protests have erupted from Beijing. The reef is 110km from Palawan, nearly 1,500km from China. The fact that the absurd claims go back to the Kuomintang era is neither here nor there. Nor is the fact that previous states may have occasionally paid tribute to Beijing. For these trading states, tribute was a tax, the cost of doing business with China, which did not imply Chinese sovereignty. And if China occasionally acted as an imperial power in the region, that is surely cause for concern, not a basis for overlordship of a predominantly Malay sea. Otherwise, Turkey could claim Egypt and the Russians all of central Asia. A revived China wants to flex its muscles and show who is boss in the region - just as it tried with Vietnam in 1979 - and remind the US of its own weakness. But there is also a basic reluctance to treat the non-Han neighbours as equals, people with their own history and cultures which, except for Vietnam, have never been subject to major Chinese influence. China's history of assuming superiority, most especially over those with darker skins, is long. Belief in eugenics and the need to protect and enhance Han genetic characteristics was strong in the Republican era and found echoes in the opinions and social policies of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew. It has long been rejected in the West and was condemned under Mao Zedong . But it has been making a comeback on the mainland, where some academics find it hard to accept that modern man spread out of Africa and that China is thus not a separate and unique source of mankind. BIO: Philip Bowring has been based in Asia for 39 years writing on regional financial and political issues. He has been a columnist for the South China Morning Post since the mid-1990s and for the International Herald Tribune from 1992 to 2011. He also contributes regularly to the Wall Street Journal, www.asiasentinel.com, a website of which he is a founder, and elsewhere. Prior to 1992 he was with the weekly Far Eastern Economic Review, latterly as editor.

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Anti-Chinese Violence Convulses Vietnam, Pitting Laborersagainst Laborers

CHRIS BUCKLEY and CHAU DOAN May 15, 2014 HA TINH PROVINCE, Vietnam — One Chinese laborer said angry Vietnamese workers had stomped on his hands, crushing them. Another said his son had been struck in the head with a metal rod by a Vietnamese mob that had sought out Chinese for beatings. At least one Chinese worker died.

While anti-Chinese violence in southern Vietnam earlier in the week targeted foreign factories, the outburst of anger here in the nation‘s center took a more vindictive turn late Wednesday, with Vietnamese turning on Chinese laborers. The violence in Ha Tinh appeared to be the worst against Chinese since a territorial dispute inflamed anger in Vietnam.

China responded to the bloody attacks on its citizens with harsh words, underlining the passions churned up by a dispute over an oil drilling rig. Foreign Minister Wang Yi called his Vietnamese counterpart, Pham Binh Minh, on Thursday to demand ―resolute and effective measures to stop all violence,‖ the state-run Xinhua news agency reported. A spokeswoman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Hua Chunying, told reporters that Vietnam bore ―an inescapable responsibility‖ for the assaults on the laborers.

By Thursday, Ha Tinh Province had settled into a wary calm as crowds of Vietnamese workers scrambled onto buses. Some said their employers had closed because of the mayhem, while others cited fear of reprisals for the violence. Some, too, may have been fleeing in fear of arrest.

News agencies quoted government officials on Thursday as saying that the unrest this week had swept through 22 of Vietnam‘s 63 provinces, but they did not indicate whether the protests beyond Ha Tinh and suburbs near Ho Chi Minh City in the south had been violent or whether peace had been restored. Reports of additional deaths were unconfirmed.

In Ha Tinh, Chinese workers waiting for treatment at the main provincial hospital had bruised faces and eyes, mangled fingers, and torsos that were black and blue from kicks and punches.

―They just turned up and started attacking,‖ said Wang Xiangzheng, a carpenter, whose son was hit with the metal rod. He said the several hundred Chinese workers at the construction site had tried to step aside when the Vietnamese men appeared, but were attacked anyway.

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―They had rocks and steel bars and pipes, and broke through the gate and started hitting us, and then they burned down the housing,‖ Mr. Wang said.

None of the Vietnamese workers interviewed in the industrial area where the attacks took place admitted to joining in, and many condemned the attacks. But some suggested the blame lay with China and its decision to send an oil rig to part of the South China Sea that Vietnamese consider theirs. Ships from both nations have reported being rammed, and photos have shown Chinese water cannons soaking Vietnam‘s ships.

―We‘ve watched on television every day, and we‘ve seen the tension,‖ said a worker who was planning to leave the area temporarily.

In a manufacturing zone near Ho Chi Minh City, it remained unclear why the crowds had taken out their frustration, in some cases, on companies from countries other than China. Some said the workers had probably attacked Taiwanese plants because they saw Chinese writing.

Continue reading the main storyContinue reading the main storyContinue reading the main story

―The people protesting can‘t tell the difference between Taiwan and China,‖ said Liu Yi-xin, secretary general of the Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce in Vietnam. ―Most Vietnamese people can‘t tell us apart and think Taiwanese are Chinese. It‘s like Americans and English.‖

That did not explain why South Korean plants had also been attacked. Workers trying to explain the seemingly indiscriminate nature of some of the violence said those protests had simply descended into a frenzy of looting.

Some of the worst violence was reported at a Taiwanese steel plant in Ha Tinh. Hundreds of protesting workers stormed through the Formosa Plastics Group plant on Wednesday afternoon, attacking Chinese employees, the company said on Thursday. One of its workers died and 90 were injured, it reported.

While managers at some other plants said the police had done little, the managers of the steel plant said the local authorities had sent vehicles to evacuate the Chinese workers after the managers called. The head of the Ha Tinh government visited the factory at around 10 p.m. and met with security officials, Formosa Plastics said, but the rioting continued until early Thursday.

Taiwan‘s foreign affairs minister, David Lin, told legislators on Thursday that Taiwan was taking steps to ensure that any of its citizens who wanted to leave Vietnam could do so, and that officials would seek compensation for damage to Taiwan‘s business interests in Vietnam. China Airlines, based in Taiwan, sent two extra aircraft to Ho Chi Minh City on Thursday to handle a surge of Taiwanese trying to leave Vietnam after its two regularly scheduled flights sold out.

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Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung of Vietnam ordered the Public Security Ministry and other agencies to prevent further attacks on foreign companies and their workers. Lawbreakers, he said, must be sternly punished.

In some cases, factory owners said, the attackers were their own employees, but in other cases they were groups of workers traveling from plant to plant.

On Thursday, factory managers in Binh Duong Province, an industrial area north of Ho Chi Minh City where the riots appeared to have begun, surveyed the damage and complained that the police response had been listless or nonexistent.

Peng Zhi-ming, a manager at a Taiwanese business, said he had thought he recognized several former employees in the crowd that invaded his factory, which employs about 70 people.

―They came around again and again,‖ he said. ―We called the police, but nobody came. I don‘t know why they didn‘t come, but the fact is they didn‘t.‖

Chinese workers at the hospital in Ha Tinh said the violence in the province had begun Wednesday afternoon when crowds of Vietnamese men — numbering in the hundreds and sometimes thousands — descended on construction sites and factories and attacked workers with steel bars and pipes, rocks and, in some cases, knives. Neither the recovering workers nor the medical staff at the hospital knew the total number of deaths and injuries.

The Chinese worker with the mangled hands, RuiFalan, 46, was in such pain he could speak only haltingly while he waited for X-rays. He said the Chinese company he worked for had sent him to Vietnam in November.

―It wasn‘t my choice,‖ he said. ―I hope they‘ll send me back home now. This was too scary.‖

Growing numbers of Chinese have come to Vietnam to find work, often with Chinese employers. In Ha Tinh, many are middle-aged. Some said their companies had sent them; others found wages here similar to those in China. Some, like Mr. Wang, the carpenter, said they had come on tourist visas and then sought out Chinese employers, often construction companies.

―If there‘s work, we stay; if there‘s none, we move on,‖ Mr. Wang said. ―But now it‘s not safe here. I might go back.‖

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Vietnam anger rises over South China Sea ROBERTO TOFANI May 15, 2014 China's oil rig deployment in disputed territory is stoking nationalistic fervour and deadly violence in Vietnam.

The war of words between China and Vietnam over disputed islands in the South China Sea has gained steam and, while never dormant, the heated rhetoric has become notably more direct.

As the 14th ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) summit was in progress last weekend in Naypydaw, Myanmar's capital, thousands of Vietnamese in the capital Hanoi and in Ho Chi Minh City took to the streets in anger after the China National Offshore Oil Corporation moved drilling rig HD-981 near the contested Paracel Islands.

Tensions further increased when Vietnamese naval ships, trying to prevent the Chinese from setting up the oil rig, collided with Chinese navy vessels. Beijing and Hanoi each accused the other of ramming their ships.

Occupied by China since 1974, sovereignty over the area surrounding the Paracel's has been challenged by China, Taiwan and Vietnam ever since.

Vietnamese anger has now erupted into deadly violence in the country's south. More than 20 people were killed on Wednesday after rioters stormed a foreign-owned steel factory in Ha Tinh province, with 16 of the dead said to be Chinese. About 100 other people were sent to hospital with injuries.

Thousands of Vietnamese set fire to foreign factories and rampaged through industrial zones in Binh Duong and Dong Nai provinces on Tuesday. News reports said hundreds of Chinese had fled the country.

US 'pivot to Asia-Pacific'

Hoang Viet, a professor at Ho Chi Minh City University, noted the rig incident came days after an official visit to Asia by US President Barack Obama, who reiterated his commitment to allies in the region, including Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and Malaysia.

"Hence, we can read the Chinese move was also a response to Obama's pivot to Asia-Pacific," Viet told Al Jazeera.

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In Manila, President Benigno S Aquino III and Obama recently signed a 10-year pact that will give the US military greater access to the Philippines.

"The United States is not trying to reclaim old bases or build new bases… We'll work together to build the Philippines' defence capabilities and to work with other nations to promote regional stability, such as in the South China Sea," Obama said during the April visit.

Tensions among China and other nations surrounding the South China Sea have risen sharply recently.

The Philippine government seized a Chinese fishing boat and its 11 crew earlier this month on charges of catching endangered sea turtles in disputed South China Sea waters, prompting China to demand their release. China foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying urged the Philippine government to "stop taking further provocative actions".

The Philippines accused China on Wednesday of building an airstrip on a reef in the South China Sea in disputed territory. If proven true, it would be the first airstrip constructed by China on the contested Spratly Islands, and would violate the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, an informal code of conduct for the region.

Complex issues

Viet said when it comes to China-Vietnamese relations, there's more than meets the eye in the latest flare-up over the disputed territory. "There are also other factors that are raising tensions, and the issue is more complex that it appears," he said.

Over the past decade, both sides have repeatedly stated their intention to achieve a peaceful solution through negotiations, but at present there is little or no direct dialogue between the two governments.

Yet, the two communist countries are bound by significant economic ties, with bilateral trade expected to reach $60bn in 2015, growing from $50bn in 2013. Vietnam's trade deficit with China in 2013 stood at $23.7bn, an increase of 44.5 percent compared to the previous year, according to Vietnam's customs office.

"China and Vietnam need each other. The Vietnamese economy cannot exist without the Chinese one," Pietro Masina, a professor of international relations and economics at Napoli l'Orientale University in Italy, told Al Jazeera.

"There is a sort of paradox with a conflict on one hand - that I would say is regional and not only between China and Vietnam - and strong economic integration on the other hand."

Analysts have underlined the necessity for Hanoi and Beijing to negotiate over the contested areas in the South China Sea - one of the world's most important transit routes and fishing areas, which is also believed to be rich in fossil fuels. However, any

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potential cooperation can only reach fruition amid common ground found between Vietnam and China, as well as countries equally involved including Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan.

Vietnam insists on the necessity to work at multilateral level and within the ASEAN framework. However, China - which claims almost the entire South China Sea as its own - has made clear its ready to negotiate bilaterally only.

'Serious concerns'

During the recent ASEAN summit, the grouping's 10 foreign affairs ministers expressed "serious concerns" over the recent developments in the South China Sea.

China's foreign minister spokeswoman Hua responded to the criticism by saying the South China Sea dispute is not a problem between ASEAN and Beijing.

"China is opposed to certain countries' scheme of spoiling the atmosphere of friendly cooperation between China and ASEAN by making use of the issue of the South China Sea," Hua said. "China is ready to press ahead with the comprehensive and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea [DOC] together with ASEAN countries, so as to safeguard peace and stability of the region."

International security analyst Rommel Banlaoi told Al Jazeera it was unusual for ASEAN to speak out against China, even though it did not directly cite Beijing's oil rig deployment specifically.

"ASEAN is a diplomatic community of sovereign states with different levels of relationship with China," Banlaoi said. "ASEAN is cautious in using strong words in order not to antagonise China. But when ASEAN uses the words 'serious concerns', China knows that the problem is getting worse, and it is a signal to China to make up with its neighbours."

Professor Masina, who has worked in both China and Vietnam, said Beijing's oil-rig deployment may backfire in its long-term efforts of securing the resource-rich region for itself.

"In some way, the Chinese aggressive behaviour in the contested area is a sign of weakness," Masina said. "A powerful country that wants to be a regional power is one which builds consensus around its policies. And if China is able to stand out by military force, politically it is weak. It is in the Chinese interests to find a negotiable solution to the issue."

Nationalism on the rise

While politicians attempt to find a way out of the impasse, nationalistic sentiment is rising both in China and Vietnam.

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"When the enemy is at our doors, women also have to fight," said Nguyen ThiHuan, who battled the Americans during the Vietnam War. She arrived in Hanoi from VinhPhuc province last Sunday to demonstrate against China.

"In the past we fought hard to regain independence for the people, and thus we cannot accept the escalation of Chinese actions," Huan told Al Jazeera.

Professor Viet said the rise of nationalistic fervour in both China and Vietnam over South China Sea possessions bodes ill for both countries.

"Tension at the moment is very high and both sides - who see each other as a provocative opponent - are trying to conquer public opinion… Nationalist sentiment is increasing and in international politics, it does not favour any of the parties," Viet said.

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South China Sea Tensions BEINA XU, Online Writer/Editor May 14, 2014 Territorial spats over the waters and islands of the South China Sea have roiled relations between China and countries like Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei in recent years, and tensions continue to escalate in the wake of U.S. President Barack Obama's announced "pivot" of focus to the region. A handful of islands comprise the epicenter of the territorial dispute, making up an area known as the "cow's tongue" that spans roughly the entire South China Sea. The region is home to a wealth of natural resources, fisheries, trade routes, and military bases, all of which are at stake in the increasingly frequent diplomatic standoffs. China's blanket claims to sovereignty across the region and its strong resistance to handling disputes in an international arena have mired attempts at resolving the crises and intensified nationalist postures in all countries involved, particularly Vietnam and the Philippines. Experts say the potential for an escalated conflict in the South China Sea—while seemingly distant for now—presents an ongoing crisis for the region, as well as for U.S. interests in the area.

What territories are involved and disputed?

The South China Sea comprises a stretch of roughly 1.4 million square miles in the Pacific Ocean that encompasses an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan, spanning west of the Philippines, north of Indonesia, and east of Vietnam. The South China Sea islands number in the hundreds, although the largest and most contentious territories include the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank, and Scarborough Shoal, to which all of the six major Southeast Asian nations lay various claims. The islands are mostly uninhabited and have never had an indigenous population, making the issue of historical sovereignty a thorny one to resolve.

The disputes aren't limited to land, however; each country has an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), prescribed by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), over which it has special rights to marine resources and energy exploration and production. An EEZ spans outward 200 nautical miles from the coast of the each state's territorial sea, and may include the continental shelf beyond the 200-mile limit. These zones come into play during disputes over sea territory, as displayed in China's December 2012 spat with Vietnam over oil and fishing activity in the waters near the Paracel Islands.

What is the 9-Dash Line?

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The 9-Dash line is a controversial demarcation line used by China for its claim to territories and waters in the South China Sea, most notably over the Scarborough Shoal and the Paracel and Spratly Islands—the two most important disputed island groups. The line, which is contested by the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam, encompasses virtually the entire South China Sea region and caused immediate controversy when China submitted a map to the UN in 2009 that included the demarcation. Beijing's issuance of a new passport in late 2012 containing a map of the disputed region based on the line drew fresh international criticism and backlash.

ASEAN countries have contested this boundary, but China has insisted on the historical legitimacy of the line based on survey expeditions, fishing activities, and naval patrols dating as far back as the fifteenth century, putting it at odds with the boundaries UNCLOS has enforced for the region since 1994.

What resources are at play in the region?

The immediate source of conflict in the region is competition over resources, said David Rosenberg, professor of political science at Middlebury College. There are roughly half a billion people who live within 100 miles of the South China Sea coastline, and the volume of shipping through its waters has skyrocketed as China and ASEAN nations increase international trade and oil imports. The need for resources, especially hydrocarbons and fisheries, also has intensified economic competition in the region, particularly given the rapid coastal urbanization of China. "Behind it all, it's essentially the industrial revolution of Asia," Rosenberg said. "And the South China Sea has become the hub of that."

According to the World Bank, the South China Sea holds proven oil reserves of at least seven billion barrels and an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, which offer tremendous economic opportunity for smaller nations like Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, and energy security for China's large, growing economy. In December 2012, China's National Energy Administration named the disputed waters as the main offshore site for natural gas production, and a major Chinese energy company has already begun drilling in deep water off the southern coast. Competitive tensions escalated when India's state-run Oil and Natural Gas Corp announced it had partnered with PetroVietnam for developing oil in the disputed waters. In June 2011, Vietnam accused a Chinese fishing boat of cutting cables from an oil exploration vessel inside its EEZ. Hostilities resurfaced in May 2014, when Chinese vessels fired water cannons at a Vietnamese flotilla that allegedly approached a large Chinese drilling rig near the Paracel Islands. The row affected Vietnam's stock markets, which plunged after the incident.

Smaller-scale fishing incidents have instead become the hub of maritime confrontation as declining fish stocks have driven fishermen farther into disputed areas to search for supply, as well as highly profitable illegal species. In the most recent clash, the Philippines' naval forces intercepted eight Chinese fishing vessels in the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012, finding what they viewed as illegally fished marine life on board. The attempted arrest of the poachers led to a two-month standoff between the two countries.

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Annual fishing bans and arrests of fishermen are a convenient proxy for sovereignty claims since they can be presented as legitimate attempts to enforce marine resources protection, according to a report by the International Crisis Group. "This is an issue that doesn't make big headlines, but 1.5 billion people live there and rely heavily on fisheries for food and jobs," Rosenberg said. "That's where most of the conflict goes on, and most of these have been dealt with on a routine conflict management basis."

How does the dispute affect trade routes in the sea?

As much as 50 percent of global oil tanker shipments pass through the South China Sea, which sees three times more tanker traffic than the Suez Canal and more than five times that of the Panama Canal, making the waters one of the world's busiest international sea lanes. More than half of the world's top ten shipping ports are also located in and around the South China Sea, according to the International Association of Ports and Harbors. As intra-ASEAN trade has markedly increased—from 29 percent of total ASEAN trade in 1980 to 41 percent in 2009—maintaining freedom of navigation has become of paramount importance for the region.

"This is a very important issue, and has become the main concern of Japan, the United States and even right now the European Union," said Dr.Yann-Huei Song, a fellow at Academia Sinica in Taiwan. However, Yann-Huei says China is unlikely to instigate an interruption in traffic because its business, exploration, and importation rely entirely on freedom of navigation as well. Experts argue that the mutual benefits [PDF] from regional economic integration provide an extremely compelling incentive for cooperation on resources, conservation, and security movements, according to a Harvard Quarterly paper.

What are the military stakes?

The region has also seen increased militarization in response to China's burgeoning power, raising the stakes of a potential armed conflict and making disputes more difficult to resolve. Vietnam and Malaysia have led regional military buildups and increased arms trade with countries like Russia and India, while the Philippines doubled its defense budget in 2011 and pledged five-year joint military exercises with the United States. The Philippines also embarked on a modernization program costing roughly $1 billion that will rely heavily on U.S. sales of cutters and potentially fighter jets.

"Behind it all, it's essentially the industrial revolution of Asia. And the South China Sea has become the hub of that." —David Rosenberg, Middlebury College

Ships are commonly involved in naval disputes, as exhibited in the Scarborough Shoal incident in April when the Philippines said its largest warship—acquired from the United States—had a standoff with Chinese surveillance vessels after the ship attempted to arrest Chinese fishermen but was blocked by the surveillance craft. The involvement of the navy made political compromise more difficult, says the ICG.

"There's nothing like NATO in Asia, and that's what's worrisome," Rosenberg said. "Unlike the United States and EU, which are engaged in other regions of the world, the Southeast Asian countries are compelled to spend more protecting their most

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immediate interests. It's not the Cold War by any means, but they're still not very open with each other about military modernization."

What is being done to resolve the disputes?

One of the largest impasses to a resolution is China's insistence on conducting most of its diplomacy on a bilateral basis, wrote CFR's Stewart Patrick. Nationalism has also fueled many of these stalemates. International tribunals, like the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, are available, but nations use it selectively in light of the potential domestic political ramifications of appearing conciliatory. China also has repeatedly rejected the mechanisms for arbitration provided by the UN.

A July 2012 ASEAN summit attempted to address ways to mitigate the conflict but ended without producing a communiqué, which some experts say highlights the difficulties of multilateral approaches in the region. ASEAN's six-point statement in July made no reference to specific incidents, and only outlined an agreement to draft and implement a regional code of conduct, respect international law, and exercise self-restraint. CFR's Joshua Kurlantzick said in August 2012 that while ASEAN was an appropriate venue to mediate this dispute, the organization still has not yet found its footing in transitioning to a "more forceful, integrated organization that can provide leadership." In a November 2012 IIGG working paper, Kurlantzick looked at how ASEAN could strengthen its role in the region to meet challenges such as the South China Sea.

Consequently, joint management of resources has been widely proposed by experts as the best way to ease current tensions, according to the ICG. China and Vietnam have managed to cooperate on a common fishery zone in the Tonkin Gulf, where the two countries have delineated claims and regulated fishing. However, oil development has remained a highly contentious issue, as both Vietnam and the Philippines have gone ahead with gas exploration projects [PDF] with foreign companies in disputed areas.

What does this mean for the United States' pivot to Asia?

The U.S. pivot to the area, coupled with the region's myriad conflicts, raises concerns about the future of U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. The Obama administration has not only worked to strengthen ties with ASEAN, but has also forged tighter relations with individual countries like Myanmar, where it has developed a new focus and strategy of engagement. The United States has also ramped up security cooperation with Vietnam, while Malaysia and Singapore have also signaled desire for increased security cooperation.

A 2012 Johns Hopkins paper notes that Southeast Asia has transformed in the last two decades to an area where Chinese power and strategic ambition confront an established U.S. military presence, and where a Chinese perception of the status of the South China Sea is fundamentally at odds with a long-settled consensus among major maritime states.

Experts say that the United States faces a dilemma and tough balancing act in the region, as some countries in ASEAN would like it to play a more forceful role to counter

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what they see as a greater Chinese assertiveness, while others want to see less U.S. involvement. The priority on all sides should be to avoid military conflict, according to Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in this Contingency Planning Memorandum; even as China spars with its Southeast Asian neighbors, it is becoming the largest trading partner and one of the biggest direct investors of most Southeast Asian states since an ASEAN-China free trade area came into effect.

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Philippines Challenges China over Disputed Atoll KEITH BRADSHER May 14, 2014 HONG KONG — The Philippines said on Wednesday that it had protested signs of land reclamation by China aimed at expanding a disputed coral atoll near the southern Philippines, the latest in a series of disputes pitting China against its neighbors in the South China Sea. The Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs said in a statement that it had lodged a protest with China on April 4, nearly five weeks ago, regarding the Chinese activity, but Beijing had rejected the protest. The Philippines also raised the issue at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit meeting over the weekend in Myanmar, and has included the dispute in a legal case against China filed with a United Nations tribunal, demanding arbitration of territorial disagreements.

The land reclamation dispute involves Johnson South Reef, a tiny coral atoll also known as Mabini or Yongshu. It is part of the Spratly Islands and is near southern Vietnam, Palawan Island of the Philippines and the north coast of Borneo. It is nearly 700 miles southeast of the southern end of China‘s Hainan Island.

Charles Jose, a spokesman for the Department of Foreign Affairs, said there was no sign yet that China was undertaking construction on the atoll, which has a single small structure on it, but added that the Philippines was nonetheless concerned.

―They are still in the process of reclaiming the land, but judging by the size of it, they could be planning to build an airstrip,‖ Mr. Jose said.

Johnson South Reef is a potato-shaped atoll about two miles long that until now has barely stuck up above sea level. An airstrip on it would give Chinese planes convenient proximity to the oil fields and gas fields of Brunei and Malaysia on the north coast of Borneo, as well as Ho Chi Minh City.

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was silent about Johnson South Reef at its daily briefing in Beijing on Wednesday. The official Xinhua News Agency had no immediate report on the Philippines‘ announcement, which is sometimes an indication that a development is being studied closely in Beijing.

But the Philippines has an unsteady record in monitoring Chinese activity off its shores. The Philippines accused China last fall of beginning construction at Scarborough Shoal, 440 miles northeast of Johnson South Reef, only to withdraw the accusation a month later and declare that new concrete blocks apparently seen at the shoal were not actually new and might even be a natural formation.

The dispute over Johnson South Reef coincided with anti-Chinese rioting in southern Vietnam, after a state-owned Chinese oil company set up a $1 billion oil drilling rig off

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the coast of southern Vietnam and near another disputed coral atoll, Triton Island. China is also upset after the Philippines police seized 11 Chinese fishermen a week ago and accused them of illegally poaching hundreds of rare, legally protected sea turtles off the west coast of the Philippines.

Two of the fishermen were found to be minors and released while the rest are being prosecuted and could face long jail sentences unless a diplomatic deal is reached.

China says that Johnson South Reef, Triton Island and much of the rest of the South China Sea nearly to the shores of Borneo, including where the fishermen were detained near the Philippines coast, represent an ancient fishing area for southern Chinese communities and belong to China.

A Xinhua commentary on Wednesday carried a strong warning for the Philippines and Vietnam. ―All parties should also be reminded that ignorance of China‘s resolve to defend its sovereign land will induce consequences too severe for certain countries to bear,‖ it said.

The Chinese military seized Johnson South Reef in 1988, killing dozens of Vietnamese military personnel who were there at the time. During an earlier confrontation with Vietnam in 1974, Chinese forces seized the Paracel Islands, about 450 miles north of South Johnson Reef and near where the drilling rig has now been erected.

Peter Dutton, the director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the United States Naval War College in Newport, R.I., said that China‘s historical behavior in the South China Sea suggests that its recent actions should not be taken lightly. ―The Chinese, in a previous policy era, have been willing to use military force,‖ he said.

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Philippines: China may be building airstrip at disputed reef AFP May 14, 2014 MANILA: The Philippines warned on Wednesday that China may be building an airstrip on a reef in the South China Sea as the Asian superpower asserts its claim to most of the strategic area.

Filipino military surveillance aircraft have been documenting large-scale earthmoving activity on Chinese-held Johnson South Reef since January, the defence department said.

Foreign secretary Albert del Rosario told reporters the Philippines had filed a diplomatic protest against China's reclamation works on the reef last month, but Beijing rejected it on grounds the reef is part of Chinese territory.

Asked if China was building an airstrip on the reef, also claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam, del Rosario said: "That's one possibility".

"On 04 April 2014, the Philippines protested Chinese reclamation on Mabini (Johnson) Reef. The Chinese side rejected the protest," a defence department statement said.

China had earlier built structures on the reef after seizing it and other outcrops from Vietnam in a deadly 1988 skirmish.

"We can confirm that there is ongoing reclamation or earthmoving activities in that portion," Filipino defence department spokesman Peter Galvez told reporters.

"Is that a possible airfield? We cannot speculate at this point," Galvez said.

"It has been getting bigger and bigger," he added. Chinese embassy spokesmen in Manila could not be reached for comment Wednesday.

The Philippines calls the outcrop the Mabini Reef while China calls it Chigua Reef.

It is part of the Spratly chain and is located about 300 kilometres (186 miles) west of the large western Philippine island of Palawan.

China's claim to nearly all of the South China Sea, which straddles vital sea lanes and is believed to sit on vast oil and gas reserves, has strained its ties with Southeast Asian countries.

Earlier this month Vietnam accused China of ramming its ships in an encounter near another part of the sea where Beijing had deployed a deep-sea oil rig.

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Those actions were described as "provocative" by US Secretary of State John Kerry in a phone call to Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi.

The Philippines in March filed a formal plea to the United Nations challenging Beijing's alleged territorial claims to about 70 percent of the South China Sea, in defiance of Chinese warnings that it would seriously damage their already frayed relations.

Manila claims it has exclusive rights to exploit the resources of waters and outcrops within its "exclusive economic zone" that lie within 370 kilometres (200 nautical miles) of its coastline under international law.

Beijing has rejected UN arbitration and urged Manila to settle the dispute through bilateral talks instead.

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Asean'sfirm stand on peaceful ways AHMAD FAIRUZ OTHMAN May 13, 2014 SOLUTION: Summit makes clear South China Sea disputes must be settled through negotiations, not through use of force

FOR much of its 47 years of existence, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) has rarely taken a hardline approach when facing conflicts domestically or outside the region.

This is the hallmark of Asean, which was built on the foundation of regional dialogue and cooperation that initially involved five nations back in 1967.

However, recent cases that highlighted territorial disputes in the South China Sea may have prompted the regional bloc to take a firm stand on an issue that can raise tension among some of its members with a regional superpower.

This issue alone loomed over much of the talks preceding and during the 24th Asean Summit in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar, over the weekend.

Asean has chosen to stand by its previous agreement to deal with disputes through negotiations and is against any use of force.

The Nay Pyi Taw Declaration, which was signed at the end of the summit by the 10 member nations, called for all parties involved in claims on the South China Sea to exercise self-restraint and non-use of force, and to refrain from taking action that will escalate tension.

The declaration also called for the strengthening of cooperation for full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), in accordance with international law. It also called for early conclusion of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).

Asean's worry over the territorial disputes is understandable.

Prior to and during Sunday's summit, leaders from two member nations had expressed unhappiness over recent developments in the vital shipping lane that stands between mainland China and Southeast Asia.

This comes after an alleged standoff between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels at an oil rig in disputed waters off the Paracel Islands last week; and the arrest of 11 crew members of a Chinese fishing boat by the Philippines, which accused them of poaching in waters disputed by Manila and Beijing.

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A group of protesters had also gathered outside the Chinese embassy in Hanoi, Vietnam, on Sunday with some holding placards that read "Denounce the Chinese Invasion".

Asean is certainly no stranger to issues that have potentially far-reaching consequences. The Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s and the recurring haze that enveloped parts of the region are examples.

Recently, domestic issues, such as Thailand's anti-government protests, have become a hot topic among Asean leaders.

But even when times are tough, Asean is able to find common ground to resolve issues amicably.

In fact, the birth of Asean in 1967 was an initiative to end conflicts among its five founding members -- Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore.

Asean emerged out of a desire by member nations to create cooperation and dialogue based on shared interest for political security and economic growth, amidst a backdrop of similar cultural traits.

This spirit remains till this day, and it can be seen when regional issues are dealt with in the uniquely Asean Way. If need be, member nations extend a helping hand, as in the case of Vietnam's assistance during the first phase of the search for the missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370.

Despite the tensions in recent developments, some observers feel that Asean's firm stance on the South China Sea issue could be a significant move that could lead to its resolution.

Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute (Asli) chief executive officer Tan Sri Dr Michael Yeoh said the Asean statement that addressed the South China Sea issue was a breakthrough for the bloc as it recognised a crucial need to ensure peace in affected areas.

"We urge all parties to peacefully discuss and resolve any issues on the South China Sea and hope that the COC can be agreed upon and adopted by the 25th Asean summit in November," said Yeoh, who was in Nay Pyi Taw for a major sideline event at the summit.

Yeoh previously urged Asean to come up with a mechanism for managing conflicts, an assignment that can be undertaken by the Asean Institute for Peace and Reconciliation, which started its first governing council meeting last December.

How the grouping deals with the South China Sea issue can be a crucial crossroad for Asean, even more so as it will be declared a community next year. This coincides with Malaysia's role as it assumes the association's chairmanship next year. As Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak has acknowledged, Malaysia will seek political will to ensure that the Asean Community and Asean Economic Community become a reality.

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U.S., China spar again on South China Seas dispute

May 13, 2014 (Reuters) - China hit back at the United States over the disputed South China Sea on Tuesday, after U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said recent Chinese moves in the resource-rich waters were "provocative".

Tensions rose last week after China moved a giant oil rig into an area also claimed by Vietnam. Each country accused the other of ramming its ships near the disputed Paracel Islands.

China claims almost the entire South China Sea, rejecting rival claims to parts of it from Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei.

"He (Kerry) said China's introduction of an oil rig and numerous government vessels in waters disputed with Vietnam was provocative," U.S. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said, referring to a telephone call between Kerry and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in which North Korea was also discussed.

"He urged both sides to de-escalate tensions, ensure safe conduct by their vessels at sea, and resolve the dispute through peaceful means in accordance with international law."

China's foreign ministry said there certainly had been provocative moves in the South China Sea, but that China was not the guilty party and repeated that it was the United States' fault for encouraging such behavior.

"We hope that the U.S. side can carefully reflect - if they really hope for the Pacific Ocean to be peaceful, what kind of role do they actually want to play?" spokeswoman Hua Chunying told a daily news briefing.

Hua said that Wang urged Kerry to "objectively and fairly" look at the South China Sea issue, and "act and speak cautiously".

China says that the South China Sea issue should be resolved via direct talks between the parties concerned, and has bristled at what it sees as unwarranted U.S. interference.

China has also looked askance at the U.S. "pivot" back to Asia, especially Washington's efforts to boost existing military links with Tokyo and Manila.

In separate remarks to visiting Singapore Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam, Kerry said the United States was deeply concerned by China's "aggressive act".

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"We are particularly concerned - all nations that are engaged in navigation and traffic within the South China Sea, the East China Sea, are deeply concerned about this aggressive act," Kerry said in the Monday meeting.

"We want to see a code of conduct created; we want to see this resolved peacefully through the Law of the Sea, through arbitration, through any other means, but not direct confrontation and aggressive action," Kerry added, according to a transcript of his comments released by the State Department.

Speaking to fellow leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations at a summit on Sunday, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung said Vietnam had acted with "utmost restraint" and used all means of dialogue to request China remove the rig.

Dung said China was slandering his country and committing dangerous violations.

However the communiqué issued at the end of the summit by the 10-nation ASEAN group contained no criticism of China.

Vietnamese state media said that Vietnamese and Chinese ships had again used water cannon on each other on Monday, though there were no injuries.

Chinese spokeswoman Hua would neither confirm nor deny the new face-off, repeating that China was urging Vietnam to "end its provocative actions" and withdraw its ships.

Kerry and Wang also reaffirmed the U.S. and China's shared commitment to work towards North Korean denuclearization, Psaki said, after North Korea on Saturday renewed a threat to set off an atomic device amid heightened concern over its attempts to build a nuclear arsenal.

"China is committed to realizing denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, safeguarding peace and stability of the Korean peninsula and resolving relevant issues through dialogue and consultation," Wang was cited as saying in a statement posted to the ministry's website.

North Korea is under heavy sanctions imposed by several U.N. resolutions adopted beginning in 2006 but has defied pressure to abandon its missile and nuclear programs. It last conducted a nuclear test in February last year.

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Trouble in the South China Sea THE EDITORIAL BOARD May 9, 2014 China has dangerously increased tensions in the South China Sea by deploying an oil rig for the first time in a disputed area claimed by Vietnam. The move is certain to make countries in the region feel even more threatened by China‘s expansionist territorial claims. The rig, belonging to a state-owned oil company, was parked in waters off the Paracel Islands on May 2. After Vietnam objected, China dispatched 80 ships to the area; Hanoi responded by sending 35 ships to obstruct the rig‘s operations.

The situation escalated on Wednesday, when Vietnam accused China of ramming and using water cannons on several Vietnamese ships. On Thursday, a Chinese Foreign Ministry official accused the Vietnamese of ramming Chinese vessels 171 times in a four-day period and argued that China‘s use of water cannons showed maximum restraint and was justified because the drilling was in ―China‘s inherent territory.‖ On Friday, Beijing accused America of encouraging Vietnam‘s behavior.

After using water cannons on Vietnamese ships in disputed waters, Beijing demanded Thursday that they withdraw.

China‘s protestations are not convincing, because there would be no face-off if it had not deployed the rig. Vietnam says the structure is parked on a continental shelf where the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea guarantees Vietnam exclusive rights to hydrocarbon and mineral resources. China, which rejects this argument, has laid claim to most of the South China Sea, a vital world trade route. As a result, China is also in conflict with the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan, which have rival interests in the sea, its islands and its rocks.

Some experts say the Chinese deployed the rig because oil and gas reserves were recently found nearby. But the move could also be pushback against President Obama and his increased focus on Asia. On a recent trip to Asia, Mr. Obama said America would defend disputed islands in the East China Sea under its security treaty with Japan and reinforced a treaty commitment to the Philippines. Washington takes no side in the maritime disputes but insists that they must be resolved peacefully.

On Thursday, China offered to hold talks with Vietnam, but only after the ships are withdrawn. In March, the Philippines, which has had frequent face-offs with China over disputed islands in the South China Sea, brought a case against China over a tiny reef to the international arbitration tribunal in The Hague under the law of the sea convention. Vietnam should pursue a similar remedy. Although a signatory to the convention, China has opted out of international jurisdiction over some territorial issues. If China really believes it has a right to drill near Vietnam, it should not be afraid to defend the claim within this internationally authorized dispute mechanism.

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Given China‘s increasingly aggressive behavior, Vietnam and its neighbors need a unified response. But fearful of antagonizing China, a summit meeting of Southeast Asian nations in Myanmar over the weekend failed to even mention the Vietnam-China dispute in its final communiqué.

(May 11, 2014, 7:34 PM ET: This editorial has been updated to reflect news developments.)

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In High Seas, China Moves Unilaterally

JANE PERLEZ and KEITH BRADSHER May 9, 2014 BEIJING — It is the pride of China‘s state-run oil industry and the nation‘s first deepwater drilling rig, a vessel as big as a football field and as tall as a 40-story building, with a $1 billion price tag. Last week, it crawled through the South China Sea, pulled by heavy-duty tugs, and parked in one of the most sensitive spots possible, about 17 miles off a speck of an island claimed by both China and Vietnam.

The Vietnamese, at times embraced in brotherly Communist Party fealty by China, were taken by surprise. Hanoi assumed the rig, known as HD-981, was just passing through, people close to the government said.

At least twice in recent years, China has sought to explore these waters and backed down after protests by Vietnam. Just six months ago, during a visit of the Chinese prime minister to Hanoi, the two sides announced that they would try to find ways to jointly develop oil and gas fields.

That good will evaporated this week when Beijing made clear the drilling rig was staying put. It set off four days of confrontation, with dozens of Chinese and Vietnamese naval vessels ramming one another and China using water cannons in a standoff that threatens to push a region known for its economic development toward military conflict.

China has not been shy in recent years about making broad claims to control much of the South China Sea. But by installing an expensive drilling rig in disputed waters, it now appears more willing to act first and invite diplomacy later. It is in effect creating ―facts‖ in the water that its regional rivals, and ultimately the United States, must either accept or fight.

China signaled it would take unilateral steps last year, when it declared an air defense zone over parts of the East China Sea that includes islands at the center of a long-smoldering dispute with Japan. In the battle of wills with Vietnam, China has unleashed a new and potentially powerful tool in its battle for territory: its oil industry and the rigs a state oil-company official once called ―our mobile national territory.‖

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Philippines offers oil, gas exploration area in waters disputed with China ERIK DELA CRUZ May 9, 2014 * Area 7 block falls in disputed Reed Bank area of South China Sea

* Area 7 estimated to hold 165 mln barrels of oil, 3.5 tcfgas

MANILA, May 9 (Reuters) - The Philippines on Friday launched a tender for exploration rights in 11 oil and gas blocks, including one in a disputed area of the South China Sea that is likely to fuel further tension with China.

China claims virtually all of the South China Sea and is already involved in a dispute with Manila over a Chinese fishing boat that was seized this week in the Spratly Islands on suspicion its crew was poaching protected turtles species.

Beijing is also in the middle of a stand-off over an oil rig it has moved into waters claimed by Vietnam.

Philippine energy officials sought to downplay the issue of territorial dispute with China in offering to investors the so-called Area 7 in Reed Bank - or Recto Bank as it is known in the Philippines. The Area 7 block, like the rest of the South China Sea, is believed to hold huge oil and gas deposits.

Manila calls the South China Sea the West Philippine Sea.

"The area we are offering in the West Philippine Sea is very near Palawan," Energy Undersecretary Ramon Allan Oca told Reuters, referring to the southwestern Philippine province.

The area is also near the Malampaya offshore natural gas oil field operated by a local unit of Royal Dutch Shell.

"From the point of view of the Philippines, it is not a disputed area," Oca said. "Area 7 is within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone."

China, the Philippines and Vietnam, along with Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei, all claim parts of the South China Sea.

It was in the Reed Bank where a 2011 confrontation between Chinese navy vessels and a survey ship contracted by London-listed Forum Energy Plc - a unit of Philippine exploration firm Philex Petroleum Corp - led to a halt in oil and gas exploration work in the Sampaguita block.

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Area 7, according to the Philippines' Department of Energy (DOE), holds an estimated resource potential of 165 million barrels of oil and about 3.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas. Water depths range between 800 and 1,700 meters.

"As we live within international laws, we seek all diplomatic recourse to assert our claims to the areas in the West Philippine Sea," Energy Secretary Carlos Jericho Petilla told potential investors in a speech at the launch of the 5th Philippine Energy Contracting Round.

The Philippines is also offering 15 blocks for coal exploration, which Petilla said are all within the country's territory.

Most of the oil and gas exploration blocks are located near the Philippines' main island of Luzon, while most of the coal blocks are in southern Philippine provinces. Ten of the 11 oil and gas block on offer are offshore.

Interested investors have until February next year to decide which oil and gas or coal areas they want to bid for.

Petilla said three potential areas for petroleum exploration have been "temporarily" excluded from the list of blocks offered because they fall within areas covered by a peace deal signed in March between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the country's largest Muslim rebel group.

Forum Energy holds Service Contract 72 issued by the Philippine government covering the Sampaguita block in the Reed Bank. The block is estimated to have 20 tcf of natural gas, much bigger that Malampaya's estimated reserves of 2.7 tcf.

Forum Energy has yet to resume work in the area after the earlier shipping dispute involving the Chinese navy.

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Christian Le Mière: Tempers flare in South China Sea CHRISTIAN LE MIÈRE May 9, 2014 ‗I don't believe there was a clash. I think this was a difference of opinion on some disputes‘, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cheng Guoping claimed on 8 May. He was talking after a face-off between Chinese and Vietnamese ships on 7 May in a disputed area of the South China Sea, in which vessels were rammed and sprayed water cannons at each other. This ‗difference of opinion‘ was perhaps the closest the two countries have come to a violent confrontation in nearly 25 years.

Hanoi claims that China‘s vessels acted aggressively; Beijing claims that its vessels were reacting to Vietnamese ramming initially. It is impossible to gauge which side is the more culpable, although the only evidence provided thus far comes from a Vietnamese video that clearly shows three separate incidents of China Coast Guard vessels (pennant numbers 46102, 44044 and 37102) changing course to ram the stern of a Vietnamese vessel and at times using water cannon.

The incidents have occurred as a result of China sending a deep-water oil rig, HD-981 owned by China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), to waters off the Paracel Islands. This situates the rig approximately 120 nautical miles off Vietnam‘s coast and 180 nautical miles from China‘s Hainan Island, but only 17 nautical miles from the nearest Paracel Island. Those islands are claimed by both Vietnam and China, but since a military clash in 1974 forced South Vietnamese troops from the westward half of the island group, they have been occupied by China in their entirety.

These incidents are the latest manifestation of tension over the various disputed features in the South China Sea, and arguably could be seen as a further attempt by China to change the status quo in the administration of the resources of the territory. In 2012, after a stand-off over Scarborough Shoal, China effectively assumed administration of the feature and has prevented Philippine fishing vessels from nearing the shoal again. In 2014, China twice attempted to prevent resupply of a small detachment of Philippine marines on a grounded vessel at Second Thomas Shoal, presumably in a bid to starve them off the feature. Now, in a clearly premeditated move that required significant organisation and planning in order to gather an 80-strong fleet of civilian, paramilitary and military vessels to accompany the rig, Beijing seems to be attempting to demonstrate its ability and willingness to exploit subsea resources in areas of the sea it considers to be within its exclusive economic zone.

Despite the aggressive rhetoric and low-level confrontation, however, the incident also reflects how neither side is eager to use violence as a solution to the dispute. Vietnam

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deployed only paramilitary vessels from its newly renamed Coast Guard and some civilian vessels, while China used only maritime constabulary vessels in the clashes themselves. The decision to avoid the direct use of military vessels in a confrontation suggests that escalation is not perceived to be in either country‘s favour at the moment. As in previous clashes with China in 1974 and 1988 in the South China Sea, Vietnam is likely to lose any brief engagement, and China is eager to appear to be acting within the confines of international law and not be seen as the aggressor by other states.

The use of civilian and paramilitary vessels reflects a broader strategy by states in the region to use unarmed or lightly armed vessels to enforce disputed sovereignty, coerce rivals and patrol the waters of the South China Sea. The policy allows the various states to demonstrate administration of disputed areas while also avoiding the possibility of rapid escalation of violence. At the same time, investment in military equipment has allowed Southeast Asian countries to develop capabilities, such as submarines and anti-ship missiles, to deter Chinese aggression more broadly.

The Sino-Vietnamese stand-off near the Paracel Islands will only reinforce these trends, and perhaps further another policy pursued by Hanoi: building stronger relations with a range of other powers, including Japan, the US and India, in order to encourage intervention from larger powers. As the oil rig demonstrates, Beijing currently has little appetite to engage in substantive dialogue over a resolution of these disputes, and hence further confrontations among constabulary and civilian vessels, increased investment in defence equipment, and greater involvement by extra-regional powers will all go to underline regional rivalry and competition in the South China Sea.

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China, Vietnam, Philippines collide amid escalating South China Sea tensions ZOE LI May 9, 2014

Hong Kong (CNN) -- Tensions escalated in the South China Sea region this week after China, Vietnam and the Philippines were involved in a series of potentially explosive confrontations over disputed territory.

Vietnamese officials say Chinese military and civilian ships have been intimidating their vessels near the Paracel Islands -- which are controlled by Beijing but claimed by Hanoi -- since Sunday, even accusing the Chinese of repeatedly ramming into them and shooting water cannons.

But China blames Vietnam for forcefully disrupting drilling activities, and demand that it withdraw all vessels from the area, said Yi Xianliang, Deputy Director-General of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs in a press briefing yesterday.

Meanwhile, a Chinese fishing boat and its 11 crew members were apprehended on Tuesday by Philippine authorities near the Spratly Islands, another disputed region in the South China Sea.

Philippine officials say the boat was carrying a large number of endangered species and they seized the boat "to uphold Philippine sovereign rights" in the disputed waters.

"It's possible that an armed clash could occur, but not a full-fledged war. The situation with Vietnam is serious -- more serious than the situation with the Philippines," said M. Taylor Fravel, Associate Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).

"China has controlled the northern half of the Paracel Islands since the 1950s and the southern half since 1974. Unlike the Spratly Islands, China maintains that no dispute exists over the Paracels. So we can see that China believes that its claim there is quite strong," he added.

Exclusion zone

Relations between China and Vietnam soured on Friday, when a Chinese platform began drilling for oil near the Paracel Islands. The oil rig, Haiyang Shiyou 981, is owned by state gas and oil company CNOOC.

The Maritime Safety Administration of China (MSAC) declared a three-miles exclusion zone around the rig, while military vessels have been deployed to patrol the area.

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"At present, the number of escorting ships of China has reached 60, including military ships," Tran Duy Hai, Vice Chair of Vietnam's National Boundary Commission, said in a statement Wednesday.

"These vessels have intentionally hit and collided with Vietnamese law enforcement ships, including those of the Maritime Police and Fisheries Control, causing damage in human and property." (sic)

China maintains that its current drilling activities are legitimate and blame the Vietnamese for provoking conflict.

"The drilling activities of this rig are within China's territorial waters. The harassment by the Vietnamese side is in violation of China's sovereign rights," said Hua Chunying, spokesperson of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She did not confirm the boat collisions.

According to CNOOC, a third of China's oil and gas resources are under the South China Sea, most of which it claims as its own, refuting rival claims from Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei.

'Undermines peace'

In Washington, U.S. State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki condemned China's drilling near the Paracels.

"This unilateral action appears to be part of a broader pattern of Chinese behavior to advance its claims over disputed territory in a manner that undermines peace and stability in the region," said Psaki.

China's Hua hit back saying that Chinese drilling activities "have nothing to do with Vietnam, let alone the U.S."

Meanwhile, the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs said it will deal with the detained fishermen "in a just, humane and expeditious manner." Philippines police claimed the fishing boat was loaded with 350 endangered turtles when it was seized near an area it controls called Half Moon Shoal.

China urged Manila to "stop taking further provocative actions."

"It is possible that the Philippines may have been emboldened by the recent defense agreement reached with the United States. China and the Philippines are jostling for control of the waters in the area where the arrest occurred," said MIT's Fravel.

The arrests follow U.S. President Barack Obama's visit to the Philippines earlier this week, kicking off the annual military drills held jointly by U.S. and Filipino forces.

During the trip, the U.S. and Philippines signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, a 10-year security pact that gives the U.S. more military access in the region.U.S.: China claim of air rights over disputed islands 'creates risk of incident'South Korea expands air defense zone in reaction to China.

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China Flexes Its Muscles in Dispute with Vietnam

JANE PERLEZ and RICK GLADSTONE May 8, 2014 BEIJING — China‘s escalating dispute with Vietnam over contested waters in the South China Sea sent new shudders through Asia on Thursday as China demanded the withdrawal of Vietnamese ships near a giant Chinese drilling rig and for the first time acknowledged its vessels had blasted the Vietnamese flotilla with water cannons in recent days.

While China characterized the use of water cannons as a form of restraint, it punctuated the increasingly muscular stance by the Chinese toward a growing number of Asian neighbors who fear they are vulnerable to bullying by China and its increasingly powerful military. The latest back-and-forth in the dispute with Vietnam — the most serious in the South China Sea in years — sent the Vietnamese stock market plunging on Thursday and elicited concern from a top American diplomat who was visiting Hanoi.

A Chinese Coast Guard ship used water cannon on a Vietnamese Sea Guard vessel near the Paracels Islands on May 4.

Political and economic historians said the China-Vietnam tensions signaled a hardening position by the Chinese over what they regard as their ―core interest‖ in claiming sovereignty over a vastly widened swath of coastal waters that stretch from the Philippines and Indonesia north to Japan. In Chinese parlance, they say, ―core interest‖ means there is no room for compromise.

―I find it quite alarming, because it was not so many years ago that there was a relatively tranquil relationship between China and its neighbors,‖ said Orville Schell, a China scholar who is the director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society in New York.

―Now we have a picture that‘s slowly pixelating, from Indonesia, to Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Japan, up the neighborhood,‖ Mr. Schell said in a telephone interview. ―We begin to get a picture of stress and strain. This is not exactly the peaceful rise of China that we were advertised.‖

While Mr. Schell said he did not necessarily foresee an armed conflict — a view echoed by others — he said the Chinese had ―created a climate where it will be very hard for China to exist in this state of fraternal relations with its neighbors.‖

The tensions with Vietnam began last week when a state-owned Chinese energy company moved the drilling rig into position in waters that Vietnam claims, and intensified this week as ships sent by both countries faced off.

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On Thursday, a Chinese Foreign Ministry official said that Vietnamese ships had rammed Chinese vessels as many as 171 times over four days. The announcement followed accusations by Vietnam on Wednesday that Chinese ships had rammed its vessels early this week.

The Chinese say Vietnam has dispatched 35 ships to the area, while the Vietnamese say China has deployed about 80 vessels.

The movement of the drilling rig, analysts said, was among the most assertive steps China has taken to solidify claims over both the South China Sea, one of the world‘s major trading routes, and the East China Sea.

In November, Beijing declared an air defense zone over a band of the East China Sea, including islands that both China and Japan claim, and demanded that other countries notify the Chinese authorities before their planes pass through the airspace. Although the United States military and Japanese aircraft flouted the demands, analysts have suggested the air defense zone helps China build a case for gaining control over the disputed islands, which Japan administers.

China also appears to have tightened its hold over a reef called Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, which the Philippines claims.

The disputes have raised concerns in Washington, which has been trying to calibrate its response to the various territorial claims. The Obama administration has courted countries in Southeast Asia as a counterbalance to China‘s power, but it has also been trying not to antagonize the Chinese.

On Thursday, the American assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Daniel R. Russel, who was on a trip to Hanoi, said that the latest dispute had been a major topic of his discussions there.

―We oppose any act of intimidation by vessels, particularly in disputed areas,‖ he said. The United States did not take a position on the competing claims of sovereignty, he added, but the disputes need to be ―dealt with diplomatically and must be dealt with in accordance to international laws.‖

The conflicts center in part on a competition for natural resources, including what some believe are substantial deposits of oil and gas beneath the seabed. China has been particularly eager to find energy reserves to feed its growing industrial needs.

The oil rig in the South China Sea was stationed there by China National Offshore Oil Corporation, or Cnooc, 120 nautical miles off Vietnam.

Yi Xianliang, deputy director general of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs of China‘s Foreign Ministry, who acknowledged Thursday that China had used water cannons, said, ―They are the most gentle measure we can take when trying to keep the other side out.‖

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But he added that China‘s oil drilling operations were legal because they were in ―China‘s inherent territory.‖

China is prepared to negotiate with Vietnam to solve the dispute, Mr. Yi said, but first Vietnam must end its ―disruption‖ and remove its vessels from the area near the rig. There have been 14 ―rounds of communication‖ between the two sides in the past few days, Mr. Yi added.

In the past, Vietnam and China have resolved some disputes by holding talks, and Mr. Yi said that relations between the two countries had improved in recent years. But the latest conflict has unsettled Vietnam and contributed on Thursday to a 5.9 percent drop in the country‘s key stock market index, its biggest one-day decline in 13 years.

The oil rig is about 17 nautical miles from disputed islands known in the West as the Paracels, in Vietnam as the Hoang Sa and in China as the Xisha. Dennis C. McCornac, a professor at Loyola University Maryland in Baltimore, said China‘s assertiveness was partly aimed at a domestic audience, and that Beijing‘s leaders were not interested in fighting with Vietnam.

―I think China and Vietnam have a lot of economic interests that are tied to each other,‖ he said. ―I can‘t see a war. That doesn‘t make sense for anyone.‖

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US slams China over Vietnamese vessels dispute in South China Sea DEMETRI SEVASTOPULO IN HONG KONG AND GEOFF DYER IN WASHINGTON May 8, 2014

The US condemned China on Wednesday for moving an oil rig into waters disputed with Vietnam, calling the decision ―provocative‖ and likely to ―raise tensions‖.

These tensions in the South China Sea had earlier escalated dramatically after Vietnam said Chinese ships rammed its vessels near the Paracel Islands and the Philippines detained a Chinese fishing boat and crew.

China and Vietnam have traded rhetoric in recent days after China moved an oil rig near the disputed islands. But the situation turned into a confrontation on Wednesday when the Chinese vessels fired water cannons at Vietnamese ships and deliberately rammed them, according to the government in Hanoi.

―This unilateral action appears to be part of a broader pattern of Chinese behaviour to advance its claims over disputed territory in a manner that undermines peace and stability in the region,‖ said Jennifer Psaki, US state department spokeswoman.

While China has accused Vietnam of infringing its sovereignty, a senior Chinese official on Thursday played down the incident, saying it was not a ―clash‖, according to Reuters.

The strong statement from the US state department follows a number of occasions in recent months when the Obama administration has adopted tough rhetoric to criticise Chinese actions in the South China Sea.

This was also a major theme of President Barack Obama‘s recent trip to the region. In particular, the US has challenged China over the so-called ―nine-dash line‖ map, which contains Beijing‘s claim to most of the South China Sea.

The US has backed the effort by the Philippines to seek international arbitration over its territorial dispute with China. In her statement on Wednesday, Ms Psaki said that the latest stand-off between China and Vietnam highlights ―the need for claimants to clarify their claims in accordance with international law‖.

Earlier, Vietnam‘s foreign ministry accused China of deliberately ramming its ships and said several sailors were injured in the clash. The Associated Press cited two diplomats saying 29 Vietnamese ships had been dispatched to the area.

China has territorial disputes with many neighbours, but particularly with Vietnam and the Philippines, which have been the most willing to push back. On Wednesday, the

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Philippines detained a Chinese fishing vessel and crew that were reportedly fishing for endangered sea turtles.

Earlier this week, Vietnam told China to stop the ―illegal‖ drilling. But Yang Jiechi, China‘s top foreign policy official, told his counterpart in Hanoi on Tuesday that

―Vietnamese harassment . . . has severely violated China‘s sovereignty‖.

The clashes on Wednesday appear to be the most serious between the countries in years. In 1974, China went to war with the Republic of Vietnam over the Paracels – called the Xisha in Chinese – and regained control over the islands. China is also embroiled in disputes with the Philippines over the Spratly Islands – which it calls the Nansha – and with Tokyo over contested islands in the East China Sea.

Japan on Thursday said it was ―strongly concerned‖ about the rising tensions in the South China Sea due to ―China‘s unilateral exploration‖, according to Kyodo News.

While China and its neighbours have quarrelled over the South China Sea for decades, Beijing has taken a more assertive position over the past five years. In addition to clashes with Vietnamese and Philippine vessels, Chinese ships have been involved in two incidents with US ships.

As well as becoming more assertive at sea, China has also taken steps at home to build support for its expansive view of sovereignty in the South China Sea.

Chinese state television recently broadcast an eight-part documentary that lionises the coast guard and fisheries bureau for their efforts to protect China‘s maritime rights and resources.

One episode describes how the coast guard dealt with Vietnamese ships that had ―savagely obstructed‖ Chinese exploration vessels. The narrator says the Chinese ships ―fearlessly confronted the armed fleets several times its own size and fought a grand

battle . . . and resolutely safeguarded China‘s marine rights and interests‖.

In recent months, China has twice tried to prevent Philippine boats from resupplying an old ship that was previously run aground on the Second Thomas Shoal. In 2012, Chinese and Philippine vessels had a tense month-long stand-off that raised concerns about China‘s intentions around the region.

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Why U.S.-Philippines Military Accord Worries China Zhang Hong May 3, 2014 A military pact between Manila and Washington sealed on Obama's trip to Asia is giving Beijing the jitters. Analysis- BEIJING — On April 28, just a few hours before President Barak Obama's arrival in the Philippines, the final stop of his four-nation Asia tour, the United States and the Philippines signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). This can rightly be called the most concrete achievement of the U.S. President's visit to Asia. With this renewable 10-year pact the U.S. is allowed to strengthen its military presence in the Philippines while the Philippines can also enhance its national defense forces. "Our goal is not to counter China. Our goal is not to contain China," stated President Obama in the joint press conference held in Manila with President Benigno Aquino. The U.S. president has been particularly careful on this Asia tour to avoid saying anything that could be interpreted as hostile to China. However, undoubtedly, China is the important context that brought about this U.S.-Philippine military pact. If China didn‘t exist, the Philippines would most likely be reluctant to invite its former colonial master, America, back to its soil. Even today Filipino leftists and nationalists are still extremely indignant about "American Imperialism." Contrary to the popularity he aroused by his visits to three other countries, there were angry protests to greet Obama's arrival. Change of mind In 1992, due to opposition in the Philippines, the U.S. Navy withdrew from Subic Bay, its permanent base in the Philippines. Up to then the Philippines had been America's largest naval base. The division of their duties had been that the U.S. military was responsible for external territorial defense while the Philippines' armed forces were responsible for the maintenance of internal stability. After the retreat of the Americans, the Philippines suddenly realized its extreme vulnerability in defense. "We don't even have a single fighter aircraft in our inventory," said President Aquino at the press conference. Very weak in both air and naval forces and exhausted by rebel groups and anti-terrorism needs at home, the Philippines does not have any extra energy to build up its external defense forces. As one of the ASEAN countries which islagging behind economically, building military forces is a particularly heavy burden for this small nation.

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Because of the Sino-Philippine dispute over Mischief Reef which began in 1994, the Philippines started reconsidering military cooperation with the U.S. and signed the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1999 allowing temporary deployment of U.S. forces in the Philippines. Since taking office President Aquino has also announced a five-year defense modernization plan. Apart from arms purchase it also implies the training of new military capability. From the point of view of the Filipino government there is no better way to improve its forces than joint operations with the U.S. A show of soft power Negotiations between Manila and Washington got a surprise boost in the aftermath of disaster when November's super-typhoon Haiyan exposed the weakness of Philippine's armed forces. In the face of catastrophe it was almost helpless. Within hours, the U.S. military has dispatched its Marine Corps stationed in Okinawa, Japan. U.S. warships arrived within a week and the U.S. government provided $140 million for reconstructionafter the disaster The American military's role in the relief provided the best propaganda for both countries. For the Philippines using the grounds of responding tofrequent extreme weather disasters and the humanitarian aid offered enables it to resist internal nationalist criticism of cooperating with the U.S. For America, it can say such cooperation is not addressed to China but is done because of humanitarian necessity. All in all, as the United States‘ oldest Asian ally, the Philippines has naturally become central to its "Return to Asia" strategy. Meanwhile, America's most important ally in Asia — Japan, has also begun to strengthen cooperation with the Philippines. Since taking office, Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been helping the Philippines in building up its military forces with the leasing of ten patrol ships and dispatching members of its Self-DefenseForcesto help in the relief of the typhoon Haiyan, which would turn out to be Japan's biggest ever postwar military intervention abroad. Last month Japan announcedit would provide another $ 67 million forrelief supplies. In return, President Aquino has expressed his support of Premier Abe's plan of revising Japan's Peace Constitution. Winning trust In China's eye, the growing cooperation between the Philippines, Japan and the U.S. can instead seem rather hostile. And yet, the only country really capable of changing the Asia-Pacific military balance, America, is not interested in starting a war there. This is because ―return to Asia‖ is first and foremost an economic interest for the U.S. The Asian emerging market is the world‘s major growth engine for the next few decades

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and thus every country in the world including the developed West all hope to enhance their economic ties with Asia. The U.S. priority in Asia is to ensure that trade and economic activities can be carried out smoothly. The South China Sea is the world‘s most important international hub of trade routes. The globalization-oriented America must guarantee the freedom of the region‘s maritime channel. Whereas America holds a symbolic ―ally of friendship‖ stance in the Sino-Japan East China Sea dispute, on the South China Sea issue it will have a more realistic advantage and incentive to maintain the status quo. As the U.S. enhances its military presence in the South China Sea, China‘s tough stance in claiming sovereignty will have an increasing cost. The most beneficial method is to conduct diplomatic measures and find solutions acceptable by all parties. However, currently China doesn‘t have an international image that wins trust. In the eyes of the outside world China rejects the Philippines proposition for resolving territorial disputes through international arbitration. It stubbornly resists resolving the dispute through international law and cares about only its own interests. This leads to the lack of a sense of security in its neighboring countries. ―While it's inevitable that China's going to be a dominant power in this region,‖ said Obama, ―it is indispensable that China gains the trust of others.‖ At present, the one thing that China can do is perhaps to show sufficient sincerity and a constructive attitude in just re-opened South China Sea Code of Conduct negotiations so as to prove that China's rise will be a peaceful one.

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Where Did All China’s Asian Friends Go? A coalition forms in Asia against Chinese aggression By Joshua Philipp, Epoch Times | May 2, 2014 Until recently, Japan was a country where national law forbade it from using war as a way to settle international disputes. The Philippines was on the U.S. piracy list. Indonesia was a neutral country. And no U.S. president had visited Malaysia in 48 years. All of this has now changed, as President Barack Obama wrapped up his visit to Asia—Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and South Korea. A coalition of Asian countries is now forming under the U.S. military‘s new focus on Asia, and with it new economic agreements, a rekindling of foreign relations, and the unraveling of tensions, which have historically divided the region. China is not part of this coalition, however. This is due to the fact that through growing aggression, China has of late made itself the enemy of nearly all its neighboring countries. In the last year, the actions of the last communist empire have unraveled the image Chinese authorities have been trying to build for decades. ―What happened is China abandoned its ‗peaceful rise,‘‖ said Edward Luttwak, an author who has served as a consultant for several U.S. government entities, including the Secretary of Defense, State Department, and the National Security Council. China‘s ―peaceful rise‖ was the line party planners once used when touting the communist regime‘s approach to foreign policy. It was based on the idea that China has its way of doing things internally—such as its human rights abuses—but these elements of aggression would not extend beyond its own borders. China dropped this approach, however, when it began flexing its muscles over territorial claims in the East and South China seas, where many countries have overlapping claims to islands, islets, and reefs. ―This China,‖ said Luttwak, referring to China‘s new aggressive approach for territorial claims, ―is a China that brings into existence an anti-China alliance.‖ Protesters hold anti-China placards and shout slogans during a rally in front of the building housing Chinese consular offices in Manila on April 2. China warned the Philippines on April 1 after Philippine leaders asked the United Nations to rule in their favor in a maritime dispute. (Ted Aljibe/AFP/Getty Images)

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Asia‘s Pivot Three island chains have become an international focus. In the East China Sea, there are the Senkaku Islands, which are grouped with Japan‘s Ryukyu Island chain. In the South China Sea, there are the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands. All countries whose shores border the islands lay claim to at least some of them. China, meanwhile, lays claim to all of them. Tensions came to a boiling point in November 2013 when China announced an Air Defense Identification Zone over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. It followed this with new ―fishing regulations‖ in the South China Sea in January. Chinese leaders said they would defend the air defense zone militarily, and the fishing area with new laws. The surrounding nations, as well as the United States, said they would not recognize either. Tensions grew. Chinese ships have nearly rammed fishing boats and military ships of other nations. Chinese jets track and follow aircraft in the region. In the end, what China created was an environment of tension—an environment where other countries were meant to fear China, and to abandon their territorial claims according to China‘s demands. The effect, however, turned out to be the opposite. Luttwak said the current situation differs from similar tensions during the Cold War when the Soviets were threatening Europe. At the time, many U.S. allies in Europe were still recovering from war, Germany was unable to have an army, and the United States was by and large the only country able to challenge Soviet power. The conflicts today with China are very different. ―In the Pacific you have countries that outnumber China, have more gross domestic product than China, and arguably more technology than China,‖ Luttwak said. ―Combined, India and Japan are greater than China.‖ He added that China‘s power is fading even more now that its economic growth is slowing—and especially now that China has provoked its neighbors to militarize and form an alliance to counter its actions. The U.S. presence in the region only adds to this countering force. U.S. President Barack Obama answers questions from young student leaders at the Young Southeast Asian Leadership Initiative (YSEALI) Town Hall during a visit to University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur on April 27. (MananVatsyayana/AFP/Getty Images)

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Riding a Tiger Rather than back down, China is instead beating its drums more loudly. While Obama was visiting other nations in Asia, Japan announced it will build a radar station on Yonaguni Island just east of Taiwan. China quickly shot back, saying it would hold patrols, military drills, and other activities near Japan‘s new station. According to June Teufel Dreyer, a former senior Far East specialist at the Library of Congress who served as Asia policy adviser to the chief of Naval Operations, many countries in the region find themselves in a complicated situation. ―Obama has taken the right steps to assure these countries,‖ she said, while noting that China will likely test the U.S. resolve to act. ―I think this will escalate further,‖ Dreyer said. ―I think what China is trying to do is provoke Japan to do something like firing a shot, and that will give them the excuse they need to move forward,‖ she said. ―They‘re going to say the Japanese side did this thing, and we are compelled to take counteraction.‖ China is also in a complicated spot: If it backs down it loses face in front of the world, and if it keeps pushing, other nations will continue pushing back. With the United States in particular, China has unintentionally helped it strengthen its relations and alliances in Asia in ways it would likely not have otherwise. Only two years ago, Japan was ready to kick the U.S. military out of Okinawa. The Japanese view of U.S. military presence quickly changed when China announced its air defense zone and started threatening Japan, saying the United States would not defend it in war over the Senkaku Islands. China‘s claims forced the United States to clarify its defense relationship with Japan, and during Obama‘s recent visit to Asia, he said directly that the U.S. commitment to defend Japan is ―absolute.‖

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Not playing China FRANCISCO S. TATAD May 2, 2014 President B. S. Aquino III apparently thought he and US President Barack Obama would be playing China together. Obama said however that they‘re not playing China right now, but that the US would defend the Philippines if attacked. This had some political pundits confused. What exactly did Obama mean?

―The US has no plan to contain China.‖ China is now the world‘s largest trading nation, according to the latest statistics, and is outspending almost every other country on defense outside of the US. Many China-watchers seem to believe China will soon rule the world—one global bestseller by Martin Jacques is entitled, ―When China Rules the World. ‖ But Obama did not come to Asia to embrace that position.

He obviously has a soft spot for B. S. III. But he has seen how unmusical the guy is on any serious question. Even when the guy appears headed in the right direction, he self-destructs as soon as he ―vocalizes‖ his position. Obama could not afford to let this loose cannon, this Philippine version of Kim Jong-un, mess up things for Washington. He had to restrain his poodle. It is within this context that one must read Obama‘s statement.

What about this? ―The US commitment to defend the Philippines against an armed attack is ironclad.‖ This is music to the ears of those who believe war is the only solution to our maritime and territorial problems, and that so long as the US is on our side, we could afford to have a war where we could lose millions of our people. Being told that the US will come to our defense may sound reassuring, but it is not nearly half as reassuring as our never having to be defended by anyone from anybody else at all.

The 1951 Mutual DefenseTreaty is not as ironclad as Obama puts it. Article IV of the treaty provides: ―Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either side of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.‖ This means the US is not obliged to respond automatically to any armed attack against the Philippines, but must leave the matter to the wisdom of Congress.

Thus from the very beginning, this absence of an automatic retaliatory clause (found in the NATO document) has been a major flaw of the MDT. Of course, from Vietnam to Iraq, the US President has never waited for authority from Congress before intervening. But there is no assurance he will act likewise in a Philippine crisis.

The US has long clarified when the MDT could be invoked. In his Jan. 6, 1979 letter to then-Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said an

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armed attack on the ―metropolitan territory‖ of either of the Parties or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific automatically activates the Treaty, except that an attack on Philippine armed forces, vessels or aircraft in the Pacific would not have to occur within the metropolitan territory of the Philippines or island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific in order to come within the definition of Pacific area in the Treaty.

The country‘s ―metropolitan territory‖ includes all of the land areas and all adjacent waters subject to the sovereignty of the Philippines, in accordance with international law, lying within the area delineated by Spain and the US in the Treaty of Paris of Dec. 10, 1898, and the Treaty of Washington concluded between the US and Britain on Jan. 2, 1930.

An attack on Philippine troops, public vessels or aircraft in disputed waters would be sufficient to call the MDT into action, even if the US did not support our position on the territorial dispute. But whether the US President would act promptly or await authorization from Congress, no one can say. Neither can we say that the EDCA, whichDefense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin and US Ambassador Philip Goldberg signed on April 28, would accelerate the response.

I was pleased to see the EDCA evolve from one originally intended to be signed by the US Department of Defense and the Philippines‘ Department of National Defense only into one signed between the two governments. But I have serious doubts it can stand without Senate concurrence. Sec. 21, Article VII of the Constitution provides: ―No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.‖

And Sec. 25 of Article XVIII provides: ―After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.‖

The ―troops‖ referred to in the EDCA are precisely the same troops that will create camps and ―non-bases‖ within Philippine military camps and bases. And the war materiel that will be prepositioned in ―agreed locations‖ constitute the ―facilities‖ referred to in the Constitution. One critical issue is the ―rent-free‖ provision of the agreement. This was a basic flaw in the 1947 military bases agreement, which Marcos had tried to cure a few years before he was ousted. Has B. S. III learned nothing at all from our earlier errors?

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Insight: Will US-Philippines pact sideline ASEAN’s normative order? RIZAL SUKMA May 02 2014 The recent visit by US President Barack Obama to the Philippines ended in an agreement aimed at reinvigorating bilateral defense ties and cooperation between the two allies. With the signing of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), the US military has greater access to Philippine bases for the next 10 years. The agreement will allow US troops and other military assets to be stationed in the Philippines on a temporary and rotational basis. Even though Obama and US officials maintain that the EDCA is primarily meant to promote regional security and has nothing to do with China, one cannot miss the fact that the agreement clearly reinforces America‘s ―rebalancing‖ strategy in East Asia. Similar steps have been carried out by the US. During 2012-2013, it announced that it would deploy 2,500 marines to Australia; station four littoral combat ships (LCS) in Singapore; and deepen defense and security ties with Vietnam. The newest agreement with Manila will clearly boost America‘s defense posture and military presence in Southeast Asia. Of course, through the EDCA, the US expects to alleviate doubts in the region, especially among its allies, about America‘s resolve and capacity to sustain its ―pivot to Asia‖ strategy. However, it is not difficult to see that the ―rebalancing‖ strategy is also meant to preserve American primacy in the face of China‘s rise and growing influence in the region. For American allies and partners in the region, it is also the rise of China — or the fear of it — that has prompted them to convince Washington to stay engaged in the region to preserve the balance of power. Regional countries are nervous about China‘s growing assertiveness invoking its claims in the South China Sea. Indeed, the strengthening of defense ties between the US and its allies and partners is taking place with the growing rivalry between the two great powers in the background. In this context, one wonders whether power politics has returned to Southeast Asia. In fact, many fear that the region is increasingly defined by the primacy of a realist order based on power politics and balance of power in classical sense. These developments raise a critical question for the future of regional order in East Asia: Is ASEAN‘s approach, which prefers norms and institution-building as a mechanism to ensure regional peace and stability, being sidelined?

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Of course, it is too early to say that ASEAN‘s approach has lost its relevance. From the outset, ASEAN realized that the region had always been characterized by the existence of three types of order that co-exist with each other. The first is the realist order based on the central role of power in inter-state relations. It would be naïve to believe that in an ―anarchical‖ world of international politics, the pursuit of power should be abandoned. Second, states also believe that international relations are guided by certain norms. In fact, norms — often demonstrated by states‘ adherence to international laws — function to define the behavior of states. Even great powers like the US and China do see the need to abide by international norms. Hence, the existence of normative order in East Asia is a reality. Third, interaction among states in East Asia has always been carried out within various institutions. This institution-based order in the region has been exemplified by the presence of various ASEAN-centered institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). The challenge for ASEAN, therefore, is how to ensure that the realist order will not become a dominant feature of regional politics. ASEAN should ensure that the three types of order would reinforce, not undermine, each other. This is critical for peace and stability in the region. In order to do this, two prerequisites need to be fulfilled. First, ASEAN and great powers need to recognize that the three types of order are interconnected. Normative and institution-based orders would not function properly without a stable balance of power among the great powers. However, a realist order based on balance of power will be fraught with risks of conflict if it is not moderated by a functioning normative and institution-based order. In the Southeast Asian context, therefore, it is in the interests of the great powers to support and strengthen ASEAN‘s normative and institution-based order. Second, it is imperative for the region to find a way to alleviate the fear of China‘s rise. It is this fear that would push regional countries to adopt either ―bandwagoning‖ or ―balancing‖ strategies. Unfortunately, more and more countries in the region are choosing the strategy of balancing or hedging against China. China‘s growing assertiveness, especially in the South China Sea, is often cited as the key factor in this regard. Therefore, the fear of China could be mitigated if the South China Sea problem can be managed peacefully through an early conclusion of the Code of Conduct (CoC) between China and ASEAN. The writer is executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta.

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China Reactions to Obama’s Asia Tour: Overwhelmingly Negative MARK C. EADES May 1, 2014 Reactions to President Obama‘s recent Asian tour in China‘s state-run media have been overwhelmingly negative. This should come as no surprise to anyone. Of particular irritation to China were a U.S.-Japan joint statement confirming that the allied nations‘ security treaty applies to all territories administered by Japan, including the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and a U.S.-Philippines defense agreement boosting America‘s troop presence in the Southeast Asian nation. Revealed in Chinese reactions to Obama‘s Asian tour is a China that lives in a world entirely of its own imagination, a place called Planet China, innocent and virtuous but beset by malicious troublemakers. ―U.S. shows its true colors,‖ announced an editorial in the English-language China Daily. ―It is increasingly obvious that Washington is taking Beijing as an opponent,‖ said the editorial, taking aim at America‘s alliances with Japan and the Philippines. ―Ganging up with its troublemaking allies, the U.S. is presenting itself as a security threat to China.‖ The editorial accused the United States and its ―malicious‖ allies in Asia of projecting a ―threatening image of China‖ in a concerted ―attempt to contain China‘s influence in the region.‖ According to the editorial, however, these efforts will ultimately fail: ―Washington must come to terms with the reality that China will continue to grow, though it will not follow the U.S.‘ hegemonic path.‖ ―Extending the U.S.-Japan security treaty to [the Diaoyu/Senkaku] islands is both morally and legally wrong,‖ said another China Daily editorial, ―Obama should not expect Chinese connivance in his turning a blind eye to Japan‘s thievery and its claims of innocence…. By tacitly endorsing Japan‘s actions, [Obama] is giving [Japanese Prime Minister] Shinzo Abe carte blanche to continue destabilizing the region.‖ In both China Daily editorials, China assumes moral and legal high ground that no one else seems to recognize, and claims innocence while placing the blame for tensions in the East China Sea entirely on Japan and the United States. ―The U.S. and Japan are playing with fire in Asia,‖ said an editorial in the English edition of People‘s Daily. This editorial likewise accused the United States of conspiring with its ―puppet‖ Japan to ―constrain China‘s development.‖ Likewise also, however, this editorial confidently insisted that America and Japan ―will benefit nothing from stirring up trouble‖ in Asia. Here, as elsewhere, China presumes to speak for all of Asia when in fact it is only making Chinese claims. China‘s neighbors in Asia beg to differ.

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People‘s Daily also highlighted ―indignation‖ expressed by Chinese netizens following the U.S.-Japan joint statement. ―The Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea have been an integral part of Chinese territory for centuries,‖ said one netizen quoted by People‘s Daily, ―The U.S. has no right to interfere.‖ Unfortunately for this netizen, the uninhabited islands in question have never been ―an integral part of Chinese territory,‖ no facts on the ground support China‘s claim to them, and they have been under Japan‘s explicit administration for more than a hundred years. There are islands in the East China Sea — such as the Zhoushan Islands off the coast of Zhejiang Province — with Chinese people living on them and to which China has an indisputable claim as ―an integral part of Chinese territory.‖ This is not the case with the uninhabited, Japan-administered Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Said another netizen quoted by People‘s Daily: ―The U.S. makes a song and dance about freedom and democracy. But the Diaoyu Islands are Chinese territory…. You have to understand other people‘s rules when you come to their home. Insist on being thoughtless, and exceed the boundaries of courtesy, and you will pay the penalty!‖ Obama didn‘t visit China on this trip to Asia, but this netizen appears to believe that any place one visits in Asia is China‘s ―home‖ and subject to China‘s ―rules.‖ China‘s displeasure at the U.S.-Japan joint statement was matched by its displeasure at Obama‘s defense agreement with the Philippines. ―Given that the Philippines is at a bitter territorial row with China, the move is particularly disturbing as it may embolden Manila in dealing with Beijing,‖ said another People‘s Daily editorial. ―It is noteworthy that the Philippines has been a trouble-maker in the South China Sea. It has encroached upon Chinese territory and harassed Chinese fishing boats.‖ It is noteworthy also that the territories in dispute are far closer to the Philippines than to China, and that China‘s claim to these territories is based on nothing more than a few old books that could just as easily have claimed the moon as a ―Chinese discovery‖ and as ―indisputable Chinese territory.‖ Noteworthy, too, is that China is viewed as a ―trouble-maker‖ by far more countries in the region than are the Philippines. Chinese reactions to Obama‘s tour of the Asia-Pacific region confirm once more that China has constructed its own version of reality, making up its own facts as it goes along and seeing only what China wants to see. Too bad the rest of the world refuses to live on Planet China.

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A Guide to Understanding China's Regional Diplomacy Phillip Saunders April 30, 2014 China's regional diplomacy has a schizophrenic quality. On the one hand, Chinese leaders have resumed their diplomatic charm offensive, with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang visiting five Southeast Asian countries in October 2013 and attending a high-level work conference on "periphery diplomacy" which highlighted Beijing's intention to use "good-neighborliness and friendship" to create a peaceful and stable regional environment. During their travels, President Xi called for a "maritime silk road" to connect China with Southeast Asia, and Premier Li put forward a seven point proposal to deepen cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). On the other hand, Beijing's aggressive steps to pursue its maritime territorial claims have generated fear and alarm throughout Asia. Since declaring an Air-Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea in November 2013, Beijing has deepened its confrontation with Japan over the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, sent a three ship navy patrol to the James Shoal (50 miles off the Malaysian coast), and tried to prevent the Philippines from resupplying the crew of a derelict warship grounded on the Second Thomas Shoal. These actions show China's determination to expand its effective control over disputed maritime territories in the East and South China Seas and highlight President Xi's vow never to compromise on basic interests. To Western analysts, the dual Chinese goals of maintaining stability (weiwen) and protecting maritime rights and interests (weiquan) are contradictory. How can China hope to maintain regional stability when it is aggressively strengthening its claims to territory claimed by its neighbors? From a Chinese perspective, however, a contradiction (maodun) is a tension to be managed, not an imperative to choose between conflicting goals. China uses a variety of tactics to manage this tension, including relying primarily on paramilitary rather than military forces and using "salami tactics" to expand its effective control of disputed territories on a step-by-step basis while staying below the threshold of military confrontation. At the same time, China has become more willing to use its growing military power advantage to intimidate rival claimants and its economic leverage to punish countries that challenge Chinese sovereignty claims. Beijing carefully differentiates between claimants and non-claimants (and distinguishes more assertive South China Sea claimants such as Vietnam and the Philippines from others such as Malaysia and Brunei) in order to divide potential opposition and prevent

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collective responses to Chinese actions. (This pattern suggests Beijing will wait before establishing a South China Sea ADIZ in order not to confront Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian countries at the same time.) China perceives and portrays its actions as defensive responses to actions by others that challenge China's "indisputable" sovereignty. Framing issues this way produces domestic incentives for tough responses and allows China to claim that its actions are reactive and defensive. Since 2012, Beijing has sought to deter challenges by using them as opportunities to expand China's effective control. For example, Philippine Navy efforts to enforce fishing regulations in the Scarborough Shoal in April 2012 created a crisis as both China and the Philippines deployed additional ships to the area. Even after a US-brokered mutual withdrawal, China wound up with effective control of the disputed territory when it redeployed paramilitary vessels to block Philippine access. Such outcomes discourage future challenges. Beijing subsequently applied this "Scarborough model" to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands after the Japanese government purchased three of the islands from a private Japanese owner in September 2012. China has sent paramilitary and naval ships into waters near the islands, with the goals of challenging Japanese administrative control (the basis for application of the U.S.-Japan security treaty to the islands) and forcing Tokyo to acknowledge the dispute. With US support, Japan has refused to make concessions in the face of Chinese pressure. China has responded by intensifying its anti-Japanese campaign, citing Japanese Prime Minister Abe's visit to the Yasukuni shrine as evidence of a revival of Japanese militarism. Chinese analysts often blame the US "rebalance to Asia" announced in November 2011 for encouraging challenges to Chinese claims, but China's more assertive approach to maritime disputes actually predates the rebalance by several years. Because the United States does not take sides in any of these sovereignty disputes, Beijing has thus far been able to expand its effective control without directly challenging Washington. China's policy includes carrots as well as sticks. Chinese leaders regularly cite Deng Xiaoping's concept of joint development of resources in disputed areas as a basis for cooperation, although neither of the attempts to apply this concept (2005-2007 seismic exploration with the Philippines and Vietnam and a 2008 natural gas agreement with Japan) have been successful. Beijing's approach rests on the belief that the regional balance of power is moving in its favor and that other countries will eventually have to compromise with a dominant China. However, other claimants also face nationalist publics and will not simply abandon their claims. Despite China's importance, they have other options (including enhancing security ties with the United States).

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Managing the tensions between competing Chinese goals requires agile diplomacy and effective control of military and paramilitary forces. However, China's nationalistic policy environment and mixed crisis management record does not inspire much confidence in Beijing's juggling ability. If China continues aggressive efforts to expand control over disputed territories, it will further damage relations with its neighbors and risk destabilizing the regional security environment. Dr. Saunders is director of the National Defense University's Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs. The views expressed are his own, and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US government. This article is adapted from his chapter in David Shambaugh and Michael Yahuda, eds., International Relations of Asia, second edition (Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield, 2014).

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Dismounting China from the South China Sea MICHAEL DANIELS AND CHRISTOPHER KUCHMA April 26, 2014 China's economy requires increased access to resources, especially when managing the needs of approximately 20% of the world's population. China's growing energy needs and overlapping territorial claims in the resource-rich South China Sea place their energy security on a collision course with its smaller, weaker neighbors. The most recent issue is China's increasingly hard-lined approach to the Scarborough Reef, approximately 4 times farther away from China than it is to the Philippines. Historic lens China backs its South China Sea claims through a Chinese map produced in 1947, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai‘s 1951 statement, and the discovery of the Belitung Wreck in 1998. Please make your own opinions regarding the legitimacy of a map created in 1947 citing a historical claim. Minister Zhou‘s statement denounced the San Francisco Peace Treaty – as China was not invited – and further declared Chinese ownership of the Spratly, Paracel, and Pratas Islands. Furthermore, Beijing portrayed the Belitung Wreck as ―[Tang Dynasty] artifacts at the bottom of [Indonesian coastal waters],‖ however failed to mention that the dhow (a lateen-rigged ship with one or two masts) was not a "Chinese vessel that had a seafaring purpose in the region," but is instead debated to have been an Arabian or Indian ship. Even if it was a Chinese trade ship, a sunken vessel possibly lost at sea doesn‘t really pass the legitimacy test for a territorial claim. Legal lens In addition to questionable historical interpretations, China tries to strengthen its claims with outdated legal decisions.

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In 2010 and again in 2013, China attempted to gain ownership of up to two-thirds of Okinawa‘s continental shelf by arguing Okinawa was a former Chinese vassal state and cited the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Case ruling to strengthen its cause. However, this form of coastal delineation was superseded by the 1973 to 1982 drafting of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which replaced the natural prolongation argument with the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) – as demonstrated in 1982 (Libya v. Tunisia) and again upheld in 1985 (Malta v. Libya). Additionally, Article 12 of UNCLOS defines islets as land masses incapable of sustaining life and therefore ineligible for EEZ status. Without this EEZ status, they cannot be used by Beijing (or any other country) to create a maritime boundary, such as Beijing‘s Nine-Dash Line. However, when we look at the Philippines‘ and other countries‘ disputes with China, we start to see some legitimacy of ownership. For example – the obvious distance factor aside – some countries have had prior habitation on the islets, whereas China has not. Additionally, several of the claimant countries either have developed or are exploring ways to develop tourism (beaches, diving, fishing, etc), which assert possession over the area. Other avenues have included deploying military contingents or setting up civilian communities on these islets to demonstrate physical occupation. These countermeasures are in addition to the 1994 decision, determined by UNCLOS Article 121, which created international maritime boundaries – that China chooses to ignore. Combined, these cursory examples prove Beijing lacks solid historical, occupational, and legal claims in the region. Ways forward Beijing‘s branding of the South China Sea as one of its ―core interests‖ will only compound matters. Previous ―core interests‖ include Taiwan, Tibet, and the former East Turkmenistan and generally means China will refuse to negotiate where they would need to concede territory; use force to protect their interests; and impose a regional order – an obviously bleak picture. Moreover, China‘s modus operandi for dealing with territorial claims is a 3-pronged approach; which includes delays in dispute resolution, consolidation of claims, and preventing the opposing country from strengthening their claims.

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To many Asia-Pacific observers, Beijing‘s heavy-handed approach is reminiscent of the ―middle kingdom,‖ a time in China's imperialistic past when rulers, emboldened by the ―mandate of heaven,‖ threatened and subdued all non-Chinese nations if they failed to pay tribute or showed deference. Which is why China was angered when the Philippines didn‘t back down and instead filed their territorial dispute in the Permanent Court of Arbitration on March 30, 2014. To maintain regional stability, everyone‘s motivation needs to be understood. For example, China‘s hard-line approach may be rooted in the fact that it is 80 to 90% dependent on foreign oil; has a massive, growing population; and the Communist Chinese Party leadership must deliver continued high-growth to maintain its position. On the other hand, as Dana Dillon suggests, China is viewed as the neighbor on the street who tries to own your yard, your driveway, and your mailbox, but allows you to keep your house. Mainland China should be more like Taiwan – in April 2013 Japan and Taiwan concluded a fishing agreement surrounding the disputed Senkaku islands. Following Taiwan's lead, Mainland China can prove that is dedicated to the Rule of Law and is not simply a reincarnation of the Middle Kingdom. Instead of increasing tensions with the possibility of a mistaken calculation leading to conflict, Taiwan and Japan sat down, discussed their fishing requirements, and signed an agreement. Their territorial dispute remains unsolved; however, both sides enjoy the new status quo and prove that even when a dispute exists, so too does an amiable solution for both sides. Thus, we have a golden opportunity for China and the Philippines to work together, demonstrate that they support the Rule of Law and are capable of solving problems in a legal and friendly fashion. – Rappler.com Michael Daniels is a World Support for Development (WSD) non-resident Handa Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies). His experience and research includes Stability in Post-unification Korea, China/India and the Politics of Energy Security, Disaster Risk Reduction as an Economic Force Multiplier in the Pacific, and grants in workforce development, cancer risk reduction in rural areas, and educational empowerment for at-risk teens. US Air Force Major (Special Agent) Christopher K. Kuchma is currently serving as a Northeast Asia-Japan Regional Area Studies Officer, whose core focus is as a Counterintelligence Special Agent and a Japan Area Specialist with the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). He has had more than 9 years in-country experience in Japan. Follow him on Twitter @BlueEyedRonin

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Defending Japan and the Philippines Is Not Entrapment JEFFREY ORDANIEL April 15, 2014 In August 2013, US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel declared while in Manila that the US-Philippines alliance is ―an anchor for peace and stability‖ in the region. In October of the same year, US Secretary of State John Kerry emphasized in Tokyo that the ―US-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in Asia Pacific.‖ Notwithstanding these bold pronouncements from high-ranking US officials, some in America have expressed concerns over the possibility of entrapment in case the two US allies‘ separate disputes with China turn violent. Some are concerned that Washington could get dragged into a war with China over tiny islands that the US has no national interest in. Others argue that Washington‘s long-standing policy of strategic ambiguity should be applied on the East and South China Seas in order to deter the Chinese from changing the relevant status quos, and the Japanese and the Filipinos from getting too emboldened. These beg two important questions. First, will militarily defending Japan and the Philippines over their disputes with China really mean entrapment of the US? Second, will ambiguity in American security commitments to Tokyo and Manila result in an outcome in favor of peace and stability? Regarding the first question, it is important to dissect what the East and South China Sea disputes involve. On the East China Sea dispute, it must be noted that it was only in 2008 when China started to send civilian law-enforcement vessels to the territorial waters of the islands in contention. In retrospect, this was the start of Beijing‘s attempt to revise the status quo of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Over the years, the frequency of incursions increased dramatically. Recently, such attempt to alter the status quo was extended to the relevant airspace with China sending paramilitary aircraft and declaring an air-defense identification zone. In 2010, Beijing used economic coercion to prevent Tokyo from sentencing a Chinese fishing trawler captain who deliberately rammed his ship into Japanese Coast Guard vessels. Furthermore, the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute involves maritime boundary questions. This is significant because the East China Sea is an important sea lane, where energy and trade for South Korea and Japan pass through. It is also a strategic common that is the gateway to mainland East Asia and an immediate connection to the South China Sea, a very important choke point. On China‘s dispute with the Philippines, it must be noted that Beijing‘s ambiguous ―nine-dash line‖ claim effectively turns much of the South China Sea, including areas long

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considered part of the global commons, as China‘s own territorial waters. Given that $5.3 trillion worth of trade passes through the South China Sea every year, $1.2 trillion of which is US trade, the significance of the dispute between Manila and Beijing cannot be underestimated. Beijing has been using coercion and intimidation to change the status quo of the islands and maritime domains in the South China Sea. In 1995, Chinese forces occupied and built a garrison on the Mischief Reef, a submerged maritime feature located 129 nautical miles west of a major Philippine landmass and 599 nautical miles southeast of Hainan, the nearest Chinese landmass. Under customary international law and its codified version, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), submerged maritime features cannot be claimed by any state as a territory under its sovereignty. Hence, their control is dependent on whichever exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or continental shelf they are located. Moreover, in 2012, China also successfully flipped the status quo of the Scarborough Shoal, another maritime feature within the Philippines‘ exclusive economic zone, after a tense standoff. Quite recently, China has been attempting to eject Manila‘s military presence in the Second Thomas Shoal, another submerged maritime feature within the Philippines‘ UNCLOS-mandated continental shelf. In March 2014, China twice implemented a blockade which tried to prevent the Philippine military from provisioning and rotating its troops in the shoal. Months prior to those incidents, China has been sending naval frigates and civilian maritime law enforcement vessels to contested waters in an apparent attempt to intimidate the Philippine government. All of these reveal two issues. First, the disputes in the East and South China Seas involve a rising revisionist power trying to alter the status quo, not by the rule of law or peaceful, nonhostile means, but by intimidation and coercion. Second, the disputes involve not just the islands themselves, but maritime domains critical for the control of valuable trade routes and strategic commons. What then do these two issues mean for the United States? They mean that militarily defending Japan and the Philippines is not simply giving a favor to longstanding allies. It‘s not entrapment. Clearly committing to their defense means defending two important US national interests: 1) the rule of law, and 2) securing freedom of navigation and unimpeded lawful commerce in very strategic trade routes and critical choke points. These two alone are enough justifications for Washington to clearly stand by with its two Pacific allies. Regarding the second question, it is obvious that America‘s ―strategic ambiguity‖ has not been effective in preserving East Asian status quo. Strategic ambiguity is not a wise answer to China‘s approach of ―salami slicing‖ and ―talk-and-take‖ policy in East Asian seas. China has shown that it is not interested in signing a binding code of conduct in the South China Sea nor in clarifying its claims to be in line with UNCLOS. While both Philippine president Benigno Aquino and Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe have been repeatedly stressing the importance of upholding the rule of law, Beijing has been continually rejecting multilateral platforms and international arbitration for resolving

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disputes. Recent incidents indicate that China is becoming more inclined to use intimidation, coercion and even force against its neighbors to attain its objectives. With all these, Washington should be very specific with its security commitments to both Tokyo and Manila, before it‘s too late. If Japan doubts the security guarantee of its US alliance, the ramifications would be deleterious. Other American allies would consequently also doubt the US. Why? Because if the US could consider an abandonment of the world‘s third largest economy, what guarantee is there that Washington would not do the same to other allies? In a way, the US-Japan alliance is the ultimate measure of America‘s rebalance to Asia. Furthermore, doubts in the US-Philippines alliance are more likely to embolden China to use force since, unlike Tokyo, Manila has a weak military and a significantly lower deterrent capability. Ambiguity also increases miscalculation and could result in a vicious arms race. On the one hand, China might perceive the two US alliances as not very credible—resulting in military adventurism. On the other hand, Japan and the Philippines might perceive the ambiguous US commitments to be too weak a security guarantee and so result in an overshoot of military buildup, increasing regional tensions further. Those are just a few possible consequences of US commitments being open to interpretation, in addition to others that can exacerbate the already tensed geopolitical and security landscape of the region. In conclusion, while it is understandable for some to put an emphasis on America‘s economic relations with China, Washington should be clear with its treaty allies in the Pacific for reasons outlined above—promoting the rule of law, preserving freedom of navigation and unimpeded lawful commerce, and protecting strategic global commons and critical chokepoints. These are indispensable and long-term US national interests. Being clear with its security commitments could drastically restrain China from further destabilizing revision of relevant status quos and deter it from using threat or force, while at the same time reducing the security uncertainties of US allies and smaller powers in East Asia. The US-Japan and the US-Philippines alliances, would then be the cornerstone and an anchor, respectively, of peace and stability in the region—not an entanglement. Jeffrey Ordaniel is a PhD Student at the School of Security and International Studies, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo.

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Russia and Vietnam Team Up to Balance China STEPHEN BLANK April 7, 2014 Justified emphasis on the current Ukraine crisis should not lead us to make the mistake of overlooking Russia‘s policies in East Asia. Normally Russia‘s policies in Southeast Asia do not get much attention. But they reveal important motifs and themes in Russia‘s overall foreign policy and its response to China‘s rising power and to trends in Asian security. Examination of those policies reveals much about Russian policy in Asia and in general. In particular they demonstrate Moscow‘s quest for total independence and tactical flexibility as well as its habitual reliance on energy and arms sales in strife-torn areas as the instruments by which it seeks to gain leverage on regional security agendas. Moreover, they also demonstrate that like other powers, Russia is pursuing what may be called a hedging strategy against China in Asia. On the one hand it supports China against the US and on the other works to constrain Chinese power in Asia. Southeast Asia‘s importance to Russia has steadily risen due to Russia‘s own pivot to Asia.[i] As part of that pivot, Moscow recently proclaimed its intention to pursue negotiations for naval bases in the Seychelles and Singapore.[ii] This is on top of Russia‘s previously overt efforts to attain basing at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.[iii] Not surprisingly, these moves will not be welcome in China and they may be seen as representing (along with Moscow‘s parallel rapprochement with Japan) Russia‘s response to Chinese President Xi Jinping‘s recent invitation to join China ―in guaranteeing security and stability in the Asia-Pacific Region.‖[iv] In other words, even as Russo-Chinese cooperation against US power, interests and values continues on global issues and in areas of unimportance to China like Syria, Russia strives for geopolitical independence in Asia. Were Moscow to accept Xi‘s offer, it would be admitting that it has become China‘s ―junior brother‖ in Asia; a role that Russia bridles at accepting. Therefore Moscow is making these ―chess moves‖ to Southeast Asia to demonstrate its true independence and great power status. While those attributes of Russia‘ standing in Asia are debatable, there is no doubt that Vietnam, for one, has fully embraced Russia in an effort to get allies to restrain China even as it continues on its own accord to pursue a diplomatic resolution of outstanding issues with China. Indeed, Vietnam‘s partnerships with Moscow and Washington strengthen its leverage vis-à-vis Beijing, thereby enabling it to pursue both military and economic enhancement and diplomatic resolution of disputed issues. Thus, despite the allegedly deepening Sino-Russian friendship (at least against the US), in fact Russia has quietly but openly resisted Chinese encroachments in Southeast Asia and is forging a deeper military-political relationship with Vietnam. Beijing has repeatedly demanded that Moscow terminate energy explorations in the South China Sea, clearly responding to Russia‘s visibly enhanced interests in Southeast

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Asia. In 2012 Russia announced its interest in regaining a naval base at Cam RanhBay, a step probably connected to joint Russo-Vietnamese energy projects off Vietnam‘s coast, and a means of checking China in the South China Sea. Gazprom also signed a deal to explore two licensed blocks in Vietnam‘s continental shelf in the South China Sea, taking a 49 percent stake in the offshore blocks, which hold an estimated 1.9 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and more than twenty-five million tons of gas condensate. Those actions precipitated Beijing‘s demand that Moscow leave the area. However, despite its silence, presumably to avoid antagonizing China, Moscow stayed put. Russia has subsequently increased support for Vietnam regarding energy exploration in the South China Sea and, perhaps more ominously from China‘s standpoint, in arms sales and defense cooperation.[v] Vietnam, clearly aiming to deter Chinese threats, has become a major customer for Russian weapons, primarily submarines and planes. Russia and Vietnam have been ―strategic partners‖ since 2001 and they upgraded the relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2012.[vi] Bilateral trade and scientific-cultural exchanges are growing and Russia ranks 18th among 101 foreign investors in Vietnam focusing on mining, processing, and manufacturing industries (particularly energy). In addition, Russia is helping Vietnam build a nuclear power plant.[vii] The most striking and consequential forms of cooperation are in the military sphere. Vietnam‘s defense minister, General PhungQuangThanh, called Russia ―Vietnam‘s primary strategic military partner in the sphere of military and technical cooperation.‖[viii] Beyond Russia‘s interest in Cam Ranh Bay, Russia is helping Vietnam build a submarine base and repair dockyard to provide maintenance support for other naval platforms. The submarine base will host the Kilo-class subs that Vietnam has bought from Russia to protect Vietnamese interests in the South China Sea.[ix] More recently, both sides have begun discussing a document allowing for regular Russian port visits to Vietnam for maintenance and rest and relaxation, although Cam Ranh Bay will not become a Russian base.[x] Vietnam and Russia announced a third tranche of the sale of twelve new SU-30MK2 fighter aircraft that can target ships, aerial and ground targets. Vietnam has also ordered six new Varshavyanka-class submarines that represent an improvement on its existing Kilo-class submarines and which can conduct anti-submarine, anti-ship, general reconnaissance, and patrol missions in relatively shallow waters like the South China Sea.[xi] These sales display Vietnam‘s defense modernization to defend against threats to its offshore energy interests, defend Vietnamese claims in the South China Sea, and deter growing Chinese aggressiveness. In these respects, it is emulating other Southeast Asian states‘ defense-modernization programs to defend against new threats.[xii] Perhaps the most striking aspect of these recent arms sales and ministerial talks between both states‘ defense ministers is the fact that Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev approved a draft Russo-Vietnamese military cooperation pact to formalize the two governments‘ defense cooperation. Medvedev‘s approval orders the Russian Ministry of Defense to discuss the planned accord with the Vietnamese government and

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authorizes the Russian ministry to sign the agreement on Russia‘s behalf. The planned accord would stipulate exchanges of opinions and information, confidence-building measures, and cooperation to enhance international security and ensure more effective action against terrorism and better arms control.[xiii] And, of course, allegedly nothing in the bilateral relationship is intended to target a third country.[xiv] However, it is clear that this relationship, whose high points are the new agreement and these arms sales, aims to counter China‘s aggressive intentions and behavior in the South China Sea. It is noteworthy that most of these announcements come from the Vietnamese side that clearly has every reason to display publicly to China its ability to garner support for its military buildup and political resistance to Chinese claims. Thus Vietnam not only enjoys strong U.S., Russian, and Indian diplomatic and military support, it is buying weapons from Russia, Sweden, and Israel, among others. Indeed, to strengthen its C4ISR capabilities, Vietnam is also investing in powerful foreign C4ISR systems and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to protect its offshore interests and installations.[xv] Vietnam‘s efforts to weave together a series of partnerships to counter Chinese power are probably not surprising. There are ample precedents for Vietnam‘s activity. But Russia‘s activities clearly surprised and even dismayed China. Perhaps China should not have been surprised as those policies are clearly part of Moscow‘s overall ―pivot‖ to Asia that actually preceded the US ―rebalancing‖ program in Asia and aims to invigorate Moscow‘s economic-military-political position as an independent major Asian power in its own right. Indeed, Russia‘s moves in the Pacific visibly confirm Edward Luttwak‘s observation that given the logic of strategy, China‘s increasingly aggressive policies will lead its neighbors and other Asian states, including Russia, to find new ways of collaborating together to check Beijing‘s policies.[xvi] Still, China is clearly not happy with the Kremlin‘s policies. In 2012, its media called them ―unrighteous‖ and warned Russia that it prefers cooperation with ―ill-doers‖ over cooperation with China, though it professes an identity of interests with Beijing. Chinese media stressed that Russo-Vietnamese military and energy cooperation allows Vietnam to extend energy exploration into contested areas. These articles even charged that Vietnam depends on this cooperation with Russia, so in some sense Russia is culpable. China also correctly accused Russia at that time of seeking a return to Cam Ranh Bay.[xvii] Thus Russia‘s ―chess moves‖ suggest that Sino-Russian amity, at least in regard to the Asian regional security agenda, is something of a facade. [xviii] If this is indeed the case, Russo-Chinese ties may not be as dangerous for the US as some have feared, although there is no reason for complacency since the two governments will clearly collude to block numerous American initiatives globally. But in Asia, we might see added jockeying and competition for support and influence by both major actors like Russia and China and by increasingly capable middle powers like Vietnam that can only add a further dimension of complexity to Asia‘s already tangled and complex security agendas. Stephen Blank is Senior Fellow for Russia at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC.

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Historical Fiction: China’s South China Sea Claims MOHAN MALIK June 2013 Mohan Malik is a professor in Asian security at Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, in Honolulu. The views expressed are his own. His most recent book is China and India: Great Power Rivals. He wishes to thank Drs. Justin Nankivell, Carlyle Thayer, Denny Roy, and David Fouse for their comments on this article. The Spratly Islands—not so long ago known primarily as a rich fishing ground—have turned into an international flashpoint as Chinese leaders insist with increasing truculence that the islands, rocks, and reefs have been, in the words of Premier Wen Jiabao, ―China‘s historical territory since ancient times.‖ Normally, the overlapping territorial claims to sovereignty and maritime boundaries ought to be resolved through a combination of customary international law, adjudication before the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, or arbitration under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). While China has ratified UNCLOS, the treaty by and large rejects ―historically based‖ claims, which are precisely the type Beijing periodically asserts. On September 4, 2012, China‘s foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, told US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that there is ―plenty of historical and jurisprudence evidence to show that China has sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters.‖ As far as the ―jurisprudence evidence‖ is concerned, the vast majority of international legal experts have concluded that China‘s claim to historic title over the South China Sea, implying full sovereign authority and consent for other states to transit, is invalid. The historical evidence, if anything, is even less persuasive. There are several contradictions in China‘s use of history to justify its claims to islands and reefs in the South China Sea, not least of which is its polemical assertion of parallels with imperialist expansion by the United States and European powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Justifying China‘s attempts to expand its maritime frontiers by claiming islands and reefs far from its shores, JiaQingguo, professor at Beijing University‘s School of International Studies, argues that China is merely following the example set by the West. ―The United States has Guam in Asia which is very far away from the US and the French have islands in the South Pacific, so it is nothing new,‖ Jia told AFP recently. China‘s claim to the Spratlys on the basis of history runs aground on the fact that the region‘s past empires did not exercise sovereignty. In pre-modern Asia, empires were characterized by undefined, unprotected, and often changing frontiers. The notion of suzerainty prevailed. Unlike a nation-state, the frontiers of Chinese empires were

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neither carefully drawn nor policed but were more like circles or zones, tapering off from the center of civilization to the undefined periphery of alien barbarians. More importantly, in its territorial disputes with neighboring India, Burma, and Vietnam, Beijing always took the position that its land boundaries were never defined, demarcated, and delimited. But now, when it comes to islands, shoals, and reefs in the South China Sea, Beijing claims otherwise. In other words, China‘s claim that its land boundaries were historically never defined and delimited stands in sharp contrast with the stance that China‘s maritime boundaries were always clearly defined and delimited. Herein lies a basic contradiction in the Chinese stand on land and maritime boundaries which is untenable. Actually, it is the mid-twentieth-century attempts to convert the undefined frontiers of ancient civilizations and kingdoms enjoying suzerainty into clearly defined, delimited, and demarcated boundaries of modern nation-states exercising sovereignty that lie at the center of China‘s territorial and maritime disputes with neighboring countries. Put simply, sovereignty is a post-imperial notion ascribed to nation-states, not ancient empires. China‘s present borders largely reflect the frontiers established during the spectacular episode of eighteenth-century Qing (Manchu) expansionism, which over time hardened into fixed national boundaries following the imposition of the Westphalian nation-state system over Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Official Chinese history today often distorts this complex history, however, claiming that Mongols, Tibetans, Manchus, and Hans were all Chinese, when in fact the Great Wall was built by the Chinese dynasties to keep out the northern Mongol and Manchu tribes that repeatedly overran Han China; the wall actually represented the Han Chinese empire‘s outer security perimeter. While most historians see the onslaught of the Mongol hordes led by Genghis Khan in the early 1200s as an apocalyptic event that threatened the very survival of ancient civilizations in India, Persia, and other nations (China chief among them), the Chinese have consciously promoted the myth that he was actually ―Chinese,‖ and therefore all areas that the Mongols (the Yuan dynasty) had once occupied or conquered (such as Tibet and much of Central and Inner Asia) belong to China. China‘s claims on Taiwan and in the South China Sea are also based on the grounds that both were parts of the Manchu empire. (Actually, in the Manchu or Qing dynasty maps, it is Hainan Island, not the Paracel and Spratly Islands, that is depicted as China‘s southern-most border.) In this version of history, any territory conquered by ―Chinese‖ in the past remains immutably so, no matter when the conquest may have occurred. Such writing and rewriting of history from a nationalistic perspective to promote national unity and regime legitimacy has been accorded the highest priority by China‘s rulers, both Nationalists and Communists. The Chinese Communist Party leadership consciously conducts itself as the heir to China‘s imperial legacy, often employing the symbolism and rhetoric of empire. From primary-school textbooks to television historical dramas, the state-controlled information system has force-fed generations of Chinese a diet of imperial China‘s grandeur. As the Australian Sinologist GeremieBarmé points out, ―For decades Chinese education and propaganda have emphasized the role of history in the fate of the Chinese nation-state . . . While Marxism-Leninism and Mao Thought have been abandoned in all but name, the role of history in China‘s future

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remains steadfast.‖ So much so that history has been refined as an instrument of statecraft (also known as ―cartographic aggression‖) by state-controlled research institutions, media, and education bodies. China uses folklore, myths, and legends, as well as history, to bolster greater territorial and maritime claims. Chinese textbooks preach the notion of the Middle Kingdom as being the oldest and most advanced civilization that was at the very center of the universe, surrounded by lesser, partially Sinicized states in East and Southeast Asia that must constantly bow and pay their respects. China‘s version of history often deliberately blurs the distinction between what was no more than hegemonic influence, tributary relationships, suzerainty, and actual control. Subscribing to the notion that those who have mastered the past control their present and chart their own futures, Beijing has always placed a very high value on ―the history card‖ (often a revisionist interpretation of history) in its diplomatic efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives, especially to extract territorial and diplomatic concessions from other countries. Almost every contiguous state has, at one time or another, felt the force of Chinese arms—Mongolia, Tibet, Burma, Korea, Russia, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan—and been a subject of China‘s revisionist history. As Martin Jacques notes in When China Rules the World, ―Imperial Sinocentrism shapes and underpins modern Chinese nationalism.‖ If the idea of national sovereignty goes back to seventeenth-century Europe and the system that originated with the Treaty of Westphalia, the idea of maritime sovereignty is largely a mid-twentieth-century American concoction China has seized upon to extend its maritime frontiers. As Jacques notes, ―The idea of maritime sovereignty is a relatively recent invention, dating from 1945 when the United States declared that it intended to exercise sovereignty over its territorial waters.‖ In fact, the UN‘s Law of the Sea agreement represented the most prominent international effort to apply the land-based notion of sovereignty to the maritime domain worldwide—although, importantly, it rejects the idea of justification by historical right. Thus although Beijing claims around eighty percent of the South China Sea as its ―historic waters‖ (and is now seeking to elevate this claim to a ―core interest‖ akin with its claims on Taiwan and Tibet), China has, historically speaking, about as much right to claim the South China Sea as Mexico has to claim the Gulf of Mexico for its exclusive use, or Iran the Persian Gulf, or India the Indian Ocean. Ancient empires either won control over territories through aggression, annexation, or assimilation or lost them to rivals who possessed superior firepower or statecraft. Territorial expansion and contraction was the norm, determined by the strength or weakness of a kingdom or empire. The very idea of ―sacred lands‖ is ahistorical because control of territory was based on who grabbed or stole what last from whom. The frontiers of the Qin, Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties waxed and waned throughout history. A strong and powerful imperial China, much like czarist Russia, was expansionist in Inner Asia and Indochina as opportunity arose and strength allowed. The gradual expansion over the centuries under the non-Chinese Mongol and Manchu dynasties extended imperial China‘s control over Tibet and parts of Central Asia (now

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Xinjiang), Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. Modern China is, in fact, an ―empire-state‖ masquerading as a nation-state. If China‘s claims are justified on the basis of history, then so are the historical claims of Vietnamese and Filipinos based on their histories. Students of Asian history know, for instance, that Malay peoples related to today‘s Filipinos have a better claim to Taiwan than Beijing does. Taiwan was originally settled by people of Malay-Polynesian descent—ancestors of the present-day aborigine groups—who populated the low-lying coastal plains. In the words of noted Asia-watcher Philip Bowring, writing last year in the South China Morning Post, ―The fact that China has a long record of written history does not invalidate other nations‘ histories as illustrated by artifacts, language, lineage and genetic affinities, the evidence of trade and travel.‖ Unless one subscribes to the notion of Chinese exceptionalism, imperial China‘s ―historical claims‖ are as valid as those of other kingdoms and empires in Southeast and South Asia. China laying claim to the Mongol and Manchu empires‘ colonial possessions would be equivalent to India laying claim to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia (Srivijaya), Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka on the grounds that they were all parts of either the Maurya, Chola, or the Moghul and the British Indian empires. China‘s claims in the South China Sea are also a major shift from its longstanding geopolitical orientation to continental power. In claiming a strong maritime tradition, China makes much of the early-fifteenth-century expeditions of Zheng He to the Indian Ocean and Africa. But, as Bowring points out, ―Chinese were actually latecomers to navigation beyond coastal waters. For centuries, the masters of the oceans were the Malayo-Polynesian peoples who colonized much of the world, from Taiwan to New Zealand and Hawaii to the south and east, and to Madagascar in the west. Bronze vessels were being traded with Palawan, just south of Scarborough, at the time of Confucius. When Chinese Buddhist pilgrims like Faxian went to Sri Lanka and India in the fifth century, they went in ships owned and operated by Malay peoples. Ships from what is now the Philippines traded with Funan, a state in what is now southern Vietnam, a thousand years before the Yuan dynasty.‖ And finally, China‘s so-called ―historic claims‖ to the South China Sea are actually not ―centuries old.‖ They only go back to 1947, when Chiang Kai-shek‘s nationalist government drew the so-called ―eleven-dash line‖ on Chinese maps of the South China Sea, enclosing the Spratly Islands and other chains that the ruling Kuomintang party declared were now under Chinese sovereignty. Chiang himself, saying he saw German fascism as a model for China, was fascinated by the Nazi concept of an expanded Lebensraum (―living space‖) for the Chinese nation. He did not have the opportunity to be expansionist himself because the Japanese put him on the defensive, but cartographers of the nationalist regime drew the U-shape of eleven dashes in an attempt to enlarge China‘s ―living space‖ in the South China Sea. Following the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the civil war in 1949, the People‘s Republic of China adopted this cartographic coup, revising Chiang‘s notion into a ―nine-dash line‖ after erasing two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1953.

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Since the end of the Second World War, China has been redrawing its maps, redefining borders, manufacturing historical evidence, using force to create new territorial realities, renaming islands, and seeking to impose its version of history on the waters of the region. The passage of domestic legislation in 1992, ―Law on the Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas,‖ which claimed four-fifths of the South China Sea, was followed by armed skirmishes with the Philippines and Vietnamese navies throughout the 1990s. More recently, the dispatch of large numbers of Chinese fishing boats and maritime surveillance vessels to the disputed waters in what is tantamount to a ―people‘s war on the high seas‖ has further heightened tensions. To quote commentator Sujit Dutta, ―China‘s unmitigated irredentism [is] based on the . . . theory that the periphery must be occupied in order to secure the core. [This] is an essentially imperial notion that was internalized by the Chinese nationalists—both Kuomintang and Communist. The [current] regime‘s attempts to reach its imagined geographical frontiers often with little historical basis have had and continue to have highly destabilizing strategic consequences.‖ One reason Southeast Asians find it difficult to accept Chinese territorial claims is that they carry with them an assertion of Han racial superiority over other Asian races and empires. Says Jay Batongbacal of the University of the Philippines law school: ―Intuitively, acceptance of the nine-dash line is a corresponding denial of the very identity and history of the ancestors of the Vietnamese, Filipinos, and Malays; it is practically a modern revival of China‘s denigration of non-Chinese as ‗barbarians‘ not entitled to equal respect and dignity as peoples.‖ Empires and kingdoms never exercised sovereignty. If historical claims had any validity then Mongolia could claim all of Asia simply because it once conquered the lands of the continent. There is absolutely no historical basis to support either of the dash-line claims, especially considering that the territories of Chinese empires were never as carefully delimited as nation-states, but rather existed as zones of influence tapering away from a civilized center. This is the position contemporary China took starting in the 1960s, while negotiating its land boundaries with several of its neighboring countries. But this is not the position it takes today in the cartographic, diplomatic, and low-intensity military skirmishes to define its maritime borders. The continued reinterpretation of history to advance contemporary political, territorial, and maritime claims, coupled with the Communist leadership‘s ability to turn ―nationalistic eruptions‖ on and off like a tap during moments of tension with the United States, Japan, South Korea, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines, makes it difficult for Beijing to reassure neighbors that its ―peaceful rise‖ is wholly peaceful. Since there are six claimants to various atolls, islands, rocks, and oil deposits in the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands disputes are, by definition, multilateral disputes requiring international arbitration. But Beijing has insisted that these disputes are bilateral in order to place its opponents between the anvil of its revisionist history and the hammer of its growing military power.