“Japanese Perspectives on the South China Sea and the

East China Sea”

Vice Admiral Masanori Yoshida (Ret.) 1

Percentage of trade on SLOC to the entire trade: 99.6％

Crude Oil ９９.６％

８６.７％

LPG ９１.０％

７２.0％ Corn １００％

９８.７％

Wheat ８６.０％

５１.５％

９６.４％

５０.６％

LNG

South-East Asia Oceania

Middle East

・エネルギー白書２０１４ エネルギー庁・海運統計要覧２０１４ 日本船舶協会（社）・農林水産物輸出入概況 ２０１３年

U.S.

Beef ９９.６％

５０.９％

legend

８０％

６５％

Export Dependence

Export dependence to local area

Importance of Sea-borne Transportation for Japan

Significance of the Sea for Prosperity

Korean Peninsula

East China Sea

South China Sea

Indian Ocean

Pacific Ocean

Sea Lane of Communication

Sea of JapanTrade Value of Total World Trade in SCS

LNG More than 1/3

Crude Oil More than 1/2

Number of Ship and Vessels at Chokepoint

Singapore Strait Strait of MalaccaSuez Canal Panama Canal

Source: MOT, Jan 2015

Threats to Japan’s Sea Lanes

South China Sea

UNCLASS

Self Defense Fleet HQ

Regional District HQ

Air Base for MPAsAir Base for Helos

Maizuru District

Ominato District

Yokosuka District

Kure District

Naha(Okinawa)

Iwo-to

Sasebo District

Location of the Main JMSDF Bases

5

Geopolitical Characteristics of Sasebo District

Sasebo

Okinawa

Senkaku

PLAN Tokai fleet headquarters

(Ninbo)

480km

Sasebo District

6

UNCLASS

7

Japan’s Senkaku Islands in ECS

Access Denial against the U.S.

Maintain access to Pacific Ocean

Restriction in Okinawa’s operation

Pressure for unification of Taiwan

Strategic Importance for China 1895 Integrated into Japan’s territory (No claim by China)

1968 Reported oil resources on the seabed around Senkaku

1971 China started to claim her sovereignty of Senkaku

1992 China declared her Territorial Sea Law, included Senkaku

2013 Suddenly announced the establishment of “ECS ADIZ”

Invasion into Japan’s Territorial Waters around Senkaku

Source : Japan Coast Guard HP（BLUE: within Contiguous Zone RED: within Territorial Waters)2008

2012.9Transfer of the ownership of the SK to GOJ

2010.9Collision incident by Chinese illegal fishing boat against JCG Patrol Ship

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Period of my command

▲ ９月１４日(金)付の朝日新聞夕刊１面

Activity of the Chinese government vessels in the outskirts of the Senkaku Islands

In a year after nationalization（Japanese government acquisition of the Senkaku Islands ）

Intruded into Japan’s territorial waters ship: 216 boats Contiguous-zone cruise ship: 1055 boats 9

※参考ＪＩＡＮＧＷＥＩーⅡ級ＦＦ

February 5, 2013 Emergency press briefing by the Minister of Defense. - PLAN vessel radiated fire-control radar at a JMSDF destroyer on January 30 in the East China Sea. - Radiated fire-control radar is unusual. - When it makes a mistake by one step, it is a very dangerous situation.

FC RadarJIANGWEI-Ⅱ class FF 522

FC Radar Radiated by PLANThe View of the Japanese Government

Defense Minister Onodera

10

East China Sea

ADIZ

Senkaku Islands

Announcement of the Establishment of “Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in ECS” in November 2013.

Chinese Short Term, Tactical Goal “A series of incidents around the Senkaku Islands aims

to appeal the issue of right of possession to international society by suggesting escalation”

Response of JCG and JMSDF(on the scene) “Without escalating military tension into military

conflict or war, make them understand Japanese will≒ maintain presence wherever they go”

Our Situation Awareness and Reaction at that Time

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★ Importance of maintaining and sharing ISR and COP(Mutual understanding of the situation)

· To anticipate China‘s intent and future action· Respond to China's unique war (“Hybrid Warfare”)· To suppress flare up of domestic nationalism in each country

★ Importance of presence(Balance of power and stabilization of crisis)JCG (front) – JMSDF (rear-guard) –7Th Fleet (sub rear-guard)

★ Importance of collaboration between politics and diplomacy(Prevention of Escalation)

· Application of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty· Provide opportunities for diplomacy

Lessons Learned from the East China Sea in those Days

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What is Chinese Strategy？○ “New Great Powers”

In the principally important China-U.S. relationship, disparity is decreased and China gains advantage. While avoiding direct confrontation, China pressures neighboring countries・・・

“Changing Status-Quo by Power”

→ Non-militarized coercion→ Maritime-style

“People’s War”

What is U.S. Strategy？○ Ground Strategy

ex. “Containment of Soviet”・・・no longer exists.

Re-balancing・・・Policy ≠ Strategy

ASB, Offshore control・・・operational concept ,

≒Military strategy≠Ground strategy ≠Regional strategy

○ Now may be「Wait-and-see approach」？

China-U.S. Power Conflict in Asia-Pacific Region

Lessons Learned from the East China Sea from other Days

14

15

Beijing View (My Analysis)

・ Power shift occurs only between the U.S. and China.

・ China’s relations with its neighbors is determined within the framework of China-U.S. relationship.

・ Japan is no longer a great power, it is one of China’s many neighbors.

・ Assertively project power until China’s national interests (that have been infringed by neighboring countries including Japan) are regained.

Territorial Dispute in the South China Sea

Philippines

China

Spratly Islands

Vietnam

Malaysia

Brunei

TaiwanChinaVietnamMalaysia

PhilippinesBrunei

Philippines

History of China’s Occupation of Islands in SCS

China’s Reclamation of Reefs in SCS

(“DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2016”)

Fiery Cross Reef2014.8 2015.3 2016.5

Subi Reef2015.1

2015.32015.9

2016.5

Case of USN/T-AGOS/IMPECCABLE, 2009 in SCS

On the deck of Chinese Fishery boat, there is a man with a long pole who is attempting to hook IMPECCABLE’s cable array in the water.

Two Chinese Fishery boats are disturbing IMPECCABLE’s course.

IMPECCABLE is spraying water at Chinese Fishery boat approaching to her.

Chinese officer on Public Vessel is on the scene and observes IMPECCABLE and their Fishery boats.

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・Strategic importance of South China Sea

・Lack of ISR capability of the states in theregion

・Lack of balancing power

・Complexity of politics and diplomacy

Differences between SCS and ECS

• Capacity building for the states in the region (with a focus on Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia)

• Low-intensity presence (Joint training exercises with the surrounding states, P.P., HA/DR multi-lateral training)

• High-intensity presence (Japan-U.S.-Australia joint training, joint warning and surveillance, expansion of Japanese and U.S.-Japan ISR areas)

• Enactment of multi-lateral accident response plans (GSOMIA, ACSA members)

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Measures for Stabilization in the SCS

Regional Non-Traditional Challenges

What Are the Challenges?

Challenges:

➣ Clear and Present Danger of Nuclear/Missiles Threats

➣ Changing the Status Quo by Force

“Hybrid Warfare” in Gray Zone Situation

Non-Traditional Threats

Cooperation to Meet the Challenges - 1

• Providing High Level of VigilanceMaintaining 24/7 High Density ISR PosturePreserving Credible Deterrence against AggressionSending Collective Messages of Like-Minded Partners

Cooperation to Meet the Challenges - 2

• Bilateral/Multilateral Exercises with Regional Navies Enhancing Interoperability Sending Messages of Strong Will to Preserve Rules

Based Order

Cooperation to Meet the Challenges - 3

• Capacity Building Support & Defense Equipment and Technology CooperationProviding Reassurance to the Regional PartnersContributing to Prevention of Changing Status Quo

by Force

Way Ahead: Maritime Security Web of Partners

WPNSIONS