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HOW “TO TALK”TO DONBAS? ANALYTICAL REPORT

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ЗМІСТ

Restoration has started. What will the further developments be? 3

Specific features of the audience in Donbas 4

How does the power communicate? 7

Interpretation of political preferences of the region residents 8

What are the dangers of communication mistakes 9

What should be said and how 10

Illustration: Donetsk Institute of Information

Note: All the references to the materials cited here are presented at the end

of the paper in pdf format at the end of this article.

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Restoration has started. What will the further developments be?

The Ukrainian power has gradually been restoring the TV broadcast infrastructure in the Donetsk

region. On December 5, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko opened the restored TV tower on

Mount Karachun in Slovyansk. The tower was destroyed during battles for the town in the summer

of 2014. The coverage of the tower signal will make it possible to improve analog broadcasting on

the territory of the Donetsk region controlled by the Ukrainian government. In addition, the tower

will provide a signal of a better quality in the areas along the frontline, for example, in Torestk (Dzer-

zhinsk) which is located on the demarcation line.

We would like to remind the readers that when the conflict in the Donbas began, the areas controlled

by the Russian Federation were left without Ukrainian TV broadcasting as a number of TV broadcast-

ing facilities were seized and destroyed.

Not a long time ago, President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko claimed once again that Ukrainian TV chan-

nels’ broadcasting would be restored on the whole uncontrolled territory of Ukraine, and residents of

those territories would be able to watch Ukrainian TV programs. Ukrainian Minister of Information Policy

Yuriy Stets claimed that the launching of this tower would allow to watch Ukrainian TV even in Horlivka.

Under the decision of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers of March 10, 2015, the Ministry of Informa-

tion Policy of Ukraine (MIP) formed the Commission responsible for providing stable functioning of

national TV and radio broadcasting system and for restoring broadcasting on the uncontrolled terri-

tory. The MIP informs that they have already launched 60 transmitters which increased the Ukrainian

broadcasting coverage by 30% in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

In 2017, the MIP is going to launch three more TV towers in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and the

coverage of Ukrainian channels on uncontrolled territories will increase. However, it is important not

only to provide the signal, but also to make the content attractive for residents of uncontrolled areas.

According to the data presented by GfK Ukraine company which conducted a survey in December

2015 — January 2016, only one of Ukrainian most popular channels, “1+1” was included in 10-top

channels on the uncontrolled territory; however, it occupied the last place in the rating. According

to the data of the survey, only 50% of residents of uncontrolled areas have access to Ukrainian TV

channels. These facts cannot be explained exclusively by the absence of coverage. It is quite logical

to assume that people do not want to watch Ukrainian channels because of different reasons, not

only because of some technical reasons and signal blocking up. In accordance with the data of the

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monitoring of news programs of central and regional channels and talk shows conducted by NGO

“Telekrytyka” (now it is the team of NGO “Detektor Media”), humanitarian problems of residents of

uncontrolled territories are almost not mentioned in programs of central TV channels.

In May, at the conference “MM participation in the process of reconciliation: Lessons for Ukraine”,

representative of Moldova — the country which has experience of coexistance with an uncontrolled

territory — Petr Makovey, executive director of Moldova Independent Press Association, stressed

on the basis of his own experience (the conflict in Transnistria) that it is necessary to avoid other

countries’ mistakes and to start information work on the other side of the demarcation line as soon

as possible since a new generation of Ukrainians is growing up there. Audience “should want” to see

the content in order to make it possible for us to conduct that information work.

Specific features of the audience in Donbas

Donbas is a geological notion used to denote the borders of Donetsk coal field which is located

on the territory of Ukraine and Russia. However, the term has been used in economic and political

contexts for almost 100 years. Today, when people speak about Donbas in Ukraine or Russia, they

mean, first of all, the administrative borders of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. The

regional identity of residents of this industrial region had been formed in the Soviet time and took

an important place in Soviet mythology constructed around working people. Donbas mythology got

“the second breath” in independent Ukraine. Considerable economic weight of this industrial area in

the economic structure of Ukraine and local elite’s ambitions determined the growth of the region’s

representatives’ influence on the state policy. Donbas occupied and important, but not the key place

in the Soviet Union. In Ukraine, its influence on the policy was, in many situations, a decisive one, and

the Donetsk region produced 20% of Ukrainian gross domestic product before the war.

Sociological surveys conducted before the conflict showed that 37% of residents of the regional

center — Donetsk — considered themselves, first of all, as residents of the city, 34% - as citizens of

Ukraine, and 18% — residents of the region. The data proves that there is strong regional identity in

the consciousness of Donbas residents.

However, the situation is typical not only of Donbas. The survey conducted to mark the 15th anniver-

sary of Ukraine demonstrated that local identity is typical of citizens of Ukraine. 44% of respondents

identified themselves with the place where they were born, 31% - with Ukraine, and 15% - with the

region where they were living. The following surveys demonstrated that the number of people who

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identified themselves, first of all, with the state has increased, and those who have birth place iden-

tity — decreased and, according to Rosumkov Center, is 40% now.

Local identity still prevails in the southern part of the country and in Donbas (50% and 44% of re-

spondents associate themselves with their towns and villages respectively). The greatest number

of people who associate themselves, first of all, with the region are in Donbas — 23%. As a whole,

regional differences are not critical.

Russian is a native language for a relative majority of Donbas residents (40%); 34% are bilingual;

20% think that their native language is Ukrainian.

Three times more people think that their native language is Russian than those who think it is Ukrain-

ian (45% and 14% respectively). Bilinguists are 35% and 33%. A lot of citizens of the Donetsk region

have other languages as their native ones (8%). Only 16% of Donetsk region residents and 29% of the

Luhansk one think that Ukrainian is to be the only state and official language.

42% of The Donetsk region residents and 29% of the Luhansk one think that Russian may be used as

an official language in some regions of Ukraine; 36% in the Donetsk region and 32% in the Luhansk

one support state bilingualism.

Identities of Ukrainian citizensRasumkov Centre data. December 2015

with Ukraine with the region where I live with the city (village I live in)

Donbas 44,3% 39,6%

31,1%

50,2%

11,4%

40,1%

23,4% 9,4%

22,6%

Ukraine South

Rasumkov Centre data. December 2015

Languare issues Donetsk region residents Luhansk region residents

16%29%

29%

32%36%

42%

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The idea of joining another state or the one of regional autonomy are not supported by residents. 52%

would like the region to stay in Ukraine, but to have wider rights and authorities of local self-government.

One third of Donetsk region residents (34%) prefer relations with Russia, and every fourth (25%) is

for the EU. In the Luhansk region, the respective figures are 18% and 32%.

The majority of people of the East would not support either Maidan or Antimaidan. 17% would

support Maidan; 14% - Antimaidan; in the Luhansk region — 21% and only 5% respectively. In the

Donetsk region the figures are 14% and 18%.

In the Donbas, the leaders of negatively assessed historical leaders are Joseph Stalin (22.5%), Stepan

Bandera (22.5%), Viktor Yushchenko (22%), and Viktor Yanukovich (20%).

For the residents of the Donbas, the negative events are Maidan 2013-2014 (32%), Holodomor (31%),

and disintegration of the USSR (29%).

The way the country’s unity is treated in Donbas

Do not want to join another state

74%

Do not want to be an autonomy in Ukraine

Want more rights for local self-governing bodies

Rasumkov Centre data. December 2015

61% 52%

Democratic Initiatives Fund data. July 2015

Negative historical personalities and events from the point of view of Donbas residents

J. Stalin

22.5%S. Bandera

22.5%V. Yuschenko

22%V.Yanukovych

20%

Maidan(2013-2014)

32%

Holodomor31%

Fall of USSR29%

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However, the support of Antimaidan, the status of Russian as a second state language, or negative

assessment of the USSR desintegration do not mean negative attitude to the state of Ukraine.

At the same time, narratives used by the state apparatus and some Ukrainian channels make some

groups of people feel inner contradiction which is applied to all actions of the power.

How does the power communicate?

Claims of some officials at the state as well as local levels are perceived as state policy directions.

However, some messages of state representatives do not correspond to the social and political situ-

ation and do not support public reconciliation in the frontline zone.

Yevhen Nyshchuk, Ukrainian Minister of Culture, claimed on November 21 that there is no “genetics”

in some Ukrainian towns, in particular, in Donbas as a part of its population “was brought” from other

places. Later the minister claimed that journalists took his words out of the context. Representatives

of the Ministry of the Interior (MI) linked criminality growth with hundreds of thousands of IDPs from

the ATO zone. It particular, such claims were made by MI head Arsen Avakov and the then deputy

head of the National Police, Vadym Troyan.

In December, Oleh Barna, Verkhovna Rada deputy from the Petro Poroshenko Block faction, claimed from

the parliament rostrum that Donetsk and Luhansk “bastards” torture Ukrainian militaries. The deputy

did not explain who he kept in mind. At present, Ukraine has a double system of local government. Lo-

cal town, district, and region councils coexist with district and regional military and civil administrations.

Administration heads are appointed by the president and are representatives of the bodies of the central

power. Heads of law enforcement bodies as well as military chiefs are appointed by the central power too.

Those people personify the Ukrainian state power on the territory of the region, with one of its aims

is “Ukrainization” as Pavlo Zhebrivskiy, chief of Donetsk regional military and civil administration,

declares. However, declarations about “Ukrainization” and the region head’s deeds do not correspond

to principles of democratic, open society. The following example of the state program of creating

base schools in the region may be used as an illustration. According to the plan, 21 such schools will

be open in the region, and in each interview the administration chief stresses that the schools will

teach in Ukrainian. “Another task is the essence, meaning of the school. It is understandable that

such school will teach in Ukrainian”, said the region head. The region head also stresses the neces-

sity to search for the “genotype of a Ukrainian” in the local population.

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Before the war, the number of school children who studied in Ukrainian was approximately equal to

the number of school children who studied in Russian in the Donetsk region. That corresponded to

the national composition of regional population. Schoolchildren parents could choose what school

their child would go. Ukrainian was quite a natural thing at schools in the Donetsk region.

Interpretation of political preferences of the region residents

Personal political preferences of the Donetsk region residents who vote for parties officially regis-

tered by the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice may also cause offenses of being “non-patriotic”.

Commenting on the results of 2015 local elections, Zhebrivsky said that it was a “problem” that locals voted

for “The Opposition Block”. This party got the majority in all big towns of the region. Zhebrivsky thinks that the

situation should be changed. So, the official gave a political assessment of the political choice of the citizens

whose interests he represents, and that he was going to influence the choice. The region chief expresses his

discontent with the election results in his claims that “Donbas has not risen from their knees yet”.

The head of the region has complained many times of the fact that the locals are “passive” and em-

phasized the fact that the economy of the region must be demonopolized with the help of small and

medium businesses.

“I have always told that if we get 150 000 well-off people here, then we will also have democracy in

the region”, said the local administration head.

In fact, a lot of major industrial enterprises whose administration influences local policy are concen-

trated in the Donetsk region.

However, small businesses were relatively well-developed here before the war (compared to other re-

gions of Ukraine). According to the data presented by the Regional Statistics Department, there were

more than 27 thousand small enterprises in the Donetsk region in 2013. The Donetsk region was the

second after the Kyiv region by the number of small enterprises and the number of employees who

worked there. The relative share of small enterprises of the region in Ukrainian economy was 7,9%.

The Donetsk region occupied the third place after the Kyiv and Dnipropertorvk regions by this indica-

tor. The situation with small businesses in the Donetsk region did not differ much from the general

situation in Ukraine, according to the Regional Statistics Department.

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This is why Zhebrivsky’s recommendations to create a class of well-off citizens look like a political

proclamation not like an action plan of a manager.

What are the dangers of communication mistakes

The Donbas is not a subject of Ukrainian politics any more, it has become an object or a factor.

Some representatives of the state authorities try to correspond to the demands of the society.

The rhetorics used by the head of the regional military and civil administration is a reflection of the

policy of the state in relation to the Donbas. This rhetorics is formed on the basis of the opinion

of the society. Thus, the survey conducted by Razumkov Centre shows that 49,6% respondents

would vote at a referendum about the status of temporarily-occupied territories of the Donetsk

and Luhansk regions. 53,6% of them would support the idea of the official recognition of the fact

that the territories are occupied and their temporary isolation until they are returned under the

government control.

A part of Donbas electors remained on the occupied territory. Another part of electors who live on

the territory controlled by the government are not loyal to the parties which are now forming a coali-

tion and represent state authorities. They are not a target audience for these parties. It is more profit-

able politically not to destroy stereotypes about these electors but to build rhetorics which is based

on them. This helps to get a higher level of support in the regions which are more loyal to authorities.

Such actions can help authorities to remain in power tactically, but strategically they will not contrib-

ute to creating a stable state. The experience of other countries which have similar problems shows

that if the government is oriented only on separate political trends and those who support it this will

aggravate conflicts among citizens. This led to a civil war in Lybia, for example.

The idea of reintegration is not popular enough for present politicians to use it as a cornerstone.

Oleksandr Kykhtenko, the previous head of the region had certain problems with the central power

as he was too mild to Ukrainian citizens who remained on the occupied territory.

International observers have also noted a tendency towards discrimination in state rhetorics. In the

report by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights which was devoted

to the situation with the human rights in Ukraine during the period of August 16 — November 15,

2016, it was stated that “there were more cases of provocative rhetorics and hate speech which can

lead to discrimination of vulnerable layers of society”. In particular, this can be said about internally-

displaced persons.

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In the monitors’ opinion, this contradicts the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Words said by the head of the Donetsk region are not attached to the report, however, some of them,

especially the ones assessing citizens’ political choice, look like violation of the Article 161 of the

Criminal Code of Ukraine “Violating equality of citizens depending on their ethnicity or nationality or

on their attidude to religion”. The article defines such criminal conduct as willful actions aimed at na-

tional, racial or religious enmity and hatred, humiliation of national honour and dignity, or the insult

of people’s feelings in respect to their religious convictions, race, ethnicity, colour of skin or language

and also any direct or indirect restriction of rights, or granting direct or indirect privileges to people

based on race, colour of skin, political, religious and other convictions, sex, ethnic and social origin,

property status, place of residence, linguistic or other characteristics. Punishment for civil servants

is more severe in this case.

The Constitution of Ukraine also guarantees the right for freedom of thought and speech, for free

expression of one’s views and convictions and also the right to form political parties.

Building of a Ukrainian state propaganda system is the first sign of building an autocratic political

system in Ukraine.

As it was said in the memorandum of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, if propa-

ganda dominates in the country, it becomes a tool for establishing autocratic regime. It is not known

what can the consequences of the words the authorities say today cаn be tomorrow. Verbal discrimi-

nation can turn into physical one.

What should be said and how

The confrontation period in Kyiv in winter 2013-2014 was relatively quiet in the Donbas. This is why

a lot of people who live in the region see Maidan victory as the start of destabilization process in

Ukraine. They connect hostilities with Maidan and see then as the price that has to be paid for

changing the country’s vector in foreign politics.

Economic interest is a strong factor as well. Despite the war, the Russian Federation remains

one of the main consumers of the goods which the region exports. According to the data of

the Main Statistics Department in the Donetsk region, the amount of goods exported from

the region (without the Anti-Terrotirst Operation zone) in January-September 2016, equalled

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2.5421 million dollars. He majority of goods were exported to Italy (504.5 million dollars

which equalled 19.8% of the general amount). The Russian Federation occupies the second

place (422.6 million dollars which equalled 16,6% of the general amount). To compare, in

2013 the amount of goods exported to Russia equalled 1.937 million dollars which comprised

20.5% of all export.

Of course, disruption of economic ties is seen as a negative factor by many as it directly influences

the level of well-being.

The strategy of re-teaching the Donbas residents, which has been much spoken about by

Pavlo Zhebrivsky, head of the region, does not work in this situation. A person cannot change

their political views and economic interests which were appropriate a couple of years ago in

no time.

State ideology and informational policy often resort to messages which emphasize the difference

between the Donbas residents instead of trying to establish some common ground.

Despite the fact that some events are perceived negatively by people who live in the Donetsk and

Luhansk regions, the majority of them do not doubt the fact that the state of Ukraine exists and they

want to live in a united country.

According to the survey conducted by Rating Group, which was ordered by International Republican

Institute, 75% of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions residents want their regions to remain a part of

Ukraine. 32% of them responded that they want to be a part of Ukraine and they had thought the

same before the beginning of Russian military aggression, 35% want to remain a part of Ukraine

but to have more freedoms as a result of decentralization reform, 8% want to be “an autonomy

in Ukraine”, 7% of respondents who live in the Donbas want to become a part of Russia, 1% of

respondents chose the variant “to become an independent state”. Thus, as for the main question

of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, there are practically no disagreements among the

Donbas residents.

Still, SCORE Ukraine research proves that despite the war, citizens’ preferences in foreign policy are

polarized depending on the region they live in. Here, the Donbas does not differ from the general

Ukrainian context. According to surveys, about 50% of citizens support pro-Russian view here. The

figure in the South of Ukraine is practically the same, 46%. There are 34% of citizens who support

pro-Russian views in the East of Ukraine.

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In general, 15% of Ukrainians have a “polarized pro-European position”, 17% have a “polarized pro-

Russian position”, 34% are politically indifferent or have not decided yet, 15% are “tolerant pro-

European”, 19% are “tolerant synthesizers” which means that they see positive features in both

positions but do not share them. It should be said that “pro-Russian” does not necessarily mean that

a person is against Ukraine as people’s motivation is more complex.

Index SCORE gives recommendations how to work with these people and how to involve them in

national processes:

• To involve them in the development of the society and making decisions at local level;

• To discuss benefits of Euro integration and membership in the EU, to broaden political

space to make their fears and concerns to be heard.

Researchers think that the above measures will contribute to gradual transfer of these people from

being “radically pro-Russian” to “tolerant synthesizers”and “tolerant pro-European” citizens.

Such recommendations initiate dialogue in the society. The research of “Democratic Initiatives”

foundation conducted in November 2015 showed that the idea of compromise as a way to overcome

the armed conflict is popular in the Donbas. It is supported by 75% of respondents. However, 54%

think that it is worth to agree, but not to everything. A year later- in the summer of 2016 — the survey

conducted by the foundation demonstrated that 47% of respondents were ready for compromises to

achieve peace, but not compromises in everything.

The research of NGO “Telekrytyka” (now — NGO “Detector Media”) among journalists who

cover events in the Donbas showed that there was a desire to have a dialogue even among

journalists, but they did not understand who the dialogue is possible with. Journalists think

that absence of the theme of the dialogue in MM is caused by the absence of a particular

articulated state policy concerning the future of the occupied territories and residents of the

uncontrolled territories.

Taking into consideration polarization of Ukrainian society, dialogue is necessary not only for Donbas

residents, but for the whole Ukrainian society. Information policy should take into consideration the

fact that the majority of citizens would like to live in one country, but these citizens are different and

have the right to have their own opinion. The state should not propagate the ideas of one group only

even if the group is the most numerous one.

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To improve the state policy in this sphere, it is necessary

• To introduce principles of tolerance, to abandon simplifications and propaganda cliches;

human rights should be the basis of the Donbas information reintegration strategy which

the Ukrainian Ministry of Information Policy is working at now;

• To make unity through diversity the main principle of information policy;

• To hold a public discussion of Maidan as a phenomenon, its consequences for the

country and the region, and for the military conflict with the Russian Federation;

• To arrange a broad public discussion of a new model of relations (or breaking up the

relations) with the Russian Federation;

• To focus on consolidating factors for Ukrainian society;

• To arrange a broad public discussion of a new model of relations with the European

Union, NATO, and the security system.

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1 Порошенко открыл новую телевышку на горе Карачун2 Юрій Стець: «Завданням на наступний рік є побудова ще трьох теле-веж у Луганській та Донецькій областях»3 ОМІП: Затверджено новий склад Комісії з питань відновлення мов-лення4 Медіаландшафт на українських та окупованих територіях Донбасу: дослідження GFK та ІМІ5 Конфліктно чутливе висвітлення груп, дотичних до конфлікту (резуль-тати моніторингу)6 Что нужно делать журналистам дла примирения на Донбассе — мнения экспертов7 Historical Dictionary of Ukraine. Second Edition8 «Если вместо головы снаряд...». Як формувалась ідентичність Дон-басу9 Економічний потенціал10 Цифры и мнения: Штрихи к автопортрету среднестатистического дончанина11 Регіональна ідентичність: український контекст12 Національна безпека і оборона13 Національна безпека і оборона14 До Дня Незалежності: що українці думають про Україну?15 Нищук заявив, що скандал щодо його висловлювань у «Свободі слова» на ICTV підняли російські ЗМІ16 Аваков назвав винних у рекордному рівні злочинності в Україні17 В регіонах, де сконцентровано більшість переселенців, значно зросла кількість крадіжок18 Нардеп от БПП Олег Барна уверен, что у всех негодяев есть про-писка19 Закон України «Про військово-цивільні адміністрації»20 В текущем году в Донецкой области планируется открыть 21 опор-ную школу21 Жебрівський розповів, як відновити генотип українця на Донбасі 22 Фейковая «украинизация» Донбасса

23 Оппозиционный блок нанес сокрушительное поражение власти в городах Донецкой области 24 www.5.ua25 Жебрівський пояснив успіх екс-регіоналів на місцевих виборах у Донецькій області26 «Якщо буде 150 тисяч куркулів на Донеччині, то там буде демократія» — Жебрівський27 Годовые показатели работы малых предприятий Донецкой области28 Ставлення українців до Мінських домовленостей та статусу тимча-сово окупованих територій Донецької та Луганської областей29 The Role of Media in Shaping Libya’s Security Sector Narratives30 Кихтенко об упреках Авакова: Если мы отказались от оккупирован-ных территорий, обвинение имеет смысл31 Доповідь щодо ситуації з правами людини в Україні 16 серпня — 15 листопада 201632 Международный пакт о гражданских и политических правах33 ККУ34 Конституція України35 Пропаганда и свобода массовой информации36 Соціально-економічне становище Донецької області у січні–жовтні 2016 року37 Соціально-економічне становище Донецької області за січень–жов-тень 2013 року38 Жители Донбасса против отделения от Украины — опрос39 SCORE Ukraine Current sociopolitical trends — programmatic and implications 40 Ставлення населення до подій на Донбасі: ціна миру і шляхи подо-лання конфлікту41 Донбас: погляд населення на конфлікт42 Висвітлення конфлікту в українських медіа: установки, практики, пошук рішень (результати дослідження)43 МІП представило напрями посилення роботи щодо інформаційної реінтеграції Донбасу

Аналітичний звіт підготовлено громадською організацією «Донецький інститут інформації» в межах «Ініціативи з розвитку аналітичних центрів Україні», яку виконують Міжнародний фонд «Відродження» (МВФ) у партнерстві з Фондом розвитку аналітичних центрів (TTF) за фінансової підтримки Посольства Швеції в Україні (SIDA). Дум-ки та позиції, викладені в цьому звіті, є позицією автора та необов’язково відображають позицію уряду Швеції, Міжнародного фонду «Відродження» (МВФ) та Фонду розвитку аналітичних центрів (TTF).

Експертна група: Віталій Сизов, Алексей Мацука.

Редактор: Віталій Сизов

Аналітичний звіт доступний для завантаження за посиланням dii.dn.ua/news

Грудень 2016