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President Putin’s proposal on September 5 for a UN support mission to protect the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) in the South-East of Ukraine drew scepticism among Ukraine’s international partners. Yet the fact that Russia is willing to consider a UN peace-keeping mission in the Donbas could represent a breakthrough after years of protracted conflict. Under the right conditions, such mission could become an effective enforcing mechanism to protect people and infrastructure across the entirety of the occupied territory. It would also create conditions to implement a political solution that restores Ukrainian sovereignty in line with the Minsk Accords. Russia’s proposal

Moscow proposed a UN peacekeeping mission for a limited period of 6 months, equipped with small arms and light weapons, and with the exclusive mandate to ensure security of the SMM along the line of contact (LoC) between Ukrainian troops and Russian-backed rebels. On September 11, Putin suggested the peacekeepers could be deployed in other areas where OSCE monitors operate but did not say if this would cover the entirety of the separatist republics or the uncontrolled international border between Russia and the rebel-held territories. Other members of the Security Council as well as Germany have stated that this would not be sufficient to support the broader Minsk process. In fact, it could hamper OSCE movements in the area and at worse, internationalize the LoC as a potential new border splitting Ukraine and freezing the conflict. Many see Russia’s announcement as a diversionary tactic, ahead of the UN General Assembly where President Poroshenko will re-introduce suggestions for a peacekeeping mission. Ukraine’s proposal In March 2015, President Poroshenko proposed a UN peacekeeping mission in the Donbas to implement the Minsk Agreements. The aim was to facilitate a broader political solution by supporting the detailed set of measures that were negotiated in February 2015, including: a) overseeing pull-out of all heavy weapons in the Donbas; b) supporting withdrawal of all foreign armed formations and military equipment, as well as mercenaries, from certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions; c) disarming all illegal groups; d) helping Ukraine reinstate full control of its border; e) ensuring the release and exchange of all hostages and unlawfully detained persons; f) supporting the OSCE’s SMM; and g) overseeing free and fair elections in the Donbas. This initiative stalled in the Security Council under Russia’s strong opposition. Peacekeeping Principles The current U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley, in a Security Council briefing in April 2017, listed five minimum guiding principles for peacekeeping missions:

1. missions must support political solutions; 2. missions need host country cooperation; 3. missions must have realistic and achievable mandates; 4. missions must have an exit strategy; and 5. mandates must be adjusted when situations improve or fail to improve.

Potential UN mission in the Donbas TYPE OF DOCUMENT: EXTERNAL MEMO September 13th, 2017

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Whereas other guiding principles could be added, even these minimal benchmarks disqualify the Russian proposal: it does not support a political solution (based on Minsk) and does not have an exit strategy based on achieving peace. Instead it presumes its end after 6 months without prescribing what would be the desired end-state by then. In contrast, the Ukrainian proposal fully meets the requirements for an effective UN peacekeeping mission. The only—and thus far insurmountable—stumbling block has been the Russian veto in the Security Council. Potential Compromise A potential compromise between the two proposals would be to give the Mission a broader mandate that would allow it to protect all civilian population and infrastructure in the entirety of the occupied territory. In this way, it could facilitate further progress towards a political solution of the conflict. The potential mission’s mandate would go beyond protection of OSCE monitors; the goal is to maintain peace on the ground. The OSCE SMM would continue to monitor compliance with Minsk provisions in coordination with the new UN Mission, and help facilitate the broader political process, including the holding of elections. Based on existing UN peacekeeping operations, this type of mission would cost approximately $1 billion and consist of 10,000-20,000 troops (see appendix for comparison). UN Process Under the UN Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for international peace and security and has authorized all existing peacekeeping missions. Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council also has the primary jurisdiction to authorize the use of force. The current 16 UN peacekeeping missions are part of a wider set of 35 so-called “UN special political missions.” While in a few cases such missions have been authorized by the General Assembly, a robust peacekeeping mission based on Ukraine’s 2015 proposal, or even the compromise version outlined above, would require Security Council approval. 1 Although Russia is likely to seek to dilute the mandate and could veto a resolution, the international community should put Moscow to the test. Despite the significant obstacles, the mounting pressure of sanctions and the prospect of US provision of lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine could persuade the Russian leader that it is time to get serious about implementing the Minsk Accords.

1 The first armed UN peacekeeping mission was established by the General Assembly in 1956, invoking the Uniting for Peace authority, when it created the First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) in the Middle East (to deal with the Suez Crisis). To date, this is the only time the GA established a peacekeeping mission.

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Russia’s proposal for peacekeepers in the Donbas – risks and fixes

Source: Rasmussen Global

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UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS * Consists of troops, military observers, staff officers, and police.

Mission Uniformed personnel*

Civilian personnel

Budget Fatalities Date Established

Congo (MONUSCO)

18,571 3,319 $1.2 billion 111 July 2010

South Sudan (UNMISS)

13,424 2,164 $1.1 billion 50 July 2011

Darfur (UNAMID)

16,673 2,888 $1.0 billion 250 July 2007

Mali (MINUSMA)

12,815 1,342 $933 million 128 April 2013

Central African Republic (MINUSCA)

12,349 1,058 $920 million 44 April 2014

Abyei (UNISFA)

4,536 204 $269 million 22 June 2011

Closing Down

Haiti (MINUSTAH)

3,707 1,117 $346 million 186 June 2004

Liberia 742 746 $187 million 200 September 2003

Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI)

0 394 $153 million 150 April 2004

Legacy Missions

Kosovo (UNMIK)

16 308 $37 million 55 June 1999

Western Sahara (MINURSO)

228 231 $57 million 16 April 1991

Lebanon (UNIFIL)

10,503 814 $489 million 312 March 1978

Syria (UNDOF) 829 130 $48 million 46 June 1974

Cyprus (UNFICYP)

956 154 $56 million 183 March 1964

India/Pakistan (UNMOGIP)

44 70 $21 million 11 January 1949

Middle East (UNTSO)

151 214 $69 million 51 May 1948

Source: UN