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AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT March 31, 2015

2015 03-31 CTP Update and Assessment

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Page 1: 2015 03-31 CTP Update and Assessment

AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT

March 31, 2015

Page 2: 2015 03-31 CTP Update and Assessment

TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. Operation Decisive Storm, led by Saudi Arabia, began against the al Houthis.

2. Iran’s negotiating team projected cautious optimism that final differences could be resolved

as nuclear talks between Tehran and the P5+1 continue up until the March 31 deadline.

3. Tunisian security forces began wide-scale counter-terrorism operations throughout Tunisia.

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Page 3: 2015 03-31 CTP Update and Assessment

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalYemen’s political crisis reached a turning point on March 25 when President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi fled the country to

Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia pulled together a coalition including the Gulf States, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, and Morocco.

Pakistan and Turkey have both come out in support of Saudi Arabia’s leadership. The Gulf States continue to call for talks to

resolve Yemen’s political crisis, but the al Houthis refuse to negotiate. Iran continues rhetorical support for the al Houthis.

Outlook: The Gulf States continue to push for a political solution in Yemen as they apply military pressure on the al Houthis,

but the al Houthis refuse to participate in talks.

SecurityOperation Decisive Storm began in Yemen on March 26 with a stated objective of restoring Hadi’s government. Coalition

airstrikes targeted al Houthi military positions throughout the country. The U.S. is providing logistical and intelligence support.

The al Houthis continue to battle pro-Hadi forces on the ground, though the pro-Hadi forces do not have a unified effort. Some

Yemeni military units have announced that they are pro-Hadi and Saudi Arabia is actively looking for a Yemeni force to engage

the al Houthis on the ground. The al Houthis are attempting to gain control of Aden, al Dhaleh, and al Bayda governorates.

Outlook: Operation Decisive Storm has enabled pro-Hadi forces to begin a counteroffensive against the al Houthis. The

involvement of regional Sunni states against the Zaydi Shia al Houthis in Yemen may further inflame sectarian sentiments.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State in Yemen (ISIS)Pro-AQAP social media accounts were noticeably quiet following the emergence of ISIS in Yemen, but have resumed posting

claims of attacks, especially in al Bayda. The ISIS presence seems to be most active in Lahij governorate.

Outlook: It is possible that some AQAP fighters have defected to ISIS. AQAP may have to compete with emerging ISIS cells for fighters and resources.

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

Page 4: 2015 03-31 CTP Update and Assessment

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

1) 26-27 MAR: Coalition airstrikes targeted al Houthi sites throughout Yemen, particularly in Sana’a and Sa’ada.2) 25-27 MAR: Al Houthis and allied 39th BDE battled pro-Hadi forces for control of Badr camp and Aden Airport.3) 25-27 MAR: Al Houthis and 33rd Brigade battled pro-Hadi forces for control of al Dhaleh.4) 22-27 MAR: Al Houthis battled pro-Hadi forces at al AnadAirbase and al Hawta, Lahij.

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Start of Operation Decisive StormAl Houthis invade Lahij

Page 5: 2015 03-31 CTP Update and Assessment

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe Kenyan government is becoming increasingly concerned by al Shabaab activity along its border and inside the country. Following a string of attacks in Kenya on March 13, 15, and 17, the Kenyan government announced that it would increase security along its border with Somalia. This will include the construction of a wall along part of the border as well as an increased presence of security forces. These measures are a departure from past policy dealing with the border and signal an increased concern by the Kenyan government.

Outlook: If al Shabaab attacks are not prevented there will be increased pressure on the Kenyan government to implement further security measures.

Security Somali security forces continued to increase pressure on al Shabaab by recapturing the village of Kuday, Lower Jubba region

on March 22. Al Shabaab had used Kuday to export charcoal, an important source of revenue for the group, and import arms.

Al Shabaab had previously been driven from the town in late October 2014 but had reoccupied it in early November.

Outlook: If the security forces can prevent al Shabaab from retaking Kuday it would help deprive the group of resources.

Al ShabaabAl Shabaab carried out a complex attack on a hotel popular with government officials on March 27 in Mogadishu. The attack involved a VBIED followed by militants storming the hotel. Security forces, including U.S. trained special forces, struggled to retake the hotel. This is the third al Shabaab attack on a hotel in Mogadishu this year. The first attack targeted Turkish diplomats on January 22, while the second targeted government officials on February 20.

Outlook: Despite efforts by security forces in Mogadishu, al Shabaab still retains the ability to conduct complex attacks in the capital. This is likely to continue as al Shabaab loses territory and continues to implement an insurgent strategy.

HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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Page 6: 2015 03-31 CTP Update and Assessment

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

1) 22 MAR: Security forces and AMISOM troops captured Kuday, Lower Jubbaregion.2) 23 MAR: Al Shabaab kidnaped the former governor of Elbur in Dac, Galgudud region.3) 23 MAR: Somali pirates hijack Iranian fishing vessel off the coast of Ceel-Huur, Mudug region.4) 27 MAR: Al Shabaab conducted a complex attack on the Makka al Mukarama Hotel in Mogadishu.

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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Page 7: 2015 03-31 CTP Update and Assessment

ASSESSMENT:

AQIMMilitant activity increased in regions surrounding the Algerian capital, Algiers. The Algerian military arrested 11 members of a

cell of the ISIS-affiliated Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria. The military also increased security across the southern and

eastern regions near Algiers. Meanwhile, two AQIM affiliated groups, the Ajnad al Sahel and the al Furqan Brigade, released an

unverified statement on twitter offering a "hand of support" and endorsement to ISIS.

Outlook: Unrest in Libya will continue to benefit AQIM and ISIS-linked groups and contribute to their overall ability to carry out

smuggling operations and attacks in the Sahel.

Ansar al Sharia (Libya, Tunisia)Tunisian security forces launched wide-scale crackdowns in the aftermath of the Bardo Museum Attack. Tunisian security

forces arrested 23 suspects linked to the attack and claimed to prevent several attacks by an ISIS-linked group. In Libya, Ansar

al Sharia Libya released images showing fighters near Derna and in Benghazi. This is the first official publication from Ansar al

Sharia in Derna in months. Ansar al Sharia is likely trying to demonstrate it maintains a presence in Libya despite rumors of

large scale defections from the group to ISIS.

Outlook: Militant activity targeting Tunisian security forces and retaliatory counter-terrorism operations will likely continue to

increase, particularly in the aftermath of the Bardo Museum attack

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)AQIM militants executed a Malian man this week accused of aiding the French forces in Mali. The man was reportedly

decapitated. Following the execution, AQIM distributed pamphlets threatening civilians with the same punishment if they assist

French forces.

Outlook: AQIM will continue its campaign to fight French and Malian forces and will likely conduct more attacks on military

targets.

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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

Page 8: 2015 03-31 CTP Update and Assessment

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA

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NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA

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NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA

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NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA

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NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA

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NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA

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NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA

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NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA

1) 20-23 MAR: Tunisian security forces arrested 11 members of an alleged ISIS cell plotting to launch attacks across the country.2) 23-24 MAR: Algerian military forces arrested 11 members of an alleged Soldiers of the Caliphate Cell in Boumerdes. An IED detonated and injured two civilians on a road in the same area.

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Page 9: 2015 03-31 CTP Update and Assessment

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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SAHELWEST AFRICA

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1) 21 MAR: Unidentified militants kidnapped five MNLA members northwest of Aguelhoc, Mali.2)23 MAR: Unidentified militants killed when explosives they were handling detonated early in Kadji village, in Gao region, Mali.

Page 10: 2015 03-31 CTP Update and Assessment

ASSESSMENT:

Regional Developments

Initial Iranian reactions to the March 26 Saudi-led airstrikes in Yemen focused on Saudi blowback and the Yemeni response.

Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif called “for an immediate end” to Saudi military operations, while National Security and

Foreign Policy (NSFP) Parliamentary Commission member Mohammad Esmail Kowsari stated that the airstrikes “will definitely

harm Saudi Arabia, it will shake up the foundations of the Saudi government.” NSFP Parliamentary Commission Vice Chairman

Mansour Haghighat Pour stated, “The people of Yemen are a determined and revolutionary people, who will transform this

country into a quagmire for the aggressive aspirations of Saudi Arabia.” Security leadership members such as Supreme Council

for National Security (SCNS) Secretary Ali Shamkhani were noticeably silent regarding the airstrikes.

Outlook: The security leadership’s support for the Houthis in any commentary this week may indicate the extent of Iranian

involvement in the ongoing crisis in Yemen.

Nuclear Talks

Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said that the P5+1 nuclear negotiations could be extended until March 31, following

Friday’s ministerial-level talks in Lausanne Switzerland. Abbas Araghchi said that, it is too soon to predict whether or not an

agreement could be reached before March 29. The Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs, nevertheless,

stated: “We will stay here until necessary,” stressing that, the current round is aimed at resolving all issues. Ali Akbar Salehi,

Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said that Tehran and the P5+1 share a common understanding on a significant

number of topics and are working to resolve two remaining technical issues. Salehi seemed to suggest that an emerging

agreement is within reach. Collectively, these statements are indicative of the cautious optimism projected by Iranian

negotiators.

Outlook: The Supreme Leader’s bottom line for a nuclear deal — the complete and up-front removal of sanctions — will

continue to be a significant impediment to reaching a political agreement before the March 31 deadline.

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IRAN

Page 11: 2015 03-31 CTP Update and Assessment

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN

1121 MAR – 27 MAR 2015

21 MAR: The Supreme Leader coined the new Iranian year as the year of “Government and Nation;

Harmony and Unanimity.” He also reiterated his demand for the removal of sanctions and said Iran would

not discuss domestic and regional issues at the nuclear talks.

23 MAR: President Rouhani called for unanimous support of the Supreme Leader’s negotiations guidelines.

23 MAR: The IRGC denied media reports that Qassem Soleimani touted Iran’s ability to control events in

Jordan on March 22.

24 MAR: National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi

dismissed the March 20 open letter to President Obama signed by 367 House members regarding a

nuclear deal.

24 MAR: Head of Iraqi Badr Organization Hadi al Amiri praised IRGC Qods Force Commander Qassem

Soleimani’s support and claimed that Iraqis do not need coalition support.

24 MAR: Spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Behrouz Kamalvandi said IAEA

Head Yukiya Amano’s demands for snap inspections were illegal.

25 MAR: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif reassured Iranians that negotiations would not deviate

from the Supreme Leader’s framework.

26 MAR: Foreign Minister Zarif called for an immediate end to Saudi military strikes in Yemen.

26 MAR: AEOI Head Ali Akbar Salehi stated that nuclear negotiators had reached a “common understanding”

on technical issues.

26 MAR: President Rouhani pressed for the removal of sanctions during a telephone conversation with

British Prime Minister David Cameron.

27 MAR: Foreign Minister Zarif denounced Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s remarks supporting

the Saudi-led airstrikes in Yemen and denouncing Iran’s regional role.

Page 12: 2015 03-31 CTP Update and Assessment

ACRONYMS

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Atomic Energy Agency of Iran (AEOI)

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)

Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)

Islamic State (IS)

Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)

National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)

North Waziristan (NWA)

Pakistani Military (PakMil)

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS)

Somalia National Army (SNA)

South Waziristan (SWA)

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Page 13: 2015 03-31 CTP Update and Assessment

CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT ANALYSTS

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda [email protected](202) 888-6576

Alexis Knutsenal Qaeda [email protected](202) 888-6570

Marie DonovanIran [email protected](202) 888-6572

Mehrdad MoarefianIran [email protected](202) 888-6574

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project,visit www.criticalthreats.org.

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