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The harvard review of PhilosoPhy vol.XVI 2009

By Michael N. Forster

WITTGENSTEIN

Michael N. Forster is the Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor in Philosophy and the College at the University of Chicago, where he served as departmental chairman for ten years. His historical focus is primarily on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German philosophy, and secondarily on ancient philosophy. Thematically, he focuses mainly on issues in epistemology and the philosophy of ODQJXDJH��7RJHWKHU�ZLWK�D�QXPEHU�RI�DUWLFOHV��KH�KDV�SXEOLVKHG�ÀYH�ERRNV³WZR�RQ�Hegel, a volume of translations from Herder, one on Wittgenstein, and his most recent Kant and Skepticism (Princeton University Press, 2008).

$n unlovely TiTle, i am afraid, BuT aCCuraTely desCriPTive of whaT seems WR�PH�DQ�LQWHUHVWLQJ�WRSLF��7KH�WRSLF�LV�WKH�OLPLWV�RI�FRQFHSWXDO�DQG�other forms of intellectual diversity, as seen through the lens of WKH� ODWHU�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V� RSSRVLWLRQ� WR� D� FHUWDLQ� VRUW� RI�3ODWRQLVP�1

In his excellent book The View from Nowhere��7KRPDV�1DJHO�WDNHV�YHU\�seriously the possibility that there might be concepts that are more or less entirely different from any of our own (perhaps because grounded in forms of perception ZKLFK�ZH� KDSSHQ� WR� ODFN��2 Wittgenstein sometimes seems hesitant about embracing such a radical possibility.3 But at other times he too seems sympathetic to it. For example, he writes in Zettel, “I want to say: an education quite different from ours might also be the foundation of quite different concepts. For here life would run on differently.—What interests us would no longer interest them. Here different concepts would no longer be unimaginable. In fact, this is the only way in which essentially different concepts are imaginable.”�

Wittgenstein is much more striking, however, for describing a wide variety of what at least seem to be concepts, or “grammatical” principles (that LV�� UXOHV�RI� ODQJXDJH� WKDW�FRQVWLWXWH�FRQFHSWV�� which, though to some extent similar to our own, are also different from our own in important respects—what he at one point in Zettel refers to as “concepts other than though akin to ours.”6 In other words, he is more strikingly concerned with cases in which we might EH�LQFOLQHG�WR�VD\��QRW�VLPSO\��´7KHVH�SHRSOH�KDYH�QR�FRQFHSW�RI�;�DV�ZH�GRµ�RU�´7KHVH�SHRSOH�KDYH�D�FRQFHSW�RI�;�ZKHUHDV�ZH�GR�QRW�µ�EXW�VRPHWKLQJ�PRUH�OLNH��´7KHVH�SHRSOH�KDYH�D�GLIIHUHQW�FRQFHSW�RI�;�IURP�RXUV�µ7

/HW�XV�EULHÁ\�FRQVLGHU�VL[�W\SHV�RI�́ JUDPPDWLFDOµ�SULQFLSOHV�FRQVWLWXWLYH�of concepts on which Wittgenstein especially focuses, in order to illustrate this feature of his texts: formal logic, mathematics, other openly necessary principles, ostensive definitions, criteria for psychological conditions, and a class of apparently empirical but in fact covertly “grammatical” principles that he mainly discusses in On Certainty.� In connection with formal logic, he envisages the case of a people for whom a double negation would count either as meaningless or

vol.XVI 2009 The harvard review of PhilosoPhy

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else as a repetition of the simple negation,9 so that their logic would not recognize the law of double-negation elimination,10 and they would only have “something corresponding to our [concept of] negation.”11 In connection with mathematics, he gives an example of our mathematics versus the mathematics of people who FDQ�RQO\�FRXQW�WR�ÀYH��DQG�ZKRVH�QXPHULFDO�FRQFHSWV�WKHUHIRUH�GLIIHU�IURP�RXU�counterparts;12 an example in which people have a practice of “calculation” in ZKLFK�́ HYHU\ERG\�EHOLHYHG�WKDW�WZLFH�WZR�ZDV�ÀYH�µ�DQG�WKHLU�QXPHULFDO�FRQFHSWV�accordingly differed from ours;13 an example in which, unlike us, people employ HODVWLF�UXOHUV��VR�WKDW�´ZKDW�LV�KHUH�FDOOHG�¶PHDVXULQJ·�DQG�¶OHQJWK·�DQG�¶HTXDO�OHQJWK�·�LV�VRPHWKLQJ�GLIIHUHQW�IURP�ZKDW�ZH�FDOO�WKRVH�WKLQJV��7KH�XVH�RI�WKHVH�words is different from ours, but it is akin to it”;�� and an example in which, unlike us, people use as the criterion for setting the price of a quantity of wood not its volume or weight but only the area of the surface that it happens to cover, so WKDW�´WKH\��GR�QRW�PHDQ�WKH�VDPH�E\�¶D�ORW�RI�ZRRG·�DQG�¶D�OLWWOH�ZRRG·�DV�ZH�do.”�� In connection with other openly necessary principles, he argues that a people might be able to dispense with our prohibition against speaking of a reddish green DQG�LQVWHDG�UHFRJQL]H�VRPHWKLQJ�RI�WKH�NLQG��́ 7KHVH�SHRSOH�DUH�DFTXDLQWHG�ZLWK�reddish green.—‘But there is�QR�VXFK�WKLQJ�·³:KDW�DQ�H[WUDRUGLQDU\�VHQWHQFH�³�+RZ�GR�\RX�NQRZ"�µ16 In connection with RVWHQVLYH�GHÀQLWLRQV, he contrasts with our grammatical procedure of picking out and classifying as similar the four SULPDU\�FRORUV�EOXH��UHG��JUHHQ��DQG�\HOORZ�D�SRVVLEOH�DOWHUQDWLYH�FODVVLÀFDWLRQ��´7KLQN�RI�D�JURXS�FRQWDLQLQJ�WKH�IRXU�SULPDU\�FRORUV�SOXV�EODFN�DQG�ZKLWH�µ17 In connection with criteria for psychological conditions, he points out that there is a difference between a concept of “love” for which a feeling alone is the criterion and a concept of “love” which also incorporates concerned behavior towards the beloved as a criterion;�� and he imagines a people who in place of our concept of “pain” with its criteria have two quite distinct concepts, one tied to the criterion RI�YLVLEOH�ERGLO\�GDPDJH��DQG�DVVRFLDWHG�ZLWK�V\PSDWK\�WRZDUGV�WKH�VXIIHUHU��the other to the criterion of sensations like stomach ache (and associated with ODFN�RI�V\PSDWK\��19 Finally, in connection with the apparently-empirical-but-in-fact-covertly-”grammatical” principles discussed in On Certainty he offers several examples of competing alternatives. For instance, he gives the example of people who believe in the biblical story of creation versus those who do not;20 and the example of an opposition between our commitment to the principle that the HDUWK�H[LVWHG�ORQJ�EHIRUH�RXU�ELUWK�DQG�WKH�ÀFWLRQDO�FDVH�RI�D�NLQJ�EURXJKW�XS�committed to the principle that the world began with him.21 For Wittgenstein, such “grammatical” differences would constitute corresponding differences in the concepts of a “world,” “time,” and so on.

:KDW� LV�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�SXUSRVH�ZLWK�VXFK�VWUDQJH�H[DPSOHV"�&HUWDLQ�readings of Wittgenstein in the secondary literature—for example, the reading originally invented by Bernard Williams and then developed further by Jonathan /HDU22³HQFRXUDJH�XV�WR�VHH�WKHLU�SXUSRVH�DV�RQH�RI�VKRZLQJ�WKDW�ZKDW�DW�ÀUVW�sight appear to be alternative conceptual possibilities are in fact not. Now, a small FODVV�RI�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�H[DPSOHV�does in fact have a purpose rather like that: they are designed to unmask seemingly coherent philosophical conceptions as in fact implicitly incoherent. Hence Wittgenstein writes at one point in the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, “In these considerations we often draw what can


60 Michael N. Forster

EH�FDOOHG�¶DX[LOLDU\�OLQHV�·�:H�FRQVWUXFW�WKLQJV�OLNH�WKH�¶VRXOOHVV�WULEH·23—which GURS�RXW�RI�FRQVLGHUDWLRQ�LQ�WKH�HQG��7KDW�WKH\�GURSSHG�RXW�KDG�WR�EH�VKRZQ�µ�� 7R�VD\�D�OLWWOH�PRUH�DERXW�WKH�VSHFLÀF�H[DPSOH�:LWWJHQVWHLQ�PHQWLRQV�KHUH��WKDW�of the “soulless tribe”: in this example Wittgenstein initially posits a tribe which behaves just like us but which lacks a soul, or feelings; but as he develops the example he gradually makes it clear that positing that they behave just like us really was positing their possession of a soul, or feelings, in whatever sense we can be said to possess these things.

+RZHYHU��WKH�QXPEHU�RI�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�H[DPSOHV�WKDW�ZRUN�LQ�WKLV�ZD\�is in fact very small, and any attempt to extend such a reading to all or even many of his examples proves to be exegetically untenable. In particular, none of the examples that I listed above can be read in this way. David Cerbone has tried to read the logical and mathematical examples in this way in his interesting HVVD\�´+RZ�WR�'R�7KLQJV�ZLWK�:RRG�µ�� and his failure is instructive. Contrary WR�&HUERQH·V�LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ��LW�LV�TXLWH�FOHDU�IURP�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�GLVFXVVLRQ�RI�WKH�wood-sellers, and the analogous case of logical aliens, at Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics�� ,�� WKDW� DOWKRXJK�:LWWJHQVWHLQ�EHOLHYHV� WKDW� WKH�ZRRG�VHOOHUV·�FRQFHSWV�DUH�GLIIHUHQW�IURP�RXUV��WKDW�ZKDW�WKH\�GR�LV�QRW�TXLWH�ZKDW�ZH�call paying, calculating, and so on, and even that we do not literally understand them—and correspondingly in the case of logical aliens: that their concepts are different from ours, that what they do is not quite what we call thinking, and even that we do not literally understand them—he nonetheless believes that they are engaged in genuine alternative linguistic practices with genuine alternative concepts. His bottom line about the wood-sellers in the text is, “We should presumably say in WKLV�FDVH��WKH\�VLPSO\�GR�QRW�PHDQ�WKH�VDPH�E\�¶D�ORW�RI�ZRRG·�DQG�¶D�OLWWOH�ZRRG·�as we do; and they have a quite different system of payment from us.”26 It is not WKDW�WKH\�GR�QRW�PHDQ�DQ\WKLQJ�DQG�KDYH�QR�V\VWHP�DW�DOO��7KH�VDPH�H[HJHWLFDO�SRLQW� DSSOLHV� WR�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V� RWKHU� H[DPSOHV� RI� ORJLFDO� DQG�PDWKHPDWLFDO�deviance as well. For instance, his bottom line concerning the example of people ZKR��URXJKO\�VSHDNLQJ��PHDVXUH�ZLWK�HODVWLF�UXOHUV�LV�WKDW�´ZKDW�LV�KHUH�FDOOHG�¶PHDVXULQJ·�DQG�¶OHQJWK·�DQG�¶HTXDO�OHQJWK�·�LV�VRPHWKLQJ�GLIIHUHQW�IURP�ZKDW�ZH�FDOO�WKRVH�WKLQJV��7KH�XVH�RI�WKHVH�ZRUGV�LV�GLIIHUHQW�IURP�RXUV��EXW�LW�LV�akin to it.”27 He does not say, imply, or even leave open as a possibility that it is a non-use, a mere illusion of a use. Similarly, when he considers the example of people who �URXJKO\�VSHDNLQJ��EHOLHYH�WKDW�´WZLFH�WZR�>LV@�ÀYH�µ�KH�GRHV�LQGHHG�LPSO\�WKDW�they would not mean by these words quite what we mean by them, that what they were doing would not strictly speaking be what we call calculating, and perhaps even that we would not literally understand them, but he nonetheless also implies that they have a genuine alternative linguistic practice��7KXV�WKH�H[DPSOH��ZKLFK�LQ�WKLV�FDVH�LV�VKRUW�HQRXJK�WR�TXRWH�LQ�IXOO��UHDGV�DV�IROORZV��

But what would this�PHDQ��́ (YHQ�WKRXJK�HYHU\ERG\�EHOLHYHG�WKDW�WZLFH�WZR�ZDV�ÀYH�LW�ZRXOG�VWLOO�EH�IRXUµ"³)RU�ZKDW�ZRXOG�LW�EH�OLNH�IRU�HYHU\ERG\�WR�EHOLHYH�WKDW"�>7KH�FRQWH[W�ZKLFK�SUHFHGHV�WKLV�SDVVDJH�RQ�WKH�SDJH�VKRZV�WKDW�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�PDLQ�SRLQW�KHUH�LV�WKDW�VXFK�D�FKDQJH�LQ�SHRSOH·V�MXGJPHQWV�ZRXOG�DOVR�HQWDLO�D�FKDQJH�LQ�WKH�meanings of the words involved.]—Well, I could imagine, for instance, that people had a different calculus, or a technique which we should not call “calculating.” But would it be wrong"��,V�D�FRURQDWLRQ�wrong"�7R�EHLQJV�GLIIHUHQW�IURP�RXUVHOYHV�LW�PLJKW�


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ORRN�H[WUHPHO\�RGG�� Finally, the same point applies to the logical example of people who do not accord a double negation its usual meaning, instead treating it either as meaningless or else as equivalent in meaning to a single negation: Wittgenstein initially presents this example as an illustration of the fact that “we can easily imagine human beings ZLWK�D�¶PRUH�SULPLWLYH·�ORJLF��LQ�ZKLFK�>WKHUH�LV@�VRPHWKLQJ�FRUUHVSRQGLQJ�WR�RXU�negation,”29 and he neither states nor implies any retraction of this characterization in the course of the example (for instance, along the lines of saying that the people in question did not have a more primitive logic or anything corresponding to our QHJDWLRQ�DIWHU�DOO��30

What, then, is�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�SXUSRVH�ZLWK�WKHVH�VWUDQJH�H[DPSOHV"�+H�actually has several purposes. For instance, besides the purpose that I am about to focus on, in a large and important class of cases, especially those involving primitive-looking linguistic practices such as the ones sketched in the Brown Book and the opening paragraphs of the Philosophical Investigations (the famous example RI�WKH�EXLOGHUV��DPRQJ�RWKHUV��KLV�SXUSRVH�LV�WR�GHSLFW�D�SRVVLEOH�DOWHUQDWLYH�WR�RXU�RZQ�OLQJXLVWLF�SUDFWLFH�LQ�RUGHU�WKHUHE\�WR�PDNH�FOHDUHU�E\�VSHFLÀF�FRQWUDVWV�and similarities certain features of our own practice. He explains this purpose explicitly at several points in the Philosophical Investigations and elsewhere.31

%XW�WKH�SXUSRVH�,�ZDQW�WR�IRFXV�RQ�KHUH�LV�D�GLIIHUHQW�RQH��$V�%DUU\�6WURXG�KDV�SRLQWHG�RXW� LQ�KLV� LPSRUWDQW�HVVD\�´:LWWJHQVWHLQ�DQG�/RJLFDO�1HFHVVLW\�µ�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�SXUSRVH�RIWHQ�VHHPV� WR�EH� WR�GLVFUHGLW�D� IRUP�RI�3ODWRQLVP�� LQ�particular a form of Platonism espoused by Frege and the early Russell.32 However, 6WURXG·V�WHUP�´3ODWRQLVPµ�LV�DSW�WR�EH�FRQIXVLQJ��EHFDXVH�RI�D�FHUWDLQ�DPELJXLW\�that it harbors. Plato himself had held at least three positions concerning concepts RU�PHDQLQJV�ZKLFK�PLJKW�FRQFHLYDEO\�EH�LQ�TXHVWLRQ�KHUH��WKDW�DQ\�JHQHUDO�WHUP�PXVW�EH�GHÀQDEOH�E\�PHDQV�RI�LQIRUPDWLYH��WKDW�LV��QRQ�WULYLDO��QHFHVVDU\�DQG�VXIÀFLHQW�FRQGLWLRQV��WKLV�LV�DQ�DVVXPSWLRQ�EHKLQG�6RFUDWHV·�IDPRXV�´:KDW�LV�;"µ�TXHVWLRQ��WKDW�FRQFHSWV�RU�PHDQLQJV�DUH�HWHUQDO�REMHFWV�RQWRORJLFDOO\�LQGHSHQGHQW�RI�KXPDQ�EHLQJV��3ODWR·V�IRUPV��DQG��WKDW�FRQFHSWV�RU�PHDQLQJV�are sparse, as it were—in other words, that there is only one concept of Virtue, one FRQFHSW�RI�-XVWLFH��DQG�VR�RQ��7KHVH�WKUHH�GRFWULQHV�DUH�ORJLFDOO\�LQGHSHQGHQW�RI�each other: a person could quite coherently be a Platonist in sense (1) without being a Platonist in sense (2) or sense (3), and similarly, with the appropriate FKDQJHV�� LQ� HDFK� FDVH��$JDLQVW�ZKLFK�RI� WKHVH� WKUHH� IRUPV�RI�3ODWRQLVP�DUH�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�VWUDQJH�H[DPSOHV�GLUHFWHG��WKHQ"�:LWWJHQVWHLQ�LV�FHUWDLQO\�RSSRVHG�to Platonism (1); that is the force of his famous introduction of the notion of ÍDPLO\� UHVHPEODQFHµ� FRQFHSWV�� D�QRWLRQ�ZKLFK�KH� LQGHHG�ÀUVW�GHYHORSHG� LQ�such earlier late works as The Big Typescript�LQ�H[SOLFLW�RSSRVLWLRQ�WR�3ODWR·V�RZQ�version of doctrine (1).33�%XW�LW�ZRXOG�EH�TXLWH�LPSODXVLEOH�WR�VHH�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�strange examples as directed against this sort of Platonism. So that leaves Platonisms (2) and (3)�DV�FDQGLGDWHV��/LNH�3ODWR��)UHJH�KDG�KHOG�YHUVLRQV�RI�ERWK�of these doctrines.��,Q�SUHVHQWLQJ�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�VWUDQJH�H[DPSOHV�DV�VWDQGLQJ�in the service of refuting a “Platonism” shared by Frege, Stroud himself mainly has doctrine (2) in mind. Now, Wittgenstein certainly is opposed to doctrine (2). However, it is far from clear whether, or if so how, his appeal to his strange examples could be meant to defeat Platonism in this sense. On the contrary,



his main case against this doctrine seems to be quite different in character—to consist in pointing out that even if there were such eternal objects, it can be seen from thought-experiments that according to our usual criteria of semantic XQGHUVWDQGLQJ�PHQWDO�DFFHVV�WR�WKHP�ZRXOG�EH�QHLWKHU�QHFHVVDU\�QRU�VXIÀFLHQW�IRU�VHPDQWLF�XQGHUVWDQGLQJ��ZKLFK�LQVWHDG�GHSHQGV�RQ�OLQJXLVWLF�FRPSHWHQFH��DQG�WKDW�WKLV�LV�LQFRQVLVWHQW�ZLWK�WKHLU�FRQVWLWXWLRQ�RI�FRQFHSWV�RU�PHDQLQJV��$QG�KLV�strange examples presuppose that case rather than constituting it—since as long as Platonism (2) seems a viable position, it will be open to someone presented with these strange linguistic practices which allegedly represent conceptual alternatives to question whether they really do so, to object that they may instead simply be GLIIHUHQW��SHUKDSV�PRUH�RU�OHVV�DGHTXDWH��UHÁHFWLRQV�RI�D�VLQJOH�FRQFHSW��WKDW�LV��D�VLQJOH�HWHUQDO�REMHFW��,�WKHUHIRUH�VXJJHVW�WKDW�LQ�LQWHUSUHWLQJ�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�DSSHDO�to strange examples as aimed against a “Platonism” shared by Frege, what Stroud should have meant is Platonism (3), the doctrine that concepts are sparse. For it LV�FOHDU��LQGHHG�SDWHQWO\�VR��WKDW�WKH�H[DPSOHV·�H[KLELWLRQ�RI�DOWHUQDWLYH�FRQFHSWV�does promise to refute Platonism in this�VHQVH��7KLV��WKHQ��LV�WKH�VSHFLÀF�IRUP�RI�Wittgensteinian anti-Platonism on which I want to focus in the present paper.��

The importance of the empiricalwiTTgensTein is inTeresTed, Then, in arguing, noT only for nagel’s radiCal PossiBiliTy of concepts which are more or less entirely different from our own, but also, and indeed especially, for the less radical possibility of concepts which, though VLPLODU�WR�RXUV��DUH�DOVR�GLIIHUHQW�IURP�WKHP�LQ�VLJQLÀFDQW�UHVSHFWV�36 In fact, as FDQ�EH�VHHQ�IURP�WKH�IXQGDPHQWDO�FKDUDFWHU�DQG�WKH�YDULHW\�RI�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�examples, he believes that such alternatives are possible for all of our concepts DQG�´JUDPPDWLFDOµ�SULQFLSOHV��DQG�WKDW�LQ�DQ\�JLYHQ�FDVH�WKHUH�LV�DQ�LQGHÀQLWH�QXPEHU�RI�DOWHUQDWLYH�SRVVLELOLWLHV��

I think that Wittgenstein is basically correct about this. However, since I have already argued to that effect at some length elsewhere,37 I shall not repeat the case here. Instead, I shall merely make a few partly critical but broadly supportive observations.

Wittgenstein is sometimes concerned with actual, empirically discoverable alternatives, at other times merely with possible, imaginable ones. For instance, it is actual, empirically discoverable cases that he has in mind when he says that “if I have made the transition from one concept-formation to another, the old concept is still there in the background,”�� and that “it is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others, when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to them becomes unimportant, and vice versa.”39 But it is mainly just possible, imaginable cases that he has in mind when he urges us to imagine certain very general facts of nature different from what we are used to so that “the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible,”�� and when he says that “concepts other than though akin to ours might seem very queer to us.”�� He understands several of the strange examples that I listed above to involve actual, empirically discoverable alternatives, for instance the example of people who only count up WR�ÀYH��2WKHUV�KH�XQGHUVWDQGV�WR�LQYROYH�RQO\�SRVVLEOH��LPDJLQDEOH�DOWHUQDWLYHV��for instance the example of people who measure with elastic rulers.



7KH�TXHVWLRQ�RI�ZKHWKHU�RU�QRW�WKH�DOWHUQDWLYHV�LQYROYHG�KDYH�DFWXDOO\�RFFXUUHG� LV� RIÀFLDOO\� D�PDWWHU� RI�SKLORVRSKLFDO� LQGLIIHUHQFH� WR�:LWWJHQVWHLQ��:K\"�7KLV�LV�EHFDXVH�ZKDW�UHDOO\�LQWHUHVWV�KLP�LV�WKH�FRQFHSWXDO�TXHVWLRQ�RI�WKHLU�possibility, and he believes that this question can be answered independently of the question of whether or not they have actually occurred (so that his occasional references to actually occurring alternatives are inessential, merely convenient EXW�GLVSHQVDEOH�LOOXVWUDWLRQV��7KXV�KH�ZULWHV�WKDW�´>VFLHQWLÀF�TXHVWLRQV@�QHYHU�really grip me. Only conceptual . . . questions do that”;�� that “the realities that are GLVFRYHUHG�OLJKWHQ�WKH�SKLORVRSKHU·V�WDVN��LPDJLQLQJ�SRVVLELOLWLHV��5HDOLWLHV�DUH�so many possibilities for the philosopher”;�� and that “we are not doing natural VFLHQFH��QRU�\HW�QDWXUDO�KLVWRU\³VLQFH�ZH�FDQ�DOVR�LQYHQW�ÀFWLWLRXV�QDWXUDO�KLVWRU\�for our purposes.”��

I do not believe that the two questions of possibility and actual occurrence are�VKDUSO\�VHSDUDEOH�LQ�WKH�ZD\�WKDW�:LWWJHQVWHLQ�WDNHV�WKHP�WR�EH��7KLV�LV�IRU�URXJKO\�WKH�IROORZLQJ�UHDVRQ��,W�LV�D�IXQGDPHQWDO�LQVLJKW�RI�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�RZQ��not only that there are alternative concepts of “language,” “concept,” and so IRUWK��WKLV�LV�DOUHDG\�LPSOLHG�E\�WKH�XQUHVWULFWHG�QDWXUH�RI�KLV�DQWL�3ODWRQLVP��but also that our existing versions of these concepts are in crucial respects vague RU�ÁXLG, in a sense which involves both indeterminacy and inconsistency in many of our intuitive judgments on these subjects, including our judgments concerning whether or not such and such an alternative way of proceeding would really constitute an example of language-use, an example of concept-use, and so on.�� We are therefore bound—on pain of either being inconsistent or else making a merely random choice between incompatible alternatives—to have recourse to considerations beyond the sheer nature of our existing concepts of “language,” ´FRQFHSW�µ�DQG�VR�IRUWK�LQ�RUGHU�WR�GHFLGH�ZKDW�WR�VD\�DERXW�VXFK�PDWWHUV��$QG�D�prime candidate here, it seems to me, should be a confrontation of the concepts in question with the interpretation of actual aliens in order to see whether such interpretation pushes us, through our inclinations to make certain interpretive judgments about the actual cases involved rather than others, to prefer one FRQVLVWHQW�UHÀQHPHQW�RI�WKH�FRQFHSWV�LQ�TXHVWLRQ�RYHU�DQRWKHU��)RU�H[DPSOH��LI�our existing concept of “language” turns out to be torn as between requiring and not requiring that anything properly called a language must be equivalent in FRQFHSWXDO�FRQWHQW�WR��SDUW�RI��RXU�RZQ�ODQJXDJH��WKHQ�D�VHQVLEOH�ZD\�RI�UHVROYLQJ�this inconsistency in our existing concept of “language” in one direction rather than the other would be to interpret some actual alien languages and see whether or not in particular cases we are inclined to attribute to them concepts which we are unable to express in our own language. It should therefore in large part be the discoveries made by such empirically informed disciplines devoted to the interpretation of actual cases of alien verbal practices as anthropology, classics, the history or ideas, and comparative linguistics that determine the character of the concepts of “language,” “concept,” and so forth that we as philosophers use, and hence what is and what is not to count for us as a possible “grammatical” or conceptual alternative.

7KLV�LV�D�UHDVRQ�IRU�WKLQNLQJ�WKDW�:LWWJHQVWHLQ�RXJKW�WR�KDYH�DVVLJQHG�D�more essential role to the use of actual, empirically discoverable examples than he does (which is not to deny that merely possible, imaginary examples can play a


�� Michael N. Forster

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The illusion of exceptionsBearing ThaT meThodologiCal PoinT in mind, leT me now maKe a few emPiriCal REVHUYDWLRQV� FRQFHUQLQJ�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�XQUHVWULFWHG�DQWL�3ODWRQLVP� UHJDUGLQJ�FRQFHSWV� DQG�´JUDPPDWLFDOµ�SULQFLSOHV��7KHUH�DUH� VHYHUDO� DUHDV� LQ�ZKLFK� WKH�empirical applicability of this anti-Platonism is especially likely to be called into question by philosophers—even philosophers who are for the most part sympathetic to it. One of these areas is common sense, another is formal logic. However, I want to suggest that such reservations are probably misguided.

Philosophers often tend to talk blithely about “common sense,” as though there were some great swath of concepts and beliefs which all humankind share �DQG�PRUHRYHU��RXJKW�WR�VKDUH��,QGHHG��HYHQ�SKLORVRSKHUV�RI�DQ�DQWL�3ODWRQLVW��RU�pluralist, tendency often concede that there are exceptions of this sort to the anti-Platonist, or pluralist, rule of intellectual variation. For example, Schleiermacher, an early pluralist of a fairly radical bent, sometimes implies that empirical vocabulary and the concept of Being constitute exceptions.��$QG�VLPLODUO\��LQ�RXU�own day the pluralist Ian Hacking seems to concede that concepts and beliefs concerning the empirically observable macrophysical world constitute an area of intellectual common ground.��

However, I think that one should in fact be very skeptical of the idea that there are exceptions to the rule of variation, and that “common sense,” however amply or meagerly conceived, is really just an illusion.�� For example, to address 6FKOHLHUPDFKHU·V�DQG�+DFNLQJ·V�YHUVLRQV�RI�WKH�QRWLRQ�RI�H[FHSWLRQV��7KH�LGHD�that discourse about empirically observable macrophysical objects and other items of sensory experience constitutes an exception to the rule of variation is refuted by such facts as that while Homer does indeed in some sense have a concept of the sun, namely Hêlios��LW�LV�RQH�WKDW�LV�VLJQLÀFDQWO\�GLIIHUHQW�IURP�RXUV��VLQFH��IRU�instance, unlike ours, it implies a sort of personhood; and that while Homer does indeed in some sense have concepts of green (chlôros��DQG�RI�EODFN��melas��WKH\�DUH�different from our concepts of green and black, since, for instance, chlôros applies not only to things which we would classify as green but also to things which we would classify as yellow, such as honey, and in addition connotes moisture, while melas applies not only to things which we would classify as black but also to things which we would classify as dark brown, such as the trunk of a tree.�� $JDLQ��6FKOHLHUPDFKHU·V�LGHD�WKDW�%HLQJ�LV�DQ�LQYDULDQW�FRQFHSW�KDV�EHHQ�FDOOHG�LQWR�VHULRXV�GRXEW�E\�&KDUOHV�.DKQ·V�ZRUN�RQ�WKH�FRQFHSW·V�WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ�LQ�ancient Greek.�� In short, conceptual variation seems likely to be an exceptionless rule, and common sense, strictly speaking, only an illusion.

7XUQLQJ�WR�WKH�VHFRQG�FDVH�PHQWLRQHG��IRUPDO�ORJLF��WKHUH�LV�D�SHUVLVWHQW�and widespread conviction among philosophers that classical logic, especially the law of contradiction, constitutes an exception to the rule of possible “grammatical” variation (say, because its acceptance is an essential constituent of any thought�� I have already argued against this conviction in some detail elsewhere,�� and shall not repeat the case here. Instead, I would here simply like to add that once one VHHV�SDVW��ZKDW�,�WDNH�WR�EH��WKH�PHUHO\�VSHFLRXV�UHDVRQV�WKDW�KDYH�VXSSRUWHG�WKLV�



FRQYLFWLRQ��RQH�LV�OLNHO\�WR�ÀQG�D�UDWKHU�ZLGH�DUUD\�RI�HPSLULFDO�FDVHV�RI�GHYLDWLRQ�from adherence to classical logic.�� Such cases of deviation include philosophical RQHV��VXFK�DV�3ODWR·V�SRVLWLRQ�LQ�WKH�Republic that appearances have contradictory SURSHUWLHV�DQG�(QJHOV·V�VLPLODU�SRVLWLRQ�FRQFHUQLQJ�QDWXUH�LQ�WKH�Anti-Dühring. But they also include cases found at other levels of culture, such as the instances of ´SUHORJLFDO�PHQWDOLW\µ�GHVFULEHG�E\�WKH�PXFK³DQG��,�WKLQN��XQGXO\³PDOLJQHG�DQWKURSRORJLVW�/pY\�%UXKO��7R�JLYH�DQ�H[DPSOH�RI�VXFK�D�GHYLDWLRQ�DW�RWKHU�OHYHOV�RI�FXOWXUH�ZKLFK�,�ÀQG�HVSHFLDOO\�VWULNLQJ��WKLV�H[DPSOH�LV�QRW�/pY\�%UXKO·V�EXW�P\�RZQ��+RPHU�VHHPV�DW�YDULRXV�SRLQWV�WR�EH�FDXJKW�LQ�D�FRQWUDGLFWLRQ�EHWZHHQ��on the one hand, an assumption that the gods know everything, and on the other hand, a conception that they engage in all sorts of human-like activities which presuppose that, like us, they have only partial knowledge. Moreover (and this LV�ZKDW�PDNHV�WKLV�H[DPSOH�UHDOO\�LQWHUHVWLQJ��KH�VHHPV�WR�EH�TXLWH�FRQVFLRXV�of this contradiction as such, and nonetheless to persist in it. For instance, in an HSLVRGH�LQ�WKH�ÀUVW�ERRN�RI�WKH�Iliad��$FKLOOHV��KDYLQJ�MXVW�KDG�KLV�IDPRXV�TXDUUHO�ZLWK�$JDPHPQRQ�DQG�WKHQ�JRQH�RII�WR�VXON��HQFRXQWHUV�KLV�RZQ�PRWKHU��WKH�VHD�Q\PSK�7KHWLV��VKH�DVNV�KLP�WR�WHOO�KHU�ZKDW�LV�WKH�PDWWHU�LQ�RUGHU�WKDW�WKH\�PD\�ERWK�NQRZ��KH�UHSOLHV��́ 7KRX�NQRZHVW��:K\��LQ�WUXWK��VKRXOG�,�WHOO�WKH�WDOH�WR�WKHH�ZKR�NQRZHVW�DOO"µ��EXW�WKHQ�KH�QRQHWKHOHVV�JRHV�RQ�WR�UHFRXQW�WKH�ZKROH�VWRU\�as if she did not already know it.��

Illocutionary forces and propositional attitudesas we have seen, wiTTgensTein mainly aPPlies his anTi-PlaTonisT message ThaT, in addition to the radical possibility of alternatives which are more or less entirely different from ours, there is also the less radical possibility of similar-but-QRQHWKHOHVV�VLJQLÀFDQWO\�GLIIHUHQW� DOWHUQDWLYHV� WR� concepts and “grammatical” principles. But it can be argued that his anti-Platonist message admits of much broader application as well, that it can and should be applied to a much broader UDQJH�RI��URXJKO\�VSHDNLQJ��SV\FKRORJLFDO�SKHQRPHQD�IRU�ZKLFK�D�JUHDW�GHDO�RI�the philosophical tradition has again been inclined to see only more limited and VSDUVH�SRVVLELOLWLHV��$QG�LW�FDQ�EH�DUJXHG�WKDW�:LWWJHQVWHLQ�KLPVHOI�DQWLFLSDWHV�at least some of the extensions in question.

I would therefore like to discuss here four further types of (roughly VSHDNLQJ��SV\FKRORJLFDO�SKHQRPHQD�IRU�ZKLFK�VXFK�DQ�H[WHQVLRQ�RI�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�DQWL�3ODWRQLVW�LQWXLWLRQ�VHHPV�SODXVLEOH��LOORFXWLRQDU\�IRUFHV�DQG�SURSRVLWLRQDO�DWWLWXGHV�� JHQUHV�� SHUFHSWXDO� VHQVDWLRQV�� DQG� ��ZKDW�PLJKW�EH� FDOOHG�the metalinguistic forms� RI�GLVFRXUVH� DQG� WH[WV��7KLV� VHTXHQFH� DSSUR[LPDWHO\�corresponds to the degree to which Wittgenstein himself makes comments suggestive of the sort of extension in question, beginning with cases where his remarks are most suggestive of it, and ending with ones where they are least VR��$FFRUGLQJO\��WKH�GLVFXVVLRQ�WKDW�IROORZV�ZLOO�EHJLQ�E\�KXJJLQJ�WKH�FRDVW�RI�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�RZQ�H[SOLFLW�SRVLWLRQV�TXLWH�FORVHO\��EXW�ZLOO�EHFRPH�LQFUHDVLQJO\�detached from them as it proceeds.

7R�EHJLQ�ZLWK� LOORFXWLRQDU\� IRUFHV�DQG�SURSRVLWLRQDO�DWWLWXGHV�� OHW�PH�RSHQ�ZLWK�D�FRXSOH�RI�LPSRUWDQW�SUHOLPLQDU\�SRLQWV��7KH�ÀUVW�LV�WKLV��,Q�LQYRNLQJ�-RKQ�$XVWLQ·V�QRWLRQ�RI�LOORFXWLRQDU\�IRUFH�� I do not mean to bind myself to any YHU\�VSHFLÀF�WKHRUHWLFDO�FRQFHSWLRQ�RI�LW��,Q�SDUWLFXODU��,�DP�VNHSWLFDO�DERXW�WKH�



XVHIXOQHVV�RI�$XVWLQ·V� UHVWULFWLRQ�RI� LW� WR�FDVHV�ZKHUH� WKHUH�DUH�FRUUHVSRQGLQJ�performatives (I doubt that it is helpful to include only such linguistic acts as promising, telling, and commanding, but to exclude such linguistic acts as joking and insinuating, simply because one can promise, tell, and command by saying “I promise,” “I tell [you],” and “I command [you]” but one cannot joke by saying “I MRNHµ�RU�LQVLQXDWH�E\�VD\LQJ�́ ,�LQVLQXDWHµ��$QG�,�DP�DOVR�VNHSWLFDO�DERXW�$XVWLQ·V�EXLOGLQJ�RI�´XSWDNHµ�E\�RWKHU�SHRSOH�LQWR�KLV�GHÀQLWLRQ�RI�DQ�LOORFXWLRQDU\�DFW�(there is indeed a sense of “to tell” in which it is a success word, that is, one only tells someone if he actually hears and understands what one tells him, but there is surely also another and equally important sense of the word in which one may WHOO�VRPHRQH�HYHQ�LI�KH�IDLOV�WR�KHDU�RU�IDLOV�WR�XQGHUVWDQG��7KH�FUXFLDO�WKLQJ�for my present purposes is just that there are clearly aspects of any intelligible discourse or writing, such as the fact that it promises, tells, or commands, which are DGGLWLRQDO�WR�LWV�PHDQLQJ��DQG�ZKLFK�DOVR�QHHG�WR�EH�FRUUHFWO\�LGHQWLÀHG�LQ�RUGHU�IRU�IXOO�FRPSUHKHQVLRQ�RI�LW�WR�EH�DFKLHYHG��7KLV�SRLQW�FDQ�EH�LOOXVWUDWHG�E\�PHDQV�RI�DQ�H[DPSOH�ORRVHO\�ERUURZHG�IURP�4XHQWLQ�6NLQQHU��,I�,�HQFRXQWHU�D�VWUDQJHU�E\�D�IUR]HQ�ODNH�ZKR�VD\V�WR�PH�́ 7KH�LFH�LV�WKLQ�RYHU�WKHUH�µ�,�PD\�XQGHUVWDQG�WKH�meaning of these words perfectly, and yet still not fully comprehend what he has said—for in order to do that I would in addition need to know whether he was VLPSO\�LQIRUPLQJ�PH��ZDUQLQJ�PH��MRNLQJ��IRU�LQVWDQFH��E\�VWDWLQJ�WKH�REYLRXV��WKUHDWHQLQJ�PH��IRU�LQVWDQFH��E\�DOOXGLQJ�WR�WKH�H[SUHVVLRQ�´<RX·UH�ZDONLQJ�RQ�WKLQ�LFHµ��RU�ZKDWQRW�

7KH� VHFRQG�SUHOLPLQDU\�SRLQW� ,�ZDQW� WR�PDNH� FRQFHUQV� WKH� UHODWLRQ�between illocutionary forces and propositional attitudes. Many, if not indeed all, illocutionary forces have counterparts among the propositional attitudes. For example, asserting that has the counterpart believing that; requesting that has the counterpart desiring that; and asking whether has the counterpart wondering whether.60�7KHVH�SDLUV�DUH�QRW�VR�WLJKWO\�FRQQHFWHG�WKDW�WKH\�DUH�LQVHSDUDEOH�LQ�particular cases: it is quite possible to assert that p without believing that p, to request that p without desiring that p, and to ask whether p without wondering whether p, and in each instance also vice versa. But they do typically go together, and moreover this typical concurrence seems to be more than just a contingent fact, it seems to be part of the very nature of the illocutionary forces and propositional attitudes in question—so that, for example, a people who never asserted and lacked any conception of doing so could not believe either, and also vice versa (and similarly, to anticipate the course of the coming argument a little: a people who had only ever asserted and conceived of assertion in one�VSHFLÀF�VHQVH�RI�´DVVHUWµ�FRXOG�RQO\�EHOLHYH�LQ�D�FRUUHVSRQGLQJ�VSHFLÀF�VHQVH�RI�ÉHOLHYH�µ�DQG�DOVR�YLFH�YHUVD��

1RZ�WR�P\�PDLQ�SRLQWV��7KH�VRUWV�RI�YDULDWLRQV�ZKLFK�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�anti-Platonism concerning concepts and “grammatical” principles postulates of course entail corresponding variations in the contents of assertions, requests, questions, and other illocutionary acts, and in the contents of beliefs, desires, wonderings, and other propositional attitudes.61 But there is also the possibility of an anti-Platonism concerning such illocutionary forces and propositional attitudes themselves.

6SHHFK�DFW� WKHRULVWV� VXFK�DV�$XVWLQ� DQG� HVSHFLDOO\� -RKQ�6HDUOH�KDYH�



tended to espouse what one might call a Platonism concerning illocutionary force: WKHUH�LV�RQO\�D�UDWKHU�OLPLWHG�DQG�À[HG�VHW�RI�VXFK�IRUFHV�DYDLODEOH��DQG�ZH�KDYH�exhausted them. However, as in the conceptual/”grammatical” case, Wittgenstein invites us to take a contrary view.

First of all, he implies that an analogue of his radical proto-Nagelian point about concepts/”grammars” applies to illocutionary forces: that one group of people may entirely lack illocutionary forces which another group has, and moreover that there is no discernible limit to the different kinds of illocutionary IRUFHV�WKDW�DUH�SRVVLEOH��7KH�IRUPHU�SDUW�RI�WKLV�SRLQW�LV�DOUHDG\�LPSOLHG�E\�KLV�famous imaginary example early in the Philosophical Investigations of the builders who only�HPSOR\�FRPPDQGV��DV�KH�SXWV�LW��ÓDQJXDJHV��DQG��FRQVLVW�RQO\�RI�RUGHUVµ��62 Both parts of the point are implied by the following passage which appears shortly afterwards in the text:

%XW�KRZ�PDQ\�NLQGV�RI�VHQWHQFHV�DUH�WKHUH"�6D\�DVVHUWLRQ��TXHVWLRQ��DQG�FRPPDQG�>WKDW�is, the only three cases that had been clearly recognized by Frege, whom Wittgenstein KDV� MXVW�EHHQ�GLVFXVVLQJ@"³7KHUH�DUH� countless kinds: countless different kinds of XVH�RI�ZKDW�ZH�FDOO�´V\PEROV�µ�´ZRUGV�µ�´VHQWHQFHV�µ�$QG�WKLV�PXOWLSOLFLW\� LV�QRW�VRPHWKLQJ�À[HG��JLYHQ�RQFH�IRU�DOO��EXW�QHZ�W\SHV�RI�ODQJXDJH��QHZ�ODQJXDJH�JDPHV��as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. . . . Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others: Giving orders, and obeying them; Describing the appearance of an object, or giving LWV�PHDVXUHPHQWV��&RQVWUXFWLQJ�DQ�REMHFW�IURP�D�GHVFULSWLRQ��D�GUDZLQJ��5HSRUWLQJ�an event; Speculating about an event; Forming and testing a hypothesis; Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams; Making up a story, and reading it; Play-acting; Singing catches; Guessing riddles; Making a joke, telling it; Solving a SUREOHP�LQ�SUDFWLFDO�DULWKPHWLF��7UDQVODWLQJ�IURP�RQH�ODQJXDJH�LQWR�DQRWKHU��$VNLQJ��7KDQNLQJ��&XUVLQJ��*UHHWLQJ��3UD\LQJ�63

Notice that if what I said earlier about the interdependence of illocutionary IRUFHV�ZLWK�SURSRVLWLRQDO�DWWLWXGHV�ZDV�FRUUHFW��WKHQ�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�SRLQW�KHUH�about illocutionary forces entails an analogous point about propositional attitudes as well. For example, if there could be people like the builders who did not assert at all, then these would also be people who did not believe at all.

6HDUOH�KDV�DWWDFNHG�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�SRVLWLRQ�RQ�LOORFXWLRQDU\�IRUFH�LQ�WKH�SDVVDJH�TXRWHG�DERYH�LQ�DQ�HVVD\�WLWOHG�´$�7D[RQRP\�RI�,OORFXWLRQDU\�$FWV�µ�,Q�this essay Searle develops a taxonomy of illocutionary acts (based on an earlier and DOOHJHGO\�FUXGHU�RQH�GXH�WR�$XVWLQ��ZKLFK�HPSOR\V�ZKDW�6HDUOH�FDOOV�́ LOORFXWLRQDU\�SRLQW�µ�RU�SXUSRVH��DV�LWV�EDVLF�FULWHULRQ�RI�FODVVLÀFDWLRQ��DQG�ZKLFK�SXUSRUWV�WR�VXEVXPH�DOO�LOORFXWLRQDU\�DFWV�XQGHU�MXVW�ÀYH�EDVLF�W\SHV��$VVHUWLYHV��'LUHFWLYHV��&RPPLVVLYHV�� ([SUHVVLYHV�� DQG�'HFODUDWLRQV� �SOXV� D� K\EULG� W\SH��$VVHUWLYH�'HFODUDWLRQV��$QG�6HDUOH�FRQFOXGHV�

7KHUH�DUH�QRW��DV�:LWWJHQVWHLQ��DQG�PDQ\�RWKHUV�KDYH�FODLPHG��DQ�LQÀQLWH�RU�LQGHÀQLWH�number of language games or uses of language. Rather, the illusion of limitless uses of language is engendered by an enormous unclarity about what constitutes the criterion for delimiting one language game or use of language from another. If we adopt illocutionary point as the basic notion on which to classify uses of language, then there are a rather limited number of basic things we do with language: we tell SHRSOH�KRZ�WKLQJV�DUH�>WKDW�LV��$VVHUWLYHV@��ZH�WU\�WR�JHW�WKHP�WR�GR�WKLQJV�>WKDW�LV��



Directives], we commit ourselves to doing things [that is, Commissives], we express our feelings and attitudes [that is, Expressives], and we bring about changes through our utterances [that is, Declarations].��

+RZHYHU��WKLV�DWWDFN�RQ�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�SRVLWLRQ�VHHPV�ZHDN�WR�PH��)RU�one thing, there are many types of use of language which would not naturally IDOO�XQGHU�DQ\�RI�6HDUOH·V�ÀYH�FDWHJRULHV��IRU�H[DPSOH��MRNLQJ��WHOOLQJ�D�ÀFWLRQDO�VWRU\��DQG�VD\LQJ�LURQLFDOO\��)RU�DQRWKHU�WKLQJ��WKH�LOORFXWLRQDU\�SRLQW�FDQ�RQO\�be said to be the same�ZLWKLQ�HDFK�RI�6HDUOH·V�ÀYH�FDWHJRULHV� LI�RQH�FKRRVHV� WR�classify illocutionary points in a very coarse-grained way (otherwise one will need, for example, to distinguish between the illocutionary point of a request, as compliance, and the illocutionary point of a command, as obedience��)RU�\HW�DQRWKHU�thing, while Searle is right to insist that a difference of illocutionary verb does not entail a difference of illocutionary act (one will at least need to concede that when WZR�LOORFXWLRQDU\�YHUEV�DUH�V\QRQ\PV��KH�GLYRUFHV�WKHVH�WZR�WKLQJV�PXFK�WRR�sharply. In particular, his implication that the evident abundance of the former differences contrasts with a paucity of the latter because identity of illocutionary SRLQW�LV�QHFHVVDU\�DQG�VXIÀFLHQW�IRU�LGHQWLW\�RI�LOORFXWLRQDU\�DFW�LV�YHU\�GXELRXV��7KH�FODLP�RI�QHFHVVLW\�DQG�VXIÀFLHQF\�LQYROYHG�KHUH�PLJKW�EH�WUXH�LI�LOORFXWLRQDU\�points were discriminated in a ÀQH�JUDLQHG way, but then the result would be that there are a large number of different types of illocutionary acts, almost as many as there are different illocutionary verbs. Nor will discriminating illocutionary points in the coarse-grained way that Searle does help his case. For then the claim RI�QHFHVVLW\�DQG�VXIÀFLHQF\�LQYROYHG�EHFRPHV�IDOVH��)RU�H[DPSOH��LI�LW�ZHUH�WUXH��as he holds, that insisting that someone do something and suggesting that someone do something do not differ in illocutionary point but only in strength, then this difference in strength would surely be enough to make these different illocutionary acts. Consequently, even if there were only a very limited number of different illocutionary points, as Searle purports to show, this would not entail that there are only a very limited number of different types of illocutionary acts. Once again, there will, on the contrary, be a very large number of them, almost as many as there are different illocutionary verbs. For yet another thing, there is a sense in which the general strategy that Searle is pursuing here could not possibly fail, and in which its result is consequently trivial: Given that we are only actually acquainted ZLWK�ÀQLWHO\�PDQ\�W\SHV�RI�LOORFXWLRQDU\�DFW��of course�RQH�ZLOO�EH�DEOH�WR�ÀQG�VRPH�ÀQLWH�FODVVLÀFDWLRQ�ZKLFK�FRYHUV�WKHP�DOO��DW�WKH�ZRUVW��D�FODVVLÀFDWLRQ�LQ�WHUPV�RI�MXVW�WKRVH�ÀQLWHO\�PDQ\�W\SHV��DQG�LI�RQH�DOORZV�RQH·V�FULWHULD�RI�FODVVLÀFDWLRQ�WR�EH�VXIÀFLHQWO\�FRDUVH�JUDLQHG��DV�6HDUOH�GRHV��of course one will be able to arrive DW�D�ÀQLWH�FODVVLÀFDWLRQ�RI�WKHP�ZKLFK�LV�PRUHRYHU�QXPHULFDOO\�PRGHVW��,QGHHG��JLYHQ�6HDUOH·V�LPSOLFLW�JURXQG�UXOH�SHUPLWWLQJ�YHU\�FRDUVH�JUDLQHG�FULWHULD��LW�LV�hard to see what there would be to prevent someone from arriving at an even more QXPHULFDOO\�PRGHVW�FODVVLÀFDWLRQ�WKDQ�KH�GRHV��D�FODVVLÀFDWLRQ�ZKLFK�UHFRJQL]HG�only a single type of illocutionary act: sayings, distinguished by the illocutionary SRLQW�RI�FRPPXQLFDWLRQ�

6R�PXFK� IRU�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V� ÀUVW� SRLQW� DERXW� LOORFXWLRQDU\� IRUFH�� WKH�analogue of his radical proto-Nagelian point concerning concepts/”grammars.” But I want to suggest that he could and should have made an analogue of his less radical, anti-Platonist point concerning concepts/”grammars” here as well—that he



could and should in addition have noted the possibility, and indeed the actuality, of cases concerning which it would be reasonable to say, for example, not that one people was acquainted with assertion whereas another people was not, but UDWKHU� VRPHWKLQJ�PRUH� OLNH��RQH�SHRSOH·V�SUDFWLFH�DQG�FRQFHSW�RI�DVVHUWLRQ� LV�GLIIHUHQW�IURP�DQRWKHU�SHRSOH·V�

&KDUOHV�7D\ORU�PDNHV�VRPH�UHPDUNV�LQ�KLV�HVVD\�́ 7KHRULHV�RI�0HDQLQJµ�which are suggestive in this connection.��7KHUH�KH�LPDJLQHV�FXOWXUHV�LQ�ZKLFK�the primary use of language is not assertion or description, but instead either LQYRFDWLRQ�RI� WKH�GHLW\� �´/HW�XV� VD\� WKDW�ZH� LQYRNH� WKH�*RG� WKURXJK�UHFLWLQJ�his high deeds. Certain myths about him, as we would call them, expressed in FDQRQLFDO�VW\OH��DUH�FHQWUDO�WR�WKLV�ULWXDOµ��RU�HOVH�SDUWLFLSDWLRQ�LQ�WKH�GHLW\·V�RZQ�ZRUGV��DV�LQ�0XVOLP�FXOWXUH·V�UHODWLRQ�WR�WKH�4XU·DQ��7D\ORU·V�RIÀFLDO�SXUSRVH�KHUH� �OLNH�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�ZLWK�KLV� H[DPSOH�RI� WKH�EXLOGHUV�� LV� WR�TXHVWLRQ� WKH�assumption made by many modern philosophers (from Kant through Frege to 'DYLGVRQ��WKDW�DVVHUWLRQ�RU�GHVFULSWLRQ�LV�IXQGDPHQWDO�WR�DOO�ODQJXDJH��%XW�D�PRUH�SODXVLEOH�ZD\�WR�FKDUDFWHUL]H�WKH�VRUWV�RI�FDVHV�WKDW�7D\ORU�LV�LPDJLQLQJ��HVSHFLDOO\�if one takes into account the additional linguistic practice which he envisages RFFXUULQJ�LQ�WKH�FXOWXUHV�LQ�TXHVWLRQ�EH\RQG�WKH�SDUDGLJPDWLF�UHOLJLRXV�VSKHUH��might rather be to say that a somewhat different sort and concept of assertion from ours would be involved.

Moreover, if the point that I made earlier concerning the conceptual interdependence of assertion and belief was correct, then these cultures would consequently also be ones in which a somewhat different sort and concept of belief from ours occurred.

,QGHHG��LI�ZH�IRFXV�LQ�WKH�ÀUVW�LQVWDQFH�RQ�WKH�EHOLHI�VLGH�RI�WKLQJV��LW�LV�UHODWLYHO\�HDV\�WR�ÀQG�HPSLULFDO�HYLGHQFH�IRU�WKLV�VRUW�RI�VLWXDWLRQ��)RU�H[DPSOH��the anthropologist Rodney Needham has shown convincingly in his book Belief, Language, and Experience, by drawing on a wealth of anthropological, historical, and OLQJXLVWLF�HYLGHQFH��WKDW�WKH�DFWLYLW\�DQG�WKH�FRQFHSW�RI�́ EHOLHIµ�YDU\�VLJQLÀFDQWO\�from culture to culture.66

Or to give a historical example drawn from some of my own work, in a paper in which I have attempted to adjudicate the well-known dispute between Michael Frede and Myles Burnyeat over the fundamental nature of ancient Pyrrhonism,67 I have argued for roughly the following solution: Burnyeat is in a sense right that the Pyrrhonists were attempting to do away with all belief, but )UHGH·V�LQWXLWLRQ�WKDW�WKH\�ZHUH�IXQGDPHQWDOO\�LQWHOOHFWXDO�UHDFWLRQDULHV�UDWKHU�than intellectual revolutionaries is nevertheless correct—and these seemingly incompatible things are reconcilable because the institution and concept of “belief” which the Pyrrhonists were rejecting in an exceptionless way was itself a relative novelty, and the life of appearances and “undisturbedness [ataraxia]” to which they were aspiring was really a sort of distorted representation of a different institution and concept of “belief” which had preceded it (seen through D�JODVV�GDUNO\��DV�LW�ZHUH��0RUH�VSHFLÀFDOO\��WKH�ROGHU�LQVWLWXWLRQ�DQG�FRQFHSW�RI�“belief” which they were implicitly yearning to return to here was the one that had belonged to Homeric culture, in which fundamental convictions (concerning UHOLJLRQ��HWKLFV��WKH�SK\VLFDO�ZRUOG��WKH�PLQG��DQG�VR�RQ��ZHUH�DFFHSWHG�SDVVLYHO\�from cultural tradition without any awareness of the existence of alternatives;



whereas the newer institution and concept of “belief” which they were attacking (often called by them dogma��ZDV�RQH�LQ�ZKLFK�SHRSOH�ZHUH�DZDUH�RI�WKH�H[LVWHQFH�of alternatives to even their fundamental convictions, and accordingly espoused these convictions, not through a passive acceptance of tradition, but instead through an active engagement of their wills. If this historical thesis is correct, then we have here a historical example of just the sort of variation in propositional attitudes in which I am presently interested: while both of the periods of Greek culture in question did in some sense engage in, and have concepts of, belief, the VRUWV�DQG�FRQFHSWV�RI�EHOLHI�LQYROYHG�ZHUH�VLJQLÀFDQWO\�GLIIHUHQW�LQ�WKH�WZR�FDVHV�

Moreover, if my earlier point about the conceptual interdependence of belief and assertion was correct, then these empirical examples of variations in the practice and concept of belief are just as much empirical examples of variations in the practice and concept of assertion.

GenresanoTher Broadly PsyChologiCal Phenomenon, Closely relaTed To illoCuTionary force, is genre�� 7KH� IXQGDPHQWDO� LPSRUWDQFH� RI� WKLV� SKHQRPHQRQ�KDV� EHHQ�VWUDQJHO\�RYHUORRNHG�E\�$QJORSKRQH�SKLORVRSKHUV��QR�GRXEW�EHFDXVH�WKH\�KDYH�WHQGHG��PLVWDNHQO\��WR�WKLQN�RI�LW�DV�FRQÀQHG�WR�OLWHUDWXUH��,Q�IDFW��DV�LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ�WKHRULVWV� KDYH� UHDOL]HG� DW� OHDVW� VLQFH�%RHFNK·V�PDJLVWHULDO�Encyclopedia and Methodology of the Philological Sciences��YLUWXDOO\�DOO�WH[WV�DQG�DOO�GLVFRXUVH�are deliberately authored within the framework of one genre or another (that is, URXJKO\��RQH�SUHGHWHUPLQHG�VHW�RI�SXUSRVHV�DQG�UXOHV�RU�DQRWKHU��DQG�LQ�RUGHU�to comprehend them fully an interpreter must successfully identify the genre in question.��7KLV�SRLQW�LV�QR�GRXEW�PRVW�REYLRXV�LQ�WKH�FDVH�RI�OLWHUDU\�WH[WV��,V�WKLV�D�WUDJHG\"��D�FRPHG\"��D�QRYHO"��D�VRQQHW"��VRPHWKLQJ�HOVH"�%XW�LW�DOVR�DSSOLHV�WR�QRQ�OLWHUDU\�WH[WV��,V�WKLV�D�KLVWRU\�ERRN"��D�VFLHQWLÀF�DUWLFOH"��D�XVHU·V�PDQXDO"��D�QHZVSDSHU�HGLWRULDO"��D�QHZVSDSHU�UHSRUW"��DQG�VR�RQ��$QG�LW�LV�DOVR�DSSOLHV�WR�RUDO�GLVFRXUVH��,V�WKLV�D�SROLWLFDO�VSHHFK"��D�QHZV�UHSRUW"��D�SDWHUQDO�DGYLFH"��D�FRPLF�URXWLQH"��D�FDVXDO�FRQYHUVDWLRQ"��VRPHWKLQJ�HOVH"69 Indeed, it also applies to QRQ�OLQJXLVWLF�ZRUNV�RI�DUW��SDLQWLQJ��VFXOSWXUH��PXVLF��DUFKLWHFWXUH��DQG�VR�RQ��70

In the case of genre, it is actually pretty obvious that an analogue of 1DJHO·V�UDGLFDO�SRVVLELOLW\�FRQFHUQLQJ�WKH�FRQFHSWXDO�FDVH�REWDLQV³WKDW�LV��WKDW�it can, and indeed often does, happen that one group of people has a genre which another entirely lacks. For the invention of new genres can often be assigned with some precision to a certain people, and even to a certain period of its history—for example, tragedy and comedy were both invented by the Greeks some time DURXQG�WKH�EHJLQQLQJ�RI�WKH�ÀIWK�FHQWXU\�%�&�(��$FFRUGLQJO\��:LWWJHQVWHLQ�WDNHV�this sort of situation for granted. For instance, in the long passage from the Philosophical Investigations that I quoted earlier in connection with illocutionary forces, several of his examples of historically emerging uses of sentences would LQ�IDFW�PRVW�QDWXUDOO\�EH�FODVVLÀHG�DV�H[DPSOHV�RI�JHQUHV³LQ�SDUWLFXODU��́ 0DNLQJ�up a story . . . ; Play-acting; Singing catches; Guessing riddles.”71�$QG�FRQFHUQLQJ�non-linguistic art, in the same book he refers in passing to the ancient Egyptians as a people who had a genre of painting which we lack and cannot return to: ´,V�HYHQ�RXU�VW\OH�RI�SDLQWLQJ�DUELWUDU\"�&DQ�ZH�FKRRVH�RQH�DW�SOHDVXUH"��7KH�(J\SWLDQ��IRU�LQVWDQFH��µ72



+RZHYHU��EHJLQQLQJ�ZLWK�$ULVWRWOH� LQ� WKH�Poetics, many philosophers and others have been inclined to espouse a sort of sparseness-Platonism concerning genres: to assume that there is just one genre of tragedy, one genre of comedy, and so on, in each case constituted by a single set of purposes and UXOHV��$QG�LQ�FORVH�DQDORJ\�WR�KLV�UHMHFWLRQ�RI�VSDUVHQHVV�3ODWRQLVP�FRQFHUQLQJ�concepts/”grammars,” Wittgenstein also rejects this.

7KLV�UHMHFWLRQ�RI�VSDUVHQHVV�3ODWRQLVP�FRQFHUQLQJ�JHQUHV�DFWXDOO\�KDV�D�ORQJ�KLVWRU\�LQ�WKH�*HUPDQ�WUDGLWLRQ�EHIRUH�:LWWJHQVWHLQ��2QH�RI�WKH�ÀUVW�WKLQNHUV�WR�UHMHFW�LW�ZDV�+HUGHU��HVSHFLDOO\�LQ��WKH�VHYHUDO�GUDIWV�RI��KLV�HVVD\�Shakespeare ��7KHUH�+HUGHU�LQ�SDUWLFXODU�WRRN�)UHQFK�FULWLFV�RI�6KDNHVSHDUHDQ�WUDJHG\�to task for making just this sort of Platonist assumption concerning tragedy—IRU�WDNLQJ�WKH�JHQUH�RI�DQFLHQW�WUDJHG\�DV�GHÀQHG�E\�$ULVWRWOH�WR�EH�VRPHKRZ�immutable and universal and therefore to be relevant for the interpretation and evaluation of Shakespearean tragedy as well. Herder pointed out that, on the contrary, the purposes and rules which constitute the genre of Shakespearean WUDJHG\�DUH�VLJQLÀFDQWO\�GLIIHUHQW�IURP�WKRVH�WKDW�FRQVWLWXWHG�WKH�JHQUH�RI�DQFLHQW�WUDJHG\��DQG�WKDW�WKH�)UHQFK�FULWLFV·�FRQWUDU\�DVVXPSWLRQ�KDV�WKHUHIRUH�OHG�WKHP�into both misinterpretations and misguided evaluations of Shakespearean tragedy (that is, evaluations which criticize it for failing to obey genre-rules and realize genre-purposes which it was not in fact aspiring to obey or realize in the ÀUVW�SODFH�� ,QGHHG��+HUGHU�QRWHG� WKDW�� VWULFWO\� VSHDNLQJ��JHQUHV� FDQ�YDU\�QRW�only between cultures and historical periods, but also between authors working within a single culture and period, and even between different works by a single author.73 Moreover, he made this sort of anti-Platonist point not only in connection with literary genres, but also in connection with the genres of non-linguistic art. For example, in This Too a Philosophy of History��DQG�HOVHZKHUH�KH�PDNHV�similar observations about portrait sculpture in its ancient Greek versus its ancient Egyptian forms. He was subsequently followed in these anti-Platonist insights by a tradition of German thinkers that included the Schlegel brothers, Schleiermacher, DQG�6FKOHLHUPDFKHU·V�SXSLO�%RHFNK�

:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�WKLQNLQJ�LV�YHU\�PXFK�FRQWLQXRXV�DQG�LQ�V\PSDWK\�ZLWK�this tradition of anti-Platonism about genres. Indeed, if anything he is even more concerned than Herder was to emphasize the sharpness of the differences that can occur within what would naively be considered a single genre, and the strength of the consequences that these differences entail for both interpretation and evaluation. For example, in Culture and Value, he writes in a general vein that “if conditions nowadays are really so different from what they once were that one cannot even compare the genre�RQH·V�ZRUN�EHORQJV�WR�ZLWK�WKDW�RI�HDUOLHU�ZRUNV��WKHQ�RQH�FDQ·W�FRPSDUH�WKHP�LQ�UHVSHFW�RI�WKHLU�YDOXH�HLWKHU�µ��/LNHZLVH��he writes concerning symphonies in particular that “a symphony by Bruckner LV�LQÀQLWHO\�FORVHU�WR�D�V\PSKRQ\�IURP�WKH�KHURLF�SHULRG�WKDQ�LV�RQH�E\�0DKOHU��If the latter is a work of art it is one of a totally different sort.”��$QG�VLPLODUO\��KH�writes concerning architecture in particular that “in a bad period the task facing D�JUHDW�DUFKLWHFW��LV�FRPSOHWHO\�GLIIHUHQW�IURP�ZKDW�LW�LV�LQ�D�JRRG�SHULRG��<RX�PXVW�QRW�OHW�\RXUVHOI�EH�VHGXFHG�E\�WKH�WHUPLQRORJ\�LQ�FRPPRQ�FXUUHQF\��'RQ·W�take comparability, but rather incomparability, as a matter of course.”76



Perceptual sensationsa furTher PsyChologiCal Phenomenon for whiCh an analogue of wiTTgensTein’s anti-Platonist position concerning concepts/”grammars” might plausibly be proposed is perceptual sensation.77

+HUH� DJDLQ� LW� VHHPV�SODXVLEOH� WR� SRVLW� D� YHUVLRQ� RI�1DJHO·V� UDGLFDO�possibility of more or less complete difference—especially if animals are included in the comparison. For example, it seems plausible to say, with Nagel, that bats must have perceptual sensations connected with echo-location which are more or less completely different from any of our own; whereas, conversely, we have visual sensations which bats lack. Wittgenstein would, I think, agree. For example, in the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology he writes: “In what circumstances VKDOO�ZH�VD\�WKDW�VRPHRQH�KDV�D�NLQG�RI�VHQVH�LPSUHVVLRQ�WKDW�ZH�ODFN"³:H�VD\�for example of beasts that they have an organ with which they perceive such-and-such, and such a sense-organ need not be similar to ours.”��

But it also seems plausible here to posit an analogue of the less radical, anti-Platonist possibility which we saw Wittgenstein advocating for concepts/”grammars.” In other words, whereas some philosophers and laymen would be inclined to assume that at least where many types of perceptual sensations are concerned a percipient simply either has a given type of sensation or not, it seems more plausible to say that there is an array of intermediate possibilities, an array of possible cases concerning which we should rather say VRPHWKLQJ�PRUH�DORQJ�WKH�OLQHV��OLNH�XV��VR�DQG�VR��RU�VXFK�DQG�VXFK�DQ�DQLPDO��has sensations of X but ones that are not quite the same as ours.

Certain limited forms of this sort of possibility will no doubt be conceded TXLWH�UHDGLO\�XSRQ�UHÁHFWLRQ��)RU�H[DPSOH��KDZNV�IDPRXVO\�KDYH�VKDUSHU�H\HVLJKW�than human beings, and it will therefore probably be conceded that when a hawk surveys a landscape from a certain vantage point, its visual sensations must be somewhat different from those of any human being who does so; and similarly concerning sharp-sighted human beings versus short-sighted ones.79

%XW�LI�ZH�SXUVXH�VRPH�RI�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�UHÁHFWLRQV�LQ�WKH�Philosophical Investigations and elsewhere on “seeing as” (for example, seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck versus seeing it as a rabbit; seeing the double cross as a white cross on D�EODFN�EDFNJURXQG�YHUVXV�WKH�RWKHU�ZD\�URXQG��DQG�VR�RQ��ZH�PD\�EH�PRYHG�WR�entertain the possibility of less obvious sorts of variations in perceptual sensation as well.

:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�RZQ�UHÁHFWLRQV�RQ�´VHHLQJ�DVµ�GR�QRW�LPPHGLDWHO\�\LHOG�such consequences. But they do so when they are revised in certain plausible ZD\V��:KDW�UHYLVLRQV�GR�,�KDYH�LQ�PLQG�KHUH"�

Peter Strawson, in his essay “Imagination and Perception,” and Norwood Hanson, in his book Patterns of Discovery��UHYLVH�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�UHÁHFWLRQV�LQ�RQH�very plausible way: they reject his usual restriction of the phenomenon of “seeing as” to the narrow range of unusual cases of “change of aspect” on which he focuses,�� and instead suggest that the same phenomenon is at work in virtually all human perceptual sensation, that the unusual cases of “change of aspect” on which he focuses are merely ones in which its normally unnoticed operation becomes noticeable.�� Contrary to Wittgenstein, it seems plausible to say that the oddity—on which he lays great emphasis in this connection—of saying in a



normal case of, for example, perceiving a rabbit, that one perceives it as a rabbit should be explained as merely a pragmatic oddity due to an implicit pragmatic rule against stating the obvious, not a semantic oddity (that is, not a failure to EH�PHDQLQJIXO�RU�D�IDLOXUH�WR�EH�WUXH��7KLV�VRUW�RI�UHYLVLRQ�RI�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�position seems very plausible indeed; for example, when a mature human being walks down a city street and observes his surroundings, he surely does see them as streets, houses, trees, dogs, and the like. Indeed, it seems doubtful that there are even any lower levels of normal perceptual sensation at which this ceases to be the case. For example, do we not normally even see colors as colors, and indeed as�VSHFLÀF�FRORUV"

$�VHFRQG�UHVSHFW�LQ�ZKLFK�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�SRVLWLRQ�RQ�́ VHHLQJ�DVµ�UHTXLUHV�UHYLVLRQ��RU� DW� OHDVW� FODULÀFDWLRQ�� FRQFHUQV� WKH�TXHVWLRQ�RI�ZKDW� UROH� WKRXJKW��conceptualization, and language play in “seeing as.” His considered position here LV�GLIIHUHQW�IURP�6WUDZVRQ·V�DQG�+DQVRQ·V�LQ�ZD\V�WKDW�WKH\�GR�QRW�WKHPVHOYHV�realize, and it may be fruitful to identify and consider this difference.

Wittgenstein himself certainly raises the question of whether “seeing as” is a sort of “amalgam” of perception and thought.�� However, he seems inclined LQ�WKH�HQG�WR�JLYH�LW�D�QHJDWLYH�DQVZHU��7KH�VLWXDWLRQ�LV�VRPHZKDW�FRPSOLFDWHG�E\�WKH�IDFW�WKDW�WKH�TXHVWLRQ�LV�DPELJXRXV�LQ�D�VLJQLÀFDQW�ZD\��́ ,V�DGGLQJ�FHUWDLQ�WKRXJKWV�WR�VHHLQJ�VXIÀFLHQW�WR�SURGXFH�¶VHHLQJ�DV·"µ�YHUVXV�́ ,V�WKH�SRVVHVVLRQ�RI�WKRXJKWV�QHFHVVDU\�IRU�¶VHHLQJ�DV·"µ�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�DQVZHU�WR�WKH�IRUPHU�TXHVWLRQ�is a clear No. His answer to the latter question is more equivocal. In some places KH�VHHPV� LQFOLQHG�WR�VD\�<HV� WR� LW�� But I think that the preponderance of the evidence shows his considered answer here to be again No. Instead, his considered inclination is to say that “seeing as” is a phenomenon unique in kind which is merely akin to thinking or conceptualizing,�� while allowing that certain VSHFLÀF�forms of it require the possession of thoughts or concepts.�� He also explicitly denies that “seeing as” always requires the possession of language.��

By contrast, Strawson and Hanson hold that there is always an involvement of thought or conceptualization in cases of “seeing as.”��$QG�+DQVRQ�at least also holds that language is always involved, implying that in its absence there could be little more than a blooming, buzzing confusion.��

7KLV� DOWHUQDWLYH�SRVLWLRQ�DGRSWHG�E\�6WUDZVRQ�DQG�+DQVRQ� LV� OLNHO\�WR� VHHP�PRUH�HOHJDQW�DW�ÀUVW� HQFRXQWHU�� ,QGHHG�� LW�GRHV�KDYH� FHUWDLQ�JHQXLQH�attractions; in particular, it does seem plausible to say that normal cases of “seeing as” by adult human beings always depend on thought, conceptualization, and language. Nonetheless, I think that Wittgenstein has good reasons for resisting their position, and that pursuing his reasons may eventually lead us to a position that is superior both to theirs and to his.

:KDW��WKHQ��DUH�KLV�UHDVRQV"�2QH�UHDVRQ�LV�VLPSO\�WKH�SKHQRPHQRORJ\�RI�“seeing as,” the fact that it strikes the person who does it as more like seeing than like thinking.90 However, Wittgenstein is reluctant to put very much weight on this sort of introspective consideration,91�DQG�SHUKDSV�ULJKWO\�VR��$QRWKHU�UHDVRQ��which carries rather more weight for him, is that thinking is an activity, whereas VHHLQJ��DV��LV�D�VWDWH�92 However, this reason does not seem very compelling either �FRXOG�QRW� WKH�VDPH�EH�VDLG�DERXW�EHOLHI"³DQG�\HW�EHOLHI�VXUHO\� is essentially GHSHQGHQW�RQ�WKRXJKW��FRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ��DQG�SUREDEO\�DOVR�ODQJXDJH��



But Wittgenstein also has two further, and arguably deeper, reasons IRU�KLV�UHVLVWDQFH��WKH�ÀUVW�RI�WKHP�D�UHDO�reason, the second something more like D�SKLORVRSKLFDO�PRWLYH��7KH�ÀUVW�RI�WKHVH�UHDVRQV�LV�D�FRQYLFWLRQ�WKDW�ZKDW�LV�HVVHQWLDOO\�FRQVWLWXWLYH�RI�´VHHLQJ�DVµ�LV�D�FHUWDLQ�VRUW�RI�FODVVLÀFDWRU\�EHKDYLRU�93 WRJHWKHU�ZLWK� DQ� LQWXLWLRQ� WKDW� VXFK� FODVVLÀFDWRU\�EHKDYLRU�QHHG�QRW� WDNH� D�conceptual-linguistic form but could also take forms of which even a conceptless-ODQJXDJHOHVV� FKLOG�ZRXOG�EH� FDSDEOH�� ´>7KH@� DVSHFWV�RI� WKH�GRXEOH� FURVV� �� might be reported simply by pointing alternately to an isolated white and an isolated black cross. One could quite well imagine this as a primitive reaction in a child even before it could talk.”��7KLV�LV�D�YHU\�SODXVLEOH�UHDVRQ��,W�DOVR�DGPLWV�of further development than Wittgenstein gives it. For, besides languageless children, there is also another class of plausible counterexamples to the claim that “seeing as” requires conceptualization and language, namely animals—who, GHVSLWH��DW�OHDVW�LQ�PRVW�FDVHV��DQG�LQ�PRVW�UHOHYDQW�UHVSHFWV��ODFNLQJ�ODQJXDJH�DQG�therefore lacking genuine concepts, are certainly not thereby plunged into a mere EORRPLQJ��EX]]LQJ�FRQIXVLRQ��DV�+DQVRQ·V�SRVLWLRQ�ZRXOG�LPSO\��,W�VHHPV�PXFK�more plausible to say that, like conceptless-languageless children, conceptless-languageless animals often possess capacities of perceptual discrimination which play a role in organizing their sensations analogous to that played by capacities IRU�FRQFHSWXDO�OLQJXLVWLF�FODVVLÀFDWLRQ�LQ�D�PDWXUH�KXPDQ�EHLQJ��VR�WKDW�LQGHHG�HYHQ�FDVHV�RI�́ VHHLQJ�DVµ�RI�WKH�PRUH�VSHFLÀF�VRUW�RQ�ZKLFK�:LWWJHQVWHLQ�IRFXVHV��namely cases in which a switch of aspect takes place, might in principle occur, not only for mature human beings and conceptless-languageless children, but DOVR�IRU�VRPH�FRQFHSWOHVV�ODQJXDJHOHVV�DQLPDOV��

:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�RWKHU�GHHS�UHDVRQ��RU�UDWKHU��LQ�WKLV�FDVH��SKLORVRSKLFDO�PRWLYH��OLHV�LQ�DQ�DWWUDFWLYH�KRSH�KH�FKHULVKHV�RI�XVLQJ�WKH�SKHQRPHQRQ�RI�́ VHHLQJ�as” in order to explain, or at least throw light on, what conceptualization consists in: roughly speaking, given that conceptualization cannot in general be explained in terms of mastery of linguistically explicit or explicitable rules, the sort of implicit SURMHFWLRQ��RU�FODVVLÀFDWLRQ�WRJHWKHU�RI�VLPLODU�FDVHV��WKDW�LV�LQYROYHG�LQ�´VHHLQJ�as” seems to him to promise an alternative explanation.96 For this hope would of course be thwarted if “seeing as” turned out to be essentially constituted by conceptualization.

,�WKLQN�WKDW�WKHVH�WZR�GHHSHU�UHDVRQV�IRU�UHVLVWLQJ�6WUDZVRQ�DQG�+DQVRQ·V�position both deserve to be taken very seriously. However, it is possible to save what is genuinely attractive in their position without contradicting these reasons SURYLGHG� WKDW�RQH�PRGLÀHV� LW� LQ�D�FHUWDLQ�ZD\��´VHHLQJ�DVµ� LQYROYHV� WKRXJKW��conceptualization, and language in the cases normally experienced by a mature human being.97�3URYLGHG�WKDW�WKLV�PRGLÀFDWLRQ�LV�PDGH��WKH�6WUDZVRQ�+DQVRQ�SRVLWLRQ�QR�ORQJHU�FRQÁLFWV�ZLWK�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�SODXVLEOH�LQWXLWLRQ�WKDW�RQH�VKRXOG�DOORZ�IRU�the possibility of “seeing as” in non-conceptual, non-linguistic cases, such as those RI�FRQFHSWOHVV�ODQJXDJHOHVV�FKLOGUHQ�DQG�DQLPDOV��$QG�LW�QR�ORQJHU�FRQÁLFWV�ZLWK�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�DWWUDFWLYH�KRSH�WKDW�LW�PD\�EH�SRVVLEOH�WR�H[SODLQ��RU�DW�OHDVW�WKURZ�light on, the nature of conceptualization by appeal to “seeing as” (since such an explanation can now appeal to a broader range of possible cases of “seeing as” which also includes ones where this does not involve conceptualization proper, DV�ZLWK�ODQJXDJHOHVV�FRQFHSWOHVV�FKLOGUHQ�DQG�DQLPDOV�IRU�H[DPSOH��



$�WKLUG�UHVSHFW�LQ�ZKLFK�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�SRVLWLRQ�RQ�´VHHLQJ�DVµ�UHTXLUHV�revision is the following. Wittgenstein implies that only certain cases of “seeing DVµ� LQ�PDWXUH�KXPDQ�EHLQJV�DUH�GHSHQGHQW�RQ�FXOWXUH�DQG�FXOWXUDOO\�VSHFLÀF��IRU�H[DPSOH��WKH�GXFN�UDEELW��EXW�WKDW�RWKHUV�DUH�QRW��IRU�H[DPSOH��WKH�GRXEOH�FURVV�� Indeed, even Hanson implies that all normal human beings at least share the same visual sensations of color patches, their shapes, and their lines, regardless of cultural background.99 Contrary to such views, it seems to me more plausible to say that virtually all cases of “seeing as” in a mature human being—indeed, virtually all of the perceptual sensations of a mature human being—are WR�VRPH�H[WHQW�GHSHQGHQW�RQ�FXOWXUH�DQG�FXOWXUDOO\�VSHFLÀF��)RU�LQVWDQFH��WR�WDNH�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�H[DPSOH��RXU�UHDFWLRQ�WR�WKH�GRXEOH�FURVV�LV�VXUHO\�LQ�IDFW�GHSHQGHQW�on the circumstance that in our culture uniformly colored cross-shaped objects are common (would it occur in a culture where these were never found, but instead ELFRORUHG�VKDSHV�OLNH�WKH�GRXEOH�FURVV�ZHUH�FRPPRQ"��$QG�WR�WDNH�+DQVRQ·V�example, it seems plausible to say that in fact even such sensations of a mature human being as those of color patches with certain shapes and lines are to some H[WHQW�FRQVWLWXWHG�LQ�FXOWXUDOO\�VSHFLÀF�ZD\V³IRU�LQVWDQFH��WKDW�+RPHULF�PDQ·V�distinctive ways of conceptualizing colors must have gone hand in hand with distinctive sensations of color somewhat different from ours;100 and that if someone KDV�WKH�<RUXED·V�H[WUDRUGLQDU\�UHYHUHQFH�IRU�FOHDU�OLQHV�101 he will perceive the distinction between clearcut and vague lines in a color patch somewhat differently from people who do not.

1RZ�LI�WKHVH�YDULRXV�UHYLVLRQV�RI�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�UHÁHFWLRQV�RQ�́ VHHLQJ�DVµ�are broadly correct, then it becomes plausible to postulate several further sources of an anti-Platonist situation in the area of perceptual sensation over and above the relatively obvious ones to which I referred earlier (sharp-sighted hawks versus less VKDUS�VLJKWHG�KXPDQ�EHLQJV��DQG�VR�RQ��2QH�IXUWKHU�VRXUFH�OLHV�LQ�WKH�OLNHOLKRRG�that there is a qualitative difference between sensations which are infused with QRQ�OLQJXLVWLF�� QRQ�FRQFHSWXDO� SDWWHUQV� RI� FODVVLÀFDWLRQ� DQG� FRUUHVSRQGLQJ�VHQVDWLRQV�ZKLFK�DUH�LQIXVHG�ZLWK�OLQJXLVWLF�FRQFHSWXDO�SDWWHUQV�RI�FODVVLÀFDWLRQ��even if the two patterns are extensionally equivalent (for instance, a languageless animal perceptually discriminates between just the same colors as a human being GRHV�ZLWK�WKH�DLG�RI�KLV�FRORU�YRFDEXODU\��WKH�YHU\�IDFW�WKDW�WKH�RQH�SDWWHUQ�LV�linguistically-conceptually articulated whereas the other is not seems likely to LPSRUW�D�TXDOLWDWLYH�GLIIHUHQFH�LQWR�WKH�VHQVDWLRQ��$QRWKHU�IXUWKHU�VRXUFH�OLHV�LQ�subtle differences that may occur between two non-linguistic, non-conceptual SDWWHUQV�RI�FODVVLÀFDWLRQ�ZKLFK�ERWK�LQIXVH�VHQVDWLRQV��IRU�H[DPSOH��RQH�DQLPDO·V�discrimination of large mammal predators from prey and harmless creatures YHUVXV�DQRWKHU�DQLPDO·V�GLVFULPLQDWLRQ��PRUH�VSHFLÀFDOO\��RI�large cat predators from prey and harmless creatures. It again seems likely that such differences will generate corresponding subtle differences in the sensations themselves. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, another further source of course lies in subtle GLIIHUHQFHV�EHWZHHQ�WZR�RWKHUZLVH�VLPLODU�OLQJXLVWLF�FRQFHSWXDO�FODVVLÀFDWLRQV�which both infuse sensations—for example, between two subtly different ways of classifying types of animals or colors. Such differences again seem likely to make for corresponding subtle differences in the sensations themselves.102



Metalinguistic formsThe ToPiCs disCussed so far—ConCePTs (and “grammaTiCal” PrinCiPles), illoCuTionary forces and propositional attitudes, genres, and perceptual sensations—will all have been broadly familiar to readers as topics. But I would like now to conclude with a topic that is likely to be less familiar.

7KH�OLQJXLVW�5RPDQ�-DNREVRQ�KDV�ZULWWHQ��́ $�IDFXOW\�RI�VSHDNLQJ�D�JLYHQ�ODQJXDJH�LPSOLHV�D�IDFXOW\�RI�WDONLQJ�DERXW�WKLV�ODQJXDJH��6XFK�D�¶PHWDOLQJXLVWLF·�RSHUDWLRQ�SHUPLWV�UHYLVLRQ�DQG�UHGHÀQLWLRQ�RI�WKH�YRFDEXODU\�XVHG�µ103 I doubt that this is strictly correct; in particular, “implies” seems too strong a word, since it seems quite possible coherently to imagine primitive language-users who lacked VXFK�D�PHWDOLQJXLVWLF�IDFXOW\��WKLQN��IRU�H[DPSOH��RI�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�EXLOGHUV�DW�Philosophical Investigations��%XW�DW�OHDVW�DV�D�PDWWHU�RI�FRQWLQJHQW�HPSLULFDO�IDFW��ODQJXDJH�XVHUV�GR�QRUPDOO\�SRVVHVV�VXFK�D�IDFXOW\��$QG�WKH�JHQHUDO�SRLQW�that language-use normally involves such a faculty seems to me an important and interesting one.

Discourse and texts often make explicit use of semantic terms, of course: ZH� WDON� RU�ZULWH� DERXW� WKH� VSHFLÀF�PHDQLQJV� RI�ZRUGV�� DERXW�ZRUGV� EHLQJ�meaningful or meaningless, about two words bearing the same meaning or different meanings, about one word having a single meaning or more than one meaning, about sentences being true simply in virtue of their meaning or not, and so on. But it also seems plausible to say that this is only the explicit tip of a much larger iceberg—that semantic concepts in addition play a large implicit UROH�LQ�WKH�FRQVWUXFWLRQ�RI�GLVFRXUVH�DQG�WH[WV��DQG��DW�WKH�UHFHLYLQJ�HQG��LQ�WKHLU�interpretation. One example of this is the common occurrence of puns and other IRUPV�RI�ZRUG�SOD\�LQ�GLVFRXUVH�DQG�WH[WV³IRU�LQVWDQFH�� LQ�+RPHU·V�Odyssey, with its famous “Nobody [Outis]” episode (in which Odysseus puns on this word LQ�RUGHU�WR�IRRO�WKH�&\FORSV�DQG�KLV�DVVRFLDWHV��DQG�RWKHU�VLPLODU�SDVVDJHV�� or LQ�6KDNHVSHDUH·V�Romeo and Juliet, with its even more lavish word-play. In order to construct such features of a discourse or text, the author has to think pretty consciously about the meanings of the words involved as such, and in order to LQWHUSUHW�KLP��DQ�DXGLWRU�RU�UHDGHU�KDV�WR�UHFDSLWXODWH�WKRVH�WKRXJKWV��$QRWKHU�example would be texts that are governed by a strong aesthetic of avoiding XQPRWLYDWHG�ZRUG�UHSHWLWLRQV��6KDNHVSHDUH·V�SOD\V�DUH�DJDLQ�D�FDVH�LQ�SRLQW��,Q�FRPSRVLQJ�VXFK�D�WH[W��DQ�DXWKRU�IUHTXHQWO\�QHHGV�WR�ORRN�IRU��QHDU��V\QRQ\PV�in order to avoid word-repetitions, and if an interpreter is to interpret such a text with strict accuracy he will need to recognize that this is what is going on, so that, IRU�LQVWDQFH��WKH�DXWKRU·V�VKLIW�IURP�RQH�ZRUG�WR�DQRWKHU��QHDUO\�V\QRQ\PRXV�word in two adjacent lines therefore primarily has an aesthetic rather than a VHPDQWLF� VLJQLÀFDQFH��<HW� DQRWKHU� H[DPSOH�ZRXOG�EH�DOPRVW� DQ\�GLVFRXUVH�or text that strives for a high degree of semantic precision (as in the case of 6KDNHVSHDUH�DJDLQ��IRU�LQVWDQFH��)RU�WKLV�UHTXLUHV�WKH�DXWKRU�WR�UHÁHFW�RQ��DQG�compare, the semantic properties of various alternative words that are available WR�KLP��DQG�IXOO�LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ�RI�VXFK�D�GLVFRXUVH�RU�WH[W�UHTXLUHV�D�VLJQLÀFDQW�PHDVXUH�RI�UHFDSLWXODWLRQ�RI�WKRVH�UHÁHFWLRQV�DQG�FRPSDULVRQV�E\�WKH�LQWHUSUHWHU��,QGHHG�� WKH�PRUH�RQH� FRQVLGHUV� VXFK�SRLQWV�� WKH�PRUH�GLIÀFXOW� LW� EHFRPHV� WR�imagine a discourse or text of any real sophistication that lacked a large implicit metalinguistic component.



1RZ�D�VSDUVHQHVV�3ODWRQLVW�DERXW�FRQFHSWV�ZRXOG�SUREDEO\�ÀQG� WKLV�phenomenon mildly interesting but not especially striking or problematic, since he assumes that there is just a single concept of meaning, of meaningfulness/meaninglessness, of sameness in meaning/difference in meaning, and so on LQYROYHG�KHUH��+RZHYHU��LI�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�XQUHVWULFWHG�DQWL�3ODWRQLVP�FRQFHUQLQJ�concepts is correct, then of course it applies to semantic concepts as much as to any others, and in consequence there may in fact be any number of variations in the VHPDQWLF�FRQFHSWV�LQYROYHG��7KLV�PDNHV�WKH�SKHQRPHQRQ�LQ�TXHVWLRQ�D�ZKROH�ORW�more striking and problematic. In particular, it raises the prospect that, besides the threat posed to exact comprehension of a discourse or text by incommensurabilities between its explicit concepts and the closest counterpart concepts already available to the interpreter, there is likely to be an additional threat to exact comprehension in the form of incommensurabilities that arise in connection with the semantic concepts which implicitly articulate the discourse or text.

7R�EH�D�OLWWOH�PRUH�VSHFLÀF��LW�VHHPV�WR�PH�WKDW�WKHUH�DUH�WZR�PDLQ�IRUPV�in which the anti-Platonist possibility concerning semantic concepts might be realized. First, it might be that the metaphysics��DV�LW�ZHUH��RI�VHPDQWLF�FRQFHSWV�varied: that there were different conceptions of the sorts of things that meanings DUH��UHIHUHQWV"��3ODWRQLF�IRUPV"��(PSLULFLVW�PHQWDO�LGHDV"��ZRUG�XVHV"��DQG�VR�IRUWK��ZKLFK�FRQVWLWXWHG�VLJQLÀFDQWO\�GLIIHUHQW�FRQFHSWV�RI�PHDQLQJ��6HFRQG��LW�PLJKW�EH�that intuitions concerning which words are meaningful versus which meaningless, which the same in meaning versus which different in meaning, which sentences true simply in virtue of their meaning versus which not, and so on, differed in systematic ways, thereby producing different concepts of meaning in this manner. $WWHPSWV�WR�LQWHUSUHW�DQ�DOLHQ�GLVFRXUVH�RU�WH[W�PLJKW�KDYH�WR�FRSH�ZLWK��KLGGHQ��incommensurabilities in semantic concepts of either or both of these sorts.

Nor, I think, is this merely a theoretical possibility. For example, I have attempted to show in essays on the early Platonic dialogues that the early Plato not only works with a certain distinctive metaphysics of meaning, namely the theory of immanent forms that he already presupposes in early dialogues such as the Euthyphro��WKLV�FODLP�LV�QRW�HVSHFLDOO\�FRQWURYHUVLDO��106 but also (perhaps PRUH�VXUSULVLQJO\��ZLWK�LQWXLWLRQV�DERXW�WKH�GLYLGLQJ�OLQHV�EHWZHHQ�VDPHQHVV�of meaning versus difference of meaning, and between truth simply in virtue of meaning versus its absence, which systematically diverge from our own.107

,Q�VKRUW��,�ZDQW�WR�VXJJHVW�WKDW�WKH��LPSOLFLW��DUWLFXODWLRQ�RI�GLVFRXUVH�DQG�texts in terms of semantic concepts constitutes another important area in which D�YHUVLRQ�RI�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�DQWL�3ODWRQLVW�PRUDO�DSSOLHV�

7KH�VLJQLÀFDQFH�RI�WKH�:LWWJHQVWHLQLDQ�SLFWXUHTo sum uP The argumenT so far, Then: wiTTgensTein develoPs a PiCTure of ConCePTs DQG�́ JUDPPDWLFDOµ�SULQFLSOHV�DV�DQ�DUHD�RI��URXJKO\�VSHDNLQJ��SV\FKRORJLFDO�OLIH�LQ�which there is not only the radical possibility of more or less complete difference from our own outlook, but also the less radical, anti-Platonist possibility of myriad GLIIHUHQFHV�ZLWK�VLPLODULWLHV��7KLV�SLFWXUH�FDQ�XVHIXOO\�EH�JHQHUDOL]HG��LQ�D�ZD\�that Wittgenstein himself only partially hints at, to cover in addition such further areas as illocutionary forces and propositional attitudes, genres, sensations, and WKH�PHWDOLQJXLVWLF�IRUPV�RI�GLVFRXUVH�DQG�WH[WV��7KH�RYHUDOO�SLFWXUH�WKDW�HPHUJHV�



both should and can be illustrated, not only from imaginary examples, but also from actual empirical ones.

´6R�ZKDW"µ�\RX�PD\�DVN��6R�TXLWH�D�ORW��,�WKLQN��/HW�PH�PHQWLRQ�IRXU�ways in which this sort of position carries important consequences. First, and most obviously, it dispels a contrary picture of limitation and sparseness which philosophers and laymen alike have often found attractive in connection with FRQFHSWV�DQG�WKH�RWKHU�SV\FKRORJLFDO�SKHQRPHQD�PHQWLRQHG��7KDW�LV�DQ�LPSRUWDQW�UHVXOW�LQ�LWVHOI��7KLV�LV�SDUW�RI�ZKDW�:LWWJHQVWHLQ�KDG�LQ�PLQG�ZKHQ�KH�FRQWHPSODWHG�using as a motto for the Philosophical Investigations the line from King Lear��´,·OO�teach you differences.”�� (Had he wanted to be more polemical, he could have FKRVHQ�DQRWKHU�OLQH�RI�6KDNHVSHDUH·V��́ 7KHUH�DUH�PRUH�WKLQJV�LQ�KHDYHQ�DQG�HDUWK��Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.”109�

6HFRQG��WKLV�SRVLWLRQ�LV�LQWHUHVWLQJ�EHFDXVH�LW�OHDGV��RU�DW�OHDVW�DGGV�IRUFH��to a host of important epistemological, and perhaps in the end also metaphysical, questions. For example, given such a variety of conceptual/”grammatical” alternatives, how is one to tell which concepts/”grammars” are the right ones WR�XVH��RU� LV� WKHUH�QR�TXHVWLRQ�RI�ULJKW�DQG�ZURQJ�KHUH"�6LPLODUO\��FRQFHUQLQJ�illocutionary forces and propositional attitudes, would it be an error to forgo DVVHUWLRQ�DQG�EHOLHI�DOWRJHWKHU��RU�WR�VKLIW�WR�DQDORJXHV�RI�WKHP��DQG�LI�VR�ZK\"�Similarly concerning genres, do the differences between, say, ancient tragedy and Shakespearean tragedy entail that there can be no meaningful comparative HYDOXDWLRQ�RI� WKH�SOD\V�RI� 6RSKRFOHV� DQG�6KDNHVSHDUH"� 6LPLODUO\� FRQFHUQLQJ�perceptual sensations, how are we to adjudicate between competing theoretical or empirical claims in the light of perceptual sensations if these sensations themselves WXUQ�RXW�WR�EH�VR�PXWDEOH�DQG�YDU\LQJ"�$QG�VR�RQ��

7KLUG��WKLV�SRVLWLRQ�LV�LQWHUHVWLQJ�EHFDXVH�LW�OHDGV��RU�DW�OHDVW�OHQGV�IRUFH��to a host of important problems concerning interpretation and translation. For H[DPSOH��LI�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�DQWL�3ODWRQLVW�VLWXDWLRQ�LV�UHDOL]HG��WKHQ�KRZ��LI�DW�DOO��is the interpreter of an alien group to understand the concepts similar to, but DOVR�GLIIHUHQW�IURP��KLV�RZQ�ZKLFK�WKH\�XVH"�+RZ�LV�KH�WR�DYRLG�WKH�FRQVWDQW�WHPSWDWLRQ�IDOVHO\�WR�DVVLPLODWH�WKRVH�FRQFHSWV�WR�KLV�RZQ�FRXQWHUSDUWV"�$QG�KRZ�LI�DW�DOO�LV�KH�WR�WUDQVODWH�WKHP�LQWR�KLV�RZQ�ODQJXDJH"�1RU�DUH�WKHVH�SUREOHPV�merely theoretical; far from it. For it is a striking contingent fact about human beings that their conceptual situation very often does�WDNH�MXVW�WKH�IRUP�VSHFLÀHG�E\�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�DQWL�3ODWRQLVP��WKDW��IRU�LQVWDQFH��+RPHU�KDV�FRQFHSWV�RI�JRGV��PLQGV��YLUWXH��DQG�WKH�FRORUV�ZKLFK�DUH�VLJQLÀFDQWO\�GLIIHUHQW�IURP�RXUV��UDWKHU�than simply having concepts which are either identical to or entirely different IURP�RXUV��110

Fourth, this position has an important political dimension—as does RSSRVLWLRQ�WR�LW��7R�EHJLQ�ZLWK�WKH�ODWWHU��0DQ\�SKLORVRSKHUV��HVSHFLDOO\�LQ�WKLV�country, are deeply hostile to this sort of position. I have already mentioned certain readers of Wittgenstein, and Searle concerning illocutionary force. But RQH�PLJKW�DOVR�QDPH�4XLQH�LQ�FRQQHFWLRQ�ZLWK�ORJLF��'DYLGVRQ�LQ�FRQQHFWLRQ�with conceptualization in general, Hardin in connection with color perception and conceptualization, Nussbaum in connection with ethical values, Chomsky in connection with “universal grammar,” and many other philosophers.111�7KH�reasons for this hostility are, I believe, ultimately less philosophical (let alone



HPSLULFDO�� WKDQ�political, albeit often unconsciously so: It is very ideologically FRQYHQLHQW�IRU�DQ�LPSHULDO�SRZHU�OLNH�WKH�8QLWHG�6WDWHV�WR�WKLQN�RI�WKH�UHVW�RI�humankind as constrained to concepts, convictions, values, and so on that are fundamentally the same as its own, and therefore to feel bound to interpret the many surprising and jarring self-expressions by other peoples that it encounters as at best merely confused versions of its own (the misreadings of Wittgenstein discussed at the beginning of this paper even go as far as to dismiss his imagined Others as incoherent or impossible, in what looks suspiciously like a theoretical GUHVV�UHKHDUVDO�IRU�VXFK�D�GLVPLVVDO�RI�UHDO�2WKHUV��112�$QG�WKH�KLJKO\�XQXVXDO�LQWHUQDO�FRPSRVLWLRQ�RI�WKH�8QLWHG�6WDWHV��D�FRPSRVLWLRQ�RXW�RI�PDQ\�FXOWXUDOO\�GLYHUVH�LPPLJUDQW��DV�ZHOO�DV�QRQ�LPPLJUDQW��JURXSV��SURYLGHV�DQ�DGGLWLRQDO�powerful incentive to efface intellectual heterogeneity, namely in the interest of SUHVHUYLQJ�GRPHVWLF�SROLWLFDO�XQLW\��7KH� UHVXOW��QRW�RQO\�ZKDW�0DUFXVH� FDOOHG�one-dimensional man, but also, as his core outlook, a one-dimensional view of man and his possibilities—a view for which philosophers have tended to serve DV�VRFLHW\·V�LGHRORJLFDO�LOOXVLRQLVWV�113�7KH�DQWL�3ODWRQLVW�DOWHUQDWLYH��LQ�DGGLWLRQ�WR� LWV�SULPDU\�YLUWXHV�RI�EHLQJ� IDFWXDOO\�FRUUHFW�DQG�EULQJLQJ� WR� OLJKW�GLIÀFXOW�epistemological-metaphysical and interpretive-translational challenges that need to be confronted, also has the merit of affording a little salutary resistance to these powerful and questionable political forces.��

Notes1 �7KLV� HVVD\� UHIHUV� WR� WKH� IROORZLQJ�HGLWLRQV�RI�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V� WH[WV�XVLQJ� WKH� IROORZLQJ�

DEEUHYLDWLRQV��%7� �´7KH�%LJ�7\SHVFULSW�µ�LQ�Ludwig Wittgenstein: Wiener Ausgabe, vol. 11, ed. M. 1HGR��9LHQQD�DQG�1HZ�<RUN��6SULQJHU��&9� �Culture and Value, ed. G.H. von Wright / WUDQV��3��:LQFK��&KLFDJR�7KH�8QLYHUVLW\�RI�&KLFDJR�3UHVV��/)0� �Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939 �&KLFDJR��7KH�8QLYHUVLW\�RI�&KLFDJR�3UHVV��/:33�� Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, vols. 1/2, ed. G.H. von Wright and H. 1\PDQ��YRO��&KLFDJR��7KH�8QLYHUVLW\�RI�&KLFDJR�3UHVV��YRO��2[IRUG��%DVLO�%ODFNZHOO��2&� �On Certainty��WUDQV��'��3DXO�DQG�*�(�0��$QVFRPEH��2[IRUG��%DVLO�%ODFNZHOO��3*� �Philosophical Grammar,�WUDQV��$��.HQQ\��%HUNHOH\�DQG�/RV�$QJHOHV��8QLYHUVLW\�RI�&DOLIRUQLD�3UHVV��3,� �Philosophical Investigations,�WUDQV��*�(�0��$QVFRPEH��2[IRUG��%DVLO�%ODFNZHOO��5&� �Remarks on Color,�HG��*�(�0��$QVFRPEH��%HUNHOH\�DQG�/RV�$QJHOHV��8QLYHUVLW\�RI�&DOLIRUQLD�3UHVV��5)0� �Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics,�WUDQV��*�(�0��$QVFRPEH��2[IRUG��%DVLO�%ODFNZHOO��533�� Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vols. 1/2, trans. *�(�0��$QVFRPEH��&�*��/XFNKDUGW��0�$�(��$XH��&KLFDJR��7KH�8QLYHUVLW\�RI�&KLFDJR�3UHVV��:/&� �Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 1932-1935��HG��$��$PEURVH��&KLFDJR��7KH�8QLYHUVLW\�RI�&KLFDJR�3UHVV��:/33� �Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946-47, ed. 3�7��*HDFK��&KLFDJR��7KH�8QLYHUVLW\�RI�&KLFDJR�3UHVV��=� �Zettel,�WUDQV��*�(�0��$QVFRPEH��2[IRUG��%DVLO�%ODFNZHOO��

2 �7��1DJHO��The View from Nowhere��2[IRUG�DQG�1HZ�<RUN��2[IRUG�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��3 For a discussion of one set of passages which imply hesitation, see M.N. Forster, Wittgenstein

on the Arbitrariness of Grammar��3ULQFHWRQ��3ULQFHWRQ�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��FK��=�� 533��FI��533��)RU�D�PRUH�GHWDLOHG�DFFRXQW�RI�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�FRQFHSWLRQ�RI�´JUDPPDU�µ�VHH�0�1��)RUVWHU��

Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar, ch. 1.6 Z, §373.7 �7KLV�ZD\�RI�SXWWLQJ�WKH�VLWXDWLRQ�RI�FRXUVH�ERUGHUV�RQ�WKH�SDUDGR[LFDO��EXW�WKH�SDUDGR[�

LV�RQO\�VXSHUÀFLDO��&I��/:33��´&RXOG�ZH�LPDJLQH�WKDW�SHRSOH�PLJKW�KDYH�D�FRQFHSW�RI�SUHWHQFH�WKDW�GRHVQ·W�FRLQFLGH�ZLWK�RXUV"³%XW�ZRXOG�LW�WKHQ�EH�WKH�FRQFHSW�RI�SUHWHQFH"³:HOO��



it could be a concept related to ours.” �� I shall here dispense with certain important but tedious subtleties of formulation which

ZRXOG�EH�UHTXLUHG�LQ�RUGHU�WR�GHVFULEH�WKHVH�H[DPSOHV�ZLWK�FRPSOHWH�IDLWKIXOQHVV�WR�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�intentions—subtleties mainly concerning the difference in the concepts involved and his skepticism that we can fully understand them. Concerning these subtleties, see M.N. Forster, Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar, ch. 7.

9 �3,��FI��5)0��,��DSSHQGL[�,��/)0��S��10 �3,��S��QRWH��D��FI��5)0��,��DSSHQGL[�,��/)0��S��11 �3,��12 �533��FI��5&��,,,��3,��5)0��,,,��13 PI, p. 226.��5)0��,��5)0��,��16 Z, §362.17 �3*��,��FI��=��%7��S��:/&��SS��19 �=��FI��/:33��SS��20 OC, §336.21 �2&��22 For a detailed discussion of this reading, and citation of the relevant essays by Williams

DQG�/HDU��VHH�0�1��)RUVWHU��Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar.23 �&I��533��II��DOVR�:/33��SS��II��II��533�� In The New Wittgenstein��HG��$��&UDU\�DQG�5��5HDG��/RQGRQ�DQG�1HZ�<RUN��5RXWOHGJH��26 �5)0��,��27 �5)0��,�� PI, pp. 226-7.29 �3,��30 �7KHUH�is a very real question as to whether Wittgenstein supposes the alternative concepts

involved in these examples to be fully intelligible to us. But this question is distinct from the question of whether he supposes them to be genuine alternative concepts at all. Concerning the relation between these two questions, see M.N. Forster, Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar, ch. 7.

31 �6HH��IRU�LQVWDQFH��3,��:/&��SS��DQG�:/33��S��32 �%��6WURXG��´:LWWJHQVWHLQ�DQG�/RJLFDO�1HFHVVLW\�µ�LQ�Wittgenstein��HG��*��3LWFKHU��/RQGRQ��

0DFPLOODQ��HVS��SS��,Q�ZKDW�IROORZV�,�VKDOO�FDVW�WKLV�LVVXH�OHVV�LQ�WHUPV�RI�WKH�´JUDPPDWLFDOµ�SULQFLSOHV�DQG�SURFHGXUHV��VXFK�DV�WKRVH�RI�ORJLF�DQG�PDWKHPDWLFV��RQ�ZKLFK�Stroud primarily focuses, and more in terms of the concepts which, for Wittgenstein, they constitute.

33 For more on this subject, see M.N. Forster, “Wittgenstein on Family Resemblance Concepts,” forthcoming in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: A Critical Guide�� HG��$��$KPHG��&DPEULGJH��&DPEULGJH�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��

��)UHJH·V�FRPPLWPHQW�WR�D�YHUVLRQ�RI��LV�REYLRXV��DOEHLW�VRPHWLPHV�TXHVWLRQHG�E\�WKH�VHFRQGDU\�OLWHUDWXUH��WKH�ORFXV�FODVVLFXV�IRU�LW�LV�*��)UHJH��´7KRXJKWV�µ�LQ�KLV�Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy��HG��%�)��0F*XLQQHVV�>2[IRUG��%ODFNZHOO��@��&RQFHUQLQJ�KLV�FRPPLWPHQW�WR�D�YHUVLRQ�RI��UHFDOO��IRU�H[DPSOH��KLV�QRWRULRXV�MXGJPHQW�WKDW�HYHQ�´DQGµ�and “but” are identical in sense, and that statements in the active voice are identical in sense to corresponding statements in the passive voice. One of his more general expressions of such a commitment occurs in “Concept and Object”: “Nowadays people seem inclined to exaggerate the scope of the statement that different linguistic expressions are never completely equivalent, that a word can never be exactly translated into another language. One might perhaps go even further, and say that the same word is never taken in the same way even by men who share a language. I will not enquire as to the measure of truth in these statements; I would only emphasize that nevertheless different expressions quite often have something in common, which I call the sense, or in the special case of sentences, the thought. In other words, we must not fail to recognize that the same sense, the same thought, may be variously expressed; thus the difference does not



here concern the sense, but only the apprehension, shading, or coloring of the thought, and is irrelevant to logic. It is possible for one sentence to give no more and no less information than another; and, for all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts” (Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy��S��

��7KH�WKUHH�SXUSRVHV�EHKLQG�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�VWUDQJH�H[DPSOHV�WKDW�,�KDYH�MXVW�GLVWLQJXLVKHG�HQWDLO�WKH�IROORZLQJ�LPSRUWDQW�GLIIHUHQFH�EHWZHHQ�WKH�VWUDQJH�H[DPSOHV�WKDW�IXOÀOO�WKHP��:KHUHDV�WKH�ÀUVW�SXUSRVH��VKRZLQJ�FHUWDLQ�SKLORVRSKLFDO�FRQFHSWLRQV�WR�EH�LQFRKHUHQW��UHTXLUHV�WKDW�LWV�examples turn out to be implicitly incoherent in some way, the second purpose (revealing features RI�RXU�RZQ�SUDFWLFH�E\�FRQWUDVWV�DQG�VLPLODULWLHV�ZLWK�DQRWKHU��DQG�WKH�WKLUG�SXUSRVH��UHIXWLQJ�3ODWRQLVP��UHTXLUH�WKDW�WKH�VWUDQJH�H[DPSOHV�EH�FRKHUHQW��L�H��WKDW�QHLWKHU�WKH�SHUVSHFWLYH�WKDW�LPDJLQHV�WKHP�QRU�WKHLU�RZQ�SHUVSHFWLYH�LQYROYH�LQFRKHUHQFH�RU�PHDQLQJOHVVQHVV��$�SDUWLFXODU�example might therefore serve both the second and the third purposes simultaneously (as DUJXDEO\�LQ�IDFW�KDSSHQV�ZLWK�VRPH�RI�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�H[DPSOHV��EXW�QR�H[DPSOH�ZKLFK�VHUYHV�WKH�ÀUVW�SXUSRVH�FDQ�VHUYH�HLWKHU�RI�WKHVH�RWKHU�WZR�SXUSRVHV�

36 �7KLV�GLVWLQFWLRQ�LV�EHWWHU�WKRXJKW�RI�QRW�DV�D�VKDUS�RQH�EXW�DV�D�PDWWHU�RI�GHJUHH�37 See M.N. Forster, Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar. Cf. M.N. Forster “On the Very

Idea of Denying the Existence of Radically Different Conceptual Schemes,” Inquiry�� RFM, IV, §30.39 �533�� =�� PI, p. 230.�� Z, §373.�� CV, p. 79.��/:33�� PI, p. 230.�� See on this M.N. Forster, Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar, pp. 137 ff.��&I��LELG��SS��II��6HH�0�1��)RUVWHU��´6FKOHLHUPDFKHU·V�+HUPHQHXWLFV��6RPH�3UREOHPV�DQG�6ROXWLRQV�µ�The

Harvard Review of Philosophy��6HH�,��+DFNLQJ��́ /DQJXDJH��7UXWK��DQG�5HDVRQ�µ�LQ�Rationality and Relativism, ed. M. Hollis

DQG�6��/XNHV��&DPEULGJH��0DVV��0,7�3UHVV��SS��́ /DQJXDJH��7UXWK��DQG�5HDVRQ�µ�in his Historical Ontology��&DPEULGJH��0DVV��+DUYDUG�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��SS��

Indeed, even the radically pluralist anthropologist Clifford Geertz is occasionally inclined to make such a concession. See, for example, his Local Knowledge �8�6�$��+DUSHU�&ROOLQV��S��

�� For a generally similar position, see Geertz, “Common Sense as a Cultural System,” in Local Knowledge��HVSHFLDOO\�SS��

�� For more detailed discussion of this color example, see M.N. Forster, “On the Very Idea of Denying the Existence of Radically Different Conceptual Schemes.”

�� C. Kahn, The Verb “Be” in Ancient Greek��'RUGUHFKW��5HLGHO��6WULFWO\�VSHDNLQJ��.DKQ�only claims that the uses�RI�WKH�FRQFHSW�FKDQJHG�LQ�WKH�ÀIWK�FHQWXU\�%�&�(��+RZHYHU��LI��ZLWK�Wittgenstein, one is disposed to identify concept or meaning with use, one will be inclined to VHH�.DKQ·V�HYLGHQFH�DV�ZDUUDQWLQJ�WKH�VWURQJHU�FRQFOXVLRQ�

�� Here again, even the pluralist Ian Hacking seems to get cold feet about pluralism. See, for H[DPSOH��KLV�´·6W\OH·�IRU�+LVWRULDQV�DQG�3KLORVRSKHUV�µ�LQ�Historical Ontology, p. 190.

�� See M.N. Forster, Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar��FK�� Cf. F. Waismann, How I see Philosophy��/RQGRQ��0DFPLOODQ��FK��6HH�HVSHFLDOO\�/��/pY\�%UXKO��How Natives Think��1HZ�<RUN��$UQR�3UHVV��DQG�Primitive

Mentality��1HZ�<RUN��$06�3UHVV��/pY\�%UXKO�KLPVHOI�HYHQWXDOO\��LQ�KLV�ODWH�QRWHERRNV��came to have misgivings about his own idea of a “prelogical mentality,” but that hardly destroys LWV�LQWHUHVW�RU�SODXVLELOLW\��WKLQNHUV�QRW�LQIUHTXHQWO\�JR�RQ�WR�UHQRXQFH�WKHLU�RZQ�EHVW�LGHDV��

�� Iliad, bk. 1, ll. 362 ff. Of course, a glib philosopher who does not know much about the OLWHUDWXUH�LQ�TXHVWLRQ�PD\�EH�WHPSWHG�WR�RIIHU�DQ\�QXPEHU�RI�GHÁDWLRQDU\�FRXQWHU�H[SODQDWLRQV�KHUH� �´0D\EH� WKH�FRQWUDGLFWLRQ� LV�QRW�+RPHU·V�EXW�RQO\�KLV� FKDUDFWHU·V�µ�´0D\EH�+RPHU� LV�joking,” “Maybe Homer is just confused,” “Maybe different texts have been stitched together,” HWF��%XW�WKH\�ZLOO�QRW�EH�FRUUHFW��0RUH�VLJQLÀFDQW�PD\�EH�WKH�IDFW�WKDW�+RPHU�WROHUDWHV�WKLV�systematic inconsistency in connection with religion��&HUWDLQ� WKLQNHUV³IURP�7HUWXOOLDQ� WR�Kierkegaard and beyond—have argued, with some plausibility, that a toleration of, or even



taste for, paradox is a distinctive feature of religious belief (think, for instance, of the Christian GRFWULQH�RI�D�WULXQH�*RG��

��-��/��$XVWLQ��How to Do Things with Words��&DPEULGJH��0DVV��+DUYDUG�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��

��&I��-��6HDUOH��´$�7D[RQRP\�RI�,OORFXWLRQDU\�$FWV�µ�LQ�KLV�Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts��&DPEULGJH��&DPEULGJH�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��S��,W�PD\�WKHUHIRUH�WXUQ�RXW�WR�EH�XQQHFHVVDU\�WR�LQYRNH�VXFK�VHSDUDWH�FDWHJRULHV�DV�4XHQWLQ�6NLQQHU·V�´REOLTXH�VWUDWHJLHVµ�LQ�RUGHU�WR�FRYHU�FDVHV�OLNH�LURQ\�ZKLFK�IDLO�$XVWLQ·V�SHUIRUPDWLYH�OLWPXV�WHVW��,Q�P\�broader sense of the term, these too may qualify as examples of “illocutionary force.”

��&I��3�)��6WUDZVRQ��́ ,QWHQWLRQ�DQG�&RQYHQWLRQ�LQ�6SHHFK�$FWV�µ�LQ�KLV�Logico-linguistic Papers �%ULVWRO��0HWKXHQ��S��

60 �&I��6HDUOH��´$�7D[RQRP\�RI�,OORFXWLRQDU\�$FWV�µ�SS��61 �7KDW�LV�WR�VD\��HYHQ�LQ�FDVHV�ZKHUH�DQ�DOLHQ�LQ�VRPH�VHQVH�H[SUHVVHV�VLPLODU�DVVHUWLRQV��

requests, and questions and has similar beliefs, desires, and wonderings to ours, if his concept of $V�RU�RI�)QHVV�GLIIHUV�IURP�RXUV��WKHQ�RI�FRXUVH�KLV�DVVHUWLRQ�WKDW�$V�DUH�)��KLV�UHTXHVW�WKDW�$V�EH�)��KLV�TXHVWLRQ�ZKHWKHU�$V�DUH�)��KLV�EHOLHI�WKDW�$V�DUH�)��KLV�GHVLUH�WKDW�$V�EH�)��DQG�KLV�ZRQGHULQJ�ZKHWKHU�$V�DUH�)�ZLOO�DOVR�GLIIHU�IURP�RXU�FRUUHVSRQGLQJ�DVVHUWLRQV��UHTXHVWV��TXHVWLRQV��EHOLHIV��desires, and wonderings.

62 �3,��63 PI, §23. Some of these examples would be more aptly characterized as genres than as

illocutionary forces, but this does not affect my main point. (We shall consider genres in due FRXUVH��

��´$�7D[RQRP\�RI�,OORFXWLRQDU\�$FWV�µ�S��&��7D\ORU��´7KHRULHV�RI�0HDQLQJ�µ�LQ�KLV�Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers

I��&DPEULGJH��&DPEULGJH�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��HVS��SS��II�66 R. Needham, Belief, Language, and Experience��&KLFDJR��7KH�8QLYHUVLW\�RI�&KLFDJR�3UHVV��

��,QFLGHQWDOO\��1HHGKDP�ZURWH�KLV�ERRN�ODUJHO\�XQGHU�WKH�LQVSLUDWLRQ�RI�WKH�ODWHU�:LWWJHQVWHLQ�67 M.N. Forster, “Hegelian vs. Kantian Interpretations of Pyrrhonism: Revolution or

5HDFWLRQ"µ�LQ�Kritisches Jahrbuch der Philosophie��$��%RHFNK��Encyklopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften� ��VW�HG��

�QG�HG��/HLS]LJ��%�*��7HXEQHU��%RHFNK�LQFOXGHV�WKH�LGHQWLÀFDWLRQ�RI�JHQUH�DV�RQH�RI�WKH�four essential types or aspects of interpretation that he distinguishes (the others being historical, OLQJXLVWLF��DQG�LQGLYLGXDO�>L�H��ZKDW�6FKOHLHUPDFKHU�FDOOHG�SV\FKRORJLFDO@�LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ��

69 �&I��0�0��%DNKWLQ��´7KH�3UREOHP�RI�6SHHFK�*HQUHV�µ�LQ�KLV�Speech Genres and Other Late Essays��$XVWLQ��8QLYHUVLW\�RI�7H[DV�3UHVV��

70 �+HUGHU�ZDV�SHUKDSV�WKH�ÀUVW�WKHRULVW�WR�QRWLFH�WKLV�ODVW�SRLQW��6HH��IRU�H[DPSOH��KLV�GLVFXVVLRQ�of sculpture in This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity��

71 PI, §23.72 PI, p. 230.73 �7KLV�ODVW�SRLQW�PLJKW�VHHP�LQFRQVLVWHQW�ZLWK�WKH�generality that essentially belongs to a

JHQUH��EXW�LQ�IDFW�LW�LV�QRW��)RU��DV�+HUGHU·V�VXFFHVVRU�LQ�WKH�*HUPDQ�WUDGLWLRQ��%RHFNK��LQ�HIIHFW�pointed out, the generality in question does not require multiple instantiations, but only multiple instantiability: “It is entirely irrelevant whether or not a genre happens to be represented by only one individual; the same purpose under different circumstances could just as well be realized by many individuals” (Encyclopädie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften��S��

�� CV, p. 67.��&9��S��FI��S��RQ�´PHORGLHV�µ76 �&9��S��7KHUH�LV�DQ�LQWHUHVWLQJ�HFKR�KHUH�RI�6FKOHLHUPDFKHU·V�IDPRXV�KHUPHQHXWLFDO�

principle that in interpretation it is not understanding but rather misunderstanding that occurs DV�D�PDWWHU�RI�FRXUVH��$V�6FKOHLHUPDFKHU�KLPVHOI�SXWV�LW��FRQWUDU\�WR�D�FRPPRQ�DVVXPSWLRQ�WKDW�“understanding occurs as a matter of course, misunderstanding occurs as a matter of course, and so understanding must be willed and sought at every point” (F.D.E. Schleiermacher, The Handwritten Manuscripts�>$WODQWD��6FKRODUV�3UHVV��@��SS��Hermeneutics and Criticism >&DPEULGJH��&DPEULGJH�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV�� @��SS�� $QRWKHU� HFKR�RI� 6FKOHLHUPDFKHU�occurs at Culture and Value��S��ZKHUH�:LWWJHQVWHLQ�UHSHDWV�6FKOHLHUPDFKHU·V�HTXDOO\�IDPRXV�GLFWXP�WKDW�WKH�LQWHUSUHWHU·V�JRDO�LV�WR�XQGHUVWDQG�DQ�DXWKRU�EHWWHU�WKDQ�KH�XQGHUVWRRG�KLPVHOI��



7KHVH�PRUH�GHWDLOHG�HFKRHV�SXW�EH\RQG�DQ\�GRXEW�:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�JHQHUDO�IDPLOLDULW\�ZLWK�WKH�ideas about interpretation that had been developed before him by the tradition of Herder, the Schlegels, Schleiermacher, and Boeckh—a familiarity which, given their pervasiveness in German culture by his day, it would in any case have been reasonable to assume.

77 I shall not here consider the closely related case of affective sensation and emotion, but I believe that points similar to the ones I am about to make concerning the perceptual case would apply in that case too.

��533��+RZHYHU��:LWWJHQVWHLQ�LV�VRPHWLPHV�PRUH�DPELJXRXV�RQ�WKLV�TXHVWLRQ��VHH��IRU�H[DPSOH��KLV�YHU\�DPELYDOHQW�UHPDUNV�DW�=��

79 �&I��=�� 6HH�� IRU� H[DPSOH��3,��SS�� 533�� /:33�� +RZHYHU��KH�

VRPHWLPHV�VHHPV�OHVV�FRPPLWWHG�WR�VXFK�D�UHVWULFWLRQ³VHH�H�J��533��II�� See P.F. Strawson, “Imagination and Perception,” in his Freedom and Resentment��/RQGRQ��

0HWKXHQ��S��1�5��+DQVRQ��Patterns of Discovery��&DPEULGJH��&DPEULGJH�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��S��

�� Cf. P. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words� �&DPEULGJH��0DVV��+DUYDUG�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��SS��$V�*ULFH�VHHPV�WR�LPSO\��WKLV�VRUW�RI�´SUDJPDWLFµ�DQVZHU�WR�:LWWJHQVWHLQ�LV�DOVR�attractive in certain other cases, for example against his denial in On Certainty that “I know” can EH�SURSHUO\�DSSOLHG�WR�0RRUH�W\SH�VWDWHPHQWV�VXFK�DV�´7KLV�LV�D�KDQG�µ

��3,��S��´7KH�ÁDVKLQJ�RI�DQ�DVSHFW�RQ�XV�VHHPV�KDOI�YLVXDO�H[SHULHQFH��KDOI�WKRXJKW��,V�LW�D�FDVH�RI�ERWK�VHHLQJ�DQG�WKLQNLQJ"�RU�DQ�DPDOJDP�RI�WKH�WZR��DV�,�VKRXOG�DOPRVW�OLNH�WR�VD\"µ�3,��S��´,W�LV�DOPRVW�DV�LI�¶VHHLQJ�WKH�VLJQ�LQ�WKLV�FRQWH[W·�ZHUH�DQ�HFKR�RI�D�WKRXJKW��¶7KH�HFKR�RI�D�WKRXJKW�LQ�VLJKW·³RQH�ZRXOG�OLNH�WR�VD\�µ�&I��533��

��)RU�H[DPSOH��DW�3,��S��LQ�PXFK�RI�533��DQG�DW�/:33�� In addition to the caginess of the passages quoted in the note before last, consider in this

FRQQHFWLRQ�3,��S��´,V�EHLQJ�VWUXFN�ORRNLQJ�SOXV�WKLQNLQJ"�1R��0DQ\�RI�RXU�FRQFHSWV�cross KHUH�µ�$OVR��3,��S��́ 'R�,�UHDOO\�VHH�VRPHWKLQJ�GLIIHUHQW�HDFK�WLPH��RU�GR�,�RQO\�LQWHUSUHW�ZKDW�,�VHH�LQ�D�GLIIHUHQW�ZD\"�,�DP�LQFOLQHG�WR�VD\�WKH�IRUPHU��%XW�ZK\"³7R�LQWHUSUHW�LV�WR�WKLQN��WR�GR�VRPHWKLQJ��VHHLQJ�LV�D�VWDWHµ��FI��533��533��=��$OVR��533��´%XW�GRHV�WKLV�WKHQ�VKRZ�WKDW�LW�FDQ·W�EH�D�PDWWHU�RI�¶VHHLQJ·�LQ�WKHVH�FDVHV³EXW�LV�RQH�RI�¶WKLQNLQJ·�SHUKDSV"�:KDW�PDNHV�WKLV�TXLWH�XQOLNHO\�LV�WKDW�ZH�ZDQW�WR�WDON�DERXW�¶VHHLQJ·�LQ�WKH�ÀUVW�SODFH�³6R�VKRXOG�,�VD\�WKDW�LW�LV�D�SKHQRPHQRQ�EHWZHHQ�VHHLQJ�DQG�WKLQNLQJ"�1R��EXW�D�FRQFHSW�WKDW�OLHV�EHWZHHQ�that of seeing and thinking, that is, which bears a resemblance to both; and phenomena which are akin to those of seeing and thinking (e.g. the phenomenon of the utterance ‘I see the F facing WR�WKH�ULJKW·��µ��7UDQVODWLRQ�FRUUHFWHG��

�� /:33�� ´6RPHWLPHV� WKH� FRQFHSWXDO� LV�GRPLQDQW� LQ� DQ�DVSHFW��7KDW� LV� WR� VD\��Sometimes the experience of an aspect can be expressed only through a conceptual explanation. $QG�WKLV�H[SODQDWLRQ�FDQ�WDNH�PDQ\�GLIIHUHQW�IRUPV��7KH�YDULRXV�NLQGV�RI�DVSHFWV�µ�&I��/:33��p. 17.

��3,��S��´>7KH@�DVSHFWV�RI�WKH�GRXEOH�FURVV��PLJKW�EH�UHSRUWHG�VLPSO\�E\�SRLQWLQJ�alternately to an isolated white and an isolated black cross. One could quite well imagine this as a primitive reaction in a child even before it could talk.”

�� See again Strawson, “Imagination and Perception”; Hanson, Patterns of Discovery.�� Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, p. 26.90 �533��´%XW�GRHV�WKLV�WKHQ�VKRZ�WKDW�LW�FDQ·W�EH�D�PDWWHU�RI�¶VHHLQJ·�LQ�WKHVH�FDVHV³

EXW�LV�RQH�RI�¶WKLQNLQJ·�SHUKDSV"�:KDW�PDNHV�WKLV�TXLWH�XQOLNHO\�LV�WKDW�ZH�ZDQW�WR�WDON�DERXW�¶VHHLQJ·�LQ�WKH�ÀUVW�SODFH�µ

91 �6HH�3,��SS��533��92 See PI, p. 212 as quoted a few notes ago. 93 PI, p. 212: “What I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a property of the object,

EXW�DQ�LQWHUQDO�UHODWLRQ�EHWZHHQ�LW�DQG�RWKHU�REMHFWVµ�� /:33��FI��3,��SS��533��533��

��3,��S��FI��/:33��7KH�GHSHQGHQFH�RI�FRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ�RQ�ODQJXDJH�WKDW�,�am presupposing here and in what follows could be questioned. But it at least seems faithful to :LWWJHQVWHLQ��DQG�PRUHRYHU��FDQ��,�WKLQN��EH�MXVWLÀHG�SKLORVRSKLFDOO\��

��2QH�FRXOG�WHVW�IRU�WKH�RFFXUUHQFH�RI�WKLV�PRUH�VSHFLÀF�VRUW�RI�´VHHLQJ�DV�µ�RU�VZLWFK�RI�



DVSHFW��LQ�ODQJXDJHOHVV�DQLPDOV�E\��IRU�LQVWDQFH��FRQVWUXFWLQJ�UHDOLVWLF�ORRNLQJ�DPELJXRXV�ÀJXUHV�of certain sorts and presenting the animals with them, then looking for sudden switches in UHVSRQVH��H�J��GXFN�UDEELW�OLNH�ÀJXUHV�DPELJXRXV�DV�EHWZHHQ�DQ�DQLPDO·V�QDWXUDO�SUHGDWRU�DQG�LWV�QDWXUDO�SUH\�ZKLFK�PLJKW�SURYRNH�LW�ÀUVW�WR�ÁHH�EXW�WKHQ�WR�DWWDFN��,QGHHG��,�DP�WHPSWHG�WR�VD\�WKDW�VXFK�WHVWV�DOUHDG\�RFFXU�QDWXUDOO\�DQG�SURYLGH�FRQÀUPDWLRQ�RI�VZLWFKHV�RI�DVSHFW��)RU�H[DPSOH��ZKHQ�,�FRPH�KRPH�ZHDULQJ�D�EODFN�MDFNHW��RXU�WLPLG�FDW�$OGR��ZKR�LV�DIUDLG�RI�ODUJH�black crows in our neighborhood, will initially run away in fright, but then shortly afterwards, once he has had an opportunity for further observation, calm down again. (Similar tests could RI�FRXUVH�DOVR�EH�SHUIRUPHG�LQ�WKH�FDVH�RI�ODQJXDJHOHVV�FKLOGUHQ��

96 �&RQFHUQLQJ�WKLV�KRSH��VHH�HVSHFLDOO\�3,��SS��FI��533��)RU�VRPH�discussion of this hope, see M.N. Forster, Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar��SS��Q��DQG�´:LWWJHQVWHLQ�RQ�)DPLO\�5HVHPEODQFH�&RQFHSWV�µ

97 “Normally” here is intended to do some real work. For the points just made about conceptless-languageless children and animals suggest that there may be some aspects of the VHQVDWLRQV�RI�HYHQ�PDWXUH�KXPDQ�EHLQJV�ZKLFK�� WKRXJK� LQ�D�VHQVH�DUWLFXODWHG�RU�GHÀQLWH� LQ�character, are not so due to any corresponding concepts or language.

�� PI, p. 207.99 Patterns of Discovery, pp. 13, 17.100 Cf. Waismann, How I see Philosophy��SS��7KLV�LV�ODUJHO\�DQ�HPSLULFDO�TXHVWLRQ��WKRXJK�

not an easy one to decide. Considerable research has been done on the general question of whether WKH�QDWXUH�RI�FRORU�SHUFHSWLRQ�GHSHQGV�RQ�WKH�QDWXUH�RI�FRORU�FODVVLÀFDWLRQ��7KH�FRQYHQWLRQDO�wisdom these days is that the question has been settled negatively (for a helpful summary of relevant research developments which interprets them in this way, see R. Brown, “In Memorial 7ULEXWH�WR�(ULF�/HQQHEHUJ�µ�Cognition��>��@��+RZHYHU��WKHUH�DUH�JURXQGV�IRU�VNHSWLFLVP��7KXV�IRU�D�VXEWOH�FULWLTXH�RI�WKLV�FRQYHQWLRQDO�ZLVGRP��VHH�-�$��/XF\��Language Diversity and Thought: A Reformulation of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis��&DPEULGJH��&DPEULGJH�8QLYHUVLW\�3UHVV��FK��/XF\�SRLQWV�RXW��IRU�H[DPSOH��WKDW�WKH�=XQL·V�ODFN�RI�VHSDUDWH�OLQJXLVWLF�WHUPV�IRU�orange and yellow correlates with a failure on their part to recognize these as distinct colors in SHUFHSWXDO�WHVWV��SS��FI��SS��

Concerning, PRUH� VSHFLÀFDOO\�� WKH� VRUW�RI� DQFLHQW� H[DPSOH� WKDW� ,�JLYH�KHUH��GHFLGLQJ� WKH�HPSLULFDO�TXHVWLRQ� LQ�D�GLUHFW�ZD\� LV�ERXQG� WR�EH�HYHQ�PRUH�GLIÀFXOW��+RZHYHU�� LW�PD\�QRW�EH�KRSHOHVV�� )RU� LQVWDQFH�� WKHUH� LV� VRPH�HYLGHQFH� WKDW� LGLRV\QFUDVLHV� LQ� FRORU� FODVVLÀFDWLRQ�conceptualization are accompanied by corresponding idiosyncrasies in color sensation in the FDVH�RI�3KDUDRQLF�(J\SW��QDPHO\�LQ�WKH�IRUP�RI�WKH�IDFW�WKDW�WKH�DQFLHQW�(J\SWLDQV·�YLVXDO�DUW�on occasion substitutes for the usual color of an object an alternative color which the Egyptians OLQJXLVWLFDOO\�FODVVLÀHG�WRJHWKHU�ZLWK�LW��ZKHUHDV�ZH�GR�QRW�DQG�ZRXOG�QRW�FRQVLGHU�LW�D�VXLWDEOH�substitute (see N. Reeves, The Complete Tutankhamun�>&DLUR��7KH�$PHULFDQ�8QLYHUVLW\�LQ�&DLUR�3UHVV��@��S��$QG�LW�PLJKW�DW�OHDVW�LQ�SULQFLSOH�EH�SRVVLEOH�WR�ÀQG�VLPLODU�HYLGHQFH�RI�GLVWLQFWLYH�IHDWXUHV�RI�FRORU�VHQVDWLRQ�FRUUHVSRQGLQJ�WR�GLVWLQFWLYH�IHDWXUHV�RI�FRORU�FODVVLÀFDWLRQ�conceptualization in the Homeric case as well, for instance by examining the few examples of Mycenean wall-painting that have survived in order to see whether there are places where yellow pigment is used for an object usually represented as green, in sensory correspondence to the Homeric color concept chlôros.

101 See Geertz, Local Knowledge��SS��*HHUW]�GUDZV�LQ�WKLV�FRQQHFWLRQ�RQ�ZRUN�E\�5REHUW�)DULV�7KRPSVRQ�

102 �2QH�DGGLWLRQDO�SRLQW�FRQFHUQLQJ�VHQVDWLRQV��:LWWJHQVWHLQ·V�SULPDU\�LQWHUHVW�LV�LQ�concepts. 7KLV�HQFRXUDJHV�KLP�WR�QHJOHFW�VXFK�TXHVWLRQV�DV�WKHVH�FRQFHUQLQJ�VHQVDWLRQV��EHFDXVH�KH�LV�committed to a strict anti-psychologism concerning concepts, inherited from Frege, according to which the possession of sensations is strictly inessential for the understanding of concepts. However, it is plausible to argue that such questions as these about sensations in fact have much greater bearing on questions about concepts than Wittgenstein supposes. For, his anti-psychologism is dubious. In particular, whereas his thought-experiments designed to show that having sensations, images, etc. is never VXIÀFLHQW for semantic understanding are very compelling, his thought-experiments designed to show that it is never necessary�DUH�IDU�OHVV�VR��$QG�LI�RQH�does reject his anti-psychologism, then the sort of anti-Platonist situation concerning sensations that I have sketched here may also support or reinforce an anti-Platonism concerning concepts



�QRW�RQO\³DV�,�KDYH�LQ�HIIHFW�DOUHDG\�LPSOLHG²YLFH�YHUVD��)RU�H[DPSOH��LI�WZR�SHRSOH�DVVRFLDWH�subtly different sorts of sensations with the word “green” (say, due to differences in their organic FRQVWLWXWLRQV��WKHQ�WKLV�PD\�HQWDLO�WKDW�WKH\�DOVR�KDYH�VXEWO\�GLIIHUHQW�FRQFHSWV�RI�´JUHHQ�µ

103 �5�� -DNREVRQ�� ´2Q�/LQJXLVWLF�$VSHFWV�RI�7UDQVODWLRQ�µ� LQ�/��9HQXWL� HG��The Translation Studies Reader��/RQGRQ�DQG�1HZ�<RUN��5RXWOHGJH��S��&I��(��1LGD��Toward a Science of Translating� �/HLGHQ��%ULOO��SS��$OVR��PRUH�UHFHQW�ZRUN�RQ� WKLV�VXEMHFW�E\� WKH�anthropologist Michael Silverstein.

��7KH�Odyssey·V�DGGLWLRQ�RI� WKLV�PHWDOLQJXLVWLF�GLPHQVLRQ�VHHPV� WR�PH�RQH�RI� LWV�PRVW�striking stylistic differences from the Iliad.

�� For a discussion of a particular biblical passage in connection with which this sort of interpretive question arises, see Nida, Toward a Science of Translating, pp. 212-13.

106 �6HH�0�1��)RUVWHU��́ 6RFUDWHV·�'HPDQG�IRU�'HÀQLWLRQV�µ�Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ��6RPH�RI�WKH�UHFHQW�VHFRQGDU\�OLWHUDWXUH�PDQDJHV�WR�REVFXUH�WKLV�VLWXDWLRQ��WKRXJK��E\�presupposing a modern metaphysics of meaning as linguistic usage and on this basis simply denying that Plato is concerned with meaning.

107 See M.N. Forster, “Socratic Refutation,” Rhizai��2I�FRXUVH��WKLV�3ODWRQLF�H[DPSOH�concerns a case in which a lot of philosophical theorizing about meaning is going on. However, the sorts of deviations from our own assumptions which it illustrates are every bit as likely to be found in non-theoretical discourse and texts as well.

�� King Lear��DFW��VF��OO��109 Hamlet��DFW��VF��OO��110 � ,W�PLJKW� EH�SURWHVWHG� WKDW�+RPHU·V� JHQHDORJLFDO� UHODWLRQVKLS� WR�XV�PDNHV� KLP� DQ�

especially favorable case for this point. But I think that less genealogically related historical and anthropological cases would support the point as well.

111 � 3HRSOH�ZKR�NQRZ�&KRPVN\·V�ZRUN�ZLOO� XQGHUVWDQG�ZK\� ,� KHUH� FODVVLI\� KLP� DV� D�philosopher rather than a linguist.

112 For some further discussion of this subject, see M.N. Forster, “On the Very Idea of Denying WKH�([LVWHQFH�RI�5DGLFDOO\�'LIIHUHQW�&RQFHSWXDO�6FKHPHV�µ�7KH�SRLQW�WKDW�WKLV�XQGHUO\LQJ�UHDVRQ�for the philosophical outlook in question is often quite unconscious�LV�LPSRUWDQW��7KH�SROLWLFDO�function served by an ideology is by no means always consciously espoused by its individual representatives. Some of the philosophers just mentioned probably do embrace the political IXQFWLRQ� LQ�TXHVWLRQ�KHUH� LQ� D� UDWKHU� FRQVFLRXV�ZD\� �H�J�� 6HDUOH� DQG�4XLQH��ERWK�QRWRULRXV�IRU�ULJKW�ZLQJ�SROLWLFDO�YLHZV��2WKHUV�DOPRVW�FHUWDLQO\�GR�QRW��H�J��'DYLGVRQ��ZKRVH�SROLWLFV�VHHP�WR�KDYH�EHHQ�PLGGOH�RI�WKH�URDG�RU�HYHQ�PLOGO\�OHIW�ZLQJ��<HW�RWKHUV�LQGHHG�DGRSW�WKH�philosophical outlook under discussion with precisely contrary political motives in mind (e.g. 1XVVEDXP�DQG�&KRPVN\��7KH�RFFXUUHQFH�RI�WKLV�ODVW�VRUW�RI�FDVH�PD\�VHHP�VXUSULVLQJ��EXW�LW�VKRXOG�QRW��7R�PDNH�WKH�SRLQW�E\�ZD\�RI�DQ�DQDORJ\��HYHQ�LI��DV�VHHPV�OLNHO\��0DU[�ZDV�FRUUHFW�in diagnosing the fundamental ideological function of Christianity in the modern world as one of defusing the discontentment of the oppressed in order to help sustain an invidious status quo, a sensible Marxist will of course readily admit that Christianity has its liberation theologians.

113 �%\�FRQWUDVW��$PHULFDQ�anthropology��WKDQNV�LQ�ODUJH�SDUW�WR�WKH�HQGXULQJ�LQÁXHQFH�RI�LWV�great founder, the empirically scrupulous pluralist Franz Boas, has tended to escape this rather ignominious role.

�� 7KLV�SDSHU�ZDV�ÀUVW�SUHVHQWHG�DW�D� FRQIHUHQFH�RUJDQL]HG� LQ��E\�PHPEHUV�RI� WKH�'HSDUWPHQW�RI�3KLORVRSK\�DQG�+LVWRU\�RI� 6FLHQFH� DW� WKH�8QLYHUVLW\�RI�$WKHQV� WR�PDUN� WKH�publication of my book Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar. I would especially like to thank the following organizers and participants: the late Michael Frede, Paul Guyer, John Hyman, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Vassiliki Kindi, Barry Stroud, Stelios Virvidakis, and Fay Zika. 7KH�SDSHU�ZDV�VXEVHTXHQWO\�UH�SUHVHQWHG�WR�WKH�:LWWJHQVWHLQ�:RUNVKRS�DW�WKH�8QLYHUVLW\�RI�Chicago. I would like to thank the following organizers and participants from the Workshop: Kristin Boyce, James Conant, David Finkelstein, and Michael Kremer.

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Vol 16 Text - Harvard Computer Societyhrp/issues/XVI/Forster, Michael N. A... · 2012-08-31 · the harvard review of philosophy vol.xvi 2009 60 michael n. forster eh fdoohg ¶dx[loldu\