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General works on Aristotle

General works on Aristotle include Sir David Ross’s Aristotle, W. K. C. Guthrie’s section on Aristotle in his A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Works specifically on his ethics include Nancy Sherman’s The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); John Cooper’s Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975); W. F. R. Hardie’s Aristotle’s Ethical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980); Richard Kraut's Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Troels Engberg-Pedersen’s Aristotle’s Theory of Moral Insight; Sarah Broadie’s Ethics with Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Two excellent anthologies of articles on Aristotle’s ethics are Amélie Rorty’s Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) and Barnes, Schofield, and Sorabji’s Articles on Aristotle: 2; Ethics and Politics (New York: St. Martin’s, 1977); the latter contains an excellent bibliography. One of the most fascinating treatments of Aristotle’s ethics is to be found in Part Three of Martha Nussbaum’s The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); also see her The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). For a perceptive discussion and evaluation of Aristotle’s ethics in light of current work in feminist ethics, see Marcia Homiak, "Feminism and Aristotle’s Rational Ideal," in A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 1-18.

Contemporary Virtue Theory

The contemporary resurgence of interest in the virtues begins with Philippa Foot’s "Virtues and Vices" in her Virtues and Vices and Other Essays In Moral Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 1-18 and Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue, 2nd edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). Several reviews of the recent literature are noteworthy: Arthur Fleming’s "Reviewing the Virtues," Ethics, Vol. 90 (1980), pp. 587-95; Gregory Pence’s "Recent Work on the Virtues," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 4 (October, 1984), pp. 281-97 and his "Virtue Theory," A Companion to Ethics, edited by Peter Singer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 249-58; Marcia Baron’s "Varieties of Ethics of Virtue," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 22 (January, 1985), 47-53; Gregory Trianosky’s "What Is Virtue Ethics All About?" American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 4 (October, 1990), pp. 335-44; and Phillip Montague, "Virtue Ethics: A Qualified Success Story," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (January, 1992), pp. 53-61. For an insightful analysis into historical views of virtue, see Richard White, "Historical Perspectives on the Morality of Virtue," The Journal of Value Inquiry, Vol. 25 (1991), pp. 217-31. Also see the excellent bibliography in The Virtues, edited by Robert B. Kruschwitz and Robert C. Roberts (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1987). Other collections of contemporary articles on virtues and vices include Sommers and Sommers, Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life, 3rd Edition (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1992); Vol. XIII of Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1988) on virtue theory; the special double issue on the virtues in Philosophia, Vol. 20 (1990); Flanagan and Rorty’s Identity, Character, and Morality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990); Halberstam’s Virtues and Values (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1988); Virtue, edited by John W. Chapman and William A. Galston (New York: New York University Press, 1992) and John Deigh’s Ethics and Personality: Essays in Moral Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). On the more popular front, see William Bennett, The Book of Virtues (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993). Joel Kupperman’s Character (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) presents a character-based ethical theory that places the discussion of particular virtues and vices within the context of the individual’s character. For a utilitarian approach to virtue, see John Kilcullen, "Utilitarianism and Virtue," Ethics, Vol. 93, No. 3 (April, 1983), pp. 451-66.

Courage

Aristotle’s discussion of courage appears primarily in his Nichomachean Ethics, Book III, Chapters 6-9. David Pears’ "Courage as a Mean" in Rorty’s Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980) is an insightful, detailed consideration of Aristotle’s views on this virtue; for a critique of Pears' position, see Michael Stocker's "Courage, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Possibility of Evaluative and Emotional Coherence" in his

Plural and Conflicting Values (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 129-64. Douglas Walton’s Courage (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986) provides a standard account of courage that focuses on courageous actions rather than character, while Lee Yearley’s Mencius and Aquinas: Theories of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990) offers an interesting cross-cultural comparison between the thought of an early Confucian and a medieval Christian. For a provocative picture of courage which also recognizes its negative side, see Amélie Rorty’s "Two Faces of Courage" in her Mind in Action (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988). Also see Chapter Two, "Courage," in John Casey’s Pagan Virtue (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). On ordinary courage in adolescent girls, see Lyn Mikel Brown and Carol Gilligan, Meeting at the Crossroads: Women’s Psychology and Girl’s Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992) and Annie Rogers’ paper, "The Development of Courage in Girls and Women," Harvard Educational Review (1993). For an account of Rhonda Cornum’s experiences as a prisoner of war, see, She Went to War by Rhonda Cornum as told to Peter Copeland (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1992). For an insightful discussion of gender and virtue in Aristotle, see "Gendered Virtue: Plato and Aristotle on the Politics of Virility," Chapter Four of Stephen G. Salkever's Finding the Mean (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 165-204.

Compassion

The explicitly philosophical literature on compassion is relatively limited. The best pieces are Lawrence Blum’s "Compassion," Explaining Emotions, edited by A. O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 507-18; Nancy Snow’s "Compassion," American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 (July, 1991), pp. 195-205; and Adrian M. S. Piper, "Impartiality, Compassion, and Modal Imagination," Ethics, Vol. 101, No. 4 (July, 1991), pp. 726-57; also see the section on compassion in Richard Taylor’s Good and Evil (New York: Macmillan, 1970). For a perceptive and intriguing discussion of the place of compassion in contemporary American life, see Robert Wuthnow’s Acts of Compassion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). The story of the village of Le Chambon is recounted in Philip Hallie’s Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed (New York: Harper Colophon, 1979) and his articles, "Skepticism, Narrative, and Holocaust Ethics," Philosophical Forum and his "From Cruelty to Goodness," Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life, edited by Christina Sommers and Fred Sommers, 3rd edition (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1992).

Self-Love and Self-Respect

There is an extensive literature on the issue of self-love and self-respect. For an insightful discussion of Aristotle's position on this issue, see Marcia Homiak's "Virtue and Self-Love in Aristotle's Ethics," The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December, 1981), pp. 633-51. On the relationship between self-love and friendship in Aristotle, see especially Richard Kraut's Aristotle on Human Good (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). One of the most influential contemporary philosophical articles on self-respect is Thomas Hill's "Servility and Self-Respect," reprinted in his Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Interesting responses to Hill's article include Larry Blum, Marcia Homiak, Judy Housman, and Naomi Scheman, "Altruism and Women's Oppression;" Philosophical Forum, Vol. 5 (1975), pp. 222-47; George Sher, "Our Preferences, Ourselves;" and Marilyn Friedman's "Moral Integrity and the Deferential Wife," Philosophical Studies, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1985), pp. 141-50. On the relationship between self-respect and race, see Michelle M. Moody-Adams, "Race, Class, and the Social Construction of Self-Respect," Philosophical Forum, Vol. XXIV, Nos. 1-3 (Fall-Spring, 1992-93), pp. 251-66. For a superb discussion of self-interest and related concepts that challenges the traditional dichotomy between self and other, see Kelly Rogers, "Beyond Self and Other," Social Philosophy & Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter, 1997), pp. 1-20.

Pride

For a brief but excellent overview of issues about pride, see Lawrence Becker’s "Pride," Encyclopedia of Ethics, edited by Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1992), Vol. II, pp. 1013-15. Also see Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) and Norvin Richards, Humility (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).

Discussion Questions

1. Human Flourishing. For Aristotle, virtues are those strengths of character that promote human flourishing. But exactly what is human flourishing? Address yourself to both the substantive and the epistemological issues that this question raises. Can you give any examples of someone who is clearly not flourishing? Are there any difficulties in knowing whether someone is flourishing? Are there many different legitimate conceptions of human flourishing? If so, how do you deal with these difficulties?

2. Gender and Virtue. I have suggested that there are typically some gender differences in our society in regard to virtues such as courage and compassion. Based on your own experience, do you think this is true? Are there any other virtues in our society that exhibit gender differences? Are there any vices that are valued differently in men and women? Are there reasons why virtues and vices should be different for women and for men?

3. The Virtue of Fortiveness. Join a discussion of the issue of forgiveness on the World Wide Web at http://ethics.sandiego.edu/scripts/webX.exe?58@@.ee6b2fb. One of the virtues not discussed in this chapter is forgiveness. Think about the place of forgiveness in a person’s character. Is it ever possible to be too forgiving? not forgiving enough? Does not forgiving sometimes play a positive role in our lives? How does too little forgiveness detract from human flourishing? Why is it sometimes hard not to forgive another? If it is possible to be too forgiving, how could this detract from human flourishing? Why is it sometimes hard to forgive? How does forgiving—and not forgiving—yourself relate to human flourishing? How does self-forgiveness differ from forgiveness of other people? Explain.

4. Flourishing and Contingency. Aristotle said "count no man happy until he is dead." What does this mean? Is it true? Why must virtue (and human flourishing) wait that long?

5. Courage. The movies Glory and The Color Purple present quite different views of courage. Compare these two movies in regard to the relationship between courage and gender. What does such a comparison suggest about this relationship?

6. Courage and Violence. Is Gandhi courageous? If so, what does that suggest about the relationship between courage and violence? How does this contrast with the picture of the relationship between courage and violence in Glory? Is the willingness to fight necessarily a sign of courage?