TICOM I-78

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2.'l'Iom:/I-78

1.,ro"""<=> t L' on obta i nedfr amReyort on ....,='

1'1,'1C3/2318 Oba tIt !tHr'rIG m::j' FsT/"',g ;,IlN/Chi

cnp nu red at 11.fUIt.'i3 15 !I,;ay 1945

HISTORY AND AC:ClI~V£:MENTS OF

'I'lL] OR¥f'rrOGR...PHIC SECT ION qF TJ.lli Q:Gi--- .. ---""---'--~~

_lOI\H!.'1HrI!IU 7 LVll

This report supp Lemenb s information already published

by CSDIC (UK) in SIR 1335 and 17')4. Although the informa-tion in t his report is of a general us ture? it gives a

fairly complete picture of the Gel'[,]sn aims and achievements

in he C,l'yptcg raphic field? seen through pOI 's personal

position as head of the Oh:H c ryp t og r aph ic section from NoV.

41 to June 43. In general, P',! has been c onne c t e d with the

wo r k of bhe "y'l service in an organ isa tiona 1 capac ity from

1935 onwards. Hio memory i~ reasonably good, though he

is less well-informed on te chn i ca1rnat tel's of c rY1Jt cgr aphy ,

"llthou3h a Slight tendency t o hedge on vital que s t ions wascb ae nveu , it would iJYlx.)dr that P". has Dot now withheld any~thing of i~portance.

His life history is 8S follows:

19331935 - 39Sep 39 - .~pr 4')

Took comd of Horchkp of Nachr Abt I.Comd Horchkp of Nach r _~b t 25.

Com~ 3 Coy Na c hr .sb t 750. (This coy !Wason intercept d u t i e s o p p o s i t e thej,Iaginot Line.)

Senior 8igs Intelligence Officer with.ral'my Group c.Comd Nachr Abt 26.

Coma OKH!In 7!VI.·

~omd pz Korps Nachr Abt 4 4 8 .~n charge of OKIljChi Haup tgrUPiJe "'.In charge of OtC'N/Chl in t he closing

~ta~8S, Went on PLuHSBUiIG mission to

I : : l H A l ! i F .nd thence into .dUed c a p t i v i t y ,

SUlJIDler 41) - Nov 41Nov. 41 - Jun 43Jun 43 - Dec 43Dec 4 3 - Apr . ' . , 5ilay 45

ORIGmS

HISTQ.RY OF IN 7/VI

B e f o r e the w a r cry t ., h ._>\r 'my was carr ted ' P??g::3V y _In the GermanThis organ iaa t ioou t by, OdJ! .m 7 Hor ch letts telle.

of the Germ::m kid r n ._?r~g1.nated i n t Ire cipher section

nith the Cipher 8e~~~lstry, ana ! S . r .ew ~p 1Ja1'a11e1

Before the war, In l~n of ti:: ? ! " d (O.l'0,J/Ohi).smell depar~ment !tHOrChleluSG011e was merely aJONG· and had • .L VldS comt'JlancJed by J , 1 3 jar ')1'

(Fl ' i f_.,ST) under L ? u m ~ ~ ~ ,O f fiAeu, intercept st8ti;ns

organis8~ion. Dnd w~r:s:n~:~e 8?8ffed,by ~ skeletonmenOeUVi:'lng traff' ~ , - , ~ a 1 r: m an 1 to rl l) .g the

lC of nel~huour1nb states.

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Genertll

The Uo;t:'ohla tts.t;.olle before t he r ( : l r f ~ r ~principDlly en gage d in inter'cept Lng r~ PUSSI \.in Ii 'F .um C IJ9 B.: :D,GIUM" HOI,i,IN.J9 PO I,,\~ [In 'The'1

SlilrZ...:iRlu<lND was only C~SUt,llY men l. tored. ofmein successes were gEllned ,1 t the expensel i 'H i INCE 9 HOI,lLlNj) a n d HU38Ill.

RUSSIA . t n firstThe Germans were able durlng e . . .

Ruaso·-Finnish war. to bI'el3k a llumb~r. of RUSSlan

2-, 3- and 4-figure codes •. In Oddlt~?n, ~ co~~of the RUssian 5-figure code was obtolned, ~hlSwas . handed over by tho Fiuniah Gono):'ol S t~ff ...

This p~~ticulo~.codo,wDs uB~d by the Russlons inthe first yeDr of the W[l;r' wlth GERJHANY.HOLL_IND

-.--- An exe r c ise or the Du tch .fIrmy was coveredin 1937. Very simple t e chn iyue89 p r inc ip a Ll.y

doub Le t ran spas iti. on c Lphe r s ~ were us e d , andthese could be r e a d without much diffioulty.As a result, it was possible to establish theor de r of ha t tLe of the Dutch units partiCipat-ing in the exercise down to En level.

F'RINCl!]

--Con t inuous 8n d O J iLn 11'Lean t sucoesses wereob tat ne e Jglilinst the Prench be f 'o r e the v ;; 81',

Before 1939 the Oe rma ns covered the }<'rsnchstatic wireless net which r0ldiated from P.IRISto the a t a tio rormat iona in FibNCl;. Oipher pro-cedures were continuously read, and providedvaluable Lnf'o rma t ion during the intern8tionalcrisea of 1937, spring and autumn 38 . and 1939.P',/ cannot de t aiL whLoh exact ciphers were read.

BRITAIN

-----Very li~tle success wos obtained in thereading of :Critish ciphers before the war; thisPWattributes to the very _l)oor gusHty of thepe re cnas 1 employed on the task.

General

-- 'I'he 8igs Intelligence ViC tu re pr'Ovided duringthe sarly period of the war W as good. The com-plete picture of BritiSh. French and ilutch ordersof b<.lttle w as uvailable. Changes in that ardel'could always be followed. Lb s ho u Lu be n o t e d,however, that whereas the Prench, Belvian IJndDutch pi.cture was p;,:Jrtly obtained as : result ofc ryp t 0-8n:'11y t 1e.:11 a 0hie veuo n t G, the orue r of

battle of the BrUish "Il:'my could only be bu iLtup by the result of DF information, ond theeva Lua t ion of CD II-signs D nd 0 the):' ite rns of WTprocec'Jure.

French

. In 1~39, the Germans crocked the "mob t ie »

c t.phe r whtch had r e p b c e d the _,83ce-time Cipherof the Gtatic I'renoh wirel.Jss net w ith the out-break of W(1r. .11 messaGes on this net Could ber~oa. ,1no though the, were of on administrative

or SUppl~ natU:'6 J nevertheless l1ellJed to f'i 11 inthe t ac tl c ol Plcture. For e Xam pl c, the strength

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-• • ~SRj;i;IN

OFFJ])H3IVEj,!iaY-Jun4')

~:

I

of units being set u . 1 J on the tI'l3i~in~i~~o~~dat MOUli .M~J,ON was 6stlmtlted b y ~tWti.,8 8lU

L

111y

wa to r bottles and blankotEJ. J"~ W£lIJ,t6rtLllO of

poae LbLe to uBduce fDots ~,bout t he IS , J , - e, I."

. it h th e ""Gnch lnf un ie e-<Jl'!Jlour-piercine amn Wl- . U J..I.L , . ,C J 7.,l'JSimilurly, the oonversion of, t he ?nd In ,: J I

French Cov Diva to, ,\rrnoured Divs 1.11 ~he., i.l~€)~rnorth €lost of PnHI8 waG (Hlco;ctDinod ltl JJelJ .JSl·Likcwi se the or ce r of bo t t Ie of t he Fren e h6th ,.lrrn/ on the 1I'.l:'onoh-It8liclD border' wcospeedily learnt.

Polish t'---Owing to the speedy Glevc:Jlopment of,nePolish campa i.gn , very little crYIJtoe~"~phlC,wO.rk was unde r t ak en , iI'he"I.lil1 sigs lotolll.genceinformation on t ho regroullinu of tho Polishforoes was derived from tho Polish rly '~t r o r r ic V i hieh Vi be l ieve e W,JS o01'J.'iocJ OU t i n

clear.

FR_';HCE'..i th th« o pe n tng of the offensive in May 40g

the F re nch bBg~n to use ciphors"in increasingquantities. Ttle Gi3rmons 800n felt an acu tes ho r tago of f or wor d o r yvtogr ~vhe rs and were therQ-f o r e unab Ie to unde r take much work on th o Frenchforward oi p her s. ~ S 8 result, tho forwnrd unitsconcentrated on tho two ]:'rench cipher mac hi ne s ,the B-211 Dod U-36. i?rOereS8 was aLow , but GO

a result of rUEJGJrch on two c aptu r ed 0-36 mooh tne s ,l\rmy Grouj} C was in d position, b y Jul 4iJ, toundertuk® sotisfactory reading of the trafflc.

I"ikewise it WDS impossible to b ro ak tho B-211mach Ine s in time for thDt information to be of

any va lUG. never lihelees thu re ae or ch under t akunduring this pariod was to justi f y itself l~t~r.

GRJ~,W BRI'l'iUN

-----::-nhough s Irn t Lar SUCGOS8 was ochre vod ,~gdinBt

Dutch an d BeLgtan c tpho r a , the Gur ,aOTIS stillfnileCl to b!'(;ak lOCO any tmpcr t on t Dri tish ))ro~cedu~e6.The English cryptogr~phers, COD8istingof 81X personnel from the Horchleitetolleg wereput to work ~~tBAD GOD:&8B.JRG, but in su it e of

good supply of rnoter to1, thoy f"i ilea t; uch revoany 81l00888.

I

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. of 1911 1J sllowed that cODbid-The e xp e r l e nce s ..,.

e r-abLe e xp ans i o n i n the GarmDn .,rmy cryptogrophiC

service WDS desirable. This reorganisation wa scarried out by l\It~jar H,mG. His ai m w a s not only

to increase th e crypto-aoa1ytic stoff at thecen t re , but a160 to p r o vi de r e s e r ve s of crypto-

gr ophe ns to wor k in ce r toLn key n r en s , ,Thecryptographic s ect ion th?reupon becJme ln ~e p on -

dent Dnd W08 r e o r gJni s cd ~ s Gr up p B VI of In 7·

Henoeforth it was subordinated to the r o s e rvonrmy for personnel an d ,1(,:ll.linistrDtive n](ltteloS~

but r emo ined su b or d imlted to arlOf ENi{ o f Field~rmy f o r matters of policy. It would hove b oen

more logioal to huvo made the oryptographio sec-

tion J dep ar trnen t of Ohef HN'N~ just u a ,Horchleit-

stelle wos converted to Gr up ~ e IV. Nevortheless

this ourious form of o X' gani s Dti o n p Bi a~ andenabled the eryptographic service to recruitsufficient personnel without serious interference.

Irl ge ne r a L, the objeot of In 7/VI was the

organ

Lso t t oo

Dnd oon ducc

of' o r -yptc--onu Iya

ts in

the field and in the r eo r ; tr a LnLng of cryptogl.~[l-phe r-s u nd the investigation of the security of

Gemmm oiphe r s ,

It was aLso felt tha t in c e r t ain cr t t Loul,

region8~ on ex t r a c nyp t o-una Ly t tc effort ah ou Ld

be enf'o rced , ro this end, t.he II.ussi,Jn ReferDt

of In 7/VI waa de tach e d to the Honc h Le t t s t e Ll.eLbTZ~N9 while speci.Jl orypto-~n[llytic sections

for Br i ti s h tr af f i c we r e dO G~ che d to the Horchkp

~E_;BOHMand th e KomrliL'lndeur for H o r ch t r up p e n 4i.n ~,THENS (Sea 8IR 1704p pCl):'Cl 45~ and _~j,Jpendix 6.)

General--PW C8n odd J.it tie to SIR 1335 an d 17!)~. In

7/VI in 1942 cons is ted of tile fa l l o w ing Roferote:

Referat Z, Hp tm IGRBRtiGGEN

English Rc I'e r ab. Obel'inspak~or ZIL1:~IN~ withfO):'WDl"d so c t ions in; NORTH

-:,FRIO" under Kl"iegsvGI'\'1~llt;ungs-inape kt or IURI\;S

,~'r}'::".;NS, undo r Ob ItXN~.J8Clli~

.L "RI8 p under rn a jo r H~N'rZc~B.mG.jN~ uoder oberiDS'J,lektorl'FIrZER

F r e nch Re Ce r a t ~~onderfiihl'er ~ U H N~ wi th s ub-Qect~ons dOGllng with Swiss~

S p on lsh, Portuguese Dnd Brbz-ilion traffic.

Reg RLl t B.iILOVITCH

K~le~sverwDltung8inspektorD""TTJ 'uNN (rJetClohed to LOrZl: : :1T)

lip tm Dr FI ••L. . ;

Oblt Dr V_ .UCx

Ba Lkan Re fora t ;

Russinn Referat:

HOlian RCferot:

~,gon t a HeferD t :

H o l l e r i th Re f t. era:Kriegsverwaltungsrot

dCH_;lli~

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HORK O F

HOLI .£RITHIlJJF:"" 'RJT

NL4THEMATICALRt:F" ';R .~T -

6.l'ICOM/I-78

TrDining Refer3t:obe rin.spo k t or KUlir,1

Linguistic Roforot.

. .sonclorfu11ver KOHLc_m

SonderfUl1l'er (z) ST~nNBjRGAmor Lean Refers t :

lIlo thenm tica J.. H efG l'o t:so n derfuhrer D r PUTSCH

Reorg~1n i8ll t io n of RefeN! t ).'1 'i'l;'5Cij dIn 19!:i2;theliiGt11erit!ltic!.~i Re~er[lt h~d expunde \

to such an extent thot three sectlons we~e created

au t o f it. Sonderfuhrer ~...lINB]lI.W cm~ the me t~e~maticians who had been working wLth h1 m on M-2J9 Iand the strip cipher 8epBX'o ted to form t~ e !Ameliccn Referot while tlo separate se~tlons.W?reformed, one under Oblt UIDERS for the l~wes t 19[1-tion of cipher seeurtty, and one under Wm Dr .DaRING for the investLgDtion of secret teleprlnters.

The Holleri th ReferDt WDS commanded by BIJU1'[lt

SCH.;:;NLE. The dOllDI'l:iment wa s e quippe d with allkinds of Germon machines and also with all klndsQ f coptured French hollerith equipment. This dept

proved Lnv aLuau Le in the investigDtions of uno Len ror difficult cipher t ec hn ique s • .il lot of time andmDnpower wa s s8ved~ particularly in the sorting outof trDffic and the ascertaining o f parollelismsand i n tho calculation of recurring differences.The exploitDtion of hollerith ue thoda was pe r tic u-larly favoured by BOUI'at SCHULZ~9 who in civilianlife was an employee of the hollerith firm Berlin

Lankwi tz.

BouJ:'ot Dr PETSCH colloc ted tor.;e t he r in thisseo t Lon the best av a t In bLe mathetnat Lca L 0):'8in8.

In this section all unbroken treffic from theNational Sections was investigated so long 38 itWGS nocessary to achiove Dn inroad by purelyonolyti901 methods. As soon as a technigue forbreaking iJ IJartioul;:lr cipher was evolved the itemwas hnn de d bGck; for further work to the specificNational Section e once rned , In some cases mathe-matical specialists were attached to the NationalSection to work on tho vor t ous na bLcna I procedures.

A further 18rg8 fie Ld of work of the ReferD t

PIETSCH lay in the Lnve s t Lga t ton of t110 se~urLtyof the current Gorman cipher prooedures and in thoassessment of discoveries that were illvu'lYs beingbro~gh ~ forw8rd. The c ompr onn.s ing of the seoul' i tyof ~ e Lphe r uSUC11~y resulted from exceeding the

?oy s sofety mar gin for trf.:lDsmission, thus creo t-~ng dept~ or by obhcr breaches o f s t ano a r o o pe r c t L ngt.ns t ru o t Lons ,

In ?rder to provide some check on tho use ofG~rmon ci phe ra and to~»):'ovide the L{ofer·t I } C 'T ''-'1W 1 th t' ~..... .L~ <:)\.1 1

_ ne ••neccss"l~y.m~tOI'i[ll~ tho NC1chr Aufkl_.bt/Ch~f H ~ust u Bd~ wos set up in Berlin in Nov 41.ThlS unlt ~DS to be under thd comd of tho Comd ofIn 7/VL r ~ ? O ooy s of this unit wore to ac t osnOl'l!l0l hoLdLng cays for In 7/Vl. while the third W"S

~n ~ntercept coy which v}ol~kea within the field o n do~s~~:es-.~~mY.for collGcting.m.Jteri~11 tocheck up

u urlty of Gcrm~n cLphers. However, ot tho

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&no of Feb 42 this unit was dissolvc;d owing to

pel'SU!1l).f;l SbOI'bogs. 'rhus tb~ c,on.trol, o~ ?~Ph~isecuri ty ueODrllO once mora lJ~0 .1CS~O~Slblll Y", 'the F i e l d . \ rtJiY, C1MSpNlsU1l11ty wh Lch was ne vo r

fu lly under t aken •

ziS [1 result of the seolJrity inveSUgQtion of

Germon ciphers .md the relJorting on new discoveI'ieS~tho Referot P.C.,~TSCH naturally be g an to aevelop DOW

o iphe r t o chn Lqu e s of ilia own. In 1942, however" ,the development of t.he ae techniques was htwded over

h_0l0li/Ghi. 'rhe main inv0sti[l"otlon ?lJrl'~ed out byReferdt PI~T8CH wos 0 continu~l onqull:'Y lnto thesecurit;y of the GermiJn cipher machine, the enigmawhich higher authority hod been worried about for

some time. The COL1se of this anxiety loy in the \fact tj1,';lt it had bean established before the wa rtho t CZEOHOSLOVAKIA in oolloborD !;i'on wi th FRANCEhad begn able to read traffic enciphered' by theenigmo maoh ine Gold model wi!;hout plug ODd socketc orme o t ions). Eviden cs on th is sub je c t W08 C ap- Ibursd during the occup3tion of OZ~CH0810V~KIAduring 1938. Morc,over in PQLAIID in 1939 the c18[l1've r s ton.i cf 8 WT message vws found; this rne s aa g ehad been transmitted from ~ German cruiser inSpanish wuters during the Spanish Civil War endhad been transmitted by the enigma offLcers' ,.-cipher . A n exact proof' wOO the r these successeswere due to compromise or to crypto-anEllytic workwas never forthcoming, despite detailed investi-

I gat ion. As this instiJnce o f compromise 8ffectedthe stecker Enigma investigations were corl'ied outthoroughly. The Polish c tphe r Hi~ at VVIOIlER W3S

ae ar c he d in 1939. In subsequent years even 1943orrd 44 Gen Fi:iLLGIi:B;J:L ordeI'ed the reint-eI'I'ogat.lonof ~o~ish orYJiltGgrophers to check this point. Nopost t tve conf t rma t t on was uch Leve d ,

Nevertheless th~se investigations showed thatthe safety margin of the' enigma had to be reuucedfrom 5'J,IJ?J to 20,1)')1)letters on a day's cipher

(a~ exper ience w~ic~ resul~ed Ln the daily cipher,which at ~he beg inn Lng of t he Russian campaign W GS

very heDVl~Y bur dene d , being split up into two orthree P?rtlona). AS the final r e su lt of theenigma investigations described above the valueof carry in~ . ?ut t.nvo s t igEl t ions in t a m~chine oiphe ro f enemy natlone was recognised ana the p r o c e s sundertaken.

Until 1942 the work of this section 'liDS notf u l l y exploited and only 3 s m n l l boginners' c o u r s e

was in },)rogress.

draw ~~t!~tf~;ttngt~t this juncture, therefore, to1 toe acute shortage in cry' to

ana y ~c personnel which the German ,Ugh CO:;;\"la~d

~~~~~~g ej~~~Jar~ t ~~El found t;~".,~ the prac t ice' ofare aa did not org itps of cr~l:!!;o-ant.11'y8ts to f~eyintelligence p t;Be~f p ro vi ae ade quate signalsgetting further ar lcu

for1, y as the front lines were

avwy rom BERLIN. .

AS a result t he Cor d f funits were allowed't ,) so o::ward interceptanalytic teams. rWOod~~e~te thelr own cry~to-

lfflCultles we re encountered

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RUSSIAN

EEFERAT

8.TIGOM/I-78

'. 1 a lack of technicalin this connection: first y:n~r into the crypto-knowledge. and secondly the 1 . Wh~were untrust-ane Lyt to service of p~rsonn~ of view. In twoworthy from the seCUI'lty ~olnt Iwere unenrthedcases in I(NA 2 in SMO~NS~perso~n~ result of this

who were guilty of eSP10TIlDlge. 1o-aDL~lYtLc person-a security vetting for a or PDel wos introduced.

t 'lytic units hadOnoe the forward cryp O-OD.. orward

be eo ae t up and at toohed to the vaI'lOUS f .0 il1VCS-llyn units it was agreed to allot to them ~hh Idtlotion of forward Bnd 1 o f C troffi~ WhlC coubegsolved in the field. In 7!VI remoLDed, howevcr1

responsible for 011 6rnlY crYllto-antllytic WO~k ~ndooncen trG ted on the most d ifficuH and unso ve

pr oce dur e s •

.As a personnel estl'lblis.hment for these forwardcrypto-I.malytic units it WDS found necessary tohove two or three linguists and one to three m~the-ma t Lc Lan s , aucn personnel were trained Dt a Slx

weeks' oouz-ae by In 7/VI. 201) suer: crypt o=an a lystswere turned out· they inoludedMa ;')01' Dr HSNTZE, .

Oblt Dr VAUK,Obit djDERS and ObIt SCHUBERT . Theresults of this work in 1941 ana 1942 was to enableIn 7!VI to conoentrote on research into more diffi-

cult procedures.

This dept hos had a rather curious history inthat it was detached to Chef H N W Horchleitstelle/LOTZENbefore the outbreak of hostilities withRUSSIA. Under tho leadership of Kriegsverw[lltungs-Ln apek t. o r' DETTMANN, and for a time of ProfNOVOPASCHENNYhis section achieved considerableinitial success until spring 1942. The 5-figurecode so qu Lred by t he Germans un ti 1 the Russian-

.Finnish. war wa a still used by the Russians. Anadditional copy of this procedure waa also capturedby the Germans. Through the allocation o f 0011-

signs and of indicator groups it was possible toestablish the entire Russian order of battle aridthe loc3tion of strategical reserves. This wasadditional to intelligence gained by read Lng thecontent of tr'8ffic. On 1 Apr 42 the Russiansintroduced a new 5-f'igure code. The transitionfrom the old to the new code was, however, sofaulty that within the r ir a t week it was vpos a LbLuto cstoblish 2,000 groups of the new code. Lndeed ,it was possible o s this t i.mo to leave the decodingof this pr ooeduro to the cryptographers of thefor~Qrd lIyt .units. The Russions grDduolly improvedthelr sccurlty, howoverj Dnd in spring 1943altered the LndLcn ton group system ond split uptho oode into various front sectors. As G resultit was n cceaaary to oo.Ll.ec t all the 5-figurc-traffic at LOTZENand to coll in tho assistance of~he hollor t th dept of In 7/VI. Oniy thus couldthe necessary depth on 0 day's traffic be 8chieved.Tho quantity o~ traffic rood decneeaed considerobly.2-1 3- and 4-flgurc; traffic W3S continuously dc codod•

. crypto-on~lytic work on portisan traffic wa scorr~od on by the forward Byl units in t be ar eo,Por tlcubr success wos ach Levcd in the SHOL.:.;NSYnroa V ii it h tho orri Vel 1of spcoiolis t crypt ogr811hGrs.

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BRITISH~.",R_4T

REFERAT

FRANCE

(

s 1943 nowever- when K,NJ\I t was on ly in the summer a 9 . tog I'ophers p

6p with Oi;llt SCHUBERT in C~DI'gO_of k t~~.a~r~be trafficwas committed to anti-porhson war . ccessfullyb e twe en MOSCOW-and tho portLaon s wua s u

read.

This dept under Oberinspektor ZILUI1AN wasoas ie ted in its early d ay s by tho successes o~fforward cryptographic teams. These suc~ess ~were restricted puroly to forward tochnLques.

In spite of continuol efforts, Obc~i~spek~orerZILLMAN was unable to brook into the BrltLsh ~LphmchfuB {Typex). SeverGll British cip~or moc1hln~swore cop~ E1uring the sunme r c amprn gn ~f 94,but with 011 of them tho wheels weI'e mlssmg.

itshowever,

The general success of British Referat ce osed ,thorefore, in the s um m e r o f 1942 o f tor the interceptcoy

underObH

SEEBOHMWQS cap tured in NORTHAFRI~A.

Despite the report of an NCO t? the crypt?-anolyt LO

section who escaped thDt all-clpher material hadbeon destroyed g it had o bvi ous ly p ro ve d poss~ble f o rthe British to recognise from other ev tdence whichBritish procedures hod b aen l'elJd and which had not.In consequenoe the department was reinforeed inorder to w1n baCk the lost ground. Up to Jun 43 thel o et ground had no t been rocovered ond successesGfter that date ore not known to PW.

From summer 1942 the Germans c oncen tra ted onwatching exercise traffic in th e BRITISH ISLES f r o mK N . A 5 in ST. GERMAIN and the HarcM telle H£RGEN.HOI'ohatell$ BERGEN also watched Swedish trofficg butapart from unimport~nt police wireless there was verylit Ue army traffic to give depth enough to break theHagelin machine which was used. This work wos direotedby Oberi~8pektor PFITZER.

As D result o f watChing the exereise traf f i c inENGLAND it was still not p o s s i b l e to gain any assist-BDce i n winni ~g bock the lost ground in Mediterraneontraffic; (of SIR 1]04, poras 61 to 64). It wos never-theless :possible to gain some Lnf'o rrna t Lon on the t ro tn-i ng und order o f bottle for the tnvus t on , but to wh a textent this wos achieved by crypto-Dnolytic methodsis 0 ma t ber which PWcannot ariawe r owing to hisdoparture to the Russ iOTI front.

Thi s.s Bcti on l os t cl lot of its Lrnpor banc e orto r

the Co~:pDl.gn of 1940. It concentrated on watching thec omnunt c a bLona of the VICHY Government wh icn WDS

supposed to inform the Germans of their cipher procod-ure e , Broaches of,regulntions committed by the. Frenchwere reported to t he Disarmament Corrmission at

WIESBADEN and rectified. The retention of capturedFrench documents and t~ further investigation of theF.ronoh cl:phe~ r~1O~hinesC-36 and B-211 justified itselftrlthoE t he lTI;tLDl de Goullist \ I J T trDffic in NORrrH

~~RI~A for ~94.::-43 wa s unde r takcn through these me t;hods.t w. e POSSl bleto r eud al l the s e techniques 0t the

~94~tP'~u~Cl~~~tf~~y~he success wns maintainod during

•

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AMERICANREFERAT

. h P rtugucse and ~wisa'rhe monitoring of 8p.::m~s 9 °nch Rafornt

tr o ff i c whi ch WOR coo~di~nted by the F ~ e I Gddi ti o ndid not yield any st8l'tlLng dovoloprrBn s. . l _ 1 . erein the winter of 1942-43 two BrozUisn techn.HJ~~~ ' I I I

re~d by this section. One of lhasa, although 1

co~tent was uninteresting, revetllCd one im~ol·tDnt 1'~Hl:,

ture' this message wos p os ae d olong the llDk BR-lZI.uw"~sHiNGTON and trovcllea by A.merican ciph~r to o n nAmerican border wireless station; the~ce It ~~s trLns-feI':t'8d to Erazilian cillher. The BrozllifHl cl~her WGS

broken but the content of the message W OS unlmportant.Nevertheless the effort to utilise the success to Cl'f'tOk

Amer icon cipher foi led.

This dept was crested in the win tor of· 1941-42 outof the MGthenwticol Refel'aL At the st8rt the work ofthis dept wos exoeedingly difficult owing t? t~e vostsize of the Amel'iQBn wireless net land the dlfflCUlty

of sOl'ting au t the numerous links and C ip~ r pr?ceduresemployed. After some weeks or der WVlS ob t e tne o ln read-ing the 01.111 8i gn S and Lnd te 0 tor groups [1 nd 8 at art,made in breoking some of the ciphers. The dept mon it or=ed in ternal Americon traffic and also tr8ffic from theUNITED STATES to EUROPE and AFRICA. The Germans knewtho t the AMERICAN GOVernmen thad bough t the Hagelinmaohine which had f'ormerly been offered in voin to theGERMAN Government. An immediate investigotion of thispr oce du re W E lS therefore en trus ted to Refera t PIETSCH.A t temp ts to procure 0 model of the machine 1 hON ever,proved unsucoessfu 1. The bulk of rn a t s r taL that GOCU-

muLs te d grew 60 big, however, that a ape c La L team inthe American Referet wa s entrusted with the investiga-tion of this machine. By caI'efulestablishl1lent ofaddresses Bnd signatures the first inroads into themachine were obtained. Additional assistance was obtain-

ed through signals intelligence on trn order of bottleof the American Army in EURDPE; this ~nabled specimenmessages bo be aasurre d , However pit was even tua llyrecognised that the main cipher procedure used by theAmericans W8@ the strip method whereby 25 Variouslyo:ronged alphabets were vertle811y loid out one olong-s~de the other. In the workshop of In 7/VI me chan Lca LGllds,were constructed a nd with the help of the hollerithsec t ton and by noting the addresses an d signatures thevarious alpha be ts ,were r ecr'ea ted. From spring 1942parts. of the Amer icc» traffic were read, particularly

traf flO from WASHINGTON to WEST AFRICA, NORTH AFRICAand IRELAND. Lo tterly traffic from YvASHINGTON toBRITAIN and WASHINGTON to CAIRO WoS 0180 read.

It was 31s~ suspoc~od in the Amer Loen RefoI'st tootthere was,a dco tme t ro llnk from LONDON to WASHINGTONr e Laye d ,V1C! IREL.~ND. This link VIDE wa t ched in itspI'oJectlo~ on tho WEST coast of NORWAYand ne a n NARVAon the BALTIC. The experiment proved unsuccessful andthe s ou rce of this theory 1s unknown to PW.

the' With t~G erriva~ of j\.mcric~n troops in BRITAINin ~~i exe r ct ae troffl c was can tLnu ous Ly rood. plN notes1 . S r es pe ct who t he has olreDdy observed with .~~g~~? t? the Wl,,-209, the t it is no t su rpr La tng t he t

o lCd1S . read when mLs takea in the use of cipherswere ms e 1n every three meaaage a ,

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1704 Work on TurkishPW cannot odd much t? SIR: .• certain [Jmount ot

trafflc w -a s fla t very profltable, 0 h _ t to thoarmy tr(lff~C wes in to roe p ted ,0 long, t e ~~~thewS tch-ASGEAN SEA, but its content,wOS unlmpor sa owing toing of Turkish traffic contlnued~ ~~wever~ndesirable toTURKEY'S uncertain pout i.c a.l Some 1 w~s '-n th~

, I- . t -t The watch crypto-l:HlGlytlODllY 11 ue r rup 1. , 1r ian t r [lf fie wascase of HungiJrian~ Rum()t;Uln an d Bu g~~l, 5 of the Russumdropped owing to the prlor manpower calm

fron t .

This section spcci~1ised in watching Ital~an ISS

traffic which was very trisecu re and most of WhlCh V i

reod by the GermDns, especially traffic ~rom ITj~~Y t~NORTH AFRICA. In 1941 Hptm Dr FIALL.t·\ p o i.d a vt s t t t tRONIE nobifiecl the Italians of' their weokness and rogues -cd g~ e ate r s e cur i ty. In spring 1942 Hptm RIGGI of theItalian Army paid a return visit to In 7/V!and WO~

enligh t ene d as to the German use of' hollerith maChln~~.The renewed request to the Italian for greater. 8':7

CUrl. y

in their di.phe r mennods fa LLed, JUS t a ~ the Hallans

were unable to set up their own hollerlth section.In 7/VI ha d not, in any dase, the Dutho)?ity to put. 8YJYpres~ure on the italians, moreover, the general oplnlonwas that the rtaiian cipher department under oen GAMBAwas nob competent enoufllh to institute changes; (in -matters of age nb s ' ci.phel's the Italian s e ct i on was more

e r r ic ien t ) i !t wa s assumed by In 7/VI that Germal_l ,troop mdvethen bs in IiFRldA were be trayed to the B:nblsh

by the insecure HoUah wireieas ~

WO RK O F ThiS section dealt with investigation of theSECRET ae cu ri ty of German machines only, since there were noTEWPRINTERenemy machines available ro r testing. In the s ummer o fREFERAT 1942~ the SIEMENS secret telellrinters T S2 a and b were

in uae, and T 52 c was in the course of distribution.

These machines were developed by the Heer8sv:,affenamtunder the di re cti on ,o f Dr IJEBKNECHT of' Wa Pr~f 7 .

They were manufaotured by the firms of SI~MENS andLORENZ, were checked f o r secur it y by OKViJ/Chi and foundsatisfactory. Nevertheless, in the summer of 1942,when these machines we re tested by Uffz Dr DORING ofInspektion 7/VI~ it appeared that the cipher could beeasily cracked. This was principa lly due to operatorssending more than one communication over the samemessage cipher. This mistake frequen t1y arose overlong distance cormnmtce tions , In the autumn of' 1942,it was also recognised that the T 5 2 09 despite theal tera tion in the ind LV LduaL mes aage enc iphermen t ,could not be 'OBde secure. This was exceedingly awkward,as 1t was the 18 tes t ava iloble seere t teleprin tor and

was aLs o used in communications from G.&RMA.NYone utr al co untr ie s . A lte r ati o ns were undertaken whichled to the T 52 d. Owing to the fact the t there was ashortage of spo re parts and industry could not deliverthe ne w machines ~ufficien tly speed Uy, the High Command(~ar~elY out of wlshful thinking) began to consider therm.egivings of Inspekt ion 7/VI as unwarran ted, since theenemy was not in a posi tion to tap lines as was donoi n the ~ecurity checks by the German personnel. Thisaomfortlog ~hought was, however, dashed in 1942-43when an entlr~ cellar for tapping telephone and tele-printer t~art'lC vms raided in PARIS; this installationwas t e cb nl c al l y e x ce l l e n tl y equipped. Early in 1943Wm Dr DORING established by furthor investigations that

BALKAN

~Fl£R1I!

ITALIANR E F . H : : : R A T

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d that single messagesthe T ~ d was not sect,lre. 3D n this W8IY: each 1e t tel'coulCItJe solved. He d~d it ~ trical impulses 1(Jhio11was characterised by f~~e e C . or minus (positivecould be indicated as elt~er ~1~~e8e irrrvulses DCiRINGor negative). On the. bOS1S 0 av tn 'ositive or

differentiated between lett~rs hi: g ~\. ve letter pre-ne ga tive qua Li ties. An ~nc lphere~ pos \~b lishe d the

served its posit~ve q~BlltY'h H~Vl~g ~~ was possibleplus/minus re Ia tl onah i.p of t e ex, b ess8geto feed a suspected clear w or d through he m 10until it fitted correctly. Thenoe the ,lt1essagem~~~ inbe broken. As a result, til new alteratlon wo~ .the T 52 d from which the T )2 e omerged,. WhlCh wa s

regarded until the end of ttie war as secure.

Other exioting cipher machines, theSchlussel-zusatz (sz) 40/42, and the secret telepri.ntel' (SFM T)

' 4 3 , were more satisfactory and werG regard~d assecure. These were used in wireless teleprl nt e r

traffic.

This sect Lon was oorrmcnd e d by ObIt LUDERS and wase s tab Lt ahed in autumn 1942. It was responsible notonly for testing the security of ciphers but a-Lao forinves tigs bing numerous inventi ons w hieh were paa aedbaok from troops in the field. These inventions dIdnot prove very profitable. They showed the Lamentableignorance, of the field army on cipher matters. ,As aresult, speCialists from Inspektion 7/VI visited thesignals school at HALLE to give lectures on this sub-ject. Otherwise this dept remained inactive9 workingparallel to its parent bOGy under Dr PIETSCH.

LUISON OF The collaboration between the crypto-analytic dep t sINSPEKTION of other services was slight because, in PW's words,

7/VI WITH the enemy used different cipher techniques in differon tOTHER ORYPT-arms of the ee rvt oea, With obscure enemy pro~eduresaGRAPHIC different dep ts carried out research and exchanged in-AGENOIES formation until it was possible for one servi.ce to

recognise the Cipher as its own when it would take ewerall respons~bility. In Jun 429 Inspektion 7/VI under-took a c ons Lderab Le volume of Hollerith work for theNavy until that dept built up its own Hollerith section.YJhere f'undamen ta I difficulties were encountered it VlDS

usu811y customary to consult OKW/Chi, which was theleading au thor ity ,

_ . 1 1 1 1! IORK OF

CIPHER8.ECURITYREFERAT

Q§E OF MECH- _. T~e collabOI'?tlon between Inspektion 7/VI andl;NIC.~L AIDS OK"'I/Ch~was re~a tlVely close. 01;11/0hi never had a1 M IN VVI Holl~rlth.sec~lon at its disposal but developed its own

macht ne e lds In a \1' :0 rksh?p. By the end of 19421 itappeared that the Hollen th section of In 7/VI did notmeet all demands. It was, therefore, decided to en-large the.Referat SCHEN 'KE (the Hollerith section) withthe t echni.c a'l adVice of the wo.rkshop dept of OKV;l/Chi .so t~'1 t it WOU~d be in the po s r ti on to c onet ruot 'specl~l mechanlcal aids for crypto-'·n~ll" eteto Ou'l.ld these l~;Dchllmic"l aidr> , "L .y.., w.It \'I<lS :plannedties so the t the 1 '. U lD,Guffl.clcntly groat guc:nti-

The fil' Y co.u d be used wlth ttlefoI"lulf! "yn unitsin Aug 43. I~~ ~a~hlne pl~n~e d. Was t a have been t e s ted •ma c h rne was deat .e~a~e OL l.t 18 not known to PW. The

a speed of 10,01)~n~o t~ search fo~ parallelisms und had

known aa the Lichtabtas~rn:~~~~~~?)· The machine w aa

\

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RESEARCHPLANS

DEVELOPMENTOF GER lv "..AN

CIJ:-'HERPROCEDURES

The nsed for using more machines in cr~pto- ch-analytic work revealed the development of n i.phe r tenique during the war. It was to be expected that theenemy would place the Germans before more and moredifficult cipher problems as hostilities dev~loped.It was considered desirable to set up a speCla~ re-search section under Dr PIETSOH in May 4 3 . ThlS sec-tion was to be responsible for research into allmathematical and 811alytical problems and was to be .p18ced at the disposal of the various notional sec~lons.The dept was also to draw up a central cryptographlcreference book based on the experimen t s of the seve'r a L

eecttons , which

W8S

to be a va LLabLe

for the wholeorgan iss t ion. This plan was never br ought t a fru iti on.

In Aug 42, Inspekt ion 7/VI was ordered to colla-borate with In 7/IV in the setting up of [I dept forthe developmen t of cipher procedures for the fieldarmy. It was considered undesirable that the pe r aonneLfrom Inspektion 7/IV and I.D 7/VI should work. toge the rin tha t they might be unduly influenced by one anothe r ,Inspektion 7/VI did not agree with this viewpoint andstated that the personnel responsible for developingciphers must be in continuous contact wi th the latestachievements of cryptography in order that 8 foolproofprocedure was evolved. This viewpoint VI 8S not recog-

nised, and In 7/VI posted Sdr Dr FRI OKE, Uffz KEHRENand Uffz JESSE to In 7/IV. This was necessary becausethe field army had no ciphers Ln reserve at all.

• .,From MO:: 42, Dr. FRICKE dev~loped the RASTERschluss~l Whlch.was lntroduced in t. o the army in 1944.It was lnte~estlng to note that the basis for ther:u~STERSo~l~ssel was a oorre spend Lng techn igue usedIn t08 Brltlsh Army. The flows in this pracedurewerer'ee t Lt'Led so as to make the Germon version foolproof.

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APPENDIX

Jg8T O F CIPHER PH O OEmIREg

B ROK:.!iN BY TEt; GERMANS

(This is D tX'[lnI51oticn of o document. i? PW'sp o s s e s s i o n . H e cannot give Bny addltloDa~informs t ion to who t has aIres dy b~en I?ent toned

in the body of the report. The 21st 18

incomple te i.n PWIS op Ln ion)

1.. USA

F MCArmy f ie Id code

Div f i e ld code

M 209s t r i p system

2. GREAT BRITAIN

Syk<D~ snnasyllable cipherCodexPhantom codeWar O f f i ce ci p he r (latte r l y no t s o l ved)

S l i d e xTransposition cipherD o u b l e tr ans po si ti on ci phe r

.PIClyfoir

3. RUSSIA

2-1 3- and 4-figure techniquesSignal tables5 figure traffic reoiphered wit h "B10k no t s"NK VD - L o f C traf~icPartison ciphers. Double transposition and re-oipbered

figure keys.

4. FRANCE

TS ~ (r e ci p he r e d COde)4-flgure code - reciphel'ed with squoreDiagonally read single square

C-36 and B-211 machines

5. BELGIUM

Ree iphered 3-fi gure code.

6 . HOLLAND

Ployfa i .r

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