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F IN AL IN TE RR OG A1 'IO N O F-- -----ltOM!I-21

WAGHTlAEIS 'rEH 01 '' 1' 0 BUGCI iJCH tOICH/IN. 71YI AND o K W L c n r l ; ,

. Att[lohed is a report on the final interrogatio:n of BUGGISCHcarrie9 .out by Maj or Bundy at OberurfJel on 25th AugU6 t, 1945.

Ttl.e'report supplements and conoludesthe notes in TICOM!r-58and 1,.:64, arid also covers questions raised by BUGGISCH'swrittenwork.' ,

.~.

DISTRIBUTIONBritish1. Director2. D.D.33 . D . D . 44. D.D. (N..S ' j 5. D.D.(M.W .6, D. D. (A. S.7-8. A.D.(C.C.R.) (2)9. Lt. Col. Leathem

1D. Mi'J,jorMorgan .

11-12.13.14-15.16.1 7 .

TICO!!18. Ohairman

19-20. ~~..AA_C.(.z.)_21. Cdr. Bacon22. Cdr. Maokenzie2).. Cdr. Tandy24. Lt. Col. Johnson25. Lt. Cdr. l.fansou26. Major Sear,.an27. Lt. VanG828. Capt. cowan29. Lt. Fehl30-31. Ticorn File~ (2)

Copy No. J . f)NO. of Pages 1 5

OP 20-~ (2) (via 1'c. Pendergrass)G~2 (na Lt. Col. Hillslil)S:S.A. (2) ( v : V . , l . Major seaman)Dl.rector, S.Ln. DSFEl' (via Lt.col. Johnson)col. l#wifl Powell

Addi tion.e.l--~"-.--.-32. Mr. Twinn33. Lt. Col. P1'i tch6rd

. .,I

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FIN.A.L INTERROGATION...2I-_._-WACHTMEISTEROTTOBUGG1SCH(IN 7/lf1 c t J ' J 1 J OKW!CHI)

AT 9BERD2J1: j.E ._ ;_L ,5 AUGU~ 945

( 5" hi wa s a m9.Ghine designed by MENZERin1. M40. See 1- d. T:ts "1940 and-never put into llB e) .'. t . oy linder withThb was mechaniGal in operatlon. I was a .. t t d byabout 30" slots for cipher alphabets. These slots. wer:a~~ ~e~teI'.a hand crank and might mOve from a to 3 slots after , 1

The plain te~t alphabet was mi.xed and was in a fixed h07'J.zonU:-slot. The plain text was enciphe.red by reading from thJ.s plaln t totext alphabet to the cipher al!3ha.bet which had been brought ns,'t,it. Buggisch described the prinoiple as that of the "THITTHEIMTABLE, a historic cryptogr~phic principle from tl,e 17th Century( = U.S. "po Iya Lphabetri.c"},

Tlilcmoti@n was governed by 3 (or possiblY 4) wh~Gls wi~hpositive and negative lug settings as :with the Hngel:mmaoh:l.lle,The motion was the BUIll of the positive settings, subject to anoverlap ]1Irinciple ail with M 209. Buggisch did not Imow the c~cleof the motion whe

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'. , -d' ing the Crcats. Buggl.sch aaLd the Germans had ooned.dez'c eqUJ..PP. 19.chi :d a lot .about getting a sectionand sent back to sea ~-. t"hr ne," Ac Wllly he had been exposed '-'uiC'l,.l"

J, "er aG Or four tl-.- . "'- "-L.Jnothing of him. sinc~. !DOn.~. Bugg~sch bad Been

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t tent were to beno fH'::Curi'by content. Messages of any seour'a ? con t knenciphered twice by the irK!!machine (but. Bugg~sch ~oes no lr.o;'.a""h th' . f t) Th t!G" nachlne was a "Vwe er th~s was ever done ~nao. e . . . ttaohedropped everywhere, having been replaced on a few milltary aneb, by the military model.

Worry was also e:,,:nre8sed over the fact that the militarYl 't' ~"".S" h V ryang so u 10.""",machane had not been changed throughout t. e war. .a . .were di~cussed, Buggisoh himself approving of the OK L a.eYloe ofEnigms. mill. The idea of LUCKENFULIERWALZEas also approved.

d) Hand Systems. There were no significant results atthe conference on this subjeot. It was agreed by a l.L that NS 42and 'l'S 42 (double and single "playfair") were insecure, and theintroduction of RASTERwas approved.

In general, the meetings were exchanges of infoTma t ion ratherthan being bound t o come to a decision.

12. "FAU, WICHER"(:rolish solution. of Enign:a..J_ Thi.s was thename gaven to the definite proof received in 194.3 or 1944 that thePoles had read Enigma up to the outbreak of war and for some timeafter, in P O h ~N D and. later in FF~ltCE. BUggisch thought that"WICBER"was the Polish ocver name for the solution operation.

Buggisch began by relating an interesting prelude. In 1939 andearly 194Q IN 7/IV (as it was then), specifically PIETSCH, STEINBERG,and one BORM(who was later re Leaaed from. the cf'f'Lce for reas onaunknown) had done theoretical work and had COWElto the eonc Lus.i.onthat the doubled enc.ipherment, of indica tors -was not secure, Therewere, rcoz-eover g a few sea ttered bits of evidence found in the Polishcipher office at WARSAWthat the Poles had possessed a section ofextraordinary security. Enigma solution, however, was pooh-poohed.As a result of the theoretical work alone, IN 7/IV was able to forcea change in the indicator system early in 1940.

Very much later, in 1943 or 1941;., two Polish officers, a Lt.Col. and a MajGr, made aome disclosures at a German PW camp inHA1IJiBURG.s a result PIETSCHwas sent to interrogate tihem, andPIBTSCHlater told Buggisch about thei:l: general story without thedetails unfortunately. It boiled down to a c.Lear claim that thepoles had rea~ ENIGMA for several years before the war (Buggischthol1g~t that lt was very bad usage, giving depths, which oaused mostof t~s. rather than the indioator system). L-\.fter the short poli.Bh~ampa1.gn the pOl~s had. moved to FRANCEand had probably worked on1.t there. .Soluhon had stopped, howevez-, and Buggisch could sayonly that l~was an abrupt ending $ as if caused by a change i.n thesystem, Th~s he mturally aaaumed ( ' > . 1 : 1 presumably did PIETSCH) wasthe change an the indicator system.

PIETSC?Hold Buggisch that he did not bother to get the detailsof the pallah iJ8thad. Buggisch himself rei t.e.rat.ed his belief thatit.caql~ have been done with C I. l'l!"ge Hollerith ;oocillne conp Lex' asone r.retnod, but he had n~ver hear-d any sugges taon th'l.t the Poles had~~c~ ~~ alpar~tus. Buggisoh also recalledOthat the officers saidhiu G ~adl.ng work.ers were. two very YOLmCJ' . :nen rcath atuden rs andt s was Linked .th th "" ,. Wl e oapt ure of two auch men in Y l A F . , c U W in 1939.They webrenot traced so far as he knew. Buggi.sch did not know theirnamea , ut thonP1t PTJJ."'TS(!H wou1.rl.

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13. O~Chi Organization. :auggischwas unable to add. ar:Y new~ . t' . d IDemb ar sh ~p o fnames or to throw nevi light on the orgarn sa a.on an -.1 dth I, ., . . """"W- H A gave a detal. e_..;I l.ngUJ_st~c aect aona as gaven by HE RZ,L I:DJ '"' ,t. .. f .... ,," ....hematical Hafara.account of the growth and development oi t. e ~" .'The origins of the ma.thRef'erat were in the old ni 7/rv in,

1939-194-0. Itwas then concerned with aecur ity of Ger.nan syste,~.only (wit.neas the job on E J l . T I G i J A l and had about a dozen r o o . therre.t:LC~a~sincluding PIETSCH, STEHffiERG, B ( ) H M : (see supra] later released).: .' ev; DEl\I"FFER,HILBURG, and LUZIUS. :MOS~ of thesew~re drawn ~raln.th tstatistical offices of Lnaur'ance conpard.ea, BuggJ.sch had hr s ill'Scontact witb. this group at the end of 1940 as a z-eaul,t of his workon the C36.n~7/VI was set up at the' beginning of 194-1,and ama.th referatcreated. The grouping was loose at first, as men would be detachedfor specific projects in security work or in some v..ational referat.The work gxad1.Ally divided itaelf into three par ta , general theory(Referat F, under v, DElIJ1'FER), hand systel1lB (Referat 7?, under Ob~t.Ltlnma)" and machine ayetems (Referat 1.3 under Wachtmeister OOERIID).Buggisch l>..i:mself was deputy to OOERING.

At the end of 1942 (later according -to HERZFELD,but the outlineis the aame) all the varied Referats were grouped into two Hauptreferats,"1..", for languages, under BAlIOVIC, and "BI', for J!Bth studies, un.derPIETSCH. The latter comprised the three former Referats, F, 7, and13. This organization remained in effect as long as Buggisch wasthere. (For later orgard.satdon see HENTZ".r!;nd H1illRENBERGaocount sv )

V. DENFFERls Referat included HILBURG, RINOW, and WmrSGHE as itsb!:st men. Under LUnERBwere hi.s deputy, ui'f'z. JESSE, and F:'HEDE,FQPFL , and WAC!m .I'f EI STER DREESEN (helper only). DOERING'ssectionhad Bugg.i.ach himself and Waohtneiater VA.LEJIj~INwho auccee ded him~ . . Jas deputy, and Uffze. MUELLER, DIEHL, and SAllER and Gefr. JAUSEL(hel~er~ ?nly)., ~he section also had vardoua men with partioularspecaa.Ia ~1eB, L INDMEIER . and LA.CHI I t 'ER on teletype security (note tha t~l'tCill:lER a.a els~ere noted by Ki.RRENBERG as the specialist in.tl-.nerwan traffJ.c) and TROEBUCEE~ on Russian systems includingBAUDOT (Troebucher spent l:i1oatof his time l'rith UTA).

The above are not all the names that Buggi.sch could haverecalled in ti:ne, he seiil, but they inolude +ne f'oremost techniciansof all sections .