The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company

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@/?/6 _--------.------.Dff i 'ffi-L/-/)THE SOVIETMOTORIZED RIFLE COMPAI{Y

. DDr-1lOO-7 76Informatior Cut'Off Date:June 1975This document was Fepared by Major Robert M.Organization Section, Ground Forcs[vlBFR Branch,Drcctorate for Inteligenc (ResearchCenter), and isauthodty of the Drector, Defensnteligenc Agency.

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PREFACEThis study war *rittcn for the us of service choolsand or unit inteligence officeF,s an aid in pr$nting classes n the organization,biining, tactics,atrdequipmntofthemotodzdrifle company.Th material presertdon unit organlzationshould be u!d asa guideor y. Sovietorganizations ary widely dpndingupon thetr manning evels,weapons nd equipmntmix,locatton and otherfactors. Dffrences n squadarmamnt, apabilities, nd numbenof men per .rmord penonnelcarrter(APC)exist betweenunits. Althougholdr APC'Sare dbcu$ed, this study concentrrtes pdmarily on the BMPquippdmotorized dflecomp8nies, ince heygobably representhe dsird t ndard-The ist of Sovietsymbolsusedmey be found n Appendix .Corunents, correctionsand suggestionsor improvementof this study are requested.They slrculd be sent hmugh properchannelso the DefensentelligencAgercy, CroundForcs/MBFRBranch,ATTN: DB-1B4, Washington,D.C.20301.

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EXECUTIVEUMMARYl lhis study examines ovietoffcnsive nd defensiveoctrineand the orSanistion,training, acticsand cquiprnent f the Sovietmotorized itle company.Emphasissplaced n tlrc comp,rnyquipped ith the nfantrycombal ehicleBMP). hemotorizedrifle companys organized,rained ndcquippcd rimrily fol a wal of rapidmovemcnland shortdurltion. Maneuver uring acticaloperationss restdctcdo wcil-rchcrndcombal formrtions and is oficn dictatedby hisher authodty. Tactical doctrincmph-asizesffensive ction-Coordination f fireandmovementspracticcd,ut usuallyin clo!.ly regulated exercises.During operatioff, riflemen Sencrallyremain in lfteirpersonnelalriers ntil conionted with serious nti-rrmor ire, hendismounlo assaoltpositions ith support rom anks, rtillery,mortan,and }lcil ownpcrsonnelarriers.2. Motorizedine company fficcrs eceive xtensiverofessionalndpolitical rainingnschools,ut areSivenittlc opportunityo exercisenitiative nd ackcombal xperience,Conscriptscceive rc-inductionminingpriorto beingassigncdo deir units.Althoughth effectivcncssf pre'inductionraining s uneven,t hasshown mprovementn somc,Jcas and may eventually provide cons(ripts with the ncssary asicmilitary skillsbefor they enter the army. About half of th consc.ipts, ncluding sergea'tsand APCcrewmembers,cccive ix montl$ specialistrainingbefore hey report o their units.Other conscriptscam thcir dutiesby repetitiveon-the-job rainmg and are notcross{rained. he lrainingprognm rnddhciplinarymearure! roducc oldienwho canperforn their duticsadequately. hcy arenol expectedo exercisenitiaiivc.Tiaining,andhence ndividual ndunil effectiveness,redegaded y thc acl tlut conscnpb erveonly woycars.Ncw roops re otatcd nto unitssemi-annuauy.3. Equipment f thc motorized iile company rovideslrc mems neededo conductoperationsand successfully ccomplish ikely missions.Tlrc htroduction of the BMP slhe most significant ecentmprovemenln the companytequipffenldnd consrderablyincrcascsts firepower. hortcomingsfcompany quipmcntnclude:a. Squadeade$,whendisrnountedrom thirpenonncl arriers, ave o radios.b- Radios vailablco platooneadersn dismounledperationsavimitcd ange.c- ThemaingunoI theBMPdoes or havc stabilizer.d Sagger ntitank guidedmissilcs lnnol be effectively ired at night Mthoutillumination.4. Sovietmotorind rinc companies,articularlyhose quipped ith BMPS,recapableof conducting ffectivc ombatoperations. lthough omequalitative eficicnciesxistin trainhg,equipmcnt ndofganization,heSoviets pparendyonsidcrllal quantitativesuperioritys adequ,rteompensation.


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TABLEOF CONTENTSTHESOVIET OTORIZEDIFLECOMPANY

PrcfaccExecutiveSunrJn{yTableof CorrcntsList of FigursIntroductionCHAPTER, PERSONNELND TRAINING

P.rrii i

xin

CHAPTER .Section.[ .I [ .v.CTIAPIER4.Section .II .llt.

lv.\{ .CHA?TER .Section[.llt.IV.

VI.vlI.YII.

C}IAPTER6.Sectior .lI .III-IV.

CTIAPTER3. HIGTIERLINITSTIIE MOTORIZEDRIFLE COMPANYG e D e r a l. . . . . . . . . . - . - - - - - - - - - r ' 1M i s s i o r s. . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . l ?O r g r n i z a t i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7E q u ip n e n t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 2 0C o m m a n dn d o n t ro l. . - . - . - - - . - - - 2 lA d m i n i s t r a t i o nn d u p p l y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8MOTORIZED IFLECOMPANY RATNNGI n t r o d u c t i o n. . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . 3 lW e a p o n sn d q u ip m e n tr a j n i n g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 lM o ra l P o l i t i ca lr a i n i n g . . . . . . . . . . . 3 ?chemical io logicalRadiologicalra in ing ,.. . .-. . . . . . . . 38I a n dN a v i g a t i o n. . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . 3 8PhysicalTraining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39J u n i o r f f i c e rn dN C O r a i n i n g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - . . . . - . . . . 4 0Tactica.lTraining . . - - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . 41THE MOTORZED RIFLE SQUADG e n e r a l. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . - .4 1M o ve m e n to c o n t a c t . . . . - . . . , . . . . , . 4 5F o r m a t i o n s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45OffensiveAction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4IDefenriveAction . . . - . . , . . . . . . . . . . . 5

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PlceCIIAPIER 7. 'IIIE MOTORZEDRIFLE PLATOONS e c t i o n. I n t r o d u c t l o n . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . - . . . . . s 5l I . M o ve m e n to C o n t a c t. . . - . . . - . . . . . . . . - - . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . 5 5IIL Fornations - . . . - - . . - . . . . . . - - - . . . . . 57lV . OFe n s i vec t i o t r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 0V. Dcfensivection ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6lCTIAPTER . T}IE MOTORIZEDRIFLE COMPANY N COMBATS c t i o n M o ve m e n to C o n t a c t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - , . . . . . . . . , . . - . . . 6 5II. The MeetingEngagemcnt . . - - . . . . . , . . . - . - - - . . . . . . . - . . . . . . , 59IU. BreaktfuoughOperations . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . . . . . - - . . . . 72l V , D e f e n s i vep e ra l i o n s . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . ? 5V. Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

CIIAPTER9.Section.I I .I.Iv.

vt.v[.vm.Appcndixs

THE MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANYOPERATING UNDER SPF-CIAL CONDITIONSG n e r a l. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 8 3OperationsUnderExtremeWeatherConditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E3Operationsn Forestsnd Swarnpc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - . . . 9lOpentionro Mountaira ... . . . . . . . . . . 93W a t e r a r r i e rp e ra t i o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9C o m b a t B u i l t - u pu e a s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 5Helibomeprations ... . . . . . . . -. . . . 110N i e h t p e E t i o n s . , . . - . . . . . . . . . - - , . 1 1 5

l . L i s t f s y m b o l s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 1 2 3 . \ 2 4II. A TypeCareer attm n Basic ombatDuty tr Peacetim.. - -.... 125I T I . (X f i ce r g e im i t a t i o n s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - . . . - . - - . - . - - . . - 1 2 7


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Figurc L7 .3 .5 .

7 .8 .9 .1 0 .I t .

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LISTOF FIGURESpage

Vanedelhnicslructure fthe SovietAnny . . . . . - . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IP r en d u c r i o nra in in ga c i l i t yta se co n d a rych o o l . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . IA DOSAAF training facility for specialists . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Youngofficcrs t a conmissioningchool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2C o m b in cdr mse a mn t h ea t r a c k . . . . . . . .. . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . 3Basic order of march of a Soviet formation anticipatinga mcctinge n g a g m e n t. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . 4Dcploymcnt f units rom the ine of rnarchnto a meeting ngagement . 5Th e re a l t h ro u g h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . . . . . 6Dvision concentration or the breatthrough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1T h e u r s u i t . . . . . . . . . - . - - - . . . . . . . . 8Basic ormsof maneuvera. Frontalattack , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . , 8

b- Double nveloprncntritl frontalattackTh cm o io r i ze di f l e e g im e n rB M P a q u ip p e d ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . nPrinciplcwcapons the motorizcd ifle regiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . I 2a . T h em e d iu na n k 5 4 1 5 5 1 6 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2b . 2 3 m m P A A u n S L l 3 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3c. ATGM auncher ehicle T-3 . . - - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . - - . . 13d. l22mmhowitzerD-30 , - - . . . . . . . . . . . . - I 3e. SAMSA-9 Gaskin . . . - . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . I 3Themotorizedif lebattalionBMP+quippd) .. . . . . . . .- t4P r i n c ip l ee a p o n sn h em o t o r i ze di f l c a t t d i o n . . - - . . . . . . . . . - . . . . 1 4r . 7 3 m m c c o i s s G u nP C -g . . . . . . . . . . . . . .b . M a n p a ckT GM e tS a g g e rA T-3 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . - t 5c - l 2 0 m m m o r t a r . . . . - . . . . . . . . . - . . . - - 1 5Th cm o t o r i ze di f l e o m p n n yB M P q u ip p e d ). . . . - - . . . - . . . . . . . . , . . 1 8Principle weaponsof thc BMP and/or BTRquippedmororizcd rifleco m p a n re s- . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . , , , , . . . 1 9a. 7.62nrmneralurposc achinegun,alashnikovPK) ... . . . . . . Ie

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Figure 20.

21.22.23.24.25.26.21.28.D.30.31 .33.34.35.36.37.38.39.40.4 t .42.44.45.46.47 .48.49.50.51 .52.53 .54.55 .57 .58.59.

PageP c rso n a lBR ro t e c t i vee : u . . . . . . . . - . . , . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3a. ShMmask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23b. St*lS mask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . 23

c. OP.f proiectiv oat-overall . - . . . - . . . . . . . - - . . . . . . - . . , . . . . . . . 23d . I n d i v i d u a le co n t a m in a t i o ni t , P P . . . , . . . . , . . . . . . . , , . - . . . 2 1Sunner and winter licld uniforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . 24F ie ld o m b a ta ck n d cco u t re m e n t s. . . . . . . . - - - . . . - - - - - . . - - . . uR-ll3 vehicularldio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2sR-123 ehicularadtowith intercom nit . . . . . . . . - - . . , . . . . . . . , . . - . . . 26R -1 2 6 a n p a cka d i o . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . .. - . . . 2 5ThR-105ard Rlo? railios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Reprcsentativcadionet ofa motorizedifle company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28S o ld ie na t i n gn h c i l d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9hcliminary wapons raining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Trdning n firing rom an APC . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . .32A n t i t a n kr a i n i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - _ . . . . . . . . . 3 3 , 3 4A TC M S a g S c r )a i n i n g . - - . . . . . . - . . . . . . - . . . 3 sSA-7 SAM) nining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Snipr raining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Political indoctination session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3?C B Rr a i n i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . - 3 EChmicslecormaissanceersonncl reparhg or an opration . .. . . - . . -. 38Traffic regulator . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - , . 39Physicalitnessraining .,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 39Thc BTR-equippedifl squad . . . . . . . . . . - . , . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . - . 43Exiting the BMP . . . . . . - . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . 44BMPS upportinSsquadsby lre . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45Tank'borne nfantry in t] attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 45Squadon a night reconnaissanceission . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 46S q u a ds s a u l ti n c . . . . . - . . . . . . - . . - , . . . . . . - 4 6A t t a ck in gro m p o s i t i o nn c f o seo n t a c t . . . . . . . - - . , . . - - - . . . . . . - - . 4 7SquadG)negotiatinga mircfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Thesquad efnsiveosition rcpared ith engineerupport . . .. . . .. . ..52Th MDK-2 ditchingmachine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52Thesquad fte plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . 53Themotorizedif leplatoonBMPquipped).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55Thmotorizedif lplatoon ttackinSchind,nks -.. .-. .- - -.- -. .-. . .56M o t o r i ze df l e l a t o o no rm a t i o n sm o u n t e d ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 5 8Motorized ifl platoon orrnationsdisnounted) .. . . .. . .. . . .,. . .. . . - 59Theplatoon defnsive osition . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52A reinforced motorized rifle company as the adidce guard of theb a t t a l i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 6 5Thc companycommanderof a reinforced motorized riflc companycon.ducting econnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66Organizationof a battalion march h anticipation of a meetingengagement66An S A -7 u m rn f i r i r u o s i t i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 8


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paSeF isu re 0 . C B R n i t o n d u c t i n ge co n t a m in a t i o nu r i n g h a r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 861. A feinforcedmotorized iflc battalion onducting meeting ngaSemnt 7162. The einforcedotodzedif lbattalionn thedefens... . . . . . . . -. . . . 76

63. The notorizedillc cornpany trong oint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 4 .G T - S n dGTS M e h i c l e s- - . - - . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . - - - . . . - . 8 465. Motorized ifl company onnanderconducting econnaissanceith sub-o r d i n a t en d t t a ch e do n m . n d e rs. . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . - 8 s6 6 .T a n k so w i n gn f a n t r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 65 7 . Ta n l ( - b o rn en f a n t r yt t a ck in gn w in t e r . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 66 8 . M o t o r i ze di f l e r o o p sn a w in t e r e f e n s i veo s i t i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . 8 76 9 . M o t o r i ze di f l e r o o p sf a in i n gn t } I e e se r t. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8 , 8 970. Reinforcedotorizedif lebattalion ttacking. thedescri -. . . . -. . . . . . 9071. Reinforced otorizedifle bathlionattackingn forestd wampyerain . e27 2 .7 6 rn m o u n t a inu n ,M 1 9 6 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 47 3 . M o t o r i zcdi f i e r o o p sra in h gn t h em o u n la in s. . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . e s74. Motonzedinecompanyttackingn mountainoNerrain ... . . . . . . .-. . 9675. Themururvedinecompan)n dc defensen mounruuus errm .. . . . . 987 6 .E x e r c i s eD n e p a ' 9 6 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - . . . . - . . . . - . . . . - 9 977- K'61 andPTS racked mphibiousericrsunloading ssaultroops . . . . . r0178. A reinforcedotorizedfle battrt ionorcing water arrier .. . -. . . . . 10279. Reinforced otodzed ifle battrliondefending riverbanl . ... . ..... . 7048 0 .C o m b a t - i n d t i e sa c t i c a lx c r c i s e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . - . . . - . . . . . 1 0 6 , 1 0 ?81. The cinforcedmolorizcd ifle companyn the attack n a builfup arca 1088 2 . M i4 H o u n d . . - . . . . l l l8 3 .M i -6 o o k . . . - - . . . . 1 1 18 , 4 .M i - 8 i p . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 18 5 . M i - 1 0 a r k e . . . . . . . 1 1 18 6 . M i 1 2H o m e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . 1 r 18 7 . M i - lH a r e - - - . . - - . . r t 28 8 . M i - 2 o p l i t e . . . . . . . 1 1 289. Mi-24Hind A . . _ . . _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . _ I 1390. Hel icoptcr ockupraining evice ... . . . . . . . 1i49 1 . t R s i g h t i n gy s . c m ,o d e i S P- 2 . - - . . - . . . . - . .. - . . . . . . . . . . .. . . - - 1 1 69 2 . S o v ie t o d e l P N -2R s i g h t i n gy s t e m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 69 3 . C o m rn a n d e r ' sR p c r i l e l e sco p co d c l K N -3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . r r 19 4 - C h a ra c t e r i s t i c sf so m el l u m in a t i o ne v i ccs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . 1 1 ?9 5 . M o t o r i ze di f l e o m p a n yn a ni g h t t t a c k . . . . . . - . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . - . 1 1 896. Possible chxnges in lhe night defensive system of a motorned rifleb a t t a l i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 1

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INTRODUCTIONSovictwritershave ontinually mphasizcdhe rcl that henextwarmustbewonbyforces n bcingand that full mobilization f a nation's csources ill nol bepossiblc.Small, rofcssionrl rmies reseen sanachronisms,nd hepolicyof mainaining uch

forcc, "bankrupt." Consequentlyhc Sovietsmphasize litzkrieg offensivcswithtank-hcaryorces upponedbyargcamounts fartillery,whichwouldbeablc o achievethe equircdirc supeliority t selectcdoints.This study examines he organization,rainjng, actics and equipmcntof theBMP-equipped otorized ifle companywithin th contcxt of Sovietoffensive nddefensiveonceprs.n an effort to present rcalistic ortrayal,weaknesses! wll ajstrenglhsreportrayedhroudout tlc study.fte study beginswilh a brief examinationf thc hunzn elernent. h irst chapierdesribesersonncl nd training.Sovict offensivedd defensive oncepts rc thendescribcd.he ink betweenhcsc oncplsnd heMR companys chapterhree,whichdescnbeshe molorjzed ifle resimentand thc MR batblion. Chaptersour and ivedescribehe organization,quipment nd raining f lhc MR company, ndset hestagefor a closeook ar eachof its subordinalelcmcnts,he squad ndplatoon chapten ix,nd seven). hapter ight ies logetherhe preccdingcvcn hapters y dscribinghemotorized ifle companyn combat.Cfiaptcr incdcscribeshe MR company prat ingurderspecial ombrtconditions.hehistorical a1l n thischapter reprovided rimarilyfor two rcasons:ust, to show hat he ypcs f opcrationsescribedave een racticedfor manyycarsby the Soviets nd arcan mportml nspct f curent Soviet ocline;scond o illustratc lle sedng mpact hatWorldWar l continueso have n theSovietmilitary.Although heres a section nheliborne pcralionsn chaptcr inc, acticdl ir supportof groundopcrationss not discussed.ovicturutsbelowdivision evelhaveno dircctorgadc adiocommunicationsith supporting ncrafl,nd representativesftacticalairforcs re arcly, fever,sent o battalion ndcompany.

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CHAPTER . PERSONNELND TRAINING

1. GeneralThe pcrsonnelmakeup of rhe motorizedrifie companytypifics rhe human element n tie Sovietgound lbrccs( f ieLre I ) . Th. rypicd muro[ ,ed r l lc c onpan) i .conrposedprimdily of conscripts,carccr cniistcd nrenand office.s constituting a srnal perccnlagc01 th totalstrength.Nomally, the majorily ofofficers are membersof thc Comnunisr Party of the SovietUnion (CPSU)orthe Young Coinnunist League(Komsomol). Most en-iisled men arc Party or Konsomol membe6 or belong oa subsidiary organization.All evidence he advrntagcsand disadvantagesf Sovict political and military sys-tems. Thesesystems nvolvc continuous,but not neces-sarily effective,political indoctrinalioni comprehensive.bur unetenl \ mpl"Telred.pre- .nJucLionr" ini . rg rngramsiand gener.lty adequatcactive duty training.Onbalance,soldien shrpcd by these systemsappear o bepolirically reliableand capable f performingeffectively,although with limited initiatjve at battalion level and

Figure 1. Vaded ethnic structure ofthe Soviet Army.

2. PoliticalTrainingand ControlThc company s ihc lowcsi cchclon at which a politicalofficer functions. The politicJl officer, whose cliain ofcommand s spafateand xtends to the Main PoliticalDirectorateof the Ministry ofDefense, s responsibleorpolitical hdoctrination and for ensuring oyalty to thecivilian leadership.He conducts poiilical lraining,pri-marily in the form of lectufes. and monitors companyactilities for indicationsof dissent.Th arnountof timedevoted to polirical training is inordinate and not as

effective assuggestedn officiai statcments.Only careerenlistedand officer personnel,who havea vcstcd ntcreslin the mi1itary, appear to react favorably to theindoctrination- Conscdpts are generallyunenilusiasricdd, to somedegree,rntated by the training.r. r.e-rnoudron r rarntnqTheoretically, he eniistedpersonneiof the motorizcdritlc company reccivcnilitary trainingprior to entenngservice.The 1967 law governingnilitary servicen rheUSSR requirespre-induction raining for al l malesandore{nbe, a (omprehensrveourse t ins l rur .uor-upto 140 hou6 ofclassroomwork -in addition to trainingwith weaponsand equiprnent.'The pros.am, beginningin the ninlh gade. is unevenly onducted n schools ndtraini g ccnteB throughout the USSR (Figurc 2) .Aflcr 1967, fie USSR eemphasizedre-induction faining to compensareor the rcduction ofconscript se.vicefrom three to two yea6. It appeaB,however, hat thcrequirement s not uniformly applied o all individuals,probablybecause f a lack offacilities in somearcas.Asjt now operates, the program provides most Soviclyouths with rudimentary military skills, bu1 cannot.onplerely compen\areor d rcducronol o1e yeJr nactiveduty training ime.Specialist raining. commencing l agc 17, s the responsibility of the AI'Union Volunlary Sociely or Coopera'tion with tlre Army, Avialion 8nd Fleel(DOSAAF) andofthe vocarionai choolsysicm Fisure3) .

Figure . Pre-inductionraining acilityat asecondary chool,


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Figure3. DOSAAFtrainingaci l i tyorspecia l ists.4. Ofiice.TrainingMortcommrsroneLl' f f iceIs rcobraiqedom cornm6-sioning choolsFigure ), but a small ercentageomesfrom univcrsity.levles officr trainingprogransand from drre!t conmi\s,ons.The commissiuningschools omparc o the U.S. Military Academyandproduce omparablyrained fficers. ubsequentduc!-lional opportunities or officrs include advancedcourses,mjd.carcer choolingnvolflng threc to fiveyetrrs t a militaryacadeny,nd r two-year ouneat theMilitary Academyof the cereral St3ff. In 8encral,Soviet fficers re eliable ndequippedo functionn acontemporaryattlcfield nyironmcnt,ut areprobablysonewhatnlibited,padicularly t the owcr commandlvels, y thepoiilicalsystem. qually mportant,mostSovietofficershdve not had tle benefirof warrinreexperiencc. type of Sovietofliccr'scareer attcrn sincludedn appcndixI.

Figure . Youngofiicersat a commissionangchool5. Conscript raining.Prior o cnrctment f lhe 1967law n universal ilitartraininS,ie nujority of conscdpts ere raincdby theunits to which they werc assigned.ince hc!, x, d,effort to compcnsateor thc reducedennofservicc,heSoriclshaveexpandedherr acilibesor tiainingconscnptsprior to assignmnr.urrcnlly,ncrcasingumbcn uf conscriDrs.ordbly pe. ia l isrrnd non.comnsioncd ofnce|s, eceive p 1o six monthsof tmininbeforc ssignment0a unit-Datagaps recludcefinitive valuationf the ndividusoldier roduced y the training mglams. ersonnelnrnotoriTcd ne companiesrobably erform atisfacnly. considednghc relativelyow skill lcvels nvolvcand the emphasisn lepetition n training.Conscripsering in morc complex ssignnentsrc ikely to varconsiderablyn then effectivncss.pecialistsuffesomwhatrom aII extensive cpendencen simulatoand l-romscvere onstrainls oveminghe uscof fulcalibcr, ive anmunition.Thc expansion f specialtraining lacilitics,however,s expected radualy toprovidecons.riph with an adequare aseof skill foindividualassignmnil.


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CHAPTEF . OFFENSIVE ND DEFENSIVE ONCEPTSSection. MOVEMENT O CONTACT

6. GenelalSoviet doctrinc stresseshat the ofl-ensivcs the decisiveforn of conbal; that the main purposc of offensivecombat is the complete destrucrion ol tlle enemysforces. To scl the stage or successful ftcnslveaction,the Sovietsstress hc use of diversionary nits (agents,parachutists nd heliborne nfantry) deep n tlte encmyrea Jers and the achievement l surprise htough thcusc of deceptionmeasures,he intensity andmobiljty otl ' iepowcr. a1o 'af id l rFs o l advance Sufces i5achieledby tnc rapid concentrrtion of supefio. forceswiih massive air and artille.y support to disruPl,penetratc,and ultimately rout opposing orces FiSure5).Air and ariilcry interdiction would occur thtoughoutihe depth of the eremy's defensivc osilion. Ifnuclcatchenricalwcapons are not used, conventionalartilcrywould be used n grealcrquantities n order to .chievedre desired irc superiority. Soviet orcesare trained togo rapidly lion a nonnuclear o a nuclearenvironmcnt,and Soviel writcn stres the essenlial arld criticalifansition bctwcen hesemodesof conbat. Despite hisernphasisn offensiveoperalions, hc Sovjels ealize hatin son1e ituations heir forceswill have o go over 1o hedefensive,but stress hat the primary purpose of ihedefense s to prepare for the resumptionof offensiveoperdtions ssoon aspossible.7. TheMarch

a. The Sovictsdescrjbe much asan organizedroopmovementconducted n column fomations on roads,or

crosscountry. Troops ale trarned o bc rcady 1br actionat any time. If possible, he march s conductcdat nightor under conditions of limited visibility. The speedatwhich the march is conducted s dependcnton manyfacto^ : encmy, erfain, weathcr.makcup of the colum,condition of vhicles, he levcl of driver training,etc.(Figure6) .

,. Averagespccds br vehiculal lrafiic by day are3040 knttu and by night and dunng other conditionsof limited visibility 20-30 km/tu. For foot movementaverase pecdsare 4 km/hr and bctween5'7 knthr onskis.

c. The inrcrval between vehiclcs s 1550 merersduringroad movementmd 50-100metersdunng acticdcross-countrymovemnl. Both the interval md thespccd of l}e vehjclc, are in(ted'ed lvhcn crosing acontaminated ea or when underair dttrck.

d Control measuresalong rhe route of advancenrclude nitial start points and casily recognizable on-tlol or phase ines. Thc number and spacingof thesecontrol measuress dcpendentupon the lcngtl of themarch. dre condition of thc ioadsand tlt weather.

c. ln a motorized march, halts of up to one houroccur evcry three-four houis. ln foot mdches,io'minute hdts are madeelery 50 minutes.During fiesecond hJlf of a motorized Inlch, a long halt ofiwo four hours is held. Such Longhalts arc not held atnidt (so as to make maximunr use of Lhc hours ofdrkncss), nor are ilrcy made during foot marches lhichcan be covered n a 24-hourperiod- Durine slort hdlls,

Fioure . Combinedrmsteamn heattack.


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column dist ncesbetwcenvehicles n column omationare not changed;men snd vehiclesmaintain the propermarchntervals. uring onghrlts,vehiclcs redisperscdandcamouflaged.

, To asrnt thc conrnandor n organizing he rnarch,theSoviets ivide he march nto two distinct lemcnts,thc movementorganization ndmarchsecurity.& Movcrnent orSanizltion is formulated to ensurehigh speed, rapid combat deployment, and effectivecontrol. Tank and artillery are usually towards thefront, and antiaircraft eapons redistributedhrough-

,l. All-around sccurity is providcd on the march inorder to ensureuninterruptedmovement,o preventsurprise atack,o keepenemy econnissancenits rohobservinghe main body and to crcare ie mostfavorable conditions for deployment of the rnain bodyin a mecting ngagement.dvancc,Ilank,nd earguardunitsensure ll-around ecuritydurinS he march. naddition, stationary flank outposts arc often used tooccupycritical tcrain until the mainbodyhaspassd.

\l--v=-Y;-

Figure . Basic rderofmarch fa Sovietformationnticipatingmeeting ngagement.


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Sectionl. THEOFFENSEL The rwo rnethods mentioned in Soviet tacticalwritings for acconplishing he trrnsilion to thc otttnsivear a) fiom the marchand b) from a posilion occupiedin direct contact with the enemy- The rluee types ofoflcnsivc action are the meetingengagement,he break-though, and thepursuii.9. TheMeetingEngagemeniThe mecting cngagcmcntj .c., fte colision of twoopposing forces, b stressedmore heavily in Sovietnr , , rJ wi ' i rCs Mar ] | . ) orher lorm ai o er . rveaction. Because f the fluid nature of modenrvar, theSovielsbclicvc that thc meeringereagemenrwill occurmore often than any other type of combat action.Meetingengagcmcnls rc characicrized y action ro seizeand naintain ihc initialive; the developnrent f combaton a wide lront with ffeedom of naneuver md thepresenceof open flanksi rupid depioymcnt of troops,chjefly lrom columnsj nrobile,high speedcombat, andoften incomplete intelligence on enemy lbrccs. TheSovietsbelieve hat it is both possiblc nd nccessaryo"nr ( ip! re mee||ng ngrg cmcnrs. r r rhrougl va ' ' "usinteltigencegrtheringrncans hcy will be prepared or,and wil aggessive]y eekout, suchengagementsFigur7).

10. The Breakthroughd. The classic breakltuough operatior is a frortald* !u l r rBa . r " wr l l -Drco"rcdcicnsi \c o' i . ior . . s ingdlargc amount of artilcry and mancuvcrclemcnls on a

narrow front (Figure8). ThebreakLuoushmay alsooccuragainsta hasly defense.Against each rype of defense,the Sovits envision swift and deep envelopment, hebypassingof stubborn pockets of resistDce, decisivemeeting engage ents with advancingcncmy reserves,continuation()1-h dttack, and the subsequent estruc-tion of enemy strong points by secondechelon uniis.Breakthroughs may now be accomplished r,n shor!pedodsof tine due to nuclearslrikcs and the ncreasedlethaliiy of conventional wcapons. Succcssfullycon-ducted meetingengagcmentsrldbreakthroughs esult nlhe pursuil and ultimate destruction of the enemy's

,. TheseSoviet-To-NATO fo.ce ratios aie reflected inSoviel doctrine as being necessaryo achicvc brerk-through against prepared osition:InfantryArt i l lery 6-8:1

c. A Soyict divisionconcentratesls forces o achievethe desired ombat ratios for thc bredkthroughagainstprepared efense sshoM in Figure9.

3 -5 : 1.+-5:1

W

,-\ Mororizedil e companyn rhedere.se#-.ffiFigure . Deplovmenrl un s rom he neol marcnnroa meeLingngagement.


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/rIET

1, Sovir irst ch.lon lorc.. achi.ving 6 br6Ekthrcugh nd holdlng the 3houlde6 op. tor tuther pnd.Etionan l srplohlrbn by ..cond 6h6lon 1orc..,2. Scondeh.lon forc.! srploiting $e pntnijon.

Figure . Thebrakthrough.

o


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E )-e"'ffflJ,T3:ff-i-":,".x?'i" | |-E.'1*.r*-e^r^"L^- .--r.'-J",.,t**,"i,-1,:^'^*-"^*"i' I )oEA_p....-r.',13":)R*--+::"-*,{i,r| |J--.,-#;-"i:L*-AJJ"i[hT^.^I I IC O M P A N \ n A C r - a O r \ r A C r J J \- E---\J- - --r'\-'. ---\J- . ---l"\- . --\J . r---aL . --\J- . ---l'\L. -_F. --l'-L - - D v sto\ 7o\rE (

o'A''oN

i

Figure Division oncentrationorthe breakthrough.


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Il . Pu6uitOperationsPursuitoperatioos rc hiShlymobile n naturandarebest conducted n a wide ront alongparullcl outes.They nvolvebotl frontalattacks nd envelopmentocut off anddestroy neDy orccs, u6uitopcrationsremademorceffective y theuse f tactical cliborne ndairborne orces,which occupyand dfend ocationsnth enernyt rearand otherwisedjsorganize nd delay hisretrogrademovcment.The Soviets tress hat the puFuitis to begin imrnediatcly upon the initiativc of thecommanderho dircovershe etreatFigure 0).12. B$ic Formiol Maneuvsr"i{aneuver" is defined n SovietmiliLary iteraturc asOemovement fa force nto a favonblc ositionn rclationto the enemy, rom which it can aunchan effectiveattack.Thc Soviclsmentionwo b sic ormsof maneu-ver, he frontalattackand hc cnvelopment,ut favorth atter,whichmay be shallow r deep, ependingnthe sizeof th unit executing t (Figure1 ). Should heenemy no! have an assailablelanl, a frontal attackwouldbe used.A frontalassault ayoccuron a wideornarrow front wilh or without heaty luc support.Tankheary sccondechelon orcesattempt to exploitsny rupture n the enemy's osition.Under avorableconditions,howcver, he Sovietswould altcmpt anenvclopment,possibly in conjunction vith a front.lattack to pin down encmy forces. Enveloprnent s lheprefenedmcthodof mancuvern the mccting ngag-mentand s used romplatooncvclup.

l. Wfthd6$n! .n mylq62, Puding Sovi.n lorc63. Helibdn. r.nding in o@ht @r4, Approachine on.ny [email protected]. Th6pursuit.

(EY

S. OOUBLENVETOPMENTIIH FRONTALTTACK!9!c

Anenvelopmentn6ybesingleordoubl,6hal lowordeem.y613accompanisdy! lronrallrackdion.d o"lit"enemy orc.s.

A. FBONTATA'TACK

Figure 1. Basicformsfmaneuver,


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Section l.13. GeneralDefcnsivc opcrations occuf when offeosiveoperationsare nol expcdicnt or wheneconony offorce is desirablcin one area n ordcr to attack n anothcr. Therefofe, heSoviets try to limit defensiveoperations to areasofsecondarymportance-The purposeof th defense s toinflict maximum damageon tlMttacker. to firmly holdthe defended rc!, ard to creatc avorable onditions orthc rcsumptionof thc offcnsive.14. Defeneive oncepri

a. Stabilit)). Thc Soviets definc this lerm as thabiljty oI thc defendrs o rcpcl attacks, to prevcntcncny airborne acrivilies in the rear a.eas, and 10destroyany penhation!ofthe defensive ositions.

,. Seclrry. Combrt sccunly forces provide earlywarning, prevent cncmy reconnaissance f the maindafensive posidon. Iorce the enemy to deploy pre-maturely, inflicl mcximum casu.lties, and coordinatelong-rangc fircs on cncmy formations.

c. Use of Kcr Tenain. By ptope]ly preparing kcytenain which dominates hc inain arcnucsof approach.the defendcr may offsct some oI the altackeis advan-ragcs.Onc aspecl of lhe proper useof key lerrarn s aIire plan and obstacleplan which restrict he attacker'slrccdom of m.rnuverwhile maxirnizing he defendcis.Thc altacker is canrlized nto preparedkilling groundsfor fires of l types includinsnucleao.

tl. Dispcrsiott. To allow for maximum protcctionfrom nuclearand chmicalweapons, he Sovictsdcfcndon a wide front and n Ircat dcptle. A aroutld Delrxe At$ough onented primarilytowards thc dircction of enemy advece, Soviet units

THE D E FE N S Eprcparc llernate nd sopplementaryosjlions ndpre-pare o rcpcl attack from rny directjon. his ncludesthe construction f platoonandcompany trong oints,dply chelonedositions,and cxlensive arrierandfire ptaming.

t Dek,Ee n Depth. Thispresentsllc atlacker itha series f preparcd latoon nd company trong ointswhich absofbdrc attackeis momentumand providetimc or resefl/eso counterattack.s. Anntat* Defense. flr stabilityandprotectionfrom weapons f mnssdeslruction. strong ntitankdefense s the most imporrantchaGclcnstic f thedcfcnse. ntibnk weaponsrc ibcrallyuUocaiedown10 ow levels,whileantitank cscrvcs remaintaincdlrcgimcnlalevelandabove.ncrcasin8mphasisasbeenplacedn Sovietwritings n the mportance l ATGMS.h. &otdnated li|es. Fires are coordinated odestroy he attackcrwhnc approachin8h defendedarea, n front of lhe lbrward edgeof thc bartledea(FEBA),on the flank, and in prepared iling zoneswithin thedefcndcd Jea,nclodedn thcscire plds areartillery,antitank,andsmall arms ires.Excludedarnuclar trikes, hichSovietwritersmaintain hould eprimarilydirected gainsthc enemy's uclear eapons,majorenemy re\ewes nd commJndpusr\.i- Mobile Counterattack -or&s. The Sovietscon-sider the countcrrttack o bc the dcisive haseofdelensive ombat.Soviet onrnrandcIsequireall unilsflom battalionand up 1() unchcountcraltrcks. hesccounterattackwill incfcasn sveriiy s lle depthofthenemy .lient ncreases.


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Section V, WITHDRAWAL15. GenehlWithdrawal pcrations re conduc.cd or purposes fregroupirg, ccupyingmore avorablcerrdn,or due ocncmypressu..Thc mftsion of a withdrawing unit is topreservcts integrity, to conduct an orderly withdrawalto a designated arca, and to b ready to execuaoffnsive mission!. The Sovicts rccognize the com-plicated atureof this operation ndprefcr o withdrawon multiplc rcu1eswithout occupying ntermcdiatcphasc ines. hneverossible,heSoviets i withdrawat night of during other conditions of timited visibility.15. Conductol rhewithdr6wal

a- Orsanizationof Fuces. The grouping of forcesfor a with&awsl hcludes coredng orces, he rcarguardand he mainbody.Flanksecurity etachmentsrealsoestablishedhennecessary.b. Diseryagenent ftom Contact. Normally, theSovietseavc ne-third f their orcesn contactn orderto deceivchc enemymd delayhis advance.c. Method of tlt,rdrawl Unengaged clemcnts(reserve nd secondechclon orccs)are withdrawn irst,followd by artilery and lirst echeton orces.Coveringforces depart uddnlyand as a rule simultancously.Thcy usuallydepai aftr the main body haspastcdpositions ccupied y the fearguard. hould hccncmy

prcsstlle withdrawing forces, the covering orce withdraws n a leap.frogmanner, enderingDutual firsupport.Withdrawal f the mainbody s donewithoudelayingn intefmediateositions.d. Actions of the Rear Guard. Prior to withdrawinat thc dsignatedime, thc rcar guardcommandoccupiesdefensepositionsusualy located behind fiIscchelon efensorces.SubscqucntefnsiveositioaJe designatedor thc rcar guard,which conducambushes nd crectsbaniersas it withdrawso susequent ositions. he rearguardmovcso subsqupositionsn a eap.frog aoner, enderingmulualsuport,ard aggcssivelyefendingach osilion.

e. Establishmentof Nel' DefensiyePositions-Pnoto arrival in the rcwl]. dsi$atcd area of defensreconnaissanceroups re ormcd.Thcse roups ondua thorough urvey fthc ncwarea, etermineheareabe occupied y each nit, designrtepproach outcs thern,mark off any minedor contrminaied rcas, ntest the water n th area.As thc main body approachthc mea ts subordinatelemnii rcmct byguidesrotthe reconnaissance roups and ar taken to ftendesignated reas,I Secudty s organizcdssoonas he cadelemeclose n thc ncwdefensivereas,ndengineeringork

irnmediatclycgun.

l 0


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CHAPTER. HIGHER NITS

17. Genera lThe molorized.ifle company s the mmeuverelementofthe nrotodzedrifle brttriion. Ar it is reintbrcedby bollrb! r ral ronand rcgi jncnro mosropc ar ions. ,c org"ni -zation and equipment of the motorized dfle regimentmd barmlion will be discussedn this chapter.18. The Motorized Bifle Regimenl

a Thougircapableofindependent action, he motoFized rifle fegimeni normally opcrates as parr of adivision. Thc diyision cornmanderalocatcs addiiionaisupporl to thc rcgiments ts requiled. Regimentd rrt -lery may be reinfofced with units ffom the divjsion\rrtillery dnd rocket brttalions, forming a regimentalanillery group (RAG). Becausehe does not possssorganic nuclear weapons, he reginrental comnandefrequests uclear ire suppoft from division.Tllc rcgimcntmay also be ren orccd with additional antiai.craft,aniilank, cngineer, ignd, ndical, chemicil, and supply

,. Th BMP-cquippedmotonzed rfie regiment isorsanized ]s shown n Figure12. Someofthe regiment\principlcwcaponsareshown n Flgure13.

19. Th Motorized Rille Battaliond. The motorjzed rifle batlalion usually operates

under the dircct control of the regimenral omm,nder.When usdas thc division reserve,t operates nder thedivisionconmandcr. The baltalion may alsoparticipatein heliborncand ship-to-shofe perations.

,. Becauset is reiativcly"light" nr terms of certainorganic combat and support elemcnls, rhc battalion isreinforced when attacking or defending in the flrslechelon oI the rcgnnent,or whcn conducting ndepen-denl opcrations.Fof example. n addition to his ownorgmic unils, lhe battaljon commandermay control rtank battalion, r 122-mn howitzer battalisn, the regi-mental antitank guided missile battery, an antiancraftmissile md ulilery battery, .an cngineer platoon, achemicdl plaioon and administrativeand logistics sup-port troops. The baltrlion conma dci reinforceshisofganicmotorized rifle companiesas requned with hisattachedor suppodingunits.a fie Bwrquippcd motorized rifle battalon isorganized ar shown in Figure 14. Principle battllionwcapons reshorvn n Figure 15.

!aI!

Figure 2.Themotorizedif le egimentBMP-equipped).t l


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MOTORI2EO

COMMIJNICATNS MAINTENANCE

!9rqFora lsr ol th n!mbers 6nd ypesol perconne nd equpmenrar baxalion, se S) SovrerGo!nd ForcesOrgan?dnor u 'de LJ ' . Dl l0O .75 areo ur . 197, , .Figure 4.Themotorizedif le attal ionBMP-equipped).

Figure15. Principle eapons n the motorized ifle battalion.

. t . J f * 'IF

l 4


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: , , ' ! '

b. lManpack TGlvlSet Sagger AT-3).

c. 120mm ortar.


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CHAPTER . THE MOTORIZEO IFLECOMPANYSection . General

20. Tlc motorizcd flc companics I the mobnzednfle battalionare organized n the tridngular oncePtwith threemotorized fle platoons,ach omposedf aplatoon eadquanersd three ifle squads.21. The organizalion nd equipmentound n motor-ued nne compnniesaries. ependin8n he rype arricrthey hav and the numbr of troops available.ThcBMPaquippcdmotorized ifle company asone moreman tlan the BTRquipped onrpany nd doesnothive r m3chine sunserrion(two PK machincSun

Section ll.22. a. Thc missions f de motoriTediflc comprn) nthe offcnsc re o peletratehecncmydefe es,developthe a(ack, neutGlizedefending neny troopsby llreand n hand'to-hddcombator to take hemprisoner,destroy r caplu eoemy quipmenrndwcapons,erzeand consolidatc efensive ositions, epulse ounter-attacks, ndpursue withdrawingnemy.,- Other missiomwhich may be given o the riflccomprny nclude: 1.)opcratines an advance ecuritydtachment ithin an adv,nce uard usuay scnl outby regimnt). typicaladvanceetachmentonsists fa mototized iflc companyeinforccd y a tankplatoon,chemicaleconnaissanceam.an ngincerquad, ndandrrlank squad. n ds siruationhe company om-

detachments),hcrcas he latter does.The companyheadquarlen f the BTRaquipped ompanys smallerthan the BMP-quippedadquarten. quadstrengthvanes ron 6-11 men,althoughwe believe hc desiredstandard s 8 mcn in the BMPquippedunits. Squadarmamentalso varics, with the BMP+quippedsquadsbcing morc hcavily armcd. Moreover,within the BMP-equippd ompanies,holcsquads ossssinghe nitialmodelBMP-Iwil havconeRPK ight machine unandoneAKM pcrsquadn lieu of the woPK machinc unsfound n the ater model ot the BMP.

MtsstoNsn]anderwouldbe under he baitalion ommdrder hocommandrhe advanceuafd. 2) Acting$ flankor reardetachment n a tacticalmarch. n this situation hecompany's ttachmentsreapproximatelyoubled, ndth companycommanderakes his oralls rom thecomnander of the division's lank or rear guard.(3) Conducting a reconnaissancen force (usually sentout by division). 4) Providing ecurityduring halts.(5)Participating n tactical airmobile operations.(6) Acting as an assault roup in an attack againstforti{ied positions. 7) Operatingas thc reglmntal

c. The compmy wiu be rcinJorced s rcquircdor

Sectionll. ORGANIZATION23. The organizationnd maj{x tcns of equipnentofthe BMP.cquipped otorizd iflc company reshownin Figures 6.18.d. The company eadquartcrsoflsists f the com-panycommander,oliticalofficer,and cchnical fficer

(thc first serscant, esscngcr/communicationspecialist,and the BMP crervmembers,. The nfle platoon consisls f a plaroonhcad-quartersnd tucc iflesquads.

plus rine enlistcdmencompany lerk, nredic,three-man A-7Team,(driver rd sunner).


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HEADOUAFIEBSMOTOFIZD

EOUIPMENT

7.@mm .ip.r rill.. SVO7.62mm P ochinegun, KMAnftanlgr6n.d.unch6r, PG-7SAM, SA-7, FAtt [email protected]@rier,aMP-AR,t13/B-1234,r26

25(15t62Ot320 t2l9310 tot1t0

1, Fisu6 in par.rhesc repre*nr rhdilt.Gnc$ in nomb.6 ol peMnnd, equipment nd *apons tound n hdATR.equippd oroized ne comFny.2. The aTR'equippedmotorized ill conFny hds 3 machin.gonseciionconsistins t riveenlisted erconn61,9x7.62mmisht machinegunsBPK)snd 0rgT8-50/0/152mored peGonnelcadersln lieuotlho AN|Pl.

NOTES

Figure16. Thsmotorized iflecompany BMPequipped).

t8


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a. BTR50. b. BTRM.

d , B M P ,c. BTR 152.

Figure18. APC'Sfound n motorized iflecompanies.

Section lV.

APCSstill found wirhin the Soviet ground forccsinclude he BTR-50, 60 and 152 series, nd thc BMPwiti modifications.h BTR-152, he standard ovictA?C during thc 1950s and erly 1960s, s anannoredwheeled on-rnphibious ruck withoul ovcr-head cover,and is usualy armed with a 7.62nmmachine un.Thc BTR'152K swellas atternodclshasoverhead rmor cover. The BTR-50P cricswith anamphibiou5 apabiljt).htfoduced during lrc middlel95os, was he lilsl Soviet tandardrackedA.PC.reBTR'sOPK ersionwith ovcrhcrdcover became$cstandardvehicle or motorized riflc units in tankdivisions. ike tbe BTRj52, il is armedwith 7.62mmSGMB machinegun. he BTR'60PscriesarrphibiouseiShtwheeledPC was ntroducedn 196l as.r eplacc-ment or theBTR-i52V.Although roriginalmodclofthe BTR-60ackedoverhead over, ubsequcntodels

EOUIPMENThave it. The BTR-60P8 as a lurcr nounting one14.5runKPVTand one 7.62nm PKT machinegun.hcvchicle suay carrics 00 rounds f l4.5nlnrand2000rounds f 7.62mrn mmudrior.The rrestSovietAPC s.he BMP which was tust identificd n 1967.h is ananphibious rackedAPC armedwith a 73Jnm moolh.borcgun,a Sagger T-3 missilcaunche!. nda co-axial7.62mmmachincgun. lalermodelofrhe BMPha! woibrward uing porlsdesignedo accommodatehePKMmachingun.hus eonsiderablyncrcasinglc squad\firepower. he BMPcafiies orty rounds f HEATandHE ammunition lor the 73rn'n gur and five Saggermissilcs,ncluding nemounted n thc aunchcr.25. Individual ndcreBservedW.apons

a. 9m pttol, ItIakznv fPn4l.Thispistol s carricdby the officers n the cornprnyheadquarrers,PCdrive6.and by SA-7and RPC-? unne$.Th PM s a20


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small, omiautomaticistolwith an eight ound nuga.zine. t is the most widcly ssucd istol n thc Sovictb. 7.62nm modentized assaub nfle, KaJathnikov(AKtrl) The AK is capable f bothseniautonatic ndfull automaticire. The mprovdmodel, esignatedheAI


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b. RG-42.

C. RKG-3M,

d. RGD-s.Figure 9.Hand renades.

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b. Shl,,lSmask.a. Shl, mask.

c. OP-1protective oat-overall.

d. lndividual econtamination it, IPP

Fioure 0. Perconal BRprotectave ear'


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28. Summet ndWinterFie ldUni formsSum er Nnd wmtcr ficld unifornrs and accout.ementsa[e sholvn nr Figurc 1 rnd 12. Each man s also ssued.amouilagc cate. Spcciai canrouflage ui6 are ssuedasrc.luircd Ior wintr 3rd sunnner opcrations and i) r

Fioure21. ummerand inter ie lduniforms

24

Figure 2. Fie ld ombat ack ndacco!trements


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f29. SisnalEquipment

4. Themotorired fle companys wel supplicd ilhradio sets. These adioc are ruggedand moisture-proofdnd arc desiped for ease f operationud naintcnance.Adcquate verlap n frcquenciess providedor com-municationsamongnfantry, armor,andaJtillery.b. EachsquadAPChaseitheran R-113 Figure 3)or Rl23 radio(Figure24), the latterbeing hc mostmodern,with a grcater requencyband. Whendis-mountcd,hesquadeader as o ndio.c. Each platoon lcadcr has a vehiculai-mounlcdR-ll3 or R 123 radiosct which, ikc thosc n hissquadAPCS, monitors the company commard nct. Whcn

dismounted,heplarooncader asanR-l26 (Fisure 5)radiowhichha! imitd angc nd requency overagc.d. The company commmdcr'sAPC containsanR-l l3 or R-123, n R-126,md an R-105 r R-107radio.The R-107 s probrblydrc replacementor theR-l05, R-l08, rnd R{09 familyof tansceivers.t existsin both the vehicularnd nranpackonfigurations.heR-105 ndR'10?arshownn Figurc 6.e. The.e s no organic rovhionwithin le moiorizedrine companyor wirccommunicatjons.-ayingof landlines spcrfomedby battalion.Otherorganic quipmcntused by the company for signrling, are whistles, flags,bugles,lars,raccr mmunition, d panels.

Figure 3. R-1l3vehicular adio.

25


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Fioure 4. R-123 ehicular adiowith intercomunit.

Figure 5. R-126manpack adio.

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R 105Figure 6. The R-105 nd R-107 adios.

SectionV. COMMAND AND CONTBOL

R 107

hisplatooneaderss routine or thedeiivery fcombatordersand for supeNisionf preparatio! or combat.Wirecommunicationsreprimarilyused n the defcnse.Companymessengenre used n both the offensc nd,. Rzdioneis Fisurc27).(1) The companyconrnmd net, when esrrb-Lished,oes ronr he conpanycommanderown o rhesquad eadersduring nou.ted operations. his netudizes hc Rl13 or R 123 adio.(2) Du.ing mounted opcrations, he companycommandermaintains omnunications irh barbrio!

through he R-ll3/R-123dnd/of he R-107 adio.whendismounted,he R 126 radio s used, lthoughi hasavery shortrange.(Jr Auachedor .rppo||rngunirr usc orLanr.radios.Commdndersf attachcd nitsarnormalywithurc company omnande. n both ihe athck dnd he

30. a. The Sovietsregardconmrnd lts the exercise fconstant and effec.ive control. Thc rnotorized nflecompanycommanders responsibleor the ope tions ofhis unit. To assisthim he has a politicdl officer and atechnicalofficer. Tle former aids n the politicaltrainingmd indoctrination of the company, while the latterarsists n adninistrative, maintenanceand supply mar-tels. Thc scnior platoon leader is thc company con-nander's second n com,'nand.

,. There re no platoon sergeuts. The seniorsquadleader s the phtoon lerder'snext in command.

a The squad leader, usudlly an 18 or 19 yearoldconscipt sergeant, irectly commandshis squad.Thereafe no fre team eaders.31. Control

u. The primary meansof conrrol of the motodzedrifle cornpany s radio, althoughpersonal ontact, wirc,ncssengcr, nd a variety ofother nethods are lso used.PeNonalcontact between he companyconxnander nd

27


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F1t3/r23COMPANY OMMANDER

1, The aciicalcommand etotan MR unit s contotd sl the highest evetpossibte.When he company s houfro rn NAPCs heremaybe no company etprse .2 . Fegadlessotwherherornotrhere isacompanynel . rado f t ' oned ,and lsedpr im. . i t vbv lhebarralion ommander nd his immediale ubordinale nd arsched unn commandeB ptatoonand squad edoe6 wolropnm6rily eceivenstructions nd would ransmir .iiequenity.

BATTALION OMMANDEF

NOTES

Figure 7. Representativeadjonerol a motorized iflecompany-

Section l. ADMINISTRATION ND SUPPLY32. AdminittrationAt company evel, adDinistrations minimal. Thcconrpany ommanders assistedn his adnrinisrrativetasksby the politicat officcr, tcchnicalofficer, firstsergeantmd the companyclerk. Forn$ and reportswhich are mdntaindat company evel nc lude &ccompanypersonnel ook (whichcontains recordo[pcrtincnt actspertrining o r soldicr's ivilandmiliturylifc), duty roste|s, he danystrength cport, and thetraining chedulc.3:1.Supply

a Normally highcr units, using their organic trans-portalion,dclivcr upplieso subordinalenils,althoughthc laltcr may collectsupptiesn somesituations. hemotorized ifle company asno organic ervicc c6on.nel, and tlrcrcforedepnds n battrlion or resupply.Thc company technical officcr works closely with hiscounterpart t baltaLion.

,. Ammudtion resupply r accoDplished y thebattalion,whichdclivcrs n'nnunitono designatedom.panyanrmunition oinrs.Platoon cnonnclpickup thplatoon\amnrunition-e. The Sovietsoldiercarries re{wo days utions.Usudly,combatunits eceivewo hot nrealsprcparcdby battalion) er day(Figurc 8).Dry rations rc ssuedtor thc other ne3ls. reads bakedat division akies.34. llledicalTle Soviers aregorizc ounds s Ighl. serious. 'critical. Only basic reatment -s endered l conrpanylevel.Ambulatory ass reexpcctcdo ma.kchcirwayon foot to thebatldionaid station.Stretcherases recarricd o thc aid station or subsequcnrvacuarion.Senously nd criticallywoundedpersonnelreevacu-ated by lhe baltalionambulance nd orher vailablevefucles. ormalyhigherunitsprovideansport or thcevacuationf casudties. hecnticallywoundedmaybe.vacuated y helicopter.

2a


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35. Recovefy nd RepanSoviot recovery and repair policy placesemphasisonroute lerr ; rg su l l rdr drmrged efu! ler nd equrpmeDldo not impede dte rdvance. f the drivcr/mcchanics tcompany cannot repairrheir vehiclesn t0-15 minutes,the lchnical deputy notifies the battalion technicatdeputy who coordinateshe baualion repairand evacu.ationSroup REG). Thebattalion REG,consisting f tbcsupply and mainrcn cc platoon, may be reinforcedwrh r rep:r i r cf lm rom rcgrrnent . e(rusc hc rcpaj r

capacity of thc REC. whether reinfo.ced or not, isLimited task rcquirjng nore than 30,60 nlinulcs wi lnomally noi bc ttempted. Vehicles requiring thisunounr ']1 llmc or more to repairnraybc towed away,or moved off the route for evacuationor rcpair byregimcntor division.Firstecheloncompanicswhic.h osea cert in percentage f rheir mcn and equipmentwoutdbe replacedby second cchclon units, reiirrmed and

{j,irI i,iIil',''

Figur28.Soldiers ating n rhe field.

29


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40. PreliminaryWeapons taininsa. During ihis phase, raining s desiSndo srve hesoldier a thorough undersiandingof his weapon.Thcnomenclature, unctioning, asscmblyand disassembly,

and carc and cleaning fthe weaponplecedemdkrnan'ship training. Firing positions, sighl alignmeni, rangceslimation, trigsr squccze. and extensivc dry-firingexercises fe closelysupcrvised y NCOSand otlicersUve fire is conducted after the basic prhciples havebeenmastefedFigure29).

,. The gorl of markrnanship trahjng is ro devclopthc soldier'sability to fire acculalelyand undef condi

Figure 9. Preliminary eapons raining.

tions of poor visibility. He is lrxincd 1o fire whennounled in an A?C and in tl1edismounted cLeaswell.c. Aficr mastcring t]rc basics, the individual is iaughtto tuc at stationary and moving l3igcls on knowndisiance ranses. He is then taken to more advancedrangeswhere he musl rapidly engagemoving,stationary,and surprise argetsat unknown ranges-Havingsuccessfully completcd this siage, he soldier s ready to firefrom molkup A?Cs.

d. Training in firing liom APCS is nornJlly con-ducted by phloon, ulilizing the counly fair nefiod ofinstruction. Teclbiques vary according o the type ofA?C used.A nunber ofstrtions provide rainingaccord-ing to specidty Gifleman, machinegunner,RPG, andSA 7 gunnet, mountinganddismounting rom the A?C,and dryfidne exerciseswithin the vehicular mockup(Figure 30). Thc training progrcsscs from station-arymockups to mockups mounted on a rocking ftarnc whichsimulates he movemenrof APCS. he men are trainedto fire through the firing ports and, in the older modelAPCS,over the sides of the vehiclewhile the vehicle sstationary and on the move- Antitank grenadiers ndSA-7 gunnersmay fife from the halt or on the move at1ow speedswhen the ground s farrly level. APC driversare trained to providea slablcplatform tbr lhose1iring.

c. Riflemcn also rcccive nstruction on the coordinated use of infartry weapons ire againsl allackingaircrrfl- A varicty of aircrdft haining aids arc uscd 10teach rapid idcniificalion ol thc air largc! and to hclpthe rifleman anticipatcaircraft mancuvcrs.

Figure 0. Training n firing rom an APC.32


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41. RPKandP(M TrainingMachinegun training ollows much the sane sequcncc srifle trdning. Wren the gumer progresses o tuing frominside ihe APC. he is rlughr how lo conrpensateorvehicLar movement. He also practices dismounlcd$sault tue. holding his weapon at hip lcvel and firing

42. Antitank Traininqd. Thc SoviersbeLievehat il tukes disciplincd,wel-

trained, and psychologcrly prepdred roops to engage

armor successfully. ntitank training attenpls to buildboth confidence and proficiency in combating armorand is usualty done in a county fair manner.Differentshlions teach characleristicsof tanks and arnroredvchiclcs. and conduct practical exerciseswith antitdkgrenades, PC'S nd mines Fisur3l ).b. RPG gunnersarc lraincd to lirc ai stationary andmoving tank silhouelles which measureapproximatclythreeby five mclcls.

Figure 1. Antitankraining.


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e ATCM (Sagger) unners sullly conduct rainingon m elcctric imulatormountedn I ZlL,l57 var. Realmissiles rc rarcly fired. The SagScr annotbe firdeffectivcly uringdarknessecause f the problemofdcpthperception nd he acl lut fte effectiveange fthe nfrffcd sighting evices350400 rctcrs. hisdoesnot give lc gunncr noud tine to guide he missileoits targct(Figure32). Tlrc Saggermay, however, eeffctivclyrcd at nightwrth lluniralion. SaggerpeFators are caJefullyselectedand reportedly fire up to2300 simulated ounds o qualify as a gunner,Afirqualifying,Sagger unnersmay tuc 5060 simulatedroundra week o maintain roficiency.tt:|. SA-7T.ainins

4 SA-7 gunners re trainedon a simulatorwhereparamclcrs f movinS argets rangc,cou6e, fli8hr

velocity, altjtudc, and boundary of launch zone) arevisualy dispjaycd. Both target trackrng and r ssilclaunching are simulated-For dctcrmining thc rypc andidcntity ofair targels, ilhoucttcsarcused.,. Havhg learned how !o rccogrize targts. rhegunncr trairs wiih models placcdal diffefent dhtanceslnd courseangles. fthe trrgctl silhouette s equal o orlcss than the dialneler oI thc small cifcle on the frontsighl thc target is outside the launch zone. When thetargelovc ills $e cncle, he missilccanbe fired. Movingl ! rgel el iccrs arc sho$n r tuuugh hc u\e of nro! rngta.gel simulalon. After the gunncr first learns how totrack low vclocity targetson a horizonlrl counc, he istrained o track spinningand diing targets.

Figure 2. ATGM {Sagger)raining.


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c Cunne6 lre warned ,bout bcing ioo slow indctcrmining he novcmenl ol passagc l the targets l]dalso about bcnrg oo abrupt whenguiding he missilconto the iargel Aiter pressing lle iire switeh, thcre is !.hn,r J . lJ) bclure l ,emrr \ e r [cs r l rdurc JJr .

d Very littlc t known about t}e conrrol anoemploymeni of tlrc sA.7s. coordination and employ-ment depend upon th mission, elrain. enemy, and

Figure . SA 7 (SAM) t ra in ing.44. SniperTraininsFor snipetS, hc Soviets -avor renwho possessrcellcnlvision and hcadng,good menrory,and qLrick eactions.Trlining lbr snipers s conductedperiodicrlly a d l stsliom one and a half to tvo months. Sniper targclsmcntn)nedby the Sovicl military press ncludc officels,observers, rnlitank ,nd reooiucss fle crcws,machincgunncrs!crews of disablcd anks, and low'flying hclicopters. Initialy, the Soviet sniper conccntratesontargctsvirich are holding up attackingunits(Figure34)-

Figure 4. Snipertraining.45. BIVIPrainingBMP rcw ]ternbersec.i!esi \ nror!hs raining r specialtrainirgunitsprior 1o rcponing o their u it. TrainingincludcsBMPcquip rcnt, 1ac1ics,oliiicalnrstrLrction.CBRwarlrre. ivcr crossings.rd physicalruhing.Oniytlre BjUP eommander! crosrtmined.Tlc BMP ispresenlcd10 traineesas a fast. lrmorcd. all-tcraiitmnsportf nd a obile bascol iirc 1brdiynountedinfant.y. Dismountingnd remountinghe vchicle rcdoneal t shorthalt or on thc move. he ehiclcslovs oapproxnutcly ivc krn/hour ndbolh rcardoors no urccommandcr'salch ale opcned. hc comnranderitsrhougi rc top of the BMP, while the sqLrad xrtsthrougfidre eafdoors. he sIlP hen olows hcsquadal a dislanccof 400-500neters. and may nole byboundswith other BMP'S. sing irc and nrovenent.Nornnllythe BMPengages ir STOP, 'IRE ndMOVIpaatcrn. inng hc nraingunon the move s inrccuraledue 10 the lack of a gunslabililer.Whenahe quadsready o renrounlhcvehicle.hcplatooncader otifiesthe BMPS10 com ltrward. Tle Btr{Pdrivessiowlyfiroughdleskirmishi]tcpicking p thesquad Dembers.Mounling nddismounling heBMP n thisnanncr akesapproxnnatly0 sconds.

36


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46. BTRTrainingBTR tratring at comp,ny evel s similar o BMP rain-ing.T]rccounty air method f insruction senrployedwith individualc.ew and squadnrembed int beins

specirllies, progressinSronrnockups and nndly to the

rlained in their separxLefixed mockups 1{) movingBTR.

Sectionll. MORAL-POLITICALRAINING

The primary reasonsbr the heary enphasison what thcSoviets erm "moral-poliUcd" training are to maintainparty control over the Armed Forcesand to prepare hepopuhce foi modrn wa!. As Marshal Sokolovski

Tne preprationof tbepopularionn fte noralipoliti!:t aspecl asdecisivenportancen presenlday condilions.ince he pplication l neans fnass ilestruclidn n vr inposcs very lnEh,previously .hcrd of demmds n thc political-mor.l m,t-upof thpopulation.Such mining s an mportrnl parl of the overallcfforl toprepare or CBR warfrre. Thc ideologic prcparationofLhe roops at company cvel s theprirnaryresponsibilityoftie deputy comnranderbr political :rffrirs.

48. The Deputy Commander or PoliticalAffatsThe deputy comnander for poljtical affairs, wHieutiljzinghis own separate hain ofcommand (he reportsto thc batralion political officer), is responsibleo rheconpany commander or the orSanizalionmd statusofparty-polilicalwork in rhe unit. He is aided by ofticersdnd enlisied party or Komsonrol nrembers n cachplatoon (Figure 35).49. ldeolosical nd Politi6l Traininq

d. Ai thc company cvc1daily idcolorjcal and politi-cal trainirg is tied in with nriljlary trainnrg. n additionto regularpolitical classes, fticers and efltistd arty orKOMSOMOL membersmust often spend Lheir "free"tinre incre:rsingheir polilical rwareness. s one Sovietsourcc nrdicared, "polirical sclf+ducation is nor a

personalnutter, but tlrc obligation of a mcmber of thcCPSU-",. crmpr, re'rel pdtirrca]rdeologrfr'lIrnrng ischiefly intended to do the fo owin8:(i) To pronrotesolidarity around thc commumstpariy and drc Sovictgovernrncnl.(2) To nrculcate personnelwith hatrcd for drcenemies f tl1cussR.

(3) To erstlre undersiandingol propcr security(4) To inform soldieNofrcccnt CPSUmd sovernment activities s well ar ntenational evenls.(5) To heighrcn hc disciplinemd politicalaware,nessof companymembers.

a. In addition, thc conpany politic,l officer trainshis assistantswithin thc phtoons and sections,helpsorganize compctitio betwen units. and aids in thedisplays n thc hnin roorn (everyuni. hassucha roomwhich combines he functionsofa readins oom,liblary,

37

Figure 5. Politicalndoctrination ession.


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c. Thc Sovieisrely on traffic legulators Ofganic oregimentand division) o guide heir fonnations FiSure38). Traffic regulaiors iont boih reginnr ,nd divisionmole witi reconnaissance lenrentsor advancegual.lunils to mark roules and dilect the rdvdncing olu'nns 1criiical points alorg the route. Melhods of tr nsporta-tion used by lrdflic rcgulatds lncludc moto.cycls,jeeps,light rucks dnd APCS-53. TraininsWe cannot determinchow ruch and navigationrainingis conducred al the compdny cvcl. Duc to the secunlycLassificalionsf nriiitary maps t is quilc possible hatliule map Lrrining s conducted and lhat nap rcadingskillshale sL!ffercd ccordingly.

54. Exercise nd CompetitiveSportsa. Ttc.soldiers' rrrining day nornrally begins with

about 30 minutes of cdisthenics (Fjsufe 39). Troopsreceive about 150 hours of physicai faining per year.Monthly physic fitness training schedules utline thetype of cnlisthenics ior cach day.b. Cornpetiriveathletics play an impo({nt pan inihc company conditioning prcgram and are integr{tedwilh physical raining. The conrpanycommander,aidedby his sporis organizer and pady and KOMSOMOLorganizriions, is rcsponsible br scejng thal everyoneparticipates n sporis rctililles as laid dorvn by thcMilitary Sports Conrplexof the Anned Forces(MSC).MSC standards of achievement are nrcludd in thewekly rraining schedulc. Edch soldicr musi nccl thestandards et or his agegroup.

Section l . PHYSIcALTBAININGFigure 8. Traff c regulator.

39Figure 9. Physicalitnessraining.


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Section l l l . TACTICALTRAINING59. G6n6ml

d. Company.levelraining uildsup to battalionlcvclandhigher j(ercises.hat s, ntensivndividual, quad,andplatoonraininS nder hcSuidancef thecompanycommandcrrecedsompanylcvel xercises,hicharenormaly under .he supcrvisionof the battalion com-,. Excrcisesrdgidlycontroledby thenexthighcrechelon, nd require igl y detailed nd cngthypriorpreparationor successfulomplction. he engthandfrcqucncy of companycxcrcises arieswidely, bulusuallyhcydo nol go or more ha oncday.c Live ire sused some actical xefcises.rainingaids consisting of portable targetsof thc pop-up rndltationarytype rcFesentingmen and cquipmenl Irutilized.Thescids maybeusedn avarictyoloffensiveanddefensivconligurationso givc hc Soviet mallunitleadcr rai ing n runge stimalion,cmin apprecirtion,targetanalysis ndbattledrills.Some raining reas scconsoles hichcontrol moving argets, omeof whichhavc lrc ability to simulatc ctum fire.d Prcvalcnt tactical themes in the military pressconcern hc the co.duct of a march, he mcetingengaSemenl,nd ttackinga defensiveosition.Delcnsc

and retrogmde perationseceiveessattention.CBRtraining md the overcomnrgof enginerobstacles sincludedn most acticalraining xerciscs.

m. Squad actical raininsThe squad normaly rrains as part of thc platoon-Training enters poo ndividual eapons,quadlctics,Arc mounting and dismomting procdures,defenscagaiist CBR attack and lraining under specill condi-

51. Platoon actical raininsBattledrillsare hemain orrnof racticalrainingof theplatoonnd company. ctions f thesoldicrs,quad ndplatoonandhow thcy fit into the overall onp ny planare stressed.Phtoon lzcticai t.ahiry is .lso aimed attcaching he platoon leader o handlc v.rriousattachedunils. Plaloonmounted nddisinounledonnations recovercdbcfore the platoor conducts onlpany evel

62. company adicalTrainins4. Trainingat thc cotnpdnyevelcombincs quadandplatoonraining n fulf ling company bjcctives spartul $e ballal ion. oordinaledrc and mrneuvcr,nconjunction ith attached rmor, hemical,nginccr nd.artillery nits,are nrnsifiedn company allledrils.,. For training onducted nderspecial ondilions,

4t


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CHAPTER . THE V]OTORIZEDIFLESOUADSection. GENEBAL

53. MassionThe rine squ d h dre infantrv\ basic taclical unil. I1accomplishes ts missi.rnsby iire and movcmcnt .rsopposcd o fire 8nd nraneu!er.Thereare no firc rcanrs ndrc squad nrough ir normrll) fiBhts as part of rhemororiTed rifle plaloon, tne squrd may be given nde-pendentmissions. he squad:

d. Conducls econnaissancend combalpatrols.,. Acts as poirt, ltrrlk or rear secLlnty during !.. Prolidessecufity or forccsat a hall-d. Acts rs thc compmy rcserve.

64. Orqanizationd. Bolh tilc BltP-cquipped und BTR.equipped iflesquadshale n $sault strength of ci-qhlmcn: r squadleader. wo mrcNne gunncrs onc nachine sunnerandan extm AK[l rii]eman n the BTR-equipped nd lrlirmodel BluP-equ'pped quads),onc antitanl grenadier.and four rinemen.Tlvo ofthe four rillcncn arc assislanlmachjneSunners.and a thifd riilcman is an assisluntRPG-7 unner(Fisurc,10) .

,. The squad eader s anned with the AKN'Iassauttrifle: the lwo machinegunncrscdrry the PKM mrchinegun (lhe machine gunncr n the BTR and in thc crrlicrnrodelBMPrquippcdunits ue armedwilh thc RPK ighrm.c[ne gun); the anlilan] Eenldier is.nncd Nith botlrdrc R?C-7 and the PM pislol, and the four itlerDcn havethe AK,\I assaultdfle. Squad membersarc also armedwiUr grenades-

r. The approximalc baric oad for each squadmem-( l ) Squrd eader l20 rounds AKNI)(2) Two PKM mrchine sunneu 2,000 ri,unds.dividedanrong quadmenbers.(3) RPc-7 sunnef onc RtC.7 huncher, oncpistolwith 16 rounds.and fou| RPG-7 cunds.(4) Four AKM rillcncn each with 120 rounds(AKM). plussome of fie nachine gunammunition-Onerineman mi-qhtcary four additional rounds of RPC-7

65. Tacticsnere hasbeen no fadical chimge n Soviersquad acticsdespilenoticeable mprovcments n weaponr! and A?C

' 1 r I ' d#Figure 0. TheBTR-equippedif le quad.t 43


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Figure 2. B[IPs supporting quadsby ire. Figure . Tank born nfantry n the attack.

Sectionl. ITIOVEMENTO CONTACT67. GeneralDuring he rnovemcnto contact, he motonzed iilesquadmry bc assigned marchsecurityor ieco rais-sece mission.Normally, owever,t noves aspart oftheplatoon n the platoon'scolurn fonnation.58. MarchSecutity

a Vehicle nd oot marchcs rcconductdrimariiyat dghl or dunngother conditionsoflimited visibility. Ona march, lle squadmay be givena Poinl, flank, or rearscuritymission. pcndingpon he erain rnd condi-tions of visibilty, the squadcrrrier is separatedrom itsunit by up to 200 meters y daymd approximately0meteis at night or in forests. f disnounled, tlrc squadleader ends ut two-man atrolso the ront and lankto act as local sccurity along the line of movcment.These lementsperate t a distancef up to 100metersby day and 30 mete$ at niahi or in forests. W}rcndismounted during daylight hours, the squad lcadercontrolshismcnby arrnandhand ignals.,. Thc squad ttacks n I goupsofthe enemy,ndaakesprisoncn or attempts to desroy the enemy dndcontinue the rnarch. If drc enemy s too strong br ihe

squad to overcomc, it defendi and holds its position so'a4er url]ls can maneuvcr.

e Dudng the punuit, the squrd moves npidly tomaintain coniact. Ma\imum use is mrde of t]le APC, asrhesquadclbls muunredand rucs ftom lie caffier.

d The squad designatedas rear sccurity in thc marchfo ows behind the unit it is protecting !t a distunce of.oughly 200 meters.69. Re@nnai$ancePatrol

a. A reconnaissmce atrol js usualy composcdof areinforccdsquador a platoon(Figure44).

,. A squad in this role is often reinforced wi rchemicrl and cngineer roops. If dismounted. he patrolleader eceives ndio andpossiblya radio operator.r- The squad s assigned specific objctivcaru/orroute instad of a zone and operatesaway fron ilsparent unit al a distanc of rpproximately ighrkilomelrsduing the day and three kilomlersat night.(Thesc distancesaIe shortened wher the squad isdismounted)-The squad accomplishes ts mission bymeansof observatjonand mrneuvcr, but may engagin limired combar r necersary. (ludrnts reconndissancc

45


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by fire. The patrolJeader ives ach quadmember nob!rvation mission. Spcific individuals are rnadercsponsible or front, flanl, redr and overheadobscrvation.he ecoonaissanceatrol salso requentlyused o capture risonersor intelligencexploitatior.

d. Normaly the squadeader ersonallyeconnoitc$lhe obiectivc. He employs he squad o protcct himselfor to ensurehc completion f the mission y combar.Rcconnaissanceatroh normally maintain radio silence-lf enemy contac!occuls,however,hesquadeader haybrcak adio ilence nd reporrenemy trength,ocauon,andactivity.Sectionl .

70. Mounted ormationsMounted quads ove n variousplaroonormarionsseeChapter ).71. Dismountedo.mations

4. Dismounled, the squads have only twofotmations-- colunn and line.b. Whendismounted.he squadnomaly moves n

Figure 4. Squadon a night reconnaissance issionFORIVlATIONS

colurnJ facililating movementandcontrol. This forma-tion is also uied in rcstrictd enain and duringconditionsf limitcdvisibility.a Theskimish lne is th prescribedombat forma,don lt hasa frontage f 5060 met.6, with 6-8mctersbetwccnndividuals.he souadaders n thecentcr fthe Lineand has one of his PKM macline gunnersoneithcr sidc, hus cnsuring ight control (Figurc45).

l6s. l50-60m!!!

(O SquadleaderP MachinesunnetP f RPG.Tgunne lA Riflehan AKM)Figurerl5.Squadassauh ine.

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SectionV, OFFENSIVE CTION72. GeneralAn attack may bc launchcd ron thc ma.ch or whn rcontact with thc cncmy. In thc lattcr case, hc squadmovesas part of the plaioo to an initial posilionfromwhich it launches he attack. The depth of ihe attackdepends n ihc naturc of the defenses, nd tlle terrain. Asquad s assigned n attrck sector.T3 Troop LadinsProcedores

a Thc squad leader is taughl to issue r completeorder. In his oider, the squrd leader includes enernyinfornalion, to include ocationsof penonnel,weapons,and obstaclcs; he platoon ob.jectiveand dircction offurther attack: thc squad direction of ailack rndmission:missions f adjaccntsquads; he numberof tlietank (it tanks are attachcd to th platoon) which winattack in front of thc squad; locations of passagesthrough enemy obstacles, nd the procedures 0 bc uscdfor negotiating hemi procedures or tucs prior to and

during the attack; missions for t]rc squad machincgunncrs!APC gumcr, grenrdierand aulomatic riflcmcnduring the attack;conbat formation to bc uscd; lre timeof attack, signals, ,nd dcsignaiion of a second-in-

,. Due 1o his scanty training and short term olscrvicc, thc Sovict squad Ieader does not function inbatlle in thc as manv of his NATOcounterparts. n practicc, t is tl platoon leader v,housually ssus he squad ordcn. lt is the squad eader'sresponsibility to execule these orders whcn thc plaaoonleadercmnot overseehe squddt dclions.74. Conductof the Auack

,. When rttacking from a posilion of closecontact,rhe squad waits h ttr assault trench until its assignedtmk crosses the lrench, then folows it in the attack(Fisurc 6).

Figure46. Attacking rom aposition n closecontact-

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,. Whenattackingmounted rom the march, hcsquadassumcsts positionwithin one of the platoonformationsGe Chapter7). Movernent f thc squ,rdfrom thc departure osition o the assault osition snormallyconductd ndercover of artilery f]Jc. Ifforced to dismount, the squrd does so in dcfilade orwhil on the movc under coverof smokc,al a distanceof 500.1000meters rom the encmypositions. hascIinesarc used o aid the platoon eadern controlandfire supporr oordination.c. On foot, the squad ireson tlle move.On opcngound andwhilc underenemy irc, hesquadmovcs ybounds goupsof two-thee menundercoveringirc.Although covq is used, speed n thc rttack is stresscd.The squadeader ont roh rhe ircsof his macfuneunt2.nd antitank genadier. By concentrating he fires ofthesc wcapons nd by the useof traccn, the squadleader ndicates o his supportingA?C and platoonleaderparticular trongpoirts which re hindering isadvancc. rtilery forwad observersFOt allached othe platoon nd/or ompanymay hencal in supportingfircs on these arSets. f the squadcomcsunder enemy,rtillery or mortar fue, it advances apidly out of the

d Use of SupportingFifcs. The squadadvanccsunder he covcrof suppoiingartillcryJnd mortar irc.Soviet tactical doctrine emphasizcs peedn the attackand statcs hat casualties uffcrcd from fuendly adllcryare or y a fraction of tlrc casualties ncurrcd byinfantrymon who jag bhind in the attack. Thc drivermoves is vehicle y bounds rom onecoveredositionto another,attemptingo mdntain a stcadygun plal-fom for the gumer.Thgunner upportsheattackingsquad by fire and attmpts o kccp the squadeadcr n

e, Mutual Support. During t}le cou6e of thc attack,the squad cadcrwatchesheproSres! f adiacent quadsand takcs advantage f their progrcssnd fue to movehis own squad orward. If the adjacentsquadsare heldup,hehelpshmwitl hissquad'sire.

i Thc assault osition.Thesquadoccupies n assaultposition closc to the enmy. The squad cader then

rpeats he objectiveof the assault, cdistributsammu-nition, and marks(by use of tracen) targers o bcaltacked y APCandartileryfirc.75. Conduct f ihe AssautrOn the platooneader\signal,hesquadeadcr ivshecommand.PRIjPAREFOR THE ASSAULT."SquadmembeF heck heir wcapons,ix bayoncts nd cadytheir h"nd grnades.hen the squad eadergivcs hecommarrd lnto the assadtFORWARDI"Thesquad,firingon tie move, ttempt! o advanceapidlya NeSotiathg Minefield.Thc methodchosen ythe Sovietsqud to crossa minc field depcnds ponrhenaturc of the cnemy\ defensg,lre rerrain snd weathcr,and tank support. hc squadmay attackmountdordismounted, lthoughwhen attackingpositionswithantitanldefcnses,t will usually ttack ismounted.ig-ure47 llustratesourmcthods fdismountcdtrackwiththc squad arrier uppoflingheattackby tue. Examplconcshos thc squlda acUnghroueh narrow peningin thc mine neld without tank support. Whenattackingwith a tank,espcciallyn dccpsnow,hc squad sa ruleattack behind he ank n a columnoftwos ollowingnthe ank's racksexample ). In thc thhd xrmpleworifl squads ttaok n a columnof twosbchinda tank.Whenthe breach n the min field is suflicientlv widc,the squad ttack on line behinda taok utilizinets fultue powerto thc front (example4). Shodd the cnenyantitnnl defenscs e strong, fte infantry mav prcedethe ank, whichwirh th A?Cs,wouldsupport y fire.b. Assault f tle Objective. hen hesquads within20-30meters f thc enemyposition,t movesnto thefinal assault ndattemptso destroyheencmy n closeconbat. Upon discoveringa weak point in the encmypocition, h squadprcssesorward.

c Consolidation.f the assaults repulsed y theenemy, he squad onsolidatesnd digs n. The squadleader, eor$nizcshis squad,attempts o neutralizeenemy ire and, in cooperationwith adjacent nits,

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to a o.-.P TKO Sqlad eadr A

Figure 7.Squad(s) egotiat ing minefield.49

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76. Battleor Ra!rve ositionrf rhe Deteffea. Majntaining he Momentum.When h enemy'sforwardpositions avebccnoverrun, he battlc or therescrve ositions egins. hesquad ttemptso exploitexisting o.tifications nd lo hi l the enemy rom theflanks and rcar- Ernphasiss placcdon naintaining themomentum f theattack.,. RepellinSEnemy Counterattacks. uring rhjrphaseof thc battle, the squad s alert for enmycountcrattacks.t engagescounleradackbyue andbyassault spa( of thc platoon.whenadjacent nitsarecounterattacked,hesquad ssisls ili lire, bul docs otdackenls advance. oviet acticrldoctrine tresscshatthc best defcNe against a slowdown in racricalmonlenlums 3nadvancen anysector.

77. Pu6uitThc squad's PC s caled orward y thplatooneader.Thc squad enrounlsndpuNucshe enenry. yplssingindividualstrong points-Thescwil be attackcdbyscondechebn (reserve)orcesdesignatedor thispurpose.Retrealing nemy orccsarc engagedy tie

78. R.id andAlnbu3hOther forms of offensivc ombat conducted y thesqudd, itler reirforcedor aspart of the platoon,arcraids ndambushes.a. the Raid(l) A laid is usuallycarriedout on foot andconsists f a concealcd pproacho an objective ndasudden attack to captureprisoners, ocuments, requipmcnt.Wheneverossiblche raid is conducted tnight or underothcr conditio oflimted visibility.(2) Prcparations or the raid and ambush aJeconductedn dtajlandsecrecy. orties y smrllgoupsmiy be made o gather oute andobstaclcnforrnation,while reheaBrlssreheld n rcar arcas-(3) the raid elcrnent usui y organizednto anobstaclc learinS roup,an assaultoup rnd a securitygloup-Thc obslacle learingor.lpconsistsf attachedsapperscombatengine6) ho clearandmarka paththrough bstaclesnd emain t thegap o act as guides,The security group may consist of additional nflemnattachd o the squad or the mission.A rcinforced

squadwould alsobc given radioandposibly a ndiooperator.Raidsarc lupporld by artillery firc. TIc.ssault lement altack the obiective dircdy andcaptures risoners. he sec|.laly lcmentprovidesiresupportor theassault lcment.(4) Due to thc cornplexity of a raid and thedegrec of leadership aled for, the patrol leadeprobabfy i5 a career NCO, prapotxhchik, ot tuniorofficef. He is normaly in the assaultelementof theparor_(5) A juniurcommander. hensilen tJlemi\sronto conducta raid, organizesontinuolsobservationfrhe objective aJer, makesan cstimatc of the situationand ssues isorder, which ncludeshc followhg:

(a) Enemy eploy,nent.(b) MissioDndnethodof cxecution.(c) Compositionnd tasks f patrolelement(d) Referenceoints.(e) Proccduresor themovc ndactions uringtheattack.(l) Withdrawal procedurcsand actions to befollowed h caseof an unexpectedencounter with thc(g) Pfocedures for requesting artilery andmortar re.(h.) Procedureor cdualty evacuation.(i ) Patrol eadeis osi.ionwithin hepatrol.C) Signals or control.(k) Second-in{ommand.(6) Upon completion f the mission,he assauelcment withdraws ilst, followed by the securityclemenl(s)and finrlly the obstaclc-clearinglemenShould he 3ctivitics f the assault roupbe djscoverejt withdraws ndcroverof the security roupandcallsfor artillery and mortar fire iI needed.,. TheAmbush-(l ) Soviet writings define rn ambushas ftecarefully onccaledisposinon I a unit ar a previousl

desiSnaredosjlion or rhepurposef makin8 surprhcattack on the nemy n ordr 10 captureprisonerdocuments, weapons, and military equipmenAmbushes re set up along the enemy'sprobablmovement routes, along corununication and rcsupplylines, rafficcontrolpoints, tc.(2) A squadgivenan ambushmissionmayconsistof assoult,ecuity, andobservationlementsndmight50


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be reinforced ith additional ersonnel d cquipment.(3) Upon ardvingat the ambushocations,hepatrol eadcrorganucs bserlation nd a ocatesasks,

(a) Referenceoints(b) Enemynformation(c) Posittuns f the patrolnembersand hil(d) Procedures of opcring fire, takingprisoners,cizing ocumcntsndequipment,pcrational

proceduresshould the palrol be discoveled,andobslacleso bc cstablished.(4) Using fe-a(angdignals,bserven arn hepatrol leadcrof the cnemyl approach. he enemy sallowed o enter the cenler of thc patrcls'scctor,atwhich time th ,mbushcomnrcnces.pon complelionof the mission,he patrol eturnso itsdeploymentreaor conducrs thernrissions.(s) the ambush arrol eaderwouldprobably en NCO.pmpotthcllik, ot junior officer.

Section . DEFENSIVE CTION79. GeneralThesquad oes n thcdefensivespan ofthe platoonnordcr o repulsc n rttack, nflict osss,oldandcreatefavorable onditionsor resuming reattrck.Defensetlhc squad lcvcl stressesanti-CBR and antitank

80- TroopLeadins roceduresAlthough he squad eaderm y issue etailednstruc.tions to his squadafter reccivinghe plaioon eader'sordcr,usurly the platooncader ssueshc order o aIpersonnel.Tlle squad lcader supe iscs to ensurccornpliance itn thc order.An obscfter s postcd oprevcntsurpriseihc platoon, quad nd rdjacentunitmissionsare cxplainedlcontact is established ithadjacnr quadri h lenain in the assignedctor sstudied nd cachman assigned mission:ieldrof iitcare clcired: prim.ry and alternnteiringpositions, li ltrenchcs nd connectingrenchcs re dug. Referencepoints, he areaof obscrvation,he principal ector ffirc and secondaryctors hich overlflp he fieldsoffire ofadjacent quads,redesignated.81. TheSquadDef.nsive ontion

a. Thc motorized ifle squ,d dcfends spaft of drephloon and occupies frontageof 50'60 merers innuclear onditions p to 150mte$).Thcsquad ngagesth enemy orwardof, andon ftc llmks of, thcptatoonposition.Theposition aswcapons ils or themachinegun crewsand the antitank grenadier, overcddittuenches hich hold up to four people. vo to threc

recessedits for ammunition, nda latrinc Figure 8)-lf rhesquads nor h conracrwilh theencnry. nSineelequipmentsuch as the MDK.2 dirch digger romregjment Figufe49) may be used o dig the squadTheemplacemenlo. the APC ouldbeprcpared y uscof explosivesr othcrengineerquipnent. f a ditchingmachinc s not rvailable, hesquadutilizes L\es, shovcls,crowbrn,andentrenchingools10prcpareic position.lndividudl oxlolesdd firingpositions ndanemplace-ment for ihe A?C are dug first- A squad renchconnecthghe ndividual ositionss t]n constructed.Revetmcntsre used o reinforcebe tench systemfthe soil is unstabl.The squaddefensiveosition sesrabtishedccording ro the pdnciplesoutlined inChapter .,. AI or partof tlle rifle squadmay ct asapirtoonsecurity lemento delay nddisorgaDizeheenemy ndto give warning of bis approach.Normaly the securityelemcnts locarcdabout600 mcters y day and 200metersby night away rom t]rc platoonposition.Thesquad le dcr/securitycoDnandcr placesa senlineiforwrd of the securitypositionat a djrtance f 100metenby day and 50 mciersat night.Whcn he enemyapproachcs,he mcn commcneiring and atlempt odelay he eneny advance ithout prolonged ombai.The security lement ilhdraws n orderoflhc outpostcommmdcr r accordingo apreanangedlan.c. Positions re estrblishedn key tcrrain o blocklikely encnry vcnuesof approlchwhilegiving hesquadm -\imumcovcr ndconcealent.


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KEY1. cove@d ningposition.3. Machinesunnins osilio.. 9. F i.s po.irionot squd APC.4. Ahernareachinesu.osnion. 10.Ldine-

Figure . The squaddelensive ositionprepared ith engineersuppon.

7. M6chineo0niins posirion.8. Ahehai. machinesunnrinoosirion

12. Ahemate nrino positionfor 3quad APc.

d Pioper dispersion n thc defcnse llows or protec-tion from weaponsof mass destruction. In a nuclarenvironrnentthe squad frontag is increascd o 150e. All-round defense s assued by prcparation ofprimary, lternate,ndsupplemcntaryositionr.t Antitank defenss providcdby the BMP with its

73mm gun and Sagger issjlesand by tle squadgrenadier.A squadt AIC may be in the rniddleof thedefensivcosition, n aflank,or up to 50 metcrs chindtheposition.Should he squad situatcd lorgagoodarmor avenue of approac:h,drc squad could receiveadditional upport rom he battahontanlitank latoon.The platoon lcader would position and control anyttachedantitank wcapons.& Coordinated fires ar planncd by inte ockingsquad fucs wilh thc fires of adjacent units arrd bycoveringal l gaps n the squad's ectorof fiie withconcentratcd rontal, flanlong,and obliquefires. Squad

fires are also supplcmentedby artillery and mortarconcentations, which cover dead space and likelyenemy venuesf approach. squads tssigned oth asectorof fire and a linal

Documents

The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company