The Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion

8/8/2019 The Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion

1/149

DDB.lrettt-78

DEFENSE NTEIIIGEIICE REPORT

THESO\TETMOTORTT.FDRIFITBATTALION

SEPTEMBER978


2/149

TIIE SOWET MOTORIZED RIFII BATTALION

DDB-11dt197-78

InformationCutoffDate:Z) Decmber197,

Thisoublication uDersedesSovist Tactics: The Motorized nifle Battalion.AP-1-22G3+04,November 964,which shouldbedestroyed.

Thi. i5a Depa.nnmr of Osl6ns6 f,rellisene Docum6nrProacd bv th. Sovi.Vw.r$w Pact Divbion.Oiroctoralo or Int.llig.nc. R...!rch, Defen* Intelligenco Ag6ncyauthor: Mdor FoblnM. Frasche,Tacljcand Or$nl!8don Secrion,G,olnd Forc. Bdnch


3/149

PREFACEThis study, a follow-up to Ihe Soviet Motorized Rifle Company{DD|-1100-7/-76},was written to familiarize he reader with the organization.training, actics, and equipmentof the Souet motorized ifle banalion(lvlRB). twas especiallywritten for troops, troop commanders,unit intelligence fficers,

seruice chools,and othercwho equire et8iled nowledge f the SovietMRB.The study concentrates n the operationsof those MRBSequippedwhh theBMP (infantrycombat vehicle). The organization, raining, tactics, and equip-ment of the BlvlPequippedMRB are analyzedwithin the context of Soviet doc-trine. Soviet actical rends since he October1973War are also considered. hescopeof the study is restrictedo thoseoperations nuclear nd nonnuclear) ele-vant o northern nd centralEurope,Studies which address n greaterdetail some of the subiectscovered n this'L Soviet Offensive Doctine: Combined Atms Operations Veaus Antitank

Deterses U), DDI-1100'1386, July 1976.2. Soviet TacticalTrcndsSince the October gn Wat (Ul, DDI-11@-160-77,Aoril 197/.3. TheSovietMoto zed RifleCompanyul, DDl1100--n76,October1976.4. Soviet Military Opeetions in Built-Up Areas (U), DDI-1100-I5S77, uly1977.5. Soviet and Warsaw Pact niver Crcssing: Doctine and Capabilhies lulDDI-1150-7-76,eptember 976.6. Evaluation of Soviet Night Combat Capabilhies U), DDI-1i00'173-7/,

February 978.7. SovietAmphibiousWaiare CapabilitiesUl, DDI-I200-74-76, ay 1976.8. SovietTactical evel oglstlcs {U), DDI-1150-co1+n,Decetnbet gn.9. Soviet FieldAnilery Tacticsand Techniquesul, {DDB-1130878to bepublished).

Addressees re requested o lorward informationwhich will supplement r cor-rect this report, Ouestions6nd commentsshould be refered in writing to theDefense ntelligence gency ATTN:DA-184),Washlngton,D.C. 20301.


4/149

SUMMARYlll Soviets tress he decisive atureof the offensive nd emphasi2ehe meetingengagementmore hana.y other ypeof offensive ction, High ratesof advance re anticipatedrom the actionsof combinedarmsunirsoperatingnconiunctionwith airborne, irmobile, nd special perationsorces n theenemy eararea.Since he October1973War, the Sovietshaveplacedevenmoreemphasis n combinedarmsoperations,and have nadenumerous rganizational nd tacticaladjustmentso increasehe suruivability f their tankforces.The ank ramainsthe ackbone l combined rmsdoctrine.Though relativelysmall, the BMP-squipped dRA is highly maneuverable nd possesses onsiderableorganic irepower,particularlyn antitankweaponry.The MRB is often augmentedby motorized ifle regi,rnentand/or divisional ssets o form a heavily einforced ombinedarmsgrouping o carryout a varietyofThebattalion ommander's ge, education, ndpolitical wareness rovide he theoretical asis or effec-irve command.Frequent ield rainingand engthypeacetime ommandassignmentsartially ffset his ackot combatexperi6nce. hough echnicallywell rained, he IMRB ommandef f ten ails o exploit he strongpointsof his menand equipmentduring iold exercises.Moreover,his nitiative s constrictedwithin narrowparamete.s y institutional nd operational onstraints.Eattalion-levelraining is highly centralized, tressesundmentals,and results n effectivebattle drill."Moral political" raining,while boring or many, s probably ffeclive.TrainingeffectivenessscomplicatedbY he 2vsar ermofservice,The MRB s capableotconducting perations nderspecial onditions, lthough heamountofsuch trainingvaries ccording o geographicocation nd mission,Th BlrP-equippedMRB normallyoperatesas part of the regiment and is mosr effective when soemployed.Discrepanciesetween octrineandpractice avebeennoted n severaltypes f fulRB perations.Thesediscrepancios,longwith constraints n battalionlevel eadership,esult n vulnerabilitieshich mayb erDloked v Western ommanders,


5/149

TABLEOFCONTENTS

S U M M A R YCHAPTER.CHAPTER,SectionASecrionBSeclionCCIiAPTER.:8APTER .SectionASecrion

SectionDSHAPTER.SectionASectionB

CHAPTER.SectionASeciionCSeciionOSecdonE

SHAPTER.SecrionASectionCHAPTER.SecrionASectionBSectionCSectionD

SectionF:HAPTER .

INTFODUCTIOND OC TR |N E , TA C T |C S , TR E N D S. . . . . . . . . . . .- Doctrine . . . . , . , . , .

- TacticalTrends inceThe Oclober 973WarTHEMOTORIZEDIFLE IVISiON ND \4OTORIZEOIFLE EGII\4ENTTHEMOTORIZEDIFLE ATTALION- Op8rational rinciplsnd vlissions . . . . . . . .- Organization, sponsibilities,nd EquipmentCommand nd ConrolBattalionRearServicesBATTALION EVEL EADERSHIP. , . . . . . . . , .- Iniroduction- Th e H is t o r i ca lP e rsp c t i ve. . . . .- The PresentB A TTA L I ON I R A I N I N GA N D S U B U N I TTA C TI C S. . . . . . . . , . , . . . . .- TrainrngPhilosophy nd Obiectives- TrainingSchedules . .Company ndSection raining ndTact icsB a t t a l i o n Ta c t i ca lT ra h in s. . . . . . . .Evalu8tionofatalionTraining... .TH E M OTOR I ZE D R I FL E B A TTA L I ON I N C OM B A T. . . . . . . . . , . , . , . . . .Offen6iveOperations- DefensiveOperation6

337

12

252526365257575759@7071719o

APPENDIXSoviet ymbols, . . . . . . . . . , .13s

v1 1


6/149

1 .2 .

LISTOF LLUSTRATIONS

S o v ie t f f e n s i veo c t r i n esB a se dnC o m b in e drm sC o m b a t . . . . . . . . . 3Airborneand eliborneroops reSelct ivelysed o Maintain ffensive omefltum ... . . . . . . . 4a . A i r b o r n er o pn h eE n e m y e a rA re a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4b . H e l i b o rn eo rce s u sh oE s t a b l i shB r i d g e h e a d. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .BasicFormsof Maneuve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5a . F r o n t a l A t t ac k . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . sb . S h a l l o w n ve lo p m e n tS i n g l e ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5c . D e e p E n ve lo p m e n t ( D o u b le ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5The MeetingEngagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6B a t t a l i o n A n t i t a n kR e se rve sR e sp o n d D i re c t l y t o t h e B a t t a l i o n C o m m a n d e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .a . A n t i t a n k es e r v e sna B TR -E q u ip p e dn i t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8b. ABIMPEquippedvlotor izedif leBattalion nt itank eserve .. . . . . . . . 9T f a f f i c e g u la t o r sA ido m m a n d e rsnC o n t ro l l i n gh e i r n i t s . . . . . . . . . . . 9The Regimental hiefof Artillery on he right)Coordinates egimental nilleryDuringP h a se n e i r e , , , . , . . . . . . , . , , r oH ig h P e r f o rm a n ce A i r c ra { t i n S u p p o r t o f t h e M a in A t t a ck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1The MotorizedRifleDivision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Th e l v l o t o r i ze d R i l l e D iv i s i o n ' sP r i n c ip a lw e a p o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4a . 7 6 m m i v i s i o n a lu n , I S3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4b . 1 o o m m A Tcu n ,. 4 - 5 5 / 12 . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 1 4c . 1 2 2 m m o w i t ze r ,4 -1 9 3 8 / D -3 0 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4d . 1 2 2 m m o cke t a u n ch rI M 1 . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 . 1 5 2 m m o w i t ze r ,- 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5f . FR OGTE L , FR OGT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1s . GA I N FU L TE L ,A 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 1 6The MotorizedRifleDivision'sPrincipal quipment . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16a . T r u c k , i n eD e t e c t o r ,im . . . . . . - . . . . . . . , . , . , . , . 1 6b. Tracked erry,GSP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16c - P o n t o o nM P nK R A Z . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6d . T r a c k e dm p h i b i a n ,6 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. i 7e. lr.4ine learerBTR-5oPK,\r-1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17f . t ! 4 i n e f a y e r ,P ,A rm o re d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7g . T r u c k , e co n , M S -6 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8The ,lotorizedRifleRegiment B[IP-Equipped) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Prin ipalWeapons n the MotorizedRifleRegiment BlvlPEquipped) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19a . M e d iu m Ta n k , T - 6 2 1 6 4 / 7 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1b . l 2 2 m m PH o w i t z e r . . . . . . . . 2 0c . 2 3 m m PA A Gu n , S U -2 3 -4. . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0d . S A I \ 4S A -9 I GA S K |N . . . . . . . . 2 1e . A TGM a u n ch e rve h i c l e A T. . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1Principalquipmentn heMotorized if leRegimentBlvlP-Equipped).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21a T r u c k , e c o n , R S1 4 . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 15 Truck,Decon,DDA-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21: . B id g e , a n k a u n ch e d ,\ 4 TU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1a B r i d ge , T r u c k L a u nc h e d , T l \ r l \ r . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2e. Ditching vlachine{ 1 ) \ 4 D K - 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2(2) lvlDK in Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 . D o z e r ,A T / B A l - l v l / P K - T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3g . M i n e l e a r i n gl o w , l \ 4 T - 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3" . M i n e a y e r ,o w e d , M R '3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3. M i n eR o l l e r ,l v l T - s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3

5.6.7.8.9.10.

r t _

' 2

'a


7/149

1 5 .Th e v lo t o r i ze di f l e a t t a l i o nB M P -E q u ip p e d }, . . . - . . . - . . . . . . . .16. PrincipalWeapons nd Equipment f TheMotorizedRifleBattalionBMP-Equippod)a. lmmm Mortarb . 8 M P . . . . . . . . . . . .c. Truck,UAZ-@d. Truck,GM-66e. Truck, IL130f . T ru ck , a n , l L iM a in t e n a n ce ). . . . .g. Truck, POL 4,000or5,200Liters}h. Truck, FieldKitchen,VanPAK-200 . .i. Ambulance,UAz-450j. Trailer-lrounrEd ieldKitchen.KP-1251 7 .B a t t a l i o n H e a d q u a r t e r s. . . , . . . . . . . . . . .

1 8 .Th e \ ro ro r i ze di f l e o m p a n yB M P -E q u ip p e d ). . . . . . . . . . .19. The Monsr Battry2 0 . Th oC o m m u n ica l i o n sla t o o n. . . . . . . . . .21. nepresentativeommunications et n a MotorizedRitleBattallon22. TheUseof LineCommunicarionsya rotof ized it leBattalionn heDetens . , . - . . . . . . . . . . . . .23. MotorizedRifleBsttalionRearServiceElemontsn anAssmblyAret24. MotorizedRifleEanalionRearServiceSupportEiements uring he March - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25. RearServiceSupportDuring he A$ack26. RearSeruiceSupport n the Defense27. TheSupplyPlatoon28, Ammunit ion esuppl yo theCompaniesn heDefense .. . . . . . . .2 9 . R e lu e l i n gh e v lo t o r i ze di f l e a t t a l i o n ' so m b a t l e m e n lsu r i n g t h 6 a r ch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . .30. TheSupplyPlatoonDelivering ood o AuackingCompanias3 1 . D i v i s i o na k e r y e rso n n e l. . . . . . . . . . . . ,3 2 . T h e M e d i c l A i dt a t i o n . . . . . . . .3. MedicalEvacuation uringan Attack . . . . . . .3 4 . T h s R e p a i r w o r k s h o p, . . . . , . . . , . . . . . ,35. Repair ndEvacuation f Weapons nd EquipmentOuring n Atack3 6 . S e n io rS o v ie t \ A / V l lC o m m a n d e rsw e re F le x ib le , E n e rg e t i ca n d Fu l l o f l n i l i a t i ve . . - . . . .a. Marshal hukov,Chielof the Gener6l tafl n Erly 941 nd DeputySupremeCommander

2I22a2aBE333I&g

cl

44

a65

Thereafter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5b . F ro n t C o h m a n d e rsE re m e n ko , K o n e v . R o ko sso vsky , a n d T im o sh e n ko . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37. Unti lOctoberl94l,TheUnitPolit icalOff icerHadToCountersignTheCommender'sOrders..38. Batt6iionCommanders reYoung vlenwith Considerablgeacetime ommandExperience. . . . . . . 5*). The Regimental ommander ndHisStaff Erercise ight ControlOver4.41.42.4ii.4,,15.

Subo r d ina ten i t s . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . , . . . 54ARepresen ta t i veS ix -MonthTra in ingSchedu le lo raBMP-Equ ippedUn i t . . . . . . . .A Typicalweek-Dayraining chedul . . . . . . . . 6TheMo(arBattery ommandert HisForward bsrvationost . . . . . . . . @FlagSignals sed y he vlonar attory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6The vlortarattery uringthe arch ..-...... @a. AsPanof the a t ta l ionormat ion . . . . . . . . . 6b. BatteryMarchOrder - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 6Mor ta ra t t e r yep loymen tr om heMar ch. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .


8/149

4 6 . v f o r t a ro s i t i o nn h eD e f e n se. . . . . - . - . . . . . . u4 7 . Oo e ra l i o n so f t h eo r t a r a t t e r v ' so rw a rd b se rva t i o no s t . . . . . , . , . , , 6 54 8 . M o r a l - P o l i t i c al T r a i n i n g i n a C om b i n e d A r ms U n i t P r i o r t o a nE x e r c i s e . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .49. Combined rms Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . - . 6s5 0 . Ta c t i ca f lM a rchrd e ro f av lo t o r i ze di f l e a t t a l i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 7251. Control ileasuresDuring he March . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 735 2 . V e h i c l e sa rei sp e rse dn dC a m o u f l a g e du r i n g o n g a l t s - . . . - . . . . . . . 7 453. SecurityDuring he March . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . 7E54. SA-7GunnersAreThe MotorizedRifleBattalionCommander's rimary/lsansof Air Defense . . . . . . 7855. NBCReconnaissancesConducted y lvlotorized illeBattalion ssetsand/orbyBRDM-Equipped pecialistsfrom egiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 795 6 . C h e m ica le r co n n e la r k i n gC o n t a m in a t e dre a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 95 7 . C o n d i t i o n se a d i n goa , 4 e e t i n gn g a g e m e n t. . . . . . . . . . . . .. , . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 8 058. A ReinforcedMotorizedRifleBattalionConducting lvleeting ngagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 825 9 . S o v i e t F i g u . es f o r N A T O D e fe n s i v e P o s i t i o ns . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 8 360. Art i l lery upportor First chelon attal ionsinthereakthrough .. . . . . . .8461. A ReinforcedMotorizedRifleBattalionDeployingrom he lvlercho Panicipatena Division

B re a k t h ro u g hp e ra t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . E aU Z-2 a n g ao re o rp e d o . . . . . . . . 8 9T a n k s C l e a rre a ch e sTh ro u g hi n e i e l d so r I o t o r i z e di f l e T r o o p s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . @T h e / l o t o r i z e di f l e a t t a l i o nn h eD e f e n se . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4A R e in t o r ce d lM o t o r i ze d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n A c t i n g a s t h e Fo rw a rd A re a S e cu r i t yFo rce . . . . . . . . .. . 9 7A ReinforcedN4otorized ifleBattalionActing as h RearGuardDuringa RegimentalWhhdrawal . . . s9R e l i e fnP l a c e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 1T h s J r b a n i z a t i o na c t o r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . r 0 3A R e in f o r ce do t o r i ze di f l e a t t a l i o nt t a ck in gB u i l t -U p A re a . . - . . . . . . . . . 1 0 5Combat-in-Cit iesxercises. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. - . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106Flamelhrowerersonnellay n mportantRolsin rbanCombat . . . . . . . .107A Reinforced,4otorizedif leBattalion efendinga uilt ' lJpArea .. . . . . . .10A B TR -E q u ip p e d M o t o r i ze d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n P re p a r i n g f o ra H e l i b o rn e Op e ra t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . .I n e FL U U b E H S e n e s r ro v rd e A f -Gro u n d S u o D o n , , , , . , , , . , . , . , , , . , . , , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , , , 1 1 0H e l i c o p t e r c u ns h i p / T r o o p C ar r i e r s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . i 1 1a . H I N D . . . . . . . . . . . . - . - . - . . . . . . . . . .. . . . i 1 1b . H t P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . l ] 1Th eH OP L I TEe r f o rm sa c t i ca le co n n a i ssace . . . . . - . - . - . - . - - . . . . . 1 1 2Th e H I P C a n C o n d u c t A e r i a l l v l i n e la y in g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 2Th eH e a vyT ra n sp o r te l i co p t e r ,O oK . . . . . . . . . r 1 3C o m m u n ica t i o n sn heA sse m b lyA re a . , . . . . . . 1 1 4A M o t o r i z e d Ri f l e B a t t a l i o ni n a H e l i b o r n e As s a u h . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . r r 5Recon aissancef BothRiver an s Jsually recedeshMainAssult. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117T h e s e n i o r E ng i n e e r o f f i c e r c on l r o l s t h e C r o s s i ng . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 1 1 8S e l f P r o p o l l ed A r t i i l e r y a n d z SU - 2 3 - 4 s S u pp o r t i n g a R i v e rC r o s s i n g . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .T-62sPrepaing or a RiverCrossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119SA-TGunnersSupplementOtherAirDefenseWeaponsDuringaWater-crossingoperation... . . . .A Reinforcedvlotorized ifleBattalionAssauhing WaterBarrier nd Establishinga B r i d g e h e a d - . - . - . - . 1 2 1AttachedArmor Rejoinsvlotorized ifleTroopsAs SoonAs Possiblena RiveFcrossingOperation . , . . , . , . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122A R e i n f o r c e dM o t o r i z e d R i fl e B a t t a l i o n De f e n d i n g a Ri v e r L i n e . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . , . . . . . . . . l 2

62.63.u.66.67.68.69.70.71 .72.73.14.75.76.n.74.79.80.81 .a.u.85.86.41 .88.

x1


9/149

89. A Roinforced Motorized Rffl6 Battalion Conducting a Night Attack . . . , . , , .12Sn. A Reintorced Motorized Rifle Battalion in a Night Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2991. Naval nfantryon Paraden Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . .1392. Naval ntantryOftnForm he FirstEchelonn a SebomoAssauh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 3 . E m b a rka t i o nn do e b a rka t i o no in t s . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 2Sl4.AmDhibious hios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . .13a . A L L I GA TORl a s s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . - 1 3b , R OP U C H Al . s s . . . , . - . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 1 3 3c . P OL N OC N Y C |a S S . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 i9 5 . A m p h ib io u s$ a u l t sMa yB eC o n d u c t o di t hA i rC u sh io ne h i c l s. . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . r 396. A Roinforced Motorized Rifle Sattalion Conducting an Amphibious Assault - . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . . 13

xl i


10/149

CHAPTER. NTRODUCTION1. RELEVANCE

Flvl O0-5examin6she basicdoct nal conceptsof the United StatesArmy and presnts he prin-ciplesdeemednoc$sary for winningthe landbat-tle. For thos m6n tasked with directing andfighring th6 battle {that is, for colonelsand cap-tainal, The Soviet Moton2ed Rille Eattalion is particularly elBvant.BMP-equippedMRBs are widelydistributed hroughout he ground orces,possssmobility and firepoworsuperior o that ol BTR-equipped MRBS, and allow mol flaxibility inemployment.The MRB is the major maneuverelementof the molorized ffle rgimont accordingto the Soviets, tho most irhportant unit in rhground orces)and plays6n irnportant ole in of-lensive and defensivoooerationa.Studv oI theMRB reveals strongths to be countered andweaknesseso be exploited;and providesan in-sight into Soviet op6rationalprocsduresat thensxt higher evel.

2. CONCEPTUALAPPROACHA straightlorwardanalysisof MRB opsrationsperse would b6 hisleadingand dangerous, s the

[/lRB normallyoperatesas part of the MRR and,in addilion, may receiveadditionalsupport frcmthe motorized rifle divlsion (MRD). Accordingly,this studv analyzeshe MRB within the context ofregimental perations,and illustrares ome of theMRD's quipmnt hichmaylso e nsupport.3. DIAGRAMS

The tactical diagrams arc not templates andshould not be used as such. lroreover, whileillustratingSovit tacticalconcepts, hey arg notintended o portray rigidly how ths Sovietswillconductevervooeration.


11/149

CHAPTER . DOCTRINE. ACTICS,AND TRENDSSectionA - Docttine

1 .GE N E R A LSoviet doctrine sl.esses that the offensive ts

ihe decisive ofm of combat. To achievesuccess,the Sovietsstresshigh average ates of advancer3050 kilometers er day in nonnuclear ituationsand 50-m kilometels per day when nuclearweapons are used) by combind arms unitsl i lgure ).To achieve such high rates of advance, theSovietsadvocate he concentration f numericallysuperior orcesand firepowerw;thin selected ec-:ofs; the use ot airborne, heliborne,and special3perstions orces throughout the depth of the

enemy eararea; nd he achievementf surprisefigure2). Shouldnuclear/chemicaleapons ot3e used, conventionalartillerywould be used toschieve he desireddensity of firepower. Soviet{r tings stress the crilical transition from non--!c ear o nuclear perations,nd requendy x-:'cise going from one mode of combat to theDetensive onceptsare less requentlydescrib-. l and practiced.Ahhough they acknowledge'-ar a parricular itualionmay diclaredefensive::ton, the Soviets tress hat the primarypur-::se ol the defense s to prepare or the resump-::. of offensive perations ssoonaspossible.

7 ' : 1 . . : : -

2. OFFENSIVE RINCIPLESSoviet olfensive doctrine is based upon com-

bined arms operations, hat is the closely coord-inatedeffortsof the missile, ank, motorized ifle,att i l lery, nd combat upport nits.Thisdoctrinedoes not separat ire and maneuverj it seeksways to improve their integration and effec,In fo"ning combined arms group,ngs, heSoviets do not cross-attach units as in someWestern armies. Within a Soviet motorized rifleregimntor example, ne ankcompanymay beassigned o a MFB, but that I \ , ' lRB i l l not, in

turn, assignone of its N4R ompanies o the tankbattalion. n the Soviet Army, units are often attached or placed in support of othe. units,Attachmnts are more responsive o the commander of the unit to wh ich they are attached,while units placed in support are controliedthroughheir arent ni tcommander.The Soviets idenrify rhree types of combataction''tl:e meeting engagement,* the offense,6nd the defense. he offense s funhersubdivid 'ed into the attackand its exploitat ion,nd thepJrsuit ulm:natiagn encirc .nent. heoffensiveis conductedby maximizingmaneuver, irepower,and shock action. Approximately 0 percentof a

- : l

aFigore1. Sov et OlrenslveDoclrine s Basedo. CombinedArmsCorn ar.

':'-r-sh rh. meelingehgaoements ofiensiv6 n nature, he Soviers, n order Io emphasze G frpodance, rcosnize t as a:-: : . rormol combar.


12/149

battalion's actical raining is offensive n nature,a biasalso flectedn the Sovietpress. t

b. Ho,ibo.neorcslsh16 rtobli5l' Brdg.h.od.Fieure2. Anborne nd Heliborne roopsAre SetctivetyUsedo MainiainOtlensiv onentum.

The Soviets define maneuver as the movementof a forco into a favorable position {in relation tothe enemy), from which it can launch an effectiveaftack.The frontal attackand the enveloDment

are the basic ypes of haneuverdescribed y thSoviets, who clearly favor the latter (figure 3)Envelopment s often employed in the meetinengagementand generallywhenever the enemhasan assailabllank. Envelopments alsoofteconducted in conjunctionwilh a frontal attacdesignedo pindown enemy orces.8'cause rheir perceptions f the fluid naturot modern war, the Sovietsplacemore emphason the rnetingngagement combatbeween opposing columns rdpidly advancing oward eacothd than on any other form of offensiveactio(figure 4). Meeting engagemnts equire a higdegree of;nitiativ because of their inheren

-- Th ned to seizeand haintain the initiative.-- Freedorn l .nneuver,often with opef lanks-.- Combron a wadefront.

Rapid roopdeploymnt... tr4obile, ighspeed ombat.

Although th Soviets believe tht theinumerous ntelligencegarheringmeans will helcommanders ptepate tor the meeting engagement, they acknowledge hat planningmust oftenbe conducted with incompletedata on enemforces.Sovietcomrnanders re encouraged o aggressivelyseek rneting engagementsand tomake rapid decisions based upon availabte ntelligence.Nuclear and nonnuclarbreakthrough operations may be conductedagainsthasty, preparedor fortified defenses. In the breakthrough, heSoviets envision penetrat ion, accompaniewheneverpossiblby envelopment, he relegatioof pockets of resistance for destruction to

second-echelonormations,meetingengsgemenwith advancing enemy reserves,and pursuit ofwithdrawing enemy forces. Against a preparedefensiveposition, and when nuclear weaponare not used, he soviets concentrate reinforcebattalionand the fire of m-100 artillerypiecespekilometer of breakthroughsector, while exertinpressureall along the remainingportion of the

o. Airbon. Drop in the Ene6y Reot Ateo.


13/149

In nuclearbreakthrough prations, he Sovietsrely primarilyon nuclearweapons and penetratEenemy defenses n column. Pursuit operations,conductedon frontal, parallel,or combinedaxes,have the purpose of cutting off and de6troyingenemy forces. Tactical hgliborne and airbornelorces occupy and hold locations n the snemy'srer and otherwise attempt to disorganizeanddelayhiswithdrawal.3. DEFENSIVE BINCIPLES

For the Soviets, he purposeof the dgfense sro inflict maximumcasualties,o hold the defend-ed area,and to creat avorable onditions or theresumption f the offensive.Sovietdefensive oncepls nclude:Stabrrt-Achieved by dfense n depth, clos6-V coordinatdire and obstacleplans,and strongSecuity-Providdd by combat secuity lorceswhich give erly waming, preventenemy recon-naissance f the main defensiveposition, forcgfi enemy to deploy prematurely, nflict max-.num casualties, nd coordinate ong-range ireson enemy ormations.Use of key te'/ain-lncludes a fire and obstaclodan which restricts the enemy's freedom of-aneuver and canalizeshis lorces into preparedxillinggrounds.Dispersion-Ailows maximum protection fromhuclear and chemical weapons by posi1bningttoops on a wide front dnd in grcat depth.All-rcunddetense-Ptepared lternateand sup-pmenrary positions provide 3mo defensive..pbilities. Battalion strongpoints,echoloned noepthwirh xtensive arr iers nd f i re pbnning,xovide the backbone fthe regirhental efense.Delense n depth-Echeloned attalionstrong-tdnts absorb the momentum of the attack andtolride time or mobilE eserveso counterattack,Antitank defense-Ptovided by the liberala4ocatjon f antitankweaponsdown to all levels,and $e formation of strong antitank reserves tSanalioneveland above.Cootdinated fircs-Planned to destroy the at.tackerapproaching he defendedarea, n tront of

rrrrt'S+rrnAI

f+ f

6. shcllow Env.lophenr shg,e,

.. DeapE^velop eht (Doeble).Figure3. BasicFofmsol Maneuver


14/149

-./,..- l_--ll Icr\\s.+ -G#^ RsEisr d.mnb d.id r dqts r 3eF.d

tL nnr

E

1r-iA L-Ji f -1 .] L - J \_ : I

B. Th. [email protected] 106id!d rhem6ti^9.ns.Fm'ft ll) .8 ed.s @rrs r2) ,Dd su!@ds hsrn.ci hr rhedr b6dy 3)Figure4.heMeetinS.gagemnrthe forward 6dg oI the battle arga (FEBA),on rain, or to escap enemy pressure.Du to th6the flanks, and in preparedkilling zones within complexity and inherent danger of withdrawathe defendedarea. Nuclearstrikssare plannedby operations, anicularly ndersnehy pressure,hedivision and higher units agains! the en6my's Soviets try to achieve su.prise by conducrinnucl9arweapons, major reserves, nd command them on multiple routs at night or during otherandcontrolposts. condirions f limired isibiliry.

Mobile countenftack to.ces-Requirod o The groupingof forces or a withdrawal n-launchcountetattacks,ovietcommandercrom cludesconvering orces, he rear guard, maintrattalion nd up maintain eservesor this puF body, and flank security dotachmentswhenpos necessary).ormally,he Sovietseaveone-thir

Approximatety0percent f th6battation.sac :1"il1:fi':::J:"contact to doceive he enemtical raining oncernsgf nsive perations.4.WTTHDRAWAL Coveringorcesdepart uddenly nd.as a rulesimultaneously.ftr the main body haspasss

Withdrawaloperations,nitiatedonly by the through' the covering-force then withdrawnext highercommander,re conducted y rhe lhrough he rear-guard hould he enemypressovists o regroup.occupymore avorabli er- lhe withdrawingorces' he rearguardwithdraw6


15/149

in a leapfrog manner, rendringmutual fire sup-port. lf the rearguard s successful,withdrawalofthe mainbody s unimpeded.The rear guard occupiesdefensavepositionsb6hind first-echelondefense orces. Subsequent

defensivepositionsar designated or the rearguard,wh;ch conductsambushes nd erects barrigrsas it withdraws o subsequent ositaons. herear guard moves to subsaquentpositions n aleapfrog manner, renderingmutual support anddefending achposition.Prior to arrivsl of the rear guard in the newly

designated area of dfense, reconnaissancegroups are formed. These groups conduct asurveyoI the new ara, determine he area o beoccupiedby each unit, designat pproach outesto them, mark off any mined or contamanatedareas,and test the water, As the main body ap-proaches he area, its subordinateelementsaremet by guides from the reconnaissance roupsandars aken o theirdesignated reas.

Security is organized as soon as the leadelementsclose on the new defensiveareas,andengineering ork is begun,

Section B - Tactics1.GENERAL

In spite of the superiorqualitiesof the BMP vis-a-vis the BTR, we are not aware of any newregulations governing employment of 8MP-equipped and BTR-equipped nits. Soviet com-manders still seem to be debating the tacticalmploymentof the BMP in an effort to maximizens principal rrengths isa vrs he BTR: superiorlirepower{panicularly nthank)and cross'countrymobility, and better crcw protecrion.Training asalso being condricted o determine he optimumuse of BMPSoperating n closecoordinataon ithtanksand rt i l lery.The BMP'S superiorityover the BTR makes tlikely hat the BN4P-equippednits of a motorizedrifle division {MRDI wiil be assigned hese key

- Reconnaissance.-- Use n the orwarddetachment.- Positioning in the first echelon duringnuclea.conditions,and/or if enemydelenseshave been sufficientlyneutGlized;otherwisein th secondechelonas an exploitation orce{The BTR-equipped egimen(s) would {ormtheMBD's irstechelon).- Operating n the mainaxisof attack.

2. ECHEIONS NO RESERVESa. GenealIn the West, there has been an overdramatiza_

tjon of the Sovietdeployhent system, as well asconfusion' over how the system, particularlyechelonment,works. Basically, he Soviet systmof echelonmentwhh "t!vo up" and "one back" issihilar to our own and seeks he same effects ntheattac(r

- Timelybuildu of ths attackeffort.'' Beating the enemy in th use of corres-pondrng eserves.- Preventingan overdensityof lroops andeqlipment {thereby denying the enernylucrative uclearargets).

Achievinghigh ratesof advanceby attacksindepth.And in the defensel

- Presenting he enemy with a series ofdefensive osilions.- Preventingan overdensityof lroops andequipment. The difterence beoveen theSoviet and US systems oncernsexactnessnterminology nd preparation.

b. DefinitionsThe firsi echelon is the most importantechelonand normallyconsistsof up to two-thardtof the forcesavailable.n the attack it comprisesthe leadingassaultunits; in the defense, t com-priseshe forwardd6fense nitson the FEBA.

'Byl@quenrlywrrting'secondechelonkerudl,"Sovietw.heBhaveconrriburedbrhecontusio..7


16/149

The second echelon, normally consisting oIabout one-thirdot the availableorces, givesthecommander he capability o intensify he attack,to shift rapidly he attack effort from one axis toanother, o repulse ounterattacks, nd to replaceheavily ttrited rst-echelon n;ts.The commanders of the first and secondechelons eceive heir missionsprior to combat.First-echelonommanders re assigned mmedi6teand subseouent biectives nd an axis of furtheradvance, while second-echelon commandersreceivean immediate objective and an axis forfurther adv6nce.Commandersmust get permis-sion from the next higher commander o committheir second echelon. A second echelon as notcommittdna piecemealashion.

Reserues learly differ from echelons.Whnthe Soviets wrile "second echelon (resrvol,"they are not equating he two; they man thatsometimes a cohmander will have a secondechelon and at other times a reserve,Starting at battalion evel, commandersnor-mally haintain reserves, suallyconsistingof l6ssthan one'third of the forces available.Reservesmay be of several ypes lantitank,branch, com-bined arms) and be employed separatelyor to-gether, The commanderot the reserve acivesno specificmissionprior to battle, but must be

pfeparedo carryout a numberof contingsncies,c. Employmentof Echelonsand ReservesThe commander's decision tor the emDlov-ment of his force deoendsuoon lVlETT.rFor ex-ample, becusea hasty defense does not havewell-coordinatedire and obstacleplans,speed nrhe atrack, combined with maximum combatpower forward, is preferred o echeloning, Ac-cordingly,a single echelonand a reservowouldmostprobrblybe usd o attacka hastydef6ns6.Moreover, unless a commander rceivesaugmentation, he must weaken his assaultelements n ordsr to have tlvo echelons and abranch or combined arms reserve. For thasreason,units at regimental evel and abov may,when attacking n two echelons,have chemical,engineer,and antitank reserves, ut no moto zedrifle, tank, or combinedarms reserve. f sullablyaugmented, they may have two echelons plusbranch,combined rms,and/orother reservs,

'MBsion,6nhy, r6iiainndwoarher, roopsdvailabl6.

The MRB is the lowest level where echelon-meni occurs n the SovietArmy (the Sovietshaveexperimented with echelonment within com-panies,but this practicehas beendiscouraged ygeneral officers who wrote that such practicedis$pates he company's combat power and in-creases he command and cont rol problems ofthecomoanv ommander),

When two echlons and a reserve areemployed, eservesor BTR- and BMP-equippadbattalionscould consjsrof 6 designatedMR unit{normallya plaroon),usually aken from the se-cond echelon,or a olatoon rom an attached ankThe antitank reserve of the BTR-equippe[,4R8 s normally ls antirankplatoonof manpackSAGGERS nd SPG9s, while or a BMP-equio-

ped MRB it may be pan of an attached ank com-pany or an anached platoon of rhe MRR'S an-titank missile banry (figur 5). Both types olreserves ar usuelly under the battalion com-mander's irectcontrol.Depending pon METT, the banalion's econdechelon reserveloperates rom 1 to 3 kilometersbehind the first echelon in order ro avoid un-necessaryosses,while being close enough fortimely commitment to banle. When a secondechelon passes through a firsr chelon. the

former lights independently f the latter, and isusuallysupponed by fjre froh the first echelon.Reservesand the second echelon are recon-stituted as soon as possible ollowing theh com-mitment.

d. Anriron*6ov.! Jto 8lR-Equtppodni,.Figur . &ttalion AnlitanhReserves espond irectlyio the BattallonCommander.


17/149

: g!re5. BattalionntitankeservesespondrrecllytotheBatialonommander.Cont ued)3. COMMANDAND STAFFIn the Soviet Army, positionand branch are..ore important han rank, lt is not unheardof for3 Commander o be junior to his chief of staff3nd/orone or moresubordinateommanders,

Soviet major commandinga regimentcould haveeutenantcolonelsas his deputies,Moreover, he:cmbined arms commander ommands ttach--ents, regardlessof whether or not the com--rander of the attached unit is superior n rank.Shouldan aft i l lery r tank battalion ommandeday a major or lieutenant olonelbe attached o ar,!RBcommanded y a captain, he IVIRB om-3nder would command oth battalions.. ChainofCommandlo reconstitu te a destroyed command ele-

-*_1. the Soviets irst attenpt to util;ze he unit's!.3 3ble assets. hould he battalion ommander:E -epacitated, he would normallybe succeed-r: .v his chief of staff and the first N4R ompany::--'13nder (who is normally he senior company::Tmander), respectively.The battajion com-nander may designatehis politicalofficer to be'ris successor, since this man is well trained.nilitaily.The regimental ommandermay appointone of his staff officers o temporarilycommand:hebattalion,

The battalion's hief of staff, the deputy commanders or politicalaffairsand technicalaffaiis,and the headsof the various earserviceelementscommunicatewith their countelpartsat regiment,thus re l ievinghe battalion ommander f manyadministrat ivendsupply etails nd allowing imto concentrateon implementing egimental ac-4. TRAFFICREGULATORS

Extensive se of tmffic regulators figure6) bythe Soviet ground forces is often interpretedasindicating a weakness n mapreading kil ls.Thoughmapreadingeemso be a problem t thelower levelsdue to a number of factors (see7reSoviet Motorized Rille Conpany, DDI-1100-T|-76,October1976,paragraphs 1.53), he extensi veuse of traffic regulators nayaid the achievementof high rates of adv6nce-Traffic regulatorsmoveout with the advance uardbattalion, nd theirplacementat key locationsspeedsup the move-mentof Soviet olumns y aiding ommandersnthe control of their subordinate elements,Becausethe Soviets move under vinual radiosilence uring he march precedingnemycon-tact), traffic controllers are panicularly useful.Theyarealsovulnerable.vloreover.f iheyate n-capacitated,advancing columns may have dif-f iculty.tfFieure6 iTraflic ReellatorsAid Commandersn Control l i rEThelJni ls.5. ATTACKTIMEAND OBJECTIVES

In the SovietArmy the at'rack ime (H hour) isthe time the firs t man reaches he enemy FEBA,whereas n most Western armies he attack timerefers o crossinghe ineof departure.A unit is given ntermediate nd subsequent bjectives and a direction for fufther attack. Thedepths of these objectivesdependsupon IIETTand whetheror not nuclearweaponsare used,The unit's immediate objective includes theenemy's orward positions; he subsequent bjective, his reserves. he battalion'ssubsequent b-

. A B[P.Equipped Aototi2ed RIll. B.nolton Antttank


18/149

iective is included n the immediateobjective ofthe regiment; the subsequent objective of theregiment s within the immediateobjectiveof thedivis ion,tc.6. COMBINEDARMS OPERATIONS

Sovietemohasis n combined rmsoDe.alionshas ncreased ver he last 5 years. Iotorizedriflergiments and divisions and tank divisions areunits with an excellentmix ol motorized ifle, aFtillery. tank, and engineer troops. Recently,motorizedrifl comoanies have been added totank regimentswithin tank divisions.Thesecom-paniesmay be the pcursors ot liR battalionsbecoming organic to tank regiments.CombinedarmsconceDts nd how thev affect the [lRB aredescribed lowia. TanksA tank unit(s) s usuallyattached o or in sup-port of a MRB, Normally, however, tanks areplaced in support, thus allowing lhe rank com-rnander to maintain control over his subunits.Such an afi6ngement acilitatesmassing of platoon and companytires n particular bjectives,When cenlralized ontrol of tanks s not prac-tical {for example, n combat n built-upareas6ndin forests), however, tank platoons may bsdecentralized nd rqspond o l/lR company com'

manders.b. AttileryTo achieve desired fire suooort in abreakthrough, he Sovietsform regimental,divi-sional, and 6rmy anillery groupings{respectivelyRAG, DAG, and AAG). An anil lerygrouping stemoorarv n natureand consistsof two or moreartillerybattalions.Wh6n a RAG is formed t doesnot includo he lrRR's organic artillerybattaljon.The battalion s, howsvr, normallyplaced n sup-

oort of the MRR'S ubordinatemotorizd ifle bat-talions. In some cases each of the artillery bat-talion's battsries may bs attached o a lvlRB. Insuch cases. coordinalion of arlillerv fire isaccomplished y the aftillery battery commander{working wilh the MRB commanded under theclose suosrvisionoI thg artillerv battalion com-msnder workingwith th IVIRR ommander)-Artillerysupport or an ofiensivsmay be divid-ed into thr phasesr preparatory ires {phase

one), fires in support of an attack (phase wo),and fires in support o{ operations within thedepths of the enemy's dafenses{phase three),The battalion commander's control over hisorganicmonarsand attachedartilleryvarieswithThe MRB commander, hough responsibleorrhe lraining and mploymentof his organicmoFtar battery, does not always have control overthis unit. The regimentalchief of artilleryplansand superviseshe trainingof the mortar batterigs(as well as the regiment'santitank means) n thgregiftent s subordinatebattalionsand supervaseexecutionof the fire plan by organic regimentaartillery, o includemortars figure7}. Artillery ireplanning is centrally coordanatedwith flexibilitybuilt in to allow lor close suD9ort ol maneuver

Figu.eT- heRtimentalhElol Artilleryon he ieht)C@rdinatsesimerialrtillery urins hase

During phaseone, all artillery, ncludingmortars, and all weapons{tanksand antitank guns)firing in th preparation,are centrally controlledby means of a fire plan. During phas wo, theMRB'S organic mortars are controlled by theMRB, The attached anillerv battery, while lesscentralized. s responsive o requests for firesfrom rhe IMRB, while still being controlled byhigher headquaners.During phase hGe. attach-ed anillery, whh the senior commander's ap-provsl, could advancewith the [lRB to provideclose support, In the aftack, the mortgr batterydisplacesaccording o the tactical situation{seechaptr 6 for details). Firing oltside a maneuver

10


19/149

unit 's boundariess not permittedwithout ap-provalromhigher uthority.During raining, hen employedn an indirectf i fe role,Soviet ni l lerydependingpon he ypeof art i l lery eing ired) wil l not f ire within 300rre lersof fr iendly roops mou4teo n APCs orwithin 200 meters of friendly tanks. Artillerywillnot fire within 400 metersof dismounted roops.Artillery ired in the difect ire mode will fi re muchcloser, Peacetime ire restrictionswould be con-siderablyeduced n wartime.Dufing the pursuit,attachedart i l lerywoutdprovideclosesupport and on call fires. Owing tothe speedof pursuitoperations, continuingbarrageof fire foMard of the maneuverunits is notdeemed ract ical .

The prol;feration,ypes, and qualityof Sovietengineer equipment complement their doctrinestressinghigh rates of adv6nce. Rivercross;ngequipment,mineclearers, nd minelayers re particularlympressivesee hapter3).There are two types of Soviet engineers:Sap-per,or combatengineersound at regiment nddivis ion, ndmore kil led ngineersrganizednd

.:t$:x*.t.'l-,'"

trained for specific rnissions.The latter type ofengineers normally rganic o atmyand tuntFfom his senior ommanders,he MHB com-mander receivesengineersupport to enable hisunit o cross atural nd manmade bstacles,nd1o colstruct defensive osit ionsand barrierc.N4RBroops re rainedo perform on'eengineertasks such as buildingweaponsemplacementsand trenches, mplacing nd clearingminesbyhand, ndcamouflagingeapons ndequipment.

Direct air support o an l,4RBcommanderwould be a rarity, since the IMB division com-mander normally directs supporting air assetsthrough air liaisonstaffs. Forwardair controllerscould, however,be assignedo a regimentattack,ingon a division main xis,

This s not to say that Soviet acticalair assetswouid not be used to "prep" an areaprior to ani.4RB attack. For example, Soviet high peFformance ircraft suchas the FLOGGEReris)and or helicopter unships ften "prep" areasprior to a fiver crossing,on the main axis of at-tack, nd in other selectiveoperations figure8).Th \ lBB commander asno directorganic om,munication ith high-performanceircraft r at-tack helicopters.

-- -:il::Rl:e:-' -

11


20/149

SectionC- TacticalTrcndsSincethe October198 War1.GENERAL

ThgOctob6r 973WarhadconsiderablemDscton the tacticaldoctrine f someWstern oun-lries, but did not cuseany ladicalchangeanSovietdoctrine r tactics, n spite of a dgofousexamination I basicdoctrinalprinciples. hseprinciplgsor the mostpartgo back o WorldWarll. andrcmain heprimary riginof curent Sovietdoctrinalhinking.Sovietoffensive octrine, uiltaround hs tankand enMsioningightes of ad-vance,emains asicallynchanged.2. SOVIET NALYSISOFTHEWAR

While impr5sedwith the increasd omplgxityof modern defenss. he high exponditur fmunitions, nd he othality f antitankweaponry,the Soviets werc equary impressed by thesnhanced otfnsive capabilities .osentedbymobileair defgnse vstems nd wellcoordinated

combined arms operationsbuil! primarilyaroundthe tank. lt should be noted rhat in the 1973w6r.tank gunnery destroyed rhree to four times asmanv anksasdid antitankmissiles.3. TRENOS INCE HEWAR

Sinc October 1!m, rhe Soviets have tak6nnumeroussteos lo incrse the viabilitv of theirtank forces and to allow for anticipated losseSoIarmored vehicls. Th6y have incroased thenumbersof ranls and anillery pieces{especiallyself-propelled artileryl within the MRD. and ar6stressing he use ot combined arms units ovenmore than previoudy. Moreover, ther are clearindications that hdi:opters will be assign6d agreatsr role in ofiefldv opradons.Nowherc aa6 dEse trids morc apparent lhanin the opradroaEt Sovbt battalionand regimen-tal combt groupa6.

L2


21/149

CHAPTER .THEMOTORIZED IFLE IVISIONAND MOTORIZED IFLE EGIMENT1 .GE N E B A L

Although the N4RB as considerableirepower,it lacks sufficient organic combat and combatsupport elements or many types of operations,For this reason t usuallyoperatesas part of thef RR. Since he MRB is normally einforced rsupported by regiment, and sometimesby divi-sion, the organizationsand equipment of theMRD and the MRR wil l be covered n th ischapter.2,THEMOTORIZED IFLEDIVISION

The MRD is a well. balancednit possessingsufficient combat, combat suppon, and combatservicesuppon units to enable t to conduct avariety of offensive and defensive operationsunder conventional or nuclear conditions-Although it normallyoperatesas part of corps orarmy, he \4RDs fullycapable f conductingn-

dependentoprations.The lvlRD s organizdasshown in fjgure L The tvlBD'sprincipalweaponsandequipmentreshown n igures 0and11.3. THE MOTORIZED IFLEREGIMENT

Though capableof independent ct ion, themotorized ifle regimentnormallyoperatesas partof a division, The division commanderallocatesadditionalsupport to his regimentsas required.Regimental ttillery, or example,may be reinforced with units from the division's artillery andmuk;ple rocket launcherbattalions,orming aregimentalr t ihery rouping RAG).The regimen-tal commander equestsnuclear ire support romdivision.The BMP-equippedRR s organizeds shownln f igure 12. Some of the regiment's rincipalweapons and equipmentare shown in figures 13and14.

Flgure.TheMotor2ed l e D vE,on13


22/149

o. ,6hm Oivisiondl Gun, zts 3

h . I00nhAfGun , t -55 / I t2 .

:-=--'-i+=:=

c. I22nm Howitzer,M-I938/D-30Figuret0.The Motori2edRille Divisiont Princip3lWea oi s.

T4


23/149

e. |52mmHowirzit,D-L

Fsure 0.TheMotorDedi l le iviston,spr inca Wea ons.Coi tnued)

f 5


24/149

-.s\i I ,:is+\. '

l.i--

a--'s\ ag GAINFUI El,5A 6

Figure 0.Th MotorizedRil eOivlsion s Pr ncrpalWeapon5 Conlrn!ed)

o. frtck, Mine Dete.tot, Dim.

f r E u r e t t . T n e M o r o r r e o R r ' l e D ' r o l s Pr c i p d l E q L i o m e n l

. - - : . - - - . - - ' . . -

.. PonloonPMP n KRAZ


25/149

d. ftdckad Anphtbidn, K 6t

e. hline Cl.oter BIR-' 'PR, M 1972

W|.k i^eloyer, SP, Atdoed

FiSure 1.Ihe Motorized illeD vision's rincipaEquipnent.Conrinued)

I 7


26/149

9 lruck, Decon. MS 65Fieure 1 TheMotorized ifleOivision's rincipaEquipment.Continued)

Fipure 2 TheMotorized illeRegimeni8MP Equpped)

18


27/149

o M.diuh fonk, f-62'

o Med tum .nk ,1 .64 .

. Medium fohk, f 72 'Fisure 3.Pr ncipalWeaponstnheMolorzedRiiteResimeii BtV -Equippd).l 9


28/149

. 23nn sPAA Gun,zSU23 1Ficure 3.PrlncipalWaponslnheMotorized illeRegrmentBM Equipped).Continued)

20


29/149

e. AIGIA Louncher Vehi.le Af.3.d. sAM sA.9) ASKIN. NOTE' Alsoioundn otherunits n he motorizedilledNision

Fiure 3.Pr ncipalweaponsntheMotorized illeRegime.iBM .Eq pped).Contined)

Figure 4.PrncrpalEqument in the\ , lotor izedi i le eg rent(BMPqu ped) .

5.

o lfuck, De.or, ARS-,1.

b.Iruck, De.on,DDA66.

Eridse, onk Lolnched,Mf U

2r


30/149

:11*

*Er--''-'

e. (2)MDK2OitchinsMd.hine inopaatran)Figure 14. Principa Equ pment n the Molorzed RiileReg ment(BMP Eq!rpped). Continued)

d Bnd\e. rru.kLounched ltuA

.. (t ) MDK-2DitchtngAo.hine.

22


31/149

g. Lrihe Cleori^g Pl6w, KMf.l

i. Min. Rollet, KJAI.5NOTE

Alo l theaboveequipmentasoloundinotheruntsthemolorzedr i l ledivison.Figure 4.PrincipaEquipnenlnthe Motorized illeRecimeniBMP'Equipped).Cofiin!ed)2i


32/149

CHAPTER. THEMOTORIZED IFLE ATTALIONSectionA - Operational inciplesand Missions

1,OPERATIONAL RINCIPLESAlthough it normally operatesas paft of the

regiment, he [r1RBmay aiso be des ignated hedivision reserve. n the latter role, the battalionopratesunder the divisioncommander. n addition to their normal operations, MRBSmay alsoparticipale n operationsunder specialconditions(see hapter ).Because t is relatively light" in combat andcombat-suppor t lements, he battalion s normaliy reinforced by regiment and/or division. Thisaugmentationmay occur when the battalionactsas a forward detachment,advance, lank, or rear

guard; when it attacks or defends in the firstechelonof the regiment;or when it conducts n-dependent operations. For such operations, aSoviet attal ion ommanderouldbe allocated,naddition o his own assets,one tank company* al22mm howitzer battaiion, an antitank guidedmissileplatoon,an antiaircraftmissileand anilleryplatoon, n engineer latoon, nd a chemical la-2. MtSStONS

The missionof the MRB dependsupon the roleit hasbeenassignedwithin the regimental ombatformation, t may attack or defend as part of thefirst echelon,be placed n the secondechelon,bedesignated s pad of the division resrve,or beassignedspecial missions.As part of the regiment's first echelon n the attack, the battalionwould have the mission of penetrating enemydefenses, eutralizingnemv oops and equip-ment, and seizingand consolidating he enemy'sdefensive ositions.Fhstechelonbattalionswouldalso take pa.t in repellingenemy counterattacksand pursuing withdrawing nemy orce. n thedefnse, irst-echelon attalionshavethe m|ssronof defeatingor wearing down the enemy's nitialassault lements.

A second-echelon attalion may be given anyof thefollowing issions:- Assuming the mission of severelyattritedfirct-echelon nits.-- Exploitinghesuccess f the irst echelon,- Eliminating bypassed pockets of enemyresistance,'Counterattacking.

-. Destroying nemy orces on the flanksandin the intervals etweenaxesof attack and inthe rearofattacking roops,--Attackingna newdirection.

As a division eserve, he l\,4R8would be givenno mission p of to combat, but would bepreparedo execute numberof contingencies:-- Flepulsingnemycounterattacks,-- Combatt ingirborneandings.- Beplacing weakened first-echelon units(rarelyone).-- Intensifyingheattackeffort.'- Exploiting uccess,

The MRB may also be assigned numberofspecialmissions: orward detachment or reconnaissance lement (the N,4RB ould be the basisfor a reconnai ssanceroup) or d iv is ion, dvanceguard of the regiment,and flank or rear securityguardfor the division(seechapter 7, section A,paragraph4 for further details). t may also begivena varietyof missions n heliborne perationsand, on occasion,n ship-to-shore perations

'< panoi the regimenfsinstechelonn a bre.kihrough peration,he MBB commandermaybsivonmoro anksuppon.25


33/149

Section B * Organization, Responsibilities,and Equipment1.THE MOTORIZED IFLE ATTALION

The organizationand principalweapons andequipmentof the BMP,equippedMRB are shownin figures15 and 16. Fora detailed ist and photosof weaponsand equipmentat company evel,seeThe Soviet Motorized Rifle Company,DDt 11q0,7/,76.

1 h . . u p p | Y e h t o n | . d . l , u l u .

FiC!re 15. The Motorzed R le Battalron BMP.Eq!rpped)

o. l20nnMor,ar .Figure 6.PrincipaWea ons ndEquipmentflhe MotortedRitteBartationBMp,Equ ped).

26


34/149

.r..''fi,; . nZ '

. . f tu tk ,UAZ.69 .Figu e 16. Principa Weapons nd Equipmentoi the MotonzedRille Batlalion BMP Equ pped). Contin ed)

27


35/149

:..s-

28


36/149

g. Irr.k, POL 1,000ot 5,20OLitett)

l. ftuck, v6^, ztL Mointeha^.e).

!E : :

ftFcure 6.Pr incipai eaporandEq! ipmentol the oiorzed i f le at la lonBMP quipped) .Cont inued)

29


37/149

for technicalaffairs, he battalioncommunicationsofficer {who is also the communications latoonleader,and the supply platoon leader a pEpot-srch,:k roughlyequivalento warreniotlicerl

FiEUre 7 Bt la lonHeadquar te rs .

FitL,re 6.PrincipalWea ons nd Equipmentfthe MoloriredR(leAattaion BM -Equpped).Continued)2.SUEONDINATE LEMENTS

a. Th6 Battalion HeadquaftercThe battalionstaff consistsof six officersand6ight enlisted men (figure 17). Office. personnelinclud the battalion commander, he battalionchief of statf, the deputybattalioncommanderorpoliticalaffairs, the deputy battalion commander

ll ) The battalion commander s resoonsiblefor his unit's mobilizationeadiness, ombat andpolitical training, ducarion, military discipline,and morale.He is also esponsibleor the unitseouiDment nd acilities.(21 The battalionchief of staff is the com-mander's rjght arm.' He has the authority ogive orders to all subordinateelementsand in-sures compliancewith orderc rom the batlalioncommander nd highercommanders. he chief ofstalf draws up the combat and training plansibasedupon the regimental lanand the baltalioncommander'sguidance) or the unit and insures

that they are carriedout, He also nsurcs hat re-quired reports are preparedand dlspatchedontime to regimentalheadquarters.He is principalorganizerof ea service upport or thebattalion.{3) The deoutu battalion commander forpoliticalaffairs organizesand conducts politicaltrainingdesigned o rally rhe battalion'spersonneleround the Communist Pafty and th SovietGovernment. He repons through the battalioncommandero the reg mental olitical fficer,

i Anhulonce, UAZ a50.

30


38/149

(4) The deputy battalion commander fortechnical aff6irs supervises the battalion'smaintenance eruiceelementand reportsdirecdyto the botblion commanderor chief of staff. Thetechnicalaffahsofficer s responsibleor the com-bat, political,and specializedraining of rear ser-vicspersonnel, nd for the technicalconditionofrheirequipmsnt.

{5) The communications fficer s a battalionstaff officer and the communicationsplatoonleader. t is his responsibilityo train banalionper'sonnel n signalprocedures nd to supervise orh-munications raining of the battalion, to includethe conduct of classes or radio operatorsandperiodic nspections f communicationsquip-rnent. In combat, the battalion signal officerreceives nslfuctions from the senior regimentalsignalofficer, as well as from the battalioncom-manderandhief f staff.

(6) The supply platoon leader may be aprapotshchikor senior NCO. He works closelywith the battalion chief of staff on all aspectsofbanalion upply.(7) Enlistedpersonnel n the battalion head-quartrsncludea sergeantmajorand his driver,achemicalnstructor/dosimelerperator, seniornedic lthe feld'sheLwho heads he medicalsec-:ion, is a medical assistant whose skills fallsomewherebetween those of a nurse and a!hysician),wo clerks, dr iver ndgunner or theaattalioncomfiander's BMP, and a driver or the:hiefof staff 's PC.

b. TheMotoized Rifle CompanyThe battalion'sprimarymaneuver lements res lhree motorized rifle (l/lR) companies. The3MP-equippedrR company s organized ssrown in figure 18- For detailed nformation on'-6 unit, the readershould .efet to The Soviet

\.otorized Ritle Company. DDl1100-77-76,::rober 1976,c. The Battalion Mortat BatteryThe mortar battery contains six l20mm moFr.s and is organized nd equipped s shown n. S J re1 9 .The mortar battery commander s assistedby- headquarters atleryplatoon eader,who also

functions as the head of the forward observer{FOl/reconnaissanceection,

Frgure8 TheMoiorlzedleCompaiy(BMPqurpped).

Each mortar platoon contains wvo squads,each of which containsa crew chif, a gunnef,one telephone opbrator, a loader, one ammobearer, nda vehicle r iver,d. TheCommunications latoonThe communication latoon'sorganization ndequipmentare depicted in figure 20. The com-municationsplatoon eader has an NCO assistant

and lvo section eadels.e. Battalion Rear Service SupportThe deputy battalioncommander or technicalaffairs s assisted n supervising earseruicesup-port elementsby the supply platoon leader, heNCos responsible or the repair workshop, andthe medical idstation.

3I


39/149

FBufe 9 TheMortar altery

Figure 0.TheComhuncations tat@n

32


40/149

SectionC- Command nd Control1.COMMAND

Tho Sovlats oggrdcornmandasthe exorcla tconotrnt ndoffactive ontrol.ThebattElion om-ntanderelios rlmarily ponhischiefof 8taff,butb roluctant to dalgte authority, pref6rdngtonlake most docisiong hirnsff. Company con-fiEnders and the command6rsof other oqanica.d atbohd uniE ara clogelysupervisdby thhgttalioncommander nd/orthe chiel of statf.zco tnol

In th6 offuiEiw, th p.irmry rneansc'f oont ol

of th6 MBB is radio,althoughm668engeE,r-aonEl ontactbelwen ommsnde6, ignglh.e6.tlags,snd s vadetyof oth6r methods6rs a|sous6d. Prior to contacti radiosilonceb Etrictlvob3rued,excopting eporE from loconnsissancolslhntsand th6 crossingot phase ln63.A typsot battalion adionet sshown nfigur62l .

In tfi detense, he battalion rlir6 primsrilyonwire. although messengeGrsignsl flar6, andradio6ar6 also used extnsivly. battalionn thdfonswould employa wire sryatems shown nlburc2'


41/149

MOTOR'D RIFT A'TALIONLEMENTS

cosMNDEF r:-^r toRr^R-- : -Phror) lF 'z )EATERY

-rl-----S"=-co*-ar"r. -------S..----.D"'Nd'dN"i!----S-----F,,. suoon a. --.-S--

NOIESr Radd ued mry be rh. Flotro7 Rtr37L23 -- h,v. R1z65or dEtu^ted @n, if$!iiJ:T;Ti"i$i,, .i iii iiiriiii pl'r'""" 'r'" arnquop.dN'd'.d ''ir' ban'bnmui i i i l "" i i j l " ; ; ;o *n ' r r t r ' * . r a -5@o '( 'e NBc r l i '3t

Fieure2l RepresentatlveommuncalonsNl na Molorized itleBattalion

KEY

34


42/149

KEY

d

P

+AA'rA

Pratoon @&r'6 Mmad o6sda o. Fs1

M.drr barery i fin4 @iiionozonn)

Telephme non onn8 or mtor *rion

@>-. l

NOTESr. $iE euld ak blaidlrcm @n deqtrcn pbr@nb6deB o squad2 ououts aE rod. Mry 5c70 mdie6 abo! virc in opn eraii to pmviddsh;her ror wn t6ns .hekinc ihe iins in mb.tFigure22. heUse l lineCommuni6tionstya votorazedirre attalionn he Delense.


43/149

Section D - Battalion Rear Setvices1.GENERAL

Pfior o the march. he lvlRBnormallyoccupiesan asssmblyarea, For operationalconven:ence,reliable efense,and protectionof the rearserviceelemenls, he latter normallyoccupy he centerofthe MRB area figure 3 .During offensiveand delensiveoprations,heMRB'S rear seruice elementsare positioned oenable hem to providerapid material, echnical,and medical support, In order to maintainfrsedom of mansuverduring the marc

and combatservice upportelementshave normaspacing between vehicles n the column {figure24). During the attack (figure 25), nd in thedelense figure26}, the rearservicesare positioned closely ehind he combatunits.The battalion's administrative6nd logisticsrespon$bilities re purposelyminimized o allowthe battalion commander o concentrateon hisprimarymissiondefeating he enemy n combat.The regimentassumesmost of the battalion'sad-ministtive burden and augments he battalionas required,ogistically.

AA\

&h. m,nnunr6n appt Fnr

AA)

AAPAFi8ure23Molorized illeBatialDnRearSrviceElementsnan AssembyArea36


44/149

I(EY

- - - - T -# # fi # c''dc4a d"d c-tt9#-Jt +--H{rr--rsrn@i!- dL bdt lh, t.ido'tld |||n

"'tu btri. tnd adill..Y in dd drhi 58'.* "* ,n,n*",-,".",""". . ,""*-, , ,""

# *,r"rion.'uni,io" *.rSQo',"-*"**,*,*

NOTES., rruds,6onsprd{ ftrns|#:fr.;tr-f,lffi, ""rE o5,.5odldi du.m,!.dnffie,.id soi Dn.^6 bk.n '8..^d hr.2{I) tErd dunn. tdbl('!r}fui4 |i1oM'Figure24. ltoto'i2ed Ritle EsftalionRr Sruic!SupportElementsOuring he March

Fddknn.n qn 9|d r7olnDt

t-/ \' rd *,1h fJlr rni.r

37


45/149

al-rrld

o(4*rrln

vE

IE

trA

.010.FANI

AAAAA

Fgure25.RearServrce upporlD!rinChAtlack

38


46/149

Rv(g .- .;i*.'.:.'.ln':r,ii',

KEY

6ilAAA@

[email protected])miflisposron

comtsry,hmunitbi spot @'nr

Mld mine e]d lafr'ts&im|:nd |nii'nk)

Fi8ure 6.RearServiceSupportn he Deiense

39


47/149

2. ADMINISTRATIONThe regimentalassistantchiel of staff for psr-6onnel s responsibloor maintaining ll personnelrecords.such as officers' eavesof absence bat'talion keeps records of enlisted perconnel onl6ave), daily strength r6ports, and peBonnol

awards. In combst, h6 is also responsibleor ad'ministration e$rding POWS,captured m8teriel,andprocessing f personneleplacements.Forms and reoorts maintainedat battalion n-clude strength r6porte, rainingschedules, upplyand maintenance equisition orms, and politicalreoorts.Ths battalion commande. s assisted nhiB administrative esponsibilities y his principalstaffofficersand clerical srsonnel.

3. SUPPLYa. Genenl

Normally the rgiment, using its organicassets,deliverc supplies to the battalions. Thisprinciple is flexible, however, and whsn

necessary,he batlalion's supply pltoon (ligure271picks up supplies rom regiment. Priorlty orresupply s ammunition, POL, technical supplies{repairparts), rations, and nontechnical upplies.Resupplynormally akosplace prior to battle andat the end of the day. The Soviers ry to r6upplyat night or during other periodsof limiredvisibil-ity. Emptyvehicles eturning o battalionand regi-ment are used to evacuatepersonnolend aquip-The battalion chief of staff. assistedby thebattalion tchnical officer, the supply pl6toonfeader.and the hatlalion eld'sheL has the overallresponsibility for coordinating the battalion'slogistic equirements.There is no forrnal re3r service element atcompany evel, where the company commander,

assistedby his technicalofficer and irst sgrgeant,handle all logistics unctions. Normally, he bat-talion delivers supplies to its subordanate

r lE r 'mLo td 'U i^ !80 [dld r ' nd r6h , f .p * l ' / :o

Fi8ur 7 TheSupply latoon

40


48/149

The chi6l of th6 battElionammunitionsupplypoint (BPB) is usually an NCO from the supplyplatoon.He signs or the ammunitiondelivered yregiment,delivers equested mounts o the com-panies, and keeps the remainder on trucks{th6r6byacilitating apid delivery)at the battalionBPB. Additional excess ammunition may bestored on lhe ground, particularlywhen ths battalion s occupying delensive osition.

During a high-sped ffBnsive, latoonguideslead the battalion ammunition carrirs lo in-dividual combat vehicles. In the delns, com-pny ammunirion supply point6 (RPBS)may bestablished figure 28). This procedu16 educestheexposure f supplyvehicleso enemy ire.The battallon's support platoon lgader andcompany lirst sergeants maintain ammunitionstatusteDorts.

5


49/149

C. POLThe deputy battalioncommander or technicalaffahs s rsponsibleor allocatinguel to the bat'talion's subordinateelements, The motor trans-port squad eadero{ the supply platoonnormallY.uns hebattalionefuelingoint BZP).To decrease he need for refueling,vehicleshave supplementaryPOL containers which arerefilledafter use, only in xtremeemergencyarevehiclesrefueled n combat. The Soviets makeevery effort to refuel prior to an engagement, tthe end of the day, after the cohbat mission,andprior to a rivercrossing.When on the march, thepreferredhethod of refueling s to simultaneouslyrefuel vhiclespositionedon both sides of thePOL ankersf igure 9).

In combat, Soviet soldiers are supposed toreceiveat least rivohot mealsper day. When thisis not possible, hey eat dry rations and bread.Four hundredgrams of bread and 3 dry combatrations rovideover4,000 alories erdsy.The MRB has 4 mobile ield kitchenswhichpreparehot mealsand transport hem to subor-dinate units {figure 30). Sealed thermos containers or each platoonare pickedup by platoonrepresent6tives hen soldierscannot individuallypick up lheir radons.The divisionbakeryprovidesfresh bread {figure 31), which may be baked on

KEY-6i

lte 29. Ret le nElhe otor izedi ieBai tal ionCombal lementsurngtheMarch--J;l a_lIE-:;F{!J tue kld $,'h k&r c*.

F g

CCCCCC CCCCC

42


50/149

Lr^.. ::8Fq^i i,.,In^("""$F-[^',$t-(^tlI-{r'""."

lgj

.fil

fl{

KEY

+olo

NOTES

Figure 0.TheSupply latoon elivringoodo AtiackinsCompanies

43


51/149

Fieure1.Divisionakeryersonner.

The battalion ood supply point (BPP) s runby the head of the supply platoon'sralion sec'tion. A water supplypoint is constructednear heBPP or, when this is not practical,a centralwaterdistributionpoint is used. Water is deliveredwithfood to the companies. lndividual waterconsumption s figured on the basisof l0 liters ofwaterperd6y(15litersn hot climates).It is the responsibility f the chief engineeratregiment o establishwater supply points,whichare then maintained y subordinate nits. Rubber

ized materialwhich protects he water from con-taminationsused of storage,e. ClothingIn combat, the battalion equests eplacementclothing on the basis of worn-out, lost, or con-taminated.The clothing supply chief at regiment

is responsibleor the distributionot clothing anfor bath and laundryservices,Soviet regulationspecify hat active duty personnelmust bathe anchange their underwearat least once a week, aperiodextended o every 10-12days during combat operatrons.

The battalionmedicalaid station (tigure32) ithe lowest levelof organizedmedicalsupport inthe Soviel Army. The section ot four men iheaded by the feld'sher. The aid station's function is to provide firct aid and to prepacasuallies or evacuation o the regimentalaistation {figure:l:l). Although subordinate o hibattalioncommander, he /e/d1rrel takes nstructionsfromtheregimentalmedical fficer.Medicalaid at battalion level is rudimentaand includesbandaging.splints, morphine njections, and simple operations o preparewoundefor evacuation.The two medical orderlies n thesection are aided by regimental orderlies incollecting he wounded from the battle areaandcarrying hem o thebattalion id station.

FiE0re2.The ed ala id la l ion.

44


52/149

d

-----\5

fu*..*"fA.r;t

G\\-Fs/crouporwdundcdn sheher Ficurcsrherunermlnded)

33 Mdi6lEvacuationurin8theAtta,k.

v-6

=.EIL II

45


53/149

4. MAINTENANCEFor some time, the Soviets have had a fieldmaintgnncedoctrine strssing rapid battlofieldreoairas close to the frontlinesas oossible.ouFing World War ll , 7t&) percenrof the disabled

Soviet vehicles rturned to combat; of these,m-90 percentwere repaired n 1 to 2 days (thelsraelisenjoyed a similar high repair rate in theOcrober1973Warl. Such raoid reoak s of criticalimportance,panicularly n a war with high rtesof attrition. This emphasison rapid repah asanessential element of soviet offensive doctrinewith itsanticipated igh ratesofadvance.The d6puw battalion commander or technicalaffairs direcrly supervises he repair workshop{figure 34). A repair or repair-evacuater roup

{BG, or REG)may be createdby augmentingbat-talion asseb with regimentalvehicles. SattalionBEGsnormallyonly conduct repairswhich can becomoletedn a veryshorttime 5hou|sor ess).

The deputy battalion commander or technicaaf{airscontrols pairand vacuationof damagedquipment from a technical observtionpoint.. This obseruation oint, normallv ocatod I to I hkibmeters from the frontlino, includesa radioooerator ndattachedmaintenance orsonnel.lf a vshiclecannot be repeiredn plece,or is indanger of capture, t is evacuatedby regimentaassets o previouslydesignatsd ocations{figuro

Figure 4 ThRepan orkshop,

46


54/149

t)r&l1^"*"J%>>'r0TTm6'

@

:k,l-l W" ml',\ r""1 t'fr-a\El '--7^), .=arolr,- -'

0. T rH;\[email protected]'-.r.(

KEY

108


114/149

1.GENERALOvgr he past few years here has bena mark-ed increase n numbeF and types oI helicoptercwithin the Groups of Soviet Forces Germany(GSFG)with a correspondingncrease n capa-bilitis or heliborneoDerations. he Sovietscur-rently have the capabil i ty to conductsimultaneously several battalion-size heliborneoorations in Central Europe with airbotn,special purpose, and/or motorized ifle troops.This section addresseshe use of the ltlRB inheliborne psrations.In wartime, Soviet helicopter egim6nts, ubor-dinate o tacticalair armies,are assigned o eachfront. Some ot these regiments eem specifically

lailored o lifr motorized ifle battalionsn a varie-ty of combat operations, Although heliborneoperations n regimentrlstrcngth are occasionallydescribed.he MRB is considered v the Sovietsto be most suited for a variety of missions.Atleasl one MRB per motorized ifle division s train-d to conductheliborne perations.2. MtSSTONS

Hlibornemissionswhich are given o the [,4R8includea;ding n maintaining ffensivemomentumby capturingkey terrain,blockingenemy resetuesand resupply efforts, interdicting withdrawalroutes, aiding amphibious orces n th seizureofa bgachhead, nd attackingcommandand controlsitgs.3. DEPTHOFOPERATIONS

The operationaldepth ot an [,4R8 heliborneoperationdepends upon several actors: the im-portanceof the objective,whether the MRB actsindpendentlyor as pan of the regiment, theamount of supponing anillery and/or close airsuoport assets available, he estimated ime forlinkup,and he natureof enemydispositions

The importanceof the objective s the over-riding actor in determining he operational epthof th6 mission.Acting as part of the regiment n a

Section C- Helibone OperationshelibornE peration, he MRB could operateup tom kilom6ters behind the FEBA. lt could alsooperate o the s:rmedistanceacting ndependent-ly. althougha more normaloperational epth is Ito 10 kilometers-thal is, within range of sup-porting artillery.The Sovietswant linkup by ad-vance guard elemenls with the heliborneMRBwithin a few hou6, and prefer to conduct theoperationwithin range ol friendlyartillory,Thesefactors, however,will not preclude he MRB frombeing inserted up to 80 kilometersbeyond theFEBA to seize an important objective. n such asituarion, the lrRB could receive additionalhelicoptergunshipsupport and/or be rginforcedwith a tillery nd or additionalmorta s.4. FORCEORGANIZATION

The organization and capabilitiesof BMP-equipped orces and BTR equipped orces clearlyfavor the latter(figure73) or heliborne prations.In addition o the tacticaladvantages ossessedythe BMP vis-a'vis he BTR(seeChapter2, SectionB, paragraph1, he8MP-equippedegimsnt'sself 'propelledartillery cannot be transportedby heli-copter, while the towed artillry minusatsprimemovers)of BTR-equipped egihents s hlicoptertransportable. Pca are also not transportable yhelicopter.Becaushe Sovietsarestillformulatingdoctrine for the optimum employment of BMP-equippedunits, and since heseunitsalso have hecapability o conduct heliborneoperations,suchoperationswill be addressed here. Moreover,principles f employment regenerallyhe same o.BTR-quippednd BMP-equipped nits.

Although lvlETTdeterminos he augmEnrationan IVIRB eceivesn conductinga heliborne pera-tion, the MRB normally operates with fewvehicls. n addition o saDoer nd NBC tamsat-tachod rom regimgnt,he MRB can ecive n aircontrol elementof three-to iv6 men from army tocoordinateair support rom gunshipsand tacticalaircraft. Close air-groundsupport is providedbyhelicoptergunships,while tactical air strikes areprepranned.

I09


115/149

FiEure 3.A BTR-Eq!ipped otorized ifleBattalrcnreparingtora eiiborne peration.

5. AERIALEMPLOYMENT ONCEPTSHigh performanceircrcf tsuch as the FLOG.GER sris f igure74) and the HIND and HIP

helicoptergunships {figure 75) suppress enemydefenseswithan he flight corridorand provideairsupport or the l\ilRB.HOPLITES erform aciicalreconnaissancefigure 6),whi leHIPS figure 7)

can iay mines on likely enemy avenuesof ap-proach nto the obiectivearea.The [iRB is trans-ported by HlPs to the LZ{s) and receives ern-forcements,supplies,and additionalcombat sup-port (Iieldartilleryand antitankguns as requiredlfromH0OKs figure 8).

Frgure4. he LOGGERSenesrovdeAir roundSupport

l I 0


116/149

&,;!}

Itt h. BtPFigure 5.Hellcopterunshp/Troop a rierc

111


117/149

FiCUre 6 . he HOPITTE e . lo rmsTdc l .a l econnarss ' rLc .

'-r+:r ! E

Fisur 77. The HIP Can ConductAeria MineiayinB.

r12


118/149


119/149

The actionsof the MFB duringobjective area, and during thephaseollow normalSovietdoctrine.

rr-EIIrl-\

/'a\

z-,.,4Ficure 9.Comrnunrcationsn he AssemblyArea.

KEYcomnlnBnon.ei&r I banaoi )

thed rcdoi ord'o.0nmu 6rois

7. DEFENSEIn the defense, he IVIRBhas the mission ofholding its positions while inflicting max,mumcasualtieson the enemy. In addition to its at,tachments, it can be aided in this task byhelicopters laying mines along likely enemyavenuesof approach,and by on-callgunship andpossibly ighter) support.The MRB'sdefenses reorganized enerallyas escribedn Chapter .Once linkup has been achieved with the ad,vance guard, the lvlRB, from its defensiveposi,tions, supports the movement of the advanceguard. The lvlRB'svehiclesare brought forwardby its parent unit and, atter linkup, the heliborneIMRB emounts ts BIMPS nd conductsmounted

8. VULNERABILITIESAlthough lcxible in hat both 8MP- and BTR-equipped units may be used), Soviet heliborneoperationswiih motorired ifle troopshave mpoFtant vuJnerabil i t i es.heliborneMRB is (at leasinitially) a felatively ightly equipped orce withrestrictedground mobilityand limitedsustainability, particularlyagainst a mechanizedopponent.Perhaps for these reasons, Soviet heliborneoperctions nvolving N4RB roops are invariablyconservativen nature, usually aking placewithinrange fsupporngadi l leryJke.

attack, in thereorganization

TI4


120/149

''',:i. : - . J : J ;

\\-E

/

/.=--.\\ alJ _,/ Panrod dq16bru


121/149

Section D - Water Bariet ODerations1.GENERAL

Wheneverpossible, he Soviets try to force awatrbarrierfrom hs marchon a broad ront, withminimum delay in appro6chingand crossing heobstacle.Th;s ype of hasty crossings usuallyat-temptgdagainstnonexistent rweakdefenss, ndwhen the curent and condhion ol the banks onboth sides of the obscle are favorable. Hastycrossings reduce the attacker's vulnerabilify onuclear iresand enablohim to raoidlv ontinue he

When a hasty crossinghasfaileddue to n6mydefnses and/or unprepared or poor crossingsites, the crossing s methodically lannedand adeliberatecrossing attempted, Deliberatecro$-ings are time-consumingand costly. Moreover,they slow offensivemomentum and increase heattackor's u nerabilityo nuclea fires.

The BMPequippedMRB is paniculaf lywllsujtsd to conduct a river crossingbecauseof theBIMP's antitank capabilitis.The BlvlP'equippdMRB needs lewer tanks (and, therefore, lessengineer upport) han a non-BMP-equippednit,and can- therefore,cross a water obstacle asterthana BTR-equipped 4RB ith armorsupport .2. ROLES ND MISSIONS

The IVIRBmay cross6 w6te. obstacleas a divi-sion's orward detachment.as the advanceguardof a regiment,or as part of the regimentalmainKnowing that his unit musl cross one of morewater obstacles,a divisioncommanderwill nor-mally task a regiment most probablya regimentin the division'smain body during the march) oprovidean llRB to servas the nucleusof a lor-ward detachment in some circumstances, n en-

tire rcgiment ouldact asa f orwarddetachmentl,As the division's orward detachment. he IVIRBwould have he missionof linkupwith a heliborneor airborne force, or to seize and exDand abridgehead from the march. The bridgeheadcould be up to 7 kilometers eepon the lar bank.Forward detachments, n their race to seize andoxpand bridgeheads, ry to avoid contact withwithdrawingenemy orces.

lf a forward detachmenthas been designatedand has accomplishedts missionof 6stablishingbridgehead,an MRB, acting as th6 lead regirnent's advancoguard, would be given lhe mis-sion of expanding he bridgehead in conjunctionwith the forward detachment) r passing hroughthe bridgeheadand continuing the ttack. l{ acrossing cannot be accomplished, he advanceguardhas he mission tclearing he nearbank,

In the absonc ot a forward detachmenr, helead regiment's advanceguard would be giventhe mission of linkup with airborne/heliborneforces and/or securing and oxpanding abridgehead.Whetheractingas the division's orwa.d detach-

menl or the rggiments advanceguard, the MRBwouldbe havily ugmented, ontaining p to:- Onea.tillrybattalion.- Two tankcompanies.- OneairdefenselatoontwoZSU-23 s).- OneantitanklatoonBRDMS).- Onebridgeplatoon orsection).- Onesapper latoon,.. Onechemicadeta hment,

Acting as part of the main body, the lvlRBwould approach crossingsiles on a broad frontand n march ormation.The remainderof this section will discuss heMRB acting as the advance guard of the division's ead regimentmakinga hastycrossingandestablishing bridgehead.

3. THECROSSING

Planning or the crossing of a water barfierbeginsas early as possible,prefsrablybefore hernarch. Basedupon all availablentelljgence nd acareful, detailed map study, the senior com-mander designates he numberand approximatelocationsof crossing ites.developsa conceptofoperations,and insures hat prior to the march.torward detachments,advanceguards,and lead116


122/149

regimentshaveadequate6ngineer upport. In ac-cordancewith new intllignceand changes nthe tactical situation{otten providedby combatand engineer reconnaissancepersonnel,figurg81), the olan is refined and new instructionsissuedduring h march.No formal combat orderis issued {or a hasty crossing. Regimentalanddivisioncommanders fien xercise losesupervi-sion of the crossing rom commandposts ocatednear h waterobstacle.

The regimentalcommandergives detailed n-stmctions o his advanceguardcommander s tohow he is to prepare or and accomplishhis mas-sion, Though he carriesout his mission epamtelyfrom the regimentalmain body, the MBB advanceguardcommander s still closelysupervised y hissenior commander. He maintainsconstant radiocommunicationswith the regimentalcommanderand may havea regimental taff officer whh himto makE sure that everythinggoes according oplan,

To his organicand attachedcommanders headvance guard commander gives the mission,march order, reconnaissance ata. location ofcro6singsites, assault schdule. and order of

crossing. n addition,he gives ire missions or aFtilleryand mortars n covering he assaultand insupport of aclions on the opposite tank,assemblyarea for lanks to carry out snorkeling(or ferry crossing)operations,details of logisticssupport,and comrhandand ont rol nstructions,The advanceguard s heavily cintorcedor itsmission. The ord6r of march of the advanceguard is organizsd o place he bulk of the com-bat power and key engineeruni6 and items ofequipment s ar orwardaspossible,

b. CommandandContolDuring the march, the battalion commanderand staff, along with the attached artillrybat-talion cornmander, are well torward. situatedbehind the advance party. During the assault

crossing. he battalioncommander xercises losepersonalcontrol from a command oost locatednear he water ba(ier. The organization nd con-Vol of rhe crossing sites are delegatedby thesenior engineerofficer present {figurg 82). Thebattalion commandr and the attachd artillerybattalioncommanderprobablycross h obstaclebehind he irsrechelon omDanies.

Fisure8l.Reconnaissancl BothRivrBanksUsually recedeshe MainAseult

l I 7


123/149

FiSure 2.TheSenior nineerOflicerCoitrolsheCrossing.c. Secuing the Neat Eanklf the nearbank has not been seizedby a fo.-ward detachmentor heliborne orce, the advanceguardaccomplisheshis task and establishs ross-ing sites. Every effort is made by the advanceguard to sdze the near bank quicklyand to pre-vent the enemy from organizing an effectivedefenseor destroyingexistingcrossing$tes. Thereconnaissanceatrolcrosses s soon as possible

and conducts active reconnaissance f the farbankand bridgehead bjectives.Attached engineercestablishandlor improvecrossing ites. Trackedamphibious erriesgo intoassemblyareas and wait until the far bank hasbeen seized belore transporting he artillery bat-talion. (Bridge-layinganks go into positionandaid in getting the advanceparty across narrowwater obstaclesup to 20 meters n width.) Ap-proaches o the water obstacleare marked, andcontrol points are established o maintainmove-

mentandprevent ongestion.The advanceparty crosses s rapidlyas possible and continues ts missionon the far bank. f itis unable to cross, t takes the enemy under fireand awaits the arival of the advance guard'smain body. Smoke is used to conceal crossinglocaflons.

An MRB will normallycrossa water obsractein one echelonwith all three companiesabreast(two abreast f the advanceparty crossesearlier)and 50 to 100 metersbetweenvehicles.This foFmation placesmaximumcombat power forwardand allows for the mosr rapid crossing of theobstacle. BlvlPs, white in the water, fire thirmain rmamentndSAGGERSs equired.Attachedartilleryand mortarsprovide ire sup-port (figure83) and smoke, and displaceby bat-tery on order. Attached tanks go into anassembly reaand prepareor the crossing figure84) or, if the enemy fires trom the far shore areparticularly eavy, hey providedirect ire supportfor the [4R8. Air defenseelementsset up onground from which they can provideair defensoand direct ire support or the entirecrossing,Airdefense ires are supplemented y the battation,sSA-7 gunnersatop the BMPSduringthe c.ossing(l igure85).Havingcrossed he obstacle, he MRB pushesrapidly nland5 to 7 kilometersand establisnesbridgehead figure86). The MRB's attached anksand anillerycross as soon as possible figure87)and lake up assignedpositionswithin the bridge-head.The sappe.platoonaids the MRB In rm-proving ts defenses,while otherengineerperson-nel remainbehind o further improve he crossingsites or the regimentalmain ody.

118


124/149

Fisure 3.Self-propelledrt rleryardZSU-23.4supportine RiverCrossing.

FiSue 84.T52sPrepaing ora RivrCrossing.


125/149

hC

Figurea3.Selt-propelledrtillery ndzSlJ23 4s Supporiinga iverCross s.

Figure84. 62s Preparingor aRiverCrossing.


126/149

Figure 5.SA.7Gunners upplement therAir DeienseWeaponsuringawaterCrossingOperation

120


127/149

ff);

K9\d

P

,fli..:a:^i

-..*o-E b*! dd aniko m manh eruhiKEY

i:i>d(en[ Podon ndse .l.is IPMP)

/-r+1 Denroyebrdge

NOTESr.Th.h Lh b4n io$e run 'e the Fe ! nmedai.dbranv!1hoox . . " |dbe ,dha ' ry ' "

Fiture86.A

Documents

The Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion