The Last Marja- Khalaji

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The Last Marja

Sistani and the End of TraditionalReligious Authority in Shiism

Mehdi Khalaji

Policy Focus #59 | September 2006


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All rights reserved. Printed in the United States o America. No part o this publication may be reproduced ortransmitted in any orm or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any inor-mation storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing rom the publisher.

by the Washington Institute or Near East Policy

Published in in the United States o America by the Washington Institute or Near East Policy, L Street NW, Suite , Washington, DC .

Design by Daniel Kohan, Sensical Design and CommunicationFront cover: Iraqis with ngers ink stained rom casting votes carry a picture o prominent Shiite cleric AyatollahAli Hussein al-Sistani during an election rally in Sadr City, December , . Copyright AP Wide WorldPhotos/Karim Kadim


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o the memory o those clerics who hae been the unrecognized and hidden ictims o torture, execution,and imprisonment at the hands o Shiite jurist rule in Iran, and to their amilies, the silent witnesses othis religiously justied iolence.


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About the Author

Mehdi Khalaji is the Next Generation ellow at Te Washington Institute, ocusing on the role o politics in con-

temporary Shiite clericalism in Iran and Iraq. From to , he trained in the seminaries o om, the tradi-tional center o Irans clerical establishment. He has also served on the editorial boards o two prominent Iranianperiodicals, worked or the BBCs Persian Service, and produced or Radio Farda, the Persian-language service othe U.S. governments Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Currently, he is completing a doctorate in Shiite theol-ogy and exegesis at the Sorbonne in Paris.

n n n

Te opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those o the author and not necessarily those o the WashingtonInstitute or Near East Policy, its Board o rustees, or its Board o Advisors.


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Table of Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Te Nature o Shiite Religious Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Sistani as aMarja. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Irans Islamic Revolution and the Conuence o wo Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Marjayat, Politicizing the Seminary, and Clerical Economic Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Te End oMarjayatand Its Political Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36


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The Washington Institute for Near East Policy v

Part of american rustration in Iraq stems rom

misestimating the Shiite religious authority and net-work in the country. Lack o clarity about the natureo the Iraqi Shiite religious authority, its social inlu-ence, its political capability, and its relation to the Ira-nian clerical establishment and government has causedvarious problems or U.S. policy in Iraq. Sometimes theUnited States has relied too much on Grand AyatollahAli Hussein al-Sistani, expecting him to calm multipletensions generated by dierent Shiite groups. Some-times Americans have ignored the power and potential-ity o the Iraqi Shiite religious network and its connec-

tion to the Shiite and Sunni networks outside Iraq.A politicization and a radicalization o the Shiite

authority and network have occurred not only insideIraq but also throughout the Shiite world. he Ira-nian supreme leadership has largely transormed theunorganized traditional Shiite clerical establishmentinto a systematic political and nancial network thatworks against U.S. interests in the region. A vast ronto moderate Shiites exists all around the Shiite world.Tese moderates exist among both clerics and intellec-tuals, with divergent traditional or democratic tenden-

cies. But what has become known as the Shiite cleri-cal establishment is mainly under the Iranian regimescontrol. hat apparatus has largely become a tool inthe hands o Shiite extremism, leaving other religiousor secular currents in the margins, without institu-tional means, social inluence, and communicationscapability. On the basis o detailed inormation aboutthe transormation o the clerical establishment rom acivil institution into a strong arm o a totalitarian gov-ernment, this study argues that as long as that clericalestablishment enjoys ample inancial resources rom

the Iranian government and is able to carry on politi-cal activity under the cover o religious activity, theMiddle East will ace serious peril rom Shiite extrem-ist undamentalism.

Te metamorphosis o the seminary rom a religiouseducational institute that manages the religious aairso worshipers into an integral part o an ideologi-

cal arsenal o the undamentalist Iranian government

dates rom the beginning o the Iranian revolution.Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his successor Aya-tollah Ali Khamenei both succeeded in underminingthe civil and religious roles o the clerical establishmentand politicizing it as much as they could. Politicizingthe clerical network went ar beyond Irans borders.Khamenei, in particular, has tried to expand his domi-nation o the Shiite networks in the region. Troughsophisticated mechanisms, he has altered the symbolicand material capacity o the Shiite religious institutionsthroughout the region in his own political avor, using

them or his anti-Western and anti-American policy.Sistani may well be the last traditional Shiite

authority (marja) not only in Iraq but also in the Shiiteworld. I the marjas no longer unction as in the past,the environment within which U.S. policy unctionswill change. A post-marja era will be characterized bypoliticization o the Shiite religious network and rein-orcement o the Iranian regimes power and inuenceoutside Iran; by contrast, the inuence o the regimeinside the country will diminish. Tese results wouldcome rom polarization o the moderate ront o Shiites

and the extremist one, rom the wealth o the Iraniangovernment as compared with other unding sourcesor the Shiite religious community, and rom increasedconnection between dierent extremist groups underthe Iranian regimes control. Te eects would be eltnot only by the West but even more so by democraticorces inside Shiite countries or communities. By end-ing the marja era and destroying the traditional unc-tion o the clerical establishment, the Iranian regimeintends to eliminate any possibility o political changerom within, to marginalize civil society and demo-

cratic movements, and consequently to limit the Westsoptions in dealing with the Iranian government on di-erent controversial issues.

Te Shiite clerical establishment can be understoodonly by studying the economic sources on which itrelies. Te ample economic resources o political un-damentalists, not the orce o the aith, drive some Shi-

Executive Summary


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Mehdi Khalaji The Last Marja: Sistani and the End of Traditional Religious Authority in Shiism

vi Policy Focus #59

ite worshipers to behave politically against democraticprocesses. Te satisaction o their material needs byextremist groups or the Iranian government is the maingenerator o their agitation against democratic reorm-

ist ideals. Unveiling the concealed nancial resourceso the Shiite network is the most dicult part o dem-ocratic countries eorts to help deconstruct the un-damentalist Shiite networks in the region.


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The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1

Aqida means the system o belies and non-belies which

are the basis or all leels o connection between author-ity and power. Power needs to be obeyed; but there is noloyal, ee obedience to an arbitrary power that is not sup-ported by authority. Jurists and legal authorities contrib-ute by providing a rationalized oundation to the author-ity o those who hae the responsibility o enorcing thelaw; law being expression o the political power monopo-lized by the state. . . . Islam is theologically Protestant andpolitically Catholic.

Mohammad Arkoun,Islam: o Reorm or toSubert?(London: Saqi Books, ), p. .

t h i s s t u d y a t t e m P t s to shed light on thenature o contemporary religious authority in the Shi-ite world, with a ocus on Iraq and Iran. For the lasttwo centuries, religious authority in Shiism has beenknown as marjaiya, which literally means the sourceo imitationand guratively describes the positiono a living Shiite supreme legal authority who sup-posedly possesses the exclusive authority to interpretsharia (Islamic law);1 is the main collector and man-ager o religious taxes; is the administrator o religious

educational and noneducational oundations; and

possesses the authority to seize control o the sanctity

in society by directing rituals, rites, and religious cer-emonies.Marjaiya is the upper echelon o a hierarchywithin the ulamas or mojtaheds who are Shiite juristsand control the so-called clerical institution.

According to late schools osharia, every Shiite wor-shiper is either a mojtahed, a religious scholar who iseducationally and intellectually able to understand andinterpret religious texts2 and deduces Gods orders tohuman beings rom those texts through traditionalmethodologies and conceptual apparatuses, or is anotherwise ignorant ollower o a mojtahed.3

Although a large number omojtaheds have stud-ied Shiite theology and jurisprudence, only a very ewmarjas usually exist. o become a marja, a mojtahedmust reach a high level o social popularity throughan economic network. Although every ignorant wor-shiper should ollow the marja who is recognized byhim as the most knowledgeable mojtahed, in reality, amarja is not necessarily the most knowledgeable moj-tahedbut rather a mojtahedwho successully orga-nizes a protable network through his relations withdierent authorities inside the seminary and abroad,

such as businessmen and political or social authori-

The Nature of Shiite Religious Leadership

. Tesharia, the legal codication o Gods commandments, is called Divine Law because it is presented as ully and correctly derived rom the teachingo holy texts (the Quran and Hadith). Ibid., p. .

. Dierent levels o religious texts exist. Primary texts are the Quran, which is believed to be a textual revelation to the Prophet Muhammad, and theSunnat, which is the traditional corpus o hadith in which a reader discovers what the Prophet and the twelve imams said, did, or conrmed. Whereasthe Quran is ocially a closed corpus that became in the last centuries a matter o consensus not only among Shiites but or all Muslims, the Sunnat isan open corpus and the subject o controversy. Every jurist has not only the right but also the duty to determine the authenticity o every hadith in thiscorpus though ilm al-rijal.Ilm al-rijalis a traditional discipline that scrutinizes the narrators o hadith, their names, genealogical lineages, lietimes, dateso death, characters, and circumstances o reception as well as the transmission o hadith and its topic or subject. Every mojtahedshould be an expert onilm al-rijalin order to reach his personal views about controversial subjects o this discipline. Tereore, each mojtahedcan invoke a specic part o thecorpuses o hadith and distinguish between authentic and ake ones through his personal practice oilm al-rijaland his opinion on usul al-qh (the oun-dations osharia or shariaprinciples).

Secondary texts are the juridical works written by earlier jurists. Te closer a text is to the period o the Prophet and imams, the more a mojtahedcanrely on its authors opinions as a correct understanding o primary texts. In principle, all mojtaheds presume that early jurists had to have access to more

sources than a contemporary jurist because they assume that in the course o history many religious sources were lost or disappeared. For a classic study onthe ormation osharia, see Joseph Schacht,An Introduction to Islamic Law (New York: Oxord University Press, ).. According to contemporarysharia schools, undersharia every Shiite worshiper should be either a mojtahedor a ollower or a muhtat(literally, cautious).

A muhtatis a worshiper who is neither a mojtahednor a ollower o a mojtahed, but one who ollows the strictest verdicts o contemporary mojtaheds inorder to be assured that she or he practices what God expects rom her or him. For example, i some mojtaheds consider an act to be illicit while otherssay that it is not, the muhtatshould not perorm it. Indeed, the criteria o his or her adherence is not the educational character o a mojtahed, but the pre-cautionary nature and harshness o a verdict, no matter who issues it. In general, the majority o worshipers are ollowers, and a ew o them are muhtats.o be a muhtatone must have the knowledge o all mojtahedverdictsnot an easy task or most ordinary people. Te concepts oijtehadand taqlid(ol-lowing a mojtahed) entered the Shiite theology about ve centuries ago, under special political and social circumstances, and have played a very importantrole in developing new Shiite political theological concepts. Tey can be considered as an introduction to the modern theory o the jurist-ruler (elayat-e

aqih). See Rula Jurdi Abisaab, Converting Persia, Religion and Power in the Saaid Empire (London and New York: I. B. auris, ).


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2 Policy Focus #59

ties.4 Recognizing the level o a mojtaheds knowledgeosharia is not based on public and concrete criteria,because unlike a university system or some religiousorganizations, such as the Catholic hierarchy, no

ocial certicated degree exists in the seminary tra-dition: thereore, an ignorant worshiper must eitherbe a Shiite scholar and rely on his personal inorma-tion and knowledge about the livingmojtaheds andthe most knowledgeable one among them, or be anignorant worshiper who should identiy the mostknowledgeable mojtahedin two ways. First, two reli-gious scholars can conrm that a mojtahedis the mostknowledgeable, provided that two other religiousscholars do not oppose them. (Many religious author-ities, including Sistani, believe that being a mojtahed

or the most knowledgeable mojtahedcan also be iden-tied by a statement o only one trusted and reliableperson.) Second, a number o seminary-trained per-sons can certiy that a particular person is a mojtahedor the most knowledgeable one, provided that one issatised by their statement. Te process o becominga marja is very sophisticated, however, and in manycases depends not on educational level but rather onwealth and social connections.

Apart rom theological dierences between Shiaand Sunni Islam, the main distinction between them

is the economic structure o the clerical establishmentin each sect. A simple ormulation o this distinctionis that the Shiite clerical establishment benets romdirect religious tax payments o worshipers and con-sequently is economically independent rom politicalpower, whereas Sunnis enjoy religious incomes thatare under the governments control. he economicstructure o the religious establishment in each sectessentially determines the nature and boundaries othe political roles and social activities o the memberso the clerical order. Independence o the Shiite cleri-

cal establishment should not be understood as beingas simple as it seems at rst; this independence is rela-

tive and certainly interacts with political power. Teauthority o clerics, in all its social and economic aswell as political dimensions, is related to the histori-cal context in which the government plays a major

role either when it is strong or weak. Te oundationo the om seminary in March more than adecade ater the Iranian ConstitutionalRevolution and on the threshold o the pro-West-ern, nationalist, anticlerical dynasty o Reza ShahPahlavipresents a signicant opportunity to studythe interrelated historical and political elements thatled to the consolidation o clerics power in contem-porary Iran. Seminary independence was always lim-ited by the political agenda o the government. BeoreIrans Islamic Revolution, no particular clerical policy

or model existed or relations with the sultan. Someclerics were hesitant to have any relation with him;many o them deined their duty as being a sultansadmonisher and adviser, and a ew o them opposedhim publicly or secretly. Each kind o policy, naturally,had its own implication: a supporter would beneiteither economically or politically, and an opponentwould deprive himsel o the sultans patronage. Onlyin the course o Irans Islamic Revolution would cleri-cal opposition gain tremendous popularity and a con-sequently huge income rom religious taxes, and, ulti-

mately, succeed in removing the monarchy.Te uid nature o the Shiite establishment trou-

bles every scholar who wants to study it through theWestern conceptual apparatus o modern social sci-ences. Te scholar must always be cautious about theapplication o social sciences concepts and terms inattempting to understand the Shiite clerical entity.For instance, using the term organization or insti-tution to describe the clerical entity is problematic.Unlike Catholicism with its dened, strict, and con-solidated hierarchy and administration, the Shiite cler-

ical establishment is not institutionalized. Becom-ing a member o the clerical establishment has a very

. A paradoxical conception omarjayatexists in the seminary. Although one o the necessary conditions o being a marja is to be pious, devout, and not devotedto the pursuit o wealth, certain mojtaheds consider the position omarjayatas a pursuit o worldly pridea pursuit o riches and powerand thus hesitate tobecome a marja. Tey preer to remain unknown by ordinary people and do not collect religious taxes. For example, Mirza Ali Aqa Falsa (who died in in Mashhad) kept himsel aloo rom the marjaposition although most high-ranking clerics believed that he was one o only a ew mojtaheds who received

Ijazeh-ye Ijtehad(a certicate o being a mojtahed) rom his mentor, Abul-assem Khoi.


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The Last Marja: Sistani and the End of Traditional Religious Authority in Shiism Mehdi Khalaji


exible and uctuating procedure that is rooted in anenduring oral tradition rather than a written one. Forinstance, in the Shiite system, everyone can choose ateacher, study theology (even at his teachers home),

and become a cleric without any need to attend a sem-inary. Also, anybody can wear the clerical cloth with-out obtaining permission rom any religious authority,or anybody can claim an ijtehaddegree without anyinstitutionalized certication; he has only to be knownas a mojtahedor have a certication rom a mojtahed.Everything is based on traditional convention, unwrit-ten rules that govern the balance o power in thereligious milieu. Many clerics neither have religiousincome nor are registered in the seminary. Especiallyater the constitutional movement, or more specii-

cally afer the political agenda o Reza Shah to ounda modern judiciary and education systemelds thatwere monopolized by the clerics or centuriesmanyclerics lef the seminary and became employees o thegovernment. Irans Islamic Revolution provided clericswith much more opportunity to join the government;many o them kept their religious income, whereasothers conned themselves to the governments salaryand benets. For example, ormer president Muham-mad Khatami, who is a cleric, was not paid by the sem-inary or decades.

he more than , Shiite clerics (nearly, in Iran and , abroad) constitute anunstable network. Although most o them rely on reli-gious incomes, the sources o the incomes vary. Fromthe preaching commission and the commission orperorming rituals (like the religious marriage con-tract), which are paid by individuals and ree romany authoritys control, to the religious taxes thatevery worshiper pays to his own marja, a vast range oincomes exists in the decentralized clerical network.Money transer and turnover is another important

subject or study. Money is an important inuence onthe clerical networks political and social behavior and

inuence. A traditional structure o money keepingdominates the network and, as this study briey triesto elaborate, enables the clerical authorities to standbeyond any scientic statistics or government control

on their incomes and expenditures. Because o thedecentralized nature o the clerical network, even theclerical authorities do not have accurate and ull inor-mation about all the unds that come in and go out oevery clerics pocket. Even each marja generally hasonly a vague notion o his own income because o thelack o modern administration. Following Irans IslamicRevolution, a dramatic change has taken place in theIranian seminary that has undamentally aected semi-nary administration as well as its economic structure;chapter develops this point and examines its political

implications.In contemporary Shiism, Ayatollah Ali Hussein al-

Sistani in Naja is the marja with the largest ollow-ing. Although the U.S. invasion in Iraq played a majorrole in publicizing him outside o Iraq, his reputationas a marja was established even beore the death ohis mentor, Abul-assem Khoi, in . Under Sad-dam Husseins tyranny, all political institutions andpartiesall civil societywas annihilated by the gov-ernment. Te Naja seminary, which has existed or athousand years, ell into crisis under severe governmen-

tal pressure. Many Iranian and Iraqi clerics immigratedto Iran, and the seminary was lef to a small group ostudents and clerics who suered rom a complete lacko reedom. Afer Khoi passed away, the situation gotworse. Ayatollah Sistani was placed under house arrestand could not teach or eleven years. Te Naja semi-nary was almost completely inactive while the omseminary, which the Iranian government supportedpolitically and nancially, increasingly ourished anddeveloped.

When Saddam was toppled by alliance orces led

by the United States, no reliable political group or g-ure existed inside Iraq. Ayatollah Sistani succeeded in

. Ijtehadas a methodology or Islamic hermeneutics and understanding divine legal codes was originally orbidden in Shiism. Nevertheless, pursuant toa tremendous change in Shiite theology six centuries ago, the Shiites have accepted it and started to ound their own principles o ijtehad. See Wael B.Hallaq,Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ), and Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi,Le Guidediin dans le Shiisme original, aux sources de lsotrisme en Islam (Paris: Verdier, ), especially the last chapter.


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Policy Focus #59

attracting international attention as someone who couldpotentially ll that gap or the ollowing reasons:

n As a marja he had regular relations with Iran, both

with private individuals and the government, so hewas supposed to be able to manage post-Iraqi aairswith Iran. Shortly afer the war, this perception wasshown to be aulty, and Americans discovered thatthis expectation would not be realized, or reasonsthat will be examined later in this study.

n Sistani as a Shiite religious authority can play therole o a Shiite community representative and bethe point o consensus or diering political tenden-cies within this community. Te post-Saddam Shiite

community has become the most powerul politicalorce in Iraq, along with the Kurds. Tereore, build-ing a new government required making Sistani thepivot o all Shiites, overcoming the diering aspectsbetween the Shiite parties and militias.

n As a marja who during Saddams reign had littleopportunity to communicate with the Iraqi peopleand thereore had no recorded history in the Iraqicollective conscience, Sistani could easily becomerespected, even by Sunni clerics and heads o tribes,

and thus become the most reliable authority to res-cue non-Shiite societal orces in a time o crisis.

n Sistanis ideas, not only in the political sphere buteven in the religious realm, were unknown andambiguous to the public. Beore the war, he had yetto publish a single book and had not had the chanceto reely meet and speak with people. So whatever henow says and writes can be taken as his opinion onsharia and its role in politics. Western media, in par-ticular, emphasized the conception that he believes

in secularism and the separation o religious andstate institutions and consequently is not ollowingAyatollah Khomeinis model o the Iranian IslamicRepublic in Iraq. Even Iranian journalists, such as

Mohammad oochani, editor in chie o the Sharghnewspaper, believe that Sistani is an example o amarja who hesitates to repeat the aults o the Ira-nian clerics in creating an Islamic government.6

Whatever Sistanis principles insharia, he played avery important role in post-Saddam Iraq, whether inadvising government decisions on reerendums, elec-tions, and ormation o the constitution, or in calmingsectarian tensions as well as controlling some militias,like the Mahdi Army run by Muqtada al-Sadr. Recentsectarian violence in Iraq may prove that even Sistanis political capability in calming sectarian tension isnally exhausted and thus indicates he aces grave chal-lenges in playing an eective role in drawing the uture

political map o the country.o explain Sistanis principles on sharia and their

eects on his political role and activity, this studybegins with an intellectual biography o Sistani, con-tinuing with an elaboration o his network in theMiddle East and especially in Iran. Ten, it scrutinizesthe Naja seminarys relation to the om seminary, therelationship between Shiite religious authority in Iraqand Iran, and the overlapping network o the Shiiteworld. Tis explanation can help the reader understandthe Islamic nature o the Iranian government and the

connection between the Iranian political order and theinternal and external Shiite authorities.

Te main thesis o this paper is that marjayat, as itexisted in the past two centuries with all its traditionalaspects, belongs to a historical context and period thatcannot last afer Sistani. Te end o the marjayatera isnot only the end o an establishment but also a unda-mental development in the political social authority oShiism. In a post-marjayatera that transorms theologyinto a political agenda, old religious concepts will sig-niy dierently. Although Shiite theology was always,

in some respects, a political theology, now all its con-ceptual apparatus would be at the service o a modernIslamic ideology that is equipped with advanced tech-nology and weapons, with global implications.

. See Mohammad oochani, Tree Islams, Shargh (ehran), June , . Available online (http://sharghnewspaper.com//index.htm).


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For instance, in terms o Iranian domestic policy,examining the historical premises omarjayats declinewill help to better understand what President Mah-moud Ahmadinezhad says about the Hidden Imam

and the governments planning or his return.Marjayatis an establishment that is based on the Shiite concep-tion o the imamate and especially the Hidden Imam.Marjayatwill be obsolete i the Hidden Imam returns,so the political use o the Hidden Imam theme by apolitical leader such as Ahmadinezhad may be under-stood as a direct competition with the clerical establish-ment o Shiism in Iran.8 Te real competition, in act,has already taken place between the Iranian SupremeLeader and the marjayatestablishment. his study

attempts to argue that the Islamic Republic that wasounded by a marja, Ayatollah Khomeini, was a projectthat ultimately will lead to minimizing the role o cler-ics in the political realm and empowering undamental-

ism led by a combined group o a ew clerics and a largenumber o military and armed groups and institutions.Ironically, the increased political role o the Shiite ulamain the last decades has already negatively aected theirsocial and political authority and will eventually end thetraditional marjayatestablishment.

Understanding the historical and political rame-work o the decline omarjayatwould help in compre-hending some o the internal and external dimensionso the crisis in the Middle East.

7. Te Hidden Imam as a political concept has played a major role in the lie o Shiites throughout history. All political concepts in Shiite theology arerelated to how they perceive the imamate (succession o the Prophet) and the Hidden Imam (the last imam o welver Shiites) and his successors (jurists).For a historical account o this concept, see Patricia Crone, Gods Rule, Government and Islam, Six Centuries o Medieal Islamic Political Tought(NewYork: Columbia University Press, ; Hossein Modarresi abatabai, Crisis and Consolidation in the Formatie Period o Shiite Islam: Abu Jaar Ibn

Qiba Al-Razi and His Contribution to Imamite Shiite Tought(Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, ); Said Amir Arjomand, Te Shadow oGod and the Hidden Imam, Religion, Political Order, and Social Change in Shiite Iran om the Beginning to 1890(Chicago and London: University oChicago Press, 7); Kathryn Babyan,Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs, Cultural Landscape o Early Modern Iran (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-sity Press, ).

. he challenge between Ahmadinezhad and the clerics has already started. Please se e Mehdi Khalaji, Ahmadinezhads Popularity One Year On,PolicyWatch no. (Washington Institute or Near East Policy, July , ). Available online (http://washingtoninstitute.org/templateC.php?CID=).


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i n t h e w o r l d o f marjayat, popularity dictates

the role and rank o the marja. Tus, the most popularmarjas are almost always the most important. No o-cial polls, however, track the number o each marjasollowers, or ollowers o Sistani in particular, becausethe decision to ollow a marja is a very personal oneor the Shiite worshiper that ollows no set legal oradministrative procedure. Nevertheless, many uncon-ventional methods are used to estimate the percentageo ollowers o each marja. For instance, during theobligatory and nonobligatory pilgrimage to Mecca(Hajj and Umrah) and Medina, millions o Shiite wor-

shipers need to learn their religious duties regardingpilgrimage ritual.

Shiite pilgrims are organized within caravans. Eachcaravan consists o about people and is headed byan administrator who may be an individual or a smallgroup and a cleric. he administratorlike a travelagentis in charge o various pilgrimage matters, suchas getting visas to Saudi Arabia and arranging accom-modation during their stay in that country. Te clericsresponsibility is to help each pilgrim in his caravan ul-ll her or his ritual duty. Each pilgrims duty may vary

rom that o the others according to her or his marja.Te cleric is expected to teach every pilgrim his or herreligious tasks according to a marja. Tereore, whena pilgrim asks the caravans cleric about what she orhe has to do, the cleric should rst o all nd out whois that pilgrims marja. By knowing the marja o eachpilgrim in the caravan, a cleric can assist the pilgrim toaccomplish her or his ritual. Hence, a caravan cleric isa reliable source or knowledge about the popularity oeach marja, whether he lives in Iran, Iraq, or anotherpart o the Shiite world.

A cleric needs to know the Hajj codes and laws,which are sometimes very sophisticated. In places otherthan Iran, a caravans cleric is usually appointed by thecaravans administrator because o the clerics reputa-tion or abilities. In Iran, however, everything concern-ing pilgrimage, including the caravan clerics, is monop-olized by the government through the Organization or

Hajj and Pilgrimage (Sazman-e Hajj va Ziarat) and by a

representative o the Supreme Leader in Hajj aairsboth controlled by the Supreme Leader. Candidatesor caravan clericship are short-listed through ormalexams and then chosen according to ideological criteriaand expediency. Beore departure rom Iran, a caravansclerics are trained by those governmental organiza-tions in Hajj rituals as well as other issues, such as Iransannual demonstration against the United States, Israel,and Western countries that are deemed the enemies oGod by the ocial ideology o the Islamic Republic.Nonetheless, a cleric needs to become inormed about

the details o pilgrim ritual through other sources, suchas every marjas important book on Hajj codes and,nally, the representative oce (betha) o every marjain Mecca or Medina.

A marjas representative oce in Mecca and Medinais not located in a private building, but in a hotel.Every marja has his own sta in the oce during theyear, but in the period o obligatory pilgrimage (Hajj),usually the most important representatives o a marjawill be at the oce. Tis oce has two main unctions:the rst is to answer religious questions about pilgrim-

age codes asked by the marjas ollowers and especiallyby caravan clerics who want to direct the members otheir caravan who ollow that marja. Te second unc-tion is to collect religious taxes. Hundreds o thou-sands o dollars are paid to marjas oces every year incash or checks. Te oce collects the money and sendsit back to the marjas main oce, either where he livesor in om.

hus, the number o people or clerics who cometo the representative oice o each marja as well asthe amount o money they pay as religious taxes are

very evident signs o the extent to which each marjais ollowed by Shiite worshipers. Iranian governmentalpilgrimage organizations conduct a condential pollannually to gure out the approximate number o ol-lowers o each marja. Tey distribute the questionnaireamong the clerics o Iranian caravans, asking them par-ticularly about ollowers omarjas. According to the

Sistani as a Marja


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The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

annual condential polling, Ayatollah Ali Sistani is themost-ollowed marja in the Shiite world, and manymore people ask his views on pilgrimage codes or paytheir taxes to his oice and representatives in Mecca

and Medina than those who ollow other marjas.Te other source or estimating the quantity o ol-

lowers is the marjas main oce in om. Whether amarja lives in om or in Naja, or other cities in othercountries, he has a main oice in om that is veryimportant or his prestige and credit. his oice hasmany tasks: publishingsharia codes (towzih ol-massael)in Persian, Arabic, and other languages; managing themarjas acilities, charities, libraries, religious schools,hospitals, and other institutions; collecting religioustaxes; paying monthly salaries to religious students and

clerics; creating a clerical network o preachers whowill be sent to various cities o Iran or abroad to ulllreligious ceremonies o Muharram, Saar, Ramadan,and other religious events; and controlling dierentnancial and quasi-political aairs o the marja. Howbig and active an oce is would certainly be good evi-dence o how many worshipers ollow a marja. On thisbasis, Sistanis oice is the biggest oice in om interms o nancial capability and ownership o multipleinstitutions.

According to clerical sources, whether rom con-

dential pilgrimage polling or om marja oces, nearly percent o Shiite worshipers ollow Ayatollah Ali Sis-tani. Te rest o them ollow other great marjas: SayedMuhammad Hussein Fadlallah in Lebanon; Muham-mad Said Hakim, Bashir Pakistani, and MuhammadIshaq Fayyad in Naja; Muhammad Fazel Lankarani,Naser Makarem Shirazi, Lotollah Sa, Yosse Sanei,Abdolkarim Mossavi Ardebili, Mossa Shobeiri, Hos-sein Vahid Khorasani, Javad abrizi, Muhammad aqiBahjat, Hossein Nori Hamedani, Sadeq Shirazi, andSadeq Rowhani in om; and Ali Khamenei, Supreme

Leader o the Islamic Republic, in ehran. Other cler-ics claim marjayiatand have published their shariacodes and collect religious taxes, but their ollowers donot exceed a ew hundred at the most.

What is the signicance o the number o ollow-ers and its religious, social, and political meanings andimplications? A large part o this study is devoted toexamining the Shiite clerical network in the MiddleEast and, through it, the multiple dimensions o thepopularity o a marja in general and some o them inparticular. o explain the mechanism omarjayiatandhow a mojtahedcan achieve this position, we rst haveto look at the biography o Sistani as an outstandingexample o a marja.

Sistani and His Road to MarjayatOnly by supercial generalization can we deduce someelements explaining the passage o a mojtahedto mar-jayat. Sistanis destiny is not common amongmarjas;his itinerary to marjayatis exceptional and linked tounique political and economic circumstances.

Ayatollah Ali Hussein al-Sistani,1 originally romSistan, a southeastern province o Iran, was bornAugust , , in Mashhad, a holy city in northeastIran. He grew up in a clerical amily. Sistani prelimi-narily trained in Mashhad and studied Arabic litera-

ture and elementary texts in Islamic jurisprudence inthe citys seminary. In he moved to om, thecenter o Shiism in Iran, and among various courseshe attended those o Great Ayatollah Sayed Hosseinabatabai Borujirdi, who was the Great Marja not onlyo Iran, but also throughout the Shiite world.2

Afer three years, in , Sistani lef om or Naja,the Shiite center in Iraq, or urther study. In Naja,he started mostly attending the lectures o AyatollahAbul-assem Khoi and Sheikh Hussein Helli on Shi-ite jurisprudence and the oundations osharia (usul

. Te honoric title o Husseini reers to his genealog y and means that he is a descendant o Hussein, son o Ali, the Shiite rst imam, and through himson o the Islamic Prophet. Asayed, or a descendant o the Prophet Muhammad, has a distinguished position in Islamic law as well as in Muslim societies.Among many other privileges, she or he can use a part o religious taxes. One can claim relation to the Prophet through a traditional genealogy, which isneither scientic nor necessarily accurate. Because o the avoritism given tosayeds, abricating a genealogy to prove that someone is the descendant o theProphet is not very dicult. Te social position o a sayedis very important, especially to Shiites. Historically, most marjas aresayeds.

. Sayed Hossein Borujirdi was called Marja alal-itlaq, that is, the absolute marja. Te absolute marja is the one who does not have any competitor marjain his time and is recognized by the Shiite community as the most credible and knowledgeable marja without any controversy. In the history omarjayat,the emergence o an absolute marjawas a rare and exceptional event. Afer Borujirdi, not a single marja appeared as absolute.


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Policy Focus #59

al-qh). He was awarded the certicate oijtehad(o-cial clerical status) rom both o them.

In Sistani returned to Mashhad, Iran, wherehe wanted to settle and be appreciated or his Naja

training. For unclear reasons, he lef Mashhad in and returned to Naja, where he started to teach juris-prudence (qh) and the science o the oundations ojurisprudence.

Some rumors indicate that Ayatollah Khoi was look-ing or a person who would be able to replace him asa great marja and undertake the responsibility or theNaja seminary. Te rumors say that many o Naja shigh-ranking clerics suggested that Khoi choose Sistanior that role. Ater Khois decision, he asked Sistanito be prayer imam in his mosque, al-Khadra. Sistani

accepted this symbolic position that enabled him toprepare himsel or marjayatand acted as imam rom7 until the mosque was closed by Iraqi governmentorder in .

Many scholars, such as Allamah Sheikh MahdiMurwaarid, Sayed Murtadha al-Mohri, Sayed HabibHusaynan, Sayed Murtadha Isahani, Sayed AhmadMadadi, and Sheikh Baqir Irwaani, were his students.But not one o those scholars became prominent aca-demically or socially. Since the middle o , aferpressure on Sistani and other Shiite ulamas by Sad-

dams regime, Sistani decided to stay home and quitteaching.

When Sistani announced his marjayatin , hewas relatively well known in om through his son-in-law Sayed Javad Shahrestanis institutes. AyatollahSistani had no prominent disciples in om, nor hadhe written a book. He would not have been able tobecome a amous marja in om i Shahrestani hadnot prepared the practical conditions or his mar-jayat. Shahrestani was born in , married Sistanisdaughter in 7, and immigrated to om in 77. He

ounded the Aal-Olbayt Institute or Revival o Shi-

ite Heritage (Moassassat Aal-Olbayt li-ihya ittorathishiii) in . About nine years later, Sistani began hismarjayatafer his mentor, Khoi, passed away.

Aal-Olbayt Institute described its unction as gath-

ering manuscripts o traditional Shiite scholars andediting and publishing them in a very elegant orm ata very low price. From the beginning o its work, theinstitute obviously had more in mind than publish-ing orgotten, neglected, or important manuscripts.he expenses o editing and publication were muchmore than what the institute could gain rom booksales. Te institute was nancially supported by SayedJavad Shahrestani and his network in Iran and abroad.Shahrestanis principal project was establishing hisown institute in the very competitive climate o om

seminary. But Shahrestanis ultimate goal or the oun-dation o that institute, which has been ollowed bymany other institutes, libraries, campuses, and even anobservatory, appears to have been to spread the nameo his ather-in-law, Sistani, who was almost unknownin om seminary until that time.

When oms inuential clerics gured out that Sis-tani was trying to present himsel as a marja, they cam-paigned against him. Abdullah Javadi Aamoli and RezaOstadi, two members o the association o the omseminarys mentors (Jameh-ye Modarressin-e How-

zeh-ye Ilmiyeh-ye om), a pro-government clericalinstitute, explicitly worked on delegitimizing Sistani.Along with other pro-government clerics, they triedto goad Shahrestani into a reaction and then suppresshim and close Sistanis oces in om. But they nallyailed because o the wise and diplomatic measuresShahrestani took that spiked their destructive eorts.

Javad Shahrestani tried to use Khois network inpart. A considerable number o Khois representativesbecame Sistanis representatives. According to Shahres-tani, Sistani has more than , religious represen-

tatives worldwide.3 Although the religious properties

. Te concept o representative is very important or understanding the exibility and uidity o religious networks. A religious representative means onewho is trusted by a marja or his oce to spread his name and to campaign or the marja, to explain and answer the religious questions o worshipers, andnally, to collect their religious taxes. Te representatives have many ranks; a ew o them are mojtaheds, but most o them are not. Also, a ew o them aredisciples o the marja. Most o them are not, and many o them have no knowledge about the marjas views onsharia except through his book CodesoSharia, which is available to everybody. Few representatives are important enough to have an oce or themselves, like Sheikh Fazel Sahlani, Sistanisrepresentative in New York, or SayedMorteza Mohri, Sistanis representative in Kuwait, and most o them work at their homes. A religious representative


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and economic capital o Khoi mostly remained in thehands o his sons, sons-in-law, and his disciples andsome o his main representatives, Khois networkwhich was the most established and expansive religious

network in the worldcould be a great help to Sistani.Moreover, i Sistani carried the title o Khois mostprominent disciple and his successor, that acknowledg-ment could help Sistani use Khois symbolic capital aswell, namely his prestige and social inuence. Te Ira-nian government could not harm Shahrestani becausehe played a major role in showing the Iranian people,as well as clerics, that Sistani was the best potentialsuccessor o Khoi, which allowed Sistani to take overKhois place.

A very tough part o Shahrestanis job as Sistanis

most important assistant and representative was tomaintain the balance o power in om seminary,not only between Sistani and other marjas but alsobetween Sistani and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei,who claims that he is a marja, too. Shahrestani madeevery endeavor to depoliticize his activity and be neu-tral vis--vis various clerical and political tendenciesand currents. For instance, when Montazeri was disa-vored by the government, Shahrestani worked on nor-malizing its relations with the cleric in order to provethat he (and consequently Sistani) was an independent

marja and did not ear government security and policeorces. When Abdullah Nori, ormer interior minister,was released rom prison, Shahrestani went to ehranand visited him. Meanwhile, he has very close ties withthe Supreme Leaders oces in om and ehran andvery ofen welcomes in his oce Muhammad Muham-madi Golpayegani, the head o the Supreme Leadersoice. Shahrestanis oice in om is a convergencepoint that includes everybody rom all political andclerical sides and even religious intellectuals like Abdul-

Karim Soroush, who was extremely disavored by boththe government and clerics and is still considered agreat enemy o the clerical establishment by clerics. Byexpanding the range o people who have connections

with Sistanis oce, Shahrestani has created a securitybelt around himsel or protection against governmentsurveillance and intererence.

Sistani gained much o his power rom his popu-larity, and through it his economic power. A marjaswealth reinorces his popularity, and his popularityhelps him increase his nancial resources. As the most-ollowed marja in Iran and abroad, Sistani is the richestmarja o the Shiite world. (In chapter , we take a lookat the economic structure o the seminary and marjas.)Te most accurate estimates o Sistanis wealth indicate

his annual income is between $ million and $7million and his worldwide assets exceed $ billion.

Because o his assets, Sistani would be able to payhigher monthly salaries to seminary students and clericsthan any other marja. Te amount o monthly salary isvery signicant; it proves the wealth and consequentlythe popularity o a marja, briely, his economic andsocial power. Although Supreme Leader Ali Khameneidoes not have that many ollowers and does not collecta remarkable amount o religious taxes, by unwrittenlaw he pays the highest monthly salary at the seminary

in order to resemble the late Khomeini, who was a verypopular marja and collected hefy religious taxes anddonations. Khamenei is using the governmental bud-get rather than religious resources or responding tohis expenses in the seminary. Hence, Khamenei hasaltered the natural order o paying seminary salaries tokeep himsel above all, while he relies on nonreligiousunding resources.

Shahrestani, respecting Khameneis desire to beabove all in administration and in salary amount, is

can represent many marjas. He does not represent them politically. A representative collects the religious taxes o each worshiper and usually afer takingone-third o it or himsel, he sends the rest to the marjas main oces.Marjas are normally unable to have any control or do any audit on their repre-sentative and all takes place only through trust and condence. Some representatives send a small portion o the money they receive to the marjas mainoces and keep a large part o it or themselves. Sistani in aatwa (religious edict) stated that a worshiper is not religiously orced to pay his taxes to hisrepresentatives and is allowed to spend it himsel or religious goals that are specied in the codes osharia.

Sistani has repeatedly denounced the statements o his representatives that purported to express his view. He explicitly and specically declared onmany occasions that statements purporting to represent his views but lacking his oces seal or signature should be considered as merely the personal

views o those who express them. See Reidar Visser, Sistani, the United States and Politics in Iraq: From Quietism to Machiavellianism? NorwegianInstitute o International Aairs, No. 7, Oslo (), p. . Available online (http://historiae.org/documents/Sistani.pd).


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10 Policy Focus #59

excused when he pays less while he collects more. ButShahrestani spends the money in other ways. He paysmonthly salaries outside the seminary system, which isunder Khameneis control, to those whom the seminary

deprives o salary. Shahrestani pays salary to clerics whobecome disavored by the government at his oce, andby virtue o such generosity he attracts the support ovarious parts o the seminary who are unable to resistgovernment injustice or protest publicly.

Sistanis Institutes in IranJavad Shahrestani, afer ounding the Aal-Olbayt Insti-tute, created specialized multilingual libraries. First, heset up the general Library o Literature, which includesPersian, Arabic, English, and other classic and contem-

porary texts, rom literary works such as novels to lit-erary criticism and theory. Tis library now containsmore than , books and is increasingly open tonew books. Foad Al-Assadi, the director o the Libraryo Literature, tries not only to bring new publicationsinto the realm but also to buy old books that are out oprint, some o which are not allowed to be reprintedunder the Islamic Republics censorship system. heLibrary o oranic Exegesis and Sciences holds ,books under its director Muhammad Ali MahdaviRaad, a pro-Khatami and a pro-Montazeri cleric. Te

Library o History, with more than , books, isrun by Rasoul Jaarian, a undamentalist extremistcleric who has a close relationship with Khameneisreligious and security establishment in om. heLibrary o Fiqh, Fiqh Principles, and Law, with ,volumes, is run by Muhammad Mehdi Mehrizi, a lefistcleric who is close to Iranian reormers and to Muham-mad Khatami, ormer president. Te Library o Hadithis under an unknown cleric, Meraji, and the Libraryo Philosophy, Teolog y, and Logic is run by AhmadAbedi, a conservative cleric. Even though since Irans

Islamic Revolution many multilingual modern librar-ies have been built up, notably by the pro-governmentinstitute, Sistanis six libraries in om are very useulor religious students, with ree admission and accept-able service. he interesting thing is that Shahres-tani, by appointing six clerics rom dierent and evenopposing sides to run those libraries, has tried to prove

his political neutrality and his willingness to generalizethe benets o Sistanis institutions as well as protectthem against the government.

Shahrestani also ounded the Center or Shiite

Manuscripts, which contains more than , man-uscripts and is constantly buying valuable personalShiite libraries throughout the world. Tis center alsogathers microlms rom world libraries and puts themat the disposal o clerics at a very low price. Shahrestanihas purchased a site (, square meters, equal to. million square eet) or building an observatory tohelp jurists gure the accurate time or religious ritu-als like prayers or asts. Moreover, Shahrestani initi-ated welare projects by building residential unitswithin ve residential complexes (totaling more than

, square meters, equal to million square eet).In uture, his project will compete with Khois town oMadinatol Ilm and Khameneis town o Mahddieh inthe suburbs o om.

Shahrestani was the irst to bring the internet toom and gain the governments permission or creat-ing several internet service providers (ISPs). By doingso he provided the clerics with very cheap internetlines that initially were not iltered but ater a whileltered out pornography as well as anti-Iranian-regimematerial. His initiative to import the internet to the

seminary climate was groundbreaking and has beenwelcomed by reormist clerics. Shahrestanis ISPs pro-vide internet access not only or om customers butalso or other cities, such as Mashhad, Isahan, Ilam,and ehran.

Shahrestani has established Sistanis networkthrough those institutions and also through religiousinstitutes. Outside Iran, Sistani has two kinds ooices: one works under the name o Sistanis oiceand others work under the name o a religious insti-tute, like Imam Ali Institute in London. Sistani has

oices and institutes in Arica as well as New York,London, Paris, Damascus, Beirut, Lahore, Karachi,bilisi, Baku, and other cities around the world. Forinstance, the stated objectives o Imam Ali Institute,which is run by Kashmiri, another son-in-law o Sis-tani, are translation o religious books, especially Sis-tanis sharia codes, into nearly thirty languages; reli-


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gious publication; perormance o ritual in Britain andother Western countries; and the sending o preachersto Arica, Europe, and North America to proselytizewith Shiites and marjayato Sistani as well as other

religious missionaries.Shahrestanis institute, Aal-Olbayt, itsel has many

branches throughout the world, including Beirut,Damascus, and London. Aal-Olbayat Institute as wellas Sistanis oicial institutes and oices supposedlyconnect with Sistanis , representatives and collectthe money they send, spending some o the money intheir countries and sending the rest to om, Naja, orwherever Shahrestani deems expedient.

Unlike the traditional clerical mentality, Shahres-tani believes in organization and institutions. For

instance, Sistanis oce in om was the rst oce oa Naja marja in om since the oundation o omseminary in ,4 even though most o them hadrepresentatives there. Sistani is the only marja aferKhoi who thinks about the institutionalization ohis marjayatthroughout the world, including Iran;no one except Khoi and Sistani had a single institutein Iran. For the time being, Sistanis institutes are thestrongest and broadest institutes o a Shiite marja inthe world.

Sistani in the Najaf ContextBesides Sistani, three other marjas exist in Iraq: SayedMohammad Said Hakim, grandson o Sayed MohsenHakim (born in Naja, ), Muhammad Ishaq Fayy-adh (born in aznei, Aghanistan, ), and BashirNajai (born in Jalandhar, India, ). None othem have Sistanis popularity and nancial network.According to seminary tradition in Naja, a non-Ira-nian mojtahedrarely could attract Shiites around theworld to accept him as a marja. Since the nineteenthcentury and basically ater the invention o the tele-

graph, when marjayatbecame a global matter tran-scending geographical borders, only Sayed Mohsen

Hakims marjayatwas able to grow overseas. All Iraqimarjas, rom Sayed Abul-Hassan Isahani to Khoi andSistani, were and are originally Iranian. An Indian,Pakistani, or Aghan has very little chance to be known

in the Shiite world. In contrast, Muhammad IshaqFayyadh is one o the prominent disciples o Khoi andwas well known in om seminary much beore Sistanibecause o his notes rom the acroamatic (oral teach-ing) o his mentor Khoi, which has been publishedseveral times in om and Beirut and is consideredto be one the most reliable sources or understandingKhois principles and the methodological oundationsoqh (Islamic jurisprudence).

wo kinds o salary payments are made to clerics inNaja seminary: general salaries and those limited to

some specic clerics. Sistani pays a salary to all clerics(the highest salary is , Iraqi dinars [ID], equalto about $7). Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei (thehighest is ID , about $) and Muhammad SaidHakim (the highest is ID ,, about $) are twoother marjas who pay salaries to all clerics. But othermarjas, such as Fayyadh and Najai or a ew ommarjas like Javad abrizi, pay salaries to only a limitednumber o clerics because they lack the economic capa-bility to pay all.

Te best courses (in the highest level, which is dars-e

kharej) in Naja seminary are given by Fayyadh, Naja,Baqer Iravani, and Muhammad Reza Sistani, the son oAli Sistani. Ali Sistani, who started teaching in ,quit in under pressure rom Saddams regime andhas not taught again to the present day.

Sistani holds a levee nearly one hour a day in whichhe meets people and clerics; yet his conversations withthem usually do not exceed a simple greeting. In hismeetings, he hesitates to answer political questions,including his opinion on elayat-e aqih (guardianshipo the jurisprudent, the doctrine granting the Iranian

Supreme Leader his authority), a question he has beenasked many times.

. Few studies are available on the history o the oundation o om seminary. In Persian, an important collection o memoirs o the clerics o that time waspublished in , but afer a short while the Iranian government prohibited its sale in bookshops and orbade its reprinting (Peydayesh a ahaolat-eHowzeh-ye Ilmiey-ye Qom, arikh-e Shaahi-e Inqelab-e Islami-e Iran, edited by olamreza Karbaschi [om: Bonyad-e arikh-e Inqelab-e Islami-e Iran,7]).


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12 Policy Focus #59

Every morning, he reads some prominent Iraqi andIranian newspapers or what his oce has selected romnews websites in Persian, Arabic, or translated romEnglish. He spends a small portion o his time listening

to radio, mostly Iranian state radio and BBC Persian orArabic. He normally does not watch television. Overall,Sistani tries to get rsthand inormation about worldand regional news through the media and his own con-nections. His apostles say that he is very knowledgeablein the history o Iran and Iraq, especially the history oclerical systems in the last two centuries.

His relations with the three other marjas in Najaare respectul, and they are not on a level that allowsthem to dey Sistanis position or authority. Neverthe-less, in some major issues on the management o the

seminary or political issues, he consults with them, butthose consultations are pro orma and he usually makesthe nal decision.

His oce in Naja is headed by his son MuhammadReza Sistani, but observers believe that MuhammadReza is not an important consultant to his ather. Hedoes his job as a head o Ali Sistanis administration inNaja, but in political issues, Mohammad Reza doesnot have much inuence on his ather. Sistanis mainconsultants in political issues are Javad Shahrestani, hisson-in-law in om; Hamid al-Khaa, his only oi-

cial spokesman and his only nonclerical representativein Beirut; Murteza Kashmiri, his son-in-law in Lon-don; Muhammad Reza, as his main mediator to theIraqi government; and Ahmad Sai and Dr. HosseinShahrestani.

Sistani is reluctant to visit with journalists. He hasnever given an interview to the media. He does notallow photographers to take his picture, except one ortwo oicial photographs, nor is he ilmed. Sistani isnot interested in dealing with political ocials. WhenSistani decided to go to London or medical treatment,

Javad Shahrestani, who was in charge o trip arrange-ments, proposed three conditions to British oicials

or Sistanis stay in London: no meetings with politi-cal ocials; no journalists around him; security orcesshould stay very ar rom him and not approach him.5So Shahrestani reused to meet the representatives o

the British ministry o oreign aairs. When Sistanilef the hospital in London, most world political lead-ers sent messages or a speedy recovery, but only in thecase o Khamenei did Sistani send Javad Shahrestani toconvey his appreciation in a private meeting, decliningto reply to the others.

Sistanis representatives justiy his avoidance o themedia by claiming that he is a man o God and doesnot like to show o as a political leader. Tey also saythat he has no trust in journalists, because he is araidthat they will misquote him or not broadcast his inter-

views in their entirety. In general, Sistani endeavors tokeep himsel aloo rom the public. Giving interviewsto journalists is basically a om, or Iranian, tradition,not a Naja tradition, and it would have quite a nega-tive eect on his reputation as a religious leader.

Creating distance is a very eective mechanism thathas its position and meaning in Islamic tradition. Cre-atingharam, or a special distance, rom architectureto social and human relations is an indication o thepower order. A religious leader should not be publi-cized, especially by modern technology, because in that

case he loses his religious pomp and spiritual glory.6Sistani resides on a small street, Masjede-e Hindi,

about meters rom the Imam Ali Shrine in Naja.In his modest home, which is also his oce, he receivesordinary visitors, representatives, and political activistsand ocials. Afer Saddams all, the street became verycrowded. It is closed by ences rom both sides. Sistanishome is surrounded and secured by his own securityguard, not by government police, but the neighbor-hood is under oicial security surveillance by thepolice. Te Iranian regime has purchased many homes

in this neighborhood in the name o various individu-als over the last three years, permitting Iranian minis-

. Javad Shahrestani, interview by author.. For the relation between special distance, political power, and social hierarchy, see Edward . Hall, Te Hidden Dimension (New York: Anchor Books,

).7. A couple o years ago, Sheikh Muhammad Mehdi Asse (a relative o Hamid Reza Asse, spokesman o the ministry o oreign aairs o the Islamic

Republic o Iran), a member o the Dawa Party, and the head o the oce o al-Majma al-Aalami li Ahli-lbayt (International Academy o Ahlilbayt)an


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try o intelligence and Revolutionary Guard membersto surround Sistanis street.

Despite the security organizations surrounding Sis-tani, whether Iraqi or Iranian, he has kept his control o

Naja seminary. Other Shiite seminaries in Iraq, underSaddams tyranny, lost their vivacity and activity. Najawas the only one that persevered, with substantial di-culty. Now the Naja seminary consists o nearly ,clerics, and about clerics are active in Karbala sem-inary and other very small seminaries.

Sistani and Politics:Theory and PracticeDoes Sistani espouse any specic theory on Shiism andpolitics? Should Sistani, as a marja, be considered a

theoretician o Shiite jurisprudence rather than Shi-ite politics? First, one has to examine whether Sistaniis a theoretician in Shiite law or merely a Shiite juristwho then seeks his own theoretical perception o Shi-ite politics.

I by theoretician we mean one who can create a newtheoretical ramework, ormulation, or at least newconcepts that replace old onesthat is, respond to oldquestions o a discipline and displace or discredit themby deining new ones in order to participate in theprocess o that disciplines developmentthen most

jurists o this time, including Sistani, are obviouslynot theoreticians. hey did not create a remarkableconceptual apparatus that challenges ormer or exist-ing theoretical rameworks. Te dierences betweenvarious Shiite marjas or mojtaheds do not go beyonda very minor contrast in very minor issues osharia,such as inconsequential and subordinate edicts con-cerning details o legal codes in religious rituals andcommercial, civil, or criminal acts. he philosophi-cal, theological, and paradigmatic presuppositions oShiite contemporary jurists inqh and usul al-qh are

much the same. One o the easiest ways to determinethe theoretical proximity o Shiite jurists principles insharia is theirsharia codes, rom which one can hardlydiscover a controversy on an essential issue. Ijtehad

which requires, by denition, ones own endeavor tounderstandsharia or sacred texts through traditionalhermeneutical methodology and based on classicIslamic worldviewhas been exhausted and is unableto bring up new dynamism or historical and episte-mological reasons.8

Curriculum and publication are signs o the rozenstate and deep-seated arteriosclerosis o thought andknowledge in the seminary. Te highest level o semi-nary education is called dars-e kharej, literally externalcourse, a course that is not based upon reading and

exegesis o a text but one in which a teacher who is sup-posed to be a mojtahedraises a question inqh, bring-ing up dierent juridical opinions o jurists, criticizingthem, and inally arguing or his own opinion. Hiscourse does not have a textbook, and students usuallytake careul notes on his criticism and argument. Acro-amatic tradition in the seminary (purely oral teaching)has been very important. A disciple who manages totake down the argument and who can properly andeloquently explain what his mentor means can parlayhis mentors approval o his writing so that his notes

can be regarded as a proo o the disciples ijtehadaswell. Tus, the most perect acroamatic notes are pub-lished and become an indisputable document o boththe mentors and the disciples ijtehad. None o thecontent, methodology, or subjects o current acroamat-ics o contemporary jurists in om or Naja, nor publi-cations that concentrate on new editions o traditionaltexts or publications o acroamatic notes, show anycreativity or dynamism in the theological thought oseminary jurists. Not surprisingly, most new ideas onreligion in general and Shiite sharia in particular are

institution controlled by the Iranian Supreme Leader with its headquarters in ehranpurchased a home close to Sistanis. His purpose in doing soappears to have been twoold: () using the security cover o the neighborhood, and () having control over Sistanis home.

Te International Academy o Ahlilbayt has nothing to do with academics, and its objectives basically are to spread the Supreme Leaders name andcampaign or his marjayatthroughout the world by publishing his books in dierent languages as well as to campaign or the Islamic Republics ideologyby issuing publications, perorming religious ceremonies, and collecting and diusing money to loyalists o the Iranian regime.

. Explaining the nature o classic Islamic or Shiite thought is one o the most challenging duties o the historiographers o Islamic thought. I we want tocategorize the structure o classic thought in Islam, most probably we can describe it as primitive thought in the way that scholars such as Hallpike usethis term. C. R . Hallpike, Te Foundations o Primitie Tought(Oxord: Clarendon Press, 7).


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1 Policy Focus #59

taking place outside the seminary, even those producedby clerics.

o understand the impact o modernity on a juristsworld outlook, one has to take into consideration the

last part osharia codes. Usually, in the last part o thebook (or in a separate pamphlet), called new-oundissues, a Shiite jurist responds to the questions that areraised by modern lie and were absent in the traditionalbooks oniqh. New-ound issues are simply a ewissues about which a worshiper cannot recognize whathis duty is, because he lives in an age dierent rom theage o tradition and conronts new circumstances andrequirementsissues such as migration to non-Mus-lim countries; the problems arising rom socializingwith non-Muslims, because they are not traditionally

considered pure men and women; medical issues thatchallenge the separation o men and women and theveiling o women; some general economic issues likeinsurance, bank systems, and investment; and so orth.In all cases a jurist tries to regard every issue as a newsubject that can be treated by the old methodology o

qh, because the dominant paradigm oijtehadassumesthat every human act has its own verdict and religiousstatus, because God is the knower o the unseen,9 whoknows what will happen to his creatures and gave hisacts legal status in the Quran or in the speeches o the

Prophet and imams. Emergence o new historical, epis-temological, social, and political conditions does notaect the essence o theqh methodology or system.

Tus, Sistani has not created a new theory onsharianor on politics in Islam. Hisatwas are the sameat-was as those o other marjas, especially his mentor,Abul-assem Khoi, with ew modications in details

according to a reading o hissharia codes and compar-ing it to those o other marjas.

Some might nd it justiable to say that Sistani lagsbehind the late Ayatollah Khomeini as a theoretician

osharia. Khomeini is the marja who ounded a con-temporary Shiite state and has the privilege o beingthe only one among the mojtaheds who developed anew conception osharia and its relation with the gov-ernment, which is not radically dierent rom Shiitetradition but is still considerably distinct rom it aswell as rom his contemporaries views.

Sistani and the AbsolutePower of a Shiite JuristTe main issue that dierentiates Khomeini10 and Sis-

tani may be the absolute power o the Shiite jurist,which dierentiates Khomeini rom other mojtahedsin general.

Abul-assem Khoi, Sistanis mentor, held thatthe authority (elayat-e aqih) who has all the con-ditions11 is limited to hesbiaeh (religious) aairs,12custodianship o endowments that do not have acustodian assigned by the endower, and litigationsthat should be judged byaqih. Besides those cases,Khoi believed that aaqih did not have any kind oauthority.13 Khois opinion is not a special view that

diers rom the mainstream view on the subject.he problem remains, however, that some hesbiaehaairs do not have a precise and dened domain andcan be expanded by personal discretion and expedi-ency omojtahedto unknown results. In other words,the rubric o some hesbiaeh aairs, like enjoiningthe right/honorable and orbidding the wrong /dis-

. Quran :7, Arbery.. For the best comprehensive biog raphy o Khomeini in English, see Baqer Moin, Khomeini, Lie o the Ayatollah (London and New York: I. B. auris,

).

. Faqih-e Jami-osharayetis a new political-theological term describing a jurist who has all the conditions or marjayatand additionally an ability to managethe Shiite community, courage, and awareness about his time, namely a vast knowledge about the political and social characters o the contemporaryworld.

. Hesbieah aairs include issuingatwa (ia); propagating religious primary rules that create an obligation or duty by declaring an act to be obligatory,prohibited, recommended, disapproved, or permissible; enjoining the right/honorable and orbidding the wrong/dishonorable (Amr bi al-Maru andannahi bi al-munkar); perorming communal and Friday prayer; making judgments and its related issues, such as application ohududpunishments andretaliation; collecting religious taxes, custodianship o general endowments, and guardianship o orphans, minors, and the insane; and also adjudicatingthe legal right o unknown ownership. In this sense, with some exceptions like Friday prayer, elayat-e aqih is almost a matter o consensus in late schoolsoqh, or even in the classic era. For a historical account o classic perception o elayat-e aqih, see Rula Jurdi Abisaab, Converting Persia, Religion and

Power in the Saaid Empire (London and New York: I. B. auris, ).. For hisatwa on elayat-e aqih, see www.alkhoei.org.uk/atawa/taghleed.htm.


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honorable is so general that it can be applied to anyindividual, social, or political issue. In the absence oa philosophy o politics in Islam as well as a politi-cal theory insharia, general rubrics can justiy either

activity or passivity o aaqih.Even though a dierence exists between Naja

schools and Iranian schools o thought, the dier-ence essentially relates to the historical position andcircumstances oaqih rather than their theological,legal principles.14 Chapter tries to explain the di-erences between the two schools o Shiite theology,especially in terms o politics. As the reader will nd,one o the main characteristics o the Naja seminaryis that it was historically ar rom political power cen-ters and eager to keep itsel independent. But histori-

cal investigation shows that even Naja ulama triedto intervene in politics when such activity was totheir benet.

Sistani as a disciple o Khoi basically holds to hismentors view on elayat-e aqih, even though he hasnot written a word on this issue or on any other juridi-cal debates. Obviously, he has published a ewatwaswith regard to elayat-e aqih. In one o his edicts, heresponded to the question o what his opinion is aboutelayat-e aqih. He states that in the traditional sense oelayat-e aqih that reers only to hisbiyah aairs, every

aqih has the authority (elayat). But in cases other thanhesbiaeh aairs, which are general aairs with whichsocial order is linked, elayat-e aqih and enorcementoelayatdepend on certain conditions, one o whichis the popularity and acceptability oaqih among themajority o worshipers.15 Despite Khomeini, whounderstood elayat-e aqih as a privilege assigned to

aqih by God, Sistani emphasizes one condition, whichis popularity and social acceptability.

Reidar Visser, in his illuminating research on Sis-tani, is absolutely right when he writes that

the apolitical tradition has certainly made its mark onSistanis writing [works written by his disciples andoce members and published in his name]. In mucho his prescriptive literature, society seems nearlystateless. Te relationship between ollowers and juristtakes center-stage; situations that involve orces exter-nal to this two-way relationship are rendered almostas unwelcome disturbance o an ideal state o aairs.In Sistanis model, Shiite believers ask questions abouteverything rom rituals o ablution to the use o rec-reational drugs or listening to music; the mojtahed

provides answers. Te state, i visible at all, is in the arbackground.16

But Visser is mistaken when he writes that a ewatwasissued by Sistani and published on his websites sug-gest that shortly afer the all o the Baathist regime in

, Sistani could or the rst time issue statements[in which] the state is present in these writings andperhaps more clearly now i compared to his ormerscholarship.1 It seems that or understanding themeaning o state in Sistanis lateatwas, one shouldposition it within the ramework o Shiite classic liter-ature. Tus the term state in Sistanisatwas does notreer to anything but the traditional perception o thestate, which is a temporal nonreligious governmentthat can be run by either just or unjust men.

Furthermore, several representatives o Sistani, such

as Murteza Mohri, who is one o Sistanis disciples andone o his representatives in Kuwait, say that Sistanideliberately hesitates to express his opinion on elayat-e aqih because i he declares that he holds that elayat-e aqih is an accurate principle in Shiism, since hebelieves in priority and superiority o the most knowl-edgeable mojtahed (mojtahed-e aalam), it would meanthat he believes in himsel as the only legitimate ruler-

aqih (ali-e ahi) , not only in Iraq but also in the Shi-ite world. Sistani knows, Mohri adds, that he does nothave the capability that Khamenei projected, without

. On the main historical characteristics o Naja ulama, see Pierre-Jean Luizard, La ormation de lIrak contemporain, le rle politique des ulmas chiites la n de la domination ottomane et au moment de la cration de lEtat irakien (Paris: Edition du CNRS, ); Jaber A. Faleh, Te Shiite Movement inIraq (London: Saqi Book, ); Meir Litvak, Shii Scholars o Nineteenth-Century Iraq, Te Ulama o Naja and Karbala (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, ).

. http://sistani.org/html/eng/main/index.php?page=&lang=eng&part=.. Reidar Visser, Sistani, the United States and Politics in Iraq: From Quietism to Machiavellianism? Norwegian Institute o International Aairs, No.

7, Oslo (), p. . Available online (http://historiae.org/documents/Sistani.pd).7. Ibid., p. .


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16 Policy Focus #59

which his claim or elayat-e aqih would remain with-out any social, political, and even economic support. Inaddition, such a claim would put him in competitionwith the Iranian regime and its Supreme Leader, which

would damage Sistani more than the Iranian regime.On the other hand, i Sistani announces that elayat-e

aqih in its current political meaning and implicationsis an illegitimate principle and is not compatible withjuridical law and theological concepts o Shiism, thenhe publicly announces a symbolic war against the Ira-nian regime by calling its government religiously ille-gal. Mohri describes Sistanis lack o ull reedom andpolitical and social power and economic acility as asustainable reason behind the ambiguity o Sistanisposition and opinion on elayat-e aqih.18

Javad Shahrestani, in his response to a question onSistanis view on elayat-e aqih, said that he does notknow exactly what his ather-in-law thinks about it andwas even unaware about what is published on Sistaniswebsite with regard to the concept.19 He may implicitlywant to mention that theatwa on Sistanis website waspublished by the om oce, in order to diminish theIranian regimes pressure on Sistani as well as to sendan implicit signal to the regime that he does not haveany intention to delegitimize the Iranian government.

What a researcher on Sistanis view can say with cer-

tainty is that Sistanis view on politics is very dierentrom Khomeinis ormulation oelayat-e aqih. Also,one can be assured that because o Sistanis histori-cal and educational background, he cannot make anepistemological rupture with Shiite traditional juris-prudence. As a consequence, in the realm o theory,Sistani does not dier much rom his contemporarymojtaheds in Naja or even in om, or with his theo-logical ancestors.

Te traditional theory o Shiite jurists, especiallyin the last our centuries and since the emergence o

ijtehadin Shia Islam, leaves a mojtahedree to denehis own social and political position. Historically,whenever central governments were weak, the inter-erence omojtaheds was more requent. In act, a

reciprocal relationship exists between the power oulamas, or mojtaheds, and the government. Althoughthe theory oelayat-e aqih enables aaqih like Kho-meini to build up a government, or Islamization o

the government most o the religious countertheoriesonaqih authority can work the same. A brie histori-cal account o political positions omojtaheds in thelast our centuries sheds light on the uidity o Shiite juridical perception o the political role and rule oaqihs.

In sum, the theoretical ramework o Shiite jurispru-dence opens the way or a pragmatism that is oundedon the special mentality o the mojtahedand his tra-ditional perception o historical, social, and politicalconditions. It impels him toward a specic, predictable

position. Everything is related to external elements andcan be justied by juridical ormulations.

Some other considerations can be enlightening inexplaining specic political actions taken by a mojta-hed, especially at the current time:

n he political actions o a mojtahedare extremelydependent on his economic capability, his socialpopularity, and the weakness o central government.When a government unctions properly, in either adespotic or a democratic way, a mojtaheds authority

would be restricted. O course, mojtaheds in gen-eral use all means or expanding their popularity orcapability, even against the governments interests,provided that such means do not lead to any explicitconrontation with the government that woulddestroy marjayatoundations.

n For a marja, preservation o his own establishmentand interests as a religious leader and then preser-vation o his seminary entity is the absolute irstpriority. He believes that without the seminary and

marjayatestablishment, Islam itsel would be atrisk. hat explains why a marja is always open tocompromises with any kind o government i hesees that he is capable o leading a social or politi-

. Murteza Mohri, interview by author, Kuwait, March .. Javad Shahrestani, interview by author, during his pilgrimage in Mecca, October .


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cal movement against it. When a marja is in a weakposition, he takes reuge in the principle o dissim-ulation (taqiah),20 in which he justies his politicalor social passivity.

n A marja usually does not care about his successor ormany reasons; he rarely ully conrms an individualbecause he is not certain whether his conrmationwould damage his reputation in uture or not, andalso because majayatis a very individual and per-sonal position without a xed hierarchy. Religiously,a marja is not obligated to conrm a successor, andhe is incapable o giving a moral guarantee o thepiety and justice o a person afer his own death. Amarja very ofen leaves the question o his succession

to a uture generation o clerics.21

n Appointing a person or marjayateither directly orindirectly can cause unpredictable and unpleasantproblems or a marja, because it can provoke competition between many candidates and generatehostility between them. Furthermore, it can lead toquestioning o the existingmarja position as an axiso unity. So ar, Sistani has not supported any moj-tahedas his successor. His ailure to do so may stemrom the act that no other mojtahedamong his dis-

ciples or elsewhere can take the responsibility o agreat marja and enjoy the same popularity and socialacceptability as Sistani himsel does.

Sistanis Political ActivitiesA glance at the political pronouncements o Sistaniin the last three years proves that he is limited in hispower and he can exercise his power only when thegovernment is in a very weak position or the countryis in a transitional period. Te current situation in Iraqallows Sistani to become involved in politics only in

states o emergency and as an arbitrator.

On many occasions, Sistani and his assistants havepublicly announced that he is not interested in politicsat all. Examining his claim and measuring it againsthis actions proves that he does not intend to take any

ocial political position like the Supreme Leader. Heknows very well that such a position is impossible orhim in Iraqs current situation or in the countrys histori-cal context. He even recommended that the clerics avoidany political and administrative position in the new gov-ernment. But his position does not mean that he is notinterested in politics i we mean by politics somethingbeyond daily management o the country. He certainlybelieves that the government and the laws should notoppose Islamic laws, which suggests that all secular lawshave to be consistent with Islamic laws. Islamic laws are

dened by mojtaheds, and above them by marjasespe-cially the great marja. Tereore, he believes that all lawsshould be compatible with what he recognizes as Islamiclaws. A marja like Sistani holds that he has the right todo his religious duty o ordering people to do good andpreventing them rom doing bad (Amr-e bi al-maruandNahy-e ane al-munkar) by all means. Tus, he sees him-sel as absolutely right in putting any kind o pressure onthe government in order to impose on it what he thinksis good rom a religious perspective and to prevent itrom what he believes is bad. We have seen his eorts in

shaping the new Iraqi constitution in accordance withIslamic law. Te dualities and paradoxes inherent in theconstitution that arise rom emphasizing that every lawshould be both democraticandnot against Islam are avery important point. Tey give Sistani and uture mar-jas the legal right to inluence the policymaking andlegislative process. Education and judiciary systems inparticular are his target, and insoar as he can play a rolein the determination o law, he will use his inuence toshape those systems.

Te politics exercised by Sistani are obviously not

the kind we witnessed Ayatollah Khomeini use in Iran.

. aqiqh is a Shiites duty when the person eels or ears a real danger i she or he expresses her or his belies. Shiite imams have ordered their ollowers toprotect their lie by dissimulation o their religious belies.

. Although theologically and traditional ly a marja cannot appoint his successor, in the course o the past two decades some marjas have tried to campaignor their successor in a very sophisticated way. See, or example, Meir Litvak, Shii Scholars o Nineteenth-Century Iraq, chapter , Monopolization oLeadership in Naja.


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1 Policy Focus #59

Sistanis actions will be sophisticated, but they cannotbe played down. He will continue the traditional roleo a marja in a time o crisis. While he will not espousea Khomeini-style Islamic government, he will intervene

to maintain the countrys Islamic legal ramework andact as the center o gravity or the Shiite communityin Iraq. Yet, it is unclear to what extent and how long

he can play these roles eectively in the ace o ever-increasing Iranian inuence.

Te policies o Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei areundamentally shifing Shiite politics. In the next chapter

we will discuss the politics o revolution ollowed by thepolitics o building an all-powerul clerical state and theirimpact on marjayatand uture Shiite politics.


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a yat o l l a h r u h o l l a h K h o m e i n i, the

ounder o the Islamic Republic o Iran, transormedthe marjayatrom a merely religious position possess-ing ambiguous relations with political authority to areligious position with explicit political connotationsand implications.1 According to the constitution othe Islamic Republic, the Supreme Leader must benot only a mojtahedbut als

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