IAEAInternational Atomic Energy Agency

Presentation to ISSPA Annual General Meeting

The IAEA Programmes for the Security of Radioactive Material in Use and

TransportChristina George

Division of Nuclear SecurityFebruary 2014

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Incident in Mexico - A Transport Security Event

• When: 2 December 2013• What: Theft of a vehicle transporting a

dismantled teletherapy device containing a Cobalt 60 source (approx. 3000 Ci)

• Where: Vehicle was en route from a hospital in Tijuana to the Radioactive Waste Storage Center in Tepojaco, Hidalgo in Mexico

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Incident in Mexico – Interaction with the IAEA• Mexico notified the IAEA through using the secure

web platform, the Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents and Emergencies (USIE)

• Regular updates to the IAEA-IEC by Mexican competent authorities on search and recovery efforts

• IAEA issued statements to notify and update the public; offered international assistance to Mexico

• Mexico advised the IAEA that the source had successfully recovered and brought to the Radioactive Waste Facility

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Incident in Mexico : Current and Follow up Actions

• What is the IAEA doing to assist States with the security of radioactive material in use and transport?

• What are the lessons learned?

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What’s New?

• As of 1 January 2014, the Office of Nuclear Security became the Division of Nuclear Security within the IAEA’s Department of Nuclear Safety and Security• To better reflect the programmatic priorities identified in the

2014-2017 Nuclear Security Plan• In line with the 2014-2015 Programme and Budget

• New structure:• Director's Office• Programme Development and International Cooperation

Section• Information Management Section• Nuclear Security of Materials and Facilities Section• Nuclear Security of Materials outside of Regulatory Control

Section 5

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What’s ongoing: The IAEA’s Programme for the Security of Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities

• 1. Coordination• Within the IAEA, with colleagues from Nuclear Safety,

Waste Management, Incident and Emergency Centre• With external organizations such as WINS, ISSPA

and others• Working Group on Radioactive Source Security• With States, i.e. donor States, assistance recipients

• 2. Guidance Development• To build upon the Nuclear Security Fundamentals

(NSS 20) and recommendations and implementing guides (NSS 14 and 11)

• Revision of NSS No. 11 in progress6

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The IAEA’s Security of Radioactive Material Programme (cont’d)

• 3. Training• Existing regional and national courses on security of

radioactive sources with a general syllabus covering basic principles and wide range of participants

• Workshop on Security Management and Security Plans under development

• 4. Advisory Missions• Technical Missions to assess needs for Physical

Protection Upgrades or end of life management• New source-specific International Physical Protection

Advisory Service (IPPAS)

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Nuclear Security Guidance

Nuclear Security Guidance CommitteeNuclear Security Series:

Fundamentals (NSS No. 20)Recommendations (NSS No. 14 and 15)Security of Sources (NSS No. 11)Security in Transport (NSS No. 9)

Under DevelopmentRevisions of NSS No. 9, No. 11

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• Revision of NSS No. 9 to cover security in transport of radioactive material (separate IG on security in transport of nuclear material)

• First consultancy meeting 20-24 January 2014 • Material categorization – coordinate with NSS

No. 11 revision. Propose not to change.• “Per package” vs. “per conveyance” approach

• not justified to change for air and sea transport• for domestic road transport – States may wish to

consider aggregation approaches

Guidance Development –Revision of NSS No. 9

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Revision of NSS No. 9 (cont’d)

• Graded approach – enhanced security level from 10 D to many thousands of D’s• States may wish to consider a more stringent

application for material > 1000 D• New sections on

• “Readiness review” prior to transport• Contingency planning• Periodic inspections

• Topic at the TM 10-13 June, Next CM 21-25 July

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• Expanded scope from Category 1-3 sources to all radioactive material in use and storage

• First consultancy meeting on 17-21 Feb 2014; focused on purpose and scope questions:• Relationship between NSS 14, CoC, NSS 11• How to apply current categorization scheme to

all radioactive material, is it appropriate for security? Should the current threshold of Category 3 be retained?

Guidance Development –Revision of NSS No. 11

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• Regulatory focus of NSS 11 to be retained such that any information modified or added should assist regulatory bodies to perform their functions• Security management Additional guidance on

specific elements introduced in NSS 14• Threat information – how to perform a national

threat assessment, what information is needed, what information should regulatory bodies transmit to operators and how?

• Additional guidance on performance-based and combined approaches

Revision of NSS No. 11 (cont’d)

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• New guidance on insider threats, computer security, safety-security interface

• Cross-cutting guidance applied to radioactive material

• Way Forward:• Smaller working group to focus on

categorization• Cross-cutting guidance adapted to radioactive

material and associated facilities• Next consultancy to be held on 7-11 April

Revision of NSS No. 11 (cont’d)

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IAEA Transport Security Programme

• Assistance in potentially the most vulnerable and complex phase in the life cycle of a radioactive source

• Assisting Member States through• Transport security guidance, NSS No 14 and 9• Training courses, international, regional and

national 7 planned for 2014• Advisory missions, transport security modules

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IAEA Transport security programme (cont’d)• Technical meeting 10-13 June 2014 on the

practical application of transport security• share experiences and lessons learned from the

application of IAEA guidance• revision of NSS No.9• identify needs for additional guidance

• Development of model exercises to assist MS to conduct transport security exercises• Initial focus on nuclear material transport;

also needed for radioactive material

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IAEA Working Group on Radioactive Source Security (WGRSS)• In 2011, IAEA Director General announced the

establishment of a working group on radioactive sources

• First meeting held in November 2012, with participants from 20 States; chaired by Australia

• Second meeting held in May 2013, with 50 participants from 35 States plus observers; chaired by Germany; formal adoption of the Terms of Reference

• 3rd Meeting to take place in May 2014, to be chaired by Canada

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WGRSS (cont’d)• Formal adoption of the Terms of Reference

• Added “security” to the title of the group• Objectives amended to reflect the group’s dual

nature• Topics included:

• Regional partnerships• Using Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans

to coordinate the provision and receipt of assistance

• Application of general guidance to specific source facilities and practices

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Update on 2013 Activities: International Conference on Nuclear SecurityVienna, July 2013• 1300 registered participants from 125 Member

States (34 represented at ministerial level), and 21 organizations

• “The fight against nuclear terrorism requires all States to stand together, fulfilling their responsibilities nationally and coordinating their efforts internationally.”

• A Ministerial Declaration is available on the conference web site

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International Conference on Nuclear SecurityFindings:• A strategy of motivation, knowledge and resources should

be utilized. • Actors should be given the necessary training and

guidance to implement source security. • Practically speaking, properly allocated resources are an

essential part of ensuring that sources can be adequately secured, regardless of the application.

• Taking a regional approach enhances working relationships at regional, national, and local levels and encourages increased coordination and collaboration across borders.

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International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive SourcesAbu Dhabi, October 2013• Over 320 participants from 87 IAEA Member

States, 1 non-Member State and 6 International Organizations

• Coincided with the 10th anniversary of the endorsement of the Code of Conduct

• 119 States made political commitment to the Code of Conduct

• 68 Member States submitted national reports for the Conference

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International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive SourcesRecommendations:1. IAEA convene working group to assess the

merits of developing a Convention on the safety and security of radioactive sources

2. Additional guidance at the international level for the long-term management of disused radioactive sources should be developed

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International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

Recommendations, cont.:3. IAEA should consider publishing integrated

guidance which addresses both safety and security for some practices.

4. The IAEA should develop more prescriptive guidance for States to self-assess their level of implementation of all provisions of the Code and to prepare their national reports.

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Lessons Learned

• A robust and effective nuclear security programme for the security of radioactive material in use and transport is essential

• Continued cooperation among international partners, States, and users/operators is key

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Thank you for your attention…

Further information is available on NUSEC:http://nusec.iaea.org/

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New Guide – Security Management and Security Plans for Radioactive Material and Associated

FacilitiesPurpose:• To provide guidance to States, regulatory bodies, and

operators on how to implement and maintain security management for radioactive material, associated facilities, and associated activities.

Scope:• Builds upon NSS 14 and NSS 11

• Focuses on Category 1-3, but may be applied to Cat. 4-5

• Does not address transport of radioactive material

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Proposed Structure

Objectives of security management:1. To ensure that the security system is reliably operated

and maintained, functions as intended, is effective, and meets regulatory requirements;

2. To provide administrative security measures, in particular against the insider threat;

3. To integrate people, procedures, and equipment;

4. To instil and promote a strong security culture.

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Security Management Elements

• Leadership• Roles and

Responsibilities• Training and Qualification

of Personnel • Access Management:

• Access Authorization• Trustworthiness

Determination• Access Control

• Information Protection

• Accounting and Inventory• Acceptance and Transfer

Procedures • Maintenance Programme• Budget Allocation and

Resource Planning • Evaluation for

Compliance and Effectiveness

• Performance Testing • Security Plans

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Specific Chapter on Security Plans• Means to integrate all security elements within the

broader management system

• Guidance not about how to DO - but rather how to DOCUMENT processes in a clear and implementable manner.

• Not a model security plan - provides more detail to users regarding the contents of a security plan.

• Graded approach should be used by Operators (different levels of detail may be needed for Category 1, 2 and 3 facilities)

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Security Plans Operators should be required to prepare, implement, test,

periodically review and revise, as necessary, a security plan in accordance with regulatory requirements and guidance Presents a detailed description of the security system and

security management measures Generally submitted to regulatory authority as part of

licensing process Demonstrates to the regulatory body how the operator is

meeting security requirements Provides guidance to facility personnel for operating and

maintaining the facility’s security system Generally contains greater detail for facilities with sources in

higher security levels (graded approach)