The Frontiers of Burma by E. R. Leach

5/25/2018 The Frontiers of Burma by E. R. Leach

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Society for omparative Studies in Society and History

The Frontiers of "Burma"Author(s): E. R. LeachSource: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Oct., 1960), pp. 49-68Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/177896.

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THE FRONTIERSOF BURMA

The thesisunderlyinghisessay maybe summarized s follows: The modernEuropeanconcepts rontier, tate andnation areinterdependentut they arenot necessarilyapplicable o all state-likepoliticalorganisationsverywhere.In default of adequatedocumentarymaterialsmost historiansof South-EastAsia have tendedto assume hat the states withwhichtheyhave to deal wereNation-Statesoccupiedby named Peoples and separated rom each otherby precisepoliticalfrontiers. The inferencesthat have been made on thebasis of these initial assumptions ometimesconflictwith sociologicalcom-mon sense. It is not the anthropologist'sask to writehistory,but if historyis to be elaboratedwiththe aidof inspiredguesses hen the specialknowledgeof the anthropologist ecomesrelevantso as to point up the probabilities.What then do we mean by a frontier? In modernpoliticalgeographyafrontier s a preciselydefined ine on the map (andon the ground)markingthe exact divisionbetweentwo adjacent tates. Most suchfrontiers,as theyexist today, are the outcomeof arbitrary oliticaldecisionor militaryacci-dent; very few correspond o any economically significantfeature of thenatural opography.Yet wars arefoughtto defendsuchfrontiersand fromsuch wars there has emergeda Europeanmythwhichasserts,not only thateverypoliticalstatemust,ipso facto,have a definiteboundary,but also thatthe frontiers n questionought in some way to correspondwith differencesof culture and language.This attitude to frontiersties in with the dogma of sovereignty.In theideologyof moderninternational olitics all states are sovereignand everypiece of the earth'ssurfacemust, by logical necessity,be the rightful egalpossessionof one and only one such state. There are no longerany blankspaceson the map and, in theoryat least, therecan be no overlapbetweenthe territories f two adjacent tates. Whateverpracticaldifficulties hismayentail-as for example n Antartica-, theprinciples not in doubt; erritorialsovereigntys absolute and indivisible.Theuniversality f thisdogma s quitea recentdevelopment.In its presentform it is a by-productof the clash of European mperialist nterests. InAsia andAfricanearlyall thepresentpolitical rontierswerefirstestablished

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duringthe nineteenthor early twentiethcenturieseither as a compromisebetweenthe rivalaspirations f EuropeanGreatPowersor else as an ad hocinventiondesignedto suit the administrativeonvenienceof some colonialagency. Even today in the few cases in which genuinelynon-Europeanregimesstill survive,the determination f frontiers s often impossible. TheboundariesbetweenSa'udiArabia and Trucial Oman are a case in point;the boundarybetweenNorth-EastBurma and Chinais another. This lastinstance s relevant o my theme.By the Burma of my title I wish to imply the whole of the wide im-preciselydefinedfrontierregionlying betweenIndia and China and havingmodernpoliticalBurma at its core.In this regionthe indigenouspolitical systemswhich existedpriorto thephaseof Europeanpoliticalexpansionwerenot separatedromone anotherby frontiers n the modernsense andthey werenot sovereignNation-States.The whole of Burma s a frontierregioncontinuously ubjected o influ-ences from both India and China and so also the frontierswhichseparatedthe petty politicalunits within Burma were not clearlydefinedlines butzones of mutual nterest. Thepoliticalentities n questionhadinterpenetratingpolitical systems, they were not separatecountries inhabitedby distinct

populations. This concept of a frontier as a border zone throughwhichcultures nterpenetraten a dynamicmanner s not a new one' but it needsto be distinguishedclearly from the precise MacMahon lines of modernpoliticalgeography.Existinghistories of the Burmaregiondo not interpret he facts in thisway. Instead it is constantlyassumed hat frontiersof languagecorrespondto frontiersof culture and of political power. The populationis said toconsist of a largenumberof separate peoples :Mons, Arakanese,Karens,Burmese,Kachins,Shans,Lisu and so on, eachgroupbeingassumed o havea separatehistory. Suchpeoplesare never treated as indigenous o Burma;eachgrouparrived eparatelyby migrationrom someremoteoriginalhome-land. Such fables are like sayingthat the originalhome of Man was in theGarden of Eden. The theorythat the Burmese came from Tibet is basedon linguistic imilarities etween he modernBurmeseand Tibetan anguages.Similarargumentsmight be used to demonstratehat the originalhome ofthe Englishwas in Italyor Persiaor even Iceland.This myth of philological origins,with its illusion of multipledisconti-nuities,has distracted he historian'sattentionfrom those elements of themodernBurmesesocial scene whichhave been persistentlypresentthrough-out the last 2000 years. In particular,he historianshave tendedto neglectthe continuinginteraction between processes of political action and thepermanent tructureof ecologicalrelationships.In what followsI shallignoretheproblemsposedby languagedistributions

1Lattimore (1940).

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THE FRONTIERS OF BURMAand I do so intentionallyor I insist that very few valid inferencescan beconstructed olely on the basis of knowledge hus provided. Anyone whodoubts this need only consider the relationsbetweenhistoryand the factssuggestedby a linguisticmapof contemporary urope. Languagegroupingsare of sociologicalrather hanhistoricalsignificance.Those who speakone mother-tongue ecessarily harea certain sense ofsocialsolidaritywithone another,but this has no necessary mplicationsorthe historical antecedents of the individualsconcerned. In present-dayCeylon most of the ruling elite speak English in their homes and havePortuguese urnames;t wouldbe completelyerroneous o supposethat anysignificantproportionof these people are of Europeandescent.

The analysisand classification f the languagesandlanguagedistributionsof Burma s an important cientificexercise, t cannotbe a contribution ohistory.As an alternativeI argue that the historicallysignificantcontrasts inpresent-day Burma re differencesof ecology and differencesof socialor-ganization.The two sets of differencesnearlycoincide;roughlyspeaking heHill People are patrilinealand hierarchical,he Valley People have a non-unilinealkinshiporganisationinked with charismaticdespotism. This co-incidence s not a necessarycoincidence;f we are to explainwhy it existsthen we must seek an historicalexplanation.The explanationwhich I offeris that the Valley People took their social organisationand their politicsfrom India while the Hill People took their social organizationalong withtheir tradeand theirkinshipsystem romChina. It is a possibleexplanation;I do not claimmore thanthat.In place of the usual linguisticcategoriesI would substituteecologicalcategoriesandthese I shall now specify.

HILL PEOPLE AND VALLEY PEOPLE

The terrainof Burma is verymountainousbut not uniformly o. There arepartsof the areawhere the valleysbetweenthe mountainridgesare narrowgorges where no human habitation is possible except for those who areprepared o scarpa livelihood rom the steepmountain ace. But elsewherethe valleys form flat well-wateredalluvialbasins perfectly adaptedto theneeds of the rice farmer. My terms HillPeople and ValleyPeople areintended o denotethe diametrically pposedmodes of subsistenceassociatedwith these two types of terrain. These two modesof subsistencehave beenpresent n the areathroughout istorical imes2andanyhypothesis oncerninghistoricalprocessmusttake this into account.2 E.g., Pelliot (1951), pp. 20-25. This is a translationof the only first hand accountof Angkor at the height of its splendour. The original author was a Chinese who

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The term Hill People is unambiguous;he people so describeddo infact live in steep hill country. In the main they enjoy a somewhatmeagrestandardof living sustainedthroughthe aid of shiftingcultivation, houghcertain exceptionsto this generalizationwill be considered ater. Amongthe Hill People there is a great range of varietyboth in languageandtribal organisation.The indigenousreligionof most groupscomes withinTylor's category of animism;it usually involves some form of ancestorworship. Over the past centurythe Christianmissionshav_ made manyconverts,but true HillPeople are never Buddhists.The term ValleyPeople is not quite so straightforward;t is not theequivalentof Lowlander .The major populationsof the lowlandplainsof Burma,Thailandand Assam are Valley People ,but so also are thedominantelements n the populationof the ShanStates,South-WestYunnanand Laos-all of which are upland districts. The characteristicalluvialterrainwhichmakeswet rice cultivationa profitableenterpriseoften occursat high altitudes. Some settlementsof ValleyPeople are located nearly6000 feet above sea level.

My term ValleyPeople also covers otherambiguities.The greaterpartof Burma s a regionof high annualrainfall, n whicheverylevel stretchof ground can readilybe developedinto a rice field. But Burma alsoincludes certainDry Zones in which the characteristic ice farmingtech-niquesof the ValleyPeople are only possiblein associationwithlargescaleirrigationengineering.Consequently,n these Dry Zone valleys,the popu-lation is divided betweentwo distinctsociological categories. On the onehand there are the prosperousrice farmers who are concentratedaroundthe areas of artificial rrigation;on the other there are the people of theparchedoutlands,whose living standardsare at an altogether ower level.In thisessayI shallignorethis distinction.My ValleyPeopleare all assumedto be wet rice cultivatorsiving in conditionshighlyfavourable o wet ricecultivation.The languagesof the Valley People are diverse but much less so than isthe case with the Hill People. The majorityof Valley People speakKhmer(Cambodian),Tai and Burmesedialects;3these languagesare not spokenby any Hill People as a mother-tongue,houghbilingualisms common.The most distinctiveculturalcharacteristic f the Valley People-apartfrom the practice of wet rice farming-is their adherenceto HinayanaBuddhism. The Valley People thinkof themselvesas the civilised sectoroftravelled with an embassyfrom the Mongol Emperorin the year 1296. He distinguishesthree elements in the population, the Cambodiansproper of the city area, the savageswho sell themselves as bond slaves to Cambodian masters and work for them in thecity, and the brigandsof the mountainswho form a race apart. The first two categoriesare dependenton intensive rice agriculture.3 This ignores the highly complex language pattern among the Valley People ofEastern Assam and Manipur.

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THE FRONTIERS OF BURMAthe total Burma opulation,andin that context Buddhismandcivilisationare synonymous. In Burma proper, the Valley People are mostly eitherBurmeseor Shan;they expresstheir contemptfor their hill neighboursbyusingthe epithetKha ( slave , savage ).Nevertheless,a Khawho becomesa Buddhistis thereby civilised, he has become a Shan , and within agenerationor two the barbarian riginof his descendantsmay be forgotten.This type of assimilationhas been goingon for centuries. What is recordedof Cambodia n the 13th century s strictly n accordwith whatwe knowofNorth Burma n the 19th century.4

My generalisation hat Hill People are never Buddhist needs furtherqualification.Apartfromindividual onversionshere are certainexceptionalcircumstancesn which whole groupsof Hill Peoplehave becomeeconomi-cally sophisticatedand have adopted the religion and mannersof theilValley neighbours.For example,the Palaung nhabitantsof Tawngpeng nthe BurmaShan Stateswho are prosperouscultivatorsof tea have becomeBuddhistsand have organisedtheir TawnpengState in exact imitationofthe politicalmodelprovidedby theirShanneighbours-who are typicalricegrowingValley People.5 In generalhowever t is onlythe trueValleyPeoplewho can afford to be civilisedand Buddhist.The fully documentedhistoryof Burma oes backonlyfor a few centu-ries and is very largely concernedwith the relationsbetween Europeancolonialistsand native rulers. For periodsmore remotethan the fifteenthcenturywe have only a kind of proto-history,a mixture of legend andinspiredguessworkcomparableo those historiesof Troy whichingeniouslymanage to fit the stories of the Iliad to the latest findings of Turkisharchaeology.If such proto-historys to be convincing t mustbe sociologi-cally probable; t must not neglectthe fixity of ecologicalfacts and it mustnot postulatesharpculturalandpoliticalboundariesn a regionwhere noneexist even to this day.Besides the two internalcontinuities-the ecologicalcategoriesHill Peopleand Valley People-there have been two externalcontinuities,he persistinginfluenceof Indiaand China. Whatis their nature?

INDIA AND CHINA

Throughoutrecordedhistory there have been two main foci of culturaldevelopmentn EasternAsia; one in India and the other in China. Everysocietyin South-EastAsia of which we haveknowledgewhich has possessedeven a modestdegreeof culturalsophisticationhas been quite emphaticallysubjectto Indianor Chinese nfluence;usuallyto both.4 Pelliot (1951), p. 19; Leach (1954), p. 293.Milne (1924).

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The manifestations f such influenceare very diverse and I only proposeto considercertainmajoraspects. Within these limits I shallpropound hethesesthat the influenceof Chinahas been mainly n the fields of trade andcommunicationand has affected the Hill People rather than the ValleyPeople andthat,in contrast, he influenceof India has been felt particularlyin the fields of politicsandreligionand has affected he ValleyPeopleratherthan the Hill People.There is no mysteryaboutthis-the Chinesehave never been interestedin Burma as a potentialdominion-they have believedit to be too un-healthy. But they have had a persistentnterest n overlandroutes to Indiaand also in the naturalresourcesof Burma's mountainsandforests. Theearly Chineserecordstell us nothingabout the politicalorganisation f theregionbut they record detailed itineraries6 nd also such facts as that theland of the b'uok7 tribesliving South-Westof Yung Changproducedrhi-noceros, elephant, tortoise-shell, jade, amber, cowries, gold, silver, salt,cinnamonand cotton, hilly-paddyand panicledmillet, a cataloguewhich,apartfrom the cinnamon, s accurateand comprehensiveo this day.Even in the 13th centurywhen Chinaunderthe Mongolswas adoptingblatantly imperialisticpolicies her ambassadorremarksof Cambodiathatthiscountryhas longhad commercial elationswith us . He doesnot claimany ancientpoliticalsuzerainty.8So also in recent centuries when Northern Burmahad been the mainsource of jade for all China,the jademines were ownedand workedby HillPeople and Chinese interests remainedbasically commercialratherthanpolitical. The ValleyPeopleof the jademines areabenefitedonly indirectly.I shall returnagainto this matterof the economicinterrelations etweenthe Chineseand the northernHill Peoples, but first let us considersomefeaturesof the politicalstructure.

Already n earlyHan times,in the firstmillenniumB.C., the Chinesehaddevelopedanidea of the Nation Statecomparableo the conceptof imperiumwhich the Romansdeveloped n Europaa few centuriesater. This ideologypostulatesa centralgovernmentwhich is the ultimatepolitical authority orthewholeof a largeterritorial rea delimitedby frontiers.The administrationof this empireis in the hands of office-holders,an Emperorwith an ad-ministrative taff of bureaucrats.9The authorityof the centralgovernmentis maintainedby militaryforce, exercisedby garrisontroops permanentlydispersedhroughouthe countryandat appropriate ositionson the frontier.Administration s financed by taxation which is levied in a systematic6 Pelliot (1904).7 See Luce and Pe Maung Tin (1939), p. 267. Chinese sources date back to the 4thcentury A.D. Certain of the Kachin groups of North Burma are still referred to asp'ok by their Shan neighbours. See Leach (1954), p. 248f.8 Pelliot (1951), p. 10.9 I use Weber's terminology:cf. Weber (1947); (1951).

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THE FRONTIERS OF BURMAlegitimate mannerand not according o the arbitrarywhimof local war-lords.No doubt the practicalapplicationof such theories often deviatedveryfar from the ideal,yet the basic structure f both the Chineseand the Romansystems possessed an extraordinary egree of stability. In both cases theEmpirewas able to survivelong phases of catastrophicncompetenceandcorruptionat the centre; he structure f administrativeuthoritywas almostimpervious o the effects of palacerevolutionsand dynasticchange.The Indianpoliticalmodel is very different. Here the ideal ruleris notan office-holder,he Emperor,but an individual,Asoka; the pattern s oneof charismaticeadershipratherthan bureaucraticontinuity.Now it is an

established act that all the earlyhistorical tatesof the Burmaregionwhichachievedany international enownwere of an Indian style. Coedes callsthem les etats hindouises,and Hall, elaboratinghis, says that their organ-isationalpatternalwayshad four commonelementswhichhe lists as:(i) a conceptionof royaltycharacterised y Hinduor Buddhistcults;(ii) literaryexpressionby means of the Sanskrit anguage;(iii) a mythology aken from the Epics, the Puranas,and other Sanskrittexts containinga nucleus of royaltraditionand the traditionalgenealogiesof royalfamiliesof the Ganges region;(iv) the observanceof the Dharmashatras,he sacred laws of Hinduismand in particularhatversionknown as the Laws of Manu.10It is quite outsidemy field to discussjust how this Indiancolonisationcame about but whatI mustemphasizes the pervasiveness ndwide extentof the politicalinfluence n question.In the second centuryB.C. the Westernborder of Chinalay along theSalweenbut after 342 A.D. the officialfrontierwas withdrawnmuchfurtherto the North-East. This was a consequenceof the development f Nanchaoas an independentpoliticalentitycentrednearmodernTali. Now Nanchao,despiteits remoteposition,was unquestionably stateof Indianrather hanChinesetype. It had no bureaucratic tabilityand its fortunesfluctuatedviolentlyaccording o the individualaggressiveness f successiverulers.Nanchao provides an excellent example of the confusion which ariseswhen such states are thoughtof as nationstatesof moderntype. Nanchaowas inhabitedby peopleof Tai speech;it ceasedto exist as an independentpoliticalentityin 1253, followingconquestby KublaiKhan. In the centurieswhichfollow,monarchswith Tai soundingnamesarerecordedas the rulersof petty principalitiesall over Burma .This has been interpretedas evi-dencethat,following he destruction f Nanchao,therewas a massmigrationof Tai-speakingpeoplesto the South-West.1This in turnis linkedwiththe10 Hall (1955), p. 13. When Hinayana Buddhism replaced Saivite Hinduism, Pallreplaced Sanscrit.11 Hall (1955), pp. 144-146.

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more general thesis that since Tai is a language of Chinese type it must haveoriginated somewhere in Central China.Yet in fact there is no evidence at all of any migration of Tai-speakingpeoples into Burma from the North-East, and recent trends in linguisticresearch seem to indicate that Tai speech has no close affinities with Chinese.Its closest links appear to be with languages further south such as Mon andIndonesian.12

Moreover Nanchao should not be thought of as a state with borders butas a capital city with a wide and variable sphere of influence. The inhabitantsof Nanchao had no specific identification with the state, there was noNanchao nation which would be dispersed by the elimination of Nanchaoas a separate political entity. Indeed Kublai Khan's occupation of thecapital-which was notably peaceful-need have had no effect on the popu-lation whatsoever.

The common-sense assumption is that there must have been Valley Peoplein Burma in the fifth century just as there were Valley People in Burmain the fifteenth century and that the Valley People of the two periods spokemuch the same sort of language or set of languages. The migration hypothesisof the historians is both improbable and unnecessary.

CHARISMATIC KINGSHIPWhat then are the empirical characteristics of les etats hindouises? Most ofthem have been small, most of them have been shortlived; the continuity ofthe state depends upon the personality of the monarch; every monarch hasa successor, but every succession is an issue of dispute; the state dies withthe King, the successor must create a new state from his own personalendeavours.There was continuity of a sort, for the states were in every case built uparound a heartland of irrigated rice cultivation and, whatever the vicissitudesof politics, the rice-land stayed in one place. But the state had no fixedfrontier, no permanent administrative staff.Scott's comment on the Shans is applicable to all the Valley Peoples ofBurma :Shan history more than that of any other race, seems to have dependedon thecharacterand personalenergyof the Sawbwa(Prince). An ambitiousruler seemsalways to have attempted, and often to have effected, the subjugationof hisneighbours. When there were two or more such there was perpetualwar; whentherewas none therewere a numberof practically ndependentchieftainsdwellingin their own valleys. Hence the astoundingnumberof huge ruined cities whichare found all over Indo-China.'312 Benedict (1942); Taylor (1956).13 Scott and Hardiman(1900/01), Part II, Vol. II, p. 333.

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THE FRONTIERS OF BURMAIn this respect the historicalkingdomsof Arakan, Pagan, Pegu, Thaton,Ava, Ayut'ia, Manipur,and Assam (as well as some hundredsof smallerprincipalitiesocated withinthe samegeneralarea)allhadmuch in common.HinayanaBuddhismwas everywherehe state religionmixed,as in Ceylon,with many explicit elements of Saivite Brahmanism. Everywhereroyalpolygynywas an exaggerated eatureof the royal prerogative.The Kingwas regardedas a Chakravartin-a UniversalEmperor -or else as anincipientBuddha.14Ritual and myth both impliedthat he was playingtherole of the secularGaudamapriorto his enlightenment.Every feature ofthe system implied that governmentwas regardedas personalrule by adivinely inspiredmonarchconsideredas an individual.

Let me elaboratethese sweeping generalisationso as to bring out thedifferencebetweenthe Indian model and the Chinese.In Chinathe successionwas governedby law;eachEmperorhad a singlelegitimateheir specifiedby rulesof descent. If the heir was a minor at thetime of his successionhe still becameEmperoreven thougha close relativemightact as regent. Usurpationwas relativelyrare and occurredonly witha changeof dynastyor in times of politicalchaos. Day to day governmentwas in the handsof the literati,personswhose statusas bureaucratswas, intheory, based on personalmerit and not on royal favour or aristocraticblood. In practicethe literaticonstituteda largely hereditary lass but theywere not close relatives of the Emperor. The Princesof the blood royalheld highly privilegedpositionsbut this did not give them office as ad-ministrators.In the Indian tates of Burma any one of a King'svery numerousoffspringmight legitimately ucceed him and palace murderswere thenorm. The first act of any successfulclaimantwas to carryout a holocaustof his most immediate rivals-that is to say, his half-brothersand step-mothers. He then apportionedout his realm in fiefs to those of his closerelativeswho had survivedand were considered rustworthy;hat meant,inthe main,the King'sown wives and sons. The natureof this fiefdom is wellindicatedby the Burmese erm for a fief holder-myosa- the eaterof thetownship . Since the myosa'stenure of office was notoriouslyshortlived,he made the most of his opportunities.It is true that in addition o these licensedroyalplunderershe structureof governmentncludeda hierarchyof commonerofficialswith fanciful andelaboratetitles-the Burmesewun, Shan amat, Siamesebrahya. But theseoffices too were directly n the King'spersonalgift. Therewas no criterionof achievedqualification s in the case of the Chinese literati. In thirteenth14 Quaritch Wales (1931), Chapter IV; cf. Cady (1950), Chapter I; cf. Hall (1955),pp. 93-94. Pelliot (1951), p. 16, credits the 13th century Cambodian monarch with5000 concubines.

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century Cambodia the two recognised ways of obtaining administrative officewere (a) to make onseself the client of a royal prince or (b) to donate adaughter to the royal harem.15First hand observers of Thai and Burmese monarchs during the 19thcentury were all unanimous in emphasising the complete absolutism of themonarch's authority16 and the arbitrariness of the resulting administration.The position is thus summed up by Scott:The coolie of today may be the ministerof tomorrow;and a monthhence he maybe spread-eagledn the court of the palacewith a vertical sun beatingdown uponhim andhuge stonespiled on his chest and stomach... WhenKing Tharrawaddysucceeded,he madeBa-gyee-daw'sministerswork as slaves on the roadsfor a time,and when this exercisehad quiteworn them out, charitablyput them to death...When an official displeased he king (MindohnMin) in some way, he said empha-tically I don't want to see that man any more ... A day or two afterwardshismajestywould ask where so-and-sowas. AlasSire, was the answer, he died ofchagrin shortly after the lord of the earth and ocean cast eyes of displeasureon him. l7Absolute tyranny was tempered only by the fact that the King, though alsohead of the Buddhist church, had relatively limited power to manipulateclerical offices. A hierarchy of relatively permanent Church officialsoperated in parallel to the secular hierarchy of royal appointees and seemsto have introduced at least a few elements of stability and mercy into agovernmental system ordinarily controlled by arbitrary whim.The typical Burma state consisted of a small fully administered terri-torial nucleus having the capital at the centre. Round about, stretchingindefinitely in all directions, was a region over which the King claimedsuzerainty and from the inhabitants of which he extracted tribute by threatof military force. These marginal zones all had the status of conqueredprovinces, and their populations were normally hostile to the central govern-ment. Insurrections were endemic and the political alignments of localleaders possessed the maximum uncertainty. Practically every substantialtownship in Burma claims a history of having been at one time or anotherthe capital of a kingdom , the elleged frontiers of which are at once bothgrandiose and improbable.It is consistent with this general pattern that those who arenow rememberedas great Kings were practitioners of banditry on a grand scale whose famerests solely on their short-term success in carrying fire and slaughter intothe territory of their more prosperous neighbours. The Just Ruler , thatarchetypal figure upon whom the Confucian ethic lays much stress, had no15 Pelliot (1951), p. 14.16 For summarisedevidence see in particular QuaritchWales (1931); Graham (1924);Scott and Hardiman (1900/01).17 Scott (1896), pp. 484-5.

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THE FRONTIERS OF BURMAplace in the value system of Burma kingship. The kings of Ava, Arakan,Pegu and Ayut'ia were forever pillaging each other's capitals, but conquestby the sword was never followed up by any serious attempt to establish apermanent political hegemony. Military success was simply a manifestationof the monarch's personal power, it did not serve to establish authority andit did not alter political frontiers.But in what sense did these explosive, ephemeral, yet recurrent statesreally possess frontiers at all?

POLITICAL INTERDEPENDENCE OF HILLS AND VALLEYS

Let us go back and resume our consideration of the ecological as distinctfrom the politico-historical factors in the situation. The political states whichwe have been discussing have always included elements of both my mainpopulation categories, Hill People as well as Valley People. The heartlandof the state, with the King's capital, was always a rice-growing valley in-habited by Valley People but the outlying parts of the state normally includedHill sectors as well as Valley sectors. The pattern of development was asfollows. The King would first establish authority over his own home valley-ideally by succession, but more frequently by usurpation. He would thenspread his authority to a neighbouring valley. This might be achieved byconquest or by marriage treaty or sometimes simply by colonization. Finallythe King would claim sovereignty over all the hill country separating the twovalley sectors of his total domain. Thus most Hill People were, at least intheory, the subjects of a Valley Prince.But the control which the Valley Princes were able to exercise over theHill subjects was seldom more than marginal, and the Hill People were quiteindiscriminate in their favours. If it suited his convenience a Hill chieftainwould readily avow loyalty to several different Valley Princes simultaneously.There were two recognised methods by which the Valley Prince might asserthis authority; he could organise a punitive expedition and levy tribute, or hecould pay protection money to the hill tribesmen as a reward for theirloyalty.18 Some form of the latter procedure seems to have been the mostcommon.

What I must emphasise is that the nominal overlordship of a Valley18 In Assam there is a special term posa for this type of payment. Even the Britishauthorities with their overwhelming military superiority found it convenient to makeposa payments to the hill tribes throughout most of the nineteenth century. Anothermethod of appeasementwas for the Prince formally to grant his Hill Chieftains theright to levy toll on trade caravanspassing through the mountains. This practice like-wise was kept up by the British colonial authorities for many years.

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Prince over a tract of Hill countrydid not entail the mergingof the ValleyPeople with the Hill People in any cultural sense. Whateverthe overallpoliticalstructure he two categoriesremaineddistinct n language,religionand ecologicaladaptation. It is true that the mannersand customs of theValley People provided, n certainrespects,a model of politenesseven forthe hill barbarians.In Burmaproperthe Hill Chieftainswhom the firstEuropeantravellersencounteredwere often dressedin Chinese, Shan, orBurmesestyle and took pride in listingthe honorific titles whichhad beenbestoweduponthemby theirelegantValleyoverlords,but at the same timetheythemselvesclaimedto be lords in their own right,subject o no outsideauthority.

But it wouldbe equallymisleadingo representhe Valley People andtheHillPeopleaspermanentlyangedn implacablehostility.Thetwo categoriesof populationare symbioticon one another; hey interpenetrateerritoriallyand politicallyas well as culturally or, in the courseof centuries, civili-sation ,as representedby the culture of the Valley People, has fanned outalongthe rivervalleysand infiltratedupwards nto isolatedpocketsrightintheheart of the hill country.Some of thesesmallpocketsof uplandValley Peoplemay have originatedas militarygarrisonsguardinga strategic oute,othersmayhavebeen startedby privatecolonistsseekingto escapethe burdensof war and tyranny,butthefact thattheyhave survivedandstillmanaged o retain heir characteristicValley Cultureshows that the professed hostility of the surroundingHillPeople is seldom carriedto extremes.The high degreeof politicalinterconnectednessetweenadjacentgroupsof Valley Peopleand Hill Peoplemaybest be demonstratedroman; xample.ThefarNorth-West f Burma s dottedwithtinyShansettlementsurroundedby vast areas of mountaincountry inhabitedonly by Kachins. Chinesedocuments how thatsomeof these Shansettlementswerealreadyn existencein the 8thcenturyA.D. Thoughwidelyscattered,hesevariousShanstateletsclaim a culturalunity; they are Hkamti Shansand formerly ell withinthedomain of the Prince of Mogaung. The Kachinsof the surroundinghillcountryadmitno kinshipwith the Shans nor do they admitthat they wereever the subjectsof the Prince of Mogaung. They point out that the jadeand ambermineswhich were the mainsourceof Mogaungprosperityie inKachinand not in Shan territory. The Kachins,they say, were the alliesbutnot the servantsof Mogaung. t is a matterof history hat the independentprincipality f Mogaungwas extinguishedby military orce in 1765, but theancientideology persists. The present day Kachinchieftainwho owns thejade mines has appropriatedo himself the title of HkamtiPrince (KansiDuwa).The Shan stateletsof the formerMogaungrealmwerewidelyscatteredasthe followingtable shows:

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THE FRONTIERS OF BURMAModern Map Names Distance (miles) and Directionfrom MogaungMogaungKamaing 22 N.W.Mohnyin 50 S.W.Mainghkwan 73 N.N.W.Mong Kong (Maing Kaing) 93 W.S.W.SingkalingHkamti 90 N.W.Taro 90 N.N.W.Hkamti (Headwaters rrawaddy) 140 N.N.E.Hkamti(In Assam) 160 N.N.W.Each of these localities is a small rice plain inhabited by a Tai-speakingBuddhist population ranging in numbers from a hundred to a few thousand.In addition the Mogaung Prince claimed suzerainty over all the hill countrylying in between, that is an area of some 10,000 square miles. For thatmatter, he also claimed overlordship over all Assam. In turn the Princehimself offered ambivalent allegiance to both the Emperor of China and theKing of Ava, a circumstance which proved disastrous when, in the latter partof the eighteenth century, the King of Ava went to war with China over thecontrol of the jade trade.

My point is this. The seventeenth-eighteenth century realm of Mogaungmay be regarded as a typical Burma state. It had from certain points ofview a very real existence; there was a Mogaung Prince and his kingdomhad a name (it appears in the records as Nora, Pong, etc.); yet in anothersense the kingdom was a fiction. Its Shan inhabitants were widely scatteredand by no means numerous. The Prince could only undertake effectivemilitary or political action with the aid and consent of the Hill subjects ,who were not subjects at all. His claims regarding territorial suzerainty wereoptimistic in the extreme.

This Mogaung example is in no way an extreme or a typical instance norhave the conditions which prevailed in the 18th Century altered substantiallyin recent times. The authority exercised by the central government of theIndependent Sovereign State of Burma over its outlying regions in the year1959 is of a very similar kind. I believe that nearly all the Indian stylestates of Burma history have been of this general type.

My main purpose in citing this example was to indicate the kind ofrelationship which existed between the civilised, nominally dominant ValleyPeople on the one hand and their barbarous Hill neighbours on the other.In the Mogaung case, Kachins fought in the Shan armies and they tradedin the Shan markets and they admitted the lordship of the Shan Prince. Butthe Shan Prince exercised no administrative authority and levied no tribute.Shans and Kachins did not intermarry and the Kachins had no truck withthe Buddhist priesthood. Yet assimilation could and did take place. Thelabourers on the Shan ricefields were mostly settled Kachins living in volun-

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tary serfdom. We have actual historical evidence that such groups, byadoptingthe manners,and dress and languageof their masters tended tomergewith themcompletelyn the courseof a few generations.19 he ValleyPeopleof todayshouldnot be thoughtof as the descendants f an immigrantalien race, they are simplydescendantsof Hill People who have settled inthe Valleysand adoptedcivilisedcustomsalongwiththe practiceof Valley-typewet rice agriculture.But in makingthis cultural ransfer hey have cutthemselvesoff completely rom theirformerassociates n the Hills. In thispartof the worlda Buddhistcannot be a kinsmanof a non-Buddhist.Certainotheraspectsof the argumentromecologydeserveattention.TheValleyPeople becauseof theirwet rice farming ive in locally dense aggre-gatesof populationandthis is an importantactorin their culturalcohesion;in contrast,most of the Hill People,being shiftingcultivators,ive in smallwidely scatteredsettlements. I have no means of computingthe precisefiguresbut, very roughly, n Burmaproper,the Hill countrytakes up tentimesas muchspace as the Valley countrybut there are ten times as manyValley People as there are Hill People.The Hill People are not in every case shiftingcultivators; ome of themresort o fixed cultivationon irrigatederraces. But the groupswhich do thisare not a distinctcategory n any linguisticor culturalsense and their ex-istence does not affect the general argument. Hill farmingof any kindrequiresa very high laboureffort in relation to yield and consequently tcanveryseldomprovideanyeconomicsurplusoverandabove the immediatesubsistenceneedsof the localpopulation.It is the existenceof such a surplusin the Valley economywhich permitsthe Valley People to maintaintheirmoreelegantstyle of life.The converse s likewisetrue;throughout he wholeHill regionwherevera particular rouphas becomeexceptionallyprosperousts membersshow atendencyto adopt a Shan (Tai) or Burmesestyle of living and to becomeconverted o Buddhism.It followsthat the contrastsof cultureandlanguagewhich have led to the conventionalclassificationof tribesand peoples ofBurma haveno intrinsicpermanence.Any individual an startas a memberof one categoryand end up in another.Although the greaterpart of the Burma hill countryhas been forcenturies under the (nominal)political suzeraintyof Valley princes, theValley influencehas not been evenlydistributed.Valley culturehas spreadonly to areaswhere there is suitable alluvialfarming and so that in someof the more remote areas an indigenousHill populationhas been allowedto develop on its own withoutpoliticalinterference rom would-beValleyrulers.If then we want to consider he natureof Hill Societyas an ideal type so19 Cf. supra, note 4.

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THEFRONTIERS F BURMAas to contrast it with Valley Society as an ideal type then it is here in themore remote hill areas that we can observe it.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF HILL SOCIETYOn this basis Hill Society can be said to possess the following generalcharacteristics:

(1) The Valley pattern of a semi-divine Prince, surrounded by a harem,and ruling by divine right in his personal capacity, is wholly absent.(2) Two contrasted patterns of authority structure stand out and are

nearly always juxtaposed in immediate association...These are:(a) an ideology of rule by aristocratic chiefs. The chief is not endowedwith personal charisma but holds his office by hereditary right as seniormember of a royal lineage;(b) an ideology of democratic rule by a council of elders. Each elderacts as representative of a particular lineage but no one lineage is intrinsically

superior to any other. The elder may achieve his office either by seniorityor as a consequence of passing some test of merit.20In either case offices of authority are representativeoffices and are derivedfrom status at birth. The granting of office is never linked with politicalpatronage as in the Valley society.It is very remarkable that both types of ideology, the aristocratic and thedemocratic, are regularly found to coexist side by side throughout the wholeof the northern and western parts of the Burma hill country. I will listonly a few examples:Hill Group Aristocratic DemocraticKachin21 gumsa gumlaoKonyak Naga22 thendu thenkohSouthernNaga23 Sema Chakrima Angami)Central Chin24 Zahau ZanniatWesternManipurHills25 New Kuki (Thado) Old KukiFor the more easterly hill tracts of the Southern Shan States, Karenni,Northern Thailand and Laos, the ethnographic descriptions are too defectiveto permit confident generalisation, but here too the same two contrastedtypes of political ideology appear to coexist.26 Elsewhere I have argued at20 Stevenson (1943).21 Leach (1954).22 Von Fiirer-Haimendorf(1941).23 Hutton (1921a); (1921b).24 Stevenson (1943).25 Shakespear (1912).26 Scott and Hardiman(1900/01), Part I, Vol. I.

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length that these two types of political organisation represent different aspectsof a single cyclic type of system viewed at different phases of its growth.27(3) In the aristocratic type of regime a single Chief usually claims do-minion over a number of scattered villages. Each of these villages has aheadman who holds office by hereditary right. The headman's lineage andthe chief's lineage are usually linked by ties of affinity.In contrast, in the democratic regime, each village is on its own. Demo-cratic villages are not necessarily weaker politically than aristocratic chief-

doms, for some democratic villages are relatively very large.(4) The great majority of the Hill People are organised in exogamousunilineal descent groups of lineage type. The Karens may be an exception

to this rule but the available information is inadequate and inconsistent. Incontrast, among the Valley People unilineal descent groups are not a normalfeature of the social structure. Where such descent groups occur, as some-times among the aristocracy, they are not exogamous.(5) Hill Society attains its highest elaboration in areas which are remotefrom the contaminating influence of Buddhist civilisation. This propositionis not self-contradictory. From the viewpoint of the external observer it is

legitimate to regard the Buddhist Valley People as the civilised element inthe total population in contrast to the Animist Hill People, who are, bycomparison, barbarians. But Hill Society has its own scale of values andthese show up best when they are unadulterated. The following remarks byScott concerning the Wa headhunters of the Eastern Shan States might beapplied to almost any of the Hill Peoples:Materialprosperity eemsto exist in inverseratioto the degreeof civilisation. TheHeadhuntingWa have the most substantialvillagesandhouses,the broadest ields,the greatestnumberof buffaloes,pigs, dogs and fowls. They also have the greatestconceit of themselves, he most ornamentsandthe least clothes. The IntermediateWa fall some way behind in material possessions. The Tame Wa with theircivilisation,find their houses dwindle to hovels, their fields shrinkto plots... andbeyond this there are Wa who put up no heads at all; some of them claim to beBuddhists,othersmakeno claim to anything,not even thepity of theirneighbours.28There is a genuine paradox here. The Valley People as a whole are vastlymore prosperous and sophisticated than the Hill People as a whole, yet inthe context of a hill ecology the trimmings of civilisation are disadvantageous.Certain features of this pattern deserve attention.In the first place, it is very clear that the process of interaction betweenthe Hill People and the Valley People has not been one of simple culturaldiffusion. Hills and Valleys stand in radical opposition and there is evidentlya certain level at which Hill culture and Valley culture are totally inconsistentwith one another just as one might say of early mediaeval Europe that27 Leach (1954).28 Scott and Hardiman(1900/01), Part I, Vol. I, p. 511.

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THE FRONTIERS OF BURMAChristianity and Paganism were inconsistent. There are cultural elementswhich are common to both groups but these similarities are remarkably few.Culturally there is far more in common between the Lakher in Assam andthe Lamet in Laos29 than there is between either group and their nearestValley neighbours. The same is true of any of the Hill peoples throughoutthe area.

Yet the pattern of political relations which I have previously describedmight have led us to expect something different. After all, the Hill Peopleand the Valley People are racially the same and languages are very easilychanged, so what is it that keeps the two groups apart?I do not think that the anthropologist or anyone else can say why thedistinction exists but I think it may be illuminating to point out some of theassociated correlations.

CHINA AND THE HILL PEOPLE

Earlier in this essay I remarked that although the Hill People of Burmahave for centuries come under the spasmodic political influence of Indianstyle states, their most direct economic contacts have been with the Chinese.In some cases this is true even at the present time. I myself have first-handacquaintance of a number of North Burma localities which were unad-ministered territory throughout the period of British colonial rule; all ofthem were regularly visited by Chinese traders, but never by Burmese.It is relevant here to remember that Chinese society, like that of the HillPeople, is structured into a system of unilineal descent groups and also thatthe animism of the Hill People is fundamentally a cult of dead ancestorswhich has many Confucianist parallels. These similarities make it possiblefor the Chinese and the Burma Hill People to communicate with oneanother and to establish permanent social relationships in a way which isimpossible for the Hill People and the Valley People.Chinese villagers actually settle in the hill country and then live much likeordinary hill folk. They will even intermarry with their barbarian neigh-bours; but the Valley People will never do either of these things. Thecontrast in the pattern of marriage seems to me particularly significant.In the Valley culture the population of each local rice plain tends to beendogamous. The Prince, who has many wives, may take daughters fromneighbouring Princes but he also takes women from his own immediatefollowers. He receives the latter women as tribute. Thus, in terms ofkinship, Valley society as a whole forms a closed system; the Valley Peopledo not give their women away to strangers. Furthermore, each marriage isan individual affair between a particular man and a particular woman; it29 Parry (1932); Izikowitz (1951). These two tribes are about 500 miles apart.

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does not establishan alliancebetweenkin groups. All this is consistentwiththe fact that elements of Hindu caste ideologyhave all along been presentin the Valley culture. Valley People repudiatemarriagewith the barbarianseven whenthey arewillingto accepttheireconomicservices.30In contrast, n the Hill culture,marriages closely mixedup with trade.Girls are marriedagainsta bride-priceand the objects involvedin bride-price transactionsare the same sort of objectsas are met with in dealingswith a Chinese trader.31Thus the ties of affinal kinship ramify widely,followingtrade routes and jumpingacross languagefrontiers and politicalboundaries. In 1942 a Gauri acquaintanceof mine from East of Bhamofoundhimself n a Singfo villagein Assam250 miles fromhome,but it tookhim only a day or so to persuadehis hoststhathe was one of theirrelatives.I am not arguing hat a singlekinshipnetworkramifiesover the whole ofthe Burma Hill countrybut everywheren the hills a very high valuationis placedon extendedkinshiprelationsand also upon the permanenceandstabilityof such relations. Individualsare regardedas representatives fparticularineagesandparticular lacesandthey areclassed on that accountas friend or foe. Women who are given in marriageserve to establisharelationshipbetweenlineages-a relationshipwhichis likely to be repeatedlaterin furthermarriages r further rade. This is the antithesisof the ValleyCulture theory which treats women either as separateindividualsor aschattel slaves. A Valley Princereceives women as tribute;a Hill chieftaingives them out as pledgesof economiccooperation.Hill culture s not a direct imitation rom the Chinesebut it parallels heChinesesystemin a way that the Valley culture does not. Just as we cansay that the Valley culturehas an Indian style withoutimplyingthat theShans are Hindus or that the Burmesehave a fully developedcaste system,I think we can say that the Hill culturehas a Chinesestylewithout mplyingthat Naga tribesmenare devoutadherentsof the Confucianethic.The reallycrucialdistinctionhere is that betweencharismaticindividual)authorityon the one handand traditional ffice on the other. In the Valleysystemall authority s individualandtemporary ndfor thatreasontyranni-cal. The Valley tyrantdoes not displayhis meritby justicebut by acts ofself-glorification.In the Hill system, as in the Chinese, all offices are vested either inparticular ineages (which are conceptually mmortal)or else are reservedfor individualswho have achieved a particular ocial status(e.g. by passingexaminationsor by workingthrougha gradedseries of sacrificialfeasts).The acts of the rulerare themselvesgovernedby rules,everythinghe doescarries the sanction of legitimatecustom.My suggestionis that this contrast of ideologies about the nature of30 Cf. Pelliot (1951), p. 19; Milne (1910), p. 50.31 Cf. Leach (1954), references to hpaga.

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THE FRONTIERS OF BURMAauthority lluminates,even if it does not explain why 2000 years of Indianrule has not eliminatedthe radical separationbetween Hill and Valleysociety.

SUMMARYBurma s a region yingbetween wogreatcentresof civilisation.Through-out history it has been influenced simultaneously rom India and fromChina,not only at the triviallevel of Courtpolitics but fundamentallynterms of the culturalsystemas a whole.But this influence has not been an indiscriminatediffusion of ideas.

Politics, ecology, kinship and economicsprovidein some degree separateandseparable ramesof reference,and I have therefore nvitedthe historianof Burmato look uponthe presentas partof a continuingprocessof inter-action between two kinds of politicalstructure, wo kinds of ecology, twodistinctpatternsof kinshiporganisation,wo sets of economic nterests.There are other frontierregionswhere a very similarstyle of analysismightapply and it is on that accountthat I feel justified n offeringthis asa contributionwith potentialcomparative alue.E. R. LEACHCambridge University

REFERENCES

No attempt has been made here to support my more general statementswith detailedreferences. For Burmaproper and the regions to the East the most useful select biblio-graphy for English language readers is that appended to Hall (1955). Ethnographicsources for the whole region are well covered by Embree and Dotson (1950). For theNaga Hills area Hutton (1926) covers 19th century sources very thoroughly. I knowof no general bibliographyof sources for Assamese history but Mackenzie (1884) andMichell (1883) and Selection of Papers (1873) give summaries of many of the keydocumentsfor the 19th centuryperiod. These source books have been supplementedbyReid (1942). Leach (1954) mentions a number of items relating to the North Burma/Assam region which do not appearin other bibliographic ists.BENEDICT,P. K. Thai, Kadai and Indonesian: a New Alignment in1942 Southeastern Asia , American Anthropologist, 44, pp.578-601.CADY, JOHN F. A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca).1958EMBREE, J. F. & DOTSON,L. 0. Bibliography of the Peoples and Cultures of Mainland1950 Southeast Asia (New Haven).FiFRER-HAIMENDORF,C. VON Dass Gemeinschaftsleben der Konyak-Naga von As-1941 sam , Mitt. d. Anthrop. Gesellsch. in Wien, LXXI.FURNIVALL,. S. The Fashioning of Leviathan: The Beginnings of1939 British Rule in Burma , Journal of the Burma Re-search Society, XXIX, Pt. I.GRAHAM,W. A. Siam, 2 vols. (London).1924

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68HALL, D. G. E.1955HUTTON, . H.

192119211926

IZIKOWITZ,K. G1951LATTIMORE, .1940LEACH,E. R.1954LowIs, C. C.1919LUCE, G. H.1940LUCE,G. H. & PE MAUNGTIN1939MACKENZIE, .1884MICHELL, ST. J. F.

1883MILNE,L.1910PARRY,N. E.1932PELLIOT,P.1904

1951QUARITCH WALES, H. G.1931REID, R.1942SCOTT,J. G. (SHWAYYOE)1896SCOTT, . G. & HARDIMAN,. P.1900/01Selection of Papers1873SHAKESPEAR,.1912STEVENSON,. N. C.n.d. (1943)TAYLOR,L. F.1956WEBER,MAX1947

1951

EDMUNDLEACHA History of South-East Asia (London).(a) The Angami Nagas (London).(b) The Sema Nagas (London).

A Bibliography of the Naga Hills with some Adja-cent Districts . Appendix VI to J. P. Mills, The AoNagas (London).Lamet:Hill Peasants in French Indochina (Goteborg).Inner Asian Frontiers of China (New York).Political Systems of Highland Burma (London).The Tribes of Burma. Ethnological Survey of India:Burma, No. 4 (Rangoon).Economic Life of the Early Burman , Journal of theBurma Research Society, XXX.Burma down to the Fall of Pagan, Part I , Journalof the Burma Research Society, XXIX (Part II wasnever published).History of the Relations of the Governmentwith theHill Tribes of the Northeastern Frontier of Bengal(Calcutta).Report (Topographical,Political and Military) on theNorth-East Frontier of India. Confidential (Calcutta).Shans at Home (London).The Lakhers (London).

Deux itineraires de Chine en Inde a la fin du VIIIemesiecle , B.E.F.E.O. (Hanoi).Memoires sur les Coutumes du Cambodge de TcheouTa-Kouan. Oeuvresposthumes de Paul Pelliot, No. 3(Paris).Siamese State Ceremonies(London).History of the Frontier Areas BorderingAssam from1883-1941 (Shillong).The Burman, His Life and Notions (London).Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States. PartI: 2 vols; Part II: 3 vols. (Rangoon).Selection of Papers regardingthe Hill Tracts betweenAssam and Burma and on the Upper Brahmaputra(Calcutta).The Lushei Kuki Clans (London).The Economics of the CentralChin Tribes (Bombay).

General Structure of Languages Spoken in Burma ,Journal of the Burma Research Society, XXXIX.The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation(London).The Religion of China (Glencoe).


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The Frontiers of Burma by E. R. Leach