The Alchemy of Austerity

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Critical Social Policy http://csp.sagepub.com/

The alchemy of austerityJohn Clarke and Janet Newman Critical Social Policy 2012 32: 299 originally published online 24 May 2012 DOI: 10.1177/0261018312444405 The online version of this article can be found at: http://csp.sagepub.com/content/32/3/299

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CSP32310.1177/0261018312444405Clarke & NewmanCritical Social Policy

Critical Social Policy

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The alchemy of austerityJohn Clarke and JaneT newmanThe Open University, UK

Abstract The return of austerity has provoked social conflict, political controversy and academic disputes. In this article we explore some of these through the metaphor of an alchemy of austerity that forms the foundation for strategies of state retrenchment through which the consent of populations is sought. We begin, in Magical thinking, by tracing some of the discursive repertoires that circulate in analyses of austerity, showing something of its significance as a key term being mobilized in different international and national political discourses. We then go on to explore political strategies, with a particular focus on the UK in Sharing the pain. However, we suggest that such a focus offers a limited conception of politics that fails to illuminate the contradictory field of political forces put into motion by austerity strategies. This field of forces, we go on to argue, crystallizes around the problem of securing consent. In Austerity and the problem of consent we examine this further, pointing to the proliferation of different forms of dissent and their relationship to austerity measures. We end by tracing shifting articulations of the moral and the economic by revisiting E.P. Thompsons concept of moral economy. Key words austerity, consent, cuts, disaffection, ideology, moral economy, politics, welfareCorresponding author: John Clarke, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, UK. Email: john.clarke@open.ac.ukCritical Social Policy The Author(s) 2012 Reprints and permission: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0261018312444405 csp.sagepub.com 32(3) 299319

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C r i t i c a l S o c i a l P o l i c y 32(3) The age of irresponsibility is giving way to the age of austerity. (David Cameron, 2009a)

Magical thinking: the alchemy of austerityAlthough austerity has a long and complicated history (to which we will return), its current significance derives directly from the multiple and multilayered crisis of the financial system inaugurated in 20078. This crisis has provided a remarkable display of shape changing as its construction has been contested and reworked (Clarke and Newman, 2010; Newman and Clarke, 2009). The current dominant image of its locus has been moved from the private to the public sector (from the financial services industry to public spending). It has been transformed from a financial crisis to a fiscal crisis (centred on government debt). It has shifted from a crisis located in the banking and financial centres of the USA and UK to a global crisis in which, paradoxically, the UK is repositioning itself as a model of probity and good fiscal housekeeping. And it has been ideologically reworked, at least in the UK, from an economic problem (how to rescue the banks and restore market stability) to a political problem (how to allocate blame and responsibility for the crisis): a reworking that has focused on the unwieldy and expensive welfare state and public sector, rather than high risk strategies of banks, as the root cause of the crisis. This shape changing, we argue, is the result of intensive ideological work work that we identify here through the image of the (political and financial) wizards attempting to find the alchemy that might turn disaster into triumph the triumph being a new neo-liberal settlement. One marker of the success of this ideological and political work is that austerity has become the dominant global wisdom for addressing the problem of public debt (including the public debt that resulted from rescuing private funds). This has been particularly evident across the European Union and the USA. It should be remembered, however, that the global North is a relative latecomer to the regime of fiscal austerity. The South has a rather longer (and harsher) exposure to its rigours (see, for example, Adepoju, 1993 and Ferguson, 2006 on Africa; Canak, 1989 and Lustig, 1995 on Latin America; and Yeldan, 2001 on Turkey and the IMF). That history is a reminder about the controversial economics and politics associated with austerity. The currently dominant consensus about fiscal austerity continues an approach established in the International Monetary Funds structural adjustment policies in which public debt, public spending and public services are all viewed as problems to be overcome (to liberate enterprise, growth and development). This model of fiscal austerity is, however, much contested:This new era of fiscal consolidation is based on two simple ideas. First, government budget deficits experienced today by many advanced countries areDownloaded from csp.sagepub.com at University of East Anglia on July 30, 2012

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unsustainable. Second, fiscal consolidation measures are invariably expansionary; that is, massive cuts in government expenditures and significant tax hikes have positive effects on output and employment. These simple ideas are wrong but very powerful. No policymaker around the world seems immune to them. (Fontana and Sawyer, 2011: 5758)

These two ideas circulate widely in global financial institutions, most notably the IMF which has remained wedded to this conception of how national and global economies work for over thirty years. However, these ideas do not just circulate; they are also enforced by a variety of means. The IMFs own lending power, combined with the political effects of its judgements on the state of national economies, make it a potent force for ensuring the continued dominance of this austerity strategy, even when evidence of its success is (at best) equivocal, and the evidence of its social costs is alarming. The European Central Bank has played a similar role in relation to vulnerable European economies. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that, even in the hard-nosed real world of economics, various forms of magical thinking are at work. These include the belief that if one says things often enough, they will come true (visible in most UK chancellors of the last few decades) and a touching faith in the power of good feelings (confidence among consumers and investors). Paul Krugman nicely points to how such magical beliefs combine in the central role of the confidence fairy:But dont worry: spending cuts may hurt, but the confidence fairy will take away the pain. The idea that austerity measures could trigger stagnation is incorrect, declared Jean-Claude Trichet, the president of the European Central Bank, in a recent interview. Why? Because confidence-inspiring policies will foster and not hamper economic recovery. (Krugman, 2011: 2)

The alchemy of austerity, then, is not just a matter of persuading the populace to adopt a form of false consciousness; alchemy, the investment in magical beliefs, is itself part of the strategy for recovery. At the heart of this austerity strategy is a belief that strategies of fiscal constraint can, counter-intuitively, produce expansionary effects in national economies, increasing private consumption and investment and producing growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In a recent working paper, Guajardo and his colleagues note that, according to this hypothesis, fiscal consolidation can thus stimulate private consumption and investment even in the short term, a phenomenon known as expansionary fiscal contraction or expansionary austerity (Guajardo et al., 2011: 3). Their study is potentially significant because they challenge the empirical measures on which most investigations of expansionary austerity have relied. Using an alternative methodology, they suggest that the effects of fiscal consolidation are consistently contractionary rather than expansionary:Downloaded from csp.sagepub.com at University of East Anglia on July 30, 2012

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C r i t i c a l S o c i a l P o l i c y 32(3) Based on the fiscal actions thus identified, our baseline specification implies that a 1 percent of GDP fiscal consolidation reduces real private consumption by 0.75 percent within two years, while real GDP declines by 0.62 percent. The baseline results survive a battery of robustness tests. Our main finding that fiscal consolidation is contractionary holds up in cases where one would most expect fiscal consolidation to raise private domestic demand. In particular, even large spending-based fiscal retrenchments are contractionary, as are fiscal consolidations occurring in economies with a high perceived sovereign default risk. (Guajardo et al., 2011: 29; see also Fontana and Sawyer, 2011)

This suggests that the confidence fairys wand may need some repair. It also indicates that the protracted character of the current economic crisis owes something to the choice of remedy that has been promoted globally and adopted (more or less willingly) by many national governments, not least the UKs enthusiastic early adopters. Indeed, Theodoropoulou and Watt (2011) have argued that the early experiences of fiscal austerity within the EU indicate that the process is likely to be prolonged, precisely because of the contractionary effects. They draw on the experience of early adopters of austerity measures Latvia and Hungary to show how programmes were frequently revised and extended over time in order to meet changed conditions set for financial recovery. They also show how Greece and Portugal, despite unprecedented austerity measures, also had to revise and deepen their programmes in order to meet the targets imposed on them. Assumptions of growth were constantly undershot because, in part, of the effects that austerity measures had on the real economy (of production, consumption and trading), which made meeting the targets of fiscal consolidation very difficult. Such studies clearly pose the question of whether austerity measures work, that is are effective in reducing debt and fostering growth. But this is not our focus here: rather, we want to explore further the political consequences of austerity as the object of magical thinking: how, for example, apparent failure leads not to reconsideration and reassessment but the imposition of more of the same, and how consent for such strategies is secured. Certainly the construction of public debt and public austerity looks very much like an example of magical thinking, and its installation as the dominant global wisdom has involved some remarkable political work. As Evans and Hussey note, between 2007 and 2010, major changes of discursive framing were accomplished:The rapidity of the current turn from rescue to exit strategies, as governments cease countercyclical spending policies that were employed in the early years of the worldwide economic crisis that began in 2007, and the commensurate

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shifting of blame and cost to the public sector, and public sector workers in particular, has been nothing less than astonishing. (Evans and Hussey, 2011: 37)

We do not have room here to explore the shifting and contested constructions of crisis that have been in play globally and nationally (but see Clarke, 2010a, b; Clarke and Newman, 2010). At each moment, they have required intense political-cultural labour to capture the future and to control the meanings of crisis in the midst of profoundly contradictory tendencies, forces and possibilities.

Sharing the pain: The contradictory politics of austerityAs the pressures for austerity grew, national governments have found different accommodations, ranging from blame avoidance (attributing causes to global forces or supra-national organizations such as the EU or IMF) through credit claiming (putting things right) and even righteous zeal (the Tea Party influenced Republicans in the USA). The UK has taken something of a vanguard position on austerity under the 2010 Coalition government, cutting deeper and harder than most EU countries. Political rationalizations of the programme have moved uncomfortably between the economic necessity claim and a more moral and social vocabulary of responsibility and interdependence (as in the brief flirtation with the idea of a Big Society, and currently pursued through a series of localization measures that deflect and decentralize responsibility for care and welfare). Clarke (forthcoming) argues that the Coalition has developed a paradoxical position of virtuous necessity, claiming both that austerity is necessary and that its adoption by the Coalition represents an act of political virtue (by contrast with the UK opposition and eurozone countries). The two elements are further connected by a recurrent trope of collective painsharing, as floated by Chancellor-to-be George Osborne in his speech to the Conservative Party conference in 2009: These are the honest choices in the world in which we live and we have made them today. Anyone who tells you these choices can be avoided is not telling you the truth. We are all in this together (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8292680.stm). Certainly, this is the collective imagery that the Coalition has tried to summon up a nation united in the face of adversity:We are all in this together, and we will get through this together. We will carry out Britains unavoidable deficit reduction plan in a way that strengthens and unites the country.

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C r i t i c a l S o c i a l P o l i c y 32(3) We are not doing this because we want to, driven by theory or ideology. We are doing this because we have to, driven by the urgent truth that unless we do, people will suffer and our national interest will suffer. But this government will not cut this deficit in a way that hurts those we most need to help that divides the country or that undermines the spirit and ethos of ou...