-
COMMISSION OFINQUIRY INTO THE
AIR ONTARIO CRASHAT DRYDEN, ONTARIO
Final Report
TechnicalAppendices
The Honourable Virgil P. MoshanskyCommissioner
-
COMMISSION OFINQUIRY INTO THE
AIR ONTARIO CRASHAT DRYDEN, ONTARIO
-
The Final Report consists of three volumes: I (Parts One-Four),
II (Part Five),and III (Parts Six-Nine and the General Appendices);
and this volume ofTechnical Appendices. The contents of volumes I,
II, and III of the FinalReport are found at the end of this
volume.
-
COMMISSION OFINQUIRY INTO THE
AIR ONTARIO CRASHAT DRYDEN, ONTARIO
Final Report
Technical Appendices
The Honourable Virgil P. MoshanskyCommissioner
-
Minister of Supply .md Services Canada 1992Printed in CanadaCal.
No. CP 3255/4-1992E
This volume has been translated by the translation scrvices of
the Secrctary of State, Canada,and is available in French
CANADIAN CATALOGUING IN PVIlLlCATlON DATA
Commission of Inquiry into the Air Ontario Crash at Dryden,
Ontario (Canada)
Fil1ul report: technical appendicesIssued alsu in French under
title: Rapport final. appendices tcchnH.luc~.
ISBN 066014383-6DSS cal. no. CI'3255/41992E
1. Aeronautics - Ontario - Accidenls - 1989.1. Mo
-
CONTENTS
Preface vii
1 Occurrence No. 825-89-C0048: Structures/Site Survey Group
ReportLP 38/89: Accident: Fokker F28, Mk 1000, Registration
C-FONF,10 March 1989 1Canadian Aviation Safety Board Investigation
Team
2 Fokker Aircraft B.Y. Amsterdam, Fokker Aerodynamics, Report
No.L-28-222: Note on the Aircraft Characteristics as Affected by
Frost, Iceor Freezing Rain Deposits on Wings 67
3 Fokker Aircraft B.Y. Amsterdam, Report No. YS-28-25:
FlightSimulator Investigation into the Take-off Performance Effects
of Slushon the Runway and Ice on the Wings of a Fokker 100 77
4 A Report on the Flight Dynamics of the Fokker F-28 Mk 1000 as
TheyPertain to the Accident at Dryden, Ontario, March 1989 131J.M.
Morgan, G.A. Wagner, R.H. Wickens
5 Wind Tunnel Investigation of a Wing-Propeller Model
PerformanceDegradation due to Distributed Upper-Surface Roughness
andLeading Edge Shape Modification 249R.H. Wickens and V.D.
Nguyen
6 Freezing Precipitation on Lifting Surfaces 277Myron M.
Oleskiw
7 Human Factors Aspects of the Air Ontario Crash at Dryden,
Ontario:Analysis and Recommendations to the Commission of Inquiry
319Robert L. Helmreich
-
PREFACE
Independent rcst!arch and anal ysis were cand ucted by Fokkcr
Aircraft B.V., themanufacturer of the Fokkcr F-28 MklOOO aircraft;
and, with Fokkcr, by theCanadian Aviation Safety Board. On behalf
of this Commission, research andanalysis were carried out by
individuals with expertise in the areas ofaerodynamics, physics,
metc'orology, and psychology.
This volume of Technical Appt~ndiC1...,s contains the reports
used by thisCommission of Inquiry in analysing the performance of
Fokker Aircmft F-28Mk1000, C-FONF, during its last takl'uff frum
Drydl'n Municipai Airport, onMarch 10, 1989. It also contains an
analysis rdating to the human factors aspectssurrounding the
accident. What folluw~ is a Grid description of each of thereports
contained in this volume.
1 Structures/Site Survey Group Report LP 38/89: Accident: Fokker
F28, Mk1000, Registration C-FONF, 10 March 1989 Occurrence No.
825-89-C0048:Canadian Aviation Safety Board
The Structures/Site Survey Croup Repurt was l'ntl'fl'd as
Exhibit 484 throughMr James W. Hutchinson, chief, engineering:
analysis, Canadian Aviation SafetyBoard. It represents an analysis
of the final flight path of the aircraft, a fircdamage analysis of
tIll' aircraft wfl:cki.lgc, and tlw CTi'lshworthincss nspects of
theaccident. This report WilS "pOkl'l1 to by Mr Hutchin:-ion during
his testimonybefore this Commission un April Y, !LJ9U.
2 Fokkcr Aircraft B.V. Amsterdam, Fokkcr Aerodynamics, Report
No.L-28-222: Note on the Aircraft Characteristics as Affected by
Frost, lee orFreezing Rain Deposits on Wings
Fokker Aircraft Report No. L-28-222, dated December 16, 1969,
was the resultof wind tunnel tests and studies conductl'd by
FokkC'f Aircraft dealing with theeffects of sandpap(,f roughness on
the wings of both jet- and propeller-poweredaircraft. The report
specifically describes the degradation in takeoff lift
andacceleration chmactcristics of the F-28 aircraft caused by
surface roughness onthe wings due to contamination such a:; fro~t,
icC', or fr('C'zing rain. This reportwas entered as part of Exhibit
532 and was spuken to by Mr Jack van Hengst,chief aerodynamic
analyst, Fokker Aircraft B. Y., during his tC'stimony before
thisCommission on May 1, 1990.
3 Fokker Aircraft B.Y. Amsterdam, Report No. YS-28-25: Flight
SimulatorInvestfgation on the Take-off Performance Effects of Slush
on the Runwayand lee on the Wings of a Fokker 100
Fokker Aircraft Report ;\Io. Y5-28-25 was the: rC':;ult of
simulation flightsconducted by Fokkcr Aircraft ilnd Commission
investigators using FokkerAircraft's Fokker "IOU cngincl'ring
flight ~imulJ.torf adju:'>ted to approximate theflight
characteristics of an F-28 Mk 1000 aircraft. It summarizes Fokker's
data and
-
viii Preface
findings used to assess tho t"kooH performance of n Pokker F-28
Mk1000 aircraftwith contamination on the aircraft wings Zlnd on the
runway. The report wasentered as Exhibit 544 and was spoken to by
expert witnesses Mr Gary Wagnerand Mr J. Murray Morgan, and by Mr
Jack van Hongst, during their respectivetestimony before this
Commission on May 4, Muy 3, (lnd May 2, 1990.
4 A Report on the Flight Dynamics of the Fokker Mk 1000 as They
Pertainto the Accident at Dryden, Ontario, March 1989
The flight dynamics report was resl'archcd and prepared by Mr J.
MurrayMorgan of National AeromlUtics Establishment, Nutional
Research CouncilCanada; Mr Gary A. Wagner, Air Canada pilot,
physicist, and aeronauticalengineer; and Mr Richard H. Wickens,
National Research Council Canada. Theobjective of the flight
dynamics report was to develop il range of po"ib]e fJightpath
scenarios in order to approximat(' thut Oown by C-FONF on its last
flight,on March 10, 1989. The report contains an ilcrodynamic
anulysis to supportsimulation work and to provide background for
thl' accident analysis andinvestigation. This report was spoken to
by Messrs Wickens, Morgan, andWagner during their respective
testimuny bdore this Commission on April 30,May 3, and May 4,
1990.
5 Wind Tunnel Investigation of a Wing-Propeller Model
PerformanceDegradation due to Distributed Uppcr~Surfacc Roughness
and LeadingEdge Shape Modification
The report on prupl-'lIer perfL1rmJnCl' dl-'gmdatton 1::; based
on r~s~archconducted by Mr Richard H. Wickens and Mr V.D. Nguyen of
th" NationalResearch Council Canada relElting to tl1l' effects of
performance degradation onpropeller-driven aircraft due to wing
contamination. This report was spoken toby Mr Wickens during his
testimony bdore thb Commission on April 30, 1990.
6 Freezing Precipitation on Lifting Surfaces
This report was prepared by Dr Myron M. Okskiw of the National
ResearchCouncil Canadu to determine tlH.-' effectt> of snow on
tlH? wings of aircraftC-FONF on March 10, 1989, and tho pussibility
of snow turning to ic" throughsuch factors as adiabiltic and
evapor2ltion cooling caused by airfluw over thewing and the
po:,sibility of snow adhering to the wings due to wing
surfacecooling. This report was entered as Exhibit 521 and was
spoken to by DrOleskiw during his testimony before this
Commis...;ion on April 26, 1990.
7 Human Factors Aspects of the Air Ontario Crash at Dryden,
Ontario:Analysis and Recommendations to the Commission of
Inquiry
The human factors aspects analy~is, prepzl.Ted by Dr Robert L.
Hclmrcich of theUniversity of Texas, was bJsed on tIll' evidence
and information before thisCommission and on previous resl'afch in
thl' aroo of human performance inflight operation.':>. Th('
re'port was entL-'H.'d as Exhibit 1270 and was spoken to byexpl'rt
witnesses Dr Robl'rt L Hl'1mrcich. Dr Charles O. Miller, i:1nd Mr
D2IvidAdams during their tl?stimony bdllH-' thh Cl)rnmis,sion on
December 17,18,19,and 20, 1990.
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Appendix 1
Occurrence No. 825-89-C0048Structures/Site Survey Group ReportLP
38/39Accident: Fokker F28, Mk 1000, Registration C-FONF, 10 March
1989
Canadian Aviation Safety BoardInvestigation Team:J.W.
Hutchinson, Structures ChairpersonJ.E. Foot, Site Security and
Survey Chairperson
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Structures/Site Survey Group Report: CASB 1
Occurrence No. 825-89-c0048
STRUCTURES/SITE SURVEY
GROUP REPORT
LP 38/89
Accident: Fokker F28,Mk 1000Registration C-FONF10 Macch 1989
structures Chairperson:
site Survey Chairperson: f7~, ~~ ' _~FootElec/Mech Engineering
SpecialistCanadian Aviation Safety Board
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Struclures/Site Survey Group Report: CASB 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Findings
3.0 Break-up sequence
4.0 Aircraft Path
5.0 Crashworthiness
FIGURES
Figure 1 - Three view drawing of the Fokker F28-Mk 1000showing
the general overall dimensions.
Figure 2 - Wreckage Distribution plot showing therelative
location of all wreckage itemssurveyed in the upper and lower half
of thewreckage trail and the outline of the swathcut through the
trees.
Figure 3 - View of Fokker F28, C-FONG showing location ofthe
mounted rotating beacon on the fuselagebelly (arrow).
Figure 4 - As in figure 3, close-up view.
Figure 5 - photo of all the pieces of the red lens fromthe
rotating beacon recovered from thevicinity of the first clipped
trees off theend of Runway 29.
Figure 6 - Aerial photograph of main wreckage trail withoverlays
showing the tree cut swath, tree firedamage, left wing and left
elevator wreckagedistribution, and the main and nose landinggear
doors wreckage distribution.
Figure 7 - Dryden Site Plan showing the tree strikes ofthe end
of Runway 29 and the location of theaccident site with respect to
the airport.
Figure 8 - Drawing of Aircraft Flight Path Profileshowing the
tree strikes off the end of Runway29 and the relative elevations of
the treestrikes.
figure 9 - Tree model showing aircraft attitude as viewedfrom
the left side.
-
4 Appendix 1
Figure 10- Tree model showing aircraft attitude as viewedfrom
the front.
Figure 11- Infrared aerial photograph looking back alongthe
wreckage trail towards the airport. Theextent of the fire damage to
the trees isrepresented by the darker coloured trees.
APPENDICES
Appendix A - Wreckage Catalogue (initial search)Appendix B -
Wreckage Catalogue (2nd ground search)Appendix C - Wreckage
Retrieval & Layout ReconstructionAppendix 0 - Aircraft Flight
Path Computer Reconstruction
-
Structures/Site Survey Group Report: CASB 5--
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Fokker F28-Mk 1000, registration C-FONF crashed shortlyafter
take-off near the end of runway 29 from DrydenMunicipal airport,
Dryden Ontario. The accident occurredat 12:11 hours CST on Match
10, 1989. The aircraft crashedin heavily wooded terrain in one to
two metres {m) of snow.The aircraft was operated by Air Ontario on
a scheduledcommercial flight (number 363) from Thunder Bay to
Winnipegwith a stop at Dryden. Of the 65 passengers and four
crewmembers on board, 22 received fatal injuries at impact andtwo
more severely injured passengers died later inhospital.
1.2 The aircraft path was considered in three segments. Thefirst
segment from the end of runway 29 for a distance of726 metres (m),
on a heading of 290 degrees magnetic. Inthis segment the aircraft
struck the tops of eighteentrees, the first one being 126 m off the
end of the runway_The seco~d segment is identified as the upper
half of thewreckage trail and represents the aircraft striking
asubstantial number of trees near the top of a knoll andbegin its
descent through the trees a further distance of144 m remaining on
approximately the same heading of 290degrees. The third segment is
identified as the lower halfof the wreckage trail and represents
the aircraft makingprimary impact with the ground and sliding about
80 m to astop against a stand of trees.
1.3 A three view drawing of the F28-Mk 1000 is depicted inFigure
1 showing the general overall dimensions.
-
6 Appendix 1-~---- -- -- ---- -- - -~2---
2.0 FINDINGS
2.1 The aircraft first contacted a single tree top 126 m offthe
end of runway 29 (293 magnetic), 3 degrees to the leftof the runway
centre line. The tree top was broken off atan elevation of 413.1 m
above sea level {ASL}. Theelevation at the end of runway 29 is 413
m ASL.
2.2 The aircraft clipped the tops of eighteen trees over thenext
600 rn prior to striking a substantial number of treesnear the top
of a knoll. The heights of the bro~en tops ofall the trees
contacted between the first tree and the topof the knoll remained
relatively constant at 413 metres1+-1.5 mi.
2.3 The aircraft descended into the trees, cutting Q swath
for224 m in length. The terrain elevation at the top of theknoll
was 404 m and sloped downwards to 390 m ASL.Aircraft wreckage was
scattered along the entire swath ofcut trees. The majority of the
wreckage came to rest at aLatitude of 49 degrees 45 minutes 11
seconds and Longitude92 degrees 46 minutes 8 seconds (UTM 5520300
N, 516650 e).
2.4 The initial pieces of wreckage found consisted of pieces
ofthe red lens cap from the rotating beacon, which was brokenoff
the belly of the fuselage. These pieces were found inthe vicinity
of the first tree strike off the end of runway29.
2.5 The next pieces of wreckage were located at the main
treestrikes and consisted of the left wing tip, main landinggear
doors (MLG) and pieces of the radome. The majority ofthe fuselage,
right wing and the empennage stayedrelatively intact until the
aircraft came to rest.
2.6 Approximately 50 m after contacting the more heavily
treedarea, a fire developed which traveled down the length ofthe
wreckage trail and culminated in the almost totaldestruction of the
cockpit and fuselage area aft to therear pressure bulkhead. The
empennage and engines weresuperficially sooted and remained
relatively unburnt.
2.1 All major control surfaces, doors, and hatches were foundin
the main wreckage scatter zone. Except for the MLGdoors the
remaining doors and hatches were determined to bein the closed and
locked position prior to impact.
2.8 It was determined that the landing gear was in transit
upwhen major tree contact occurred.
2.9 Reconstruction of the wreckage and examination of
thebreak-up patterns showed that they we~e consistent witheither
tree or ground impact damage.
-
2.10
Structures/Site Survey Group Report: CASB 7
- 3 -
The initial evidence of fire was noted to be approximately50 m
after the aircraft struck trees at the top of theknoll which was
consistent with the rupturing of the leftfuel tank. There was no
evidence of an in-flight fireprior to the aircraft striking the
trees.
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8 Appendix 1
- 4 -
3.0 WRECKAGE SURVEY AND BREAK-UP SEQUENCE
3.1 During the ground searches carried out as part of theon-site
investigation, most pieces of aircraft wreckagewere located,
tagged, assigned an item number and staked.The majority of these
pieces were identified withassistance from the manufacturer and the
operator of theaircraft. In some cases, when a number of pieces
ofwreckage were found in close proximity to each other, theywere
grouped together under the same item and stake number.The position
of each stake was then surveyed by groundsurvey and incorporated
into a wreckage distribution plotshown in Figure 2. A Wreckage
Catalogue listing thewreckage items surveyed along with a brief
description iscontained in Appendix 'A'. A second ground search was
alsocarried out in May 1989 when the ground was clear of snow.A
number of wreckage pieces were found and tagged. Thelocations of
these items relative to the accident site werethen recorded using a
standard police grid search method.The Wreckage Catalogue in
Appendix 'B' identifies thelocation along with a brief description
all of the piecesof wreckage found during the second ground
search.
3.2 During the second search phase, numerous pieces of the
redlens from the rotating beacon were found just beyond thefirst
tree strike, 126 m off the end of Runway 29. Thisbeacon is normally
mounted on the belly, in the centre ofthe fuselage, just aft of the
main landing gear inboarddoors. Figures 3 and 4 show the location
of the rotatingbeacon on the belly of the fuselage of another F28 t
C-FONG.Figure 5 shows the numerous pieces of the broken red
lensrecovered from the vicinity of the first tree strikes. Allother
pieces of wreckage found during the second searchwere located
within either the upper or lower part of thewreckage trail.
3.3 As the aircraft began striking a substantial number oftrees
near the top of the knoll, the aircraft started toreceive major
structural damage. The wreckage distributionplot (Figure 2) shows
to scale the location of all the mainpieces of wreckage
recovered.
3.4 Among the first items recovered near the top of the
knollwere the left and right outboard main landing gear (MLG)doors,
both essentially intact, and various pieces of bothinboard MLG
doors, inclUding the gear access panels. Theinboard MLG doors are
normally stowed when the gear iseither fully up or down. When the
gear is selected up aftertake-off, the inboard gear doors will open
down and in,hinged to the fuselage at the inboard end of the
doors.They will remain open while the gear is in transit. Due tothe
location of these doors near the beginning of the
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Structures/Site Survey GrOllp Report: CASB 9
- 5 -
wreckage trail, it is considered that they were open whenthe
aircraft entered the trees. The nature of the impactdamage to the
MLG doors was consistent with them havingbeen opened normally, as
opposed to being forced open dueto tree strikes, etc.
3.5 A review of the wreckage distribution shows that as
theaircraft proceeded through the trees, it shed most of itsleft
wing in the upper half of the wreckage trail, due toimpact damage
with trees. Near the top of the knoll, on theleft side near the
start of the wreckage trail, the leftwing tip navigation light
holder and a small piece of thered lens were found. Only the stub
section of the left winginboard from lift dumper (spoiler) #2,
remained attached tothe fuselage structure after the aircraft came
to a stop.The lift dumpers are numbered 1 to 5 on each wing from
theinboard end outward.
"3.6 Sections of all the major control surfaces were
accountedfor at the wreckage site between the top of the knoll
andwhere the aircraft finally came to a stop. Found along
thewreckage trail were sections of the left elevator, the
leftinboard and outboard flaps and sections of the flap leadingedge
vanes, the flap shroud doors, the left aileron andtrim tab, and
lift dumpers 3, 4, and 5 from the left wing.The remaining control
surfaces, including the majority ofthe right wing were found still
attached to the fuselagestructure, or in close proximity to the
main wreckage.Figure 6 shows an aerial photograph of the main
wreckagetrail with overlays depicting the outline of the tree
cutswath (overlay 1), an outline of the tree fire damage(overlay
2), location of wreckage items identified ascoming from the left
wing or left elevator (overlay 3),location of wreckage items
identified as coming from themain and nose landing gear doors
(overlay 4).
3.7 The main wreckage consisted of three major pieces. Therewere
two major breaks in the fuselage, one just aft of themain passenger
door, and the second through the fuselageat approximately seat row
12. The first major piece ofwreckage consisted of the tail section.
which was facingforward on the right side and approximately in line
withthe lower half of the wreckage trail. The vertical fin andboth
mounted engines were essentially intact. The completespeed brake
assembly (doors, frame, support structure) hadseparated from the
tail of the aircraft and was found in areversed position just
behind the tail section. The righthorizontal stabilizer and
elevator were intact. The leftelevator had separated from the
horizontal stabilizer andthe tip of the stabilizer had been torn
away. The mainsection of fuselage between the two major breaks was
turnedapproximately 130 degrees to the left with respect to the
-
10 Appendix 1
- 6 -
tail section. The right wing had remained attached to
thefuselage structure until it came to rest, and becamepartially
separated during the post-impact ground fire. Thecockpit section
forward of the break had rotated a further90 degrees to the left
with respect to the fuselage, suchthat the main wreckage formed an
approximate 'u-shape'.
3.8 Reconstruction and examination of the wreckage are
detailedin Appendix 'C'.
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Structures/Site Survey Group Report: CASB 11--------
- 7 -
4.0 AIRCRAFT PATH
4.1 The aircraft flight path was reconstructed based upon
thephysical evidence of the clipped tree tops and the locationof
wreckage. A total of eighteen tree tops were clippedstarting at 126
rn from the end of runway 29. Pieces of thered lens from the
rotating beacon were found adjacent tothe first tree. The position
and elevation of the eighteenclipped trees were determined during
the ground survey andrecorded in UTM co-ordinates and heights ASL.
The treepositions were then plotted on a Dryden Site Plan (Figure7)
and the heading was determined to be 290 degreesmagnetic based on
the fact that the aircraft had to contacteach tree. The aircraft
maintained this heading or groundtrack for 600 m until it came into
contact with asubstantial number of trees at the top of a small
knoll. Aprofile (Figure 8) of the flight path showed that
theelevation of the eighteen tree tops remained relativelyconstant
at 413 m (+- 1.5 mi.
4.2 The attitude of the aircraft as it passed through
theeighteen trees prior to the major tree strike wasreconstructed
using computer modeling to scale of theaircraft and the cut trees.
Appendix 'D' depicts theaircraft attitude at the various locations
along theflight path. The flight path was estimated based on
thelocation of the first pieces of wreckage found (rotatingbeacon
red lens) and the possible positions of the aircraftrequired to
strike all eighteen trees. The assumption wasmade that the aircraft
was not yawed, that is, its headingand ground track remained
essentially constant. Theaccuracy of the aircraft attitude varies
with the number oftrees cut at anyone time and the attitudes
depicted areconsidered to be the best possible fit.
4.3 The cut tree canopy starting at the top of the knoll
wasdocumented by aerial photography in conjunction with
thedeployment of numerous target blankets. The targetblankets were
surveyed and tied into the original UTMco-ordinate system.
photogrammetric analysis of the aerialphotographs determined the
position of each of theindividual cut trees in terms of UTM
co-ordinates and theirheight ASL. A scale model (1:72) of the cut
trees, overthe first 45 m through the tree canopy, was built
basedupon this survey information, to determine the
aircraftattitude at this point. A model aircraft (1:72) of
anF-28-3000 was obtained for this purpose. A model 1000 wasnot
available but the only difference between the two isthat the 3000
model has a 1.5 m longer wing span; all otherdimensions are the
same. Flaps were scaled and glued ontothe model aircraft at the 25
degree position. thisposition had been determined from the
examination of the
-
12 Appendix 1
- 8 -
flap track screw jacks. Landing gear was scaled and addedto the
model in the full down position. It had beendetermined that the
gear was in transit at this time butthe exact location had not been
determined.
4.4 The aircraft was then fitted to the cut tree model
whichshowed that the aircraft was in a left bank (angle betweenthe
lateral axis of the aircraft and the horizontalestimated to be 7
degrees (+- 2 degrees) which increased to15 degrees over the next
45 m. This was consistent withthe pieces of left wing located in
this area. There was nodistinct path which would indicate that the
main landinggear was fully extended at this point. The aircraft
pitchangle (angle between the longitudinal axis of the
aircraftfuselage and the horizontal) was determined to be
nose-downapproximately 1-3 degrees. This appeared to
remainrelatively constant over the next 45 m. Figures 9 and 10show
the model depicting the aircraft as it entered thetree canopy at
the top of the knoll.
4.5 As the aircraft proceeded into the trees at the top of
theknoll it began to receive major structural damage,primarily to
the left wing. The width of the swath cutthrough the trees was
about 20 - 25 m, but began to narrowto about 12 m, which indicates
that the aircraft continuedto roll to the left and finally impacted
the groundpredominantly on the left side. The primary ground
impactwas at about 144 m from the top of the knoll. The
aircraftthen yawed to the left with the right wing dropping and
theaircraft sliding about 80 m to a stop against a stand
oftrees.
-
Structures/Site Survey Group Report: CASB 13
- 9 -
5.0 CRASHWORTHINESS
5.1 FIRE DAMAGE
The initial pieces of wreckage that exhibited fire damage,were
items number 11, outboard wing leading edge and number12, LH piece
outboard wing structure containing a hot-airanti-ice exhaust louvre
and part of the fuel tank (Appendix'A'). Both items were found in
close proximity to eachother on the left side of the wreckage trail
approximately50 m from the first major tree strikes near the top of
theknoll. Both items exhibited small areas of superficialcharring
and sooting and were adjacent to burnt trees. Theremaining pieces
of wreckage from this point forward untilthe main wreckage all
exhibited some form of burn damagesuch as charring or sooting. It
appears that as the leftwing started to break apart fuel was lost
and was ignitedalmost immediately. The ignition point of the fuel
was notdetermined but may have been the result of electricalarcing
as the ~ires in the wing were torn out or by fuelvapours being
ignited by the engines. The ensuing firetraveled or followed the
aircraft path until the aircraftfinally came to rest. The post
crash fire was confined tothe trees down and adjacent to the
wreckage trail withmany of the trees exhibiting superficial
charring. Figure11 is an infrared aerial photograph showing the
wreckagetrail looking back towards the airport. The use ofinfrared
photography clearly displays the fire damage tothe trees as
depicted by the outline of darker colouredtrees.
The fuselage from the interior of the cockpit back to therear
pressure bulkhead was gutted by post crash fire.Although the
fuselage was gutted the fire appeared to havebeen more intense on
the left side than the right. This isbased upon the observation
that part of the right side ofthe fuselage (containing the overwing
exit and ninewindows) was still in place and the exterior paint
scheme,although charred, was still recognizable. The exteriornose
of the aircraft was relatively free of fire damage.The cockpit
floor was burnt away revealing the remains ofthe nose gear and
steel belts from the tires. The leftside of the instrument panel
was completely burnt outwhereas the centre (engine panel) and right
panel wererelatively intact although they were also burnt
andphysically damaged. The engines, tail section andempennage
exhibited superficial sooting and the interior ofthe tail section
was in good condition.
There was no evidence of an in-flight fire prior to theaircraft
striking the trees near the top of the knoll.
-
14 Appendix 1
F28 ENGINEERS GUIDE
56 (0 (ll ~ 1 )
II: ",
glI
o ,
~I ~I ,I To :1300 (lO t 1 ") o ,o ,I
o '
CO~ I:. -~--
I ,-lft RR~~O.O (16" 64)
13516 (11' ~ 2")
Fn... l001
FIG. I GENERAL ARRANGEMENT
-
FigIn 2
., I-"
-... - --',> -. "- -" ' , I, ",.......~., , --" " - -0,'
..... ~ ,
~
\-- I-I
i
'"t
r"eckage Dlatribu 'I liOn PIoII I
I I I,
1
- +- +ree Cut Outine
- --
wreckage TnlB
_ _ ;--~__ I............-"''1.. -1.
-
16 App""dix 1
Figure 3 - View of Fokker F28, C-FONG, showing the location of
theanti-collision light mounted on the fuselage belly (arrow).
Figure 4 - As In Figure 3, close-up view.
-
Strllctun'S/Site Survey Group Report: CASB 17
,
Figure 5 - Photo of all the pieces of the red lens from the
anti-collisionlight recovered from the vicinity of the first
clipped trees offthe end of Runway 29.
-
Ovellay 1 Tree CuI Swaltl
Overlay 2 Tree Fre Damage
Figure 6 Overlay 3: Left Wng and Left Elevator
Ovellav 4: MaIn and Nose La"d~ Gear Doors
-
TREE STRIKES.Figure 7
-
25m
REO lENS
---~-RNY'
..' .'
250m Aircraft Flight Path Profile
li'ee Strikes:
-
ill....o
NN
-
S/"'C/II"'5/S;/e SlIn'ey Grollp Repor/: CASB 23
Figure 11
Tree Fire Damage
-
Structures/Site Survey Group Report: CASB 25--------------
ITEM #
WRECKAGE CATALOGUE
DESCRIPTION
APPENDIX 'A'
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
A) RH inboard main landing gear(MLG) door.
s) small piece red lens cover fromleft Nav light amoung freshly
brokenspruce branches.
C) ADF Sense antenna.
A) RH outbord (MLG) door PIN Al1440-420,SIN CH 52.
A) Piece of LH wing leading edgePIN A143124401.
B) Left wing tip navigation lightholder.
A) Piece of LH wing tip structure withstatic discharge wick.
B) Piece of leading edge duct foranti-ice.
A) LH wing tip piece (trailing).
A) Extendable light (flare or taxilight) .
B) Wing ribs/stringers.
A) LH inboard gear access door (red oninside) 2 pin latches in
l'out"position
A) LH outboard MLG door Al1440-423.B) Piece of wing skin.
A) LH wing skin.
A) LH outboard wing structure withaileron fitting. Number 75F
stenciledon panel. Top panel exhibits blackstrip with "Ne pas
Marcher'! writtenon it. Access panel numbered "1" forfuel quantity
probe.
A) LH outboard wing structure.
A) LH outboard wing structure number 7SEcontains outboard
aileron hingeand flux valve.
-
26 Appendix 1
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
- A2 -
A) Piece wing leading edge A12430-001.
A) Mid section of LH aileron and ailerotab.
8) Vent float valve.
A) Stringers.B) Piece wing skin.C} Piece of radome.
A) VHF corom. antenna.
A} RH inboard MLG access door.B) Piece of radome
A) Section of LH inboard MLG door.
A) Top centre piece of nose aboveradome.
A) LH outboard end of aileron (number83W)
A) Section of LH inboard MLG door.B) LH wing fence.
A) Piece of wing fence.B) Stringers.
A) Piece of wing skin - fuel cell.
A) Middle section of LH outboard flapvane.
A) Piece of wing leading edge with heatduct.
S) Piece of radome.
A) Section of LH wing skin with accesspanel numbered 5. Fuel
quantityprobe.
A} Piece of wing skin with inboard endrib
-
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
~uctures/SiteSurvey Group Report: CASB 27
- A3 -
A) outboard flap with flap vane.S) Piece of lower wing skin.C)
Section of RH inboard MLG door
A) Inner aft shroud door of LH flap.S) Piece of wing skin.
A) Landing light.S) Flap track fairing.
A) Inner forward shroud door of RH flapB) Pieces of wing
skin.
A) Pieces of wing skin, fuel cell area.
A) Flap fairing.S) Wing panel, A-frame support.
A) Piece of wing skin.B) Oil service door.
A) Section of RH MLG doorF/N A11320-4LP, SIN 5H51.
B) Drive cap.e) Air valve temperature sensor.D) Piece wing skin
fuel cap number 4.II Bellcrank W.S. 8056.
A) Piece of trailing edge of wingnumber 528.
BI Landing light.
A) Flap shroud panel - 2 pieces outerO/B aft L.H.
B) Small piece of LH nosegear door, rednumber 28.
A) LH outboard flap track with trailingedge wing structure and
inboardsection of aileron and trim tab.
B) Trailing edge upper wing fairing flapwith abrasive strip and
shroud doordamper.
A) Piece fuselage skin with greeninsulation.
B) Piece wing skin.
A) LH inboard flap track canoe.B) Piece of radame.
A) LH inboard flap track with section ofwing structure
attached.
-
44
45
28 Appendix 1
- A4 -
A) Mid section of LH inboard flap vane.S} Piece of flap
fairing.C) Piece of engine nacelle.D) LH lift dumper #4 (counting
from
inboard out).E) Leading edge of horizontal stabilizer
A03507-40l, SIN 066.
A) Piece of wing skin number 52E, SOC,45A.
B) Piece of leading edge of LHstabilizer PIN A03507-40l, SIN
066.
C) Support flap - A-frame.
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Al Inner and outer forward shroud doorsfrom LH outboard
flap.
A) Piece of LH elevator PIN A04-00l-4l5,SIN 064.
B) Piece of engine cowling.
A) LH Wing structure with #5 lift dumperattached.
B) Flap rod torque tube.C} Fuel quantity transmitter.
A) Piece of flap.S) MaiJ wheel well structure.
A) Transmitter and pressure switch,located in wheel well.
A) Piece of tail cone.
A) Engine cowling and lock.
A) Leading edge of wing root.
A) Piece of fuselage skin with antennamount.
A) Lower fuselage skin PIN A128 30-401.
A) Engine fuel drain.
A) Piece of wing skin.
A) Shroud door bellcrank.
A) Skin with number 9iL.
A) Wing fillet skin-lift dumper line.
-
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
Structures/Site Survey Group Report: CASe 29
- A5 -
A} LH inboard flap with flap vane (midsection of vane
missing).
A) ADF loop antenna.
A) Bell
A} Seat frame.
A) Static inverter P/N 601698-2.
A) Piece of cabin floor.
A) Piece of engine support beamcarry-through P/N 13103003-2.
A) Piece of engine cowl.
A) LH inboard wing structure with liftdumper 43 attached.
A) Main wreckage.
-
FORKER F-2B, c-rONF2ND GROUND SEARCHWRECKAGE SURVEY
Structures/Site Suruey Group Report: CASE 31
APPENDIX 'B'
In May 1989, after the snow had melted from the ground, a
groundsearch was carried out with the assistance of an opp Search
andRescue Team and three members of the CASB Investigation
Team.
A datum line was established from the end of runway 29 through
thecentre of the accident site to the edge of the beacon road, on
aheading of 290 (see survey drawing).
Two search paths were laid out, one north of the datum (North
Team)and one south of the datum (South Team). The first search was
fromthe beacon road eastward to the airport fence, with the
returnsearch westward back to the beacon road. Each search path
wasapproximately 15 metres wide, with the total search width about
60metres wide.
Item locations were identified by distance measured along
datumline from point 0,0 at the edge of the beacon road, and
distancenorth or south of datum line. Items 200-223 located north
of datum,items 300-322 located south of datum. All measurements in
metrestranslated from the standard opp grid search method of
Tally's andPaces, where;
63 paces = 1 tally10 tallys = 1 kilometre(average pace estimated
to be 1.3 metres)
-
32 Appendix ]
- B2 -
ITEM ~ IDENTIF!CATION LOCATIOl
200 Skid control valve, ASs'y # 9543466 118, 9 (
201 Skid control valve, Unit ~ 9542718 134, 14
202 structure w/door lock bar 140, 13
203 wing structure 166, 7
204 Skid control valve (see item 200) 169, 12
205 Right liB skid control gen. drive 169, 9
206 Piece of door hinge 177 , 9
207 Small piece of casting 177, 4
208 Small AC induction motor 192, 9
209 Torque tube 211, 12
210 Small piece of structure 216, 13
211 Pressure transmitter PIN 3567645-3701 220, 12
212 Hydraulic valve 248, 5
213 Small bracket 270, 1
214 Lift dumper hydraulic accumulator 282, 9
215 Low inertia motor 324, 9
216 Fuel guage transmitter PIN 391067-06098 334, 4
211 Piece of trailing edge aileron (6"x6") 346, 3
Group of tree tops knocked off 282, 0218 Pieces of red lens
(anti-collision 772, 5
light, lower) 785, 5
219 Pieces of redlight, lower)
------------------RETURN
lens (anti-collision 841, 9865. 0
SWEEP---------------------------
220
221
222
223
AC motor
Access panel 9SA
Access panel frame 950
piece of wing skin
260, 20
231, 17
213. 21
165. 21
-
Structures/Site Survey Group Report: CASB 33- ----_ ....~--
- B3 -
ITEM # IDENTIFICATION LOCATION
300 Piece of wing panel (burned) 143, 3 (SOUTH)
301 Piece of wing structure 143, 5
302 Service door 21A (fwd of nose gear bay) 155, 14
303 AC motor & landing light G/B see #220 158, 6
304 weather radar unit P/N 2067568-0501 176, 7
305 Section of LH nose gear door 200, 2
306 Tube 222, 0
307 Small gearbox 229, 1
308 Electrical conector 235, 6
309 Landing light pot 242, 3
310 Fuel guage transmitter 391057-06097 283, 7
311 small bushing 298, 9
312 Fuel tank supply fitting 306, 0
313 Pieces of landing light glass 458, 6
314 Piece of ADF antenna 486, 0
315 Pieces of red lens (anti-collision 686, 6light, lower)
316 Pieces of red lens (anti-collision 780, 0light, lower)
317 Pieces of red lens (anti-collision 792, 0light, lower)
-------------------RETURN SWEEP--------------------------
318 Piece of fuel tank w/cap 402, 21
319 Piece of engine structure 272, 26
320 Tube fitting 216, 14
321 Servo motor 185, 18
322 Servo motor 172, 0
323 Aircraft manual 109, 20
-
WRECKAGE RETRIEVAL AND
LAYOUT RECONSTRUCTION
A. RETRIEVAL
Structures/Sill' Survey Group Report: CASB 35
APPENDIX 'c'
upon completion of the site survey, all of the wreckagealong the
wreckage trail was retrieved and slung out of thesite by helicopter
to a secure area at Dryden airport,where it was loaded onto
enclosed trailers, sealed andshipped by rail to the CASB
Engineering Lab in Ottawa. Theremaining pieces of the main wreckage
required somesectioning to allow removal from the site by truck.
Themain fuselage was separated by a longitudinal cut throughthe
middle section of the floor. The right stabilizer andelevator were
separated from the vertical fin, as was thereamaining section of
the left stabilizer. Both engines hadalready been removed from the
aircraft by the powerplantsGroup and removed from the site.
The nose section of the aircraft, both halves of thefuselage,
the right wing, the tail section and sectionedpieces of the
stabilizer were removed from the site bytruck and shipped to ottawa
by rail.
B. LAYOUT RECONSTRUCTION
FUSELAGE
All of the wreckage was sorted and a partial reconstructionof
the major pieces was carried out. In this manner, thebreak-up
patterns and fire damage could be examined, andall major components
of the fuselage and wings could beidentified. The tail section was
essentially intact, andalthough the cockpit area was gutted due to
post-impactfire, it was roughly in one main piece. A general photo
ofthe burned out cabin area of the fuselage is shown inF'igure
C-l.
LEFT WING
The wreckage of the left wing is shown laid out in FigureC-2.
The middle and outboard left flap tracks wererecovered from the
wreckage trail, but the flap screw jackfor the middle track was not
recovered. The mounting pointswhere the middle screw jack was
attached to the track wereexamined. There was evidence of severe
impact damage to thetrack adjacent to the rear mounting point and
the mountingbracket was found to have failed due to overload.
Thetranslating nut had broken in two due to overload and thefront
mounting point was deformed due to bending. Thesefailures allowed
the screw jack to separate from the track.The middle flap track
(survey item ij43) was found near the
-
36 Appendix 1
- C2 -
bottom of the wreckage trail adjacent to a largeoutcropping of
rocks. It is considered that the screw jacklikely separated from
the track due to impact with theground at this point, and was
projected forward, becomingburied under the snow and debris near
the main wreckage.During the retrieval of the main wreckage, this
area wascleared away to the edge of the wreckage zone and the
screwjack may have been trapped in the debris at this time.
RIGHT WING
The right wing is shown laid out in Figure C-3. The rightwing
was found essentially in its proper orientation in thefield on the
right side of the aircraft where it had cometo rest. Much of the
destruction to the right wing occurreddue to the post-crash ground
fire. All the major controlsurfaces of the right wing were
identif~ed.
PASSENGER/EMERGENCY AND CARGO DOORS
There is one main passenger door, located on the forwardleft
side of the aircraft, and a service/emergency door onthe forward
right side (Refer to Figures C-4 and C-S). Thepassenger door is
hinged at the bottom and is kept closedby a latching mechanism
which has two hook latches in thedoor lintel engaging into the
latch fittings of the door.The door was found in place, still
attached to thefuselage. Both hook latches had separated from the
doorlintel due to fire damage, but they were recovered andfound in
the locked position. The service/emergency door isa plug-type door
which is kept in the closed position byfour wedge -shaped latch
pins engaging into holes recessedinto the door aperture. The door
was found free of thefuselage, but was recovered in the immediate
vicinity ofthe main wreckage. The four latch pins were in the
out(locked) position. Both of these doors were damaged due toimpact
and fire.
There are two cargo dotrs, both on the right side, one onthe
lower forward fuselage and one on the lower aftfuselage (Refer to
Figures C-6 and C-7), Both cargo doorsare hinged at the bottom to
the main structure and bothwere found still attached by their
hinges. The doors arenormally held in the closed position by two
hook latchesengaging onto latch fittings in the door lintel. For
theforward cargo door both latch hooks were still on the doorin the
locked position, although the door lintel had beendestroyed by the
fire. The forward half of the rear cargodoor was consumed by fire
as was the door lintel. One latchhook was still attached to the
door and was found in thelocked position, The other latch hook had
separated, butwas also found in the locked position.
-
Struclures/Sile Survey Group Reporl: CASB
37------------------
- C3 -
There is one over-wing emergency exit window on each sideof the
aircraft at seat row 8. Only two small pieces ofexit window were
recovered (Figure C-8), both pieces foundin the main wreckage zone.
Although not determinedpositively, both pieces were likely from the
same exitwindow on the right side of the aircraft. The remainder
ofthe right exit window, as well as the left exit window,were most
probably consumed by the post-impact ground fire.
LANDING GEAR DOORS
Most pieces of the nose gear doors, and the left and rightmain
gear doors were identified. Figures C-9, C-IO and C-l1show the
doors laid out during reconstruction.
-
38 Appelldix 1
Figures C-1, C2
Fuselage view from rear showing btJrnt out cabin area.
Wreckage of left wing laid out during reconstruction
-
Structures/Site Survey Group Report: CASB 39
Figure C-3
Wreckage of right wing laid out during reconstruction
-
40 Al'pclldix 1
Main Passenger Door
Figure C4
-
Sln/elllres/Site SI/m{~y Group Report: CASB 41
FigUfe C-5
. \ .. ..t .... ' - .........-._.
Servlce/Emergencv Door
-
42 Appel/dix 1
Figures C-6, C-7
Right Front Cargo Door
/'.
Right Rear Cargo Door
, '
-
Stl"llcillres/Sile SlIrvelf Grollp Report: CAS8 43
Figures C-8, C-g
Exit Window
Nose Gear Doors and Service Doors 21A, 23A, 24A
-
44 AppcIILiix J
Figure C-10, C-11
Left Main Gear Door
Right Main Gear Door
-
prepared by:
_____________ _ ~tructure5/Site Survey GnJul'- Rcp()r~C::AS~
45
Appendix 0
Occurrence No. 825-89-ca048
FLIGHT PATH RECONSTRUCTION REPORT
LP 97/89
Accident: Fokker F-28-1000Reg. # C-FONF10 March 1989 ~
~~!06/3f ~~D(.gy/M.R. poole, P.Eng.Superintendent, Computer
Systems EngineeringEngineering Branch
'-y~mJdianAviation Safety Board
1?~e11'8LComputer Scientist/AnalystEngineering BranchCanadian
Aviation Safety Board
~~~:AL. Landriault,Systems Manager/TechnologistEngineering
BranchCanadian Aviation Safety Board
-
46 Appendix 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 On Friday, March 10, 1989, a Fokker F28 IC-FONF)crashed in a
wooded area shortly after take-off.
1*2 In support of the overall investigation, a
three-di-mensional flight reconstruction was requested by
theEngineering Branch technical coordinator for the Dry-den
Accident. The flight reconstruction associatedwith this paper is
depicted on standard VHS videotape (reference LP097/89). The video
tape depicts afew sample views chosen to demonstrate the
recon-struction. It should be realized that any desiredview
(inclUding witness location views) can easily begenerated.
1.3 Normally, flight reconstructions of this nature arebased
largely on flight recorder information. As noflight recorder data
was available, the -reconstruc-tion was based on a review of the
witness statements,the physical evidence of the trees cut by the
air-craft on its trajectory, and past flight recorderdata for this
particular aircraft (reference LP040/97- Flight Recorders Group
Report).
1.4 The runway and surrounding geographical informationwere
modeled in UTM grid coordinates from maps andphotographs of Dryden
Municipal Airport. Tree datawas input as supplied by the Site
Survey Group forthe Dryden accident. Figure 1 shows an overall
viewof the airport and trees.
1.5 The 1-28 aircraft was modeled from engineering draw-ings
provided by Fokker.
1.6 It is important to note that this reconstruction de-picts an
approximation of the aircraft's flight pathand behavior from the
limited data available. Theresults are qualitative~nd should not be
used forquantitative analysis. Any conclusions based on
thisreconstruction should be reviewed in light of themanner in
which the reconstruction was produced.
-
2.0
2.1. 0
2.1.1
Structures/Site Survey Group Report: CASB 47----
- 2 -
INVESTIGATION
Assumptions for the Reconstruction
In order to reconstruct the estimated flight path,the following
basic assumptions were made:
1 The aircraft does not begin to rotate until3400 feet of
distance (taxi-way alpha) based onwitness statements.
2 The aircraft reaches Vref (126 knots indicatedair speed as
determined by the OperationsGroup) at 3400 feet of consumed runway
(con-stant acceleration) and continues at Veef forthe remainder of
the flight.
3 The first rotation is at a 'typical' pitch ratebased on
previous flight data from C-FONF. Thepitch attitude is allowed to
reach 13 degrees.Thirteen degrees represents the maximum
pitchattitude the aircraft may have reached(reference Performance
Group Report).
4 At 13 degrees of pitch attitude the aircraft isrotated back
down to an arbitrary attitude offive degrees. This was done so that
the air-craft had two noticeable rotations as per wit-ness
statements.
5 Thetimetent
aircraft is then rotated for the secondto 11 degrees of pitch
attitude (consis-
with Performance Group scenarios).
6 The aircraft reaches an altitude of six feetduring the first
rotation and ten feet duringthe second rotation. Both altitudes are
com-pletely arbitrary.
7 The aircraft does not yaw or drift throughoutthe flight.
8 All tree cuts represent the point at which theaircraft
contacted the tree. In other words,the trees did not bend or break
off at a pointlower than the point of contact.
9 The breakup sequence is not considered in thefinal group of
trees.
10 The trees do not affect the flightaircraft due to the
relative masscraft and that of the trees.
path of theof the ai r-
-
48 Appendix 1-- -- - ----------------------- ---
- 3 -
11 The flaps were set at 25 degrees for tilepurpose of fitting
the aircraft through thetrees. (refer to the Systems Group
Report).
12 The landing gear was assumed to be in the downposition (refer
to Structures Group Report).
-
2.2.0
2.2.1
y~uClures/SileSurvey Group-!cl'~rl~A~B ~
- 4 -
Take-off Roll
The constant acceleration required to accelerate theaircraft to
vref at 3400 feet was determined as fol-lows:
vref - at 2d - 0.5 atHence, 212.5 ~t/s = at
0.5 at = 3400 ft
0.5 (2l2.5)tt 32.0 s
3400 it
2.2.2
2.3.0
2.3.1
2.3.2
a 212.5 ft/s 132.0 sa 6.64 f t/s/s (.21 g)
Take-off fifteen (LP040/89) had an average accelera-tion of
approximately .25 g. Higher take-off weightand runway slush would
contribute to the lower ac-celeration level calculated above.
Tree~cut Path and Attitude Determination
A linear regression was initially fit through the x-ytree
location data. The aircraft was then placedalong this regression
path at discrete locations(Figure 2). At each discrete location, a
fit ofroll, pitch, and altitude were attempted. In somecases, it
was required to move the aircraft slightlyoff the regression to
obtain a good fit. A smoothspline was then fit through the refined
locations, aswell as the take-off roll. This spline was then usedas
the flight path. This spline produced a smoothcurve from the time
the aircraft was assumed airborneduring the second rotation to the
heading determinedfrom the regression through the trees.
In general, roll attitudes were more apparent thanpitch
attitudes due to the fact that pitch is in thesame direction as the
direction of flight. It wasdiscovered that a number of different
fits were pos-sible, especially during the first tree
locationswhere there were very few trees. In general, thesolutions
which yielded the least attitude deviationsfrom level flight were
chosen to estimate the flightpath.
-
- 5 -
2.3.3 The attitudes and altitude (with respect to the meanrunway
elevation) for each of the eight fit locationswere determined as
follows (figures 3 through 101:
Location Time Roll Pitch Altitude(sec) (degrees) (degrees)
(feet)
l(see note) 47.2 6.4 5.5 -1. 32 48.6 -1.1 5.5 2.03 50.0 6.0 5.5
-2.34 53.2 6.4 3.1 -5.55 56.2 -10.1 -1.0 -10.86 56.3 -10.3 -1. 3
-10.57 56.4 -10.5 -1. 3 -11.18 56.5 -13.9 -3.6 -10.5
Note: For the first location, it was reported thatthe
anti-collision light on the belly of the aircraftwas struck off by
one of the two trees. Due to thegeometry of the aircraft, the
aircraft would have tohave been pitched up a least 5.5 degrees such
thatthe nose gear would clear the top of the clippedtree. If the
aircraft were level, for instance, thenose gear would have clipped
the tree and the treewould have then been too short to hit the
anti-col-lision light.
-
2.4.0
2.4.1
2.4.2
2.4.3
2.4.4
Struclures/Site Survey Group Report: CASB 51
- 6 -
Data Generation Summary
A graphical representation of the ground velocity,heading, roll,
pitch and altitude data used in thereconstruction is shown in
Figure 11.
Once the reconstruction is generated, the 'camera'positions,
perspectives and orientations the computersystem can generate are
infinite. Typical orienta-tions are chase plane views, cockpit
views and fixedviews in space. Since the witness locations
wereplotted in the reconstruction, it was possible toplace the
observer at a witness location to view thesequence. A 'knob box'
input device allowed the userto rotate the observer's head from
left to right orup and down. This view revealed the relative sizeof
the aircraft, given the distances involved. Ingeneral, views
generated from the witness locationsdemonstrated that the aircraft
would have been dif-ficult to see due to the distances involved,
even inthe best of environmental conditions.
The tree-fit data where available was considered morereliable
than witness information. The physics andgeometry of the
circumstances of the Dryden accidentdo not allow for a great deal
of flexibility in thereconstruction. For example, the aircraft
could nothave reached much altitude when clearing the end ofthe
runway in order to hit the first trees and con-tinue on a fairly
flat altitude. Similarly, roll andpitch attitude rates are
generally limited by themass and consequent momentum of the
aircraft.
The positive pitch attitudes determined through theinitial trees
correlate with the relatively flat al-titude history. A positive
pitch attitude wouldlikely have been required to maintain the
altitudedisplayed through the trees.
-
3.0
3.1
3.2
52 Appendix 1
- 7 -
EVALUATION
The flight reconstruction represents an approximatedepiction of
the aircraft's flight path and attitudesduring the accident
sequence. The reconstruction isbased on the physical evidence of
the tree strikes,witness information and past empirical flight
re-corder data.
For the purposes of this flight reconstruction, wit-ness
information was considered very subjective andqualitative. The
physical evidence of the treestrikes was considered to have
relatively good re-liability. The data provided many possible
flightattitudes. In general, attitudes were chosen whichdeviated
the least from level flight. The recon-struction should therefore
be viewed with caution.Any conclusions drawn based on the flight
recon-struction should be made with full cognizance of itsmethod of
production, assumptions and approximations.
-
Figure 1
dataairport and treeOverall vIew af the
7
';
-
\
Tree Grouo No. SIrre ;
-~g:6 ~~eAI t i tude;Roll; -10 1 dPi leh; -1.0 d
Tree '0 No 6ITlrre: -fg. ;~eAI t; tude;Roll: -10.3 dPi teh: -1.
3 d
Tree Grou No 7rrre :
-~~:~ '"AI t i tude: ftRoll: -10.5
4:~Pi teh: -1.3 d.T, '0' No.lrre : _~g:~ ~~eAl t i tude:Roll:
-13.9 dPi tch: -3.6 d
"- I~
I
~I 1 I& r~.~ secAltitude: -5.5 ftRoll: 6.4 degPitch: 3.1
deg
Tre r N
~ "Tre rou No.1
\\
Figure 2
Tree cut poth and ottitude determinotion locotions.
Note: All ottitudes ore meosured with respect to the meanrunwoy
elevotion ot Dryden Municipal Airport whichis 1353 feet above sea
level.
- denotes minimum pitch ongle ot 47.2 seconds.
-
Figure 3 - Fit at location 1.
-
Fi9u~e 4 - Fit at location 2.
-
Figure 5 - Fit at location 3.
-
Figure 6 - Fit at location 4.
-
Fi9u~e 7 - Fit at location S.
-
riqure 8 - Fit at location 6.
-
Figuce 9 - Fit at location 7.
-
riqu(e 10 - Pit at location 8.
-
-',
-62
-7460
Engineering Branch/CASB
50
Attitude and Altitudevs, Fligqt Time
4030
Flight Tlm~ (sec)20
Figure 77
10o
5!, ::1."\ ,
0,i >
"0 -0
5I ,
\ I '\.,0 "I J 1 \!
5
\0
1~
'rR
,\ \4
,( '\j \ ,Jk, A0
\t "R
'\'.
- based on previous f'ights and trt!e"-cut analysis
-1;; ,~
CFONF Estimated Velocity, Heading,
240
--... 200 "." ,~
-'!;60:?
{;>" c.Q 120 , ,
" Ii80 E0, '" 40 >Q
"Q0 ""'
-
Appendix 2
Fokker Aircraft B.V. AmsterdamFokker AerodynamicsReport No.
L-28-222Note on the Aircraft Characteristics as Affected byFrost,
Ice or Freezing Rain Deposits on Wings
December 16, 1969
-
Fokker Aerodynamics Report, L-28-222 67
N.V. KONINKLIJKE NEDERLANDSE VLlEGTUIGENFABRIEK FOKKERRbTAl.
HI!THE~LANDSAIRCRAFT FI\CTo"IES FOkKeft
SCHlPHOL..ZVlD THE NETHERLANDS
RAPPORT -+- REPORTAJlDI~I~
Pf",.lltHfl'"
DAN".An
Aorodynamics Department
Docember 16to, 1969
,,,,,,,.0.1 m.1~OlT N',
IlUlllll
-
68 Appendix 2
KQNJNlo\UJ/( NCDERLANDSE VlIEG rUI' ,EW ABRIEK FQKKER RAPPORT
NR. c
L-;'O-?2?
GenerulLYt it is 'Nell KL01ln t1:101'... tne Gont.,_
.l:'llo"'.hines," f.eiuire::h;r.t;;or. ?er;',r:.. :"'llc;e usei
d1.lril;'~ L,f CE'rtif_(,~t"l()', uf the!.llI'cr,""ft.DurinG 1...:w
t i:,ci':t.'r;ce
t:.:' ~r:"lj:.:E'i~e:' slip:::;trcJ,;:,;'O'~:, !-:,~'-ie::"
:10'\'p-'/er, tl~e
.r''' t ,,'c';' Ol~ ~1l8 s"r.:c l:2:;.;...lfr-o[
-
Fokker Aerodynamics Report, L-28-222 69----------
N.V KONI"-I(l,.lJKE NEDERlANDSE Vl,lE(;T1JGENF"A8RI/:'K
FOKK[R
ROYAL Nn~RLANDS AI~Cll:An ~A('"OR'f.S FOl(K[1l
RAPPORT Nfl. ' REPORT Nfl
L-2U F-.?8. Nind",unr.el testsshow that comparable jet aircraft
suffersimilar lift Gnd drag pena:ties due to the samijtype of
roughness.'Nnen the ~irc:raft is rot.tlted at Vp, t:-,e body
Cl.n!Jleof incidence does not normally exceed approxil7.ately8
1eir~e-;-Te
-
70 Appendix 2
q;Ah NV t
-
Fakker Aerodynamics Report, L-28-222 71
c:tr NV IT ~"CJOp,ts '~)":' ~
ConcluCJ"ion
RAPPORT IIR. RlPORT HR.
In the interest of fligr.t safety complte rer..QY
-
72 Appendix 2
C7"1f.. N v KONlNKUJKE N(OCRLANOSE VLIEGTU'GCNfAl.Jf/ff 1\
F01\KUl't\)'~ PQYAl NETHERlM,OS A'RCRAFT fACrOll,[S f01',~tJl
// \
//
HArpOR! NR. - REPORT HR.
LIF'I'
prop.aicraft J'all p.ngincs}fo power
'Y/
//
//
l:largin a
margin b
FIGURE 1
jet aircraft and prop.driven aircraft power off
lift required for) Ht off
LIFT Ys. A:\GLt: CF Il'CILSNCS
Take off configurationclean wing
AKGLE: OF I:lCI:021::::c.:
-
NV KONiNKUJKE NEDRlANDSE VLlEC>TlW".NFAE)Rlfl( FOl\l
-
---- .. I I~
-f) I :>.\'i~" I'"C'" I '"I ( I I ~
z i 2:< I k, N
~ ~ Io ,~ ~ !" mT Z, m
;.' g> ", T
~ ':: ~
.: ='; C';
~ ~F n'c' Z
;; ;:> 0. "T T
~
'"X~
~
~
'I ~'0 ~
'f ;;" .:..,., x
~
~
o
""~?'
\dr:J.g f''lua:to thn:."c;;1:'1 Br.g~n('5:J. t :0 p::o...
e:'
drag, clean wi:-.g
DR!,:; and T!i!:l:3T
dr~g, roug~~ess
on wing
tr.rust r~$ervein 2nd sc~ent
__~~T I thru"2-eng. II-eng.
take of fie li~ona oneine ~tV -speed
2 \
LIF'!'
clean 'King
FOKKS~ ;'28 Ern;'.:::! 05' "SJ,)'DPAPER" ROUGEXESS O~ 'rAi.::::;
OFYjcLI:.m
roughnui:riJ on
bound~"y of e::ectiveroll co~trol (tip stall)
F'IG:JRE 5
-I EJvei.''';CE t-:!-1 20
st:J.ll warr.ir.g!.ltick sl-:nker
~~f1'
-
Appendix 3
Fokker Aircraft B.V. AmsterdamReport No. VS-28-25Flight
Simulator Investigation into the Take-offPerformance Effects of
Slush on the Runway and Iceon the Wings of a Fokker 100
August 1989
-
Fokker Flight Simulator investigation Report, VS-28-25 77
..ca.REPORT
~. Fokker Aircraft B.V. Amsterdam
, e Nether landsissue date: August 1989 issue no: 2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------security
class Restricted : report no.
VS-28-25--------------------------------------:-------------------------------------~--
Flight simulator investigationinto the take-off
performanceeffects of slush on the runwayand ice on the wings of
aFekker 100.
den HertogJellemade Boervan Hengst
via EQFA
Mr.Mr.~r.
~r.
plant/department Schiphol/EDAA ; order no.
22192--------------------------------------1----------------------------------------controlled
copies :
:,,,,,,I title:,,,,,,,,
ED100EQFAEDVPEDAAELTSCASB
:----------------------------------------:
enclosures::,,,,,,,,,,
summary:
Simulations have been executed on the Fokker fixed base
engineering flightsimulator. in which the Fokker 100 was
modelled.Test conditions were selected to represent the take-off
performCL~ce of theF-28 Mkl0aO as during the accident on Dryden
Airport, Ontario, on March 10.1989.A comprehensive set of runway
slush and wing ice conditions has beeninvestigated.
IIssue 2: Test results for flap 25 is added,
prepared/department
B.J. Warrink/EDAA/SB 1)tJ
:checked/departmen~t. :original issue date, ,, ,:N. v.d.
Bovenkamp M/SB :June 1989
approved/department :approval others:
-
78 Appendix 3
REPOH1'~ Fokker Aircraft B. V. Amsterdam
g The Nether lands ' issue date: August 1989 issue no: 2---
-----------------------------------------------------------------------security
class Restricted : report no. VS-28-25
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGESPage iss.date i8s.nr Prepared Checked
Approved
1 August'B9 2 B.J. Warrink N. v. d. Bovenkamp J. van"Hengst ~2 2
'1>Q Y3 2
4 2
5 2
6 June '89 1
7 1
8 1
9 Augu.t'89 2
10-37 June '89 1
38-49 August'B9 2
50-51 June '89 1
52 Auguet'89 2
page 2 of 52 pages
All rights reserved. Reproduction or disclosure to third parties
of thisdocument or any part thereof il!l not permitted. except
'With the prior andexpress written permission of Fokker Aircraft
B.V.
10,"" 114602-8, ~ 9001
-
~R E PORT~~kker Aircraft~lne Netherlands
B.V. Amsterdam
ieaue date: August 1989 bsue no:
2-------------------------------------------------------------------------------security
claae Restricted : re~rt no.
V6-28-25-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Introductjon
In the week of June 5th-9th. 1989. a delegation of the
Canadianinve8tiga.tive authorities visited Fokker at Schiphol to
diecus6 theaccident of an F-28 Mkl000 near Dryden Airport on Maroh
10. The diBCU8eioDwith respect to performance and flight handling
was with:
Mr. D. Langdon CASBMr. G. Wagner Concordi~ University
(CALPA/Adviaor to Commissioner)Mr. M. Morgan NAKMr. D. Wickens
NAE
No calculation- Ot' sitnulation models were available of the F2S
Mkl000. Toinvestigate the effect of eluah on the :t"\.Ulway and ice
on the wings. use hastherefore been made of the Fokker 100
simula.tion model. The use of thi."model in stead of the F28 Mkl000
oan be justified with:
a take-off weight (87000 lba) wae seleoted which resulted in the
sametake-off speeds ae for a Mkl000 at the weight in the Dryden
accident(63500 lb.).a thrust setting was Selected whioh gave the
same thrust/weight ratioand thus the same take-off dietance and
climb performance.a e.g. position wae used (30% mac) that gives
tht!! same rotation pitchresponse as a MklOOO with the c.g. at 22%
mac.the simulation of ice and ground effect!! is much better in the
Fokker100 aero model than in the former F-2B Mk1000 (n.b. The
Fo'kkeI' 100 aeNmodel is certified by the FAA to phaBe 2
standard).the Fakker 100 angles-at-attack for stall warning and
stall are C10S8to thoee of the F28 MX.l000 (flap 18, clean wing):
F28 MklOOO 11.0 degand 13.5 deg and Fokk.er 100 13.0 deg and 15.5
deg respectively.
Due to differences in lift/drag ratio etc., the repreeentation
of F28MklOOO by the Fokker 100 is of course not perfect. but
considered closeenough for a qualitative assessment.
IOn request of the Canadian investigative authorities. the
take-offperformance for flap 25 ha.s been inveetigated by Fokker in
August 1989.The simulation results are presented in this report.
'They are intt:lnded tosupport the investigation into the cause of
the Dryden accident.
page 3 of 52 pages
All righte reeerved. Reproduction or diecloeure to third partiee
of thiedocument or any part thereof is not pemitted. except with
the prior andexpree~ written permission of Fokker Aircraft B.V.
-
80 Appendix 3
REPORT~ Fokker Aircraft B.V. Amsterdam
DThe Netherlands
' issue date: August 1989 issue no: 2---
-----------------------------------------------------------------------security
class Restricted report no. VS-2B-25
Simulatjon model
The aerodynamic model as used in the simulations is according
toreference 2.
Ice on the Ring is simulated as a change in lit-~ drag- and
pitchingmoment coefficient. The magnitude of it haa been determined
in thewindtunnel, in which one inch thick horn shaped ice on the
leading edge wassimulated. From tests with different ice shapes and
from literature it isknown that these effects are also valid for
rime ice or frozen slush in theleading edge region. Through
calculations in which static equilibriumconditions are determined
the effect of 1 inch ice (in ground- effect) onlift, flight path
angle and elevator deflection has been assessed. Seefigures 1, 2
and 3.In the simulation the effect of ice on the wing could be
linearly variedbetween 0 and 1.0 inch.
Slush on the MlDH"Y was modelled through a rolling friction
coefficient(upto mu =.15) in the ground roll model. This
coefficient depends on theEquivalent Water Depth and the ground
speed, according to reference 3.The slush thickness was varied
between 0 and 0.5 inch E.W.D. in thesimulation.
Simulatpr teata
Three aeries of simulator sessions on the fixed-base simulator
wereexecuted, two flown by ttlr. G. Wagner and the third flown by
mr. J. Hofstra(Fokker test pilot).1. June 7th. Preliminary
investigations into the effect of slush and ice.
Take-off. at ISA/SL, Flap 16.See table 1 for the conditions and
the take-off distances.
2. June 8th. Detail investigations thru 20 take-ofs at ZUrich,
1500 ft"elevation/O C, Flap 18.See table 2 and the figures t to
22.August 1. Detail investigations thru 12 take-ofis at Zurich,
1500 ftelevation/O C, Flap 25.See table 3 and the figures 23 to
34.
page 4 of 52 pages
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of thisdocument or any part thereof is not permitted, except with
the prior andexPress written permission of Fokker Aircraft B.V.
form 1\4602
-
Fokker Flight Simulator Investigation Report, VS-28-25
81---------~--- _.-~_---_. __._--
REPORT~ Fokker Aircraft B. V. Amsterdaro
~The Netherlands
' iesue date: August 1989 issue no: 2---
----------~------------------------------------------------------------security
clas8 Restricted : report no. V5-28-25
Parameters
The following parameters are presented in the plots:
Parameter Unit
ALFA dogCAS ktsDE dogHRADIO m
TETA dogXDIST m
Description
Angle of attackCalibrated airspeedElevator deflectionRadio
height; equals zero for stretchedundercarriage at zero pitch-angle.
At lift-offHRADIO: .7 m due to pitch anglePitch angleDistance along
runway. XDIST : 0 at start of t~~e-offroll.
Obserygtjons from the tests
I. The take-off distance without slushthrough weight and thrust
selection
FZB Mk1QQQ AFlj'roD m 1400
ft 4600m 1350ft 4430
O~ ice haa been approximated fairly(at 1500 ft field elevation/O
C):
Fokker 100 silllu'atiQn Flap1455 1847701340 254400
2. The increment in take-off distance (from standatil1 to 35 ft
altitude)agrees well between simulation aIld AFM (no ice on wing).
Flap 18 only.
Slush Depth F28 11k1000 AFM Fokker 100 simulationinch EWD ft
ft
0 0 0.15 350.2 520 440.25 850 850.5 1770 1490
3. The effect of ice on the wing i.e considerable (see figures
35.36 and37). Above a certain ice thickness the performance 10s5 is
80 large thatthe aircraft cannot climb out off ground-effect (3D m)
anymore.
4. Engine failure at V1 i6 catastrophic when combined with slush
on thertffiway and some ice on the wing leading edge.
o. The airfield elevation (1500 it versus sea-level) has
increased thesensitivity to ice on the wing. Compare figures 35 and
36.
page 5 of 52 pages
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of thisdocument or any part thereof is not permitted, except with
the prior andexpress written permi5sion of Fokker Aircraft B.V.
-
82 Appendix 3
REPORT~ Fokker Aircraft B.V. Amsterdam
~The Netherlands
. ' issue date: August 1989 issue no: 2---
-----------------------------------------------------------------------security
class Restricted : report no. VS-28-25
References
1. Fokker report L-2B-269. iSBue 5.Flight Simulator Data for the
Fokker F28 HkOl00 aircraft.E. Obert/Dept. CB-AP/April 1973.
2. Fokker report L-2B-338, issue 8.3.Aerodynamic data of the
Fokker 100.EDAA/SB/Oet. 1988.
3. Fokker F28 MklOOO Airplane Flight Manual Section
2.11.5"Take-off from slush covered runways".
page 6 ~f 52 pages
All righta reserved. Reproduction or disclosure to third parties
of thisdocument or any part thereof i8 not permitted. except with
the prior andexpress written permission of Fokker Aircraft B.V.
-
REPORT~ Fokker Au'craft B.V. Amsterdam
~The Netherlands
. issue date: August 1989 Issue no: 2---
-----------------------------------------------------------------------security
class Restricted report no.
VS-28-25-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 1
Take off distances of simulations on June 7thFokker 100, Flaps
18 deg, W - 87000 Ibs, CO =30%, EPR = 1.62, ISA/SL.V1 =124 kt, V2
=128 kt. (see page 2)Run Slush Ice Rotation TOR TOO (to 35 ft)
inch EWD m m
1 .5 0 Normal 1290 14802 0 0 970 11803 .5 0 Nosewheel lift 1280
14604 .5 0 1230 14505 0 .25 Normal 950 11806 0 .50 970 12607 0 .75
960 16408 0 1.00 980/2380 26909 .5 .75 1290 1920
10 .5 1.00 1330/4860 5300
page 7 of 52 page~
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of thisdocument. or any part thereof is not permitted, except w:ith
the prior andexpress written permission of Fokker Aircraft B.V.
-
84 Appendix 3------_.
REPORT~Fokker Aircraft B.V. Amsterdam
mI'I'he Netherlands
' ~S5ue date: August 1989 ~saue no: 2---
-----------------------------------------------------------------------security
clas8 Restricted report no. VS-28-25
Table 2
Take-off distances of simulatioDs on June 8thFokker 100, Flaps
18 deg. CG - 30%. KPR = 1.62, 1500 it/OAGV1 = 124 kt, V2 = 128 kt.
(aee page 2)
Run Figure Weight Slush Ice Remark TOR TOD (to 35')Ibs inch EWD
m m
1 4 87000 0 0 1265 14552 5 87000 ,25 0 1500 17153 6 87000 ,2 0
1395 15904 7 87000 ,5 0 1730 19105 8 87000 ,2 ,5 1430 17306 9 67000
,15 ,5 1380 17057 10 87000 ,15 ,6 1410 18708 11 87000 ,15 ,7 1575
20909 12 87000 ,15 ,75 1585 2255
10 13 87000 ,15 ,75 1545 228511 14 87000 ,15 ,75 Slow rotation
1555 185012 15 87000 ,15 ,8 1830 241013 16 89000' ,15 ,75 1665
241014 89000 ,15 ,815 17 89000 ,15 ,8 2260 449016 18 89000 ,15 ,825
1935 crash17 19 89000 ,15 ,8 2745 crash18 20 89000 ,15 A Engine
failure Vl 1680 crash19 21 89000 ,15 ,25 Engine failure Vl 1545
crash20 22 89000 ,15 ,1 Engine failure Vl 1540 crash
* to simulate weight increment due to anow and ioe on wing and
fuselage
page 8 of 52 pages
All rights reserved. Reproduction or discloaure to third parties
of thisdocument or any part thereof ie not permitted. except with
the prior andexpress written permission of Fokker Aircraft B.V.
10'''' 114f,02.JlS ~ 900"
-
Fokker Flight Simulator Investigation Report, VS-28-25 85--- --
- ------ -------- - --~-"-~ _._---~-"-
REPORT~ Fokker Aircraft B.V. Amsterdam
~The Netherlands
iasue date: August 1989 laeue no: 2---
-----------------------------------------------------------------------security
class Restricted ~ report no. VS-28-25
Table 3
Take-off distances of sjwllJatiOhS OD Augnst 1Fokker 100, Flaps
25 deg, CG - 30%. EPR ~ 1.62. 1500 ft/O CVl =120 kta. V2 = 128
kta.Run Figure Weight Slush Ice Remark TeR TeD
Ibs inch EWD m m
1 23 83900 0 0 1165 13402 24 83900 .15 .5 1300 15453 25 83900
.15 .6 1285 15804 26 83900 .15 .7 1290 16955 27 83900 .15 .75 1270
23606 26 63900 .15 .8 1250 32107 29 83900 .15 .9 No lift off 12708
30 85900~ .15 .5 1270 15809 31 85900 .15 .6 1285 1716
10 32 85900 .15 .7 1300 201511 33 85900 .15 .75 1300 CRASH12 34
85900 .15 .8 1300 CRASH
* to simulate weight increment due to snow and ice on wing and
fuselage
page 9 of 52 pages
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of thisdocument or any part thereof is not perroitted. except with
the prior andexpress written permission of Fokker Aircraft B.V.
-
86 Appendix 3~~~- - - --- -~---------------- ---
,[DORTS."_ A~"te'~u"
f\~' ,~,.;~'.;;
J
-
Fokker Flight Simulator Investigation Report, VS-28-25
87----------- --------- ------_.
P, roO'!'cl'.,p.- 8.v. ~~st",~~o",T"f ~PlN'IQ"0'.
JAK~-OFF wlTH leE
FOKKER 100
\If :;. 39500 kg
TAKE-OFF THRUST~LAP 18
ICE ON WING GROUND-ECCE:' I[:, NO NOv NO YeS, H 0 1M
I+ NO YES, H 0 CX YES NO0 YES YES, H 0 1M0 YES YES, H 0 0
170160150140130120110
i I .-""
~-tll ;r'i ro...:'!:i)
I . lfjJ1
. /-IS ~u r
\
~\
1
~.Jj1
I I)
1
0,
15, -;- -,__-,- __~.
"If----+-----+-lJ-+--H1 I1 I I I ' I
-2.5100
10,
'"w~
7.5(!)z~"'G ~r,CI' ';l.-.~ ll~r"'lIU ~~r('.";, rVIr,.H'(' cf
Fc"-
-
94 Appendix 3
/ .e REPORTFokwer ~Jrcraft S.V.Amsterdam The NetherlandeIUue
dat.JUHE 1999 l ue no O1
keCIS'1t.1.I cl..llIRESTRICTED VS-28-25
Fok~.r too I TAY620 Condilion $1 Ice =0.5 Slush = D.2
~
V/
I..EURTDR DEFLECT J0'" J dea J
A " /'..\ r-'"'. V\./ V
,nCH ATTITUDE ldenl
.......
V '-' "-/
T:~ 9
2." E J
2.1" E 1
I." E 1
LIN E 1
Mit E J
2.'" l )
2 E J
Z... , 5
f.WI J
1... e 1
2.", E 1
L... E J
2.... ' .,
"Iff .... Ill
1.711' 1
I.'" E 1
I.'" I J
"'lit J
101. I 1
I.... E 1
I.,E 1
..... , 1
1.4" t 1
1." J
l.tII E 1
1.111" J
"'"11
1.1" r JSf.'
....
.....
....
....
AHGLE QF ATTACK t dtI I
l,.---/~ "'- ...-...-..../
CAt.rIRRTED IURIN'ED tXt..,
V--~
If."..,.,
-11.1'
......OE
IXDIST
2.4."
.....
................ XDIST.....II."
.....
.....TETR
IXDIST....
I".'"........
""SIXDIST....
j........-HRADtO,
XDISTAll right, rn.rvtd. QlPrcdtJctlon or llllCIOflr. too UHrd
par-Utiof tha dorount or any part Wt1'..,f I' net p.,.aftt.d
~.lt'4't wit)')ii'll Cl"'ICi~ ...a tIC""." .,..,tttn- ".,..llll"n
of Fol(ktl'" Alrcr"n t,V,
-
Fokker Flight Simulator Investigation Report, VS-28-25 95~--~---
-~ ------~- ~----- ------_. ---- -
REPORTFowker Aircraft a.u.Amslerdam The Netherlands
aacurlt.U cl-ae. I"QP0I"'t. fW R5TRICTED VS-28-25
FoL
-
96 Appendix 3
REPORTFokker Aircraft S.U.Am8terdam The Netherlands
la"UtI dat.JUNE 1989 IUUfJ no .OIcurlt.W cl
RESTRICTEDreport no
U5-28-25
ELEVRTOR DEFLECTION [denl
\ A ~ ~~ ......\./ -
Fokker 100 I TAY620 Condition 8. Ice =0.7 Slush = 0.15
MN [ 3:LVI [ J2.1.. [ '3I.'" [ 3I.... [ 3I,IN E 1....XDIST
!Y...
......:...........DE
ANGLE OF ATTACK [de I
/~ "" -/
It...
II...
t.tu
.....IVA
XDIST .... loIN [ J I." [ J I." E J UN( 3 2." [ J LUI r JPITCH
ATTITUDE I~nl
/~--- ""/
It.Y
If."
.....
.....TETA l
-
Fokker Flight Simulator Investigalion Report, VS-28-25
97------
REPORTFokker Aircraft B.V.Amsterdam The Netherlands
J IlliIU8 dat.e,JUNE 1989 lUlJe no. ,0 IlillCurlt.U Chilli
RESTRICTEDr-aport. no
VS-2B-25
Fokker 100 I TAY620 ConditIon 9. Ice =0.75 Slush = 0.15ELEVRTOR
DEFLECTION Ideo)
'-/
\ A r-.~-""~ --..."Iv'
A!'iGLE DE:' ATTACK 'da I
A l--'"~ ~ '-...../V
)))To-! ATTITUDE {dea}
A~ -~
V
~...
1." E ]
1.2M [ '5
1.21. I: 1
1." ( ]
2... E 1
2.111 [ 1
1. [ 1
"'Nt J
2 J
2,t1. E 1
2.... I: 1
2." '5
t ' 3
MI' '5
2.... 1
1.1" [ i
2..., 1
ED I
I.At 1
I.A. [ 1
I [ 1
I.a, :I
1.511 '5
I." [ 1
I [ 1
I' 1
t... ]
1.2:1' '5
".1
....
...,CALIBRRTED R RSPE "0
./V-
V
.."
RRDID RLTITUDE
:11'"
a,1f
.....~I....
~'2I,
DEI
XDI5T24."
II."
I,m
.....Al.FR
IXDI5T
",If
Ji.U
I.'"" ..,
TETAI
XDI5TJi'"
141.1
12'"
I....
C" XDI5T_,If
''''') ....,"'.
HRRDtoI
XDI5TAll rIQM~ rnirved. RQprOdUctlon or daclccV'1l 1,.(1 thIrd
p~tl"of tl'ii dllCI.M6nt or IIrII/ part t.hQ:"flM Ie flot
pllrJlIt,tlHl !Oxc.pL Ylth.....~ rrlr~ ~.,~ ~~rq;, jrl.~.,,, r5n.'"
. ;;
-
98 Appendix 3
REPORTFokker Aircraft S.U.Amsterdam The Netherlands
IUu.d.t..Il,JUNE 1989 leIlUllno OI lleur' I t.\,j cl 11
RESTRICTEDreport. no
U5-28-25
Fokker 100 I TAY620 Condition 10, Ice =0.75 Slu8h = 0.15ELEVRTOR
DEFLECTJOH [den]
\ 1\ ~~ -~r-..
0-/
1.211I ]
1... E ]
1' ]
..... , ,
1." ' ]
t ... [ ]
2." I: 1
2." I: 1
t ... I: 1
1:." 1
20tH )
2 1
2.... I: ']
1. ... f 1
~.'" ]
.... 22
2.... ' 1
2.1111' 1
;!oJ1t t 1
e.... I: 1
1.1" I: ]
I.IN 1
1.... ]
1.51' I: :5
1." 1
1.5M [ ]
1,2'1' ]
1.211 3
I ' 1
1." 1
1.,1 ]
".1
....
....
....ITCH ATTITUDE Ie.a)
Aj
CAL IIRAT DAR
./.-
.........- ,
ANGLE OF ATTRCK l de I
f'.-..j
RRDIO ALTITUDE
J....
....."II."
"11."DE XDIST24."
IU'
I ....
.....ALFA
XDIST.....IU.
I ....
.....TETA XDISTla
J....
II'"
.....C
XDIST...............-HRAlIl 0 XDIST
All rlgh~' I"u.rv.d, l1.proWctloll or auc!oliiS" t,e thlrd
p1rtln(~ '.'"::r jr:'",,"6~,t tr 1n.. prO. lMr6cf '. nt~
t6r~,i'.t6: jj~~6rt It Itr,
-
Fokker Flight Simulator Investigation Report, V5-28-25 99--
~eREPORTFokker Al~craft B,V,Ameterdam The Netherlande
In....e d8t..eIJUNE 1989 IVIiUQ no Ol""Cut' I toy c I au'
RESTRICTED U5-28-25
Fokksr JDD I TAY62D CondllJon 1J, lee =D.75 Slush = D.
JSELEURTOR DEFLECTIO~ rd.~J
"-",/,j\'V "- '-.r
~
RNGLE OF RTTRCK {da I
../'"'-..,~
V
/
),2" E ]
~I'"
1.2IIlI '3
1.2H [ '3
t." I: 1
2' [ '3
2 &: 3
2." '5
Mit [ 1
2. ... [ '3
2.... &: 1
2.... t ]
2.'" '3
2.'" E )
2.... &: '3
!:.IlIt:l I.... t '3
,
I."! 1
I.W '3
I.A' [ 'I
1.51' E '3
t." ]
I.a. E '3
1.!If 1
1.2n '3
1.1N [ '3
".1
....
....
....
RLIBRRTED AIRSPEED (Kia1
.//
V
,../...-
...--V
;....
RADID ALT1TUDE , I
~ITCH RTTITUDE Idecl
/"V "'--/
.a. ... '3 2." I: '3
XDIST
11."
.un
~lt...
~211."
DEI
XDIST24...
15.11
"tH.....
RLFA1
XDIST.....JUt
..........
TETA1
XDISTI....
I....
121.'
1....CRS
1XDIST
!II."Ii....
11.".111'
HRRUID1
All rlghti l"(Iurvtd, RlIProductlorl or dl.clll'''''''
w..UHfl~~'Hcf' tl1l' ac:u.Qnt 01' ~nll part tl;II1'O(l1" r, not
Pirllitto-Il' liIXCllpt lIlil'!t'":. r~D- .c,j i~Pf''.I'11
iI/~ltta'l IlQf"IllII1"cr. Cf Flh
-
100 Appendix 3
REPORTFokker Aircraft S.U.Amsterdam The Netherlands
l ~ GiIot.JUNE 1989 llleu- no Olcur-ltl.l c)
RESTRICTED VS-28-25
FOKker 100 I TAY620 Condition 12. Ice ~ D.S Slush := D. J5
.... 1.l!H E J
1... E 1
J... 1
1.... [ 1
2." )
2." 1
2." 1
2." [ 1
I." E 1
2.... [ 1
2 Ii ]
2.... 1
2 [ 1
2.... [ 1
2.... 1
I.... 1
I .... I: )
1.... 1 t .... !
t.s [ J.
l.iU I: 1
1.1iU [ 1
1." 1
1.21'
1.211 1
E T
I." E 'J
'.IN.'
.....
....
ELEVRTOR DEFLECT) N (d0 ..,\ ,N\ A .-' /'
1-/ " ~
....
"HOl OF A TACK (de 1
/'-h -~V
:....~lT H TTITO E Id
1.CII [ 1
c D ..,r--h
V
CAl.lIRATEJ: RtRSJI'ED rlChl
,/..-
V
-....--
RADIO ALTITUDE
XDIST
:1,11
UI
11."21."DE XDIST.....IS."..........
Al..FA XDIST
24.11
II...
I.U'
.....TETA
XDISTIII.'
I....
J2t
I....CAS
IXDIST....
....
.........
HRA1JlO
Rll rl(fl~, f".urWd. i~ctNclID(l Dr' dl,clc#lT' to
tJw'.(lpW't.!uof t.hl;; ooeUlllioi or ally P
-
_________F_o_kk_e_rFlight Simulator Investigation Report,
VS-28-25 101
REPORTFokker Aircraft S.U.Amsterdam The Netherlanos
luua dat.a,JUt'iE 1989 IUu" no.,OI.acur I t.1J c1 a""
RESTRICTEDreport.. no. I
VS-28-25
Fokker 100 I TAY62D Condition 13, Ice =0.'5 Slush = 0.15
RADIO ALTITUDE I_I
l------
ANGLE OF ATTACK (de 1
I' ---"v--.. ..--......../
~ltCH RTTItUDE (denl
.....A ~V -......
/
ELEVRTOR DEFLECTION Ide"l
\ N'\J
1\ "" /"'-'
1 [ 1
3.2.. [ 3
'In'
1.211 ]
1.211 E ]
2." 1
2' E J
2.111 [ ]
UN E ]
2' E ]
2.... [ ]
2.'" E '3
2.... E 1
2.'" J
2.1.. l
Mit 2.... E 1
2.111 E 1
2.fO [ 1
1.... E 1I.Af E 1
I.Af E 1
1.61' ]
1.61' J
I." 'J
I.IM [ ]
1.11' [ 1
1.211 [ ]
1.21' E 1
1.211 1
.....
....
-VV
CRLIBRATED AIRSPEED IKt.
XDI5T
It ...
.....-1....
-21...DE
XDI5Tn...
1'."
I ...'
.....R1.FA
IXDI5T
...n
II."
.....
.....TETA
IXDI5T
151
I....
I'll
I....CAS XDI5T.....,.....u..
HRADIDI
All rlgt1~i rllil;rv.d. Ililprod!.ll;t.lol'l or ducjotlS'. t.~
t.hlro parllt;cf "~.Ii cl~:lJlllBn" or afl\l 1')/'1. lhQriOf I~
1'\01. plrllltti(l iXCgp1. Itlth','0 r.- c.,,; ~,r~15( Jr..~a-.
r6.~n(;.cc d ;:c,(~~~ ~;~~r;ft B.l'.
-
102 Appendix 3
REPORTFokker AIrcraft S.O.AmBterd.m The Netherland.
,uue data.JUNE 1989 '''l.MI no .OlC'lI'lt.l,/ c)
RESTRICTEDreport. no .
VS-28-2S
Fokker 100 I TAY620 Condition 13. Ice =0,'5 Slush = 0.15
4.111 (
4.211 E
..... ,'.1St ( 1
].Sit ( J
3.211 (
,.... , ,Z.7A (
2.1.. ,-r--
2.211 I 1
L .. ,
"He "'-~~
.-----~L.------'~
L.----
/)
~
t DIST , I
''''' ,1."(
..... ,
1.211
1.... 1
"'......-XDJST -HRADIQ .... ..... N." 'L" .... 11.11 ....
All rll1ll.. r'ltrVld. R,pl"oQJctlOl'l Of' d1tc:jD!M" t.o third
pw"t.l (If t.hu lloc~nt. or trlU par-\. t.hreef Ii not p.r.IU.d
Ixcl Withthe pr-Ior arid upr..f lIl"lt.t.~ P'1"1I11110rl 01' Fokk.r
AlrCl"~rt I.V.
-
Fokker Flight Simulator Investigation Report, V5-28-25 103
REPORTFokk~ AIrcraft B.U.Amsterdam The Netnerlande
IUUQ dat,li,JUNE 1989 luua no Dl
""cur I t.lJ C1alUIRESTRICTED
l"'apol"'t. no. IUS-2S-'25
Fokker 100 I TAY620 CondItion 151 Ice =o.e Slush = D.l5
11' E ]
Ii." [ 1
S' I: 3
1i."E 1
Utt E 3
4.1t. E 3
3' &: 3
1.11. &: '32' 1
2' &: 1
R T
I' i 1
1.1d i 3
G
....
C UR E EC ON Ideel
('/'A vV' 11 cf.AV
E E TOR n FL TI
AN LE OF T ACK t d. I
IV "- ~V V-I
XDIST
XDIST
,""
.....IU'
n...
-JM.
.....ALFR
-21."DE
o
'ZTCH ATTITUDE Edeal
--.IV ~ "'--rv --........JI
2UI
JIi.
1.11'
.....lTA
IXDIST
I ' ') 2'" '3 1." ( 1 UN ( ): t ' J Ii &: 1
Ii." E ]
Ii." :J
5.1 I: ]
S' &: 14." I: 1l." &: 1
t .... &: ]
.... ,J.IH 1....
/'/
V./" ........
RADIO RLTITUDE I 1
CALIBRATED AIRS'EED [Kt
XDIST
lo.u
g ...
.....lAfIO I' [ ]
XnIST :"., !I
la.'
1....
If'"
"'"",,5I
All rlgflt.e rllillrv.d. ~llprol1uctlon or dl,clo~urg t.o third
p-vt1",of tn" doclAIent or anl,j P'irt. th;rgo1 " flot per.lt.t.'d
excipt. '''It.ht.ht pI'" 0:" 'Olntl tXIll"en "'I": 1.1.;" pe"'" I
It" on of' FOK\(el" AlI"cr
-
104 Appendix 3
-
Fokker Flight Simulator Investigation Report, VS-28-25 105
REPORT
Fokker AIrcraft B.V.Amaterd~m The Hetherlands
lUUQ dat.lIIJUNE 1989 llililUQ 1"10 0 IslIcurlt.\,i C!lIlUi
RESTRICTED 05-28-25
Fokker 100 I TRYG20 ConditIon 16. Ice = 0.825 Slush =0.15
4.... E 1
..... [ 1
..... [ 1
MlfE J
4.41' 3
'J,.. E 1
1... 1
3. E 3
3." [ ]
1." E ]t.a. E )
l.21" )
MI' E :I
1.21' [ 1
1.2111' 1
2.A' ]
2,5. E 'l
2.111 [
UI. [ 1
"'Nt ].
2.1" E J
a.1II 1
2.mf l
2.... 1
UII'
I." E 1
I .... E)
1.... 1
I.... E ')
I.tli E :I
.....
.....
....
....
.....
AL R' .,
/"f-"
V
ITe ATT E daal
~AV ~ / "-/
El.E TD
/
VA R DEFLECTJON Id.a.
\ A" \f\ J./ /'w'
P H IrUD
ANGLE OF ATTACI< Id. 1
~/\V "'-'\ / "-
/
RADIO ALTITUDE I 1
XDIST
11.".,,,,
1....
21."DE
IXDIST
H.II
1[."
l.tlO
.....ALFR XDIST14."If."
.....
.....TETA XDISTIII.'
I....
n...
"...CAS XDIST....g ...
lI.1I
.....HRAlIIe
I
All rlQl'lts rUlj('vlld, RQprOductlon Ill' dl,=loc\t"1l to third
partlUcf VII. ccc ...II11'll tl(' ~Ii Il~r't th;r;c1 Ii
nolll;r'll\lltlld fX~fpt ,11th
. J~.:~ .-.~ .,
-
106 Appendix 3
Fokker].//
REPORTFok~er Aircraft S.V.Amsterdam The Netherlands
IUue datJUNE 1989 luue no O1ClS"ltu cta
RESTRICTEDreport. no
VS-28-25
Fokker 100/ TAY620 Condition 16. Ice =0.825 Slueh =0.15
DISTAMCE I 1
..---~-Ie::~
/V
) l
s.... t
,. t
..... t
Milt:
..... ,1.'Sf t J
1.... t
1.211 t:::" - ~ ...,.... ,
Mil t:
..... ,t ' J
I." [ 1
I .... ' J
1.211 t:
1....
lII
....w.
.-XDJST HRROln .-
..... .... 15." .... ..... ....All rtght.c "'''tru.d.
RJPl"oI1letIDn or dllelo'lI'l to third partl"or ttll' d/JclJl.nl.
or VI\,j part thor.of Ie l'lDt p.,.alti.d .XCtpl. Vitti"~,6 r"jcr
~:1~ llxpr.u IIlrttlir. Pf('lIfUfcn 01' Fckkfr Rlrcr"rt 6,1),
-
Fokker Flight Simutator Investigation Report, VS-28-25 107---
---_._----
--~~-
REPORTFokker Aircraft a.V.Amsterdam The Nstherlande
cur I t.1,J Clli"llIRESTRICTED
ISSU'l datOl.]UNE 1989 lU'UQ no.,OI
VS-2B-25
Fokker 100 I TAY62D CondItIon I?, lea = 0.8 Slush = 0.15
c E 1
c E 1
"III E l
, ... E 1
, ... E 'J
c 3
