Su PhD thesis - 15 Chapter 8

8/14/2019 Su PhD thesis - 15 Chapter 8

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CHAPTER EIGHT

THE JUNE 1 MOVEMENT: COMPELLING JIANG TO RESIST JAPAN AND

THE CLIQUES ROLE IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

The previous chapter discussed the background to the launching of the anti-

Japanese movement, with its supposedly suspect motives, by the Guangxi Clique and the

Southwestern leaders. This chapter will analyze how the Clique put the forcing Jiang to

resist Japan policy into practice and examine the measures carried out by Jiang when

dealing with the June 1 Movement, its development and result. The issues of how the two

parties reached reconciliation and to what extent the Clique contributed to the AJNUF will

also be dealt with. Through the analysis of these issues, I will argue that the June 1Movement was a test in the formation of the AJNUF and an important factor in the

reconciliation between the Clique and Jiang. I will also discuss the significance of the

movement for the important events which followed, in particular, the Xian Incident,

which took place three months later.

Forcing Jiang to Resist Japan

The June 1 Movement lasted three months until early September 1936. it can be

divided into two phases: the first from June 1 to July 18, in which Guangdong and Guangxi

were the main force, and the later phase when Guangxi proceeded its own. Guangxi was

the only participant of the June 1 Movement from beginning to end.

In the first phase, with Guangzhou as its centre and the Guangdong-Guangxi

alliance its main pillar, the activities of the movement included the military measures taken

by the Clique and Chen Jitang and the constant political pressure on Nanjing urging it to


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declare war immediately against Japan, and, in response, Jiangs various tactics to counter

this movement. In other words, the bi-Jiang kangri policy was carried out by a

combination of propaganda campaigns and military pressures. Along with the developing

and changing situation with the two Guangs, the movement eventually fixed on constantappeals to Nanjing to promise to take the lead in national resistance on the lines that the

Southwest had propagandized. Of course, the real sponsors of the movement, according to

Joseph Stilwell, were Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi.1

For this reason, the discussion of the

main activities is focussed on the Clique.

The Southwest Political Council of the GMD and the Southwest Executive

Committee of the Nationalist Government at Guangzhou issued a circular telegram on May

26, only one day after the funeral of Hu Hanmin, urging Nanjing to protect the countryagainst the increase in the number of the Japanese troops in North China.

2According to

Liu Fei, Bais aide at that time, it aimed to express the Southwests anti-Japanese attitude

and determination to sway public opinion. Through openly publishing this telegram they

expected to attract people's sympathy for their stand and to arouse patriotic feelings against

Japanese aggression, on the one hand, and to incite people's discontent with Nanjing for its

impotence and non-resistance in its failure to deal with the further Japanese aggression in

both North and South China after 1935, on the other. Meanwhile, issuing such a circulartelegram was also an exploratory action of the Southwest in its preparation to implement

the forcing Jiang to resist Japan policy.3

Thus, this event seemed to be a prelude to the

official launching of the June 1 Movement.

On June 1, the Southwest Political Council and the Southwest Executive

Committee held an official meeting and moved to submit a petition to the Nanjing

Government and central party headquarters of the GMD calling on the Nationalist

Government to take the lead in resisting Japan. The petition stated that China was facing a

1U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9408 (June 19, 1936).

Hereafter as U. S. Military.

2For details of the increase in Japanese military forces in North China in the first half of

1936, see The Major Events of the Week, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 20 (May 25, 1936), p. 5;

and SMZYYK, Vol. 8, No. 1-2 (August 31, 1936), pp. 33-54.

3Liu Fei, Liangguang liuyi shibian, GXWSZL, No. 29 (1990), pp. 290-291 (hereafter

as Liangguang).


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moment when the country's fate hung in the balance as Japan speeded up its aggression in

not only North but also South China. It emphasized that only resistance could ensure the

survival of the country, and that the nation had no way out except for the whole country to

rise together with force and spirit to fight a last-ditch battle against the enemy. In thepetition they pledged full support if Nanjing would resist with armed forces. The

concluding paragraph of the message, which was strongly worded throughout, stated that

feeding the enemy with territory is like feeding fire with firewood and is national suicide.

We insist that not one more inch of Chinese territory be alienated.4

Perhaps seeking to

exploit the occasion as propaganda, the two Guangs issued another circular telegram to the

entire nation, publishing the contents of the petition in full on June 2. In the telegram they

asked the Central Government to permit them to march northward to fight Japan andrecover the lost territories. The telegram also expected all parties and groups throughout

the nation to press Nanjing to pass a resolution to fight Japan.5

Two days later, scores of

army generals in the provinces of the two Guangs led by Chen Jitang and Li Zongren issued

another circular telegram of support for the earlier resolution of the Southwestern

authorities calling for resistance against Japan and pledging to lead their men to avenge

the age-old humiliation of the country and strive to ensure the continued existence of the

nation.

6

This telegram was the manifesto of the Southwest, and it reflected theirconsciousness of striving for national independence and liberation. Of course, it was a very

good platform from which the Southwest could launch the movement. Whatever the

motive, the message reflected a strong anti-Japanese feeling. As Bai emphasized on June 5,

4U. S. Military, No. 9392 (June 5, 1936); and Guangxi gejie kangri jiuguo lianhehui

(ed.), Guangxi kangri jiuguo zhongyao wendian huiji, Nanning, 1936, p. 103 (hereafter as

Huiji).

5For details of the telegram, seeNanning minguo ribao, June 3, 1936. Also see Liu Fei,

Liangguang, p. 291; Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe,

1987, p. 88, and the same author, Liangguang shibian, GXWSZL, No. 22 (1985), pp. 48-

9; Huang Xuchu, Guangxi yu zhongyang nian yunian lai beihuan lihe yishu, CQ, No. 127

(16/10/1962), p. 17 (hereafter as Guangxi); Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The

Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, pp. 307-8; and Huiji,

pp. 102-4.

6Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 307-8; andHuiji, pp.

49-50, and p. 104.


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they would rather die free men than live as slaves under Japanese domination.7

Meanwhile, as the advocate of scorched earth resistance, Li also called on military

leaders throughout the country to shed their blood in the cause of anti-Japanese

salvation.

8

Soon the two Southwestern organizations accepted the request of these armygenerals and reorganized the troops of the two Guangs as kangri jiuguojun, marching

northward under the flag of fighting Japan.9

The bi-Jiang kangri policy was in action.

These events marked the beginning of the June 1 Movement. The two provinces,

particularly Guangxi, carried out a general mobilization to meet the needs of anti-Japanese

activity. Thus, Guangxi, together with Guangdong, politically and militarily completed

preparation for bi-Jiang kangri.

At the same time, the Clique publicised in the province that the movement was apatriotic action with the sole aim of fighting Japan. This policy was widely propagated by

the provincial authorities not only in the mass media but also to the people through its

militia system. The entire province of Guangxi was mobilized under the anti-Japanese flag.

Militia and army were reorganized. Various anti-Japanese mass organizations, such as, the

National Salvation Association of Guangxi Cultural Circles (Guangxi wenhuajie jiuguohui)

and the National Salvation Association of Guangxi Workers (Guangxi gongren jiuguohui),

were established throughout the province. Women, students, and workers, all joined themovement.

10Students of tertiary and middle schools were more radical than others, but

their patriotic enthusiasm was well used and guided by the Clique. As a result, they were

organized as the Guangxi Student Army Corp.11

They were soon divided into many small

propaganda units and then sent to the countryside in order to mobilize the peasants and

7Hansu Chan, Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?, China Today, Vol. 2, No. 10, p. 188.

8Ibid.

9Huiji, p. 104.

10For details of these mobilizations, see Guangxi daxue wenfa xueyuan zizhihui (ed.),

Liuyi yundong jinian tekan, Guilin, 1937; and Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way in

Kuomintang China, 1931-1939, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993, chapters 4, 8,

and 14.

11Shenbao, June 29, 1936, p. 3.


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other masses for the patriotic cause of fighting Japan and saving the nation.12

It seemed

that a tide of anti-Japanese movement promoted and sponsored by the Clique had already

appeared in Guangxi.

In fact, the Southwest had already mobilized in both military preparation andpropaganda before June, even before the death of Hu Hanmin. Utilizing the alleged

menace of imminent Japanese invasion to impress the people with their patriotic

obligations, the authorities had enlisted the service of the newly organized National

Propaganda Commission to spread the doctrine of national defence and were enlisting

popular cooperation by various means for starting a war against Japan.13

This was a

response to the rising tide of national unity for resisting Japan since the end of 1935, which

many parties and groups had called for.

14

Further evidence might also explain theapparently spontaneous action in the two Guangs. In May, a special Guangdong

Commission made a tour of inspection in Guangxi, one of its main objects being to study

the provincial military system, particularly that of the militia.15

These might also be

considered as coincidental actions of the two provinces in preparation of mass mobilization

for action under the slogan of resistance.

To add fuel to the flame of the movement and to provide it with a just cause for the

action, the Guangxi leaders also frequently emphasized that their aim coincided with thecall of the Southwestern authorities. For example, when the Guangxi troops were on the

way northward, Li and Bai both repeatedly reiterated, through a series of orders and public

notices, that the movement was only for resisting Japan and national salvation, not for

opposing any individuals.16

For example, Bai clearly announced in his official declaration

at the launching of the movement and mass mobilization on June 1:

12Guangxi daxue wenfa xueyuan zizhihui (ed.),Liuyi yundong jinian tekan, pp. 14-7, 50-

6.

13U. S. Military, No. 9369 (22/5/1936); Giu Guo Sh Bao, 25/6/1936; and Hu zhuxi

zhisang weiyuanhui ed., Hu xiansheng jinian zhuankan, Guangzhou, 1936 (hereafter Hu

xiansheng).

14Giu Guo Sh Bao, January 4, 1936.

15U. S. Military, No. 9369 (22/5/1936), p. 3. Also see Guangxi of the Month, CJYK,

Vol. 3, No. 9 (1936), p. 12.

16Huiji, p. 61.


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When the entire nation has already reached the point of extinction, all existing

personal feelings of the past, gratitude or resentment between different groups and

parties, should be put-aside. From now on Chinese should not fight each other

anymore. Instead we Chinese should reunite and fight Japanese imperialism,

standing on one front.17

Indeed, these proclamations stated clearly that the Guangxi authorities were

building up a strong momentum which opposed civil war and regarded resistance as the

sole aim of the projected northern expedition. Obviously, it aimed, through mass

mobilization and wide propaganda, to put pressure on Jiang and Nanjing to make a

resolution for war against Japan.18

In so doing they renounced or concealed their personal

ambitions, if these really existed, which lay behind this movement from its inception. The

demands of national affairs came first, and they openly linked their ambitions with struggle

for national salvation. The CCP followed the same tactics at this time, or at least it seemed

to be so on the surface, possibly because they recognised that the tide of the time favoured

any groups and parties taking action against Japanese aggression; but certainly their

influence added to the anti-Japanese tide, regardless of what their motives were.19

As Bai

stated, the Guangxi group had issued many manifestos and petitions to Nanjing calling for a

war of resistance since 1931, now they found themselves no longer able to tolerate

Japanese aggression. Therefore, it was the time to put their anti-Japanese policy into

action, instead of enduring Nanjings continuing impotence.20

The Guangxi troops publicly declared their aim to the public in order to win popular

support. They strongly believed their action was for universal principles of nature and

society (gongli), and justice (zhengyi), for existence (shengcun) and self-defence (ziwei),

and for national conscience (liangxin) and moral personality (renge). This reflected a belief

that, as the Clique repeatedly emphasized, the people of the Pearl River valley should

17Bai Chongxi, Kangri jiuguo, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, Hong

Kong: Zhujiang ribaoshe, 1937, p. 58.

18Huang Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No. 127, p. 17.

19Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 25, 1936.

20Bai Chongxi, Kangri jiuguo, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.),Jiaotu kangzhan, p. 56.


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shoulder more responsibility in fighting Japan.21

For this reason, they clearly declared their

aims as follows:

1) We insist that the national government immediately break off all relations

with Japan, and abolish all humiliating treaties and agreements with Japan.

2) We oppose any kind of civil war and oppose any policy which results inChinese and the Chinese troops fighting each other.

3) We invite all anti-Japanese forces, no matter which region or party and

which army or section of the masses they belong to, to join us in order to

form a national revolutionary front for resistance.

4) On marching northward, we will not attack any towns and individuals or

troops, but we will join forces with the national people and strenuously fight

any one or group who declare themselves to be Chinese traitors and

endeavour to impede our progress northward.22

There is evidence that the Guangxi troops marching northward at that time were

mobilized by the above policies. Even Joseph Stilwell did not deny this. He recognized

that the policies sounded good and that morale of the Guangxi people was high under the

influence of such political propaganda.23

To demonstrate more widely their declared

purpose, the Clique also distributed large numbers of propaganda leaflets with slogans such

as Expand the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement, Japanese Is Our External

Enemy, Down with Japanese Imperialism, Down with Opponents of the Anti-Japanese

Movement, Down with All Sino-Japanese Treaties Signed Under Duress, and so on.24

They expected a broad and positive response throughout the country to this call. Thus, they

completed preparation for influencing public opinion for bi-Jiang kangri through such

propaganda.

It can be seen that the Cliques bi-Jiang kangri policy had already become

apparent. Its spearhead, at least outwardly, was directed against Japanese aggression, not

internal disputes. It sent Nanjing a message that resistance was the responsibility of every

Chinese. The message had a dual content. First, all of the people should rise to resist

Japan; and secondly, if some powerful people did not want to do this, then the Clique

21Ibid, pp. 53-54.

22Huiji, p. 48.

23U. S. Military, No. 9446 (July 31, 1936).

24During the movement, the newspapers in Guangxi published anti-Japanese slogans

daily, among themNanning minguo ribao was a best example. SeeNanning minguo ribao,

June 1936. Also see Hansu Chan, Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?, p. 188.


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would lead the Chinese people to do so without hesitation.25

The Clique thus tried to

convince the whole country that they were not only sincere themselves in wanting to resist

Japan but also willing to promote Nanjing in the movement of national liberation. In that

way, bi-Jiang kangri was put into effect. Meanwhile, the Pearl River ValleyRevolutionary theory, in which the people of the two Guangs were lauded as the main force

of the national revolution with the Clique as the leader, was closely linked with the anti-

Japanese movement they launched. Thus, personal purposes and ambitions, even if they

still existed, were increasingly weakened as the movement developed. Once Jiangs policy

was changed, for example, he came to cooperate with other groups and parties for

resistance, and any ideas of anti-Jiang action were no longer relevant to the universal ideal.

In such circumstances, fatong (orthodox legitimacy) was widely endorsed. Li and otherSouthwestern leaders consequently recognized, until the war was won, Nanjing as the sole

government of China, even though it was actually under the control of Jiang, whom they

distrusted and even opposed. Before even considering any chance of replacing Jiang, they

wanted to fight Japan to convince that their actions reflected the wishes of the majority of

the people.26

On the other hand, the differences between them, which were frequently

emphasized, were mostly concerned with policies towards Japanese aggression. They

never missed an opportunity to explain their different measures in dealing with Japan.

27

That is to say, the situation forced the Clique to avoid, as much as it could, building up the

image of a region actually opposing the central government for power only; but they

fostered the bi-Jiang kangri policy because it could attract more public support and

legitimate its opposition to Jiang.28

Once the bi-Jiang kangri movement was initiated, the Clique had to follow this

direction; otherwise, their actions would make no sense. As the Chinese saying goes,

water can either carry or destroy the boat. The movement was the boat sailing in thewater of the masses who were imbued with patriotism. The Guangxi leaders of course

25See Liuyi yulun yiban, in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai

Chongxi de yanlun, Nanning, 1937, p. 266.

26Huang Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No. 127, p. 17.

27Ibid. Also see Hu Yugao, Gongfei xicuan ji, Guiyang: Yugao shudian, 1946, p. 110.

28Huiji, pp. 107-110.


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knew how to use the masses, particularly the popular tide they had set in train and they

emphasized the importance of the masses and mass mobilization, which later could also

become a powerful force used by the Clique in opposition to Nanjing.29

As Liu Fei pointed

out, the only thing that the Clique could do was to elevate the banner of resisting Japan at atime when the movement for that purpose was already on the way. This was also the way

to avoid any suggestion of a regional image which might cause unfavourable criticism of

them.30

Resistance against Japan became the basis of Guangxi reconstruction and

mobilization, and this was recognized within and outside the province. Visitors, whether

from overseas or from other provinces, commented favourably on Guangxi and lauded it

with the title of model province,

31

for the Clique imbued the population generally withenthusiasm for its policies of both reconstruction and mass mobilization (dealt with in

Chapter Four). The enthusiasm of the masses was of course channelled by the Clique into

self-defence, which could effectively serve both the national and provincial levels.

Recognising the powerful force created by the mobilization of the masses in the province,

Sherwood Eddy said, I see in Guangxi a hope of the new China.32

Of course, Li and Bai

paid great attention to these comments, which were regarded as a clear indication that their

pursuit of correct policies had been recognized by the people.

33

However, these

29Bai Chongxi, Kangri jiuguo, Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.),Jiaotu kangzhan, pp. 54-6; and

Li zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, pp. 157-65, and pp.

203-12.

30Liu Fei, Liangguang, p. 293.

31For details of those peoples comments on Guangxi reconstruction and mass

mobilization such as speeches and articles of Chen Baoyin, Chen Lijiang, George

Sherwood Eddy, Huang Tianshi, Jiang Kanghu, Hou Zhenqiu and Wang Heng, see LengGuan et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935; Liang Wenwei

et al, Guangxi yinxiang ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935; and Guomin gemingjun

disi jituanjun zong zhengxunchu (ed.), Li-Gui zhongwai mingren yanjiang ji, Shanghai:

ZHSJ, 1936; Sherwood Eddy,Is There A Model Province in China? Shanghai, January 7,

1935, printed by the author himself; and U. S. Military, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).

32Sherwood Eddy,Is There A Model Province in China? p. 2.

33SeeLi zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji, pp. 259-65;Bai fu zongsiling yanjiang ji, Nanning:

GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, pp. 19-24; and Bai Chongxi xiansheng zuijin yanlun ji,

Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1936, pp. 14-6.


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appreciations were often the result of encouragement or pressure from the Clique itself. To

defend further their reputation as the leading figures in resistance, they had ultimately to

succeed with the policy of forcing Jiang to resist Japan.

In fact this latter stance as a central pillar of the Cliques policy represented a subtlechange in emphasis. Before his death, Hu had repeatedly emphasized downfall of

dictatorship as a prerequisite to resisting Japan.34

According to Xiao Focheng, a GMD

veteran and a senior leader in the Southwest, although the Southwest still insisted that it

must carry out Hus three deathbed calls, as mentioned in Chapter Seven, at present

resistance was more important and urgent than the others.35

This, of course, still left the

Clique with excellent reasons to take action against Jiangs non-resistance; and their

propaganda took this into account.Another factor affecting the actions of the Clique was the tactics of the Communists

and the Red Army in their Eastern Expedition which ended just before the June 1

Movement began. The Eastern Expedition of the Red Army took place between February

and May 1936; the army marched eastward, passing through Shanxi province towards

Hebei province under the flag of fighting the Japanese. After fighting with both Yan

Xishans troops and Jiang's Central Army which rushed to Shanxi province as a

reinforcement for Yan, the Red Army withdrew to their base in northern Shaanxi with thestated purpose of avoiding further civil war with Jiang and other regional troops.

36

Whatever reasons might be given to account for this action, during the expedition the Red

Army widely propagandized their position on stopping civil war in the cause of unity for

34For details of Hus ideas on downfall of dictatorship, resistance against Japan and

suppression of Communism, see Hu Hanmin xiansheng wenji, Taipei: Guomindang

zhongyang dangshihui, 1978; Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (ed.), Hu xiansheng; and

Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, Guangzhou:, 1934, pp. 1-2. Formore details of these, see Hu Hanmin (ed.), Sanmin zhuyi yuekan (SMZYYK), Guangzhou,

1933-36.

35Huiji, p. 117.

36For details of the Red Armys Eastern Expedition, see Jiang Shunxing and Li Liangyu,

Shanxi wang Yan Xishan, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1989, pp. 141-4; Zhonggong

zhongyang dangxiao (ed.), Yan Xishan pingzhuan, Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang

dangxiao chubanshe, 1991, pp. 256-61; Jiang Kefu (ed.), Minguo junshi shi luegao,

Beijing: ZHSJ, 1991, Vol. 2, pp. 435-9; and Donald Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in

Shansi Province 1911-1949, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967.


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resisting Japan,37

which to a great extent coincided with the mood of the growing tide of

national resistance. It was a clever political tactic of the Communists and the Red Army,

and their propaganda was used to real purpose, and helped to expand their strength. The

Clique was aware of the positions and tactics of the Red Army because Li and Bai senttheir representative to contact the Communists and the latter also sent their agents to

Guangxi before and after the June 1 Movement.38

Under these circumstances, the Clique

learned a lot from the experience of the Communists.

However, the Clique was regarded at that time as having been the most important

opponent of Jiang since 1931, which was another reason for careful planning to implement

the bi-Jiang kangri policy. Indeed, each time Nanjing yielded to Japanese demands or

carried out some suspect policies and measures under Japanese pressure, Li and Bai alwaysstood in opposition. It was a vulnerable position because the supporters of Jiang found

excuses to criticize them as remnant warlords.39

For example, after the June 1 Movement

was launched, a newspaper suggested it to be a case of giving vent to personal spite.40

Li

and Bai must have anticipated this,41

for even before the movement, they had foreseen the

many difficulties ahead. As Li himself pointed out, when the movement really began, they

had mounted a tiger and could not get off.42

The situation, however, propelled them

forward and, once committed, they had no choice but to follow wherever it led.

37Zhongyang tongzhanpu and Zhongyang dangan guan (eds.), Zhonggong zhongyang

kangri tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian, Beijing: DACBS, 1985, Vol. 2, pp. 108-41

(hereafter as Wenjian xuanbian).

38Liu Zongrong, Xian shibian de huiyi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 9, pp. 49-56 (hereafter as

Xian); and the same author, Huiyi wo zai Guixi gongzuo shi de jijianshi, WSZLXJ,No. 73 (1981), pp. 29-36. Also see Chen Dunde, Guigen - Li Zongren he Mao Zedong he

Zhou Enlai woshou, Beijing: JFJCBS, 1990, pp. 23-45.

39See, for example, Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi, n.p., 1936; and

Anonymous,Liangguang panluan neimu, n. p., 1936.

40Shenbao, June 13, 1936, p.3.

41Huiji, pp. 4-8; and pp. 53-66.

42Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 307.


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The development of the movement indicated that the purpose of bi-Jiang kangri

was not easy to achieve. It quickly became apparent that the Clique and Chen Jitang had

underestimated the strength of the measures Jiang would take.

While the two Guang troops marched northward into Hunan, Jiang published aseries of telegrams and speeches in response. On the one hand, Jiang expressed his

sympathy with the anti-Japanese action of the Southwest; on the other, he emphasized such

action should be taken only in unity, that is, he declared that the Southwest should take

action only after Nanjing had made a firm decision to deal with the new Japanese

aggression.43

In this way, he hinted that the Southwest was doing what suited itself. In

addition, he sent some representatives to negotiate with the Southwest on future mutual

cooperative action against Japan.

44

It seemed that Jiang was successful, because, under thecover of these statements, he secretly and rapidly moved large numbers of the Central

troops to the borders of the two Guangs and its neighbouring provinces, and, as a result,

blocked the way of the two Guang troops marching northward.45

As stated earlier, before launching the movement, the Clique believed there would

be a positive response from people all over the nation once their action took place. Now

that the flag had been raised, however, the expected patriotic reaction did not appear, and

this was particularly evident in Hunan, the passageway through which the two Guangtroops would march. To enlist the sympathy and support of Hunan, the Clique, in fact,

even while the movement was being prepared, sent General Liu Fei to Changsha calling on

He Jian, ruler of Hunan province. He Jian expressed his support for this movement and

promised to join once the Guangxi troops arrived at Changsha. But this was merely an

empty promise. In fact, He Jian proved to be a double agent. He secretly reported to Jiang

43For details of Jiangs telegrams and speeches, see Anonymous,Dui liangguang yidong

zhi renshi, pp. 29-36; and Jizhe, Yue-Gui wenti zhi zhankai, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24

(June 22, 1936). Also see Fragments of newspaper cuttings in 1936, Archives of the

Nationalist Government, Vol. 787, serial No. 919, in The Second History Archives of

China, Nanjing.

44Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 25, 1936.

45Luo Ziwen, Liangguang liuyi shibian zhong He Jian wanlong liangmian shoufa,

HNWSZLXJ, No. 5 (1963), pp. 185-91 (hereafter as He Jian).


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the action the Southwest would take.46

After the movement began and the Guangxi troops

entered Hunan on their northward march, the Clique sent General Li Pinxian, former

colleague of He Jian and now Chief of General Staff of the Guangxi troops, to Changsha to

discuss the same matter. Again, He Jian played the same trick. The Guangxi troops wastedtime on the Hunan border waiting for the promised action from He Jian but it did not

eventuate. Li Pinxians mission to Hunan failed.47

Instead, a large number of the Central

troops led by General Chen Cheng, the most trusted follower of Jiang, flooded into Hunan

and occupied Hengyang, the very important city and strategic point in southern Hunan. He

Jian soon joined Jiang to oppose the Southwest. Jiang had taken advantage of this

situation, at least in military terms. Under these circumstances, the Guangxi troops stopped

marching northward and were ordered to withdraw to the border of their home province toshow their sincerity in avoiding a fight with other Chinese troops as they had promised in

all their propaganda, because they did not want to provoke a civil war against Jiang.48

In fact, the delay had ruined a favourable chance for the Clique and Chen Jitang to

defeat Jiang if they had exploited the advantage they had. When the June 1 Movement was

launched, a good chance existed for the Southwestern leaders to gain an initial advantage

quickly by a swift move into Hunan. If, when they showed their hands and marched into

Hunan, they had gone in wholeheartedly and vigorously attacked Hengyang, they couldprobably have taken it at once, as they had in 1930.

49Then a rapid advance on Changsha

46Liu Tingfang, Wo shuofu Jiang Jieshi xiansheng huajie yichang neizhan weiji - ji

liangguang shibian weiceng gongkai de yiduan neimu,HNWSZL, No. 29 (1988), pp. 199-

206 (hereafter as neimu); and Liu Fei, Liangguang, p. 289. Also see Shenbao,

15/6/1936, p. 9.

47For details see Luo Ziwen, He Jian. Also see The Major Events of the Week, and

Jizhe, Yue-Gui wenti zhi zhankai, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24; Cheng Siyuan, Wo suo

zhidao de Bai Chongxi,XSLT, No. 4, 1987, p. 81, and Cheng Siyuan,Bai Chongxi zhuan,Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1989, p. 187.

48U. S. Military, No. 9408, (June 19, 1936). Also see Li Zongrens speeches on the

days of June 8, 13, 29, and Telegrams of Li Zongren and others on June 18 and 21,

Huiji, pp. 1-9, and pp. 50-4.

49For details of the occupation of Hengyang by the joint forces of the Clique and Zhang

Fakuis Ironside in 1930, see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-

jen, pp. 278-9; Zhang Dihai, Zhang-Gui jun fan-Jiang zhong de Beiliu ji Hengyang

zhanyi, GDWSZLXJ, No. 19, pp. 45-8; and Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, Hangzhou:

Fengyun chubanshe, 1945, pp. 206-7.


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would have given them an even chance of overrunning Hunan and perhaps drawing He Jian

into the camp of the Southwest. The possibility of success would have attracted to their

side all the many elements that were always ready in a Chinese civil war to rush to the aid

of the victor, and the action of He Jian later joining Jiang was just an example. WithHunan in their possession, other provinces in Southwest and Northwest, particularly those

factions under the leadership of generals such as Liu Xiang of Sichuan province, Zhang

Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, leaders of both the Dongbeijun (the Northeast Troops) and

theXibeijun (the Northwest Troops) now stationed in Shaanxi province, could have been

counted on,50

and Jiangxi province, which was under the firm control of Jiang, directly

threatened. Such a situation could have made their chances of success rosy, for Jiang could

not have counted on any help from the provinces of Shandong, Hebei and Shaanxi, wherethe Clique also had sent representatives and asked them to join and support its side. These

factions also had made positive response to the movement, although secretly.51

But,

instead of pushing ahead and putting it to the test, as soon as they crossed the Hunan border

earlier in June, the Guangxi troops sat down in expectation of He Jians participation in the

movement and later in dismay as their concern grew about a civil war when Jiangs troops

rushed into Hunan. The Southwest undoubtedly made two serious miscalculations, i.e. it

overestimated the active response of other groups and parties to its policies and itunderestimated the speed and force of Jiang's measures against the movement. Although

Zhang and Yang as well as Liu Xiang had made certain plans which coincided with the

action of the Southwest, they could not carry out these plans once the troops of the two

Guangs remained their northward march and stayed at their home borders.52

Immediately

the two Guang armies stopped, Hunan at once began to fill up with Jiangs troops. The

50For details of Liu Xiangs active response to the June 1 Movement and his coincidental

action with the Clique, see Chapter Five of the thesis; also see Qiao Cheng and Yang

Xuyun, Liu Xiang, Beijing: HXCBS, 1987, pp. 193-6. The detailed actions of Yang and

Zhang will be accounted for in the following section.

51SeeHuiji, p. 29; and Ying Detian, Zhang Xueliang yu Xian shibian, Beijing: ZHSJ,

1980, p. 75 (hereafter asZhang Xueliang).

52For details of these actions, see Liu Zongrong, Xian. The reasons for the failure of

implementation of these plans worked out by Yang Hucheng and Zhang Xueliang will be

further discussed in the following section.


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chance had been lost, and the tide at once turned against them.53

The result was contrary to

their expectations, and by hesitating, they had put themselves in a dangerous situation and

were forced to expend a great deal of energy to escape and recover lost ground.

Would the Southwestern leaders, particularly Li and Bai who were alwaysconsidered to be the best Chinese militarists and commanders, not have known the chance

which they were missing? I think they would have known. One reason for missing this

chance might be that, according to Joseph Stilwell early in 1936, they did not want civil

war, but if war came they would take every chance it offered to protect and improve the

position of the Southwest provinces.54

In my opinion, another possible answer was the

positive response from the Red Army.55

Although there is no corroborative evidence to

indicate that a practically cooperative action existed between the Clique and the Red Army,the tactics carried out by the latter during their Eastern Expedition, such as the use of the

political propaganda of resistance to serve their march eastward through Shanxi, averting a

crucial military clash with the strong Central Army, might have influenced the Clique to

take similar action.56

Moreover, the statement and manifesto of the CCP coinciding with

the action of the Southwest might have encouraged the Clique in their hope that a wide

positive response to their action would soon spread throughout the country. The Clique

also contacted the Communist branches in both Hong Kong and Tianjin before and after thelaunching of the movement.

57However, regardless of their possible hopes, it was wise of

the Clique to make the decision to withdraw the troops to the border of Guangxi in order to

avoid a civil war. Under these circumstances, the Cliques action indicated that it insisted

53Joseph Stilwell also had the same opinion when the Southwest authorities ordered the

two Guang troops to stop on the Hunan border, failing to take advantage of the chance to

defeat Jiangs troops. See U. S. Military, No. 9446 (July 31, 1936).

54U. S. Military, No. 9271 (January 13, 1936).

55Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, pp. 161-164.

56Ibid, pp. 108-41.

57Ibid, pp. 161-4. For details of the Cliques contact with the CCP, see Yun Guangying,

Liuyi yundong qianhou wodang zai Nanning huodong de pianduan, GXWSZLXJ, No. 9,

pp. 45-8 (hereafter as Liuyi); Chen Dunde, Guigen, pp. 9-10, and pp. 23-48; and

Zhonggong Guangxi Zhuangzu zizhiqu weiyuanhui dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui

(ed.), Zhonggong Guangxi dangshi dashiji, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1989, pp. 98-100

(hereafter asDashiji).


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on the policy of bi-Jiang kangri rather than that of overthrowing Jiang only. The

withdrawal also clearly indicated their purpose focused more on Japanese aggression than

on fighting Jiang, for there is no evidence to suggest the Guangxi troops were engaged in a

battle.The Clique seems to have badly underestimated the impact of the power of

censorship by Nanjing, as a result of which their voice hardly spread outside the Southwest.

While it is true that the policies of the Southwest appeared to be sound and to meet the

needs of the time, theirs was a difang (regional) voice, which worked to the detriment of

both Guangxi and Guangdong. The Jiang group could freely use the mass media they

controlled to condemn the whole movement as part of a Japanese conspiracy, and as a

regional rebellion against the central government backed by the Japanese; it moreoverbanned all newspapers in their territory from printing the opinions of the Clique and the

Southwest (as discussed earlier). They criticized the movement as a disruptive element

hindering the plan of the Central Government in preparing for resistance.58

Further, Jiang

organised all his subordinate generals and other factions and associations to issue circular

telegrams in opposition to the Southwest. Through this, a campaign of fear and distrust

against the Southwest, particularly the Clique, was influential in forming public opinion.59

The Southwest was placed in a negative position.

60

In this way, Jiang cleverly guidedpublic opinion, and successfully transformed the Southwest's demands for resistance into a

regional quarrel with Nanjing, that is to say, a regional revolt against the centre.61

Moreover, Jiang was able to manipulate the mass media to convert this quarrel between the

Centre and the region into one of contradictions between region only, i.e. between

Guangdong and Guangxi, or even one of internal dissension within Guangdong itself

58See, for example, Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong de renshi; and Anonymous,

Liangguang panluan neimu. In fact, the Nanjing Government did carry out some measuresin preparing for resistance against Japan. For details see Le Jiaqing and Jiang Tianying,

Ping kangzhan qianxi Guomindang Nanjing zhengfu de kangri zhunbei, FDXB, No. 5,

1987.

59Huiji, pp. 28-9; and Liuyi yulun yiban, Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi

yundong hou Bai Chongxi de yanlun, pp. 268-71. Also see 1936 nian jianbao shanpian,

Archives of the Nationalist Government, Nanjing.

60See 1936 nian jianbao shanpian.

61See Anonymous,Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi, pp. 29-34.


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only.62

Jiang no doubt realized that he could not overtly deny the demands of the

Southwest for resistance; he could not overtly suppress their actions, as these demands and

actions were ultimately justified by events and were an expression of a good deal of

Chinese public opinion. Instead of a military clash with the Southwest, he therefore electedto use the mass media, by condemning the suspect contacts of the Clique with the Japanese

to create the image of a treasonable and devious Southwest leadership.63

Following the

apparent initial success of the above measures, Jiang announced that the Second Plenum of

the 5th Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the GMD was scheduled to be

held in Nanjing in July. He stated that vital decisions would be made at that session.

Through this tactic, he won time to complete his plans to deal with the movement, while

leaving the Clique and the Southwest in limbo.Faced with this unfavourable situation, the Southwest was placed in a passive

position. Under the pressure of Jiang's counter-measure, the Southwest was obliged to

explain their aim as one of asking Nanjing and Jiang Jieshi to take the lead in resistance,

and the Clique had to fall back on the policy of bi-Jiang kangri and to disclaim their

personal purpose of achieving Jiang's downfall.64

Their original scheme having led them

into the trap that Jiang had set for them, the only thing that the Southwest could do to

escape from this was to continue to express the need to resist Japan and force Jiang tocommence the war against Japan. Thus, the policy of bi-Jiang kangri gained emphasis as

a result of the developing situation.

First, the Clique and Chen Jitang worked energetically to break the blockade of

Jiangs censorship and to refute the criticism from Nanjing,65

then to draw sympathy for

62Giu Guo Sh Bao, October 8, 1936.

63In fact, Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi and Liangguang panluan neimu, two

confidential documents of Nanjing published in June 1936, have clearly indicated this

purpose and the measures used against the movement.

64For details of propaganda used in the Guangxi Cliques policies towards Japanese

aggression and urging Nanjing to take the leadership of fighting Japan, seeHuiji, pp. 49-66.

65See Liu Fei, Liangguang, pp. 291-2. Also see Liuyi yulun yiban, in Nanning

Gengsheng baoshe (ed.),Liuyi yundong hou Bai Chongxi de yanlun, pp. 255-279.


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their anti-Japanese stand through increased numbers of circular telegrams as well.66

For

example, Chen Jitang further stated the aim of their action to the mass media in mid-June:

We have also requested Chiang Kai-shek to assume the leadership of our armies

and to lead the way across the Yellow River. But our wire (telegram) has not been

answered. We do not care through what provinces the route lies. Any way that willlead northward will be agreeable.

67

At the same time, Li and Bai continually and frequently telegraphed to Jiang urging him to

lead the resistance. No doubt, all of these were published through the propaganda organs of

the Clique and those which supported it.68

For example, in a circular telegram to Jiang on

June 29, Bai said that he would personally command the Guangxi troops in the field to

follow the former in fighting Japan if Jiang would resolutely lead a national resistance;

furthermore, Bai claimed he would like to be a fighter or a maqian xiaozu

(cats paw) ofJiang at the front.

69Here the Guangxi leaders clearly sent a message to Jiang, i.e. if he

cared to fight Japan, his leadership would be recognized by his most important rival. This

was an expression of the bi-Jiang kangri policy. Moreover, in their telegrams to other

Nanjing leaders, Li and Bai as well as Chen Jitang repeatedly asked them to push Jiang to

proclaim immediately a war against Japan to save the nation.70

Meanwhile, they warned

Jiang that he would shoulder the responsibility of civil war if it really occurred, as he had

not used the Central Army which was stationed in the front line of the provinces close toNorth China to resist Japan but had moved them down to South China in order to wipe out

the forces whose one desire was to fight Japan. They gave Jiang dubious praise by

claiming he was brave in civil war but nervous in resisting foreign aggression.71

In fact,

it became a telegram war between the two sides. This term enunciates a characteristic of

the June 1 Movement. In this way, each side attempted to justify its actions with good

excuses.

66For details of these telegrams, seeHuiji, pp. 49-101.

67Hansu Chan, Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?

68For details of these telegrams, see Huiji. Also see Guangxi gejie kangri jiuguo

lianhehui (ed.),Duiri kangzhan de qiantu, Nanning, July 1936.

69Huiji, p. 57.

70Ibid, pp. 60-6.

71Ibid, p. 52.


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The Clique also used their regional mass media and organized political propaganda

teams to go to the countryside to enlist the support of the people of Guangxi and to inspire

patriotism for national salvation and resentment against Nanjing's non-resistance.72

In the

local region this was quite successful. For example, Zhao Biyun, a girl student of themiddle school at that time, in explanation of her reasons for joining the Student Army

Corp, stated that her motives came from the long-term patriotic education in resisting Japan

and national salvation that she had had since her primary school, and from her discontent

with Jiang's non-resistance against foreign aggression but military suppression of anti-

Japanese forces at home.73

Even in the small villages, a journalist found such propaganda

slogans as Down with Japanese Imperialism and We Will Be Slaves Without A Nation

If (Jiang Jieshi, or Nanjing) Still Maintains Non-Resistance.

74

At the same time, theClique used other mass media sponsored by some minority groups and parties located in

Hong Kong and the Shanghai Concession to support their policy and action.75

They also

sent several senior members of the Southwest authorities to Nanjing to attend the Second

Plenum in July. To strengthen their propaganda campaign, they submitted to the Plenum

five proposals relating to the resistance. These proposals included: 1) immediate

declaration of breaking off relations with Japan; 2) the abrogation of all Sino-Japanese

treaties signed under duress after the September 18 Incident; 3) immediate prevention ofthe increase of the Japanese troops in North China by military force; 4) the guarantee and

support of the freedom of the people's patriotic speech and movement; and 5) the national

general mobilization for resistance against Japan under the leadership of the Central

72For details of the Cliques practice in propaganda, see CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12(September 1936); and Hansu Chan, Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?. Also,Nanning

minguo ribao published many articles and reports during the June 1 Movement.

73Zhao Biyun, Wo de juexin (My Determination), CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12.

74Zhujiang ribao, 9 June 1937.

75Zhonghua minguo guomin geming kangri jiuguojun disi jituanjun zongsilingbu

zongzhengxunchu (ed.), Xinan fadong kangri hou gefang zhi yulun, Nanning, August

1936; and Liuyi yulun yiban, in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.),Liuyi yundong hou Bai

Chongxi de yanlun, pp. 255-279.


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Government.76

In a word, they wanted to use all legal forms in furthering the policy of

forcing Nanjing to fight Japan.

To a considerable extent, this propaganda helped the Clique to consolidate its image

as a firm anti-Japanese group, and won sympathy and support of all other parties andgroups which themselves had insisted on resistance.

77One hundred and fifty-six Huangpu

officers headed by Generals Li Xinjun and Lai Gang lodged a petition with Jiang urging

their xiaozhang (principal) to fight Japan instead of suppressing the anti-Japanese

forces.78

Most of these officers later joined Guangxi.79

Even some units of the Central

Army, such as the 51st Division and 77th Division at that time stationed in Hunan and

Jiangxi separately, turned to support the Southwest in June, as they were discontented with

Jiangs policy of suppressing the anti-Japanese forces, even though these rebels were soonput down and disarmed by Jiang after their uprising.

80

Furthermore, the Clique worked to strengthen the Guangdong-Guangxi alliance.

Only the existence of this alliance could force Jiang to be conciliatory with them and

eventually accept their demands. The two Guang troops allied themselves with Cheng

Jitang as Commander in Chief and Li Zongren as Deputy in late June.81

To maintain the

76Huiji, pp. 110-115.

77See comments of Ma Xiangbo, in Nanning minguo ribao, May 1936; and U. S.

Military, No. 9423 (July 3, 1936); and Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai zizhuan, Harbin:

HLJRMCBS, 1982, pp. 443-4. In his memoirs, T. G. Li also states that the reason for his

heading to Guangxi from Paris in the summer of 1936 for participation of the anti-Japanese

movement was that he was enthusiastic about joining them in Chinas coming struggle

against the Japanese invader. See T. G. Li, A China Past: Military and Diplomatic

Memoirs, Lanham: University Press of America, 1989, p. 46.

78CYGL, No. 2 (July 5, 1936), p. 1. Huangpu officers refer to those who graduated from

the Huangpu Military Academy and held posts in different levels of the Central Army

under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi. Jiang had been Principal of the Huangpu Military

Academy since its establishment in 1924.

79Lai Huipeng, Liuyi shibian jieshu qianhou xin Guixi anpai fashe de liangzhi

lengjian, GXWSZLXJ, No. 4, pp. 152-60. Lai himself was one of these officers, including

Li Xinjun and Lai Gang, defected from Jiang Jieshi.

80Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 30, 1936; andHuiji, p. 42.

81Guangzhou minguo ribao, July 16, 17, 1936; and Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.),

Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, Guangzhou: Guangdong Provincial Archives, 1985, pp. 366-74;

Nanning minguo ribao, July 16, 17, 1936.


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force,86

and then General Yu Hanmou, Commander of the 1st Guangdong Army and a

leader of less importance than Chen Jitang in the Guangdong army, declared himself

against the whole movement. From then on defections increased by leaps and bounds, and

every lukewarm element hastened to leave the sinking ship. The result was that allGuangdong troops, including air force and navy, betrayed Chen Jitang and changed their

loyalty to Jiang after the latter had spent several million dollars.87

Chen reluctantly left

Guangdong on July 18 and headed overseas for a study of foreign affairs, an excuse for

saving his face. Guangdong was finally taken over by Jiangs troops. Li returned to

Guangxi on the same day. Encouraged by this success, Jiang tried to take advantage of the

occasion to wipe out the Clique and move his rivals, both Li and Bai, away from the

province. As a result, the centre of the movement was transferred into Guangxi.There is little doubt that the Clique put its anti-Japanese policy into practice in the

June 1 Movement, with bi-Jiang kangri as its concrete form, and that the movement

reflected the common demand of most people. As was pointed out at that time, in making

the demand on Nanking to resist Japan, Canton (i.e. the Southwest) is not only speaking for

itself, but is actually expressing the sentiment of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese

86See Chen Shaoxiao, Heiwang lu, Hong Kong: ZCCBS, 1966, pp. 75-80; and

Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, p. 419.

87The defection of the Guangdong officers was not only caused by Jiangs silver bullet

policy but also the result that Chen Jitang distrusted his subordinate commanders,

according to Li Jiezhi, a senior commander of the Guangdong troops. Li claims that at that

time they did not believe that Chen could lead them to defeat Jiangs army which was

marching to Guangdong and besieged this province from Hunan, Jiangxi and Fujian. They

also suffered heavily from rumours throughout Guangdong and even outside of the

province that Chen had made some secret deals with the Japanese when he joined forces

with the Guangxi Clique to launch the June 1 Movement. Li Jiezhi adds, they deeply

believed that the movement served the Guangxi Cliques own purposes only. As a result,in their view, Guangdong would be a scapegoat of the Clique. See Guangdong sheng

dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, pp. 414-20. Certainly, some evidences from

materials mentioned above may support all these claims. In fact, reasons for the defection

of these Guangdong generals are various. Namely, it was a result of the mixture of

personal, economic, political reasons and so on. For details of the defection of the

Guangdong generals in the Movement, see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs

of Li Tsung-jen, p. 308; Chen Shaoxiao,Heiwang lu, pp. 75-80; and Lin Hu, Xian shibian

shi Jiang Jieshi xiang liyong wo dao Chen Jitang de yimu, GXWSZL, No. 17, pp. 164-8;

Cheng Siyuan, Liangguang shibian, GXWSZL, No. 22; Chen Cheng, Liangguang liuyi

shibian chuli jingguo, ZJWX, Vol. 53, No. 3; Kan Zonghua, Chen Jitang, Li Zongren,

Bai Chongxi fadong liangguang liuyi shibian jingguo, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1.


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people.88

Although Jiang put enormous pressure on his opponents, his action provided

them with a motive for practicing the bi-Jiang kangri policy more positively and clearly.

When the movement suffered heavy setbacks such as the fall of Chen Jitang in

Guangdong, how did the Clique deal with this crisis and would Li and Bai continue thecourse which they had pursued in their propaganda?

The Attempt to Establish A Broad-Based Anti-Japanese National United Front

There were two options available to the Clique after Chens collapse in the

movement. One was to abandon their action and surrender to Jiang without preconditions.

But, in so doing, the result would justify the image promoted by the Jiang group that themovement was selfish. This was what the Clique strove to avoid.

89Another option was to

continue the movement, even if they failed in the end, so that the nature of the movement

they engaged in would be confirmed as that of determined resistance against Japan, not for

themselves, but in terms of their policy and their demands.90

If so, the result would be

beneficial to the reputation of the Clique, to the saving of face and to the maintenance of

their notable history in the GMD. Their resistance could still make them heroes, as Cai

Tingkai and his 19th Route Army had become in Shanghai in 1932. Obviously, the secondoption coincided with the policies of the Clique and was more easily accepted by it. Under

these circumstances, Nanning, capital of Guangxi, became the centre of practising the bi-

Jiang kangri policy, which brought the June 1 Movement into the second phase.

If Jiang had now kept his promise made to Huang Xuchu in the previous year, he

would have reached reconciliation and cooperation with the Clique in July 1936 instead of

September, in order to unite other groups within the GMD earlier and to concentrate more

energy on dealing with Japanese aggression. If this had happened, the movement wouldhave been already completed. Such an opportunity actually existed at that time.

91Before

he drove Chen out of Guangdong, Jiang stated at the Second Plenum that he and the

88Hansu Chan, Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?

89Wei Yongcheng, Zaitan liuyi yundong,ZJWX, Vol. 37, No. 1, p. 56.

90Liu Fei, Liangguang, pp. 293-4.



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Nanjing Government would maintain the status quo of Guangxi. However, perhaps the fall

of Chen added to Jiang's confidence and determination to eliminate the Clique and also

provided more excuses to the Jiang group to criticize this most dangerous political rival

within the GMD. Perhaps Jiang adopted the suggestion of his political adviser XiongShihui (Chairman of the Provincial Government of Jiangxi at that time) that this was the

right time to finally settle scores with Li and Bai in Guangxi.92

At the same time, his

subordinate generals, particularly those young officers originating from the Huangpu

Military Academy (Huangpu junxiao), were even more radical and keen to teach a lesson

to this opponent.93

Therefore, Jiang altered his original decision and ordered Li to Nanjing

as a member of the Standing Committee of the Military Affairs Council and Bai to

Zhejiang as governor of the provincial government. These were high positions, but actuallywithout any power. To force both Li and Bai to leave Guangxi, Jiang even strengthened his

forces in the encirclement of the province with over 400,000 troops, including those of

Guangxis former ally - the Guangdong troops now under the command of General Yu

Hanmou. In addition, Jiang tried to divide the Clique with the same tactics employed to

subvert Chen Jitang. There is evidence that along with his successful occupation of

Guangdong, Jiang sent millions of dollars in silver bullets over the Guangxi border.94

However, Jiangs efforts were in vain. He also underestimated the power and theinternal consolidation of his rival. All of his efforts in both military blockade and his

silver bullets campaign failed. On the contrary, these inspired the Clique and the people

in Guangxi to greater efforts for consolidation of themselves and insistence on their

previous demands and policy. Within a few days the provincial defence force had

expanded from fourteen to forty-four regiments and the militia was reorganized, ready to

92Ibid. Other sources show that the idea came from Yang Yongtai, Chairman of the

Hubei Provincial Government, and senior member of the Political Studies Faction of

Nanjing. See Liu Fei, Liangguang, p. 294; and Cheng Siyuan, Liangguang shibian, p.

54. Xiong was also a senior member of the Political Studies Faction.

93For details see Luo Ziwen, He Jian. Also see Huang Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No.

126 (October 1, 1962), p. 14.

94U. S. Military, No. 9458 (August 28, 1936).


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engage in battle with Jiangs troops.95

In the judgement of Joseph Stilwell, at a

conservative estimate Kwangsi could put 1,000,000 men in the field, - poorly armed and

equipped, it is true, but fairly good soldiers as Chinese go.96

Only the militia of Guangxi

was an inestimable force. Stilwell emphasized in a report,Aside from her regular troops, Kwangsi depends for defence upon a large well

drilled militia which is spread over the entire province and difficult to estimate, but

it is believed that more than 100,000 could be mobilized and equipped without

great difficulty.97

It seemed that the people of Guangxi became deeply involved in support of their

leaders and the Clique, because they commonly regarded Jiang and his government as a

more fierce and dangerous opponent and they were determined not to allow Jiangs

influence to enter Guangxi.

98

Indeed, according to Stilwell, there is an air of greatenthusiasm all over the province. No objection could be heard anywhere to the policies

which are being followed by the provincial authorities.99

The Guangxi people made an

anti-Japanese pledge to support their leaders and urged the Clique to continue with its

policy. There were even many examples of taking an oath in public meetings to follow the

pledge throughout the entire province.100

Such a consolidation welded the province into a

force which could counter an attack by Jiangs troops. Under these circumstances, Jiang

had to modify his projected measures against the movement.In continuing the bi-Jiang kangri policy and countering possible attacks by Jiang

at this stage, the Clique also sought to maintain and strengthen its contacts with other

parties and groups who were willing to fight Japan. That is to say, they had put the AJNUF

into action during the movement. Its theoretical foundation derived from the scorched earth

resistance policy (as discussed earlier). In their view, once the movement for resisting

95The Guangxi forces were expanded to 200,000 soldiers and reorganized in twenty-one

divisions, which was a powerful force Jiang Jieshi could not underestimate. For details of

the systems and organization of the Guangxi troops during the movement, see Appendix 4.

96U. S. Military, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).

97Ibid, No. 9426 (July 3, 1936).


99U. S. Military, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).

100Nanning minguo ribao, September 2, 1936, p. 1.


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Japan was launched, all parties and groups throughout the country, whatever differences in

political belief held, had a duty to China to form a firm united front to strive for national

liberation. Nanning minguo ribao repeatedly discussed this issue and loudly called for it

during the movement.

101

They believed such a movement should obtain broad support.

102

There were several steps taken by the Clique in the formation of a wide anti-

Japanese united front. First, Guangxi protected freedoms of speech and the press in

contrast to Nanjings restriction of speech and movement that was anti-Japanese. Aside

from the areas under the control of the CCP, Guangxi might claim to be the only place

where anti-Japanese propaganda and mass demonstrations were not interferred by the

government under the flag of the GMD before 1936.103

For example, Chuangjin yuekan

(Pioneer Monthly), organ of the Guangxi troops, even published some speeches and thesesof Karl Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and other popular international Communist politicians, whose

names often appeared in publications of the CCP.104

The Clique used them to serve their

own propaganda, or, perhaps these came from its Brains Trust who were familiar with the

Communist doctrine (as dealt with earlier), as this journal in 1936 was calling for the

formation of the AJNUF to fight Japan. Whatever the underlying reason, there was

projected a generous attitude towards the mass media on the part of the Clique. Shen

Junru, a well-known figure throughout the country at that time, and his organization, i.e. theFederation of the National Salvation Associations (quanguo gejie jiuguohui), expressed

appreciation of this practice,105

which was perhaps the reason for the participation of his

101For example, seeNanning minguo ribao, May 26, 1936, August 16, 1936, October 14,

1936. Also see CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12.

102Huang Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No. 127 (Oct. 16, 1962), p. 16.

103See Liuyi yulun yiban, in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai

Chongxi de yanlun, p. 269;Jiuwang qingbao (Newsletter of National Salvation), July 26,

1936; and Meng Guanghan et al (eds.), Kangzhan shiqi guogong hezuo jishi, Chongqing:

Chongqing chubanshe, 1992, Vol. 1, pp. 104-5 (hereafter as Kangzhan).

104CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 9 (June 1936), pp. 1-5.

105Meng Guanghan et al (eds.), Kangzhan, Vol. 1, pp. 98-109; and Liuyi yulun yiban,

in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai Chongxi de yanlun, pp. 274-

279.


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comrades and this popular organization in support of the June 1 Movement.106

Even

Western observers also recognized that freedom of speech and movement which was anti-

Japanese existed in Guangxi.107

In so doing, according to the Clique itself, it attempted to

achieve a united front in public opinion.

108

As freedom of speech was a major concern of those other groups and parties at that

time, the practice of the Clique attracted much support in those sections of the dissident

media and propaganda organs which had suffered heavily under Jiangs iron censorship.

All bodies concerned with the anti-Japanese cause were moved to assist the Clique in

countering the Jiang groups criticism.109

Meanwhile, personalities and representatives of

all patriotic parties and groups rushed to Guangxi from all directions. In a short period

Guangxi became a medley of voices from various figures with different interests, speakingfor resistance or advocating opposition to Jiang, even seeking positions or ranks in both the

army and the government if an opposition government to Nanjing was to be set up there.110

Indeed, as the Fujian Rebellion before, these people were prepared to form a united

government to carry out their own policy of resistance against Japan, and to oppose Jiang as

well, if he still attempted to suppress the movement. A dangerous anti-Jiang atmosphere

106

For details of the relationship between the Guangxi Clique and the Federation of theNational Salvation Associations, see Chen Dawen, Guixi yu jiuguohui de guanxi,

NNWSZL, No. 5 (1988).

107A. Bisson,Japan in China, New York: The Macmillam Company, 1938, p. 140.

108Nanning minguo ribao, May 26, 1936, p. 3.

109These organs included Dazhong ribao, Chaoran bao, Jiuwang qingbao, Yongsheng

Weekly, Giu Guo Sh Bao, and others published in the foreign concessions, Hong Kong, and

overseas. For details see Zhonghua minguo guomin gemingjun disi jituanjun zong silingbu

zong zhengxunchu (ed.),Xinan fadong kangri hou gefang zhi yulun, Nanning, 1936; andLiuyi yulun yiban, in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.),Liuyi yundong hou Bai Chongxi

de yanlun.

110These people were representatives of the following parties and groups: the Hu Hanmin

Faction, the Reorganization Faction, the Li Jishen Faction, the Federation of National

Salvation Associations and its branches in many provinces, the CCP, the former 19th Route

Army,Zhonghua minzu geming tongmeng (the Chinese National Revolutionary Coalition),

Shengchan renmindang (the Productive Peoples Party), the Third Party, Zhonghua zhiye

jiaoyushe (the Chinese Professional Education Association), the Rural Reconstruction

Faction, the Chinese Youth Party, the Democratic Socialist Party, and other public figures

without party affiliation. For details see Liu Fei, Liangguang, p. 295.


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existed in Guangxi. Li and Bai were, of course, willing to encourage this even if they did

not expect it to culminate in a military clash with Jiang and his Central troops. According

to Liu Fei, who later became the person who carried the messages between the Guangxi

leaders and Jiang for a peaceful settlement of their differences in the movement, this was alla tactic of Li and Bai to counter the pressure from Jiang.

111Whatever the reason, it

indicated that such a broad united front formed in Guangxi, at least partially, from aversion

to Jiang's high pressure policy against the Clique.

At the same time, the Clique strengthened its contact with the CCP in the

movement, to counter Jiangs pressure and to plan for possible joint resistance. Apart from

frequent meetings between their representatives, there were permanent contacts both within

and outside the province.

112

The most important result was a draft agreement worked outwith the CCP in forming an alliance for resistance and for forcing Jiang to resist Japan as

well.113

Although there is no corroborative evidence at present to show the detailed

contents of the entire agreement, the event itself indicated that the Clique paid great

attention to the CCP in their search for partners in concerted action. Here the CCP and the

Red Army were believed by the Guangxi leaders to be the most important force in

compelling Jiang to give up his plan of eliminating the Clique, but to accept the demands of

the latter. Furthermore, the former were regarded as a balanced force between the Cliqueand Jiang, as Bai once foretold in 1934 when the Guangxi troops were ordered to check the

Red Army passing through the Guangxi border from Jiangxi for the Long March:114

only

111Liu Fei, Liangguang, pp. 293-4.

112See Yun Guangying, Liuyi; and the same writer, Teshu shiming, GMSZL, No. 10.

Yun was the representative of the Red Army under the CCP and came from northern

Shaanxi. Before the movement, the Clique sent its representative Liu Zongrong to Tianjin

to establish contact with the CCP. See Liu Zongrong, Huiyi wo zai guixi gongzuo shi de

jijianshi, WSZLXJ, No. 73.

113See Wenjian xuanbian, pp. 278-9. For details of discussion of the agreement, see

Chapter Five of this thesis.

114For details of the Guangxi troops' checking the Red Army coming from Jiangxi by

passing through the Guangxi border for Guizhou and then northward, see Zhonggong

Guilin diwei (ed.), Hongjun changzheng guo Guangxi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1986; Mo

Wenhua,Huiyi hongqijun, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1979; Quanguo zhengxie wenshi ziliao

yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), Weizhui dujie hongjun changzheng qinli ji: yuan Guomindang

jiangling de huiyi, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1990; and recollections of Tang Yao and YanDaogang in the Bibliography of this thesis.


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the existence of the CCP and the Red Army could guarantee our survival.115

It is safe to

say that the establishment of close contact with the CCP undoubtedly added confidence to

the Clique in confronting Jiang, and was an important factor in reaching a final conciliation

with Jiang Jieshi and joint forces between them for resistance against Japan.Furthermore, reorganization of the 19th Route Army in the province to form an

alliance with the Clique was another important counter-measure against Jiang.116

The

reputation of the 19th Route Army, won in fighting Japan in 1932, was legendary, and the

alliance between this army and the Guangxi troops indicated determination to resist further

invasion. This expanded strength added confidence to the Guangxi people, and was a

convincing warning to Jiang against military action.

While the Clique speeded up the formation of the AJNUF, a rumour spreadthroughout the entire country that Li and Bai would unite with other parties and groups

which opposed Nanjing, and form a military government in Guangxi with the aim of

resistance against both Japan and Jiang.117

The choice of persons in the planning of such a

government, including Li Jishen and former leaders of the Fujian Rebellion, had in fact

been already prepared for.118

If Jiang pushed his Central troops further into the province of

Guangxi, the Clique would immediately declare the establishment of this new government

in Nanning. Of course, this was a tactic of the Clique. Once irrevocably committed to thepolicy of calling for resistance, the Clique had to declare its intention to meet a real or

115Tang Yao, Hongjun changzheng zhong Bai Chongxi kaifang Xiang-Gui bianjing de

neimu, GXWSZL, No. 17, p. 162.

116For details of the reorganization of the 19th Route Army, see Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai

zizhuan, pp. 441-6; and Lin Yiyuan, Liangguang liuyi shibian zhong shijiu lujun yidu

zai-Gui huifu de jingguo, GDWSZLXJ, No. 3 (1961), pp. 150-5. This army was disarmedby Jiang Jieshi after he defeated the Fujian Rebellion early in 1934. For details see Wang

Shunsheng et al, Fujian Shibian, Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1982; Xue Moucheng

and Zheng Quanbei (eds.), Fujian shibian ziliao xuanbian, Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin

chubanshe, 1983; Cai Tingkai, Huiyi shijiu lujun zai-Min fan-Jiang shibai jingguo,

WSZLXJ, No. 59; Jiang Guangnai, Dui shijiu lujun yu Fujian shibian de buchong, ibid,

No. 59; and Xu Xiqing, Fujian renmin zhengfu yundong, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1 (1961).

117Shenbao, June 13, 1936, p. 3.

118Liu Fei, Liangguang, pp. 295-302; and Huang Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No. 127, pp.

18-9.


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invented public demand for the formation of a united government willing to fight Japan.119

Although this planned government was never established, it seemed that a united front for

national salvation had already appeared in Guangxi. According to the writers of the Clique,

the existence of a united front was proclaimed to act as a coalition against the Chinesetraitors front (hanjian zhenxian) which appeased Japanese aggression but suppressed the

internal elements and forces who wanted to fight Japan.120

Actual war between the two parties was finally averted when Jiang decided to

compromise with the Guangxi leaders. Perhaps Jiang had known that, if a civil war against

Guangxi occurred, it would be a prolonged one.121

If so, before he defeated the Clique,

Jiang would face another vital threat from the CCP, which was planning to form a similar

government as that planned in Guangxi by joining forces with both Yang HuchengsXibeijun and Zhang Xueliangs Dongbeijun in the Northwest.

122If this happened, it was

possible that his rule would be shaken to its foundations. At the critical time, some GMD

veterans with potential influence in both military and political circles, such as Cheng Qian,

Feng Yuxiang, Zhu Peide, Ju Zheng, and Huang Shaohong, persuaded Jiang to compromise

with the Clique, and played the role of intermediary between the two sides.123

The Clique

had thus successfully used the consolidation of Guangxi and its influence in the practice of

the AJNUF, in fact, to form a threat strong enough to compel Jiang to sit down and to talk

119For details see the discussions ofGiu Guo Sh Bao at the end of 1935 and in the early

of 1936.

120CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12.

121Huang Shaohong told Jiang that the Guangxi Clique would not be easy to defeat and

might resist an external attack for over three months or more according to historical

experience, and the morale of the Clique and consolidation of the interior, as well as thevaried topography of Guangxi. See Huang Shaohong, Wushi Huiyi, p. 310. Also see Yong

Sou (pseud., i.e. Zheng Renmin), Jiang-Li diyici lihe neimu, CQ, No. 62 (February 1,

1960), p. 5.

122Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, pp. 171-81.

123Liu Fei, Liangguang, pp. 296-302; Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of

Li Tsung-jen, p.310; Huang Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No. 127, p. 19; and Guiju dayou

zhuanji (A favourable turn for the situation of Guangxi), GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 35; and

Guiju heping jiejue jingguo (The story of the peaceful settlement of the situation in

Guangxi), GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 37.


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with Li and Bai.124

Showing his flexibility to seize the moment to compromise, Jiang

ordered all Central Government and Guangdong troops to withdraw fifty li125

from the

Guangxi border in order to avoid clashes, and the Guangxi leaders began to talk with their

old rival.

126

After discussions between the two parties through Liu Fei and other politiciansand militarists, the main points of the terms that Li and Bai put forth to end their radical

action against Jiang instead of compromise with the latter are as follows:

1) The Central Government reaffirms the freedom of the anti-Japanese

movement, speech, publication, and assembly.

2) The Central Government promises that China will prepare for resistance

positively based on the present situation existing between China and Japan.

If the Japanese advance one more inch, China will carry out the nationwide

resistance. Once resistance begins, Guangxi will immediately send its

troops to join in.3) Nanjing should make the anti-Japanese plan and schedule, and must carry it

out as soon as possible.

4) The status quo of Guangxi should be maintained and Nanjing should assist

the Guangxi troops with military expenditure.

5) Nanjing should provide three designations of the army (jun) to the Guangxi

troops and ensure Li Zongrens commandership.

6) After the achievement of the agreement above, Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi

will pledge allegiance to the leadership of Jiang Jieshi by a circular

telegram.127

In addition, except that item 3 above should be kept secret as military intelligence,the Clique insisted that Jiang must announce these terms to the public by a speech to show

his trustworthiness. Although there was some small retrogression from their original

demand of immediate resistance, these terms still basically reflected the efforts of the

Clique in forcing Jiang to the stage of resistance, and showed that the Guangxi leaders were

realists in the Chinese political game - avoiding too drastic action to cause a result being


125One li = 500 meters.

126For details that suggest Jiang Jieshi took action on his own initiative in peaceful

settlement of the differences between himself and the Guangxi leaders in August 1936, see

Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, pp. 91-3; Liu Fei, Liangguang, pp. 296-302; and U. S.

Military, No. 9458 (August 28, 1936), and No. 9460 (September 11, 1936). Also see

Chongqing shi dangan guan (ed.), Liangguang liuyi shibian hou Jiang Jieshi yu Li Zongren

deng laiwang handian,LSDA, No. 4, 1987, pp. 75-9 (hereafter as Handian).

127Liu Fei, Liangguang, pp. 297-8; and Chen Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, pp. 91-4; and

Huang Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No. 127, p. 19.


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contrary to their original intention. It also indicated that the achievements of the practice in

the AJNUF was in fact a tactic used by the Clique to force a compromise with Jiang. In

the end, the latter adopted all terms demanded by the former in early September.128

Moreover, to show his willingness to unite all other political figures of the GMD, forresistance, Jiang even ordered the wanted circular on Generals Li Jishen and Chen Mingshu

to be repealed, and pardoned them for having fomented the Fujian Rebellion in 1933 and

for having insisted on resisting Japan and opposing Jiang (i.e. kangri fan-Jiang) after

this.129

The result of the June 1 Movement indicates that, in most respects the Clique

achieved its objectives of bi-Jiang kangri. A number of writers suggest that the success

of the Clique in the promotion of the AJNUF was largely due to the CCP.

130

However, thedevelopment of modern Chinese history indicates that the formation of the AJNUF was a

reflection of the context, a requirement which many parties and groups, not the CCP only,

had called for from time to time. It is true that the CCP worked out the famous slogan -

anti-Japanese national united front - in 1935, which led this party not only to survive at

the eleventh hour but also to strengthen itself in the Sino-Japanese war until it successfully

overthrew the rule of the Nationalists on the mainland in 1949.131

There is no

corroborative evidence to show any close affinity with the CCP in the actions of the Clique,even though both advocated similar policies but different tactics. For example, both of

them pushed for the formation of a united government or a national defence government for

resistance.132

In fact, the positions and policies of all parties and groups who insisted on

resistance against Japan were influenced by each other. In the case of the June 1

128See The major events of the week, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 38, p. 1.

129U. S. Military, No. 9458 (August 28, 1936).

130For example, see articles written by Wang Jingxia, Zhang Qi, Shi Shunjin, Luo

Yunshu, Li Ming, Lu Jiaxiang, Guo Xiaohe, Luo Jianing, Gu Guanlin, Cao Yuwen, Cao

Guangzhe, Chen Mingzhong, Li Jingzhi, Zhang Meiling, Zhang Guangchuan, Xia Chao,

Wang Qingshan and Deng Xueyi, in the Bibliography of this thesis.

131For detailed discussion of the CCPs road to the final victory based on the AJNUF, see

Kui-Kwong Shum, Chinese Communists Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National

United Front, 1935-1945, Hong Kong and London: Oxford University Press, 1988.

132For details of these discussions of the Clique, see CJYK, Vol. 3, Nos. 8 and 9, 11-12.


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Movement, the work of the Clique in the formation of the AJNUF was, to a great extent, on

their own initiative. The CCP preferred at that time to form a national united front with the

lower and middle classes in resisting both Japan and Jiang (fan-Jiang kangri).133

The result

of the movement indicated that reconciliation or unity with Jiang for resistance had beenthe purpose of the Clique in the formation of the AJNUF, i.e. bi-Jiang kangri, although

preparation for fan-Jiang kangri proceeded during the movement, in case Jiang refused

reconciliation. The Clique always treated Jiang as an important element of the AJNUF.

This was perhaps a stance which suited their propaganda, for both the Clique and Jiang

were always more likely to compromise than Jiang and the CCP. As Li Zongren said on

June 8, 1936,

If the Central Government resists Japan, of course it is the fortune of our nation,because we are willing to unite all of the people for fighting Japan with one mind.

If now they still hesitate, we simply must resist Japan by ourselves.134

The performance of the Clique in the Sino-Japanese War proved that Li and the Guangxi

troops not only put forth the political rhetoric for resistance themselves but also put it into

execution.135

As Diana Lary emphasizes, while fighting in central China, the Guangxi

troops acquitted themselves well - far better than the majority under Nankings

command136

throughout the War.

It was also a factor that the Clique, from 1931 onward, strove to build up and

develop its relationships and cooperation with other GMD factions, in particular, with those

of the Southwest region (as discussed in Chapter Five), in order to foster resistance to the

Japanese.

The Clique's AJNUF served the purpose of bi-Jiang kangri, which was the key to

all parties and groups who later came under Jiangs leadership for resistance, whether they

were willing or not. In this sense, the AJNUF of the Clique was beneficial to resistance,

whatever the motive. Many writers recognize that the Clique practiced the policy of bi-

133

For details of speeches and resolutions of the CCP in the formation of a national

united front for fan-Jiang kangri, see Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, pp. 1-166.

134Li Zongren, Kangri jiuguo de zhengzhi baogao, in Meng Guanghan et al (eds.),

Kangzhan, p. 291.

135Cheng Siyuan,Zhenghai mixin, pp. 155-156.

136Diana Lary,Region and Nation, p. 206.


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Jiang kangri in the movement, but they attribute it to the influence and collusion of the

CCP, or believe it was only with the assistance of the Communists.137

However, that was

not the case.

CCP documents before the June 1 Movement emphasized the anti-Japanese andopposition to Jiang policy as their main task, although they called for a national united

front. Theoretically, this united front was based on a national defence government in which

the CCP would be the

Documents

Su PhD thesis - 15 Chapter 8