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CHAPTER FIVE

RELATIONS BETWEEN LI AND THE SOUTHWEST REGIONAL FACTIONS

There had been continuing internal conflicts within the GMD from the moment of

its establishment. The conflicts, particularly after the Northern Expedition, concentrated

either on the struggle for power between the Central Government at Nanjing and the

regions, or on differences of political lines and policies; sometimes it was a mixture of

both. Hence, these conflicts had a great impact on the rise and fall of some GMD factions,

and on the policy-making of different parties and factions. All this suggests that a priority

for internal political unity of the GMD was to settle the debates and conflicts over domestic

and external affairs with other parties and factions outside the GMD.

As leader of a strong faction with military power, Li Zongren had been voluntarily

or involuntarily involved in these conflicts since he came to power in Guangxi. Thus, his

relations with other factions and leading figures of the GMD, particularly with Guangxis

neighbouring provinces, the southwest regional factions, had a great effect on both his and

the Guangxi Cliques fortunes in central and regional power structures, and also affected

his relations with Jiang Jieshi. The fact that the Clique revived its force after it was

defeated by Jiang in central China in 1929 and became the major opposition to Jiang after

then shows the importance of such relations in factional conflicts.

The aim of this chapter is to analyze and account for Lis and the Cliques relations

with the southwest regional factions within the GMD. It also studies the impact of these

relations on the Cliques actions in the decade before the War of Resistance and the role of

such relations in the approach to internal political unity of the GMD, an essential

prerequisite to national political unity when China was seeking a way to resist Japanese

aggression.


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The Role of Relations between Li and the Southwest Regional Factions in the Process

of the Internal Political Unity of the GMD

1. Definition of the Southwest Regional Faction

Factional struggles had existed throughout the Republican era. Before the Northern

Expedition, these struggles concentrated on control over the Central power in Beijing.1

During the Nanjing period, the struggles between central and regional factions were very

sharp. The so-called region (difang), in plain terms, is the opposite of the center

(zhongyang). In this sense, the region mainly means provinces. Therefore, the regional

faction was made up of the military and political leaders and cliques who controlled

particular territories (usually one or more provinces) and military forces with certain power.

Many writers trace regional factions of modern China back to the Taiping Rebellion, and

some suggest the regionalism created by the Beiyang warlords group created by Yuan

Shikai.2

Whatever the case, regional factions had existed before the establishment of the

Republic. However, regional factions which claimed to believe in a certain ideology, and

to have a concern with both national and regional affairs and interests, was the phenomenon

typical in the Republican era, particularly in the Nanjing decade. Therefore, regional

factions of the GMD originated, not during the Sino-Japanese War period as some Chinese

scholars have suggested,3

but during the Expedition, and grew in the Nanjing decade. First,

before the Expedition, China was dominated by different warlords (or militarists), who

supported different regimes in both the north and south. But regional factions, particularly

those in the Southwest, grew from the chaos and wars of this area caused by the fall of the

1For a thorough discussion of the formation of factions and their conflicts in modern

China during 1918-1928, see Andrew Nathan, Peking Politics, 1918-1923: Factionalism in

Chinese Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, pp. 27-90.

2See Jerome Chen, Yuan Shih-kai, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972; Ernest P.

Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-kai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early

Republican China, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1977; Andrew Nathan,

Peking Politics; and Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin,Jiang Jieshi yu xinan difang shili pai,

Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1990.

3Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin,Jiang Jieshi yu xinan difang shili pai, p. 2.


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Qing dynasty and the establishment of the Republic in 1911,4

and they only accepted the

GMDs regime nominally following the launching of the Expedition in 1926.5

In other

words, the feeling of political regionalism was stronger in the Southwest.6

This area also

was the main base of the GMD before the Expedition.

7

Secondly, these factionsmaintained semi-independence from the Nanjing regime under the slogans of power

sharing in the region and opposing Jiangs centralization or dictatorship. They differed

from the warlords or militarists in the Beiyang period who usually attempted to control the

Central government in Beijing. In appearance, the state of semi-independence was similar

to the federalist movement popular in the early 1920s in the Southwest.8

But the factions in

this area claimed Sun Yatsens ideas of regional self-government (difang zizhi) as the

guideline of their actions and actually, to some extent, carried out policies for that,particularly at the levels of county and township, as in Guangxi.

9Furthermore, regional

4For detailed discussion of the origin and development of these factions, see Guo Xuyin

(ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, Shanghai: SHRMCBS, 1992; and Mo Shixiang,

Hufa yundong shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1990.

5For details of relationship between the Southwest regional factions and the Nationalist

Government at Guangzhou and Nanjing later, see Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, Jiang

Jieshi yu xinan difang shili pai.

6Guo Jianlin, Luelun xinan gesheng zizhi chaoliu he feidu caibing de husheng,

XNJFSYJCK, No. 3.

7For details see Mo Shixiang,Hufa yundong shi.

8The Federalist Movement was for a federation of autonomous provinces and was

practised in the provinces in the Southwest, particularly in Hunan, following the first world

war when China seemed lost in anarchy. This movement was similar to that of the

Southwests semi-independence from Nanjing in regional autonomy, but different from

their origins and purposes. The former wanted to get China into a united nation through theway of federation and was a reflection of national anarchy. The Southwests semi-

independence or regional self-government was the result of the Central Governments

impotent control over this area and was aimed at sharing power with the Jiang group in the

region and sharing the leadership of the Central Government by overthrowing Jiangs rule

if any opportunity came, such as the Guangxi Clique did so. For details of the Federalist

Movement, see Jean Chesneaux, The Federalist Movement, 1920-23, in Jack Gray (ed.),

Modern Chinas Search for a Political Form, London: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp.

96-137. Also see Guo Jianlin, Luelun xinan gesheng zizhi chaoliu he feidu caibing

husheng,XNJFSYJCK, No. 3, pp. 48-67.

9

For a thorough discussion of the achievements of Guangxi in regional self-government,see Chu Hongyuan, Woguo jindai minzhu zhengzhi de gean yanjiu: Guangxi sheng de


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factions in the Nanjing decade were concerned with not only regional economic

reconstruction but also national affairs, particularly the issue of Japanese aggression. This

phenomenon was particularly typical in the Southwest.

It can be seen from the above that the Southwest Regional Faction means that: 1)they were groups with political and military power which originated in the regions in the

Republican period and developed and strengthened in the Nanjing decade; 2) those groups

had long historical relations with the GMD for they were its main supporters from its

inception, and it relied on the regions as a base to expand its influence over the country; 3)

these groups were semi-independent from the GMD regime since its establishment in

Guangzhou in the early 1920s; and 4) these groups were to oppose Jiang over power

sharing (junquan) with the Jiang group in the regions, and to differ with Jiang over hisresponse to Japanese aggression.

The Southwest regional factions in the Republic comprised the ruling groups based

on the provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Guangxi, and sometimes Hunan and

Guangdong as well. They held political power and military forces in these provinces. They

also maintained semi-independence from Nanjing in opposing Jiang. The Southwest is

traditionally a geographic term. Its provinces have always had close connections in

economics and geopolitics as they border on each other. The Southwest also embraces adistinctive culture. Most of the provinces in this region have similar dialects and cultural

traditions. Guangxi is in the intermediary position, sharing both Cantonese and Sichuan-

Guizhou-Yunnan dialect (xinan guanhua) - the Southwest Mandarin, which gives Guangxi

a favourable advantage through links with speakers of both. Culture and geopolitics in the

Southwest determined to a great extent its closer internal relations and cooperation, as well

as opposition to Jiang.

2. The Role of the Southwest Regional Factions in the Internal Political Unity of the GMD

After 1912 China experienced a period of instability and chaos following the

destruction of the Qing regime. The Central Government failed to win loyalty from the

xuebu minzhu, 1907-1937,Zhengzhi kexue luncong (Taipei), No. 1 (March 1990), pp. 89-

124; Chu Hongyuan, 1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian,

ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17B (December 1988), pp. 307-53; and Chu Hongyuan, Woguo

sifa xiandaihua de gean yanjiu: Guangxi sifa de chuqi xiandaihua, 1907-1937, Keji

zhenghe xuebao, No. 1, 1991, pp. 16-33.


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regions and had only weak control over the country. In such circumstances, political

separatism and a strong feeling of political regionalism gradually developed, particularly in

the Southwest, which led to an upsurge of regional militarism.10

In a sense, this was a

reflection of the struggle for power between different political and interest groups after thecollapse of the Qing. As a result, the government, made up of these groups, was unable to

exert effective control over national affairs.11

Although they maintained a lukewarm

political relationship with the Central Government before 1935, when Nanjing started to

pursue a policy of peaceful reunification in the Southwest, militarists in this area had long

had a great impact on Chinas political situation and its development. During the early

Republican period, for example, Southwest militarists were actively involved in such

important domestic events as the huguo (the National Protection) and the hufa (theConstitution Protection) movements. A reason why they were so active in that period was

that they aspired to make themselves national leaders, because most of them were members

of the Tongmenghui, and the Southwest was the base of the Tongmenghui, which had

endeavoured to overthrow the Qing Dynasty. It was also because they were dissatisfied

with their positions in national affairs, for Yuan Shikai and the Beiyang warlords (or

militarists) had successively dominated the Beijing regime after the fall of the Qing. This

was very important for the Southwest militarists because it planted the seeds of their laterstruggle with Jiang, who controlled the GMD authorities and the Nanjing Government.

Meanwhile, it became a process in which all parties and factions were being continually

divided and recombined.12

That is to say, this was a preparatory period for political

unification of the country. The Northern Expedition was a significant expression of the

10For a detailed discussion of provincial politically centrifugal force emanating from the

Central Government, see Chen Zhirang (Jerome Chen),Junshen zhengquan, Hong Kong:SLSD, 1979, pp. 16-23.

11For a thorough discussion of the struggle for power in the Beiyang warlord regime, see

Andrew Nathan, Peking Politics,; and Hsi-sheng Chi, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-

1928, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976. On the situation of the Guangzhou

regime before the Northern Expedition in 1926, see Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao

qingdang, Taipei: Xueshu zhuzuo jiangzhu weiyuanhui, 1966; and Mo shixiang, Hufa

yundong shi.

12For a detailed analysis of this process, see Hsi-sheng Chi, Warlord Politics in China,

1916-1928, Chapter 9.


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aspirations of the various groups and influences towards national reunification under one

central government, the symbol of political unity of the nation.

The Expedition achieved nominal national reunification under the Nationalist

regime, but failed in the issue of political unity in the country. One main reason wasJiangs pursuit of centralization. Under Jiangs centralization, the interests of regional

leaders and regional development were not served. As a result, there was poor motivation

for the internal political unity of the GMD and national political unity in much of the

country. The other reason was the GMDs failure to ward off foreign imperialism after the

establishment of the Nanjing Government. The nation was soon confronted with renewed

Japanese aggression, and in response to the national crisis, Jiang carried out a policy which

did not lead the nation to resist Japan first, but which insisted on eliminating the oppositionfactions within and outside the GMD first - the policy of domestic pacification before

external war. Whether the policy was correct or incorrect is beyond the scope of this

thesis. But it is clear that the policy did not meet the needs of the national political situation

at that time. Even some pro-GMD historians in Taiwan, such as Guo Tingyi, admit that the

policy "was not allowed to be carried out by the circumstances".13

The regionalist

development in the 1930s, particularly that of the Clique, was actually, to some extent,

based on opposition to the policy and on common demands for regional cooperation andreconstruction.

However, this is not to say that regionalism was of no benefit at all to the internal

political unity of the GMD. It at least moved slowly towards that goal in two important

aspects. First, the political and military regionalists in each province focused on provincial

reconstruction in economic, political, and other fields, for which they worked out a series of

reconstructive plans. To a certain extent the achievements of some provinces such as

Shanxi, Guangxi and Guangdong were remarkable.

14

The efforts of regionalists led local

13Guo Tingyi, Jindai Zhongguo shigang, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press,

1982, p. 623.

14For detailed discussion of the achievements of Shanxi province under Yan Xishan in

reconstruction, see Donald Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province 1911-1949,

Princeton University Press, 1967; and for details of the same issue of Guangdong under

Chen Jitang, see John Fitzgerald, Increased Disunity: The Politics and Finance of

Guangdong Separatism, 1926-1936, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 (October

1990), pp. 745-75.


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people to a belief in regional reconstruction and laid a foundation for national political and

economic development with measures applicable to local conditions.

Secondly, these regionalists paid great attention to regional or provincial

cooperation. In particular, they created political and military allies in the Southwest toensure implementation of their own policies in both economic and cultural development of

the provinces. It forced Jiang to pay attention to what was going on with regional interests

and to start to acknowledge regional characteristics. As a result, in dealing with

regionalists, Jiang gradually carried out a policy of compromise with other factions within

the GMD instead of that of his centralization. These factors created an atmosphere for the

Southwest regional factions to form their own policies and to look after their common

interests in the regions through strengthening relations between them. Mass mobilizationin the regions and regional military cooperation between the provinces in the Southwest

strengthened and supported these factions in this area to vie with Jiang for power.

Meanwhile, they awakened the political consciousness of the masses which was

transformed from regionalism to nationalism. With the promotion of anti-imperialism and

national salvation, once the regionalists accepted conciliation with the main faction in the

Central government, regionalism began to support internal unity for the GMD and then

national political unity. In so doing, a common interest and the demand for national action,such as resistance against external aggression and the formation of a sub-national political

system which involved regional cooperation and some new policies applied to the local

conditions (and in this, Guangxi was a good example), served to promote the internal

political unity of the GMD.

3. The Impact of Relations between Regional Factions on the Li-Jiang Conflict

A good relationship with the Southwest first gave Li a chance to revive his fortunes

in Guangxi after he was defeated by Jiang in central China in 1929. Freed from the military

threat from the factions in neighbouring provinces, Li found enough time to consolidate

and reconstruct his base - Guangxi, a popular model province in the 1930s. This region

then became the weapon which Li and the Clique used to criticize Jiangs slow progress


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towards reconstruction.15

In a sense, reconciliation between Li and Jiang in 1936, in the

eyes of the public, meant the end of open internal conflict in the GMD. A good

relationship with the Southwest contributed to strengthening Li in both his conflict and

reconciliation with Jiang.This stability in the region formed by mutual cooperation, particularly in Guangxi,

created a favourable environment in which Li could safely introduce his policies in

Guangxi. The policies were worked out by Li and other leaders of the Clique, as they

pursued their own reconstruction and mass mobilization in the province in accordance with

the local conditions without attracting any physical GMD pressure as Nanjing left Guangxi

alone. It contributed to a great extent to Guangxis achievements in political, economic,

military, educational, and social reconstruction and development, and ensured continuity ofthe policies.

16

Furthermore, Lis relations with other regional factions in the Southwest disturbed

the rapid spread of Jiangs influence in this region, and made Jiangs policy to eliminate

regionalists and to centralize under himself more difficult. However, Lis cooperation with

the Southwest militarists was also based on concern for the serious national crisis. Li and

the Clique were genuinely committed to saving their nation through regional development

and cooperation, even though they to some extent paid lip service to the wishes of thecentral government, and certainly aimed at retaining power in their own regions or

province.

15Diana Lary,Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937,

London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 196. Eugene Levich also points out that

Guangxi leaders planned to create a model of national resistance and development as an

example for the rest of China to follow, which was to be, the Clique seemed to hope, a

source of fatal embarrassment for Jiang Jieshi. See Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way inKuomintang China, 1931-1939, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993, p. 28.

16For detailed discussion and revaluation of Guangxis reconstruction in the 1930s, see

Diana Lary, Region and Nation, pp. 164-93; Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way; Chu

Hongyuan, 1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian,ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b;

Mo Jijie and Chen Fulin (eds.), Xin Guixi shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1991; and Shen

Xiaoyuan,Li Zongren de yisheng, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1992. Also see Guangxi sheng

zhengfu shinian jingji jianshe bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.), Guizheng jishi, Guilin, 1946; Hu

Lin (Leng Guan) et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935;

Liang Wenwei et al, Guangxi yinxiang ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935; and Li

Zongren (et al), Guangxi zhi jianshe, Guilin: GXJSYJH, 1939.


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With the motive force of national salvation and anti-Japanese imperialism, regional

cooperation gradually constructed a sub-national political system under the banner of the

political unity for the nation, which drove Jiang to abandon the policy of reunifying the

Southwest militarily and to carry out peaceful reunification or conciliation instead. Inreturn for this concession, the Southwest militarists including Li and the Guangxi leaders

accepted Jiangs leadership of the country and of the War of Resistance. Jiangs new

rapport with the Southwest militarists ended the open internal conflict in the GMD. This

was a prelude to national conciliation and led to the formation of the Anti-Japanese

National United Front (AJNUF), a prerequisite to political unity in the whole nation.

Clearly, the good relationship between Li and the other powerful Southwest militarists was

an important factor in forcing Jiang to seek conciliation on the internal unity of the GMD,and allowing progress towards the political unity of the entire country.

Factors Affecting the Relationship between the Southwest Regional Factions

Guangxi borders on Guangdong, Hunan, Guizhou and Yunnan provinces. Since its

formation, the Guangxi Clique had paid considerable attention to its relations with the

neighbours, towards whom it carried out a policy of mutual aid and cooperation tostrengthen its position on the Chinese political stage or to implement its political plans

within and outside the province.17

Such a relationship was extremely important to the

Clique after 1929, when it was defeated by Jiang in its struggle for Central power and was

then forced to return to Guangxi. Having the support and cooperation from its

neighbouring provinces was an important factor for Li and the Clique to continue to

challenge Jiang's power and to carry out their own policies in the province.

Several factors contributed to Lis relationships with the other Southwest regionalfactions. On the one hand, since 1932 there were the two organizations - the Southwest

Branch of the Central Executive Committee and the Southwest Political Council of the

Nationalist Government - which existed in Guangzhou until 1936 (also called Xinan

liang jiguan - the two Southwest organizations), with Guangdong and Guangxi provinces

as its mainstays. The two organizations became the opposition to Jiang. Through the

17See Cheng Siyuan,Zhengtan huiyi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1983, Chapter Four.


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organizations, Guangxi gained legal protection in the GMD and made itself semi-

independent of Nanjing. Seizing the chance, Li and other leaders of the Clique worked on

internal consolidation and reconstruction in Guangxi, so the policy of goodwill with

neighbours and absolute sincere unity with them became an important aspect of theCliques reconstruction and development in the province.

18On the other hand, although

Guangxi ended its open revolt against Nanjing in 1929-1931, it was still on its guard

against Jiang, who was widely believed to have plans to wipe out those factions and

political figures who held different views from him in the GMD. Furthermore, owing to

differences between the Clique and the Jiang group in internal and external affairs, the

conflict between the two parties had never ceased. Naturally, there was a need to

strengthen association and cooperation with all forces for Lis struggle against Jiang. Inaddition, maintaining friendly relations with the neighbouring provinces could frustrate

Jiangs attempts to blockade and isolate Guangxi.

Apart from the possibility of conflict with Jiang on the national level, several

reasons committed Li to carry out the policy of goodwill with neighbours. First, since

Guangxi was a relatively poor province, it could not maintain a massive military force.

Rapid expansion of troops would obstruct Guangxis economic development and create

turmoil, such as had occurred in 1921-1925 after the fall of the Lu Rongting group andfrequent invasion by the neighbouring provincial troops.

19Bai Chongxi repeatedly warned

of such possibilities in those years.20

After 1932, Guangxi maintained only two armies

(jun) with fourteen regiments (totalling less than 20,000 men). Even so, its expenditure on

armaments was still more than 50% of the total of the provincial budget.21

Hence, a good

relationship with neighbours to a great extent helped to reduce Guangxis expenditure on

armaments.

18Bai Chongxi, Kangri jiaogong he qinren shanlin, Bai fuzongsiling yanjiang ji,

Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, p. 52.

19For details of the situation of Guangxi at that time, see Mo Jijie and Chen Fulin (eds.),

Xin Guixi shi, pp. 1-105. Also see Huang Zongyan, Lun Sun Zhongshan 1921 nian yuan-

Gui tao-Lu zhizhan, GXSHKX, No. 3, 1986, pp. 52-67.

20See Xiao Yuan (pseud.), Ji Lu Rongting, GWZB, Vol. XIII, Nos. 12-14 (30 March, 6

April, and 13 April, 1936); and Bai Chongxi, Sanyu zhengce, Bai Chongxi xiansheng

zuijin yanlun ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1936, p. 174.

21Guangxi nianjian (First Issue), 1933, p. 622.


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Secondly, in the early Republican period the mood of excluding outsiders was in

vogue. Under the slogan of natives of the province ruling their own provincial affairs,

outsiders or outside influences (or armies) found it very difficult to set foot in provinces

other than their own, particularly in the Southwest.

22

Lu Rongtings failure in Guangdongin 1917-1920 had given the Clique a warning.

23Therefore, Li and Guangxi leaders had

long realized the importance of maintaining friendly relationships with their neighbours and

were careful not to take any action to destroy it.24

Thirdly, the southwestern provinces, in particular, Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan,

were the main sources of the opium products for the South China market.25

Guangxi was

not an opium growing area because weather and geographical conditions were not suitable

and the sale of opium in Guangxi was very small.

26

Nevertheless Guangxi provided amuch safer route along which to transport opium from Yunnan and Guizhou via

Guangdong to Hong Kong and southeast Asia than others, such as the Yangzi River opium

route. Guangxi could have earned a large revenue from opium.27

The Clique greatly

benefited from levying taxes on the transit of this opium. It was interested in ensuring that

the opium trade flourished because the rise and fall of the tehuo (special goods, i.e.

opium) business was sufficient to determine the prosperity or depression of the commercial

22Sichuan province is a good example. For details of natives of Sichuan ruling their

own provincial affairs, see Chen Zhirang (Jerome Chen), Junshen zhengquan, Hong

Kong: SLSD, 1979; Qiao Cheng and Yang Xuyun,Liu Xiang, Beijing: HXCBS, 1987; and

Robert A. Kapp, Szechwan and the Chinese Republic: Provincial Militarism and Central

Power, 1911-1938, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973.

23For details see Lu Juntian and Su Shuxuan, Lu Rongting zhuan, Nanning: Guangxi

minzu chubanshe, 1987; and Mo Shixiang,Hufa yundong shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1990.

24See Cheng Siyuan,Zhenghai mixin, Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1987, p. 70.

25See Kuang Jishan and Yang Shurong, Sichuan junfa yu yapian,XNJFSYJCK, No. 3,

pp. 250-62.

26H. G. W. Woodhead (ed.), The China Year Book, Vol. 13 (1931), Nedeln/Liechtenstein

Krans Reprint, 1969, p. 599.

27Huang Shaohong, Xin Guixi yu yapian yan, GXWSZLXJ, No. 4, pp. 1-20; Wang

Jialie, Guizhou Tongzixi junfa yu xin Guixi de guanxi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 9, pp. 91-103;

Chen Xiong, Xin Guixi tongzhi xia wo suo zhuban de Guangxi jinyan, GXWSZLXJ,

No. 2, pp. 71-82; and Edmund Clubb, The Opium Traffic in China, 24 April 1934, 893.114

Narcotics/738, National Archives, Washington.


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markets of the whole province.28

As for the income of the Guangxi provincial

government, figures given in an agricultural survey indicated that opium taxes contributed

18,031,000 yuan (Chinese dollar) to a total of provincial revenue of 32,950,944 yuan

(about 54.7% of the whole revenue) in 1934.

29

Statistics given in the Guangxi Year Bookalso showed that the annual incomes from opium taxes exceeded at least 10 million yuan,

reaching nearly 20 million yuan in some years during the first half of the 1930s. This

contributed nearly a half of the revenue of the province in those years.30

This explained

why the Clique worked hard to maintain friendly relationships with its neighbours, even

when these provinces provoked a conflict with it.

As an example of extreme measures designed to preserve relations, after Tang

Jiyaos defeat in his invasion of Guangxi in 1925, Huang Shaohong, Governor of theGuangxi provincial government at that time, immediately sent a delegation to Yunnan to

promote and renew the relationship between the two provinces.31

On the other hand, Li

Zongren was determined to maintain the Guangxi opium route by using any means he

could. For instance, in the mid-1930s, Jiang ordered a change to the transportation route of

opium export from Yunnan and Guizhou, avoiding Guangxi in favour of the other province

(i.e. Hunan) in order to put economic pressure on the Clique. To defend its interests, Li

even sent troops disguised as bandits to Hunan. These troops raided and harassed theopium transportation route, forcing the opium tradesmen to return to the former Guangxi

route.32

Thus it can be seen that the Cliques relations with the Southwest militarists were

to a great extent determined by economic factors, and more precisely the issue of opium

revenues.

28Qian Jiaju, Han Dezhang and Wu Bannong, Guangxi sheng jingji gaikuang, Shanghai:

SWYSG, 1936, p. 18.

29Xingzhengyuan nongcun fuxing weiyuanhui (ed.), Guangxi sheng nongcun diaocha,

Shanghai: SWYSG, 1935, pp. 259-260.

30Guangxi Nianjian (First Issue), 1933, pp. 621-630; and Guangxi nianjian (Second

Issue), 1935, p. 830.

31Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, Hangzhou: Fengyun chubanshe, 1945, p. 126.

32Huang Bingdian, Jiang-Gui zhengduo yanshui de yimu, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 59-

61.


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Lis Relationships with the Southwest Regional Factions

As the political and economic situation in each province of the Southwest was

different, in dealing with relationships with the factions in the provinces of Yunnan,Guizhou, Guangdong and Sichuan, Li Zongrens strategy was different in each case.

1. Lis Relations With Yunnan

In their studies on Yunnans relations with the Guangxi Clique, Chinese historians

have often assumed that the former was closer to Jiang Jieshi than to the latter.33

This was

not the case. In fact, Yunnans concern was, on the one hand, the balance of power

between Nanjing and Guangxi. The defeat of either would have been a severe threat to itsindependence, apart from the economic tie between Yunnan and Guangxi in the opium

trade.34

On the other hand, Guangxi was interested not only in gaining a large income from

opium taxes in which Yunnan was a main source of opium products, but also in keeping

Yunnan at least neutral. However, relations between the two provinces underwent two

periods (i.e. the Tang Jiyao and Long Yun periods) as a result of changes in the political

situation.

In the first period, Li and the Clique were defending their base in Guangxi againstinvasion by the Yunnan Army led by Tang Jiyao in 1925, as dealt with in Chapter Two.

Generally speaking, this was the period during which China was being reunified by the

GMD. The relationship between Li and Yunnan was subsequently to some extent

concentrated on how to approach reunification of the country. Tang Jiyaos political

ambition left Yunnan in opposition to the GMD which was based on Guangzhou.35

As a

faction of the GMD and one of the main forces participating in the Northern Expedition, Li

and his Clique were naturally opposed to Tang and prevented a possible second invasion of

33See, for example, Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin,Jiang Jieshi yu xinan difang shili pai,

pp. 89-92.

34See J. C. S. Hall, The Yunnan Provincial Faction 1927-1937, Canberra: Department of

Far Eastern History, The Australian National University, 1976, p. 179.

35For a thorough discussion of Tang Jiyaos role in Chinese politics, see Donald S.

Sutton, Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic: The Yunnan Army, 1905-1925,

Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1980.


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Guangxi by the Yunnan Army under Tangs command. But Guangxi also attempted to

resume economic cooperation in the transit of opium, sending delegations to Yunnan.36

This was an expression of the Cliques dual policy towards its neighbouring Yunnan.

Long Yun, himself a Yi, a national minority in Southwestern China, came to powerin Yunnan after the death of Tang Jiyao in 1927. Long removed Yunnans hostile attitude

towards Guangxi and claimed his loyalty to the Nanjing regime, but chose Jiang Jieshi as

his political patron. Longs choice was understandable: the Clique did not control central

power though it was one of the most powerful factions within the GMD. The Chinese

preferred to emphasize the fatong (orthodox legitimacy). In the GMD, emphasizing

fatong meant to carry on the cause of Sun Yatsen. In other words, anyone who upheld

fatong would have an opportunity to be successor to Sun. This was a key issue in thestruggle between Jiang Jieshi, Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin and other factions in the GMD.

Li Zongren did not have any advantage in this respect. Also, Long faced challenges from

several sub-factions in the province after he came to power but could call for support from

the central government when the latter vied with him for provincial power from time to

time. His right to support in suppressing rival sub-factions in the province was granted

under the fatong. Only Jiang could provide such support at that time. As relations

between the Clique and Jiang worsened, Longs loyalty to the latter increased.

37

This waswhy Long, after the Jiang-Gui War broke out in the spring of 1929, commanded the

Yunnan troops to attack Guangxi via Guizhou in 1929-30, though this strategy ultimately

failed.38

However, Longs invasion of Guangxi, apart from his interest in supporting Jiang,

was widely believed to be the result of his dissatisfaction with the state of the transit of

opium through Guangxi. In other words, it was touched off by a dispute over opium

revenues between the two provinces rather than an expression of more superficial politics

36Huang Shaohong, Xin Guixi de jueqi, WSZLXJ, No. 52 (1964), p. 57.

37Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, Jiang Jieshi yu xinan difang shili pai, pp. 89-92; and

Jiang Nan (Liu Yiliang),Long Yun zhuan, Taipei: Tianyuan chubanshe, 1987, pp. 57-97.

38For details of Long Yuns military action against Guangxi in 1929-1930, see Archives

of the Editorial Committee for War History, The Nationalist Government, Nanjing. Also

see Huang Xuchu, Nanning dierci weicheng zhan qinli ji, CQ, No. 46 (1 June 1959), pp.

4-6.


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in which Yunnan was nominally on the side of Nanjing under Jiang.39

Certainly, economic

reasons also brought the two provinces together after Longs defeat in the invasion of

Guangxi in 1930 and ensured their cooperation in the opium trade again.40

After 1931 the Clique again firmly took control of the province. Relations betweenGuangxi and Yunnan entered a relatively peaceful period but were never entirely

harmonious. To improve relations between the two provinces, Li not only sent the Cliques

senior officers, such as Ye Qi, then Chief of General Staff of the 4th Group Army (the

Guangxi Army), to call on Long occasionally,41

he also requested Hu Hanmin, the spiritual

leader of the two Southwest organizations, to write Long a letter expressing the desire of Li

himself and other leaders of the two Southwest organizations for closer and better relations

with Yunnan.

42

It can be seen from the above that Li genuinely tried to establish afriendship with Long.

However, Long played a dual role during the period of Lis promotion, on his own

initiative, to achieve a better relationship for the Clique with Yunnan. He predicted that, in

this role, Yunnan also needed the practical cooperation of Guangxi, particularly in the

opium trade.

Long became a secret agent keeping watch on the Cliques actions to show his

loyalty to Jiang. He frequently sent Nanjing secret reports on the Cliques militarymovements. There are indications that Long sent numerous confidential telegrams to Jiang

reporting activities of the Guangxi army, such as information about the armys

concentration in Longzhou, a town near the border of Vietnam, and Lis purchase of

39PRO.FO371/14692 F3680/93/10, 22/5/1930; Shenbao, 31/7/1930; and E. Snow,Journey to the Beginning, New York: Vintage Books, 1958, p. 49.

40For details of Long Yuns invasion of Guangxi in 1930 and resuming the cooperation

with Guangxi in the opium trade, see J.C.S. Hall, The Yunnan Provincial Faction, chapters

4-5, and 7.

41Long Yun to Li Zongren etc, 18/1/1935, 17/4/1935, YNLSDA, No. 6 (1984), pp. 58-

9.

42Hu Hanmin to Long Yun. Quoted in Yang Tianshi, Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-

Jiang mimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991, p. 106.


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armaments from the French in the 1930s.43

In addition, he also spied on the Cliques

political movements.44

The second role played by Long was to become a mediator between Li and Jiang,

though he worked mainly for Jiang. This is understandable, partly because Long was closerto Jiang than were other leaders of Southwest provinces, who were semi-independent of

Nanjing before 1935, and because Longs position had been more secure than his

neighbours, such as Wang Jialie and Liu Xiang, Chairmen of Guizhou and Sichuan

provinces respectively, who faced challenges in their provinces from time to time when

they were in power. In 1935, Jiang started to carry out the policy of peaceful reunification

in Yunnan and other Southwest provinces. Although he knew Long was a tu huangdi

(local Lord), Jiang had to rely temporarily on him because Long had firm control over theprovince, where economy, law and order were well maintained. Also, Yunnan officers of

military and civil administration from high to low ranks were all Long's trusted followers.45

Thus, Longs actions naturally carried a lot of weight with both Jiang and Li. In the role of

mediator, Long told Li about Jiangs conciliatory attitude and passed the former and the

Clique's opinions back to the latter.46

Longs actions had much to do with his attempts to expand Yunnans sphere of

influence into Guizhou by seizing chances as his predecessor and ex-superior Tang Jiyaohad attempted to do. Earlier in 1935 Long ordered his subordinate commanders to wipe out

Wang Jialies troops in Guizhou and to annex the province by seizing any chance they

could during their action to intercept the Red Army in Guizhou.47

He even sent numerous

confidential telegrams to Chen Bulei, Jiangs private secretary, emphasizing that while

Yunnan and Guizhou nominally are two provinces, they are, in fact, an integrated

43For details of Long Yuns confidential report on Guangxis activities, see Archives of

Guangxi Provincial Government, No. L4-1-6, Nanning.

44Such as, Long Yun to Jiang Jieshi, March 1935, YNLSDA, No. 7, p. 44.

45Jiang Nan, Long Yun zhuan, pp. 112-3; and Wang Taidong, Chen Bulei waizhuan,

Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1987, p. 98.

46For details see YNLSDA, No. 6, p. 59, and No. 7, p. 45.

47Sun Du, Dianjun ru-Qian fangdu hongjun changzheng qinli ji, WSZLXJ, No. 62.


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whole.48

This confirmed Longs eagerness to expand his influence into Guizhou.

Probably Long had reason to know that the Nanjing Government would like to strengthen

his power in both Yunnan and Guizhou as the Government's mainstay in the two provinces

- that of Jiangs policy to use Yunnan against Guangxi.

49

Perhaps he also knew that Lisinterest was to keep Yunnan at least neutral in the struggle between the Clique and the

Jiang group. Li must have hoped that Yunnans influence in Guizhou would

counterbalance that of Jiang's influence. Whether for regional cooperation and

development or as a factor in the political struggle with Jiang, Yunnans counterbalancing

position could benefit the Clique before Li and Jiang reached a compromise. According to

aDagong Bao editorial on April 28, 1936, Li sent a number of telegrams to Jiang urging

him to give Long authority for pacification in Guizhou. It is obvious from the above thatLong attempted to extend his own influence in Guizhou by using his special position in

overtly bringing a closer relationship between the Clique and the Jiang group.

In sum, Long had taken advantage of his position as a mediator to gain favour from

both Jiang and Li. According to Long himself, until the outbreak of the June 1

Movement of Guangxi in 1936, I still act as a mediator to both parties in accordance with

my previous ideal, and give them (i.e. Jiang and Li) sincere advice and repeatedly send

telegrams to mediate between them.

50

It is a matter of history that Long did not joinJiang's 400,000 troops used to besiege Guangxi during the June 1 Movement. This

naturally weakened the pressure that Jiang could bring to bear on Guangxi to some extent.

This could have been a result of Lis careful efforts to keep Yunnan neutral in his conflict

with Jiang. In fairness it must be said that Long also played a positive role in compelling Li

and Jiang to reach a reconciliation within the GMD.

2. Lis Relations With GuizhouWhile Li's relations with Yunnan were not always satisfactory, his relations with

Guizhou were good. The Guizhou faction became one of the Clique's most important allies

48Long Yun to Chen Bulei, 20/11/1934, and 21/1/1935, YNLSDA, No. 7, p. 51.

49Yan Daogang, Zhuidu changzheng hongjun de bushu jiqi shibai, in Quanguo

zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui et al (eds.), Weizhui dujie hongjun changzheng

qinli ji, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1990, p. 22.

50 Long Yun to Lu Daoyuan, 17 July 1936, YNLSDA, No. 7, p. 57.


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in the Nanjing decade. Unlike its relations with Yunnan, the Clique had kept the Guizhou

Tongzi Faction as its ally since its rise to power. Relations between the two parties were

based on interdependence.

Guizhou was ruled by the so-called Tongzi Faction for ten years (1926-35), withZhou Xicheng and Wang Jialie as its leaders successively, the former from 1926 to 1929,

the latter from 1932 to 1935. Between them was Mao Guangxiang from 1929 to 1931.

Mao also was a leader of the Tongzi Faction, but, his rule of Guizhou coincided with the

period of the Guangxi Clique's struggle for survival and revival in its base - Guangxi.51

For

this reason, the discussion of the Guangxi Cliques relations with the Guizhou Tongzi

Faction will mainly focus on the periods of both Zhou and Wang, but not that of Mao.52

Several factors contributed to Zhou Xichengs decision to ally with the Clique.Politically, He Yingqin and Wang Boqun, leaders of another Guizhou faction, who were

rivals of the Tongzi Faction and who had bad relations with Zhou and his followers, were

repeatedly defeated in previous battles for provincial power in Guizhou in the early

1920s.53

Unlike Zhou, He Yingqin and others not only had joined Jiang for lengthy

periods, but also had close relations with the latter since the establishment of the

Guangzhou revolutionary government. In the view of Zhou, they would make trouble if he

also joined Jiang who was then rising to power. After Guizhou joined the Expedition inmid-1926, the troops under the command of Wang Tianpei, a general of the Tongzi

Faction, were under Li Zongrens command most of the time before they were disarmed by

Jiang in the autumn of 1927. On the defeat of the Expedition Army under his command in

a campaign in Shandong by the northern militarists and the strong pressure from both the

Wuhan and Nanjing regimes during the same time, Jiang had to announce his retirement in

August 1927. When he left Nanjing, Jiang had Wang killed on the excuse that the latter

51For details of Guizhou under the rule of militarists in Republican China, see Zhou

Suyuan, Guizhou junfa shi shuyao, GZWSZLXJ(Guizhou), No. 1, pp. 1-43; and Guizhou

junfa shi yanjiuhui and Guizhou sheng shehui kexueyuan lishi yanjiusuo, Guizhou junfa

shi, Guiyang: GZRMCBS, 1987.

52For details of Zhou Xicheng's rule of Guizhou, see Fan Tongshou, Shilun Zhou

Xicheng jiqi dui Guizhou de tongzhi,XNJFSYJCK, No. 1, pp. 182-202.

53Liu Shenyuan, Diwulu Qianjun yuanzhu xin Guixi qijia jilue, GXWSZL, No. 15, pp.

35-39.


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was responsible for the defeat of the Northern Expedition Army.54

This indicated that

Jiang had closed the door on Zhou. Thus, maintaining a friendly relationship with the

Clique, neighbour of Guizhou, would both protect and benefit Zhou in consolidating his

power over the province. Economically, Guizhou was a major producer of opium, and, asmentioned earlier, the opium route via Guangxi was a more important route for transporting

opium from Guizhou to South China and overseas markets than any other. Militarily, Zhou

wanted to wipe out his rivals in the province. To achieve this, he needed arms supplies. It

was much more convenient for him to purchase weapons from the British munitions

merchants through Guangxi and Guangdong. For these reasons, Zhou strengthened his

relations with both Guangxi and Guangdong.

A further cementing of relations was the signing of a secret Guizhou-GuangxiAgreement,

55the exact contents of which are still unknown. However, when the Jiang-

Gui War broke out in early 1929, Zhou stood firmly on the side of the Clique.56

Jiang

issued orders on April 14, 1929 to attempt to wipe out Lis remnant armies in Guangxi

from three routes - Yunnan, Hunan, and Guangdong but not from Guizhou. That province

was left to Long Yun who could satisfy his ambitions of securing Guizhou by passing

through that province to attack Guangxi. Zhou Xicheng commanded the Guizhou troops in

the attempt to intercept the Yunnan army and he died in this battle.

57

In his memoirs,Zhang Renmin, a senior officer of the Clique, also gave evidence to prove the close

relations between the two provinces at that time.58

The facts given above may partly

54For details of the execution of Wang by Jiang, see GWZB, Vol. 4, No. 32 (21/8/1927);

Mi Xi, Wo zai Jiang Jieshi shenbian de shihou, Zhejiang wenshi ziliao xuanji, No. 23

(1982), pp. 27-8. Also see Zhang Yingzhi, Luelun Wang Tianpei,XNJFSYJCK, No. 1,

pp. 203-17.

55Wang Jialie, Guizhou Tongzixi junfa yu xin Guixi junfa de guanxi, GXWSZLXJ, No.

9, p. 94. Guangdong was also included in this agreement because Li Jishen was leader of

the Guangdong Faction at that time. More detailed discussion of Guangdongs relations

with Guangxi will appear in next section.

56Ibid, pp. 94-5.

57Archives of the Editorial Committee for War History, the Nationalist Government,

Nanjing. Also see Wang Jialie, Guizhou Tongzixi junfa yu xin Guixi junfa de guanxi,

GXWSZLXJ, No. 9, p. 95.

58Zhang Renmin, Huiyi lu, Hong Kong: printed by the author himself, 1987, p.90.

According to recollections of Zhang Renmin, Guizhou had long had a firm friendship with


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explain the essence of the Agreement. Unfortunately, with the Cliques rapid defeat and

Zhous death, the alliance between the two provinces collapsed.

The alliance was not resumed until 1932 when Li and his Clique firmly regained

control over Guangxi. If the earlier alliance with Guizhou was mostly part of Lis powerstruggle with Jiang, the present reunion of alliance with Guizhou became part of Lis

continued conflict with Jiang and Guangxis semi-independence from Nanjing. Jiang

attempted to prevent regional cooperation between the Southwest militarists, and this was

one aspect of his campaign to achieve centralization under his direct control. In resisting

Jiang, Li took the initiative to win over Wang Jialie, Chairman of Guizhou province and

leader of the Tongzi Faction after Zhou Xicheng.

Wang Jialies choice of Li and the Clique as his ally was clearly determined by theinternal struggle in the province and his own external conflict with Jiang. Wang came to

power in Guizhou in 1932. However, he was challenged by his rivals in the province from

time to time. This is partly because Long Yun helped General You Guocai, a Divisional

Commander of the Guizhou armies, and partly because Liu Xiang also supported General

Jiang Zaizhen, another Divisional Commander of the Guizhou armies. The two Guizhou

Generals were separately fostered by Long and Liu in their attempts to take over Wangs

position in the province.

59

Moreover, in order to gain control over Guizhou, Jiang alsosupported all of Wangs rivals. Thus, Wang felt a serious threat to his position and it is

understandable that he followed in his ex-superior Zhou Xichengs footsteps in standing on

the Cliques side, as he wrote in his memoirs several decades later.60

As a result, Li

succeeded in reaching a secret agreement with Wang in 1934. It was entitled The Military

Agreement of Guangdong, Guangxi and Guizhou Provinces, with the main provisions as

follows:

us. It showed tacit sympathy towards Guangxis sufferings, never doing anything to harm

Guangxi province:. The other confidential report also said that Zhou Xicheng was

affiliated with Guangxi. See U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China 1911-1941, No.

7507 (May 8, 1929).

59U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China 1911-1941, No. 8848 (June 9, 1934).

60Wang Jialie, Guizhou Tongzixi junfa yu xin Guixi junfa de guanxi, GXWSZLXJ, No.

9, p. 99.


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The three provinces shall have mutual military cooperation, should Jiang Jieshi

launch an attack on any of them. Should Guizhou need ammunition, purchase can

be made through negotiation with Guangdong and Guangxi.61

Partly as a consequence of drawing the Tongzi Faction into rejoining the former

Guizhou-Guangxi-Guangdong alliance and signing the above agreement, the Clique was

free of military threat from the neighbouring provinces of sort that had occurred in 1929-

1930. It was, to a certain extent, helpful to the Cliques control over provincial situation

and implementation of economic reconstruction in Guangxi. The existence of the

Agreement partly explains why Jiang tolerated Guangxis semi-independence from Nanjing

for years.62

In 1935, Jiang finally dismissed Wang when the Central army entered Guizhou

attempting to intercept the Long March of the Red Army.63

That Li allied with the Guizhou faction strengthened the Clique itself and helped in

his rivalry with Jiang for years. There are several reasons for this alliance: the most

important one is that the factions of Guizhou had depended militarily and economically on

other powerful forces outside the province. In comparison with the factions of its

neighbours, the Guizhou faction was one of the weakest at that time. The revenues of the

province were very low.64

For example, its total revenues were only 2,908,399 yuan in

1932,65

and 2,902,079 yuan the following year.66

This was much lower than its

neighbours, but served military expansion of Guizhou militarists only, which further

61Ibid, p. 101. Guangxis relations with Guangdong will be discussed in next section.

62According to Wang, Jiang had already known such a military alliance existed between

Guizhou, Guangxi and Guangdong, because General Yu Hanmou, a subordinate

commander of Chen Jitang, secretly passed the information to Jiang. For this reason, Jiang

hated Wang intensely and had attempted to dismiss him from his post. Wang Jialie,Guizhou Tongzixi junfa yu xin Guixi junfa de guanxi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 9, p. 101.

63Chen Jiren and Qiao Yunsheng, Junfa Wang Jialie de kuatai,XNJFSYJCK, No. 3.

64For details of Guizhous economic and social situations under the rule of militarists,

see Hu Keming, Guizhou junfa tongzhi shiqi de shehui jingji gaikuang, XNJFSYJCK,

No. 1, pp. 218-256.

65Guangxi nianjian (First Issue), 1933, p. 671.

66Guangxi nianjian (Second Issue), 1935, p. 885.


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worsened the provincial economics and increased the tax load on the masses.67

Moreover,

the internal struggle in the province had been going on within the Guizhou faction since

1911. Each group in the Guizhou faction vied with the others for power and each

succeeding militarist who came to power faced antagonistic powerful rivals. For example,Zhou Xicheng fought against Li Shen, a Guizhou General supported by Long Yun; and in

the Wang Jialie period, the active opposition came from Generals You Guocai and Jiang

Zaizhen. To keep leadership in Guizhou meant reliance on outside political, military and

financial support.68

The need to transport opium to markets via neighbouring provinces

further increased the dependence of a weak province on external assistance.

After Guizhou was brought under Jiangs direct control in 1935, the already

strained relations between the Clique and the Jiang group became even further strained.Indeed, along with the growing differences in internal and external policies, Jiangs

economic pressure on Guangxi speeded up the outbreak of conflict between the two parties.

Jiang used his power in Guizhou to undermine the Clique by cutting off its most important

sources of revenue. He placed a heavy levy on opium in Guizhou and prevented it from

passing through Guangxi. A measure taken by Jiang was the Regulations for Levying the

Provincial Tax on Special Goods of the Guizhou General Opium Prohibition Bureau,

published on 30 June 1936.

69

Consequently, Guangxis incomes from opium taxes in 1936were reduced to less than one third, as against 1934.

70To break Jiang's economic and

military blockade, the Clique during the June 1 Movement gave energetic support to

those pro-Clique and anti-Jiang figures in Guizhou to organize the Guizhou Anti-Japanese

and National Salvation Army, about 20,000 men active on the border of Guizhou and

67See Wu Duanjun, Wei junshi kuozhang fuwu de Guizhou caizheng, XNJFSYJCK,

No. 3, pp. 354-371.

68See Liu Yixiang, Shilun Qianxi junfa de yifuxing he lueduoxing, XNJFSYJCK, No.

3, pp. 326-338.

69Zhang Xiaomei, Guizhou jingji, Shanghai: SWYSG, 1938, p. Q30.

70Chen Xiong, Xin Guixi tongzhi xia wo suo zhuban de Guangxi jinyan,

GXWSZLXJ, No. 2, p. 79.


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Guangxi. It broke down to some extent the Central armys encirclement of Guangxi during

the Movement.71

Although Jiang finally broke the Guangxi and Guizhou alliance through military

occupation of the latter, Li won precious time to reconstruct and mobilize his base -Guangxi, and formed a regional cooperation which was favourable to force the internal

political unity on the GMD.

3. Lis Relations with the Guangdong Faction (Yuexi)

In Guomindang China, Guangdong was the birthplace of several main military and

political factions, such as those of Hu Hanmin, Wang Jingwei, Chen Gongbo, Sun Ke and

others, who to a great extent had an impact on the political development in Guangdong, andeven China. Jiang Jieshi himself originated from Guangdong also as he began his

successful political and military careers from the Guangzhou Military Government which

existed in the late 1910s and the early 1920s, first as Sun Yatsens military aide and then

Chief of Staff of the Guangdong Army. Those were steps made by Jiang as he was

gradually promoted to the position of Commander in Chief of the Northern Expedition

Army of the NRA in 1926, before he left this province. The men who really had control

over Guangdong and had influence on the province for years, however, were Li Jishen andChen Jitang successively, leaders of the so-called Guangdong Faction (or Yuexi), as it was

called after 1926. Their actions had more impact than any others on the Guangxi Cliques

rise and fall in the GMD.

Apart from close connections between Guangdong and Guangxi in culture and

geography, several factors affected their relations. Politically, Guangdong enjoyed high

prestige in its political role in the early Republic. It was a major source of the Nationalist

Revolution under Sun Yatsen, particularly before the Expedition, as the province was Sunsbirth place. It also was an area where all political and military groups over the country

assembled and debated with each other, even those factions and parties in opposition to the

GMD.72

71Chen Jiren, Liangguang shibian qijian Guizhou kangri jiuguojun jishi, GZWSZLXJ

(Guizhou), No. 23 (October 1986), pp. 237-255.

72See Chen Zhirang,Junshen zhengquan, pp. 153-162.


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Militarily, Guangdong was a traditional supplier of ammunition to Guangxi. In the

early Republic, Guangxi did not have an arsenal, but Guangdong had a number of big

munitions factories able to meet the needs of both Guangdong itself and the South China

market.

73

For the Clique, it was convenient to obtain ammunition supplies fromGuangdong for geographic reasons. More importantly, bordering the two western colonies

- Hong Kong and Macao - Guangdong never ran short of foreign arms supplies. There is

evidence that the large purchases of foreign firearms by the Clique were made via

Guangdong in the 1920s and 1930s.74

Economically, until recently Guangdong has been the major market for Guangxis

rural products. For this reason, a good relationship with Guangdong enabled the Guangxi

authorities to levy taxes on these goods, including opium,

75

and to gain certain financialsupport for the Clique.

76This partly explains why, after the reunification of the province,

the Clique brought itself under the Nationalist Government in 1925.77

Li Zongren wrote on

May 13, 1932, in a letter to Xiao Focheng, a native of Guangdong and a veteran member of

the two southwestern organizations, "Guangxis policy towards the current political

situation should, in the future, be under the leadership of the Political Council and follow

Guangdongs lead.78

This indicates that the Clique had pursued a cooperative policy with

Guangdong since the early 1920s.

73For details of arsenals in Guangdong, see GZWSZLXJ (Guangzhou), No. 37, pp. 161-

167. Also see Lu Dayue, Jiuyiba shibian hou guomin zhengfu tiaozheng binggong shiye

shulun, KRZZYJ, No. 2, 1993, pp. 102-116.

74Huang Shaohong, Xin Guixi de jueqi, WSZLXJ, No. 52, pp. 26-7; Archives of the

Nationalist Government, Nanjing; and Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan (ed.), Zhonghua

minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian, Vol. 4. Nanjing: JSGJCBS, 1986, p. 902.

75Chen Xiong, Xin Guixi de juanxiang, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, p. 55.

76Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, Guangzhou:

Guangdong Provincial Archives, 1985, p. 33. Also see Kan Zonghua, Cheng Jitang, Li

Zongren, Bai Chongxi fadong liangguang liuyi shibian de jingguo, GXWSZL, No. 29, p.

379.

77See Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan (ed.), Zhonghua minguo shi dangan ziliao

huibian, Vol. 4, pp. 887-912; and GWZB, Vol. 2, No. 31 (16 August 1925).

78Quoted in Shen Xiaoyun,Li Zongren de yisheng, p. 183.


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Relations between Li and the Guangdong Faction can be traced back to 1923, when

the formers sphere of influence was limited to a small area - Yulin fu only. Li had a

chance to expand his influence in the summer of the same year, when the Clique captured

Wuzhou with the assistance of the First Division of the Guangdong Army (FDGDA). Thiswas the provinces richest area as well as the closest area to the Guangzhou Military

Government (GMG) under the leadership of Sun Yatsen. Through the assistance of the

FDGDA, Li and the Clique built up its close relations with the GMG. The occupation of

Wuzhou became a turning point for a new relationship between the two provinces, which

had experienced some enmity after Lu Rongtings group and Guangdong became enemies

in 1920.79

FDGDA was a powerful troop under the leadership of Li Jishen. After theoccupation of Wuzhou, relations between Guangxi and Guangdong developed into a close

friendship, which laid a foundation for the Cliques alliance with the Guangdong Faction in

the future. FDGDAs financial and military support was even more important, for it

enabled Li to reunify Guangxi in the following two years.80

Several factors contributed to the good relationship between the two parties. First,

their leading officers were all aged between 20-30, and had experienced political

movements since 1911, such as the Revolution of 1911, the National Protection Movementand War in 1916 and the Constitution Protection Movement and War in the following

years. They were imbued with patriotic enthusiasm. Secondly, they had similar

educational backgrounds for they mostly graduated from military schools, i.e. four different

79For details of earlier relationship between the Clique and Guangdong, see Huang

Shaohong, Xin Guixi de jueqi, WSZLXJ, No. 52; Huang Shaohong, Jiu Guixi de

xingmie, WSZLXJ, No. 16; and Li Jiezhi, Guanyu Li Jishen fuzhi xin Guixi qijia de

bianduan huiyi, GXWSZL, No. 14, pp. 34-43. Also see Li Peisheng, Guixi ju-Yue zhiyoulai jiqi jingguo, Guangzhou, 1921.

80For details of the Guangdong Factions support of the Guangxi Clique financially and

militarily, see Huang Shaohong, Xin Guixi de jueqi, WSZLXJ, No. 52, p. 26, and Wushi

huiyi, 1946, p. 110; Li Jiezhi, Guanyu Li Jishen fuzhi xin Guixi qijia de pianduan huiyi,

GXWSZL, No. 14, pp. 34-43; and Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu

ziliao, p. 33. And for detailed story of battles in reuniting Guangxi and the support from

the Guangdong Faction, see memoirs of Huang Shaohong, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi, Chen

Xiong, Huang Xuchu, Li Jiezhi etc, in the Bibliography of the thesis. Also see Shenbao,

March and April 1924; and Chen Jitang, Chen Jitang zizhuan, Taipei: ZJWXS, 1974, pp.

15-22; GWZB, Vol. 2, No. 3 (18 January 1925).


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levels of military schools (sixiao - lujun xiaoxue, lujun yubei xuexiao, lujun zhongxue, and

Baoding junguan xuexiao - the Elementary Military School, the Army Preparatory School,

the Middle Military School, and Baoding Military Academy). They joined together

because they were discriminated against by old-style armies in each province.

81

Li Zongrengathered together a number of graduates of these schools, who were mostly natives of

Guangxi, as well as many in the FDGDA. When these schoolmates from the two provinces

met together, it was easy for them to form a strong force as they had much in common

ideologically.82

Furthermore, Li Jishen, Commander of FDGDA, then leader of the

Guangdong Faction, was a native of Guangxi. His high rank and key position in the

Guangdong Armies were esteemed by his fellow provincial colleagues - the Guangxi

Clique.

83

It is quite possible that Li Jishens real purposes might have been to foster afaction with his home province as his support base. This would have enabled him to play a

decisive role in the two provinces and to promote and expand his strength in his struggle

for power in the GMG, though basically his role was that of a mediator between the GMG

and Guangxi and his stated aim was to expand the Nationalist influence into Guangxi.84

In any case, the two parties, together with Guizhou as mentioned earlier, formed a

powerful political and military alliance in both the 1920s and 1930s. The Guangdong

Faction under Li Jishen (1926-29) and Chen Jitang (1929-36), in fact, played an extremelyimportant role in the alliance, which lasted until 1936 when Chen lost his influence in

Guangdong.

The first feature of the alliance was that the two provinces formed the base of the

most powerful opposition to Jiang in the GMD.85

They maintained semi-independence

81For details of the way in which military school graduates were discriminated against by

the old-style armies, particularly the armies under Lu Rongting, see Yin Chenggang, Li

Zongren qijia jingguo, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7; and Li Pinxian, Li Pinxian huiyi lu, Taipei:Zhongwai tushu gongsi, 1975, pp. 25-30.

82Huang Shaohong, Xin Guixi de jueqi, WSZLXJ, No. 52, p. 20.

83Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, p. 57.

84Li Jiezhi, Guanyu Li Jishen fuzhi xin Guixi qijia de pianduan huiyi, GXWSZL, No.

14, pp. 33-34; and Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, p. 33.

85Lai Huipeng, Jiang Jieshi yu Li Jishen mingzheng andou jilue, GDWSZLXJ, No. 31

(1981).


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from Nanjing by firmly holding onto the two southwestern organizations, with Hu Hanmin

as spiritual leader, until Hus death in May 1936. With this power, the two provinces were

free to implement their ideas in their own provinces without intervention from Nanjing.

During the Nanjing decade, the two provinces had upheld a political policy ofoverthrowing Jiang and resisting Japan. It also was the reason why the two southwestern

organizations could coexist. In the early phase of their relationship, the objective of the two

parties was to overthrow Jiangs dictatorship.86

After the September 18 Incident they

held up the banner of resisting Japan to condemn Jiangs policy of domestic pacification

before external war; but, the pre-condition of the two parties policy was to overthrow

Jiang if he still aimed at suppressing all of his rivals. Of course, the Clique particularly was

more eager than the Guangdong Faction to overthrow Jiang in the earlier 1930s.

87

Tosecure the anti-Jiang base, the two parties created a relationship of mutual assistance.

88

This policy led to the outbreak of the June 1 Movement in 1936, which appealed for an

immediate launching of national resistance against Japan.

The second feature was that, while the two parties shared the same bed, they were

strange bedfellows. The Clique benefited from cooperation with the Guangdong Faction,

in particular, for its survival and revival after its defeat in 1929. Its main aim was to

promote its position in the GMD during the Li Jishen period and to overthrow Jiangs rulein order to restore its influence in the Central Government as well as to carry out its policies

86For details of this policy, seeLi zongsiling zai-Liu xunhua ji, Liuzhou: Liuzhou minguo

ribaoshe, 1931; and Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, pp. 78-

92.

87

See Yang Tianshi, Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie,KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991.

88For example, the Clique assisted Li Jishen to consolidate his rule in Guangdong by

victory over the CCP army under Generals He Long and Ye Ting who marched towards

Guangdong after the Nanchang Uprising in August 1927, and the Guangzhou Incident

launched by generals Zhang Fakui and Huang Qixiang, two subordinates of Li Jishen and

natives of Guangdong who aimed at overthrowing his rule in the province. See Huang

Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 187-190. For the detailed story of the Guangzhou Incident

(also called the Zhang-Huang Incident), which occurred in November and December

1927, see Guangzhou pingshe (ed.), Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, Guangzhou:

Pingshe, 1928.


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in the nation during the Chen Jitang period.89

On the other hand, Li Jishens anti-Jiang

attitude was different from that of the Guangxi Clique. According to a report, Li Jishens

anti-Jiang stand was based on the principle of Guangdong for the people of Guangdong.90

Also, Chen Jitangs main aim was to have firm control over Guangdong. Chen had alwaysindicated that he did not stand firmly together with the Clique. In other words, he did not

want to entirely break his relations with the Jiang group. For example, the two

southwestern organizations often sent Nanjing a circular telegram voicing their views on

the current national events and affairs, but Chen usually sent Nanjing another confidential

telegram to explain that though he was one of signatories it did not represent his personal

opinion.91

Another feature was that the Guangdong Factions frequent internal split had adirect effect on the Cliques rise and fall in Chinese politics. That is to say, the alliance

between the two parties was broken in some years, because of the Jiang-Gui War. The

Guangdong Faction turned out to be comprised of a very complicated political and military

group. With continuing victory in the Expedition, internal splits occurred in the

Guangdong Faction as internal conflicts in the GMD speeded up. General Zhang Fakui

first separated from the Guangdong Faction and showed his loyalty to Wang Jingwei rather

than to Li Jishen in 1927.

92

Chen Mingshu, another subordinate commander of Li Jishen,also joined Jiang when the Nanjing regime openly confronted the Wuhan regime earlier in

1927.93

On the other hand, as regionalist feeling grew and the cry for anti-territorial

expansion became louder at that time, rapid expansion of the Cliques sphere of influence

during the Expedition made itself a target of wider criticism, mostly from the Jiang faction,

Wang Jingwei and Hu Hanmin groups. Both of the latter then supported Jiang in

89 Hu Hanmin to Lixiong. Quoted in Yang Tianshi, Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiangmimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991, p. 120.

90Chenbao, 26 July 1927; and GWZB, Vol. 4, No. 40 (16 October 1927).

91Huang Xuchu, Ba-Gui yiwang lu, CQ, No. 124, p. 5.

92For details of Zhang Fakuis turning out of the Guangdong Faction, see Zhang Fakui,

Fenggong, hui-Yue, hudang,ZJWX, Vol. 33, No. 1. Also see Guangzhou Pingshe (ed.),

Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, 1928.

93Tang Degang and Li Zongren,Li Zongren huiyi lu (Chinese version), p. 288.


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opposition to the Clique.94

In these circumstances, Li Jishen was embarrassed by the

position he was in: he was leader of the Guangdong Faction, but a native of Guangxi. His

subordinates were mostly natives of Guangdong. However, the help and support that he

obtained to save his rule in Guangdong were from the Clique, not from his subordinates.

95

Furthermore, Guangxi troops in the garrison of Guangdong received about 300,000 to

400,000yuan monthly after 1927, which was endorsed by Li Jishen during his rule of the

province.96

The animosity between the Guangxi Clique and the Guangdong Faction caused

by strong regionalist feelings was concealed by Li Jishens personal relationship with both

the Clique and natives of Guangdong at that time. Consequently, in spite of Li Jishens

detention at Nanjing in March 1929 at the outbreak of the Jiang-Gui War, the Guangdong

Faction sided with Jiang. This is partly because its members were discontented with LiJishens favouritism towards the Clique.

97Of course, Jiang also tried to break the alliance

between the two parties by any means he could use.98

Once Jiang succeeded in causing a

94For details that the three groups joined forces to oppose the Clique, see Zhongguo dier

lishi dangan guan (ed.), 1927 nian Jiang Jieshi deng lian-Wang zhi-Gui handian xuan,

LSDA, No. 1, 1984. Also see Guangzhou pingshe, Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi,

1928.

95For example, relying on the Cliques support, Li Jishen overcame two crises in

Guangdong. One occurred when the Cliques troops defeated the CCPs troops led by He

Long and Ye Ting (an ex-subordinate commander of Li Jishen) in September and October

1927. In another, the Clique again drove Zhang Fakuis troops out of Guangdong at the

end of the same year when Zhang and Huang Qixiang launched a mutiny in Guangzhou to

overthrow Li Jishens rule in the Zhang-Huang Incident. Huang Qixiang was also an ex-

subordinate of Li Jishen. See Huang Shaohong, Zuji Ye-He nanzhengjun de zhanzheng,

WSZLXJ, No. 24; and Guangzhou Pingshe, Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, 1928.

96Some documents indicate that Guangxi's military expenditure for assistance was less

than 200,000 Yuan monthly. See Guangzhou Pingshe, Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai

huiyi, p. 63. According to Huang Shaohong, it was 400,000 Yuan monthly, and thisplanted the seeds of the trouble between the two provinces in the following years. See

Huang Shaohong, Zuji Ye-He nanzhengjun de zhanzheng, WSZLXJ, No. 24, p. 180. In a

speech, Chen Jitang also expressed Guangdong natives resentment over Guangxi's

extortion of a huge military expenditure for assistance from Guangdong that was at least

more than 300,000 to 400,000 yuan monthly. See Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.),

Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, p. 33.

97Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, pp. 33-34.

98See, for example, Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan (ed.), 1927 nian Jiang Jieshi deng

lian-Wang zhi-Gui handian xuan,LSDA, No. 1, 1984, pp. 62-64.


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split between these senior commanders (i.e. Chen Mingshu, Chen Jitang and so on), they

immediately betrayed their leader. Having lost the rear base, the Guangxi Cliques sphere

of influence and strong military power in central China soon collapsed.

However, common interest brought the two provinces to reconciliation andcooperation again following the Hu Hanmin Incident which occurred in February 1931.

99

In appearance, the incident was a turning point for reconciliation between the two

provinces. In fact, several factors indicated that the Guangdong Faction, particularly Chen

Jitang, had been unable to keep fighting with the Clique. 1) The Guangdong army had been

put in a tight spot for two years in fighting with the Clique. However, it could not see the

prospect of victory over Guangxi as the latter still held fast to its own base. If the

Guangdong Factions effective strength was worn down in the war, Chens power inGuangdong would be lost. Should Jiang further weaken other rivals within the GMD,

Chen would then be a major target.100

2) The Guangdong Faction received an annual

military expenditure of 4.3 million yuan in 1929-30 from Nanjing. Chen expanded his

troops into a force of nearly 100,000 men by taking advantage of the war with the Clique.

Jiang urged him to disarm and to reduce his annual military expenditure to 2.5 millionyuan

at the end of 1930. As Chens troops had suffered huge casualties in the war without any

supplements from Nanjing, disarmament and reduction threatened to further weakenChens influence, which resulted in a conflict between Chen and Jiang.

1013) The conflict

between Chen Jitang and Chen Mingshu, then Chairman of the Guangdong Provincial

99The so-called Hu Hanmin Incident refers to Hu, President of the Legislative Council

of the Nationalist Government at Nanjing, being detained by Jiang, Chairman of the

Nationalist Government, in Nanjing in 28 February 1931. The Incident is usually regarded

as a result of the conflict between Jiang and Hu for the latter opposed the former as

President of the national government and drew up a provisional constitution. See Hu

Hanmin, "Hu Hanmin zizhuan",JDSYJ, No. 2 1981, and No. 2, 1983; Lei Xiaocen, Sanshinian dongluan Zhongguo, Hong Kong: Yazhou chubanshe, 1955; Zhang Tongxin, Jiang-

Wang hezuo xia de guomin zhengfu, Harbin: HLJRMCBS, 1988; Zhongguo qingnian

junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, Guangzhou: Qingnian junrenshe, 1934, pp. 252-300;

and William Tze-fu Chu, Hu Hanmin: A Political Profile (1879-1936), unpublished PhD

dissertation, St. Johns University, 1978.

100See Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, Shanghai: SHRMCBS, 1992,

p. 192.

101See Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, p. 39, p. 83, and

p. 95.


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Government who was supported by Jiang, became more and more critical.102

4) Hu

Hanmin was Chen Jitangs political patron. It was self-evident that Hus fall in the Central

Government would directly affect Chens position. Therefore, once Chen Jitang changed

his force to the anti-Jiang front, he could win a reputation in defence of the GMDs lawand discipline and expand his political influence and military strength. Also, he could

drive Chen Mingshu away and make himself sole ruler over the province.103

5) The Clique

was the only surviving group which still upheld the anti-Jiang policy after all other anti-

Jiang factions within the GMD were defeated by Jiang in a series of civil wars during 1929-

30. If Chen took the anti-Jiang policy, he would obtain support from the Clique and make

it follow his lead, which was better than maintaining an enemy in the neighbour of

Guangdong. Chen believed that Guangdong and Guangxi could coexist when theycooperated and would suffer from each other if they split; this also was a continuation of

FDGDAs policy towards the Clique after 1923. The current war between the two

provinces also provided an illustration of this view. When he cooperated with the Clique,

Chen could obtain more external support to maintain his rule in Guangdong.104

In this

sense, the Hu Hanmin Incident occurred at the right time. It provided both Chen Jitang

and the Clique with a great opportunity to reach reconciliation.

However, the Guangdong Faction was continually split into two groups: one headedby Chen Jitang which was still called the Guangdong Faction (Yuexi) with its sphere of

influence in Guangdong, the other the Chen Mingshu group (i.e. the 19th Route Army),

which split from the Guangdong Faction in 1931, when Chen Jitang became reconciled

with the Clique and showed his anti-Jiang attitude openly. The group demonstrated its

loyalty to Jiang before 1931 and then built up its sphere of influence in Fujian in 1932.

Chen Mingshus separation from the Guangdong Faction was the result of a fierce struggle

with Chen Jitang for power over the province, rather than his quest for favour with Jiangbefore 1931. After the September 18 Incident Chen Mingshu had conflicting views from

102Ibid, pp. 387-389.

103Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, pp. 192-193.

104Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, p. 387.


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Jiangs on a series of internal and external policies, particularly on the policy towards the

Japanese invasion.105

Li and the Clique cooperated equally with each of them, but had to follow Chen

Jitangs policies in dealing with many affairs related to the two provinces, for geographicalreasons. Their attitude towards the Fujian Incident, which was launched by the 19th

Route Army under Li Jishen, Chen Mingshu, Cai Tingkai and Jiang Guangnai in November

1933,106

was a good example. In mid-1933 the three provinces (Fujian, Guangdong and

Guangxi) signed a secret military agreement, which called for mutual military assistance if

any one of them was attacked by the Jiang group.107

After the outbreak of the Fujian

Incident, Chen Jitang broke his promise to Chen Mingshu. Li found it difficult for the

Clique to react to the incident though he tried to form a united government which includedthe three provinces by persuading Chen Jitang to join them in facing the incident.

108As a

result, Chen Mingshus group was wiped out by Jiang soon after the incident.109

The

Guangdong Faction also collapsed following its further internal split during the June 1

105For details of changes of Chens attitude towards Jiang, see Chen Mingshu, Jiuyiba

disi zhounian jinian ganyan, Giu Guo Sh Bao, December 9, 1935 to February 4, 1936.

106The Fujian Incident was launched in November 1933 by Chen Mingshu, Li Jishen, Cai

Tingkai, Jiang Guangnai and others, most of them were former members of the Guangdong

Faction. They aimed at overthrowing the Nanjing Government under the leadership of both

Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei and appealed for immediate resistance against Japan. They

claimed themselves to be separated from the GMD and formed a new party

Shengchandang (the Production Party) instead. They also established their own national

government - Fujian renmin zhengfu (The Peoples Government of Fujian). But the

Incident was soon suppressed by Jiang in January of the following year. For details of the

Incident, see Wang Shunsheng and Yang Dawei, Fujian shibian, Fuzhou: Fujian renmin

chubanshe, 1983; and Xue Moucheng and Zheng Quanbei (eds.), Fujian shibian ziliao

xuanbian, Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1983.

107See Xue Moucheng and Zheng Quanbei (eds.), Fujian shibian ziliao xuanbian, pp.

51-54. Also see Jiang Guangnai, Dui shijiu lujun yu Fujian shibian de buchong,

WSZLXJ, No. 59; Cai Tingkai. Huiyi shijiu lujun zai-Min fan-Jiang shibai jingguo, ibid,

No. 59; and Yin Shizhong, Fujian shibian zhong wo daibiao Li Jishen Chen Mingshu fu

Guangxi dao Ruijin qiatan jingguo, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1.

108Cheng Siyuan,Zhenghai mixin, pp. 73-77. Also see SHXW, Vol. 5, No. 27, and No.

29; and Vol. 6, No. 1-2.

109See Xu Xiqing, Fujian renmin zhengfu yundong, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1; and

Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, pp. 653-689.


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Movement in 1936, when General Yu Hanmou, senior subordinate commander of Chen

Jitang, turned to Jiang and took over the latters position in Guangdong. This marked the

end of a long-term cooperation between the Guangxi Clique and the Guangdong Faction.

4. Lis Relations With Sichuan

Sichuan is in the southwest area, but not on the border of Guangxi. Li had no

special relations with Sichuan militarists in the early GMD period. Even Liu Xiang, the

most powerful Sichuan militarist and Chairman of the province, usually supported Jiang in

many domestic affairs during this period.110

It seems that Liu was unlikely to create a close

relationship with Li and the Clique. However, common interests brought the two provinces

into an alliance in the last few years prior to the Sino-Japanese War. The form of such analliance was expressed as the Sichuan, Guangxi and Red Army Agreement signed by Li

and Liu, with the CCP together, in around the spring and summer of 1937.111

Detailed

provisions of the agreement are unknown. According to memoirs of the persons who took

Documents

Su PhD thesis - 12 Chapter 5