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CHAPTER SEVEN

BACKGROUND TO THE JUNE 1 MOVEMENT

As Hallett Abend pointed out, the Guangxi Clique was genuine in its anti-Japanism

in the 1930s.1 Indeed, the Clique not only insisted on resistance, but also tried to put this

policy into practice throughout the country. The June 1 Movement (liuyi yundong) in

1936 was an example. This was the name given to Guangxis mass mobilization and

activities in resistance against Japan. This to a great extent compelled Jiang Jieshi to

abandon the implementation of his policy ofannei rangwai within the GMD, and to instead

compromise with other factions, particularly the Southwest regional factions with the

Clique as head, in order to reach unity within the Nationalists, which was, however, a

temporary and superficial one at best. This result was a promise from Jiang to fight Japan.

In the end, the movement at least achieved an apparent unity within the GMD with the

common target of resistance. This achievement also provided the Nationalists with a

favourable condition for reconciliation with all other groups and parties throughout the

country, mainly with the Communists, leading to the formation of the Anti-Japanese

National United Front (AJNUF).

Unfortunately, western scholars of modern Chinese history usually neglect the

significance of the June 1 Movement and its impact at the time. It is surprising that Eugene

Levich has not discussed this important event even though his study especially focuses on

the Guangxis preparation for the Sino-Japanese War.2 On the other hand, although she has

1Hallett Abend, My Years in China, 1926-1941, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943, p.223.

2

For details see Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way in Kuomintang China, 1931-1939,Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993; Kui-kwong Shum, Chinese Communists Road to


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touched on the issue of the movement in her study of Guangxi, Diana Lary also regards it to

a great extent as an action in the Cliques struggle for power with Jiang rather than as a

factor in the conflicting policies towards Japanese aggression. In the end, the movement

did not escape the fate of defeat by Jiang.

3

In evaluating this, Lary goes too far to assumethat the Cliques defeat in the movement marked the end of the Clique as a faction within

the GMD.4 Her interpretation of the movement fails to explain the interaction of the

Cliques anti-Japanese practice and policy as we have discussed it earlier, and its important

role in and contributions to the Sino-Japanese War in the following years, as discussed by

such observers and scholars as Evans Carlson and Eugene Levich.5

In fact, these different evaluations and views of the June 1 Movement stem from

different understandings of the historical backgrounds at that time, even though all writershave recognized the importance, either within the GMD or throughout the nation, of unity

and resistance. As we have seen, the most urgent task of China in the 1930s was to resist

Japanese aggression and to strive for Chinese national liberation, which indicated that the

policies of each party had to be based on the imperatives of resistance. The problem is that

both scholars and observers have not used same criteria when they discussed the June 1

Movement. Based on the prerequisite to resistance, the criteria in this case should be as

follows: 1) Whether its program and policy coincided with the needs of the time; 2)Whether its practice was guided by its program and policy; and 3) Whether its result

benefited or harmed development of a national anti-Japanese movement. Using different

criteria, one would of course have a different view of the movement.

This chapter will mainly analyse the background of the June 1 Movement and the

factors which affected the Cliques practice of forcing Jiang to resist Japan. In this

Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935-1945, Hong Kong and London:Oxford University Press, 1988; and Wu Tien-wei, The Si-an Incident: A Pivotal Point in

Modern Chinese History, Ann Arbor: Michigan University, 1976.

3See Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937, London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, Chapter 7.

4Ibid, p. 206.

5Evans F. Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency, New

York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, p. 31; and Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way, pp.

173-7.


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analysis, we will explain why the Clique launched the movement and why Li Zongren and

Bai Chongxi persisted for three months until September when they reached a reconciliation

with Jiang to end their actions peacefully.

Origin of the June 1 Movement and Its Relations with the Japanese

The June 1 Movement was the wording used by the Clique. In a joint assembly

of the party, government and army held at Nanning on June 1, 1936, Bai, on behalf of Li

and the Clique, publicly declared that Guangxi, together with Guangdong, was initiating a

movement aimed at resisting Japan for national salvation (kangri jiuguo) from that day on.

The Guangxi troops were soon reorganized by both the Southwest Political Council of theGMD and the Southwest Executive Committee of the Nationalist Government, i.e., the two

Southwest organizations ( xinan liang jiguan) at Guangzhou, as the Nationalist

Revolutionary 4th Army Group of the kangri jiuguojun (the resisting Japan and national

salvation army). A couple of days later, the Guangxi troops, joining force with the

Guangdong troops which were renamed the Nationalist Revolutionary 1st Army Group of

the kangri jiuguojun under Chen Jitang, marched northward with the intention of fighting

Japan, according to the propaganda of the Southwest. Meanwhile, the Clique mobilized theprovince politically, militarily and financially for the purpose its leaders had declared. The

movement continued for three months until September when the Guangxi leaders came to a

reconciliation with Jiang under certain conditions. They had succeeded in forcing Nanjing

to promise to start a war of resistance as soon as possible, and their action ended peacefully,

without a military clash between the two factions. The Clique named this movement by its

initial date, believing, from the top levels to the lower ranks, that this was the beginning of

effective resistance to Japan. According to Li, the movement referred to a crucial momentin the national revolution and in anti-imperialism - Japanese imperialism, a purpose that the

Clique had pursued as the Guangxi Reconstruction Program stated.6 The June 1 Movement

was a practice or a dress rehearsal for the Cliques scorched earth resistance policy.

However, in the view of some people outside Guangxi, the movement was called

xinan shibian (the Southwest Incident) or liangguang shibian (the Two Guangs

6See Li Zongren, Liuyi yundong yu Zhongguo minzu geming, CYGL, Vol. 2, No. 8

(1937), p. 47.


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Incident, or the Guangdong-Guangxi Incident), and xinan yidong (the Southwest

Rebellion) or liangguang yidong (the Two Guangs Rebellion, or the Guangdong-

Guangxi Rebellion). Speaking in the Chinese way, the different wording used to describe

the movement indicates a different view of its nature. Consequently, these different naturesresult in different evaluations. On the one hand, the term the Southwest rebellion, or the

two Guangs rebellion at that time referred to a regional factions conflict with the main

faction in the central government for power and interests in both the region and the centre,

and a struggle against Jiang. In those views, particularly expressed by supporters of Jiang,

the Guangxi leaders, including Chen Jitang, sought to use the calls for resistance to conceal

their real aim of struggling for more power and the increase of self interests. This

movement was believed to be an action of the remnant warlords in an attempt to maintainregional separation from the central government.7 On the other hand, as it occurred at a

time when the Japanese had speeded up their invasion and separated activities in both

North and South China, according to some confidential documents of Nanjing, the

actions of the two Guangs amounted to a regional separatist movement aimed at

maintaining selfish personal interests with the backing of the Japanese. The Clique was

suspected of collusion with Japan in order to separate the Southwest, i.e. Guangdong and

Guangxi provinces, from the titular control of the central government. There wereaccusations that the movement harmed the nation in its collusion with Japan.8 Such a

critique provides a major source for many Chinese historians, both pro-Jiang and pro-

Communist, who wish to label the movement as a selfish action of the regional factions or

a case of collusion. This view had, in fact, spread throughout the country even at the

beginning of the movement, and, to a great extent, was directed by the mass media under

7See GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24 (June 22, 1936); K. B. Vaidya, Reflections on the Recent

Canton Revolt and After, Canton: Mr K. B. Vaidya for National Publishers, Ltd., 1936, pp.6-9, and pp. 41-5; Anonymous, Tezhong zhengzhi tongxun: Liangguang panluan neimu,June 1936; and Anonymous, Dui xinan yidong xuanchuan yaodian: Dui liangguang

yidong zhi renshi, June 1936. The word Confidential appears on the cover of the latterdocument. Both documents show neither publisher nor place. However, judged from the

contents of the documents, they seem to be compiled and published by the GMDpropaganda organizations under Chen Lifu, a powerful supporter of Jiang and a veteran ofthe GMD, or by the Blue Shirts under General Dai Li, head of the secret police force in the

Nanjing Government.

8See Anonymous, Tezhong zhengzhi tongxun: Liangguang panluan neimu; andAnonymous,Dui xinan yidong xuanchuan yaodian: Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi.


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the control of the Jiang regime.9 The Nanjing Government carried out a strict censorship

policy throughout the country even though some provinces were not under Jiang's direct

control. The Jiang regime controlled the national mass media and blocked information and

opinions favourable to the Clique from wide dissemination.

10

As a result, the propagandaof Nanjing under Chen Lifu, a powerful follower of Jiang and a GMD veteran, undoubtedly

had an impact on the national mass media. Under these circumstances, the people did not

fully know the real aims of the Clique, and to a great extent, had to accept the propaganda

of Nanjing, believing the movement had some regional separatist colour, at least.11 Such a

view has also been adopted by some historians.12

Another reason for the regional separatist image of the June 1 Movement was a

result of the defection of Guangdong generals to Jiang in July 1936 because of theirdiscontent with Chen Jitang. As participants of the movement, it is understandable that

these generals, headed by Yu Hanmou, had to seek some excuses for their action. The best

excuse was to echo the Jiang regimes criticism and denunciation of the movement as a

subversion of the cause of Chinas unification which Jiang had been pursuing for so many

years.13

However, it seems that the criticism was more propaganda than truth in the light of

presently available sources. The reasons are as follows.A main point of censure of the Clique in the movement was its collusion with

Japan. However, this was based mainly on the sources and information provided by

9Hansu Chan, Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?, China Today, Vol. 2, No. 10, pp.188-90; Liang Min-teh, Nanking vs Canton, ibid, pp. 196-7; and GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24

(June 22, 1936).

10For example, Guangxis publications and periodicals were banned from distribution inother provinces before 1936, as a Guangxi periodical stated. See CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 11(August 1936), p. 76. I believe such a statement was to a great extent a real reflection of

the situation at that time, because I could rarely find these Guangxi periodicals in librariesoutside the province except in Guangdong, when I conducted my field work in preparationfor this thesis in China in 1992.

11See, for example, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 23, No. 24, No. 25 and so on in 1936.

12For example, Zhang Yufa,Zhongguo xiandai shi, Taipei: Huadong chubanshe, 1977, p.236.

13See Zhu Zhensheng (ed.),Li Hanhun jiangjun riji, Hong Kong, Lianyi yinshua gongsi,1975, pp. 7-12.


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Japanese newspapers or agencies in China. These sources and information asserted that the

movement pretended resistance but in reality aimed to overthrow the Central Government,

after the Southwest acted in June 1936.14 At the same time, by exploiting the fact that the

movement occurred in the Southwest, the Japanese fomented and spread rumours, forexample, that they provided financial and military assistance to the Southwestern leaders

and were also directly involved in the activities carried out by the two Guangs.15 As a

result, such Japanese propaganda had a wide impact on the Chinese mass media. As

Guowen zhoubao (National News Weekly, or Guowen Weekly) pointed out, "the

atmosphere created by the Japanese caused simple and honest Chinese citizens to have an

absolute suspicion of the two Guangs matter."16 Reactions of western observers to the

movement were, to a great extent, affected by these sources and information as well, due tothe fact that their perception and knowledge of the movement were based largely on the

Japanese agencies. For example, according to Guowen zhoubao, a western writer named

Sabotage also shared the above Japanese view.17 Colonel Joseph W. Stilwell, Military

Attache of the U. S. Embassy in China in the 1930s, also reported that the most prominent

reports (on the movement) are by the Domei Agency, which is Japanese controlled.18

Therefore, these Japanese sources and information were able to create a bad image; an

example is that more evidence is coming to light to show that the Kwangsi leaders havereceived financial and military assistance from Japan.19 Except for the above Japanese

sources, however, I have found no corroborative evidence to confirm the existence of

collusion between the Guangxi Clique and Japan.

14See Yizhou jian dashi (The Major Events of the Week), GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24, p.1.

15For example, the confidential documents of Nanjing were also partly based on theseJapanese news reports. See Anonymous, Liangguang panluan neimu, p. 13. Also see

Liang Min-teh, Nanking vs Canton.

16See The Major Events of the Week, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24, p. 1.

17 Foreign Views, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24, p. 1.

18U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9392 (June 5, 1936), p. 4.

19Ibid, No. 9426 (June 13, 1936), p. 4.


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It is important to ask why these claims of collusion were released only when the

June 1 Movement began. If such a movement was really a part of clever Japanese

conspiracies", as Jiang's followers claimed,20 why did the anti-Japanese propaganda and

policies as well as mass mobilization throughout the province win such great support fromthe Guangxi people who are proud of their province and believe that they are being led by

trained men under a new system, that the system is sound and big with promise for the

future?21 As mentioned in the previous chapter, to achieve its end of conquering China, a

method frequently used by Japan was yihua miehua (use Chinese to eliminate Chinese).

Therefore, it is not surprising that Japan spread rumours to incite factions within the GMD

to struggle against each other in order to divert the attention of the Chinese people from

external aggression to internal strife. Meanwhile, some Japanese, particularly notoriousmilitarists, such as Doihara Kenji, had tried their best to associate suspicion of collusion

with Chinese who advocated resistance against Japan. The real aim of these Japanese

activities, according to a Japanese writer, was to create for these people a pro-Japanese

image in order to falsify their reputation.22 As the Japanese aim was so obvious, even the

above confidential documents of Nanjing in dealing with the movement had to express

their doubt on these Japanese sources.23 In a word, the Japanese sources and information

are highly suspect.It is true that Guangxi purchased Japanese arms, a matter which was often referred

to as evidence of the Cliques collusion with Japan. There were indications that the most

important purchase occurred when the Clique took over an order of airplanes which the

19th Route Army had sent to Japan. General Cai Tingkai, commander the 19th Route

Army in fighting against the Japanese in Shanghai in 1932, placed an order for Japanese

20See, for example, Anonymous,Liangguang panluan neimu, p. 12.

21See Sherwood Eddy,Is There A Model Province in China? Shanghai, 7 January 1935,printed by the author himself, p. 3. For details of anti-Japanese enthusiasm and positive

participation in the movement, see Guangxi daxue wenfa xueyuan (ed.), Liuyi yundong jinian tekan, Guilin, June 1937. Western observers were also surprised by the morale ofthe Guangxi people and their trust in the provincial authorities. For details of these

observations, see U. S. Military Intelligence Reports -China, 1911-1941, No. 9348 (May 5,1936).

22Yahara Kenkichi, Qianlu suibi, Hong Kong: Zhanggu yuekanshe, 1974, pp. 77-81.

23See Anonymous,Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi, p. 20.


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airplanes and arms in 1933 to prepare for a revolt against both Jiang and the Japanese

aggression against China. However, after paying a large deposit on this purchase there was

no delivery of these goods, and his army was defeated by Jiang early in 1934. Although he

was in exile in Hong Kong, Cai still kept a close relationship with the Clique. A small unitof the remnant of the 19th Route Army after 1934 was accepted by the Clique and

reorganized as a regiment of the Guangxi troops, but this unit received financial assistance

from Cai rather than the Guangxi authorities as it was still loyal to its former leader.24

Through the introduction of Cai and General Weng Zhaoyuan, a former Divisional

Commander (shizhang) of the 19th Route Army, Guangxi needed only to pay another one

third of the price to take delivery of these airplanes.25 Moreover, there is evidence that the

Clique bought heavy shipments of Japanese arms, particularly cannons and militarycommunication equipment.26 These facts indicated that Japan encouraged the Clique to

struggle against Jiang on the one hand and that the Clique played the Japan card in

Chinese political game on the other.27 However, in view of the fact that Jiang had, after the

Fujian rebellion in 1934, adopted a policy of encirclement of Guangdong and Guangxi by

placing Nanjing and Nanjing-controlled troops in the surrounding provinces of Guizhou,

Yunnan, Hunan, Jiangxi and Fujian,28 it is not difficult to understand why the Clique would

purchase arms from the outside, and from any source, to defend and strengthen Guangxi.

24Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai zizhuan, Harbin: HLJRMCBS, 1982, p. 443.

25Feng Huang, Wosuo zhidao xin Guixi goujie riben diguo zhuyi gaikuang,

GXWSZLXJ, No. 5 (1963), p. 49. Hereafter as Gaikuang. Also see U. S. MilitaryIntelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).

26Kan Zonghua, Chen Jitang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi fadong liangguang liuyi

shibian jingguo, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1 (1961), pp. 91-2; and Anonymous, Dui liangguang

yidong zhi renshi, pp. 3-13.27Hallett Abend has the same explanation for the Cliques purchase of Japanese

armaments. See Hallett Abend, My Years in China, pp. 197-8. The current evidenceindicates that the purchase of Japanese arms was made by both Guangxis and Japanesebusiness agencies in Hong Kong but not by the Guangxi authority and the Japanese

government. It seems that this deal in purchasing arms, to a certain extent, was unofficialrather than official. Certainly, more evidence about this matter still needs to be unearthed.See Kan Zonghua, Chen Jitang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi fadong liangguang liuyi shibian

jingguo, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 91-2.

28Hu Yugao, Gongfei xicuan ji, Guiyang: Yugao shudian, 1946, p. 13.


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By this means the Clique gained extra advantage for a small amount of money in

comparison with other armament purchases.29 It is understandable that Li and Bai would

not miss this opportunity even though their action might compromise their chance for anti-

Japanese leadership and belief in their honesty.Following delivery of these arms to Guangxi, some important Japanese officers,

such as Doihara Kenji, and a number of Japanese military instructors visited and came to

the province. This is not surprising. It was a common phenomenon for Japanese officers to

visit the central and regional authorities in China before the Sino-Japanese War. Through

these activities the Japanese hoped to put China into a state of continuing internal struggle

and division.30 Under these circumstances, all Chinese authorities from Nanjing to the

regions had to deal with the Japanese, however reluctantly. The key to the Cliques contactand deals with the Japanese is whether these involved military agreements between the

province and Japan and whether the Clique made any concessions to Japan when

purchasing its arms. If the answer is yes, then the actions of Guangxi could be denounced

as bringing harm to the nation. However, I have not found any corroborative evidence for

the claims of the Japanese sources. If the answer to the above questions is negative, why do

some writers still accept the claims of the Japanese sources as true? An answer probably is,

according to Liang Min-teh, evidently the correspondents personal enthusiasm for thegeneralissimo has overshadowed the interests (in acceptable evidence).31 In other words,

these pro-Jiang journalists created an atmosphere of support for Jiang and attacked his

opponents through the mass media or propaganda.

Such propaganda was at the same time assisted by the strict censorship of Nanking

over all news sources other than (those of) the Japanese.32 As a Western journalist stated:

Nanking has done its worse to make it appear that the Southwest is the paid agent ofJapan, and is starting a civil war at this time in order to make easier Japans

absorption of China.33

29Feng Huang, Gaikuang, pp. 49-50.

30Hallett Abend describes a Japanese conspiracy in which the Japanese hoped to getsome leaders in Nanjing to sign an agreement favourable to Japan. This was an example ofsuch Japanese activities. See Hallett Abend,My Years in China, pp. 212-5.

31Liang Min-teh, Nanking vs Canton, p. 197.

32Ibid.


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The censorship of Nanjing indeed had a great impact on the mass media. For example, in

regard to the death of Hu Hanmin, the spiritual leader of the Southwest, Guowen zhoubao,

a weekly with wide influence throughout the country and an organ of the Political Study

Faction ( zhengxue xi) with the function of little criticism but big help to the NanjingGovernment, according to some sources,34 reported that the elimination of the

Communists was Hus deathbed call, but his other two calls were deliberately omitted by

this weekly and other newspapers and periodicals.35 In fact, according to his deathbed

calls, Hu put resistance against Japan (kangri) as the premier one - the most urgent task

facing the Chinese people at present, then the downfall of the politics of dictatorship ( tuifan

ducai zhengzhi), i.e. Jiangs rule, second, and the elimination of the Communist bandits

(suqing gongfei) as the third task. Hu also linked these three calls with Sun Yatsenssanmin zhuyi (i.e. nationalism, democracy and the peoples livelihood).36 After Hus death

on May 12, the two Southwest organizations immediately reported his deathbed calls in full

to Nanjing by telegram. However, the newspapers and periodicals under Nanjings control

rarely made them known to the public.37 It is certain that the Jiang group did not allow

publication of them, because it knew how to prevent unfavourable news from appearing in

the newspapers and how to use the mass media to serve its own purpose.

Although present sources are not sufficient to prove the existence of a collusionbetween the Clique and Japan, the question still remains: why did Li and Bai play such a

dangerous Japan card while they were loudly calling for nationwide resistance and

33Hallett Abend,My Years in China, p. 223.

34Da Xiao (pseud.), Guanyu Jiang Jieshi lingdao xia de Guomindang zhu paixi de

ruogan kaocha, Archives of the Nationalist Government, Nanjing, No. I1-118.

35

See The Major Events of the Week, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 19 (18 May 1936), p. 2.Other newspapers such asZhongyang ribao (The Central Daily) also did not mention Hus

deathbed calls. For details of peoples comments and views on Hus death, See SelectedDomestic and Overseas Opinions, in Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (Chairman Hu FuneralCommittee) ed.,Hu xiansheng jinian zhuankan, Guangzhou, May 1936, pp. 1-53.

36See Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (ed.),Hu xiansheng jinian zhuankan, p. 1.

37Chaoran Bao (Detachment Post), the organ of the National Socialist Party, criticized

the Nanjing Government's blockade of Hus deathbed calls. See Appendices - The Public

Opinion Relating to the June 1 Movement, Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (comp.), Liuyi

yundong hou Bai Chongxi de yanlun, Nanning, 1937, p. 261.


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preparing for war against Japan? The following reasons might explain the actions of

Guangxi in purchasing Japanese arms and employing Japanese military instructors.

The Japanese instructors were mostly limited to the fields of teaching the operation

of cannons, military communications and airplanes.

38

As Hu Shi pointed out after his visitto the Southwest in 1934, although Guangxi had achieved a successful reconstruction in the

province, several difficulties still existed which limited its achievements. Among these was

a lack of qualified technicians.39 In fact, the Clique employed not only the Japanese

experts. Several British and American as well as Canadian instructors had accompanied an

earlier shipment of airplanes purchased from Britain. The Clique employed these Western

instructors to teach its pilots in the province, and some of them had even remained in

Guangxi until the eve of the Sino-Japanese War.

40

Interestingly, another reason given forthe employment of Japanese flying instructors, according to General Feng Huang, Principal

of the Guangxi Air Force Academy in the 1930s, was that they were more skilled and

experienced than most Western instructors.41 In 1992, when I interviewed Feng, he told me

that the employment of Japanese instructors was based on the needs of the Clique for

technicians at that time and these were not available in the province.42 Bai Chongxi at that

38Feng Huang, Gaikuang, pp. 48-9.

39Hu Shi, Nanyou zayi,DLPL, No. 164 (1935).

40Feng Huang, Guangxi hangkong xuexiao gaikuang, GXWSZLXJ, No. 35 (1992), p. 3;

and the same author, Guangxi hangkong xuexiao, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1 (1961), p. 78.

41Feng Huang, Gaikuang, p. 51.

42I think this statement reflects the real situation of Guangxi at that time, based on the

writers interview with Feng Huang, Nanning, Guangxi, October 1992. In comparison withhis earlier recollections (see Feng Huang, Guangxi hangkong xuexiao, GXWSZLXJ, No.5 [1963]), Fengs interview of 1992 and the previous wording contradict each other. Feng

claimed that the Cliques employment of Japanese aviation instructors was a part of theevidence for the Guangxi groups collusion with the Japanese in his earlier recollection.However, Fengs wording of the employment of the Japanese Instructors in his recollection

is the by-product of the time, when, i.e. the 1950s and 1960s, all people in Chinacondemned the old society (jiu shehui), i.e. the Guomindang regime, for whatever the thingthe previous authorities did. Under these circumstances, those former senior GMD

politicians and militarists, both from the Central Government and the regional authorities,willingly or reluctantly, vied with each other in condemning the former authorities as muchas they could in order to vindicate their innocence of the events in which they had

participated, regardless of the motive behind the facts they accounted for in the past.However, the statements or judgements of these authors on those events are open to


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time also gave the same explanation as Feng.43 Such an explanation is reasonable and

understandable, because it was becoming increasingly necessary to employ relevant

technicians when purchasing any advanced modern weapon or piece of military

equipment.

44

Such employment was hardly evidence of collusion with Japan, but indicatedthe technical deficiencies in Guangxi itself.

All activities of visitors to Guangxi in the 1930s were well controlled by the Clique.

A writer, who was a former subordinate of Wang Gongdu - Li Zongrens adviser - recalls

that Guangxis secret police under Wang's command kept watch on all visitors, including

the Japanese.45 Even the Japanese flying instructors, according to Feng, were allowed to

stay only at Nanning and were not allowed to meet the British instructors in Liuzhou, the

base of the Guangxi air force.

46

These facts indicate that the Clique was very careful whenthey employed instructors from Japan - the assumed they were the enemy of the future.

This practice of employing Japanese instructors might reflect an opportunistic psychology

on the part of the Clique: it wanted to learn about Japanese weapons and technology on the

scrutiny because, as many know, they had to do this to gain favour with the Communistauthorities. But, today the authorities of China and more and more scholars there have

begun to reevaluate the policies of regional factions, even the main group in the NanjingGovernment, and have put a higher value on the some important events such as the FujianRebellion and the Xian Incident. Under these circumstances, these figures, whoparticipated in these events in the Guomindang era and are still alive, have also started to

revise previous incorrect recollections. When I interviewed Feng in 1992, he was overninety years old, and he no longer held emotive attitudes towards those activities in whichhe participated in the old society. Therefore, I believe that Fengs account of the June 1Movement and other events in the interview is, in general, reliable.

43Quoted in Feng Huang, Gaikuang, p. 51.

44

In his memoirs, T. G. Li also tells a story about two French officers, employed by theClique just after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (though they were soon recalled by

the French authorities), teaching the Guangxi troops how to use and maintain an anti-aircraft heavy machine gun, because the Guangxi soldiers lacked modern industrialknowledge. See T. G. Li, A China Past: Military and Diplomatic Memoirs, Lanham:

University Press of America, 1989, pp. 87-91.

45Liang Boming, Daonian Wang Gongdu, Xie Cangsheng xiansheng, GXWX, No. 10(1980), p. 44. Also see Liang Wenwei et al, Guangxi yinxiang ji, Nanning:

GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, p. 210.

46Feng Huang, Guangxi hangkong xuexiao, p. 77.


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one hand and to promote combat effectiveness of the Guangxi troops on the other.47 It

seems to be typical pragmatism. Whatever their secret reasons, however, all these Japanese

instructors were dismissed and expelled from the province before the outbreak of the June 1

Movement.

48

After that, no Japanese had been allowed to stay in or to enter Guangxiagain.49 Further, the fact that Cai Tingkai and his followers joined the movement in August

had already quashed the rumours about Guangxis collusion with Japan, as Cai and the

former 19th Route Army had already been lauded by many people for their resistance

against Japan since 1932.50 Jiangs followers must have known these facts, yet their

confidential documents in relating measures aimed to suppress the June 1 Movement,

which was really engineered by the Clique,51 were distributed secretly with a limited

circulation only. They instructed units and organizations loyal to Jiang to keep or file thesedocuments secretly or immediately destroy them after reading.52 These instructions

indicate that the so-called Guangxis collusion with Japan in the June 1 Movement as part

of a pro-Japanese conspiracy was, to a great extent, a propagandizing ploy of the Jiang

group in order to destroy the reputation of the Clique, rather than the truth.53 Hallett Abend

makes a fair comment, as follows:

47The writers interview with Feng Huang, 1992.

48Kan Zonghua, Chen Jitang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi fadong liangguang liuyishibian jingguo, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1 (1961); and Huang Xuchu, Sheng zhengfu Huang

zhuxi jinggao Guangxi quansheng minzong shu, CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12 (September 1936).

49Zhujiang ribao, May 28, 1937, p. 2.

50Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai zizhuan, p. 444; and Jin Ming, Cai Tingkai ru-Gui de

yingxiang, CYGL, Vol. 1, No. 5 (August 20, 1936), pp. 13-5. Cai and other former leadersof the former 19th Route army formed a new organization entitled Zhonghua minzugeming tongmeng (the Chinese National Revolutionary Coalition) in Hong Kong in 1935,

with resistance to Japan and the overthrow of Jiang as its aim. See Giu Guo Sh Bao (AuSecours de la Patrie), January 4, 1936; and Meng Guanghan et al (eds.), Kangzhan shiqiguogong hezuo jishi, Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1992, Vol. 1, pp. 40-3.

51U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9408 (June 19, 1936).

52For details of these instructions, see Anonymous, Liangguang panluan neimu, andAnonymous,Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi.

53People at that time had already pointed out this aim pursued by the Jiang group. Fordetails of these discussions, see Hansu Chan, Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?; and

Liang Min-teh, Nanjing vs Canton.


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It is true that Kwangsi used Japanese military advisers, and has purchased arms,munitions and airplanes from Japan, some purchases probably being made underliberal credits. But there can be no question of the genuineness of the anti-Japanese

spirit of both the leaders and the people of Canton and Kwangsi.54

Reasons for Launching the June 1 Movement

As part of the scorched earth resistance policy, the June 1 Movement was a

reaction against Jiangs annei rangwai policy. The Guangxi leaders had insisted that only

resistance could ensure real unity in both the GMD and the entire country. However, they

also opposed Jiang himself, or to be more exact, his dictatorship over the country. As a

result, some Western sources believed that the movement was a result of Guangxi's

resentment against Jiang only.55 According to these, Li and Bai were both ambitious men

and in order to fulfil their ambitions to replace Jiang and to avenge themselves of the insult

levelled at them by the latter in 1929, both of them, particularly Bai, were depicted as still

plotting in the solitude and the exclusiveness of Guangxi about ways and means of teaching

Jiang a lesson.56 Relying on these sources, some historians have also stated that the

movement was motivated by a desire to oppose Jiang.57 It would be a great mistake,

however, to view this conflict purely and simply as a personal issue between the Jianggroup and the Southwestern leaders, including those of Guangxi, because this view could

not answer the following questions. Why had all statements and telegrams issued by the

two Southwest organizations called for resistance against Japan only, and appealed to Jiang

himself to lead the nation in fighting Japan at the same time? Why did such a movement

enjoy the support of all political parties and groups all over the country which advocated

putting aside all disputes among them instead of uniting them for immediate resistance?

Why had the Clique remained in its base in the province, and at its normal strength evenafter Jiang had to accept its demands on internal and external matters in the end? To


55See Selected Domestic and Overseas Opinions, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24, p. 2; and K.B. Vaidya,Reflections on the Recent Canton Revolt and After, pp. 6-9.

56K. B. Vaidya,Reflections on the Recent Canton Revolt and After, p. 7.

57Tang Degang, Xian shibian liuyi shibian wushi zhounian,ZJWX, Vol. 50, No. 2.


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answer these questions, it is necessary to examine the factors which acted on the

movement.

It is true that the Clique had had a bad relationship with Jiang from 1929. But its

resentment against Jiang was eventually focused on the latter's internal and externalpolicies, especially on his policy of non-resistance after 1931, which we have discussed in

the previous chapter. As we have seen, Jiangs appeasement of Japanese aggression and

military suppression of his opposition at home after 1931 were the main reasons for the two

Southwest organizations existing in Guangzhou as powerful critics of his policy. Yang

Tianshi, a Chinese historian, has stated that opposition to Jiangs annei rangwai policy lay

behind the secret activities of Hu Hanmin who planned to overthrow Jiang, with the

assistance of the Clique.

58

Many people believed Jiangs domestic pacification wasdirected against not only the Communists and other parties and groups but also the Clique,

although ostensibly it was a tactic of Jiangs unification of China.59 A main aim ofannei

rangwai, according to Ma Junwu, a GMD veteran and Chancellor of Guangxi University in

the 1930s, was to eliminate the influence of Guangxi and Guangdong, and then to make a

compromise with Japan.60 Such an opinion, although it was biased, was so widespread that

any action taken by Jiang in dealing with domestic affairs was suspected of being motivated

against the Clique and the Southwest.

61

Indeed, Jiang's actions at that time were open tosuspicion. For this reason, in 1936 a writer criticized Jiang for ignoring Japanese

aggression in North China, while concentrating a large number of the Nanjing troops in

South China to suppress his opponents. That writer argued that,

58Yang Tianshi, Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie, KRZZYJ,

No. 1, 1991, pp. 101-140.

59

For details of the suppression of parties and groups in opposition to Jiang, see RogerJeans, Third Force: Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang) and the National Socialist Party of

China, 1932-1937, Republican China, Vol. XIX, Issue 1 (November 1993), pp. 113-45;Qiu Qianmu, Lun Zhongguo qingniandang de kangri jiuguo zhuzhang, KRZZYJ, No. 4,1992, pp. 35-50. Also see Hu Yugao, Gongfei xicuan ji, p. 108.

60Guangxi daxue zhoukan (Guangxi University Weekly), Vol. 2, No. 1 (February 26,

1932).

61For example, many believed that the real aim of Jiangs pursuit of, and attacks on the

Red Army westward was to wipe out his opposition in the Southwest. See Hu Yugao,

Gongfei xicuan ji, pp. 79-80, and pp. 108-110.


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Instead of unifying the North, Chiang Kai-shek chooses to unify the South; insteadof driving out the Japanese invaders from Hobei, Chahar, and the four Northeasternprovinces, he prefers to settle an account with General Chen Chitang in Kwangtung,

and General Pai Chung-hsi in Kwangsi; instead of sending an expeditionary force tosubdue the autonomous government in East Hobei under the open traitor Yin Ju-

keng, he has long since disposed large bodies of troops in Fukien, southern Kiangsi,Kweichow, and Hunan Provinces to get ready to attack the Southwestern troops.62

Judging from the above, it is not difficult to understand why the Clique simultaneously

insisted on the policy of opposition to Jiang and resistance against Japan for a couple of

years after the September 18 Incident.

But the Clique began eventually to change the above policy into that of forcing

Jiang or supporting him to resist Japan after 1935, as discussed in Chapter Six. In fact, this

change coincided with Jiangs gesture to peacefully settle the differences between the two

parties. Two reasons led Jiang to extend the olive branch to the Clique, including Hu

Hanmin. On the one hand, Jiang had eventually consolidated his rule in Central China after

he had successfully driven out the Communists to the Northwest from its base in Jiangxi,

and he realized that he could no longer refuse the demand for resistance. Instead he slowly

adjusted policy towards Japan and secretly prepared for a war of resistance.63 According to

Huang Shaohong, faced with Japanese aggression, Jiang had started to have concerns for

opinions from other sides within the GMD. Of course, Jiang's attitude was based on thecondition that his leadership was widely recognized.64 This was the background to the

Second Plenum of the GMDs 4th National Congress held at the end of 1934 with the

declared policy of peaceful unity within the party as the main principle which Nanjing

would pursue. At the same time, Japanese aggression in North China, and the so-called

North China autonomy movement engineered by the Japanese in order to separate this

territory from the control of Nanjing, further deepened the national crisis, and threatened

62Liang Min-teh, Nanking vs Canton: Press vs Truth, p. 196.

63For discussion of Jiangs preparation for resistance and readjustment of his policytowards Japan, see Chen Qianping, Shilun kangzhan qian Guomindang zhengfu de

guofang jianshe, NJDXXB, No. 1, 1987; and Meng Guanghan (ed.), Kangzhan shiqi

guogong hezuo jishi, Vol. 2, pp. 810-866.

64See Huang Shaohong to Li Zongren and Others, August 31, 1936, in Chongqing shi

dangan guan (ed.), Liangguang liuyi shibian hou Jiang Jieshi yu Li Zongren deng laiwang

handian,LSDA, No. 4, 1987, p. 76.


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Jiang's rule. Under these circumstances, Jiang began to secretly contact both the CCP,65

and his opponents within the GMD, mainly Hu Hanmin and the Guangxi Clique, seeking to

solve the differences between them. This was why Hu headed overseas in the summer of

1935 to observe and consider Jiangs sincerity in embracing unity with other groups andfactions.66

At the same time, General Long Yun, ruler of Yunnan province, tried to play the

role of intermediary between the Guangxi and Jiang, which I have discussed in Chapter

Five. Furthermore, there is evidence that the Clique tried on its own initiative to negotiate

with Jiang for mutual cooperation with the common aim of resistance, attempting to leave

all disputes aside in favour of a resistance policy for national salvation. This contact

between the two parties also had the backing of Huang Shaohong, the former second-in-command of the Clique and now Chairman of the Provincial Government of Zhejiang.

Huang Xuchu, the third-in-command of the Clique and Chairman of the Provincial

Government (sheng zhuxi) of Guangxi, and General Ye Qi, Chief of General Staff (zong

canmouzhang) of the 4th Army Group, i.e. the Guangxi troops, were the key figures of the

Clique involved in negotiation with Jiang Jieshi in order to solve the disputes between the

two parties. In the summer of 1935, Ye flew to Chengdu, capital of Sichuan, and met

Jiang, who was then commanding the central army and the Sichuan army in pursuit of theRed Army which was then undertaking its historic long march. Also, at this time, Huang

Shaohong visited his home province to discuss cooperation between the Clique and Jiang

with his former colleagues.67 Along with these contacts, Huang Xuchu was present in

November, during the GMDs 5th National Congress, and negotiated with Jiang in

Nanjing. In the end they reached a draft agreement. The Clique would recognize Jiangs

leadership in the nation and support him if he took the lead in resisting Japan and promoted

the positions of the Guangxi leaders in the central government, looking after their interests

65Meng Guanghan et al (eds.), Kangzhan shiqi guogong hezuo jishi, Vol. 2, pp. 695-725,and pp. 810-34.

66For details of Hus negotiations with Jiang for mutual cooperation in the anti-Japanese

issue, see Yang Tianshi, Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie.

67See The Major Events of the Weeks, GWZB, Vol. 12, No. 35 (9/9/1935), p. 1.


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in both the regions and the centre as well.68 It seemed that the two parties had reached the

point of joining forces to resist Japan through this agreement.

However, Jiang at that time failed to keep his promise to the Clique.69 Instead he

took measures to put pressure on the province by cutting off the opium route via Guangxi.As a result, Guangxi lost its most important financial source. Moreover, Jiang concentrated

large numbers of Nanjing troops in Guangxis neighbouring provinces to threaten the

Cliques existence. This was the motive force pushing the Clique to join forces with

Guangdong in launching the anti-Japanese movement in response. This proved to be a

powerful method of dealing with Jiangs pressure on the Southwest. After his return to

China early in 1936, Hu Hanmin, also acting on behalf of the Clique, put forward a plan to

save the nation to Nanjing in order to deal with the escalating national crisis, but no replycame from Jiang and Nanjing.70 The reason for Hus advocacy of immediate resistance

against Japan is that he (including the Clique) shared Jiang's ambition to control the whole

country at that time; but they differed in response to the national crisis faced China. This

was one of the reasons why Hu remained in Guangzhou after his return to China in 1936,

instead of keeping his promise to Nanjing to cooperate with Jiang. Unfortunately, Hu never

lived to experience the eventual reconciliation. His last words before his death, things go

contrary to my wishes (shiyu yuanwei),

71

in fact, indicate a heartbreaking disappointment.Hus disappointment reflected the further Japanese aggression in North and South

China, a national crisis for which Jiang had failed to take sufficient measures. In Chapter

Six, I have discussed the Japanese ambition to conquer China and its strategy of dividing

the Chinese nation, and subduing each region separately. Li Zongrens impassioned

declaration of his famous scorched earth resistance came as the new national crisis forced

all Chinese to consider the way out for their country. Since 1935, the Japanese had

68For details of negotiation between the Clique and Jiang, see Huang Xuchu, Guangxiyu zhongyang nian yunian lai beihuan lihe yishu, CQ, No. 126 (1/10/1962), pp. 13-16(hereafter Guangxi); and Huang Shaohong, Wo yu Jiang Jieshi he Guixi de guanxi,

WSZLXJ, No. 7. Also see GWZB, Vol. 12, No. 35 (9/9/1935).

69Huang Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No. 126, p. 16.

70Wan Renyuan and Fang Qingqiu (eds.), Zhonghua minguo shi shiliao changbian,

Nanjing: The Nanjing University, 1993, Vol. 38, p. 316.

71See Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (ed.),Hu Xiansheng jinian zhuankan, p. 1.


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intelligence in China everywhere they could. South China came under the direct threat of

the aggressive Japanese influence.81

Although Nanjing failed to take action in response to increasing Japanese military

and economic aggression, the new national crises after 1935 further aroused strong Chineseresponse, urging a new and more large-scale movement of resistance.82 Even those people

from the higher levels of the Nanjing Government realized the inevitability of resistance.

For example, Song Ziwen (i.e. T. V. Soong), Minister of Finance in the Nanjing

Government, had already stated that, it is a great mistake to try to negotiate with Japan

about anything.83 Hu Hanmin and the Clique found much fertile ground for their pleas for

resistance and their claims to leadership. There are indications that Hu, after his return to

Guangzhou, frequently convened secret meetings with Li Zongren, Chen Jitang and othersenior leaders of the two Southwest organizations in his house. People believed the

Southwestern leaders should have reached some political and military solutions to the

future of China and made some practical plans or policies that the people of the Southwest

could follow. Strangely, the exact plans are unknown,84 but there are indications that Hu

and the Clique still had the plan to launch a national resistance in opposition to Jiang's non-

resistance, and the June 1 Movement was to put the scorched earth resistance policy into

practice.First, as stated earlier, Lis scorched earth resistance policy called for immediate

resistance. Before publishing it, Li sent it to Hu Hanmin and discussed it with him. Hu

agreed with his views.85 Second, after his return to Guangzhou, Hu insisted on promoting

nationalist education and propaganda to meet the needs of resisting Japan and national

81See Zhu Zhengsheng (ed.),Li Hanhun jiangjun riji, Vol. 1, pp. 43-4.

82Hallett Abend, My Years in China, pp. 210-1; and Liang Min-teh, Nanking vsCanton.


84See Zhongguo dashi ji, compiled and published by Center for Chinese ResearchMaterials Association of Research Libraries, Washington, D. C., 1973, Vol. V, pp. 354-9.

85Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Boulder, Colorado:

Westview Press, 1979, p. 316. Lis article was also published in Sanmin zhuyi yuekan, Vol.

7, No. 5 (May 15, 1936).


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salvation.86 The purpose was to prepare public opinion for the coming war. Furthermore,

although he still insisted thatjiaogong (suppression of the Communists) and tuifan ducai

(overthrow of dictatorship) were part of the policies which should guide the Southwest, or

even the whole country if possible, Hu believed, it is better to come under the rule of theCommunists than to be eliminated by Japan.87 This indicated his determination to resist

Japan and why he nominated the anti-Japanese war as the most urgent task. According to

correspondence from Guangzhou on 24 May, the Southwest had been preparing to launch a

national war against Japan before Hus death, and afterwards did not stop this action, but

speeded up preparations.88 The slogans and other propaganda of the Southwest after Hus

death were all directed towards this aim.89 Nanning Minguo Ribao (Nanning Republican

Daily), official organ of the Clique, became even more determined in its call for immediateresistance just after Hus death.90 In fact, Li and Chen had already called and prepared for a

war against Japan early in 1936. According to Joseph Stilwells report, Chen and Li also

stated they, once the war broke out, would immediately put 70,000 and 50,000 troops,

respectively, into the field, though they finally failed to do so, as Jiang could not be moved

to go to war yet.91

There can be no doubt that the Clique was keen to put its policy of resistance into

practice. That is to say, the movement seemed to be the most positive response to thefurther aggression and Japans smuggling activities in 1936 and disappointment at Jiangs

failure to ward off the Japanese threats. Hallett Abends comments were very much to the

point:

The Southwest are sincere in their anti-Japanism and in their belief that if ChiangKai-shek continues in power China will be given away to Japan, bit by bit, whileGeneral Chiang husbands his military and cash reserves to sustain his own domestic

position against domestic adversaries. The Southwest sincerely wants to reorganize

86Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (ed.),Hu xiansheng jinian zhuankan, p. 1.

87Giu Guo Sh Bao, March 20, 1936.

88Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 25, 1936.

89For details see Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (ed.),Hu xiansheng jinian zhuankan, p.14.

90Nanning minguo ribao, 13 May 1936.

91U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9271 (January 13, 1936).


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the Central Government, and then arouse the patriotism of the Chinese people inorder to make an effort to regain North China and Manchuria.92

Therefore, the Southwest would not wait any longer, but decided to take action in

opposition to Jiangs impotence in dealing with the Japanese. After they had dealt with

Hus funeral, the two Southwest organizations telegraphed to Nanjing its intention of

moving its troops to North China against Japan, and both Guangdong and Guangxi were

soon mobilized, which began the June 1 Movement.

Jiang's decision to settle his differences with the Southwest by force also spurred

the two Guangs into launching the movement. It is possible that Jiang had adopted three

principles in dealing with the two Guangs' semi-independence from Nanjing about May

1936. According to Lis memoirs, these were as follows: 1) The thorough elimination of

the power of Li and Bai in Guangxi, with the central government helping Guangdong in

their use of troops for the purpose; 2) The expulsion from Guangdong of anti-Jiang

veterans such as Xiao Focheng; and 3) The maintenance of the status quo in Guangdong. 93

These principles indicated that Jiang would attempt to wipe out the Clique as a top priority.

However, if Guangxi was defeated by Jiang, Guangdong could not maintain its position.

Both Chen and Li of course knew it was Jiangs tactic of killing two birds with one stone

( yishi erniao) in order to split the powerful Guangdong-Guangxi alliance, a force ever

threatening to Jiang's rule over China. In their own positions and interests, Guangdong and

Guangxi had to take measures in response to Jiangs principles; and the best justification

for taking such measures was of course that which would be accepted by many Chinese,

that of fighting Japan. The death of Hu Hanmin provided Jiang with an opportunity to

speed up his settlement of the two Guangs matter. Soon after Jiang had sent five senior

members of Nanjing to Guangzhou to pay a condolence call after Hu's death in mid-May,

rumours about Jiangs more concrete intentions of eliminating the two Southwest

organizations spread throughout the country. According to some sources, these principles

included:

1) The abolition of the Southwest Executive Committee of the NationalistGovernment and the Southwest Political Council of the GMD;

2) Reorganization of the Guangdong provincial government;

92Hallett Abend,My Years in China, 1926-1941, p. 223.

93Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 303.


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3) Retirement of all senior leaders of the two Southwest organizations andreappointment of their positions by Nanjing;

4) The change of Chen Jitang's position from Commander-in-Chief of the 1st

Army Group to Field Commander of the 4th Route Army (Guangdongtroops), and the reappointment of all commanders of this army by Nanjing;

and5) The unification of Guangdong currency into the central system.94

If these principles really existed and were carried out, Chen would no longer be able

to maintain his power in Guangdong. But Jiang, in a speech on June 8, 1936, denied the

existence of such principles.95 I also have not found corroborative evidence to prove their

existence. However, Jiang often used the tactic of allying himself with nearby forces to use

them in subduing opposition in an area, and he had already concentrated large numbers of

troops to encircle the two Guangs. It was not unreasonable to assume that Jiang would

carry out these policies to eliminate the Clique, his largest opponent within the GMD. 96

The same tactics had served him well in 1929, during the Wuhan Incident (dealt with in

Chapter Two) when Jiang successfully eliminated the influence of the Clique in Central

China for almost a decade.

The Motive Force Behind the Launching of the June 1 Movement

It was also understandable that the Clique and Chen Jitang would launch their anti-

Japanese movement as a counter measure. First, in so doing, the two Guangs could not

only be maintained as a powerful political force within the GMD as usual but could also

94Cheng Siyuan, Liangguang shibian, GXWSZLXJ, No. 22, pp. 47-56; Liu Fei,Liangguang liuyi shibian, WSZLXJ, No. 3; and Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.),

Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, Guangzhou: Guangdong Provincial Archives, 1985, p. 373.

95See Anonymous,Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi, p. 30.

96Some sources show that senior leaders of Nanjing, such as Ju Zheng, Sun Ke and Li

Wenfan, did take advantage of Hus funeral ceremony in Guangzhou to discuss the issue ofunity between Nanjing and the Southwest (i.e. the two Guangs), but the details of thenegotiations and the results are unknown. SeeZhongguo dashi ji, Vol. V, p. 374. Other

evidence is the recollection of Jiangs intelligence officer who was in Guangzhou at thattime. In this recollection, the writer acknowledges Jiangs ambitious plan to eliminate theSouthwest and his mission in Guangdong was to coincide with Jiangs purpose in the

Southwest. See Shi Xin (pseud.), Liangguang shibian qianhou de huiyi zhiyi, CQ, No.

172 (1/9/1964), p. 14.


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win a commanding reputation in the anti-Japanese movement.97 The Clique expected the

War of Resistance to be most effective in North China and the Yangzi valley and these

areas were far from their home base. The earlier resistance began, the more likely it would

be that the enemy would not be able to reach provinces like Guangxi. Also, success in theNorth would bring prestige and a much better chance of returning to the central government

control of or a share in the leadership of resistance to Japan; it would also reinforce its rule

of the whole country.98

Second, the successful launching of resistance would efficiently frustrate Jiang's

plan of eliminating the two Guangs, and if Jiang refused to take the lead in fighting Japan,

it would provide them with a good reason to argue for his replacement. It is self-evident

that ideally they wished to replace Jiang and to assume leadership of the country in resistingJapan through the movement.99 This might be an important motive force behind the

movement. In fact, Joseph Stilwell had already sensed this earlier in 1936. In a

confidential report, he pointed out that the Southwest believed Jiang did not want to go to

war with Japan because of his desire to maintain his own supremacy in China; as this

American officer saw it, war meant the certain downfall of Jiang at the hands either of the

Southwest and Japan. For this reason, Joseph Stilwell believed that:

Chen and Li, once in the lower Yangtze, and in superior military force might verywell issue an impassioned plea to the nation to rally and save that great region underCanton auspices. In case of the success of such a plea the supreme national power

would fall like a ripe plum into the laps of Chen and Li, who would be not loath toreceive it.100

Finally, it was the most propitious time and the most convincing reason for the

Clique and Chen Jitang to take action by carrying out Hus rhetorical unfinished tasks on

the one hand and promoting their reputation as the logical replacements for Jiang on the

other. These based their decision on their judgement of the growing anti-Japanese

97Liu Fei, Liangguang liuyi shibian.

98U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9271 (January 13, 1936).

99In fact, in the first half of 1936, Chuanjin yuekan andNanning Minguo Ribao, officialorgans of the Clique, frequently advocated a war of resistance and urged Li and Bai to leadresistance if Jiang failed to do so. See Chuanjin yuekan, Vol. 3, No. 8 (May 1936) and No.

9 (June 1936); andNanning Minguo Ribao, April 26, 1936, p. 2.

100U. S. Intelligence Military Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9271 (January 13, 1936).


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sentiment around the country. According to their judgement, the year 1936 was a critical

time in which the world war could well break out (for reasons discussed earlier). It also

was the year of resisting Japan for national salvation as well.101 Once they initiated the

war, they believed that the whole country would rally to their call for resistance; if Jiang didnot respond to the wishes of the people, his prestige would collapse.102 Launching such a

movement had in fact been well planned by the Southwestern leaders before and after Hus

death, and they had widely contacted other minority parties and groups and discussed the

possibility of war against Japan. The suggestion of General Chen Mingshu, former leader

of the Fujian Rebellion, in a telegram to Zou Lu, a GMD veteran and a senior leader of the

Southwest, on May 21, is an example of the major responses. Chen said,

What the Southwestern leaders can do at present is to unite together and insist on atotal struggle of resistance against Japan, and to establish a certain scale of anti-Japanese unity in the Southwest, as well as to strike relentless blows at the Japanese

pirates aggression. In so doing, once the Southwest is rising to the call for fightingJapan, the whole country will give a positive response. At present the feeling thatthe national people bitterly hate the Japanese pirates has already become white-hot.

Such a will held by the 400 million people must become a powerful backup forceof yours. Thus these people who fawn on foreign powers and beg to preserve theirown wealth and rank will destroy themselves before the angry people if they do not

follow you and participate in the war against Japan. This is not only the best self-defensive way of the Southwest but also that of the whole nation.103

In short, the interaction of these internal motive forces and the external factors

favourable to the Southwest pushed the Guangxi leaders, also including Chen Jitang, to

launch the June 1 Movement in 1936.

Conclusion

It can be seen from the foregoing analysis that the June 1 Movement was a natural

continuation of the Guangxi Cliques scorched earth resistance policy and its practice. The

allegations of collusion with Japan came mostly from the propaganda of Nanjing, using

Japanese sources with scant facts. Although there is evidence to indicate that the Clique

101Giu Guo Sh Bao, January 4, 1936.

102Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 305.

103Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 20, 1936.


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had some contacts with Japan in order to purchase arms and that these contacts indeed

aroused suspicions among many people, there is no corroborative evidence to show that the

Clique was in collusion with Japan when the movement was launched. In addition to

protection of their own territory and countering military pressure from Jiang, the realmotive force was the need for nation-wide resistance, because the Southwest had already

realized, as a newspaper said, that this was the year of national salvation for the Chinese

people.104 They also realized that such a movement could coincide with the anti-Japanese

positions of many, and gain wide support from the Chinese people,105 including some

Nationalist leaders such as Feng Yuxiang.106 The call for immediately launching a war of

resistance even had its echo in the Nanjing government. For example, after the Japanese

had forced China to sign an agreement on demands in North China late in 1935, SongZiwen (T. V. Soong) declared heatedly:

This is a time for fighting. If we do not resist now, our chance may be lost for goodand all. Even a defeat, after all, is something. It is better to fight and to lose, thanto give up everything without a struggle.107

When Nanjing withdrew 140,000 troops of the Central Army, and later another 40,000

more troops, from North China at the end of the same year, T. V. Soong said further, it

would have meant thousands of people killed, but even street fighting is better than not

fighting at all."108 It indicates that the call for immediate military resistance brought wide

and favourable reactions from many groups, even including some in the Nanjing

Government. According to Western sources, the Guangxi leaders were also backed by a

clique at Nanjing. In other words, their anti-Japanese action was echoed by some leaders of

104She Lun (Editorial), 1936 - Kangri jiuguo nian, Giu Guo Sh Bao, January 4, 1936, p.1.

105Huang Xuchu, Guangxi yu zhongyang nian yunian beihuan lihe yishu, CQ, No. 127(October 16, 1962), p. 17; and also see CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 9, p. 12.

106Giu Guo Sh Bao, May 20, 1936.


108Ibid.


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266

Nanjing.109 As Hansu Chan pointed out, launching a movement for resistance against

Japan had already become a matter of life and death for the Chinese nation.110

There is enough evidence to show the existence of personal ambitions as one

motive behind the movement and opposition to Jiang, but the prerequisite to anti-Jiangactivity was opposition to his non-resistance policy. That is to say, the purpose of the

movement was to urge Jiang to lead a nationwide resistance. Only when Jiang still refused

the appeal for this leadership, and even responded by military threats against both Guangxi

and Guangdong, did the Southwestern leaders act by instigating the June 1 Movement. In

such a way, the Southwestern leaders combined the national interest and personal

ambitions.

Nevertheless, it is safe to say that the June 1 Movement met the needs of the time.As James Bertram, a British correspondent in China in the 1930s, pointed out after the

movement,

The motives behind this movement were somewhat suspect, but it is noteworthythat it could command mass support only on a programme of more active resistanceto the inroads of Japan.111

Statements and telegrams from the Southwest during the movement indicate also

that all actions were, indeed, designed to urge Jiang to wage an immediate resistance, even

though we can accept that there were suspect motives behind it. Just based on these, some

writers believe that the movement was both anti-Jiang and resisting Japan.112 This is

correct because it basically reflects the complicated motives behind the movement.

109U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9499 (December 10,

1936). Also see Giu Guo Sh Bao, May 20, 1936.

110Hansu Chan, Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?, p. 188.

111James Bertram, First Act in China: The Story of the Sian Mutiny, New York: VikingPress, 1938, p. xiv.

112For details of relevant studies, see Cao Yuwen, Lun kangzhan qianxi xin Guixi deqiqiang zhengzhi, XSLT, No. 1, 1991, pp. 100-5; Xia Chao, Shilun liangguangshibian, JDSYJ, No. 3, 1986, pp. 194-215; Guo Xiaohe and Luo Jianing, Liangguang

shibian qianhou xin Guixi zhengzhi taidu de bianhua, GXDXXB, No. 1, 1985, pp. 90-4;Li Jingzhi, Liangguang shibian de xingzhi chutan, LSDA, No. 1, 1986, pp. 100-4;Zhang Guangchuan, Liangguang shibian xinyi, Zhengming (Discussion), No. 2, 1991,

pp. 36-9; and Zhang Meiling, Li Zongren bi Jiang kangri de lishi diwei yingyu chongfen

kending, Tansuo, No. 4, 1987, pp. 31-6.


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However, those writers still use a static and undynamic view to examine the movement,

including its development and resolution, thus, neglecting the factors and circumstances

affecting the Cliques policies and practice in the movement. In fact, these factors and

circumstances interacted with the Cliques policy and impelled the Guangxi leaders toreadjust their purposes to coincide with the demands of the time. These will be the main

subject of the next chapter.

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Su PhD thesis - 14 Chapter 7