Su PhD thesis - 09 Chapter 2

8/14/2019 Su PhD thesis - 09 Chapter 2

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CHAPTER TWO

THE RISE OF LI ZONGREN AND THE GUANGXI CLIQUE

Previous studies relating to the Guangxi Clique in Republican China have discussed

to some degree the origins and intensity of the conflict between this group and Jiang Jieshi,

leader of the Nationalist Government.1

However, the conflict, in our view, not only

reflected the bitter power struggle between them, but also the differences in internal and

external policies between the two parties, something which these studies do not fully

discuss. The conflict had a great impact on the policies and practices of both parties in the

Nanjing decade. If the conflict was concerned with power struggle and policy-making, how

did the Clique come into conflict with the Jiang group? What was the background to the

conflict between them? And what was the impact of this conflict between Li and Jiang on

1For details of these studies, see Diana Lary,Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in

Chinese Politics, 1925-1937, London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, chapters 6-8;

Shen Xiaoyun, Li Zongren de yisheng, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1992, chapters 5-9; Mo

Jijie and Chen Fulin (eds.),Xin Guixi shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1990, Vol. 1, chapters 6-

8; Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, Shanghai: SHRMCBS, 1992, chapter

9; Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, Jiang Jieshi yu xinan difang shilipai, Zhengzhou:

HNRMCBS, 1990, chapters 5 and 10; Shi Quansheng, Gao Weiliang and Zhu Jian (eds.), Nanjing guomin zhengfu de jianli, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1987, chapters 6-8; Gao

Weiliang, 1927 nian Guomindang zhongyang tebie weiyuanhui pouxi, JDSYJ, No. 3,

1988; Lu Jiaxiang, Lun Jiang-Gui zhanzheng zhong Li Mingrui de fange dao-Gui,

HCSZXB, No. 2, 1988; Lu Yangyuan, Luelun diyici Jiang-Gui zhanzheng,MGDA, No. 1,

1986; Peng Jie, 1927 nian de Wang-Gui zhizheng: cong Guomindang Hankou tebieshi

dangbu de gengdie tankai qu, JHLT, No. 1, 1991; Wang Xutian, Luelun kangzhan shiqi

Jiang-Gui zhijian de maodun douzheng,XSLT, No. 1, 1990; Xue Moucheng, Lun Jiang-

Gui zhanzheng,XMDXXB, No. 4, 1982, and Li Zongren Tang Shengzhi zhizhan,DSYJ,

No. 5, 1985; Yuan Jingxiong and Li Qixian, Lun Jiang-Gui maodun de chansheng he

fazhan, GXSFDXXB, No. 2, 1990; and Zheng Derong and Tian Keqin, Guomindang

paixi de jiaozhu yu Nanjing zhengfu zai quanguo tongzhi de jianli,ZGDSYJ, No. 5, 1988.


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the policies and practice of the Clique in the 1930s? To answer these questions, we need to

trace the origins of the Clique, and examine the conflict with the Jiang group in some

detail. The purpose of this chapter is to pursue these issues. I will argue that the conflict

between Li and Jiang was based on their differences over political unity in both the GMDand the nation, and over domestic and external affairs as well. This conflict led the Clique

to carry out its own policies of reconstruction and mass mobilization in Guangxi, and to

create a foundation of regional political unity before the Sino-Japanese War.

Historical Background of Guangxi

Guangxi is a province in southwest China, with Guangdong to its southeast, Hunanits northeast, Guizhou its north, Yunnan its west, and Vietnam (the French Indochina

before the 1950s) its southwest. Historically, it was notoriously poverty stricken. A key

factor in that has been the geographic conditions in Guangxi: it is covered with vast areas of

barren mountains. As a result, the difficulty of communication isolated the province from

the political centre of China before the Republican era, which also caused its low

agricultural production. In the 1930s, Guangxis agricultural production capacity was

lower than the national average both in terms of yield per unit area (125kg per mu asagainst the national average of 175kg per mu) and cultivable land (9.1% as against the

national average of 10.3%).2

The poverty was worsened by heavier land taxes. In the Qing

era, the tax levies on the province were higher than those of its neighbours such as

Guangdong.3

By the time of the Republic, land taxes were by no means reduced, but had in

fact increased. Consequently, farmers suffered cruel exploitation. Various abuses, of

having land but without taxes, paying taxes but without land, less land but more taxes, and

more land but less taxes, permeated throughout Guangxi.

4

In addition, exploitation by thepractice of usury in Guangxi was worse than in other provinces. For example, it was

2See Zhang Peigang, Guangxi liangshi wenti, Changsha: SWYSG, 1938, pp. 134-135.

mu, a unit of area = 0.0667 hectares.

3Tianfu, No. 4, Kao, No. 7536, in Liu Jingzao (ed.), Qingchao xu wenxian tongkao,

Shanghai, n.d.

4Xingzhengyuan nongcun fuxing weiyuanhui (ed.), Guangxi sheng nongcun diaocha,

Shanghai: SWYSG, 1935, p. 280.


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reported in the late Qing period that the monthly rate of interest on loans was 16.6% in

Guilinfu (prefecture), but its annual rate in Liuzhoufu reached 300%.5

Poverty was always accompanied by chaotic social conditions in Chinese society.

Along with the various imperialist influences penetrating China after the 1850s and thecollapsing rural economy, the already large numbers of the unemployed vagrants (wuye

youmin) began to increase. As Guangxi had virtually no modern industry, the vagrants,

with no legal means of earning a livelihood, joined forces with the secret society (huidang),

banditry (lulin), and disbanded soldiers (youyong), who grew to large numbers in the late

Qing period. They fought the authorities and savagely harassed the people. They also

attacked foreign invaders from Vietnam (Annam, or French Indochina).6

Thus, public

order became a major problem in Guangxi. The saying no mountain without caves and nocave without bandits was a true portrayal of the situation in that province at that time.

Guangxi is also inhabited by various minority groups apart fromHan Chinese. The

long conflict between minorities andHan Chinese was aggravated by the large number of

Hakka migrants who had entered Guangxi since the Ming dynasty.7

They fought against

each other very often over land, water and other matters.8

This made the Guangxi people

well known for their militant character. This identity was also strengthened by continuing

rebellions of the Guangxi people, which had a far-reaching impact on the politicaldevelopment of China from the Taiping Rebellion in the 1850s onwards, as the province

was the birthplace of the Taiping.9

Moreover, the significant achievement of the province

5Zhang Youyi (ed.), Zhongguo jindai nongye shi ziliao, Beijing: SLSD, 1957, pp. 350-

351.

6See Lin Baohang, Guangxi de youyong, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 170-200. For more

details, see Lu Juntian and Su Shuxuan,Lu Rongting zhuan, Nanning: GXMZCBS, 1987.

7For detailed discussion of the immigration of Hakka moving from north to south China,

see Luo Xianglin, Kejia yuanliu kao, Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chuban gongsi, 1989.

8Xu Qiming, a senior commander of the Clique, as well a descendant of Guangxi Hakka

in Yongfu county, recalled that the fighting between Hakka and natives occurred very often

during his childhood. See Xu Qiming, Xu Qiming xiansheng fangwen jilu, Taipei:

ZYYJYJDSYJS, 1983, pp. 1-2.

9For discussion of the Taiping Rebellion, see Franz Michael, The Taiping Rebellion,

Seattle, 1966; Ssu-yu Teng,New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion, Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950. Also see Deng Zhicheng and Xie Xingyao (et al

eds.), Taiping tianguo shiliao, Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1976.


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in resistance against foreign aggression since the Sino-French War in the 1880s further

reinforced the identity of the Guangxi people. The Guangxi soldiers were well known for

defeating the French invaders on the border between Guangxi and Vietnam in 1884. This

victory earned the reputation for the Guangxi people for being unconquerable.

10

As LengGuan (Hu Lin) has pointed out, the Guangxi people have the character that they would

rather become bandits in the mountains than surrender to others.11

Poverty and backwardness, chaos, constant rebellions, and personal courage and

militancy all combined to form the character of modern Guangxi, which took the form of a

regional characteristic. Once these characteristics were combined with a political

consciousness of regional self-government following the introduction of various popular

isms and ideas which spread in the late Qing and the early Republic, politicalregionalism, or provincialism, emerged and developed.

12This reflected a growing political

and cultural cohesion of regional identity, which in turn provided a motive force for

regional cohesion. And this in turn became a component of modern nationalism, which

was emerging to become the main motive force in overthrowing the Qing Dynasty and

establishing a republic. This was further strengthened by the rising military force of the

regions. Political regionalism thus became a common phenomenon throughout China, this

was an indication of the weakening of central authority; but it was the first step towards theultimate political integration of the modern Chinese nation-state. It seems to have been a

necessary process, as the old society had broken down without any sign of its revival in the

new world of domestic trouble and external invasion of the early twentieth century.13

10For details of the victory of the Qing army over the French army in 1884, see Lu

Juntian and Su Shuxuan, Lu Rongting zhuan; and Yang Jialuo (ed.), Zhongfa zhanzheng

wenxian huibian, Taipei: Dingwen shuju, 1973; as well as Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushi

nian wenxian bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.), Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushi nian wenxian,diyi bian diwuce: lieqiang qinlue [2] , Taipei: ZZSJ, 1970.

11Leng Guan, Yue-Gui xieying, in Leng Guan et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping, Nanning,

1935, p. 10.

12For detailed discussion of the rise of the political regionalism, see Li Jifeng, Shengqu

zhuyi yu minguo shengzhi de sanbian, unpublished PhD dissertation, Nanjing University,

1992.

13For details of discussion related to regionalism, see Diana Lary, Region and Nation,

Introduction.


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The rebellious and unlikely traits of the bulk of its citizens did not undermine

Guangxis interest and participation in significant political events and movements in China

before 1911 and after. On the contrary, Guangxi had a considerable role to play in

Republican Chinas political development,

14

and it had a close connection with the courseof modern Chinese history, despite the fact, as Lary says, that it felt itself to be only on the

edge of the Chinese world.15

Indeed, Guangxi was as backward economically and isolated

politically as were its unfavourable geographical circumstances.16

The backwardness and

isolation were further worsened by unequal development in the social and economic realms

in different regions of China after the 1840s. However, the military achievements of

Guangxi in the late Qing and the early Republic, and the active participation and

involvement in the political development of modern China, inspired its people andinfluenced later generations,

17particularly the new military and political group in the

Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang), the so-called Guangxi Clique (Guixi) with Li

Zongren as its head. Because of the appalling poverty and backwardness as well chaos in

the province, these leaders were anxious to change Guangxis conditions, and sought to use

military force to achieve this, to advance regionalism, and to promote their role in national

affairs - a goal they pursued in Chinese politics and military affairs. The Guangxi Clique,

in order to unite the people behind them, attributed Guangxi's poverty to imperialistaggression, against which they mobilized, organized, educated, trained and armed the

masses to awaken them to a new political consciousness. In this way, the militant character

of the Guangxi people was successfully combined with the Clique's policy of militarism, a

tool for its existence and development, and for reunification of the province. The anti-

imperialist tradition which had developed from the Taiping became a driving force to take

Guangxi to a strong position from which it could play an important role in Chinese politics.

14For details of Guangxis role playing in Chinese politics before 1920, see Lu Juntian

and Su Shuxuan,Lu Rongting zhuan.

15Diana Lary,Region and Nation, pp. 26-27.

16For detailed discussion of the circumstances, seeIbid, pp. 21-33.

17All memoirs and recollections written by members of the Guangxi Clique claim that

they had more or less been influenced by the achievements of their older generation from

the Taiping, the Sino-French War and the Black Flag Army (heiqi jun) under the command

of Liu Yongfu and so on. Whatever the reason, it reflects the fact that the people ofGuangxi possessed an identity reflecting their history and their geographical location.


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The Rise of Li Zongren and the Formation of the Guangxi Clique

Li Zongren was born on 13 August 1891 into a straitened peasant family in Linguicounty, near Guilin, the then capital of Guangxi. In his childhood his ambition was only to

be a duck-keeper.18

However, China's political and social changes brought him out of the

rural lifestyle and into a new world. With a series of national crises taking place at the end

of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, one of the policies adopted by the

Qing government was to set up a modern military school in each province in order to help

maintain its rule. Ironically, the establishment of the military schools changed not only the

fate of China itself, i.e. destruction of the Qing Dynasty, but also the life and career of manyindividuals, including Li Zongren. Like other militarists of the Republic, Li was attracted

by the new and dynamic atmosphere of the outside world created by this modern facility

and left the village for ever. He became a cadet of the Guangxi lujun xiaoxue, the Guangxi

Military Elementary School (GMES), in Guilin in 1909. As he worked hard and did very

well in military training, Li enjoyed a high reputation among his schoolmates, who gave

him a nickname Fierce Kid Li.19

He joined the Tongmenghui (the Revolutionary

Coalition, which was established by Sun Yatsen in Tokyo in 1905) in about 1910,

20

andcompleted his studies in this school in 1913.

21

Inspired by patriotism, Li began his long military career in 1916 when he was

recruited into the National Protection Army (huguo jun) which was initiated by Generals

Cai E and Tang Jiyao - the so-called National Protection Movement (huguo yundong) - to

fight President Yuan Shikai who attempted to restore the monarchical system with himself

18

Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Boulder, Colorado:Westview Press, 1979, p. 13.

19Ibid, p. 21. Also see Yin Chenggang, Li Zongren qijia jingguo, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7,

p. 104 (Hereafter as Jingguo).

20Te-kong Tang and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 23.

21In 1912 the school was renamed the Guangxi lujun sucheng xuetang, i.e. the Guangxi

Intensive Military Training School (GIMTS). For details of this school, see Li Shucheng,

Xinhai geming shiqi Guangxi de lujun ganbu xuetang he lujun xiaoxuetang, GXWSZLXJ,

No. 10, pp. 38-42.


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as emperor. As an officer of the Constitution Protection Army (hufa jun), Li then

participated in the Constitution Protection War (hufa zhanzheng) in the following year,

which was launched by the Southern Military Government in Guangzhou. With his

distinguished performance in both the National Protection War (huguo zhanzheng) andhufa zhanzheng he was soon promoted to a battalion commander in 1918, and a deputy

regimental commander in 1921. For his bravery and military ability he also was highly

praised by the young middle and lower ranking officers in the Guangxi armies; these

officers had mostly been his schoolmates at the military schools.22

This reputation placed

him in a favourable position to unite these young officers around him when he himself

became a provincial militarist and reunified Guangxi several years later.

The year 1921 gave Li an opportunity to rise as a provincial militarist during theGuangdong army's invasion of Guangxi. Lu Rongting, then ruler of Guangxi, was defeated

and reluctantly announced his retirement, leaving the province in turmoil. Li resolutely

broke away from the old Guangxi army set up by Lu Rongting. In this complicated and

uncertain situation, Li carried out a policy of examining the situation carefully and then

waiting for change ( jingguan daibian),23

and led his troops into the Sixty Thousand

Mountains (liuwan dashan) to maintain and develop his own strength. This action had a

great impact on the course of Guangxi's history. With his reputation as a middle-rankingcommander in the Guangxi armies, Li attracted a large number of military school graduates

to his side, and soon had a small but effective force of 2,000 men. In the fall of 1921, by

seizing an opportunity in the chaotic situation prevailing in the province, he occupied Yulin

fu, including seven counties in the West River Valley of Guangxi, the richest area of the

province.24

With this base secured and his troops well-trained and disciplined, Li rose

rapidly to embark on his political and military career in modern Chinese history.

22Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-Jen, p. 52; and Yin

Chenggang, Jingguo, pp. 111-2.

23Yin Chenggang, Jingguo, pp. 120-5.

24For the details of Li's occupation of Yulin, see Yulin shi wenshi ziliao, No. 10, pp. 1-50.


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The rise of new provincial militarists was an outcome of the time, and a common

phenomenon in the Republic.25

Guangxi was no exception. The provincial turmoil and

civil war of Guangxi caused its economic and financial collapse. In these circumstances,

ending the chaos and reunifying the province became a common cause.

26

However, therecould be no help from the central authority. The Beijing government and Sun Yatsens

Guangzhou government were involved in their own internal struggles for power and even

for their very survival,27

and had neither time nor strength to pay attention to regional

affairs, particularly Guangxi, a province remote from Beijing and a hostile neighbour of

Guangdong between the years 1920-1922.28

Under the circumstances, the chaos of

Guangxi was left to be solved by its own internal forces. In this situation, any faction

within the province which carried out an appropriate and determined policy could becomethe new ruler of the entire province.

The rise of Li Zongren in Guangxi in the early 1920s depended to a great extent on

the unity of the young Guangxi army officers who graduated from military schools. This

unity led to the formation of what is commonly known as the Guangxi Clique, though its

members did not use that name, regarding it as an insulting term, which is the sense in

which it was used to refer to them by outsiders, particularly those rivals of the Guangxi

group, from about 1927. The turmoil in Guangxi after 1921 created a great chance for therapid rise of young army officers. By establishing his sphere of influence in Yulin and

pursuing a firm policy of uniting graduates of military schools to strengthen his own

25Tao Juyin and Tian Buyi provide plenty of examples of the rise of this sort of militarist

after the 1911 Revolution. For further details, see works by Tao Juyin and Tian Buyi in the

Bibliography of this thesis.

26Li Jiaxian, Zizhijun zhanling Nanning he Guangxi de jumian, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, p.

154.

27For details of the internal struggles of the two regimes in the North and South, see

Andrew J. Nathan, Beijing Politics: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism,

1918-1923, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974; and Mo Shixiang, Hufa

yundong shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1992.

28For details of the hostility between Guangdong and Guangxi and the wars between the

two provinces, see Li Peisheng, Guixi ju-Yue zhi youlai jiqi jingguo, Guangzhou, 1921; and

Mo Shixiang,Hufa yundong shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1992.


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force,29

Li soon built up his power base. Guangxis graduates of the military schools,

such as Huang Shaohong, Bai Chongxi and Huang Xuchu, together with some ambitious

military graduates from other provinces, such as Hu Zongduo and Tao Jun, natives of

Hubei province, all joined his troops. When Li made himself Commander-in-Chief of theGuangxi 2nd Route Self-Governing Army (zizhijun) in 1922, for example, his subordinates

(above the rank of major) were nearly all these graduates. Even when his troops were

reorganized as the 7th Army of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army (NRA) early in 1926,

thirty-two high-ranking officers of the army were of the same background.30

With his

successful political, military and financial practices in Yulin,31

Li expanded his troops to

number about 10,000 by early 1924, and extended his sphere of influence into Wuzhou and

Xunzhou (Guiping) - the other rich areas in the West River Valley of Guangxi. With hishighly qualified officers and well trained soldiers, Li was able to keep his own areas free of

turmoil, and he managed to maintain social stability in these areas during Guangxi's

chaos.32

Li's actions after 1921 made him a regional militarist. However, like many other

well-trained soldiers, neither he nor his colleagues were satisfied with the role they played.

They desired also to pursue a political objective and be motivated by political ideals. An

important decision was made to join the Guangzhou government under the leadership ofSun Yatsen in 1923. Apart from geographic and cultural connections between the two

provinces of Guangxi and Guangdong, two factors were crucial. First, after the

establishment of his sphere of influence in Yulin and Wuzhou areas, Li and his colleagues

had an ambition to reunify Guangxi. To reach this goal, outside military and political

support was necessary. At the same time, the Guangzhou government was also seeking a

29

Yin Chenggang, Jingguo, p. 130.

30Materials from the memoirs and reminiscences of Li Zongren, Huang Shaohong, Bai

Chongxi, Yin Chenggang and other senior members of the Guangxi Clique. See Appendix

1.1 and Appendix 1.2.

31For details of these practices, see Wen Guan, Guangxi geju xia zhi caizheng

zhuangkuang, NLZB, No. 40 (4 February 1923); Yin Chenggang, Jingguo, pp. 125-30;

and Yulin shi wenshi ziliao, No. 10, pp. 1-50.

32Yin Chenggang, Jingguo, pp. 129-30; and Wen Gongzhi, Zuijin sanshi nian

Zhongguo junshi shi, reprinted Taipei, 1962, Vol. 1, p. 345.


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pro-Guangzhou force from Guangxi to free western Guangdong from the threat of other

military groups such as Shen Hongying and Tang Jiyao, two major militarists in Guangxi

and Yunnan who had attempted to take over Guangzhou. If they accepted the leadership of

Guangzhou, Li and his colleagues would in turn receive material support to complete thereunification of Guangxi and then to work towards transforming the province.

33

Meanwhile, Guangxi public opinion expressed the view that "the figures with the

revolutionary spirit who were trusted by the [Guangzhou] Revolutionary Government

would rise to rule the province".34

Li and his group were thus in the right place at the right

time. This is because this group was a new force with revolutionary ideas,35

and also

because it was regarded as a force that could be trusted by both the Guangxi people and the

Guangzhou government too.

36

Secondly, Sun Yatsen and his colleagues had earned a reputation in their struggle to

overthrow the Qing Dynasty and to promote the Republic in the past decades. Suns ideal,

which was expressed in his Three Principles of the People (sanmin zhuyi), also met the

needs of the current political climate which sought to enrich the state and strengthen the

military (fuguo qiangbing). This also affected the ideology and actions of many Chinese,

including these young army officers. As he needed wide support during the Guangzhou

Military Revolutionary Government in the early 1920s, Sun Yatsen opened the door of hisparty (i.e. the Guomindang) to anyone and any faction promising this, whether that support

was substantial or just lip service. Joining the Guangzhou Military Revolutionary

Government would not only meet the ideal Li Zongren and his group pursued, but also

allow them to have a role in the party under Sun Yatsen, which might well have control

over the whole country in the future. Furthermore, Sun had future plans to launch the

Northern Expedition to reunify China under his leadership. Although at this time his

33Yang Yitang, Deng Yanda, Guangzhou: GDRMCBS, 1986, pp. 5-6. Also see Li

Jiezhi, Guanyu Li Jishen fuzhi xin Guixi qijia de pianduan huiyi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 14,

pp. 33-43.

34Qunyan (Your Say), Vol. 4, No. 1 (1925).

35Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-Jen, pp. 95-102; Huang

Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, Hangzhou: Fengyun chubanshe, 1945, pp. 56-7; and Huang Xuchu,

Ba-Gui yiwang lu, CQ, Nos. 170-173 (hereafter as BGYWL).

36Yang Yitang,Deng Yanda, pp. 5-7; and Qunyan, Vol. 4, No. 1.


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military strength was too weak to control the whole of Guangdong, Sun's ideas and

revolutionary banner would be useful weapons for Li and his colleagues to use in their own

plans to reunify Guangxi. Moreover, the Guangzhou government on its own initiative tried

to build a close cooperative relationship with the new and rising Guangxi Clique.

37

In thesecircumstances, Li Zongren and Huang Shaohong, another leader of the Guangxi group,

joined the Guangzhou government first and then the Guomindang (GMD), the Chinese

Nationalist Party reorganized by Sun in 1924.38

In the summer of 1924, Li and Huang dispatched their troops - dinggui jun and

taozei jun - separately from Yulin and Wuzhou to attack Nanning, capital of Guangxi.

They soon defeated the remnants of Lu Rongting, who then had 20,000 troops and

controlled south and west Guangxi, and captured Nanning in July. This victory led to theformation of the Guangxi Pacification and Bandit Suppression Joint Army (dinggui taozei

lianjun), with Li as Commander-in-Chief and Huang as Deputy Commander-in-Chief in

the same month,39

marking the official establishment of the Guangxi Clique. Sun Yatsen

on behalf of the Guangzhou Military Revolutionary Government appointed Li

Commissioner of the Guangxi Provincial Pacification Office (Guangxi quansheng

shuijinchu duban) and Huang Deputy Commissioner (huiban) on 24 November 1924,

which officially confirmed the two mens leadership in the Clique. By the end of the year,the Guangxi Clique had expanded its strength to over 20,000 men. However, the north and

northeast areas of Guangxi were still under the control of Shen Hongying, the biggest

militarist of the province who had an army of 30,000. To reunify the whole province, the

37Lis relations with the Guangzhou government (or Guangdong province) will be

discussed in Chapter Five.

38Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 79-80. According to a report, Li Zongren had

decided to ally with Guangdong and he had sent a delegation to Guangzhou for discussion.

See Shenbao, 17/10/1923. This indicates that Li's statement about his contact with Li

Jishen at the end of 1923 is reliable. See Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of

Li Tsung-jen, p. 104.

39For details of the reunification of Guangxi by Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique, see

memoirs of Li Zongren, Huang Shaohong, Bai Chongxi, Xu Qiming, Huang Xuchu, Zhang

Renmin and other members of the Clique in the Bibliography of this thesis. Also see

GXWSZLXJ, No. 29.


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Clique launched a campaign and wiped out Shens troops in the first half of 1925.40

At the

same time, the Clique also annihilated the invasion force of Tang Jiyao, the biggest

Yunnan-based militarist in southwest China. An opportunity came for Tang when Sun

Yatsen was critically ill in Beijing at the end of 1924. Tang attempted to take over theGuangzhou government to replace the leadership of Sun.

41To clear a way for occupation

of Guangdong, Tang attacked Guangxi with a crack force of 60,000, but his powerful

troops were fiercely resisted and finally defeated by the Clique in July 1925.42

The victory

over both Shen and Tang brought an end to Guangxi's chaos which had existed since 1921

and signalled the arrival of a powerful new force under the Nationalist government which

was just established in Guangzhou in the same month.

The rise of the Clique and the reunification of Guangxi were of great significance tothe political development of both the province and its neighbour - Guangdong. It helped

consolidate the Guangzhou government43

and supported the complete reunification of the

40Yu Shixi, Xin Guixi xiaomie Shen Hongying jituan jingguo, GXWSZL, No. 29, pp.

119-24. Yu was then a subordinate commander of Shen Hongying.

41Mo Jijie and Chen Fulin (eds.),Xin Guixi shi, pp. 86-8;XDZB, No. 107 (1925), p. 898;

Shenbao, March 24, 1925. Sun Yatsen died in Beijing on March 12, 1925.

42For details of the campaign, see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li

Tsung-Jen, pp. 112-3; Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 94-104; Bai Chongxi, Bai

Chongxi xiansheng fangwen jilu, Taipei: ZYYJYJDSYJS, 1984, pp. 29-32; Zhang Renmin,

Huiyi lu, Hong Kong: printed by the author, 1988, pp. 43-9; and Huang Xuchu, Guangxi

yu zhongyang nian yunian lai beihuan lihe yishu, CQ, No. 103 (16 October 1961), pp. 2-5

(hereafter as Guangxi).

43The Cliques extermination campaigns against Shen Hongying and Tang Jiyao, in the

first half of 1925, enabled the Guangzhou government to launch the Eastern Expedition

(dongzheng) against Chen Jiongming, a former subordinate of Sun Yatsen and a

Guangdong militarist, in Dong (East) River Valley of Guangdong, and to suppress

separately the troops under Liu Zhenhuan and Yang Ximin who were affiliated to the

Guangzhou government and were thought to be scheming to take over Guangzhou in the

same period. At the same time, Shen and Tang attempted to take over Guangzhou. The

Clique resisted Tang's offensives and eliminated Shens influence. This ensured the

consolidation of the Guangzhou government, and then the establishment of the Nationalist

Government in Guangzhou in July 1925. See Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan (ed.),

Zhonghua minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian, Nanjing: JSGJCBS, 1986, Vol. 4, pp. 887-

912. Hereafter asHuibian.


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41

Guangdong province in the fall of 1925.44

However, it should be pointed out that, in

dealing with the reunification of Guangdong, many contemporary Chinese historians have

neglected the support and help from the Clique, and have usually attributed the event to the

contribution of the Huangpu Military Academy (Huangpu junxiao) under the leadership ofJiang Jieshi and of the other forces in Guangdong, such as the united front between the

Nationalists and Communists.45

In fact, Guangdong was not successfully reunified until

the formation of the Guangxi Clique and the subsequent reunification of the province.

When the Nationalist government was set up in Guangzhou in July 1925, Guangxi was the

first province to come under its administration and to offer powerful support to reunify

Guangdong. The military and organizational skills of the Guangxi Clique were clearly

sought after by that body.

46

The Clique also became one of the main forces behind theNorthern Expedition, playing a very important role in the military dimensions of the

Expedition.

Heading for the Northern Expedition

China was fragmented in the 1920s. Two national governments existed at the same

time, each demanding the loyalty of politicians, militarists and the common people.Meanwhile, the imperialist powers, particularly Japan, speeded up their steps to exploit

China and conquer the Chinese people by taking advantage of Chinas internal turmoil.

Hence, territorial reunification, i.e. the establishment of a united Chinese national

government and political unity of the country became an urgent need of the time. For the

44For the contribution of the Guangxi Clique to the reunification of Guangdong in detail,

see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-Jen, pp. 124-6; Huang

Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, p. 107; Huang Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No. 103, pp. 2-5; BaiChongxi,Bai Chongxi xiansheng fangwen jilu, p. 32; and Zhang Renmin,Huiyi lu, pp. 51-

2.

45See, for example, Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang, Taipei: Xueshu zhuzuo

jiangzhu weiyuanhui, 1966; Zhang Yufa, Zhongguo xiandai shi, Taipei: Huadong

chubanshe, 1977; and Zhang Xianwen (ed.), Zhonghua minguo shigang, Zhengzhou:

HNRMCBS, 1985.

46On 6 August 1925, the Nationalist government placed Li and Huang in charge of

Guangxis military and political affairs. See Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan,Huibian, p.

908.


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42

Guangzhou government, the Northern Expedition to reunify the nation under the leadership

of the GMD was a firm policy, a goal Sun Yatsen had dreamed of since the Constitution

Protection Movement. Even members of the Beijing government such as Duan Qirui

wanted to reunify China by force. A war to reunify the country to create one nationalgovernment would naturally also provide opportunities for those militarists with advanced

military training and great ambitions to pursue their careers and serve the country at the

same times. When Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique decided to come under the

Guangzhou government, they became involved in the Northern Expedition, motivated by

several factors.

First, Guangxi was completely unified under the Nationalist government in early

1926.

47

Although the Clique showed a strong regionalist feeling before 1925, as manyother militarists did at that time,

48this unification indicated that Li and his group had

already shifted their focus to beyond the province. They had an strong desire to participate

in national political and military affairs. Li and his colleagues supported the aim of the

Northern Expedition to reunify China, which, if successful, would give them an opportunity

to serve the national government.49

Secondly, as every member of the Clique was aware, Guangxi was the birthplace of

the Taiping Rebellion. Taiping heroism and military achievements had inspired the

47For details of the process by which Guangxi was completely unified under the

Nationalist Government in politics, military, and finance, see Bai Chongxi, Bai Chongxi

xiansheng fangwen jilu, pp. 33-6; Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 117-21; Te-kong

Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 138-42; and Zhongguo dier lishi

dangan guan,Huibian, pp. 910-2.

48

Before the reunification of Guangxi, for example, Li and Huang had implied a strongregionalist colour with the chosen title of their troops, Guangxi Pacification and Bandit

Suppression Army, even though the appointment from the Nationalist government in 1925

placed them in charge of military and political affairs of the province only. It was, on the

one hand, a common process towards national affairs when regionalists were just rising to

power in their provinces. On the other hand, this showed an attempt by the Nationalist

government to secure power in the Centre and to limit the interests and power of the

regions. See Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan,Huibian, pp. 906-8; and Diana Lary,Region

and Nation, pp. 43-63.

49Zhang Renmin,Huiyi lu, p. 54; and Bai Chongxi,Bai Chongxi xiansheng fangwen jilu,

p. 34.


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43

younger generations of the province to strive for a higher political and military goal.50

Since its foundation, the Clique considered itself to be the successor of the so-called Hong-

Yang (Taiping) Revolution. For them, the Northern Expedition was the continuation of the

Taiping.

51

They were uneasy about the fact that, although Guangxi was now part of theNationalist government, it was belittled and discriminated against by some major factions

of the GMD, especially in terms of the army reorganization and financial support.52

The

Clique attempted to promote its position in both the GMD and the rest of the nation

through its performance in the Northern Expedition.53

Thirdly, there was a more pragmatic consideration. During the reunification of the

province, the Cliques strength expanded rapidly. Its forces had grown to about 40,000

men by 1925. Li and other leaders of the Clique were concerned with maintaining theinternal unity they had achieved in their group. By joining the Expedition, Li could provide

opportunities for members of his group not only to get promotions but also to keep the

morale and fighting capacity of the troops at a high level, to maintain the internal cohesion

50In their memoirs, leaders of Guangxi always claim the impact of the Taiping on their

actions. See, for example, Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen,

p. 3; and Xu Qiming,Xu Qiming xiansheng fangwen jilu, pp. 1-2.

51See Guangxi yu zhongguo geming, compiled and published by the Department of

General Political Training of the 4th Group Army, Nanning, 1936.

52For example, in early 1926, leaders of the Nationalist government urgently needed

large numbers of troops, and they were rapidly expanding their own troops also, for the

coming Expedition. However, they limited the army reorganization of the Guangxi Clique

to one army (jun) only, even though the military strength of the Clique, with 40,000 men,

was enough to be reorganized into two armies. At the same time, these leaders of theNationalist Government offered the title of the army (jun) to other militarists who had a

small number of troops and even allowed them to expand their troops from a division (shi)

into an army. Financially, they used large amounts of money to buy over the militarists

who were then loyal to the Beiyang Government and to pay the salaries of their own

armies, but left the Clique to resolve its own financial problems in armament expenditures.

See Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang, pp. 487-8; Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi,

pp. 118-21; Zhang Renmin,Huiyi lu, p. 52; Bai Chongxi,Bai Chongxi xiansheng fangwen

jilu, p. 34; and Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan,Huibian, pp. 1048-1051.

53Huang Shaohong, Xin Guixi de jueqi yu liangguang tongyi ji dageming beifa,

GXWSZLXJ, No. 6, pp. 74-80 (hereafter as The Clique).


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44

of his group and to enable the Clique to play its role in the achievement of the Nationalist

government as well.54

These factors drove Li and the Clique to play an important role in promoting the

Expedition. Li advocated an immediate launching. He first persuaded Tang Shengzhi, apowerful militarist and Commander of the 4th Division of the Hunan Army stationed at

south Hunan, to join the Nationalist government. An ambitious man, Tang had good

relations with Wu Peifu, a bigger militarist in central and north China with an ambition to

reunify the country by force. He also wanted to get support from the Clique.55

Li and the

Guangxi leaders had kept close connections with Tang and his subordinates through

General Ye Qi, a Brigadier of the Hunan army and a native of Guangxi as well as a

graduate of both GMES and BMA.

56

During the winter of 1925-26, Ye visited his homeprovince as Tangs representative. Li initiated a move to cooperate with Tang,

57thus

causing the split between Tang and Wu and having Tang on the side of the Clique and the

Guangzhou Government. This action freed Guangxi from the direct threat of Wus

influence.58

On the one hand, it also created for the Nationalist Government at Guangzhou

favourable conditions to launch the Expedition, for Tangs actions brought about the

downfall of Zhao Hengti (governor of the Hunan Province and a supporter of Wu Peifu) in

the province in the spring of 1926; and, on the other, it weakened Wus influence in Hunanto some extent.

When Tang conspired to expel Zhao from Hunan and prepared to join Guangzhou

early in 1926, Li promised to reinforce him by sending troops to Hunan.59

In March 1926

Tang successfully compelled Zhao to retire by force and soon occupied Changsha, capital

54See Yin Chenggang, Diqijun tiqian ru-Xiang jiqi zai beifa zhong de jige zhongda

zhanyi, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3 (hereafter as 7th Army), p. 1.

55Zhang Renmin,Huiyi lu, pp. 51-4; and Shenbao, 7 February 1926.

56Shenbao, 7 February 1926; and Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li

Tsung-jen, p. 133.

57Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 133-8; and Zhang

Renmin,Huiyi lu, pp. 51-5.

58Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 133-6.

59Bai Chongxi,Bai Chongxi xiansheng fangwen jilu, pp. 796-8; and Te-kong Tang and

Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 143-4.


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45

of Hunan. Wu Peifu launched an offensive against Tang and forced the latter to withdraw

to south Hunan. Li immediately sent a brigade of troops to Hunan in late April as Tang

requested before the action of the latter in Hunan, which was one month earlier than that of

the 4th Army of the NRA from Guangdong, followed by the entire 7th Army under his owncommand. This action saved Tang from the verge of defeat.

60Meanwhile, Li also sent an

emergency telegram to Guangzhou reporting the latest developments in Hunan and the

Cliques military reactions, which he intended to present to the Expedition as an

accomplished fact.61

The contribution of Li and the Clique to the launching of the

Expedition at the right moment should therefore be fully recognized.62

Furthermore, after the mobilization of the Guangxi armies to reinforce Tangs

action in Hunan, Li went to Guangzhou personally for a discussion of the NorthernExpedition with Nationalist leaders. Lis stay in Guangzhou from May 10 to June 18 to a

considerable extent promoted the launching of the Expedition. According to the media

reports, after Lis arrival at Guangzhou, the appeal of the Northern Expedition or for

moving troops into Hunan to reinforce Tang (Shengzhi) and to send a punitive expedition

against Wu (Peifu) suddenly ran high.63

Meanwhile, some Guangzhou leaders, such as

Tan Yankai and Cheng Qian, who were not prepared to send reinforcements to Tang

because of their previous resentment with the latter, did not change their mind until Li's

60Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 145-6; and Yin

Chenggang, 7th Army, pp. 3-4.

61Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 144-5; and Huang

Xuchu, Guangxi, CQ, No. 104 (01/11/1961), p. 5.

62In his telegram to the Central Military Affairs Committee of the Nationalist

Government on June 3, 1926, Tang Shengzhi praised the fact that the great battle againstthe army under Ye (Kaixin) had been fiercely fought for over three days since starting on

29 May, in which Zhong (Zupei) Brigade of the 7th Army participated. Zhong Brigades

officers and soldiers all were very brave, and made great contribution to the victory over

Yes army. According to this fact, I would like to ask the Government to cite them for their

meritorious service. See Shenbao, June 15, 1926. The same newspaper also made a

comment on 12 June 1926 that the Guangxi Armys advanced force was quite efficient in

reinforcing Tang (Shengzhi) in Hunan. This indicates the foresight and determination as

well as courage of the Guangxi Clique before the official launching of the Northern

Expedition.

63Guangzhou minguo ribao, May 13, 1926.


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arrival and his discussions with them.64

Thus, the GMD Central Military Affairs

Committee (CMAC) authorized on May 29 the appropriation of a sum for armament

expenditures for the Guangxi army to finance the dispatch of their reinforcements to

Hunan.

65

The GMD Centre adopted formally the motion of dispatching troops for theNorthern Expedition on 4 June.

66Even more crucially, Li also played an important role in

supporting the appointment of Jiang Jieshi as Commander-in-Chief of the NRA for the

Expedition at the Central Military Affairs Committee meeting held on the same day.67

The above actions reflected an urgent desire of Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique

to participate in national affairs. Li and his troops, the famous 7th Army, a powerful main

force of the NRA, participated in all significant campaigns in the Northern Expedition.

With its strong fighting capability, the 7th Army won titles of feijun (the flying army) andgangjun (the steel army).

68Following the expansion of military strength and the

promotion of reputation, Li became more and more involved in the internal struggle of the

GMD, particularly with Jiang Jieshi, and played a more important role in both the GMD

and the Nationalist government. However, Lis strength in the central government did not

last long after the accomplishment of the Expedition. Soon after the capture of Beijing in

June 1928 Li was under the pressure of the Jiang group from many sides. Even in the

summer of the year, rumours of a civil war fermenting in the middle Yangzi River Valleyswept over the country, in which it was suggested that Lis troops, its main forces then

64Shenbao, May 25, 1926.

65Mao Sicheng,Minguo shiwu nian yiqian zhi Jiang Jieshi xiansheng, Shanghai, 1936;

reprinted by Longmen shudian, Hong Kong, 1965, Vol. 15. p. 76. This is the only record I

know of that the Guangxi Clique received financial assistance from the Nationalist

Government before the establishment of the Wuhan regime early in 1927.

66Archives of the Central Executive Committee of GMD, in The Second Historical

Archives of China, Nanjing. Also see Zhang Xianwen (ed.),Zhonghua minguo shigang, p.

256.

67Shenbao, June 18, 1926.

68For details of the performance of the 7th Army in the Northern Expedition, see Wen

Gongzhi, Zuijin sanshi nian zhongguo junshi shi, reprinted Taipei, 1962, Vol. 2; and

Shanghai minguo ribao (Shanghai Republican Daily), 13/6/1928. Also see Hu Puyu (ed.),

Beifa zhanshi, Taipei: Congwu chubanshe, 1974; and Luo Jialun (ed.), Geming wenxian,

Taipei, 1953-, Vol. 16 (hereafter as GMWX).


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47

concentrating in Hubei, were in preparation for a war against Jiangs troops in both Anhui

and Jiangsu provinces.69

Although the rumours proved to be without foundation, the tense

relationship between Li and Jiang never relaxed after that. Along with a series of debates

on the nations reconstruction and troop disbandment within the GMD, Li and the Cliquebecame the major target which Jiang intended to eliminate. In March 1929 the conflict

between Li and Jiang broke out into an internal war within the GMD, i.e. the so-called

Jiang-Gui War,70

followed by a series of civil wars throughout the country during the next

two years, in which nearly all factions of the GMD were involved.71

As a result of the war,

the Clique was soon defeated by Jiang in central China and was forced to return to its base

in Guangxi, and to become a rival to Jiang for many years thereafter.

Reasons for the Cliques Conflict with Jiang and Its Return to Guangxi

Although the Guangxi Clique was credited with outstanding achievements in the

Northern Expedition, it was accused of aiming at territorial expansion. Was one of the

Cliques aims in joining the Expedition to control a much larger region, or was it a desire

for the expansion of the Kwangsi empire?72

Judging from the complicated political

situation in the Expedition, the image of the Clique as a territorial expansionist to a greatextent seems to be a product of the widespread propaganda of its political opponents.

However, the Clique did have legitimate differences, in policies of national reconstruction

and in response to imperialist aggression, with other factions, particularly the Jiang group.

69Guo Tingyi (ed.), Zhonghua minguo shishi rizhi, Taipei: ZYYJYJDSYJS, 1979, Vol.

2. p. 380 (hereafter asZHMGSSRZ).

70Wan Renyuan and Fang Qingqiu (eds.), Zhonghua minguo shi shiliao changbian,

Nanjing: The Nanjing University Press, 1993, Vol. 27 (hereafter as ZHMGSSLCB). Also

see Archives of War History Compiled Committee, the Nationalist Government. The

Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing.

71For details of civil wars in 1929-30, see Zhang Tongxin, Guomindang xin junfa

hunzhan shilue, Harbin: HLJRMCBS, 1981; Wan Renyuan and Fang Qingqiu (eds.),

ZHMGSSLCB, Vols. 28-30; and Jiang Kefu, Minguo junshi shi luegao, Beijing: ZHSJ,

1991, Vol. 2. pp. 1-63.

72Diana Lary,Region and Nation, p. 64, and pp. 115-28, specifically p. 121.


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These have usually been ignored by previous studies. To respond to the issue of

expansionist ambition, it is necessary to discuss the background at the time.

Li Zongrens return to Guangxi after the Expedition was in fact the outcome of the

GMDs internal struggle for power. Because of their short history in the GMD, Li and hiscolleagues were at a political disadvantage in this struggle in comparison with those long-

term GMD members originating from the Guangzhou government. The Clique had some

difficulties to claim power in both the party and government though it had shown its

military strength during the reunification of both Guangxi and Guangdong. In a sense, the

Northern Expedition was a process of the distribution of power and territorial interests

among the GMD factions in the party and later in the country along with the continuing

victories of the campaign against the militarists who were loyal to the Beijing government.The principal competitors for power within the GMD were the factions under the

leaderships of Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin and Jiang Jieshi respectively before the

Expedition, while the Guangxi Clique, having recently joined the GMD, had none of its

leaders holding a significant position in the GMD and its government until a year after the

launching of the Expedition. After this, Li and the Clique were rapidly promoted to the

GMDs top leadership and played an important role in both the Party and the Government,

simply because of their military accomplishments in the campaign. However, the GMDwas a group which emphasized its members qualifications and record of service in the

party. In the eyes of some GMD leaders, particularly that of Jiang Jieshi, the Guangxi

Clique was only an opportunist group to be exploited by more experienced politicians.73

In

other words, Jiang was convinced that the Clique joined the Expedition in an obvious

attempt to seize the top leadership of the GMD and its government by force.74

In Jiangs

view, anyone who opposed him was considered to be acting against the best interests of the

73 Jiang zongtong yanlun bubian (Supplement of President Jiangs Speeches and

Writings), 10:50 (quoted in J. K. Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1983, Vol. 12, pp. 133-4).

74See Wan Renyuan and Fang Qingqiu (eds.),ZHMGSSLCB, Vols. 29-30; GMWX, Vols.

17-18. Also see Jiang Jieshis speech, in Zhang Qiyun (ed.), Xian zongtong Jianggong

quanji, Taipei: Zhonghua wenhua daxue zhonghua xueshuyuan, 1984, pp. 577-80. And see

Taofa Guixi xuanchuan dagang, 1929 and Taofa Guixi junfa wengao, 1929, Archives

of the Editorial Committee for War History, the Nationalist Government, Nanjing.


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nation.75

During the confrontation between Wuhan and Nanjing regimes under Wang

Jingwei and Jiang Jieshi separately in the second half of 1926 and the first half of 1927, the

Guangxi Clique played a strong role as a mediator to bring the two regimes together.76

The

problem was that the Cliques independent actions hurt the interests of both Wang andJiang, and frightened both.

77Wang instigated a debate on Party Legitimism or

Orthodoxy (dangtong) to arouse the fears of other factions against the Clique, which was

supposed to have controlled the Nanjing Government, i.e. the so-called Nanjing Special

Committee (NSC), after the Wuhan regime was merged into the Nationalist Government at

Nanjing in September 1927.78

In order to return to the top leadership of both the party and

the government, Jiang created obstacles to the NSC in many ways to embarrass that body,

on the one hand,

79

and used large amounts of money to bribe the Cliques rivals to oppose

75Zheng Houan (et al) trans, Zhongguo dageming Wuhan shiqi jianwen lu, Beijing:

ZGSHKXCBS, 1985, p. 90.

76For details of the roles of Li Zongren and other Guangxi leaders in acting as mediator

between Wuhan and Nanjing, see Zou Lu,Huigu lu, Chongqing, 1943, pp. 199-214; Chen

Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong, 1979, Chapter 8;

Guangzhou pingshe (ed.), Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, Guangzhou: Pingshe,

1928; and GWZB, Vol. 4, from July to September 1927.

77As a compromise, Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei retired before and after the

combination of the two regimes in August and September 1927. For details of the

retirement of Jiang and Wang before and after the combination of Wuhan and Nanjing, and

conjectures of the Cliques compelling Jiang to retire, see GWZB, August to October 1927;

and Mi Xi, Wo zai Jiang Jieshi shenbian de shihou, Zhejiang wenshi ziliao, No. 23(1985), pp. 1-41.

78For details see Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, pp. 141-73; Guangzhou Pingshe, Guangzhou

shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, 1928; and Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang, pp. 756-

806.

79For example, when Jiang left Nanjing for his retirement in August 1927, he brought all

moneys, which were provided for military expenditures of the NRA, with him. On the

other hand, he engineered incidents in Nanjing to excuse attacks on the NSC. See GWZB,

Vol. 4, No. 33; and Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, Shanghai:

SHRMCBS, 1992, pp. 29-32.


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it and to split that group, on the other.80

By these means Jiang successfully isolated the

Guangxi leaders as a prelude to the outbreak of the Jiang-Gui War in 1929.

Moreover, Wang Jingwei and Jiang Jieshi joined forces to destroy the Guangxi

Cliques influence even though at the time both were locked in a bitter struggle againsteach other for the GMD leadership. From the moment of their promotion to the GMD

leadership the Clique was under hostile pressure from the left and right wing Nationalists

because of its supposed direct threat to their positions in the GMD. There is evidence that

Wang and Jiang joined together to subvert the efforts of the Clique in both the Zhang-

Huang Incident in November 1927 and the Western Expedition (xizheng) which occurred

in the autumn of the same year by using money and their personal potential influence

among both the party and the troops.

81

Even before the 3rd GMD National Congress washeld in Nanjing in March 1929, Wang, assisting Jiang, colluded with Tang Shengzhi, who

retired after he was defeated by the Clique in the Western Expedition, and Yu Zuobai, a

Guangxi general who aspired to leadership of the Clique, and finally engineered a large-

scale defection of Lis troops both in Hebei province under Bai Chongxi, and those in

Hubei province under the command of Generals Hu Zongduo and Xia Wei, two of Lis

senior subordinates.82

The result was that the hard fighting Guangxi troops were impotent

to defend themselves when Jiang suddenly launched a campaign against them with bothmilitary action and large amounts of money in March and April 1929.

The GMDs propaganda (mass media) organs, including the Propaganda (Public

Affairs) Department of the GMD Central Committee and its branches, newspapers and

periodicals, were overwhelmingly controlled by either the Wang or Jiang groups. This

proved to be an extremely powerful weapon in action against other factions within the

GMD. For example, the Western Hill Clique, the key member of the NSC, was forced to

80Liu Xing, Huiyi guomin gemingjun dibajun, HNWSZLXJ, No. 6, pp. 92-97; Chen

Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, Chapter six; and Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan, 1927 nian Jiang

Jieshi deng lian-Wang zhi-Gui handian xuan,LSDA, No. 1, 1984.

81Ibid. Also see Tang Shengzhi, Guanyu beifa qianhou jijianshi de huiyi,HNWSZLXJ,

No. 6, pp. 108-10.

82For details of the defection of the Guangxi Cliques troops in both Hebei and Hubei

provinces, see LSDA, No. 2, 1984; HBWSZLXJ, No. 18; WHWSZLXJ, No. 11; and Chen

Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, chapter six.


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resign from Nanjing under the propaganda attack of the Jiang and Wang groups.83

In

dealing with the Guangxi Clique, Jiang and Wang employed the term xin Guixi (the New

Guangxi Clique) to attack. The term xin Guixi meant that the Clique was constantly

described as the remnant of the jiu Guixi (the old Guangxi Clique) under Lu Rongting.Because Lus group occupied Guangdong and was the rival of Sun Yatsen in the

Constitution Protection Movement, the term Guixi labelled Lu both as a regionalist who

intended to expand territory beyond Guangxi and as a leader in opposition to Sun. In the

views of the GMD, and in the popular belief, anyone who opposed Sun was thereby a

counter-revolutionary, and a warlord if he controlled troops at the same time.84

Such an

attack by ideological propaganda had already created an unfavourable image for the Clique

in its struggle with Jiang and Wang.As a result of this propaganda the Clique was widely seen to be expansionist, and a

target to be attacked by many factions.85

This view is also shared by Western and Chinese

scholars in their studies of contemporary Guangxi. The widespread assumption that the

Clique was primarily occupied with territorial expansion was based on the fact that after the

Northern Expedition Li Zongren controlled Hunan and Hubei, while Bai Chongxi, another

leader of the Clique, was stationed at Hebei after 1928, and Huang Shaohong governed

Guangxi, their base. Li Jishen, leader of Guangdong and a native of Guangxi as well, wasalso included in this Guangxi group.

86In fact, Li Zongrens troops had not stayed in Hunan

except while participating in the campaign in the province. Li Jishen was not a leader of

83For details see Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, pp. 29-31; Zou Lu,

Huigu lu, pp. 198-214; and Guangzhou Pingshe, Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi,

1928.

84For details of Lu Rongtings struggle with Sun Yatsen, see Li Peisheng, Guixi ju-Yue

zhi youlai jiqi jingguo; and Lu Juntian and Su Shuxuan,Lu Rongting zhuan.

85See Taofa Guixi xuanchuan dagang, 1929, The Second Historical Archives of China,

Nanjing.

86For example, Zhang Xianwen (ed.),Zhonghua minguo shigang, p. 341; J. K. Fairbank,

The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12, p. 125; Diana Lary,Region and Nation, p. 117;

and Guo Tingyi, Jindai zhongguo shigang, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press,

1982, p. 595.


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52

the Clique but a supporter.87

The Guangxi troops (i.e. the 15th Army, which was

reorganized by the rest of the 7th Army in 1927 which did not participate in the Expedition

and was stationed at the province as the garrison force of Guangxi) had not been retained in

strength at Guangdong except when Li Jishen ordered them to reinforce the provinceagainst the threat of the ally of Generals Ye Ting and He Long, military leaders of the

Communists in the Nanchang Uprising in the autumn of 1927. After this they only

obtained financial support from Li Jishen in return. As Guangxi was under the rule of the

Guangzhou Branch of the GMD Central Political Conference during the Northern

Expedition, the order from Li Jishen, Chairman of the Branch, was reasonable and

understandable since he could not gain any assistance and support from any other provinces

and factions except the Clique, a military and political group from his native province.Bais stay in Hebei was in response to an order by Jiang Jieshi. With the completion of the

last battle of the Expedition, Bai asked Jiang for permission to return to south China,88

but

was refused, presumably because Jiang had already resolved to wipe out the Clique by

military and financial blockades.89

The focus was on the occupation of Hubei. It is true that Li Zongren occupied

Hubei late in 1927, but this action occurred after the NSC decided to launch the Western

Expedition against Tang Shengzhi, a powerful militarist supporter of the former Wuhanregime. Some were of the view that the Guangxi Clique as a powerful key member of the

NSC could use that body to reach its goal of acquiring more territories. Those who held

that view must explain why Li and the Clique gave up the rich lower Yangzi River Valley,

mainly Jiangsu, in which annual tax incomes were higher than other provinces, and

Shanghai, the financial and commercial centre of China - just to take the province of Hubei.

Guangxi troops were stationed right around Nanjing, capital of the Nationalist government,

and in Shanghai, both of which Tang Shengzhi attempted to take over before the Western

87Huang Shaohong repeatedly emphasizes that Li Jishen was not member of the New

Guangxi Clique. See Huang Shaohong, Xin Guixi de jueqi, WSZLXJ, No. 52 (1964), p.

1.

88See GMWX, Vol. 18; and Cheng Siyuan, Bai Chongxi zhuan, Hong Kong: Nanyue

chubanshe, 1989, p. 116.

89Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, pp. 182-4.


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53

Expedition.90

To be leader of the Nationalists, to control the capital of the Nationalist

government and Shanghai with a powerful force should have been the ideal opportunity the

Clique sought, yet these prizes were all foregone after the cooperation of both the Wuhan

and Nanjing regimes. The prizes must have been tempting, because Wang and Jiang, thetwo rival leaders of the Nationalists, were absent from the GMD leadership at that time.

Jiangs safe return to the leadership of the GMD and the NRA at the end of 1927 and in the

early 1928 also relied on the loyalty of the troops which were stationed around the above

region by taking over the position which the Clique left after the Western Expedition.91

If

we ignore this obvious demonstration of honest purpose on the part of the Clique, the only

explanation is that the Clique was too stupid to exploit the advantage they held at the time.

Such a conclusion is fallacious. It must therefore be concluded that the ambition of theClique was to achieve a more important political role in both the GMD and the Nationalist

government, but not to occupy more territory.

In addition, it may be said that the Western Expedition and the occupation of Hubei

by Li Zongrens troops reflected the plans of the Guangxi Clique for territorial expansion.

However, there is no evidence that the decision to launch the Western Expedition was

made under pressure from the Clique only. Even according to memoirs of relevant persons

in opposition to the Clique at that time, the Western Expedition was actually initiated byTan Yankai and Cheng Qian, both natives of Hunan and former leaders of the Wuhan

regime. In fact, when Wuhan leaders decided to cooperate with Nanjing in late August,

Tan and other leaders had already conspired to launch a campaign against Tang Shengzhi

as the latter wanted to control not only Wuhan but also Nanjing.92

Cheng Qian was also

90Zheng Houan et al (trans.), Zhongguo dageming Wuhan shiqi jianwen lu, p. 111. In

1926, the annual incomes of the provinces the Nationalist Revolutionary Armys

occupation were as follows: Guangdong, 100,000,000 yuan (Chinese dollars) approx;Guangxi, 11,000,000 yuan; Jiangxi, 18,000,000 yuan; Hunan, 12,000,000 yuan; Hubei,

24,000,000 yuan; Jiangsu, 4-60,000,000 yuan; Zhejiang, 30,000,000 yuan approx; and

Fujian, 12,000,000yuan. Also see Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, p. 129.

91After the Western Expedition (xizheng), Nanjing was garrisoned by the troops under

He Yingqins direct control. See Wan Renyuan and Fang Qingqiu (eds.),ZHMGSSLCB,

Vol. 25.

92Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, p. 157; Tang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese

Revolution, London, 1930, p. 307; Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang, p. 779; and

Li Pinxian,Li Pinxian huiyi lu, Taipei: Zhongwai tushu gongsi, 1975, p. 97.


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54

more determined than others to destroy Tangs strength because of the formers attempt to

return to Hunan with himself as provincial ruler.93

In the light of the above factors, even Li

Yunhan, an expert on GMD history, has also pointed out that the most important reason for

the NSC to launch the campaign against Tang was the ambition of the latter to take overNanjing and his collusion with Sun Chuanfang, Commander in Chief of ally of five

provinces (wusheng lianjun zongsiling), the most dangerous enemy directly threatening the

safety of Nanjing at that time.94

It seems that the so-called territorial expansion plans of the

Clique for the Western Expedition were to a great extent the result of intense propaganda

by its political rivals during the internal conflict of the GMD in an attempt to discredit Lis

influence and reputation and that of his fellow Clique members in both the Nanjing

government and the GMD centre. Therefore, the territorial expansion of the Clique in theNorthern Expedition was at least exaggerated.

The problem was complicated by the stationing of Guangxi troops at Hubei, a

product of the Western Expedition, because the Guangxi Cliques strength was expanded at

this time. More important was the fact that Li Zongren supported the demand of Hubei for

the Hubei people. The demand by provincial people for a share in the affairs of their

native province was not uncommon throughout China at that time. In general, except when

the region on the Asian frontier attempted to separate from China, this emotion did not hurtnationalism but stressed the native people's newly aroused political interest and reflected

the struggle for power in their own province. The problem was that Sun Yatsen in his

sanmin zhuyi (the Three Principles of the People) also emphasized regional self-

government (difang zizhi), an idea which could be explained in many ways by his followers

as well as his enemies. In other words, this was a political ideal which had not been tested

before in China. Anyone could endorse it to serve his or her purpose. Perhaps Li picked up

this idea as an excuse both to benefit the natives of Hubei and to maintain his power in theprovince for the purpose of opposing the centralization of Jiang Jieshi.

95Whatever the

93Tang Shengzhi, Guanyu beifa qianhou jijianshi de huiyi, p. 108; Liu Xing, Huiyi

guomin gemingjun dibajun, p. 95; Li Pinxian, Li Pinxian huiyi lu, p. 97; and Chen

Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, p. 140.

94Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang, pp. 778-9.

95Li Zongren, Duiyu difang zizhi jige yidian de poushi, DSZK, No. 3 (1 December

1931), pp. 7-14.


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55

reason, this proposition was further practised by Li in Guangxi during the first half of the

1930s when he led the province to become a semi-independent body from Nanjing in his

struggle against Jiang. However, the emotion of self-government, such as that in Hubei,

sometimes went beyond control. Hu Zongduo, a native of Hubei and Commander of the19th Army which was affiliated to the Guangxi Clique, made himself master of Hubei after

the Western Expedition and appointed provincial government members at his own

direction. Relying on support from Li, Hu disarmed all of the "zapai jun" (inferior brand

armies) in the province and strengthened his own force. Most of these appointees, both in

the government and in charge of troops, were natives of Hubei, graduates of the BMA and

supporters of Hu. These actions threatened the power and interests of other factions inside

and outside the province. As Hu and his followers were all under the wing of the Clique,

96

the latter became a target of other factions in the GMD. This is the source of accusations of

the Cliques territorial expansion in Hubei. In other words, this was a result of Li's troops

being stationed at Hubei at a time when regionalist sentiment ran high, particularly in that

province. However, it was not a case of Li and the Clique conspiring to occupy territory,

because such a province was too small to meet the needs of the Clique, as stated earlier.

The defeat of the Guangxi Clique in central China also was a result of conflict

between Li and Jiang in different policies towards domestic and external affairs after theNorthern Expedition. In domestic affairs, except for regional self-government, Li

advocated the policies of transformation of soldiers into workers to settle national army

disbandment, and unity within the GMD party to solve internal struggles for power. In

other words, each faction of the GMD should have the rights to share power in both the

party and central government.97

This reflected the policy of the Clique within the national

structure, in contrast to Jiangs desire to centralize his power within the whole nation. It is

not surprising that all proposals for national reconstruction that Li Zongren and BaiChongxi presented were refused by the Central Government under Jiangs control. In

responding to imperialist aggression, particularly after the Jinan Massacre engineered by

the Japanese on May 3, 1928, Li advocated a firm policy for mass mobilization and

96A detailed discussion of the origins of Hu Zongduo from the Guangxi Clique and his

actions in Hubei will appear in the next chapter.

97See Zhongyang zhengzhi huiyi Wuhan fenhui yuebao, Vol. 1, No. 1 (July 1928), pp.

117.


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56

education and training of the masses.98

For this purpose, Li even favoured restoration of

Confucian worship as a national ideology in order to achieve national political unity in this

way,99

because China needed to rebuild its social values and ideology against national

ideological confusion with various isms imported from the western countries at thattime.

100Of course, he was unable to carry out his policies in the national structure because

of opposition from Jiang. But Li practised them, not that of Confucian worship, but the

political ideology for the masses developed by the Clique itself, in Guangxi later in the

1930s.

The Cliques defeat had been a top priority in Jiang Jieshis agenda from the first

differences between the GMD factions in internal and external affairs after the unification

of China in 1928. The capture of Beijing by the NRA in June 1928 marked the beginningof national reconstruction. This was a period of transition towards nationhood in a new era

under the leadership of the GMD, and Jiang meant to direct its policies, ie. political tutelage

(xunzheng) by the GMD. Of a series of domestic problems which the Nationalists faced,

the most important one was that the country had five agglomerations of military groups -

Jiang Jieshi's group proclaiming itself the orthodox representative of the Nationalist

government itself, the Guangxi Clique, Feng Yuxiangs National Peoples Army or the

Northwest Army (Guominjun), the Yan Xishan Faction in Shanxi province, and ZhangXueliangs Northeast Army (Dongbeijun). How the power at national and regional levels

was to be redistributed between these groups became an urgent problem to be settled.

Troop disbandment seemed to be a key factor in settling the problem and a precondition for

all efforts at national reconstruction. However, the leaders of these groups did not trust

98See Lis proposal for training the masses and party members in 1928, in Wu Chuming

et al (eds.), Dangguo mingren zhongyao shudu, Shanghai: Huiwentang shuju, 1929, pp.

191-211.

99See the proposal of Li Zongren in 1928, in Shijie shuguang zhi zhonghua wenhua, No.

1 (October 1928), pp. 68-81.

100See Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, Kaifang zhong de bianqian: zailun Zhongguo

shehui chao wending jiegou, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1993, pp. 269-74.

In this work, Mr and Mrs Jin point out a new ideology was a great force in the

transformation of the nation. But, the sanmin zhuyi (the Three Principles of the People),

the new ideology of the GMD, could be explained in any way by different parties and

groups because of its excessive mixture of the many popular isms at that time. It is

against this background that Li favoured restoration of Confucian worship.


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57

each other. Each wanted to seize more power in the nation and the regions. Among them,

anyone who put forward a proposal for disbandment (such as that of Bai Chongxi and Li

Zongren) was opposed by others.101

Differences were further complicated by the power

struggle of the Nationalists themselves. The GMD, which was actually a loose alliance,was riven by factionalism. Each faction wished to use the potential influence of those

liberal-minded and conservative leaders who were earlier driven out of the party and who

now were asked to return to guide and advise in the party and government. It made the

internal struggle of the GMD more complicated than ever before.

Externally, according to Martin Wilbur, although Great Britain and the United

States were moving towards negotiating the return of Chinas lost rights step by step, a

more determined imperialist power, Japan, was acting forcefully to protect and enhance itseconomic dominance of Manchuria.

102Furthermore, Japan speeded up invasion of China

following the May 3 Jinan Massacre in Shandong province in 1928.103

How should

China deal with this foreign aggression, and how should it accomplish the Nationalist

Revolution with its anti-imperialist purpose? This fueled the debate both inside and outside

the GMD on whether the Nationalist Revolution was successful or had failed.104

Other

factions of the GMD also demonstrated their differences with the dominant faction in

response to the Jinan Massacre.

105

Such differences were deepened by the September 18

101For the proposals of both Bai and Li, see Cheng Siyuan,Bai Chongxi zhuan, pp. 109-

13; Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 253-61; GWZB,

Vol. 5, No. 25; and Wu Chuming et al (eds.),Dangguo mingren zhongyao shudu, pp. 60-

63, and pp. 110-112.

102J. K. Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12, p. 719.

103This Massacre was engineered by the Japanese army in order to protect its interests

and influence in Shandong and to obstruct the victory of the Northern Expedition. The

Japanese army committed an atrocity of unparalleled savagery and large numbers of the

Chinese people in Jinan were massacred. For details of the Incident, see GMWX, Vol. 18.

104For details of the debate, see Edmund S. K. Fung, Anti-Imperialism and the Left

Guomintang,Modern China, Vol. 11 (1985), No. 1, pp. 39-76.

105For example, the Reorganization Faction. For details of its criticism of, and

statements on the Incident, see Geming Pinglun (The Revolutionary Review) edited by

Chen Gongbo, leader of the Faction, and published in Shanghai in 1928.


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Incident three years later.106

In these circumstances, seizing his advantage in ruling the

faction which enjoyed domination of the GMD, Jiang intended to suppress all of his

political rivals by using his superior military forces to centralize the government of the

country under his own control, before he went on to deal with Japanese aggression. It wasnot surprising that the Clique became the first target which Jiang attempted to wipe out as it

was his major rival in the GMD.

Although the Guangxi Clique became more and more involved in a struggle for

power with Jiang and argued over differences on policy with him in the GMD, Li Zongren

and his followers did not prepare for war against Jiangs forces. Even Li wanted a peaceful

compromise with Jiang, but his efforts failed.107

This might explain why none of the

leaders, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi and Huang Shaohong, were in Wuhan when Jiang led hisforces personally in a surprise attack to wipe out the Cliques troops in Hubei. This

surprise defeat by Jiang humiliated Li and his colleagues who from that moment always

looked for a chance to seek revenge. This power struggle with Jiang, combined with policy

differences over mass mobilization and Japanese aggression, caused Li to develop his own

strong policies in Guangxi after his return to that province in the 1930s.

Conclusion

Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique rose to power in a province characterizedly

political regionalism, a product of geography and history, when the country was in a state of

chaos and instability in the 1920s. In general, such regionalism was never intended to

separate the province from national Chinese politics, but was a reflection of the desire to

strengthen the country. When Li and his colleagues established a Guangxi with a strongregionalist flavour, they believed that provincial reunification and strengthening could be

106For details of the Incident and the ambitions of the Japanese invasion of China, see Li

Yunhan (ed.),Jiuyiba shibian shiliao, Taipei: ZZSJ, 1977, 1977; and Zhongyang Dangan

guan, Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan, and Jilin sheng shehui kexueyuan (eds.), Riben

diguo zhuyi qinhua dangan xuanbian -jiuyiba shibian, Beijing: ZHSJ, 1988.

107Cheng Siyuan,Bai Chongxi zhuan, pp. 118-9.


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the first step towards the rebuilding of the nation. Such a perception led them to participate

in the campaign for national reunification.

However, Li and his group were involved in the GMDs factional struggles after the

confrontation of the two Nationalist regimes in Wuhan and Nanjing - a situation entirelyfamiliar in the Chinese setting - which combined with their differences over domestic and

external affairs, besides power in both regional and central structures. The subsequent

conflict between Li and Jiang finally led to a civil war in 1929-1930. The Nationalist

Revolution was an ideal pursued by all GMD factions, but each viewed the ideal differently

and adopted its own method to reach it. Once the goal of national reunification was

reached, all factions of the GMD soon split and fought for their own interests. Therefore,

the political unity of the country, particularly in relation to policies on internal and externalaffairs, presented greater difficulties than territorial unification; the conflict between these

factions was transformed into civil war, and was manifested in their separate policies of

how to commence national reconstruction and complete political unification.

As a result of the conflict, Li and the Clique were forced to return to their home

province, Guangxi, in 1929, and to commence a process of regional reconstruction and

cooperation, a process which lasted until their compromise with Jiang in the face of a

common need for internal unity to save the country from Japanese aggression. This was akey element in achieving political unity for the country.

In the next chapter, I will analyse the internal structure of the Clique and its

relations with regional identity. I argue that the consolidated internal structure contributed

to the Cliques survival and restrengthening itself in the province after its defeat by Jiang in

central China, and allowed the Guangxi group to carry out provincial reconstruction and

mass mobilization at every level of society. I also argue that regional identity was

employed by the Clique to arouse the nationalism of the people, for this would serve itspower struggle with Jiang and as well meet the national common demands of that time for

resistance against Japanese aggression.

Documents

Su PhD thesis - 09 Chapter 2