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Matriculation No: CSC Index No: CSC45058

Title: Term Paper (Qn 5)

Course and Code: SAF009-14: Maritime Security Studies

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Submission Date: 23 Jun 2014, 0830 hours

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Signed: Date: 23 Jun 2014___________

How significant for maritime stability and security in the Indo-Pacific is

China’s agreement to the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), at

the most recent Western Pacific Naval Symposium, in Qingdao? What

further policy recommendations would you recommend for containing

inter-state maritime tensions at the regional or local level?

Introduction

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is undoubtedly the main

protagonist in the region that has come to be characterised as the Indo-Pacific,

the part of the world spanning the shores of East Africa and West Asia across the

Indian Ocean to the East Asian periphery of the Pacific Ocean by way of the

South China Sea (SCS). This region has become the centre of gravity of the

globalized world in the post-Cold War era with the economic, military and

demographic pivots shifting from the European landscape to the Asian seascape.

One third of global bulk cargo traverses the Indo-Pacific bound for the

manufacturing centres of Asia and carrying finished products to the rest of the

world, two thirds of global oil shipments sail these same waters1 to fuel the

world’s second and third largest economies (China and Japan)2 – who are also

the second3 and third4 largest net importers of oil in the world. The SCS and its

surrounding waters have become the future of conflict with the littoral states

1 Australian Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013, p. 13.2 World Bank Development Indicators database, accessed 11 Jun 2014 from: http://databank.worldbank.org/ 3 US Energy Information Administration website, accessed 11 Jun 2014 from: http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=CH 4 US Energy Information Administration website, accessed 11 Jun 2014 from: http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=JA

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engaged in an arms dynamic as well as territorial disputes over national interests

and the United States finding itself a key actor in the balance of regional power.

China by virtue of its geography and economy is the resident Great Power on the

scene and finds itself in a delicate game of power politics with the existing Great

Power that is the US and the other SCS littoral states including ASEAN countries

and Japan. Of late, tensions in the SCS have flared with Vietnam the latest

antagonist to provoke China5; President Obama’s strongly worded statements to

reaffirm American support of Japanese6 and Philippine7 security during his recent

Asian tour have not helped soothe frayed tempers either. What then, can be

done to ease the situation and prevent these tensions from potentially spiralling

into inter-state conflict that could affect the trade and energy flows that are the

lifeblood of the world economy? Is the recent agreement by China to the Code

for Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES) during the Western Pacific Naval

Symposium (WPNS) a positive sign for maritime security and stability?

The following essay will analyse how seapower shapes the national

political goals of states at the grand strategic level, and subsequently how it

affects policies and strategies at the tactical/operational levels of strategy (using

the case of the SCS) and its role in the balance of power politics in the Indo-

Pacific region with particular focus on the PRC – as the resident regional

5 BBC report on China-Vietnam confrontation in the South China Sea dated 8 May 2014, accessed 11 Jun 2014 from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27332723 6 CNN report on President Obama’s visit to Japan on 23 Apr 2014, accessed 11 Jun 2014 from: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/23/world/asia/obama-asia-visit/7 Reuters report on President Obama’s visit to Philippines on 28 Apr 2014, accessed 11 Jun 2014 from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/29/us-philippines-usa-obama-idUSBREA3S02T20140429

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powerhouse and protagonist in the on-going disputes. The thesis of the essay is

that cooperation or conflict management initiatives such as the CUES are

tactical/operational level solutions that have no traction regardless of China’s

agreement unless they are aligned with national political goals at the grand

strategic level; tactical/operational measures might cure the symptoms that

inflame conflict but without alignment with grand strategy, they will be unable to

permanently address the causal political factors leading to conflict in the first

place and new symptoms that could spur conflict might manifest. That being said,

it is this author’s belief that whilst CUES is a solution to calm tensions manifest at

the tactical/operational level, it is also a political signal of intent consistent with

Chinese foreign policy towards a stable and secure Indo-Pacific. There are some

who fail to see the true significance of China’s endorsement of CUES and

question its necessity8 through a misperception of Chinese strategic culture. The

essay will conclude by identifying potential areas where political convergence

with China may be possible and propose policy recommendations for

cooperation and/or prevention of conflict between concerned parties in the SCS

disputes.

Framework

This essay will first scope the concept of seapower as it relates to the

national interests of China. It will examine these national interests, analyse how

seapower figures to be used in the grand and tactical/operational level strategies

8 Pedrozo, P., “The US-China Incidents at Sea Agreement: A Recipe for Disaster”, Journal of National Security, Law & Policy, Vol.6, Aug 2012, pp. 207-226, accessed 13 Jun 2014 from: http://jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/07_Pedrozo-Master.pdf

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and how these strategies incorporate cooperation and/or conflict prevention to

achieve security and stability. It will make comparisons with similar initiatives in

other instances of seapower competition and conclude that any policies or

strategies that are adopted to blunt the inflammatory edges of such competition

need to be vertically aligned across the grand strategic and tactical/operational

levels of strategy in order to achieve long-term stability. Policy recommendations

will be mooted in areas where there is the prospect of such vertical alignment.

Seapower: The Concept

“He who rules on the sea will shortly rule on the land also”.

Ottoman Admiral Khaireddin Pasha (better known as Barbarossa)

“Whoever commands the sea, commands the trade; whosoever commands the

trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world

itself”

British aristocrat, soldier and explorer Sir Walter Raleigh.

These quotes encapsulate the essence of seapower as a key component

of grand strategy formulation underlining the nexus between the mercantilist and

military aspects of seapower that was the bedrock of Mahanian theory. Several

facts underpin this: two thirds of the globe is covered by the sea, and of the

remaining one third that is inhabited, 70% of its population live within 100 miles of

a coastline9; over 90% of international trade (by volume and weight) travels by

water10; it thus follows that a nation’s ability to exploit the sea and protect this

9 BR 1806, The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (London: HMSO, 1995).10 US Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Maritime Challenges 1997, p. 24.

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source of commerce has a significant bearing on its prosperity. Without

trivialising the advocates of landpower such as Mackinder’s Heartland Theory11 in

favour of seapower theorists like Mahan12, both schools of thought share a

commonality in the securing of resources and their flows to support national

interests, they diverge on the subject of the means (medium of land or sea)

rather than the ends. In any case, the geography of the Indo-Pacific and the facts

of global resource flows point to the maritime domain as the medium of

importance in the 21st century.

Seapower is a not so much a definition or term as it is a concept made up

of multiple facets spanning different levels of strategy from political grand

strategy to tactical/operational military strategy. Till offers a succinct foundation

through his four attributes of the sea as: a resource, a medium of transportation,

a medium of information and a medium for dominion13. Building on this

foundation, the ability to exploit the sea’s resources, transport goods and

materials to conduct commerce, spread ideas and establish outposts form the

bedrocks of a state’s national interests and drive its grand strategy. At the

tactical/operational level, the discourse revolves around the ability to secure this

exploitation of the sea and possibly do so at the expense of other states.

At this tactical/operational level, two main strands of thought exist: Mahan

and his dictum of seeking dominance of the sea by removing the threat of the

11 Mackinder, H.J., “The Geographical Pivot of History”, Geographical Journal 23, No.4 (April 1904), pp. 421-37.12 Mahan, A.T., The Influence of Seapower Upon History: 1660-1783, 12th edition, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1918), pp. 25-88.13 Till, G., Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, 3rd edition, (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 6-23.

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enemy’s forces altogether be it by decisive battle or blockade14; and Corbett’s

approach to gain control of the maritime domain at a time and place conducive to

its usage in support of strategic interests15. It is important to be cognizant of the

contexts that influenced both men; Mahan based his theory on the case studies

of maritime powers like the British who used the Royal Navy to achieve the

dominance that Pax Britannica came to symbolise while Corbett’s works

examined conflicts such as World War I, that epitomised the difficulty of being

able to muster the level of dominance called for by Mahan and perhaps

advocated a more cost-effective and limited concept of command of the sea.

The grand strategy formulation of states with regard to the military

dimension is thus concerned with the security of these arteries of resource flows

through which the lifeblood of trade and energy course to the beat of the nation’s

commercial heart.

Seapower & Grand Strategy

An overview of the security environment that states plan to secure is a

pre-requisite to any meaningful discourse on the grand strategies of the SCS and

the concerned states because it will bring into focus the threats that jeopardise

the safety of these arteries of commerce and make it easier to key in on

practicable solutions.

The literature on the subject of Maritime Security (MARSEC) generally

identifies four threats to the security of resource flows: natural disasters, maritime

14 Ibid, pp. 57-59.15 Ibid, pp. 64-67.

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terrorism, piracy and inter-state conflict as a result of resource competition or

territorial disputes16. The first three do not usually involve threats emanating from

state actors; as such it is easy to find common ground between states in

collaborating to deal with them and these frequently serve as avenues for

advancing political concord through cooperative arrangements (a key tenet of the

proposals for easing inter-state tensions that will be covered later in the essay). It

is the thorny subject of territorial disputes with its attendant issues of energy,

environment and food security as well as sovereignty that have generated

headlines on the issue of regional stability.

Taking a Realist view of the world, a fundamental priority of a state is to

secure itself through the raising of a credible military force that can either be

called upon or used in coercion to protect its national interests. This force needs

to be able to first and foremost protect its sovereign rights within its geographical

territory (including sea, land and air). This protection does not only entail the

ability to influence the physical geographical territory, but also extends to the

approaches or surroundings of this territory since events or parties within these

approaches or surroundings may be able to exert some level of influence on the

state’s territory. In fact the state’s protection umbrella also needs to extend to

cover those areas that concern its key industries and economy, which in the case

of the SCS states, entails the global sea lines of communications (SLOC) that

16 Cole, B.D., Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled Waters, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013), pp. 1-2; Ho, J., “The Shifting of Maritime Power and the Implications for Maritime Security in East Asia”, IDSS Working Paper No. 68, (Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, 2004), pp. 13-19; Sjaastad, A.C., “Southeast Asian SLOCs and Security Options” in Maritime Security in South East Asia, Kwa, C.G. & Skogan, J.K. (eds), (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 4-6.

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their energy needs and trade goods traverse. However, the sheer size of the sea

space these areas cover, and the myriad of tasks and relatively limited size of

most navies (as a function of fiscal considerations) these days mean they face a

Herculean task even with the advance of technology. This was the impetus for

then-USN Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Mullen’s call for a

thousand-ship navy to ensure the security of the global maritime commons17 and

a key consideration driving coalitions such as the Combined Maritime Forces

(CMF) in the Arabian Sea.

The antagonists of piracy, maritime terrorism and natural disasters are

non-state actors and make little distinction between the national identities of their

victims. It is thus such common causes that nations band together against to

ensure the safety of the global maritime commons that encompass a large

proportion of global SLOCs. Even where these threats encroach upon territorial

seas, nations have been able to agree at the political and tactical/operational

level on collaborative frameworks to address the threats. A current example is

the trilateral Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) to combat piracy between Singapore,

Malaysia and Indonesia as well as its aeronautical extension: the Eyes in the Sky

(EiS) maritime air patrols that also include Thailand. The MSP has contributed to

the removal of war risk insurance premiums by Lloyd’s on maritime traffic

transiting the Malacca Straits. Another example is the 30-member CMF coalition

conducting anti-terrorism and anti-piracy missions in the Arabian Sea. Although

there are existing rivalries amongst the MSP nations and the CMF member-

17 Adm Michael G. Mullen, USN, remarks delivered at the 17th International Seapower Symposium, Newport, Rhode Island, 21 Sep 2005.

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states, the non-state nature of the threats that they collaborate against make

these cooperation arrangements possible and attractive at the political level,

even attracting informal cooperation arrangements with non-CMF members like

China. This paves the way for the tactical/operational implementation (in the form

of Operation MALSINDO in the Malacca Straits and the various CTF missions in

the Arabian Sea) to enjoy continued success. The subject of defining territorial

seas and securing Command of them (in the Corbettian sense) is where the SCS

states diverge politically.

Gaining political concord with China certainly goes a long way towards

advancing a more lasting solution on the disputes in the SCS and calming the

tensions that have flared up of late considering that China is involved in nearly

every territorial dispute in the SCS as well as its long-standing concern of re-

unification with Taiwan. In order to do so, one needs to first understand Chinese

interests, its accompanying grand strategy and China’s strategic culture.

Chinese Maritime Interests

Returning to the Realist need to secure the state’s territory and its

approaches/surroundings, the SCS constitutes both a large swathe of China’s

territorial seas (in accordance with UNCLOS definitions), and the alternative

approach to the PRC mainland other than the continental route. The decline of

the USSR coupled with China’s quantum growth since the end of the Cold War

has seen it resolve land border issues with both Russia and India. The maritime

approach however is less secure with the USN and regional navies combining to

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pose a formidable counter-balance to the PLA-N. The heightened sensitivity of

the maritime domain is also a historical by-product of the “hundred years of

humiliation” when China was invaded by foreign powers from the sea.

The potential and current resources that the SCS contains in fish stocks

and minerals affect the food security, energy security as well as environmental

security of the concerned states. China is easily the world’s dominant fish

producer18 and the Chinese fishing industry forms a sizable chunk of the

agricultural GDP19. Considering the implications for employment and food

security, ceding some of the fishery resources to other states by virtue of

capitulating in its territorial claims does not seem politically attractive. The huge

energy potential in the SCS20 as well as China’s reliance on imported energy to

fuel its economy provides another compelling political reason for it not to back

down from its current stance in the SCS territorial disputes.

Chinese Maritime Strategy

China’s strategy to secure this maritime space seems to follow two central

themes: the strengthening of its navy and paramilitary forces to acquire an anti-

18 Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations statistics on global aquaculture production, accessed 12 Jun 2014 from: http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/global-aquaculture-production/en 19 European parliament Study by Blomeyer, R., Goulding, I., Pauly, D., Sanz, A., Stobberup, K., “The Role of China in World Fisheries”, accessed 12 Jun 2014 from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/pech/dv/chi/china.pdf; Zhang, H. “China’s Evolving Fishing Industry: Implications for Regional and Global Maritime Security”, RSIS Working Paper No. 246, (Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, 2012), p. 3.20US Energy Information Administration analysis of the South China Sea energy deposits, accessed 13 Jun 2014 from: http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs

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access area denial and enforcement capability at the military tactical/operational

level, and at the political grand strategic level, the occupation and/or

consolidation of disputed islands and features in the SCS with a view to using

them to lay legitimate claim subsequently to the surrounding resources in these

areas.

China’s military strategy is part of its shifting doctrine towards an active

offshore defence21 that calls for it to be able to influence engagements with any

adversaries up to the peripheries of its territory. In the case of the SCS that

constitutes the maritime approach to China, this involves the deployment of its

navy and paramilitary assets for the conduct of maritime naval presence patrols,

naval exercises and law enforcement operations. Politically, China is currently

employing a delaying strategy22 in order to strengthen its own claims by the

exercise of jurisdiction and guarding against exclusion from any development

activities in the disputed areas so that if or when it eventually decides to start

further negotiations, it can do so from a stronger position.

Conflict Prevention, Collaboration & Constraints

It is during these Chinese naval deployments that provocations with other

states’ naval and paramilitary forces have taken place. A code of conduct –

21 Cole, B.D., The Great Wall at Sea, (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2001), p. 173; Le Mière, C., “The Spectre of an Asian Arms Race”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Vol. 56, No.1, p. 148; Shambaugh, D., “China’s Military in Transition: Politics, Professionalism, Procurement, and Power Projection”, The China Quarterly, No. 146, Special Issue: China’s Military in Transition (Jun 1996), pp. 279-280.22 Fravel, M.T., “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 33, No.3, Dec 2011, p. 299.

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CUES – in a similar vein to the Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) agreement between

the USN and Soviet Navy in 1972 to prevent such provocative incidents from

accidentally spiralling into serious inter-state conflict was recently signed by the

naval chiefs of the WPNS of which China and the SCS littoral states are

members. This signalled an underscoring of the political impetus generated by

the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) to

alleviate an earlier round of tensions. The inclusion of the PLA-N in large-scale

multi-lateral exercises such as the US-hosted Rim of The Pacific (RIMPAC) has

also allowed the navies of the concerned states to build better rapport and lessen

misunderstandings.

The flaw in the CUES is that it concerns naval vessels whereas

paramilitary vessels instead of naval forces have been involved in the recent

skirmishes. Although some might view the use of paramilitary vessels as less

provocative than naval warships, the tendency to engage in more extreme

behaviour such as ramming could have an opposite effect and heighten tensions

even more. Furthermore, despite the alignment of the CUES (a code applicable

to military vessels) with the (political) aims of the DOC, within the Chinese

bureaucracy, it is difficult to coordinate the actions of the numerous agencies

involved in maritime affairs23 with the result that the tactical actions of coastguard

or fisheries vessels might not always be aligned with the political position. In any

case, present regulations applicable to all vessels that ply the seas (Rules of the

23 Freise, C., “By Invitation, Mostly: the International Politics of the US Security Presence, China and the South China Sea”, RSIS Working Paper No.247, (Singapore Nanyang Technological University, 2012), pp. 20-21; Li, M., “Chinese Debates of South China Sea Policy: Implications for Future Developments”, RSIS Working Paper No.239, (Singapore Nanyang Technological University, 2012), p. 25.

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Road) exist, prompting Pedrozo and Roughead to question the utility of a more

comprehensive code to include non-naval vessels24.

China recognizes the logic that collaboration (especially in resource

exploitation) is likely to reap synergies, which could benefit it rather than engage

in petty conflicts that benefit no one since resources continue to go untapped or

fish stocks continue to be exhausted and efforts cannot be directed toward

efficient preservation of the marine environment for fish stocks to thrive. The

Sino-Vietnamese cooperation arrangement to resolve territorial disputes, develop

and secure the Gulf of Tonkin is an example of successful Chinese collaboration

with a concerned SCS state.

A key impediment that complicates China’s tactical/operational actions

and its political rhetoric is nationalism25. As much as its actions might be

perceived as belligerent by the most pessimistic non-Chinese observer, Chinese

actions taken in the context of its strategic culture are in fact fairly consistent with

a non-provocative stance. The numerous policy statements that China has made

to commit to peaceful non-violent resolutions of disputes and its endorsement of

the DOC and CUES are consistent with its New Security Policy (NSC)

announced at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996 that are based on the

Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence first enunciated by Zhou Enlai in 1955

of: respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-

interference in the internal affairs of other countries, equality and mutual benefit,

24 Pedrozo, pp. 208-09.25 Freise, p. 7.

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and peaceful co-existence26. The fact that China is using water cannons from

paramilitary vessels to exchange “fire” with Vietnamese vessels instead of

sending warships to engage in more serious exchange of ordnance is in a way,

some form of restraint also.

Opportunities for Collaboration

Some initiatives and platforms currently exist in the Indo-Pacific that

promote multi-lateral collaboration and involves China and several concerned

SCS states. As mentioned earlier, these address non-state threats of piracy,

maritime terrorism and humanitarian disaster relief.

At the tactical/operational level, China along with most of the ASEAN

countries and Japan are contracting parties to the Regional Cooperation

Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia

(ReCAAP), an information-sharing network and capacity building facility to

combat piracy and armed robbery at sea. China also maintains a permanent task

group on-station in the Gulf of Aden to conduct escorts of merchant shipping in

collaboration with CMF task forces against the threats of piracy and maritime

terrorism, and conduct humanitarian (medical assistance) missions in Somalia. In

the wake of the MH370 incident, Singapore has mooted the establishment of a

Regional HADR Coordination Centre (RHCC) leveraging on the infrastructure at

its Command and Control (C2) Centre, which hosts the Information Fusion

26 Shambaugh, D., “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order”, International Security., Vol.29, No.3, Winter, 2004, p. 69; Nan, L., “The Evolving Chinese Conception of Security and Security Approaches” In Tan, S..S., Acharya, A., (eds) Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 61.

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Centre (IFC)27 – an information sharing agency amongst militaries. The RHCC

aims to provide a platform for efficient coordination of multi-national HADR efforts

following the massive effort required to effectively coordinate the multitude of

assets from various nations across the large expanse of ocean in the search for

the missing aircraft.

At the political level, forums such as the Shangri-La Dialogue, ARF,

ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and Expanded ASEAN

Maritime Forum (EAMF) offer a dialogue platform for politicians. Although the

ADMM+ has its working groups on specific issues such as MARSEC, it is not

clear if the group’s composition includes the myriad of civilian law enforcement

agencies that constitute MARSEC practitioners in addition to the traditional

military personnel. Since one of the key problems affecting the alignment of

political and tactical/operational strategies highlighted when dealing with China is

its difficulty of internal bureaucratic coordination, a platform that brings all its

maritime agencies together to discuss MARSEC issues might be a practical

solution. It could potentially be organised along the lines of the Regional

MARSEC Practitioners’ Course (RMPC) currently conducted by the Republic of

Singapore Navy (RSN). The RMPC brings together personnel from MARSEC

agencies in the Asia Pacific region including coastguards, customs and

authorities as well as other maritime agencies to discuss and share perspectives

on MARSEC as well as establish relationships. The establishment of closer

27 Wong, K., “Shangri-La Dialogue: Singapore continues push for regional HADR centre”, Jane’s Defence Weekly article, accessed 13 Jun 2014 from: https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=News&ItemId=+++1713267&Pubabbrev=JDW

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relationships and understandings of one another’s modus operandi would sow

the seeds for subsequent cooperation to materialize over resource sharing and

joint development efforts.

China should continue to maintain its participation in the Gulf of Aden and

ReCAAP as these serve to reinforce its commitment to protection of its interests

by securing the SLOCs that contribute to its resource flows. At the same time,

they provide a platform for cooperation and relationship building with other states

at the political level. The RHCC is another good opportunity in this respect and

China should capitalise on it should the initiative eventuate.

With respect to the recommendation of an expanded MARSEC

practitioners’ course that includes Chinese maritime agencies, Singapore is best

placed to drive this initiative as it already conducts the RMPC and Shangri-La

Dialogue and both could be synergized to enable both cooperation at the political

and the tactical/operational levels. Politically, Singapore has both a credible

reputation as an interlocutor for other countries and it would be feasible, as it is

not involved in any disputes with China in the SCS.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that China is a centrepiece in any collaborative venture

to ensure maritime security and stability in the Indo-Pacific by virtue of its

economy and geography. This essay has framed the issue as an interaction

between the military tactical/operational and political grand strategic levels of

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strategy. It has used the concept of seapower to derive a link with Chinese

national interests and its strategies to secure these interests; it has also provided

an alternative (conciliatory) interpretation of Chinese strategies to the Western

perception using the lens of Chinese strategic culture. In doing so, it aims to

reinforce the point that any strategy for collaboration with China needs to fit into

its domestic political rhetoric (at the grand strategic level) and achieve buy-in

across all its bureaucratic maritime agencies (at the tactical/operational level of

implementation). The policy recommendations this essay proposed address the

political and tactical/operational considerations and offer potential avenues to

serve as a springboard to deepen collaboration with China to achieve safe and

secure seas in the Indo-Pacific for all.

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References

1. Admiral Michael G. Mullen, USN, remarks delivered at the 17th International

Seapower Symposium, Newport, Rhode Island, 21 Sep 2005.

2. Australian Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013.

3. BBC report on China-Vietnam confrontation in the South China Sea dated 8

May 2014, accessed 11 Jun 2014 from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-

27332723

4. BR 1806, The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine (London: HMSO,

1995).

5. CNN report on President Obama’s visit to Japan on 23 Apr 2014, accessed

11 Jun 2014 from: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/23/world/asia/obama-asia-

visit/

6. Cole, B.D., The Great Wall at Sea, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001).

7. Cole, B.D., Asian Maritime Strategies: Navigating Troubled Waters,

(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013).

8. European parliament Study by Blomeyer, R., Goulding, I., Pauly, D., Sanz, A.,

Stobberup, K., “The Role of China in World Fisheries”, accessed 12 Jun 2014

from:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/pech/dv/

chi/china.pdf

9. Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations statistics on global

aquaculture production, accessed 12 Jun 2014 from:

http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/global-aquaculture-production/en

18

10.Fravel, M.T., “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea”, Contemporary

Southeast Asia, Vol. 33, No.3, Dec 2011, pp. 292-319.

11.Freise, C., “By Invitation, Mostly: the International Politics of the US Security

Presence, China and the South China Sea”, RSIS Working Paper No.247,

(Singapore Nanyang Technological University, 2012).

12.Ho, J., ““The Shifting of Maritime Power and the Implications for Maritime

Security in East Asia”, IDSS Working Paper No. 68, (Singapore: Nanyang

Technological University, 2004).

13.Le Mière, C., “The Spectre of an Asian Arms Race”, Survival: Global Politics

and Strategy Vol. 56, No.1, Feb 2014, pp. 139-156.

14.Li, M., “Chinese Debates of South China Sea Policy: Implications for Future

Developments”, RSIS Working Paper No.239, (Singapore Nanyang

Technological University, 2012).

15.Mackinder, H.J., “The Geographical Pivot of History”, Geographical Journal

23, no.4 (April 1904), pp. 421-37.

16.Mahan, A.T., The Influence of Seapower Upon History: 1660-1783, 12th

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