Some Pertinent Questions on Collective Violence and the News Media

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES VOLUME 28. NUMBER 1, 1972

Some Pertinent Questions on Collective Violence and the News Media

Gladys Engel Lang

Columbia University

and Kurt Lang

SUNY at Stony Brook

How responsible the coverage of conflict and confrontation by the news media is for the violence in contemporary American society involves at least four separate issues. (1) Do general news practices help create violence-prone situations? (2) What effect does the presence of T V and other news media in such situations have on the likelihood that violence will erupt? (3) What impact do news reports of violence already in progress have on its subsequent spread or abatement? (4) Are predictions of violence more likely to become self-fulfilling or self-defeating? The information available suggests that the media are rarely a major influence on the amount of violence in any specific situation and that they function as much to deter as to incite violence. Yet, if media reports of both actual and potential violence affect expectations, then this will influence the nature of public protest as well as the official response to it and to other situations where the possibility of violent confrontation must be reckoned with.

How responsible are the mass media-especially television- for the violence in contemporary American society? The question is very much in the news these days. It has also been taken up in

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several official inquiries (Baker & Ball, 1969; President’s Com- mission on Civil Disorders, 1968). But the answers depend in large part on how the question is formulated; that is to say, on how violence is defined and the kind of mass media content under consideration. Here we are concerned with the contribution of news coverage-especially by TV-to the outbreak of collective violence on certain public occasions.

Defining violence. By our definition, all violence involves physical force. Aggression of a purely verbal nature, symbolic acts of degradation, and all other “attacks” in which there is no use of physical force are thereby excluded from consideration. Further- more, most violent acts result in physical injury or in the destruction of objects valued by those against whom the acts are directed. The intent is at least as important as the consequence in char- acterizing an act as violent. The same injury or destruction may result from an accident, or the perpetrators of violence may be stymied in their goal. The point is that they willingly assume whatever risks this resort to physical force by those who lack the authority to use it may entail. In fact, the lack of legitimate social sanction is what stamps as violent the force even of the agents of law enforcement whenever it exceeds the minimum necessary to achieve a socially valued objective. To this extent, then, the com- mon element of all violence considered here is its illegality.

Our interest here is, furthermore, confined to those acts of violence that are attributes of conflict situations and which, therefore, cannot be explained simply as an individual and psycho- logically determined response. More important than any generalized disposition toward violence is the commitment the parties have to the values being contested, which determines the intensity of the conflict. The more intense the conflict, even if it is between only the most loosely formed aggregates, the greater the likelihood of violence during any confrontation. The kind of violence we are talking about is obviously a collective phenomenon.

Three types of mass media content. In exploring the relationship between mass media and violence, we must distinguish among three types of content. The first consists of appeals, warnings, and instructions about riots and violence which, taken together, can be treated as a species of prescriptive and persuasive communications. Past research on campaign effects points to the limited effectiveness of such appeals and information, demonstrating how much their capacity to produce change depends on elements that are not part of the communication (Klapper, 1960). In other words, this type of content by itself is rarely crucial for the development-or absence-of collective violence. The media function

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only as an ad.junct to other strategies for reducing tension or restoring order once normal law enforcement has broken down.

The two other types of content involve the portrayal of violence in the media. Most researchers investigating the links between T V and violence have accepted, as a working hypothesis, the notion that the witnessing of violence acts as an inducement to similar behavior on the part of the audience. While they may acknowledge that whether the violence portrayed represents an actual incident reported as news or whether it occurs as part of a dramatic presentation is likely to make some difference, the rele- vant experimental variable in investigations that have nearly always used children as subjects reduces itself to the reality value these children attach to what they are shown. In this regard, the present preoccupation of psychologists and others with linkages between television and violence represents the continuation of a prior and long-standing concern over the possible effects of the movies, the comic book, and radio on aggressive behavior among children.

Concern over the news media’s handling of incidents where violence either has already erupted or threatens to erupt-as illustrated by the two commission reports-proceeds from a dif- ferent assumption. A sensational coverage that emphasizes the violence of confrontation is believed to be inflammatory. Thus, Northern newsmen and network cameramen covering the South were held responsible for inciting and escalating violent confrontations over the desegregation of public facilities and educational institutions in the mid-fifties. By the mid-sixties, the media generally-and television and radio newsmen in particular-were being charged with escalating ghetto riots and stage-managing the disorders in Chicago during the 1968 Democratic convention. The various experimental studies shed no light whatsoever on whether, or in what way, the coverage of these events contributed to the prevailing climate of violence and widespread unease.

Any consideration of the role played by the news media must treat them as essential ingredients of a complex network through which the spokesmen for various publics seek recognition. Hard as newsmen may try, the communication media can never be neutral transmitters. Insofar as they are the targets of activity by public officials no less than of demonstrators, their mere availability will influence the character of political life. The purpose of this paper is to pose the questions that have to be asked and answered in assessing the impact of news coverage, by television in particular, of major public events on the likelihood of violent out- comes.


THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN VIOLENCE-PRONE SITUATIONS The first question is: do the news media by their general

practices help bring about (or avoid) situations with a high potential for violence?

To begin with, the media-just because they exist-make a difference in political life; some effects are independent of the specific slant they take toward the news and of their editorial emphases. Mass media exposure is a prerequisite for participation in the thought life of society; all evidence shows that high media consumers are both more likely to hold opinions on a variety of matters and to perceive possibilities of which others not so ex- posed are unlikely to be aware (Lerner, 1958). In a similar way, the coverage of events promotes awareness of such events, and the fuller the coverage the larger the size of the attentive public. Such coverage also inhibits the emergence of sharply divergent definitions of public events.

Styles of protest change together with life conditions: the up- swing in various forms of mass protest during the nineteen-sixties hardly needs documentation. The new era in the United States was ushered in by dramatic challenges in the South to desegregation in its various forms. The walk from Selma in 1962 and the march on Washington the summer after were culminating points in this activity. What violence accompanied these demonstrations came mostly from the police. It was meant to intimidate the protesters and to discourage others from trying similar tactics. By the mid-sixties the scene of violence had shifted to the large black ghettoes in the cities outside the South; by 1968 the campus and the campus town had begun to displace the ghetto as the most likely stage for the type of demonstration that often led to violent clashes with police and law enforcement agents.

The publicity given the dissidents by TV was often cited as a major factor determining their strategy, increasing and chang- ing the character of mass protest. But how much of the increase and change is a matter of appearance and how much of it reflects what is actually going on? In retrospect the question sounds aca- demic. We do not know whether a continuing count of all protests, beginning before the time the media first began to recognize and dramatize new forms of protest, would have revealed a prior increase or an increase that followed recognition by the mass media. Of one thing we can be sure: the television viewer has been made aware of conflicts and confrontations outside his own community and of conflicts within his own community which he never would have heard of except for the video coverage they received.

Media as ally f o r demonstrators. The avenues available for pub-


licity do affect the prevailing forms of protest. All demonstration organizers recognize the news media as potential allies, mecha- nisms for achieving visibility and scoring points against the oppo- sition or embarrassing recalcitrant authorities. Such tactics are but a refinement of the old-fashioned ballyhoo and stunts which press agents use to disseminate self-serving messages about those who employ them. When television caters to the insatiable appe- tite of the public for news stories told in pictures, it also serves the ends of those intent on dramatizing their grievances. The sig- nificance of intrinsically trivial incidents and of minor figures becomes magnified when they receive national coverage on television, and this alone makes them newsworthy for the rest of the press. Some demonstrations, sit-ins, rallies, and so forth are only what Boorstin ( 1 963) has called pseudo-events. Off camera, they have no life of their own.

It is all too easy, however, to confuse a real event, altered by the media, with a pseudo-event. This mistake is occasionally made with respect to confrontations before the television cameras : the angry exchanges, the rock throwing, etc., are dismissed as “acting for the camera.” But such direct action, including violence, has always been the natural political weapon of those whose demands find no recognition within the framework of conventional politics. Most of the time the mass media themselves have not been channels for the airing of minority grievances; they have reflected establishment values by what they select as news, in their styles of presentation, and through the things they advertise. At the same time visual media especially have made more obvious the gap between the rich and the poor, between the powerful and the powerless, between the ideals officially espoused and reality as it impinges on the lower orders in everyday life. This occasions resentments insofar as people continue to be excluded from the channels of actual influence.

These same people can now achieve visibility by addressing themselves to the mass media (Baker & Ball, 1969). Television did not, to be sure, create the conditions underlying the present conflicts, nor did it invent the notion of “taking to the streets”; it has helped to transform street demonstrations and other forms of legal and extralegal mass (anomic) protest, the success of which nowadays depends on publicity, into a useful substitute for conventional lobbying. Officials who ignore a petition with thousands of signatures sometimes find it difficult not to react to a far smaller demonstration that enjoys the spotlight of media publicity.

The demonstration helps pierce the curtain of silence thrown over some grievances in three ways. First, on a local level-


especially in a one-newspaper city-it can be used to circumvent the monopolistic power of an unsympathetic publisher. Television is usually attracted by a spectacle, so that even when the T V sta- tion is owned by the same newspaper, the demonstrators may gain a hearing. Second, local groups lacking sufficient support in their own community seek national coverage to invoke the standards of the larger community. This was the case with civil rights demonstrations meant to crack the walls of segregation in the South and, more recently, with the seizure of Alcatraz by American Indians, which gained them a national audience. Third, on the national level, television has provided the powerless and the poorly organized with a lobby of their own through which to bring pressure on the federal government. Partly because of the video coverage they received, the various anti-Vietnam demonstrations, the Poor People’s March, the peace moratorium climaxed by the 1969 march on Washington, campus protests, and so forth have brought considerable, though not necessarily decisive, pressure on legislators and the executive in Washington.

Whether or not demonstrations achieve the ends sought, their mere visibility contributes to their importance and can create something of a demonstration “fad” involving marginal followers not sufficiently aggrieved by the issues nor yet organized to join in sustained political activity. Some go to be seen and still others to be counted by the camera should official police estimates turn out to be disappointing. But just to be present at some occasion that people are able to identify and talk about can be a gratifying experience (Lang & Lang, 1968).

Reciprocal effects. These considerations suggest that there is some reciprocal effect between the size and frequency of demonstrations (or like forms of protest) and the coverage they can expect to receive. The availability of the media to televise confrontations and the prospect that they will provides an incentive to the organizers and attracts marginal participants. Yet politics built around spectacles and dramatic confrontations must ultimately give way to other forms. Either those in positions of authority will be forced to capitulate, make concessions, or give access to means of influence, thereby removing some of the causes leading to these demonstrations, or these same authorities will develop effective strategies for containment and repression. A decline in enthusi- asm for demonstrations is inevitable when they bring no visible results. For example, dismay at the increasingly small turnouts for demonstrations it helped organize led the Vietnam Morato- rium Committee to disband in April, 1970. Apparently the particular form of protest was losing momentum (just before the Kent State killings), and the organizers were surveying new tactics

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AND T H E NEWS MEDIA 99

through which to dramatize and render more effective their demands. Appearance and reality are difficult to separate in cases like this one. Demonstrations were becoming “old hat,” and the media were seeking out the activities of groups intent on even more dramatic gestures, including the deliberate use of violence to gain the media spotlight.

Given the cyclical nature of mass protest and the very loose correspondence with the development of new media, the relationship between media coverage and frequency of violence-prone protest can hardly be a direct one. In the United States the peaks of violence occurred more than ten years after television satura- tion had reached a plateau. The hypothesis is advanced that the reciprocal effects inherent in television speed the oscillations in the cycle of protest by magnifying what is taking place and being inattentive to protest that has not yet reached a level deemed worthy of public recognition.

THE ERUPTION OF VIOLENCE The more protest moves into the streets, the greater the like-

lihood that it will be accompanied by violence or culminate in a confrontation. Minor misunderstandings are apt to be magnified and get out of control. Also, those aggrieved and those (on all sides) who are bent on violence find that the presence of large numbers offers them a cover as well as a justification for engaging in provocative acts. The second question to ask is: does the presence of television and of other news media in a situation that is potentially violent help or hinder the actualization of this potential?

“There is little doubt,” states the Report ofthe National Commis- sion on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, that the newsmen’s “presence has an effect on the behavior of protestors [Baker & Ball, 1969, p. 891.” Demonstrations, as pointed out, are partly addressed to camera and the mass audience, and many demonstrators are highly concerned over the public image they are help- ing to create. What the behavior directly achieves is less important than more indirect political effects. With regard to the Commis- sion’s conclusion, a two-sided question must be asked: is there any evidence that the presence of the media incites demonstrators to violence or, alternately, that it serves to restrain them?

Comparing protests with and without live or extensive coverage is not likely to yield a reliable answer to the question. Such comparisons are, to begin with, confounded by the inexorable attraction the larger gatherings, especially those that also take place in an atmosphere of tension, exert on the news media. In other


words, planned protests with the greatest potential for violence are also those most likely to attract reporters ready to move wher- ever violence breaks out. Even at that the first acts of violence do not always occur where TV-camera crews are waiting. The public outcry against violence deliberately staged for the benefit of the TV cameras-like the instances mentioned in the Walker ( 1 968) report on Chicago 1968-is certainly justified. Such practices call into question the objectivity of the news media; they are certainly breaches of professional standards. Still, insofar as most such instances merely reenact violence that has already occurred, the media cannot be charged with inciting its outbreak.

Charges that the media encourages protesters to commit acts of violence rest on an image of violence as a deliberate tactic rationally employed. It seems to us, rather, that the media offer protesters a channel through which to demonstrate their potential power without actually using this power-or at least to hold its use to a minimum. As Schelling (1963) has pointed out, violence beyond a level necessary to make one’s ability and determination to use it credible becomes counter-productive. Particularly with respect to mass protests, violence marshals the full force of the law against the demonstrators, a force that at this stage of the game, if ever, they cannot match.

For example, during the school integration crisis in New Orleans, a group of white women deliberately shouted obscene epithets only when the T V cameras turned on. This was to demonstrate a determinedness to resist to the bitter end the court- ordered desegregation of their elementary schools. Other protesters under the scrutiny of the camera have gone to great lengths to remain peaceful even in the face of extreme provocation, as did the followers of Martin Luther King. Similarly, the organizers and participants in two Washington moratoriums exerted special ef- forts to keep any undisciplined demonstrators in line. Keeping the peace was a deliberate rational tactic, and the presence of the cameras could only have reinforced the intent since any breach would immediately become visible. In fact, the news footage has occasionally been useful in identifying and convicting demonstrators for transgressions against the law, as during the London peace demonstration of October 1968: a student-later arrested- was photographed holding the arms of a policeman behind his back so that two other peace demonstrators could kick and beat him (Halloran, J. D. et al., 1970). The restraining influence of news media is exerted against all those who do not want their un- lawful acts recorded. This includes law enforcement agents who, though less likely to face conviction, must be concerned over the possible adverse effects on public opinion. Some have even


charged that the police deliberately refrain from using any undue force until after the cameras have been shut off.

All this suggests that, in balance, the presence of TV crews comes down more heavily on the side of deterring violence than on the side of inciting it. Yet this restraining influence is far from universal; nor does it operate equally against every kind of possible provocation. The report of the Violence Commission specifically states that “so long as the media continue to cover demonstrations, some demonstrators will continue to provoke the police [Baker & Ball, 1969, p. 921.” The deliberate search for a confrontation that will force into the open the excessive force and repression on the part of the police is sometimes rendered more effective by the practice of camera crews to operate from behind the shelter of police lines. They thus tend to focus more on violence by law enforcement agents, which is massive, than on violence by demonstrators, which appears to be more sporadic. There is no reason to believe, however, that such “provocative” acts would cease were the media to stop covering them. A bashed head may do more to turn a person against the police (as Stokely Carmichael) than any number of filmed sequences of police brutality.

The term “provoke,” as used in this context by the Commis- sion, is fraught with ambiguity. T o be provocative an act need neither threaten violence nor even be deliberately gauged to evoke a violent response. The media by their presence no doubt alter the scenario being played. Both sides, to the extent that they are rational, are being forced to justify themselves before a larger audience. Sometimes positions taken in the glare of publicity cannot be abandoned without paying a heavy price. A greater emphasis by the media on the issues involved in controversy or confrontation, less emphasis on personalities engaging in self-serving behavior, and inattention to the more sensational aspects of the conflict might well discourage provocation which inadvertently produces violence though meant only to attract attention. It is rare, however, that the presence of the camera is in any way a determining factor in the outbreak of violence.

ESCALATION AND SPREAD OF VIOLENCE What impact does the reporting of violence already in process

have on the development of that violence? It is generally conceded that those who disseminate the news about highly volatile and explosive situations have some responsibility for the effects of their reportage. Still, little is known about the ways reports about violent clashes or ongoing rioting affect the subsequent course of events.


Information about any unusual event tends to attract people from nearby to the scene. Large crowds add to the confusion and make restoring order more difficult. The role of the media in at- tracting crowds to the scene of impending trouble, as in Watts, has been touched upon in many a riot report. The Kerner Com- mission also addressed itself briefly to problems occasionally caused by television’s getting in the way of the law enforcement effort. The latter problem was especially acute in Chicago during the events surrounding the 1968 convention. Several representa- tives of the press actually received beatings from the police.

Guidelines for the coverage of civil disorders include a volun- tary blackout in the “reporting of incidents likely to spark group violence with a minimum delay in broadcasting such news and perhaps longer delays in giving the precise location of potentially explosive crowds, and very careful and restrained [sic] reporting until the police have the situation under control [President’s Com- mission, 1968, p. 1611 .” The idea is to keep a minor incident from spreading, but the effectiveness of such practices, however well- intentioned, is limited by the availability of alternative channels. Although surveys of people in riot-torn communities have indicated that most of them first heard news of the trouble from television or radio, enough persons, especially those nearby, got their first news by word-of-mouth to swell the number on the scene to proportions difficult to manage. In Newark, where the precipitat- ing incident for the riot was a cab driver resisting arrest, the two- way cabbie radio network was particularly important in dis- seminating their version of the incident. The point is that those nearest and/or most involved and therefore most likely to join in are also those least dependent on the official news media.

In weighing the desirability of covering such incidents against that of a blackout, some balance has to be struck between com- peting considerations: how important is it to warn those anxious to avoid trouble to stay away from the area? Can those ready to participate be kept ignorant long enough for the disturbance to be quelled? Are word-of-mouth communications about the incident so inflammatory that, unless contradicted by verifiable news reports, they will spread the disturbance to other areas? It should be clear that a news blackout concerning a major disturbance entails considerable risks.

A more basic problem is that “responsible” reporting, as usually defined, tends to tie the news media even more closely to the establishment. The President’s Commission (1968) reconp mendation that channels be set up to assure a rapid and efficient flow of information between media and enforcement agencies when violence does erupt gives inadequate weight to the need to


keep contact with the protestors. The press, as has been repeatedly said, is a party to any conflict. All too often it has evoked the wrath of demonstrators and of rioters for the prominence it gives spokesmen who enjoy establishment recognition but have little influence or even resonance within the riot community.

The media are sometimes caught in the middle. They become targets of attack and subject to intimidation as each side attempts to promulgate its own version of what is happening. Not only angry rioters but also some police smash cameras and confiscate film they do not care to have scrutinized too closely.

Even the most sensational depictions of violence are not necessarily contagious. They elicit in their audience a variety of reactions, which range from fear and abhorrence on the one side to sympathy and identification with perpetrators on the other. These reactions do not usually cancel one another out. O n the contrary, reactions that are both extreme and opposite tend to polarize the community, contributing to tension and distrust. Thus the press is caught in a vicious cycle. The incidents it reports reflect exist- ing tensions and conflicts and these reports, in turn, confirm and sharpen these divisions. The prevalence in the media of news concerning violence could result in what has sometimes been called “narc0tization”-that is to say, it could generate a climate in which a large part of the public begins to accept riots and confrontations as normal. They cease to view it as a symptom but clamor for coercive intervention by the law.

THE PROPHECY OF VIOLENCE: SELF-FULFILLING OR SELF-DEFEATING?

The belief that widely publicized predictions-or warnings- of violence often help bring it about carries great conviction. The fourth question to ask is whether news reports about the likelihood of violence serve as self-fulfilling prophecies. It is, of course, possible that press reporting of community tensions contributes to expectations of violent conflict, and the press has been known to use deliberate scare tactics that breed violence (Paletz & Dunn, 1967). But here we focus not on the role of the press in creating a climate conducive to the outbreak of collective violence but on predictions concerning what is going to happen at a specific demonstration, march, or other political occasion. No doubt concerned about the self-fulfilling function of such reporting, the Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence recommended that the press coverage place “less emphasis on the willingness of the aggrieved to engage in violence and the likelihood that they will [Baker & Ball, 1969, p. 971.”

104 GLADYS ENGEL LANG AND K U R T LANG

To judge whether the popular concern and, consequently, the Commission’s warning are justified, one must analyze the conditions under which such reports-warnings or straight accounts- are likely to become self-fulfilling or self-defeating. Robert K. Merton (1949) used the term self-fulfilling prophecy to indicate that “public definitions of a situation can become an integral part of the situation and thus affect subsequent developments, with special emphasis on those instances in which a false [sic] definition of the situation evokes a new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true.’’ Less attention has been paid to the self-defeatingprophecy in which a public definition evokes a response that keeps the conception (however true or false) from coming true. There is also the practice of deliberate leaks to the press and of rumors as trial balloons to test public reaction. Insofar as plans are altered as a result, public reactions to an event that has not yet taken place can help to prevent it. We have discussed this alternative to self-fulfilling prophecies elsewhere (Lang & Lang, 1961, Ch. 3 ) .

Predictions that some event will be accompanied by violence can, when taken seriously, have effects on three categories of participants: (a) those among the public who still have to decide whether or not to attend; (b) the organizers of the event; and (c) law enforcement agencies who must make provisions to maintain order at such events. Whether predictions of violence, reported by the media, become self-defeating depends on the responses of all three groups. Empirical study of these responses is possible. The discussion here concerns mainly the effect on turnout.

The more the turnout depends on the advance publicity a scheduled protest receives, the more difficult it is to anticipate who will turn out and how they will behave. Uncertainty about the composition of many recent peace rallies has been voiced by their organizers, as the following statement by the Anti-Vietnam Peace Committee illustrates: “The people come out but we don’t know who they are. The vast, vast majority of these people are on no- body’s mailing list. They want to come out two, three times a year and make their feelings known [quoted in Walker, 1968, p. 191. ”

Large crowds can be a problem not only for the police but also for organizers of a demonstration committed to orderly protest. Crowd violence has to be viewed as a collective response within a specific, highly volatile, and transitory situation. The outcome-once violence erupts-is unpredictable, and those who employ such crowd violence as a tactic or implore crowds to do so use it at their own risk. The magnitude of the problem depends not only on the relatively small number of demonstrators who may deliberately seek a confrontation-to dramatize their de-


mands or to reveal the repressive character of the authorities-but also on the mass of others whose presence provides would-be disrupters with anything from a “cover” to varying degrees of tacit or open support. Once the size of a demonstration reaches a point where control depends less on counter-force than on spon- taneous cooperation by the mass of demonstrators, the likely course of events depends less on the absolute number assembled than on the dispositions of those who have turned out.

Dzfferential responses to violence potential . It is thus crucial-in assessing the role of the media-to note that both the size and the composition of the crowd are affected by widely publicized state- ments about the possibility or probability of violence. For analyti- cal purposes, we can distinguish four categories of persons who respond differently to the violence-potential:

1 . The core of demonstrators determined to make their protest or demands known and whose decision to attend is thus unaffected by predictions; 2. sympathizers who come specifically and primarily because they feel reponsible for, and capable of, preventing the predicted violence; 3 . sympathizers who would have come but were deterred from attending because they feared or were repelled by the possibility of violence; and, 4. persons likely to be attracted by the spectacle, especially if the turnout promises to be large and includes the prospect of a dramatic (even violent) confrontation.

Most of the literature on crowds exaggerates the degree to which members of the crowd act in unison. The “collective” psychologists emphasized the momentary consensus into which un- likeminded people were drawn by the collective excitement of the occasion. Others-especially sociologists writing about recent ghetto riots-have rejected the image, reactionary in its implica- tions, of the crowd as basically irrational and have instead emphasized the part played by more permanent sectarian commitments, stressing the extent to which rioters are motivated by specific grievances. Yet both in their own way gloss over the fact that most crowds-even the most violent-include persons determined to prevent and resist violence. If this is so-and it is more than a plausible assumption-the question of who is attracted and who is deterred by predictions of violence determines in large measure whether that prediction becomes self-fulfilling of self-defeating.

Effects of media on a peace demonstration. Some suggestive leads about the way press publicity may influence attendance were con- tained in a study sociologists (Barker et al., 1968) made of the London anti-Vietnam demonstration in October 1968. Before that demonstration took place, some news sources had warned that the country might witness “the most ferocious, most appalling, and


undoubtedly most unnecessary spasm of violence in London in our times Wones, 1968, p. 4211.” The demonstration, held on a Sunday, was for the most part peaceful, even holiday-like, though some violence, deliberately provoked by a small group of demonstrators, did occur at Grosvenor Square, the home of the Amer- ican Embassy.

A clear line must obviously be drawn between the committed demonstrators and those more marginally involved. Queries answered by a representative sample of 270 marchers indicated that the majority were anticipating violence but this had not played much of a part in influencing them to participate; two- thirds were veterans of similar demonstrations. Eighty percent of those who anticipated violence had no intention of becoming personally involved. The other twenty percent-those expecting violence and expecting to be involved-parallels the proportion of all marchers who did go on to Grosvenor Square, apparently intent on a violent confrontation.

No questions were asked of spectators, but, according to wit- nesses, the predictions of violence turned the march into the “year’s biggest tourist sight.” In the end, at Grosvenor Square, there were “many more spectators than demonstrators. . . . They were here in anticipation of what the press said could happen [Barker et al., 1968; see also McCarthy, 19681.” In this in- stance, the mass media do not seem to have attracted confirmed demonstrators to the scene, but they apparently attracted sufficient persons looking for an exciting Sunday as to have changed the tenor of the occasion. Even the confrontation between police and would-be violent demonstrators at Grosvenor Square became a sports spectacle with the contestants but an attraction for a much larger audience in a holiday mood, curious, and waiting for something to happen.

It is likely that some persons were deterred from participating in the protest or coming as spectators because violence was expected. Those likely to be dissuaded from coming to any event where violence threatens to erupt include those physically most vulnerable-the old, the infirm, the mothers with baby carriages. More important, there will also be included some persons determined to demonstrate peaceably but who are persuaded that the intransigeance of extremists or the inability (or determination) of authorities to contain the extremists will inevitably lead to a physical confrontation-whether or not they themselves attend. The news emphasis on whatever violence occurs during or following a predominantly peaceful mass assembly feeds this sense of futility. The desire of the strongly committed not to sanction-or give the appearance of sanctioning-the violent acts of a minority is prob-


ably a more effective deterrent than the official scare tactics, reported by the press, that emphasize preparations to counter the expected violence.

Bringing out the “cool heads. ”Every conflict situation, no matter how tense, brings to the scene some persons ready to use their prestige or simply to add their presence as counterweight to violence. Leaders and celebrities have walked the streets urging people to “cool it.” These violence-resisters have included not only well-known symbols-like Martin Luther King-but also “mod- erate” students and faculty, liberals over thirty, trade-unionists and clergy, anxious to provide “cool heads” should trouble erupt; they attend, often in groups, so long as it appears from reports that their presence is needed to support those anxious to protest peaceably. The marches at Selma, the 1963 March on Washing- ton, as well as the huge anti-Vietnam moratorium demonstrations in 1969 and 1970 drew thousands of such persons. Many writers describing these events have recorded incidents where pockets of instigators among the assembled crowd were instantly subdued by the “numbers” around them. This phenomenon of group- resistance to the provocation of violence is media-related to the extent, also, that resisters are drawn to the event because “the whole world is watching.” They assume that non-violence, as well as violence, will be reported by the media. One element in the determination to attend is to demonstrate, by keeping the peace, that the press prophecies were false.

Innocent bystanders. Finally, two types of persons likely to be positively attracted by the prospect of disorder will not resist violence and may, inadvertently or deliberately, contribute to its realization. First is the large number drawn to the spectacle, provided it is not too threatening. They have no intention of participating but rather thrive on the excitement they can view from a safe distance. This audience, by virtue of its size, can magnify the problems of control. Such “innocent” bystanders often become the victims of indiscriminate counter-violence; because they do not expect to be the objects of violence, they come unprepared to protect themselves.

Eager participants. But other persons are positively lured by the chance to participate in the action and even assure its realization. Every crowd attracts its share of petty criminals who seize the opportunity to ply their trade under the cover of the crowd. In every crowd there are the impulsive-the “children” with “delin- quent egos” unable to resist the temptation to indulge their irn- pulses, or the new “children of Aquarius” indulging their irn- pulses as a political act. This is not to endorse the so-called riJrafl theory of riots but to acknowledge that there are those in every


crowd who make use of the crowd or eagerly join in. Such individ- uals contribute to the occurrence of violence by “being the first” to throw a rock, to spit at a policeman, etc., or by joining the lead of others. Especially where the prediction of violence brings such persons out in large numbers, this in itself may account for the violence that does occur. A clear line must be drawn between those intent on violence who would come whether or not violence was expected and those-including counter-demonstrators- lured by the chance for mischief.

Effects of crowd composition. There is little in the sociological literature to throw light on the relationship between the composition of crowds and the occurrence of violence. This remains true even though the studies of recent riots have included statistical profiles both of arrestees and of self-styled participants, which profiles could then be compared with those of the “non-rioters” among similar populations. The best work along this line is still that of George Rude, of which his recent book (1970) provides a good sampling.

We would insist, however, that the likelihood of collective violence in any specific situation depends not only on who is assembled but on such matters as where they are assembled, how they are physically distributed, and, especially, on the provisions that have been made for minimizing the eruption of incidents and containing any outbreaks of violence. Still, just as the spread of a disease hinges in part on the ratio of the immune to the susceptible among a population, the occurrence and spread of violent behavior when large crowds assemble must depend on the ratio of the violence-resistant to the violence-prone-with susceptibility to violence being understood not as a generalized susceptibility to suggestion or as an index of aggressiveness but as an intent to resist or participate in violence on the particular occasion. Whether or not media predictions of violence become self-fulfilling or self- defeating then becomes in large part a matter of who is attracted, repelled, or unaffected by these predictions. It seems possible, with forethought, to supply some empirical answers.

SUMMARY How responsible are the mass media for the violence of our

violent society? Do the media by their general practices help bring about situations with a high potential for violence? We suggest that the media both contribute to the appearance of increased frequency and accelerate the cycle of protest. Does the presence of


T V and other news media in potentially violent situations affect the likelihood that violence will erupt? O n balance, it is hypothe- sized, the presence of the media probably acts more as a deterrent of violence at such events than as a n instigator. What impact does the reporting of violence in progress have on the course that the violence takes? It is suggested that the answer to this question lies in the answer to another: what impact would nonreporting of the event have? The effect of a news blackout depends on the availability of alternative channels of communication whereby people on the scene (or likely to be attracted to the scene) get information on what is happening. Finally, to what extent do media predictions of violence become self-fulfilling, or, to the contrary, self- defeating? The answer depends on the responses of the public, the organizers of a protest, and the law enforcement agencies to these predictions. Insofar as the media stress the likelihood of violence but also the preparations and intent of demonstrators and law enforcement agencies to keep order, they may contribute to the non-occurrence of violence.

The focus in this paper has been on the effects of media (especially television) coverage of major public events on the violent or non-violent outcome of those events. O n balance, it appears that the media share no large responsibility for the violence that occurs on any particular occasion. The larger question-which has been raised repeatedly-has to do with the effect that media reporting of violence and potential violence has on the expectations of and public response to organized protest and conflict situations with a potential for violence. This remains the crucial question to ask in determining the linkages between the mass media and the political climate.

REFERENCES BAKER, R. K., & BALL, S. J. Violence and the mass media. Washington: Government

BARKER, P. ETAL. Portrait of a protest. New Society, October 31, 1968, 631-634. BOORSTIN, D. J. The image. Hammondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1963. HALLORAN, J. D. ET A L . Demonstrations and communication: a case study. Hammonds-

JONES, M. The police and the militants. New Statesman, October 4, 1968, 420-424. KLAPPER, J. T . The effects ufthe mass media. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960. LANG, K., & LANG, G. E. Collectivedynamics. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1961. LANG, K., & LANG, G. E. Politics andteleziisiun. Chicago: Quadrangle, 1968. LERNER, D. The passing of traditional society. Glencoe: Free Press, 1958. MCCARTHY, M. Report. New Tork Review ufBooks, December 19, 1968, 5-8. MERTON, R.'K. The self-fulfilling prophecy. In R. K. Merton, Social theory and

Printing Office, 1969.

worth, Middlesex; Penguin Books, 1970.

social structure. Glencoe: Free Press, 1949.


PALETZ, D. L. , & DUNN, R. Press coverage of civil disorders: A case study of

PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORI~ERS. Report of lhe National Advisory Com-

RUDE, G. Pans and London in the 18th century: Studies in bobular brotest. London:

Winston-Salem 1967. Public Opinion Quarterly, 1969,33,328-345.

mission on Civil Disorders. New York: Bantam Books, 1968. 1 1

Collins, Son, 1970. SCHELIJNG, T. C. The strategy ofconflict. New York: Oxford University, 1963. WALKER, D. Rights in conflict. New York: Bantam Books, 1968.

Documents

Some Pertinent Questions on Collective Violence and the News Media