Collective Violence in India

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Collective Violence in IndiaAuthor(s): George J. BryjakSource: Asian Affairs, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Summer, 1986), pp. 35-55Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30171906

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36 Asian AffairsIndia is a land of tremendous diversity. A nation with a population of ap-proximately 762 million people in 1985, India may well be the most hetero-

genous country in the world. It is a society inhabited by people of differentraces, religions, linguistic groups, and cultures. Besides the Hindu majoritywho comprise 83 percent of the population, there are significant numbers ofMuslims, Sikhs, and Christians. The constitution officially recognizes six-teen major languages; Indians speak over sixteen hundred regional dialects.The peoplerangefromtaller,relatively air-skinnedPunjabis n the northto the shorter,darkerDravidians n the south. Indianshavean acute senseof regionalism nd arequickto identify hemselves sresidents f a particu-lar state or geographicarea.Theycan choose from a multitudeof opposi-tionparties,althoughRajivGandhi'sCongressParty s thecountry'sdomi-nantpoliticalorganization. ndiansociety s dividedhierarchicallynto fivemajorcastes and thousandsof subcastes hataffect both Hindusand non-Hindus.

Sociopoliticaldiversity ontinues o be a majorsourceof conflict in con-temporaryIndia. This conflict usually occurs betweenmembers of thefollowing groups:caste Hindus and untouchables;Hindus and Muslims;Hindus and Sikhs;Muslimsand the police; Marxistsand Maoists;unionmembersandthepolice;thearmyand thepolice;untouchables ndthepo-lice;and farmersand the police.2Accurate tatementsabout these trendsof collectiveviolencearedifficultto make for at least two reasons: (1) accurate data on the frequency ofgroup violence, especially in rural areas, are scarce; and (2) the definition ofrioting used by the Indian police includes a wide range of behaviors. The In-dian penal code defines rioting as "the use of violence by a group of five ormore people"-thus, a skirmish between a small number may be reportedin the crime statistics as a riot. "Two or three men may fight and when thepolice come implicate a number of witnesses so as to discredit their testi-mony and spread the blame. The police then record a riot case not a case ofassault or an affray."3 Riot statistics, therefore, can be somewhat mislead-ing as they do not really reflect the magnitude, duration, or seriousness ofcollective violence. Nevertheless, these statistics are useful in pointing outgeneral trends of collective disorder over long periods of time.The publication of Indian crime statistics lags at least four years behindthe time offenses occurred. For example, Crime in India 1977 (similar to theFBI Uniform Crime Reports) was not published by the Government of In-dia Press until 1981. An examination of statistics for 1953-77 indicates bothan increase in the absolute number of riots and the rate of this behavior asexpressed in cases per 100,000 population. Table 1 shows that the riot rateincreased slowly in the thirteen-year period between 1953 and 1966, climb-ing from 5.5 to 7.1. The ratejumped to 8.5 in 1967 and then to 10.7 in 1969.Between 1970 and 1977, the riot rate vacillated between 11.5 and 13.7.


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Collective Violence in India 37Table 1.-Riots in India

Year Actualno. Per 100,000pop.1953 20,529 5.51954 22,777 6.01955 23,609 6.11956 24,700 6.21957 23,750 5.91958 24,942 6.01959 26,987 6.41960 26,890 6.31961 27,199 6.21962 29,096 6.51963 28,114 6.11964 32,693 7.01965 32,940 6.91966 34,696 7.11967 42,447 8.51968 45,801 8.91969 55,796 10.71970 68,331 12.81971 64,114 11.51972 65,781 11.71973 73,388 12.71974 80,547 13.71975 67,241 11.21976 63,675 10.41977 80,081 12.9

Adapted rom: B. R. Nayar(1975),Violence nd crime n India--A quantitativetudy (Mac-MillanCo. of IndiaLtd.);Crime n India 1977 1981),Faridabad:Governmentf IndiaPress.

While the rate has fluctuated, the overall trend is clear: riot activity in Indiais increasing.A Typology of Collective Violence

David Bayley, a specialist on crime and the Indian criminaljustice system,constructed a useful typology for categorizing and analyzing riots or collec-tive violence in India. The following discussion utilizes an adapted version ofthis typology and owes much to its conceptual framework.4Three categoriesof collective violence exist-violence of remonstrance,violence of confronta-tion, and violence of frustration. Each of these may vary along the followingseven dimensions: (1) occasion; (2) target; (3) catalytic agent; (4) organiza-tion; (5) duration of growth; (6) participants;and (7) location.


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38 Asian AffairsViolence of Remonstrance

The violence of remonstrance culminates from the efforts of a group ofdemonstrators to bring attention to a particular point of view, usually in theform of a set of perceived or experienced grievances. Participants are mostlikely to be membersof formal groups with an organizational hierarchy,whopossess the necessaryskills and resources to mobilize members and make theirdissatisfactions known to officials or government agencies. This form of vio-lence increasingly occurs in the countryside because of rising social aware-ness, literacyrates, and proliferation of rural-basedor rural-orientedpoliticalparties; it is not spontaneous but erupts after prolonged periods of agitationor demonstration. Since the targetsare government officials (or other author-ity figures), violence is often tactically precipitated by the police. Aftermarching on a government office and demanding to see officials, for exam-ple, demonstratorsmay become impatient and rowdy. They may cross policebarricadesor fail to disbursewhen ordered to do so. The police may then re-spond by attemptingto arrestgroup leaders, push back the demonstrators,orcontrol the crowd. Some demonstratorsmay not move, may refuse to let theirleaders be taken away, or may commence an attack on the police. Isolatedclashes between the police and a few demonstrators can quickly grow from asmall fracas into a full-scale violent confrontation.Incidents of violence of remonstrance have occurred frequently in thestate of Punjab where the majority of India's 15 million Sikhs reside. Sik-hism, a religion founded by Guru Nanak in the fifteenth century, has a longand proud military tradition. Sikhs view themselves as a unique people, andsome of them have attempted to establish an independent political statesince 1947. The desire for an autonomous homeland to be called Khalistan(derived from the concept of Khalsa-a chosen race of soldier-saints), alongwith a number of other economic, social, and cultural grievances, has pittedSikhs against their Hindu neighbors, the local police, and the federal gov-ernment over the past few years.Prior to the armed forces' storming of the Sikh Golden Temple in Amrit-sar in June 1984, demonstrations, protests, and acts of terrorism had beencommon in Punjab. In the summer of 1981, after a fundamentalist Sikhleader was arrested, police clashed with demonstrators who demanded hisrelease. Unable to disperse or control the protesters, the police fired into thecrowd and killed thirteen people. Over seven hundred arrests were made asviolence spread to other cities and towns within the region. In March 1983in an effort to draw attention to their demands, Sikhs set up roadblocks onnumerous major highways throughout the state. When police attempted toclear these roadways, the protesters resisted violently. In the aftermath ofthese confrontations, 20 people were killed, approximately 400 policemenwere injured, and over 1,000 people were arrested. At the conclusion of an


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Collective Violence in India 39eighteen-month period ending in April 1983, 140 people had been killed as aresult of violence in Punjab. Most of these deaths were the result of clashesbetween demonstrators and the police.5India is a land of scarcity and poverty, and any substantial increase inprices or decrease in government subsidies is likely to result in demonstra-tions. In November 1980 Punjabi students were protesting the increase inbus fares when eighteen policemen (for some undeterminedreason) suddenlycharged their ranks and "mercilessly" beat many of them.6 Layoffs andstrikes (especially in Bombay and Calcutta) often result in confrontationsbetween angry union members and the police. Newspapers regularly reportthe numbers killed and injured in these confrontations, but unless the cas-ualties have been unusually high such stories are not considered newsworthyand are relegated to back pages.

Violence of ConfrontationUnlike the violence of remonstrance where a group's feelings of injusticeand anger are directed toward an authority figure, the violence of confron-tation results from the conflict between two groups of private citizens over

an issue. These factions are usually informal, comprised primarily offriends, relatives, neighbors, and/or members of the same caste, religious,linguistic, or regional group. Tension and latent hostility between twogroups may simmer for long periods before exploding into violence. Thepolice are not the catalyst of violence; rather, the rival group's behaviortriggers conflict.Violence of confrontation is both a rural and an urban phenomenon. Inrural areas personal relationships are stronger and lend themselves moreeasily to intense partisanship. Another contributing factor is the relativelysmall number of police and other formal agents of social control who nor-mally monitor and diffuse the tension between rural groups and keep theconflict to a nominal level of violence if fighting does break out. Sporadicincidents between two rival groups can be drawn out over extended periodsas a momentary victory in a particularconfrontation by one group results invengeful feelings and a strong determination to get even by the other.Violence of confrontation, however, occurs more often in the cities wheremany different groups occupy a crowded, deteriorating environment.India's largest cities are especially heterogeneous in their ethnic composi-tion. According to the 1971census, 31.8 percent, 16.9 percent, and 16.3 per-cent of the residents of Bombay, Calcutta, and Bangalore, respectively, areinterstate migrants as defined by their last place of residence.7 It appearsthat as long as they attractpeople from all cornersof the subcontinent,India'slargestmetropolitanareas will be potentialcentersof violence of confrontation.


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40 Asian AffairsThe caste system, which ranks people in a rigid hierarchy and prohibitsindividual mobility, has been the source of much violence of confrontation.

This stratification system has withstood the challenges of reformers andabolitionists since the time of Buddha, some twenty-five hundred years ago.It was, however, affected by the adoption of the Indian constitution in1950, which officially abolished discrimination on the basis of untouchabil-ity. In an attempt to integrate the untouchables (or scheduled castes, as theyare now often called) into the mainstream of economic and political life, theunion government has instituted a type of affirmative action program.Under various facets of this program, a designated number of seats and/orjobs are "reserved" for untouchables in schools, professions, and govern-ment positions. Many "caste" Hindus, however, have been and continue tobe outraged by such a policy. Confrontations between untouchables andcaste Hindus over these programs have been frequent and often violent. Inthe state of Maharashtra the two groups have also fought over land rights,agricultural wages, and the renaming of a state university after a prominentuntouchable leader.8

After caste Hindus attacked national banks, police stations, and schoolsto demonstrate their displeasure at the government's policy of admitting aset number of untouchables into medical school, thirty thousand untouch-able textile workers went on strike in Ahmadabad (the capital of the state ofGujarat) in 1981 to demonstrate their support for the reservations. Whenthe mill finally reopened a few days later, the police had to be summoned tocontrol fighting between caste Hindus and untouchable workers. These con-frontations occurred intermittently for almost three months and resulted inthe deaths of forty people.9During the spring and summer of 1985 Gujarat was once again the sceneof intercaste confrontations. This latest wave of violence erupted after thestate government announced that it was raising the admission quotas for"backward classes" in medical and engineering schools from 10 percent to28 percent.'0 Backward classes are those who-although not outside thecaste system (outcastes, i.e., untouchables)-are very poor and oftendespised."Untouchables (who comprise approximately 14 percent of India's popu-lation) and tribal non-Hindus (who make up another 8 percent and wouldalso benefit from this upward adjustment) welcomed the new governmentfigures. Upper-caste Hindus, however, were furious, and antireservationprotests began almost immediately. Joining caste Hindus in their oppositionto preferential treatment for backward castes were farmers already dis-gruntled by untouchable reservations. These protests soon turned violent asthe antagonistic groups battled each other for four months. Two hundredand twenty-four people were killed, hundreds more injured, and at least tenthousand had their homes destroyed as a result of the fighting.'2 In the


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Collective Violence in India 41midst of these intercaste confrontations, Hindus and Muslims began killingone another. Unable to control the hostilities, local authorities called in thearmy, and curfews were established in Ahmadabad.13The recent Gujarat antireservation riots are the most serious among thou-sands of confrontations that occur each year between upper-caste Hindusand untouchables.14Most of these incidents take place in rural areas andrarelycome to the attention of government officials. Upper-caste policemenoften oppress untouchables who are struggling for their constitutionalrights."5The most costly incidents in terms of lives lost and property destroyed arethose clashes that the Ministry of Home Affairs refers to as "communalviolence." This type of confrontation takes place between two or more eth-nic, linguistic, and/or religious groups. Table 2 shows the growing numberof confrontations and casualties resulting from incidents of communalviolence between 1976 and 1980. Communal confrontations increased from169 n 1976 o 421in 1980,whilethenumberof peoplekilledrose from 39to372 during this period.Table2.-Communal Violence n India

No. of incidentsof communal No. of persons No. of personsYear violence killed injured1976 169 39 7941977 188 36 1,1221978 230 110 1,8531979 304 261 2,3791980 421 372 2,691Adapted rom: TheEconomicand Political Weekly 1981), Bisharif,9 May:1.

WhileHindusand Sikhsbattleeach other n northern ndia,Hindusandtheir traditionalMuslimrivalsmaintainan uneasypeace that is at timespunctuatedby episodesof extremeviolence.Onesuch incidentoccurrednthe industrial ity of Jamshedpurn 1979. In an attempt o avoid a Hindu-Muslimconfrontationduringan upcomingreligiouscelebration, hepolicearrested150(whomtheyconsidered) eligiousfanatics.Duringthe courseof thecelebration,a processionwasstoppedbyHinduswhodemanded hatone of theirpriestsbe released rompolicecustody.An argumentbetweentheofficerswhorefused o release hepriestand theHinduswhowantedhisreleasesoon turned nto a shoutingmatch betweenHindu andMuslimon-lookers.Thisexchangeedto stone-throwinghatescalated o hand-to-hand


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42 Asian Affairscombat. The Hindus then stormed into Muslim neighborhoods and re-sponded in kind. Before the police could restore order, over one hundredpeople had been killed.16In an April 1984 speech in Bombay a leader of a radical Marathi organi-zation likened India's Muslim population to a growing cancer that had to besurgically removed. Such highly inflammatory remarks not only increasedreligious tensions in Bombay but began to polarize Muslims and Hindus in anumber of coastal cities north of India's largest industrial center. In the cityof Bhiwandi-with a "delicately balanced" population that is 45 percentHindu and 55 percent Muslim-Hindus prepared for an upcoming religiousfestival by flying saffron-colored flags. Not to be outdone, Muslims beganto display their traditional green flags wherever possible. Bhiwandi'sheightened religious consciousness erupted into a week-long riot that quicklyspread south from one city to another. In Bombay alone 100 people werekilled, and the widespread carnage ultimately claimed the lives of 230 peo-ple. Fire is especially treacherous in poor, densely populated urban areas,and in one Bhiwandi neighborhood 27 people trappedin their homes burnedto death. Only the army's intervention prevented a higher death toll.'7Perhaps the most brutal incident of confrontational violence occurred inthe eastern state of Assam during the winter of 1983. The "agony ofAssam," as Indira Gandhi referredto these hostilities, was not specifically amatter of religious, ethnic, or cultural differences. Instead, all such ele-ments were to be found in a situation that has its roots in the economy ofcolonial India.'"Since the British discovery and cultivation of tea as a cashcrop in the early eighteen-hundreds, millions of people (mostly Bengali Hin-dus and Muslims) have migrated to Assam.The indigenous people of Assam have deeply resented the continual inva-sion of their homeland.'9 Under British rule they were powerless to keep themigrants out, and the constitution of independent India provides for the un-impeded movement of all citizens. The federal government's reluctance tostem the tide of people crossing into Assam illegally from Bangladesh hascaused the population to escalate. It is surprising that Assamese hostilitytoward migrants and the non-Assamese resentment at being labeled as out-siders (even though some have lived and worked in the state for generations)has not erupted into violence more frequently. Some of the more recent con-flicts, however, such as the Assamese Disturbances of 1960, the anti-Bengaliriots of 1972, and the violent protest of 1980 that prompted Mrs. Gandhi toplace the state under federal law for one year were but minor skirmishescompared to the death and destruction that ravaged the state in 1983.Tensions in Assam reached a boiling point with the coming of springelec-tions. The Assamese believed that if the immigrant populations were to be-come citizens and vote, then the indigenous Assamese would be overrunpolit-ically. The most recent wave of migrantsand the Bengali Muslims felt that if


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Collective Violence in India 43the Assamese could prevent them from voting, then they would eventuallylose other rightsas well as their land. Under such a political climate, it seemedinevitable that legislation would be introduced demanding the expulsion ofsome or all of the nonindigenous population. Despite numerous protests,strikes, and boycotts on the part of the Assamese and threats of furtherviolent disruptions, Indira Gandhi decided to go ahead with the scheduledelections. Hundredsof thousands of immigrantswould not be disenfranchised.With the Assamese determined not to permit state elections to proceedunder these conditions, violence continued until the situation deterioratedinto India's worst communal fighting since partition. In one incident alone,Lalung tribesmen massacred over one thousand Bengali Muslims (mostlywomen and children) who were unable to flee. The killing, however, wasnot confined to Assamese versus Muslims. Apart from Assamese Hinduskilling Bengali Muslims, "Assamese Muslims killed Bengali Muslims,Assamese Muslims killed Bengali tribals, tribals killed Assamese Hindus,tribals killed Bengali Muslims, tribals killed tribals, Bengali Muslims killedBengali Hindus, older assimilated immigrants killed recently arrived ones,and all the local peoples killed Nepalese and Biharis."20In a nightmare offear, hatred, panic, and confusion "every community killed every othercommunity."'"8When the slaughter was over, approximately four thousandpeople lay dead, many of them killed in a most barbaric way. People werehacked to death by machetes, shot through with arrows, and impaled onspears. Bodies were decapitated and thrown into a river. When the policeand some of the seventy thousand troops (that Mrs. Gandhi had dispatchedto Assam) arrived, they found bloated buzzards sated on human flesh.21To the terribleloss of life resulting from this communal fury can be addedthe high economic price India must pay for its internal warfare. Besides des-troying a substantial amount of property, in 1980 protestors successfullyblockaded the movement of oil from Assam to other Indian states, forcingthe government to spend nearly 100 million dollars a month for additionalimports. The transport of jute and other forest products was also temporar-ily halted, depriving India of much-needed funds derived from the export ofthese materials.22Since granaries were a prime target of arsonists, and far-mers missed one rice planting because of the chaos, Assam was threatenedby a substantial food shortage.The agony of Assam is a bitter example of the magnitude of brutality thatcan result from communal conflict. Although the level of heterogeneity andpolitical and cultural strife that exists in Assam is not indicative of the situa-tion in most of India, there are a number of northeastern states with similarproblems. In 1980 in the small state of Tripura383 "foreigners" were killed(unofficial estimates were in the thousands) in clashes between local tribes-men and immigrants from Bangladesh. A number of villages were burned,and 30,000 people were forced to seek food and shelter in relief camps.23


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44 Asian AffairsViolence of Frustration

The final form of collective violence results from frustration and occurswhen people perceive themselves to be in a situation they find unendurable.In some cases the police are the catalyst for this form of violence. Some im-personal event usually sets in motion the people's anger and frustration.Once the crowd begins engaging in aggressive action, it becomes opportun-istic andmaylash out randomly, n some casesdestroying verythingn itspath. Participantsare not usually organized,although mpromptueadersmay emerge romthe crowd'smorevociferous,forcefulmembers.Partici-pantsmay or maynot know each other,buttheyarebrought ogetherbe-cause of some commoninterestor eventthat suddenly urns violent. Theviolenceof frustration s an urbanphenomenonoften associatedwith thedisadvantages nd irritationsof livingin a poor and crowdedcity.Oneof the bloodiestriots in Indiawas a spontaneousuprising hat tookplacein the city of Moradabadn 1980.To celebrate he conclusionof theholymonthof Ramadan,Muslimsgathered or prayerat a localmosqueonthe outskirtsof the city. A disturbance eganafter someonenoticed that apig had strayed into the mosque. When nearby police refused to retrieve it,some members of the crowd accused them of purposefully allowing the pigto enter the mosque. Before long the crowd became angry and began throw-ing stones at a stall where a number of policemen were seated, and the out-numbered officers retaliated by firing into the crowd. Police reinforcementsarrived shortly and the shooting continued. By this time the swelling crowdretreated toward the city, chanting: "Kill the police " Upon reaching asmall substation, they beat up all of the officers, stole the availableweapons, and set the station on fire. One policeman trapped inside wasburned alive. News of the Moradabad incident quickly spread, and riotingbroke out in eighteen other cities in the region. A large contingent of para-military forces had to be brought in to restore order. On the following day,Hindus began attacking Muslims and burning their shops. A riot of frustra-tion initially targeted at the police-accompanied by the destruction ofproperty-had turned into a Hindu versus Muslim confrontation. The finaltoll of death and destruction was extremely high: estimates of the numberkilled ranged from 250 to 300. The number of injuries was in the thousands,with nearly all of the casualties being Muslim.24Indira Gandhi's assassination by her two Sikh bodyguards on October31, 1984 resulted in some of the worst rioting in India since the time of inde-pendence and partition in 1947. The Hindus' rage at the death of their"mother" exploded in an all-out attack on Sikhs in many parts of Delhi.Sikhs were savagely beaten, shot, and in many cases burned to death.Within a week of Gandhi's death, two thousand people (mostly Sikhs) werekilled in the capital city, and another five hundred died as a result of riots in


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CollectiveViolencenIndia 45fiveneighboring tates.25 hearmy whichwas notcalled n untilthe seconddayof rioting)did notgaincontrolof thesituationn DelhiuntilMrs.Gandhihad beencrematedon November3, threedaysafter her death.Accordingto PranChopraof New Delhi's Centerfor Policy Research,IndiraGandhi'sdeathtriggered iolencerooted in "classantagonisms ak-ing shelterunderreligiouscoverings."26 hopraargues hat theriotersweremembersof Delhi's lowest economicclass, many of them rural-to-urbanmigrantsonly recentlyarrived n the capital city. Their victimswereoftenmembersof a Sikhbusinesscaste, financiallywell-offby Indianstandards.Theprimeminister'sdeathprovided hem withboth a coverandan excuseto vent theirfrustrations ndhostilities owarda classof peoplewhose eco-nomicprosperity heywillprobablyneverexperience. f Chopra s correct,this typeof violence will no doubt increaseas Indiancities swellwithpoormigrantswho have little if any chance of achievingupwardmobility.The Hindu-dominated oliceareoften accusedof facilitatingntergroupviolenceby remainingpassivewhen Hindus are the instigatorsof, and/orhave theupperhandin, communalconfrontations.Sikhleaders, or exam-ple, charged hatduring he Delhi riotsfollowingthe assassination f Mrs.Gandhi, hepolicecould havepreventedmuchof thekillinganddestructionbutchose not to do so. According o somereports,Delhipoliceofficersac-tuallytook partin the lootingof Sikh-ownedbusinesses.At othertimes the police themselveshave instigatedcollectiveviolence.On one occasionduring he Gujaratviolence somepolicemen oinedin therioting,sidingwithuntouchables,and even led the mob thatdestroyed heoffices of a local newspaper.27During the antireservation riots inAhmadabad hepolicewerestonedbydemonstrators nd localresidentsormorethan a week. In apparent etaliation, he policecharged nto a groupof peopleandwere"absolutelyruthless n theirattack."According o oneaccount,the policebeatand molestedwomen,broke waterpipesin a resi-dentialneighborhood,andransacked ome homes.28InAugust1982roaming roupsof Bombaypoliceburnedbuses,sabotagedrailway ignals,andmanaged o block almostall roadandrailtraffic n andout of thecity. As a result ivepeoplewerekilledandsixty-seven olicemenwerefired.A similar,although essserious, ncident n the stateof Haryanaresulted in the dismissal of almost four hundredofficers. The possiblereasons behindthis violence are thoughtto be low pay, long hours,poorbenefits, and few chancesfor promotion.Prospectsfor advancement reespeciallydismal, "with about 75 percentof all personnelretiring n therank at whichthey wererecruited."'29ayleybelievesthat, "for betterorworse,the lowerranksof thepoliceare nowpreparedo emulate he tacticsof militant abor. Theywill strikeandtheywill organize."It also appearsthat theywill engagein collectiveviolence f andwhentheydeem such ac-tionnecessary.Policemayalso be optingfor the leastdangerous lternative


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46 Asian Affairsregardingheirownsafetyin attemptingo keeptwo groupsof peoplefromkillingeach other. Rather hantakinga moredefensivepostureandjust try-ing to keep opposinggroups separated,police may pressthe attack them-selves.Although his tacticmayormaynot beeffective n stemminghe tideof collectiveviolence, t willcertainly acilitate he mistrustanddisdain hatmanyIndiansalreadyhave for the police.Modernization ndCollectiveViolence

Explanationsor the increase n ratesof collectiveviolence n Indiaare tobe found in its effort to modernize.After a society undergoesan internalpoliticalrevolution-or gains ndependencerom a colonialpower,as in In-dia's case-it mustbeginto findsolutionsto a seriesof complexproblems.Unfortunately,politicalautonomydoes not necessarilyranslate ntoa dra-matically mproved tandardof livingfor thepeopleof a recently ndepen-dent nation. The newgovernmentmustbeingto deliveron the promises tmadeduringthe struggle or power.Althoughthe majorityprobablydoesnot expect mmediate hanges n thecountry'smajor nstitutions, t does ex-pect that substantial mprovementsn the overallqualityof life will comeabout in a reasonableamountof time. It has now been thirty-nineyearssince Indiabecame ndependent, nd eventhoughthestandard f livinghasimprovedfor some, as far as many Indiansare concerned, t has not im-provedfast enoughor gone far enough.The paradoxof India'spoliticalsituation s that whereasMrs.Gandhi'spopularitywashigh, a substantialnumberof urbanIndianswere not satis-fiedwith thestateof the nation.A quarterly pinionpoll-conducted in fif-teenurbanareasby the IndiaMarketResearchBureaubetweenSeptember1980and July 1982-indicates that between 57 percentand 59 percentofthosesurveyedwere satisfiedwithMrs.Gandhi'sperformancen office. Atthe sametime,between64 and 67 percentof thoseinterviewed elieved hatoverall"thingsaregoing badly"in India.30Dissatisfactionwasthe highestin the largeindustrial ities of Bombay,Ahmadabad,Madras,andBanga-lore, withbetween76 and 85 percentof the respondents tatingthatcondi-tions were"bad." PerhapsMrs. Gandhi'spopularitywas a majorreasonwhy there were not substantiallymore protests, strikes,and violent con-frontations.It is quite possible hat if RajivGandhidoes not proveto be aspopularas his mother,and socialandeconomicconditionsdo not improveto the satisfactionof more urbanresidents,India will experiencea rathertumultousperiodcharacterized y significantsocial and politicalunrest.The belief that India'sleadershave not beenableto bringabout a morefavorableeconomic climatehas been accompaniedby the realization hatsome segmentsof society,especially he cities, haveprosperedgreatlyandwill continue to do so. Mrs. Gandhicommentedon the poor's changingself-perception:"Therich arericher, ust as therichercountriesaregetting


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Collective Violence in India 47richer. But that doesn't mean that the poor are getting poorer. What is hap-peningis that they see theirpoverty-even though it is an improvedsituation-with much sharper eyes. Before they tolerated it; today they say, 'Why shallI tolerateit?' ,,3 As educationadvancesfarther nto the countrysideandthe number of literate people increases (in 1981 only 36 percent could readand write), more Indians will be liberated from the ignorance of their iso-lated existence. The number of dissatisfied people who reside in India's600,000 villages will grow.

Not the least of India's problems and a factor related to collectiveviolence is the number of people who inhabit the subcontinent. A nation of762 million, India has a growth rate of 2.23 percent per annum. This rate,relatively modest when compared to other third world countries, translatesinto a population increase of over 15 million people a year. Demographersestimate that at this rate, India will surpass China to become the most popu-lous nation on earth not too far into the twenty-first century. Thus a sub-stantial amount of economic growth is negated by the needs of a rapidly ex-panding population. Even the world's richest nations would be hard-pressed to increase their standard of living if they had to meet the needs ofso many more people.These factors, coupled with an extremely heterogeneous society whosemany rival groups have a long history of communal conflict, are responsiblefor the collective violence seen in India today. As India continues tomodernize and traditional values and centers of power are challenged, manymutually hostile groups are likely to become even further polarized. Un-touchables, for example, seem determined to exercise their rights as guaran-teed by the constitution and by the Untouchability (Offenses) Act of 1955.Caste Hindus, however, who have dominated and exploited the outcastesfor three thousand years, appear equally determined to maintain their posi-tion of superiority. Each victory that untouchables gain will no doubt becountered by caste Hindus who have shown little, if any, reluctance to en-gage in violent reprisals against scheduled castes. This same bleak scenariocan be extended to Hindu-Muslim relations, as well as to the multi-ethnic,religious, and linguistic groups that inhabit the northeastern states. All arecompeting for political power and for the paucity of resources: land, hous-ing, and jobs in one of the word's poorest countries.

Feelings of pride in one's religion, ethnicity, language, and way of life thatonce led to an independent India now have the potential for not only imped-ing modernization, but also for causing widespreaddeath and destruction. Inthe aftermath of colonial independence,nationalist movements have emergedin the third world, as people reject the many arbitraryinternal and externalpolitical boundaries established by the colonial powers.32The preindepen-dence cohesiveness and internal solidarity of many new nations is being re-placed by regional loyalties and identification at the ethnic, religious, and


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48 Asian Affairslinguistic evel. In a societyas largeanddiverseas India,the resultsof thisphenomenon an bedevastating.Bridginghegapfromthe traditional o themodernworld is problematic noughfor a basicallyhomogeneous ocietywhere here s general greement n nationalgoalsandpriorities.Fora coun-tryas heterogeneous s India,this transitionmaybe impossible.CollectiveViolenceandRevolution

With a growingnumberof dissatisfied,angrypeopleengagingn demon-strations,protests,andcollectiveviolence,thequestionarisesas to whythisangerand frustrations not aggregatednto an organized ppositionmove-menttargetedat thestateand/or unionmovement.Froma Marxistperspec-tive, one might magine hatevenin a societyas heterogeneouss India t isonly a matterof timebefore all those who aredissatisfiedwith the currentstateof affairsaregalvanizednto anopposition orce whoseaim is to toppletheCongressPartyandthe federalgovernment.Thereare,however,a num-berof reasonswhythesewidespread utbursts f collectiveviolence n Indiahave beenandprobablywill continue o be unorganized nd fragmented.1. As Huntingtonnotes, people can be too poor to engagein ongoingrevolutionary ctivity."Theslum dweller ives on a low margin; hepayoffthat counts is in the hereand now. He who is concernedwitheating s un-likely to be concernedabout revolting."33Almost anyone can engage insporadicepisodesof collectiveactionand violence.Revolutionary oliticsrequireshe time andenergy hat the mostdowntroddenegmentsof Indiansociety simplydo not have.2. Between1970 and 1975 approximately 5 percentof India's urbangrowthwas a functionof rural-to-urbanmigration.34heserelatively ecentarrivalsareprobably tillcomparingheir ivesin urbanIndiato the intrac-tablepovertyanddespairof those who continue o toil in the countryside.Althoughit is difficult to comprehend, he typical poor urbanmigrant-even the pavement dweller-is in a superior economic position (withchances for advancement) omparedto many of his ruralcounterparts.Unlessconditionsnthecity seriouslyworsen, he urbanpoorwillmostlikelyremain politically passive, content with the realization that they havebroken the cycleof helplessnesshat existsin ruralIndia.3. Based upon his study of nineteenth-and twentieth-century rance,CharlesTillyargues hatincidentsof collectiveviolencedo not correspondto the pace of urbangrowth.He notes: "If anything,the correlation unsthe otherway:rapidurbangrowth-less collectiveviolence."35He observesthat rates of collectiveviolence increase a number of years after peakperiodsof urbangrowth.There s, in effect, a gap or lag between he mi-grants'arrival n the citiesand theirdisruptiveaction. Ruralpeasantsnew


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Collective Violence in India 49to the city simply do not possess the skills and level of organization neces-sary for concerted collective action, especially revolutionary activity. Tilly'sfindings and interpretation are consistent with the "marginality perspec-tive" that emphasizes the traditional attitudes of rural-to-urban migrantsand the lack of political participation on the part of low-income urbanpeople.

4. In a pluralistic society-like India-where people tend to think ofthemselves foremost as members of a particular caste, religious, ethnic, orlanguage group, feelings of anger and frustration emanating from economicand social problems (that would usually be directed at the government) areoften aimed at another group. A significant number of Indians think oftheir society in termsof a zero sum game where one group's gains are believedto result from another group's losses. This widely held belief mitigates agood deal of hostility that would otherwise be directed against the govern-ment because of its inability to oversee or create opportunities that permitmore upward mobility for a significantly larger number of people. Thesometimes vast cultural and social differences existing among the multiplic-ity of Indian subcultures (that have hindered communication and coordina-tion and made modernization even more difficult) may pose organizationalproblems that potential revolutionary groups find difficult-if not impossi-ble-to overcome.Similarly, the social and economic gradations existing within any class inIndia will make it extremely difficult to generate a class-based revolutionarymovement. Classes in India are superimposed on a caste system that in itselfis comprised of thousands ofjati, or subcastes. These jati are typically localgroups each having a particular occupation or profession. Jati (which donot usually cross regional boundaries) are hierarchicallyarrangedwithin thefive major castes. These are (in descending order of status): brahman; ksha-triya; vaishya; sudra; and outcastes, or untouchables. While members ofdifferent jati within a particular caste may occupy the same economic posi-tion-a mason and basketweaver, for example-they do not consider eachother as social equals and thus they act accordingly. Any feelings of "classconsciousness," in the Marxist sense, will have to overcome this fundamen-tally divisive feature of the caste system. Joshi observes that in the Gujaratriots of 1981, "The conflict was not between owner and laborer, but be-tween 'Untouchable' and non-Untouchable laborer."36Because they loathebeing associated with and possibly suffering some of the abuse now reservedfor untouchables, nonuntouchables may be fearful of aligning themselvespolitically with any of India's more than 100 million outcastes. The poorand dispossesed may share the same economic position in society, but theystill view one another as superordinates and subordinates in a complex sys-tem of status differentiation that places extreme importance on ritual purityand pollution.


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Collective Violence in India 51portunities, adequate housing, and a variety of educational, health, andsanitary services that are not now being provided. The problem of housingalone in urban India is of catastrophic proportions. One social scientist esti-mates that as many as 22 million people-one-fifth of India's urban popula-tion-live in substandard housing.39Slums are increasing at 8 percent peryear in large urban areas, approximately twice the rate of total populationgrowth in these cities. In Calcutta, for example, one out of every three peo-ple lives in the city's approximately three hundred registered slums, andpavement dwellers number in the hundreds of thousands. This housingshortage only enhances the possibilities for collective violence, as membersof different ethnic groups compete with one another for living space as wellas for jobs. "Moving into an area that was formerly defined as the territoryof one particular group according to the traditional divisions in the pluralsociety city, as well as moving into an occupational area that was formerlymonopolized by a particular ethnic group, is interpreted in the social con-sciousness as invasion and leads to defense reactions."" The likelihood thaturban housing conditions will substantially improve and reduce this compe-tition for living space is doubtful because of the reluctance of private inves-tors or the government to commit the large sums of money necessary to anonproductive segment of the economy.41

On the other hand, conditions in rural India are even more deplorable asan increasing number of peasants see their land holdings dwindle and disap-pear. Half the farms in India now occupy less than one-tenth of the totalagricultural area.42The proportion of landless rural people soared from 24percent in 1961 to 35 percent in 1971.43The population of rural India in1961 was 360 million. By 1978 that number had increased to 499 million, ofwhom 239 million were below poverty level and 130 million well below thatlevel.44The tremendous increase in the number of rural inhabitants is a functionof natural population growth resulting from an excess of births over deathsand new technology. The number of people living in poverty in rural Indiais not only a function of growth due to natural increase but also a functionof change and the decline of economic conditions in the countryside, whichhas resulted in a large albeit fluctuating rate of rural pauperization (seeFigure 1). If this poverty continues, it will provide even more people with themotivation to relocate to the cities. If only 1 percent of the 239 million peo-ple in the countryside who live below the poverty line moved to the citieseach year for the next ten years, India's urban areas would have to absorban additional 23,900,000 people during the next decade-over and abovethe population increase attributed to natural increase.

The problem of collective violence is not confined to the cities, however.The slaughter in Assam demonstrated that large-scale confrontations occurin the countryside as well. Pluralistic rural areas in Assam as well as other


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52 Asian AffairsFigure 1.-Changes in the Incidence of Rural Poverty in India (1956-57 to 1977-78)

10080

S 60(5440 (50)

(39) (41) (39)200 I I I I I I1956-57 1960-61 1966-67 1971-72 1974-75 1977-78

Adapted rom: J. W. Mellor,andG. M. Desai(1985),Agriculturalhangeand ruralpoverty:A synthesis,in Agricultural hangeand ruralpoverty: Variations n a themeby DharmNarian,editedby MellorandDesai(Baltimore: ohnsHopkinsPress):192-211.regionsof the Indiancountrysidemaybejustas proneto intergroup ostili-tiesas highlydiverseurbanareas. India'suntouchables,who resideprimar-ily in ruralareas,have been theparticular argetsof violentbehavior.TheseHarijans,or "childrenof God," as Gandhicalledthem,arebeingbeaten odeath, robbed,raped,and even burned alive in record numbers.In 1975over six thousand uch ncidentswerereported o authorities,withthe num-berclimbing o eighteen housand about fifty per day)in 1980.45 he actualnumber s probablymuchhigheras many,if not most, of these ruralatroci-ties go unreported.In many cases the untouchables'greatest enemyaremembers f the localpoliceandgangsof goondas(thugs)whoare under heemployof local landowners.Whenuntouchables esistattack, theyrun therisk of evenmore brutalandoppressivereatment.Thepotential or a largenumber of casualtiesresultingfrom collectiveviolence is even higherinrural areas than in the cities. Once the fightingand killing beginsin thecountryside, t is verydifficultfor a smallpoliceforceto maintaincontrol.By the timethearmyor additionalpolicecan be brought n, the loss of lifeand numberof injuriescan be quiteextensive.

Although t seemsapparent hat rates of collectiveviolencewill increasein the comingyears,the impactthese incidentsas a whole willhaveon In-diansociety s much less clear.DilipHiro, an Indian ournalistandauthor,foresees intermittent"periods of advances" by leftist parties in hiscountry'spoliticalfuture. Theseadvances,he argues,willbe followedby aperiodof "repressionand setbackas the dominantclassesmanipulate he


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Collective Violence in India 53political form of the state from liberal democratic to authoritarian or semi-authoritarian ."46Whilesomeformof successful eftist revolution n thenot-too-distant future seems a remote possibility, the likelihood that thesepolitical challenges (along with an increase in the other forms of collectiveviolence we have examined) could result in the emergence of a less demo-cratic society-as Hiro predicts-is more realistic. We may witness a grad-ual erosion of some fundamental freedoms in the world's largest democracyas the government implements whatever measures it deems necessary tomaintain order and stability, especially in the cities.Large segments of the urban middle and upper classes may not opposeany movement aimed at curtailing freedoms guaranteed by the Indian con-stitution but instead may welcome these changes. These people may be quitewilling to accept a government that would utilize increasing amounts offorce in order to keep the cities free of protests and collective violence ifthey can be assured that their economic advantages and relatively comfor-table lifestyles will be preserved. It would not be the first time the affluentclasses exchanged a democratic form of government for a repressive onethat permitted them to maintain their positions of wealth and status.

NOTES1. K. Singh(1956),Manomajra NewYork:GrovePress):1.2. This list is not exhaustive ndrepresents nlythe moresignificant roupswhohaveen-gaged n collectiveviolence.3. D. H. Bayley 1969),Thepoliceandpoliticaldevelopmentn India(Princeton:Prince-ton UniversityPress):247.4. Ibid.: 249-284.5. T. Marshall 1983),20 killed as SikhsfightIndiapolice,Los AngelesTimes,5 April.6. TheEconomicand Political Weekly 1981),Sourcesof violence,17 January: 4.7. P. Visaria,and L. Visaria1981), ndia'spopulation:Secondandgrowing Washington,D.C.: PopulationReferenceBureau,Inc.).8. M. Weiner(1980),India at the polls, 1980: A study of the parliamentarylections

(Washington,D.C.: American nstitute or PublicPolicy):19. For an examination f sched-uledcastepoliticssee: A. B~teille1965),Caste,class,andpower Berkeley:University f Cali-forniaPress);alsoO. M. Lynch 1968),Thepoliticsof untouchability: case fromAgra,In-dia, in Structure nd change n Indiansociety, editedby M. Singerand B. Cohn(Chicago:AldinePublishingCompany).An excellent eriesof articleson scheduled astescanbe foundin Theuntouchablesncontemporaryndia(1972),editedbyJ. M. Mahar Tucson:Universityof ArizonaPress).9. B. Joshi(1982),Whose aw,whoseorder: Untouchables'ocialviolenceandthestate nIndia,AsianSurvey,July:676-687.10. R. Tempest 1985),India'scollege, job quotas reigniteold castehatred,Los AngelesTimes,28 April.11. R. G. Revankar 1971), The Indianconstitution-A case study of backward lasses(Rutherford,NJ: FairleighDickinsonUniversity): 83.12. Los AngelesTimes 1985),21 July.13. A. Kumar 1985), Continuing iolence,India Today,31 May:38-39.14. Economist 1984),Murdersmostfoul, 26 May:38.15. TheIllustratedWeeklyof India(1983), Brutalizinghe police,27 March:8-10.16. Economist 1979),The fires of faith, 21 April:91.17. C. Kapoor 1984), Nightmare t noon, India Today,15 June:8-14.


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54 Asian Affairs18. TheEnglish ook stepsto createa tea industryn the fertilesoils of Assam. Thesmall,indigenous,relativelyprosperous opulationwasnot overjoyed,however,at the prospectoftoilingfor low wages n theextremely ot and humid unglelike errain.Outside abor,there-

fore, was needed o work the plantation,and after an unsuccessful ttempt o settle Chinesecoolies n thearea,the Britishwereforced o look elsewhere ormanpower.Utilizinga systemof contractabor,tribalpeople rom thehighlands f SouthBiharwerebrought o Assam.Toadminister heirnew andthriving nterprise,he Britishencouragedhemigration f BengaliHindusrecently ducated tmissionary ndgovernment olleges.A relativelymallnumber fpeople-the Marawaris rom the state of Rajasthan-also made theirway to Assam. TheBengaliHindusand Marawaris ere o formthe backbone f a growingprofessional lass. Theturn of thetwentieth enturywitnessed hebeginning f a steadystreamof Muslims rom theneighboring tate of Bengal nto the area. Withpartitionn 1947and the Pakistanicivil warthat resulted n the creationof Bangladeshn 1972,millionsof peoplecrossed he internationalborder nto Assam.Of the 20 millionpeoplewho reside n Assam oday,approximately8per-centaremigrants r the descendants f migrants.Oneof the fastestgrowing tates nIndia, hepopulationof Assam ncreasedby 24.7 percentbetween1971and 1981.For an excellent verview f thesociopolitical istoryof Assam,see M. Weiner1978),Whenmigrants ucceed and natives fail: Assam and its migrants, n Sons of the soil (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress):75-144.19. Ibid., 131: "TheAssameseblame he British or giving he Bengalis headstart,Mus-limpoliticians or encouragingMuslimmigrations ndBengaliHindusand Marawarisor us-ing theirsuperioreconomicpositionsto preventAssamese rom effectivelymoving up theoccupational nd economic adder."20. Economist 1983),All againstall in Assam, 19March:63-64.21. Newsweek 1983),An Assam massacre:Bad blood for India,7 March:38-40.22. Economist 1980),Peace,perhaps,9 August:33.23. S. Wolpert (1982), A new history of India (New York: Oxford University Press): 411.24. K. Gandhi (1980), Anatomy of the Moradabadriots, The Economic and Political Weekly,13 August: 1505-1507.25. R. Santhanam1985),Thecrucialprobe,India Today,31 January: 0.26. R. Tempest 1984), Angerat "rich" linkedto riots after Gandhi'sdeath,LosAngelesTimes,16 November.27. Economist (1985), Auction politic, 25 May: 36.28. A. Kumar, and R. Mendon (1985), State of siege, India Today, 15 May: 24-33.29. D. H. Bayley (1985), The police and political order in India, Asian Survey,23(4):484-496.30. India Today(1982),An unendingparadox,31 July:17-18.31. T. Szulc (1982), What Indira Gandhi wants you to know, Parade, 25 July: 4-6.

32. Stateboundariesn India,however,wereredrawnn the 1950sprimarily n the basisoflanguage.33. S. P. Huntington (1968), Political order in changing societies (New Haven: Yale Univer-sity Press): 280.34. K. Newland (1980), City limits: Emerging constraints on urban growth, (Washington,D.C.: Worldwatch Paper 38).35. C. Tilly (1974), The chaos of the living city, in An urban world, edited by C. Tilly (Bos-ton: Little, Brown & Company): 86-109.36. Joshi,note 9.37. A. A. Engineer (1983), The politics of communalism, The Illustrated Weekly of India,23-29 October: 16-21.38. Los Angeles Times (1985), Gandhi warns terrorists, 8 July.39. H. Spodek (1985), Squatter settlements in urban India: Self-help and government poli-cies, Economic and Political Weekly, 3-10 September: 1575-1587.40. H. Evers (1975), Urbanization and urban conflict in Southeast Asia, Asian Survey, Sep-tember: 775-785.41. B. Roberts 1978),Citiesof peasants:Thepoliticaleconomyof urbanizationn the thirdworld (Beverly Hills: Sage): 148.


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Collective Violence in India 5542. J. Loup (1983), Can the third world survive? (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UniversityPress): 114.43. P. Harrison (1979), Inside the third world (New York: The Harvester Press): 80.44. S. Guhan (1980), Rural poverty: Policy and play acting, The Economic and PoliticalWeekly, 22 November: 1975-1982.45. O. Ilhau (1981), Converting India's untouchables, WorldPress Review, December: 58.46. D. Hiro (1979), Inside India today (New York: Monthly Review Press): 290.

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Collective Violence in India