SCOTUS Petition Chamberlain v. Chamberlain

No. _________

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

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STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN,

Petitioner,

v.

JUDITH C. CHAMBERLAIN,

Respondent.

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On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The Maryland Court Of Special Appeals

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN Pro Se Litigant

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The vast majority of liberties declared to be “fun-damental” by this Court are not mentioned in the text of the Constitution. They are, however, so important that the government may not infringe upon them unless justification can be provided proving that its action is necessary to achieve a compelling govern-ment purpose.

It is also inarguable that the judicial system in this country is an adversarial one; where judicial power is used to decide cases between adverse liti-gants and render judgment after adjudication of live controversies. It is settled law that a case which be-comes moot normally removes subject matter juris-diction from a court, a court without jurisdiction cannot proceed in any cause, and the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is void.

The questions presented are:

First, does the fundamental right to liberty include freedom from being compelled to stand trial before a court acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction?

Second, did the Maryland Court of Special Appeals by its action, and the Maryland Court of Appeals by its inaction, violate Peti-tioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and the equal protection of the law by affirming the lower court’s jurisdiction when the case before it was facially moot?

Third, should the judgment of the lower court be vacated?

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................................. i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................... iv

OPINIONS BELOW ............................................... 1

JURISDICTION ..................................................... 1

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATU-TORY PROVISIONS ........................................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................ 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..... 11

I. THIS COURT HAS A DUTY TO COR-RECT STATE JUDICIARIES THAT DEM-ONSTRATE A CLEAR DISREGARD FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF LITIGANTS.................................................. 11

II. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN ISSUE OF EXCEPTIONAL AND CONTINUED IM-PORTANCE TO THE FUNCTIONING OF OUR DEMOCRACY .................................... 17

III. THE CLARITY AND EGREGIOUSNESS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS IS SUCH THAT A GVR ORDER IS AP-PROPRIATE ................................................. 19

CONCLUSION ....................................................... 21

APPENDIX

Unreported Opinion of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Chamberlain v. Chamber-lain, dated April 21, 2015 .................................. App. 1

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TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued

Page

Consent Order of the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court, dated June 5, 2014 ................. App. 14

Maryland Court of Appeals Denial of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, dated May 27, 2015 ..... App. 18

Maryland Court of Appeals Denial of Motion for Reconsideration, dated July 27, 2015 ...... App. 19

Request of Plaintiff Below for Voluntary Dismis-sal to the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court, dated April 14, 2014 ........................................ App. 20

Response of Defendant Below to Request for Vol-untary Dismissal to the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court, dated April 17, 2014 ............... App. 23

APPENDIX G: Transcript Excerpt from Merits Hearing before the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court, dated April 18, 2014 ............... App. 27

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

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CASES

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) .......................................................... 15

Attorney Gen. v. A.A. County School Bus, 286 Md. 324, 407 A.2d 749 (1979) ................................. 13

Bowser v. Collins, Y. B. Mich. 22 Edw. IV, f. 30, pl. 11, 145 Eng. Rep. 97 (Ex. Ch. 1482) .................. 20

Boyd’s Civic Ass’n v. Montgomery County, 526 A.2d 598 (Md. 1987) ................................................ 13

Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990) .......................................................... 15, 19

Caperton v. AT Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 556 U.S. 868, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (2009) ....................................................................... 14

Case of the Marshalsea, 10 Coke Rep. 68b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K. B. 1612) .................................... 15

Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S. Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940) ........................................ 16

Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244 (1996) ...................... 13

Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869) ...................... 15

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963) ..................................... 16

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891 (1956) .............................................. 16

Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462 (1950) ............. 13

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L. Ed. 942 (1955) ..................................................... 14

Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895)............................ 15

Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250, 55 L. Ed. 246 (1911) .............................. 15

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) .......................... 12

Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 (1975) .................... 15

Stevenson v. Lanham, 127 Md. App. 597 (1999) ........ 14

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ............. 15, 18

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ....................................................... 1

United States Constitution, Article III, § 2 ....... 2, 15, 20

United States Constitution, Fourteenth Amend-ment ............................................................... 2, 13, 21

Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights, Article 2 ............................................................... 2, 20

Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights, Article 24 ............................................................. 3, 13

Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights, Article 44 ....................................................... 3, 13, 18

Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-409 ........................................................... 4, 14, 20

Maryland Rule 2-324 .............................................. 3, 14

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner (Defendant/Appellant below) Stephen D. Chamberlain respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the June 5, 2014 judgment of the Anne Arundel County, Maryland, Circuit Court in this case.

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OPINIONS BELOW

The June 5, 2014 order of the Anne Arundel County, Maryland, Circuit Court is printed in full text at Pet. App. 14. The Maryland Court of Special Ap-peals’ unreported opinion of April 15, 2015 affirming the actions of the lower court can be found at Pet. App. 1. The Maryland Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2015 denial of the Appellant’s Petition for Writ of Certiora-ri can be found at Pet. App. 18. The Maryland Court of Appeals’ July 27, 2015 denial of the Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the petition for writ of certiorari can be found at Pet. App. 19.

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JURISDICTION

The Maryland Court of Appeals’ denial of the Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the denial of petition for writ of certiorari was entered on July 27, 2015. This Petition has been timely filed and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

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RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

2. Article III Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part:

The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Consti-tution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; – to all cases affecting am-bassadors, other public ministers and con-suls; – to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; – to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; – to contro-versies between two or more states; – be-tween a state and citizens of another state; – between citizens of different states; – be-tween citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.

3. Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights, Article 2 provides:

The Constitution of the United States, and the Laws made, or which shall be made, in pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of

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the United States, are, and shall be the Su-preme Law of the State; and the Judges of this State, and all the People of this State, are, and shall be bound thereby; anything in the Constitution or Law of this State to the contrary notwithstanding.

4. Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights, Article 24 provides: “That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.”

5. Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights, Article 44 provides:

That the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and of this State, apply, as well in time of war, as in time of peace; and any departure therefrom, or violation there-of, under the plea of necessity, or any other plea, is subversive of good Government, and tends to anarchy and despotism.

6. The following sections of the Annotated Code of Maryland provide in relevant part:

Maryland Rule 2-324. Preservation of certain defenses

(b) Subject matter jurisdiction. When-ever it appears that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.

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Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-409 Discretionary relief

(a) In general. – Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, a court may grant a declaratory judgment or de-cree in a civil case, if it will serve to ter-minate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding, and if:

(1) An actual controversy exists be-tween contending parties;

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case began as a request for declaratory judg-ment concerning a single unambiguous sentence in a Marital Settlement Agreement regarding college applications.1 Prior to trial, both parties to the litiga-tion declared in formal motions the only issue before the Court had become moot and both sought dismis-sal. (App. 20; App. 23) At the commencement of the trial, the Plaintiff (Respondent here) requested leave of the court to withdraw her request for voluntary dismissal without explanation. This request was granted by the trial court. Despite evidence being pre-sented proving mootness at that time, the trial judge elected to proceed to hear the case on the merits.

1 Despite naming the request for a Declaratory Judgment as a Complaint to Enforce, no breach of contract was noted in the filing and no enforcement relief was requested.

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(App. 27-37) An oral agreement to settle the litigation was subsequently coerced from the Petitioner during the trial. Later, the trial judge modified the terms of this agreement, and unilaterally signed it as a “Con-sent Order” without the assent of the Petitioner. (App. 14) Appeal of the lower courts’ jurisdiction, inter alia, was timely filed.

Maryland’s intermediate appellate court, the Court of Special Appeals, based its affirmation of the lower court’s jurisdiction on clearly erroneous reason-ing. (App. 1) Despite implicating serious consti-tutional due process and equal protection violations, the Maryland Court of Appeals denied certiorari and a subsequent motion for reconsideration. (App. 18; App. 19)

While numerous judicial errors were made in this case and noted on appeal, this petition does not seek correction of those errors. Neither does this petition address the misapplication of law. This petition solely concerns a state judiciary willfully denying equal protection and due process rights by compelling a citizen to stand trial in the clear absence of subject matter jurisdiction. The evidence is substantial, in-disputable and unrefuted.

These are the relevant facts of this case. After 207 days of litigation concerning a clear and unam-biguous sentence in a contract concerning college applications, the Respondent (Plaintiff below) filed a Request for Voluntary Dismissal. The basis provided for the dismissal request was “[g]iven that the relief

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requested in Plaintiff ’s Complaint to Enforce is now moot and the issue involving each parties’ future obligation to contribute towards college tuition pay-ments has yet to mature, there is no longer any need for the hearing currently set on April 18, 2014.” (App. 21) The Petitioner (Defendant below) filed a response with the Court, concurring with the admission of mootness: “That while the Defendant does not dispute that John’s decision to file for admission to colleges before receiving the assent of his parents does render the issue on which the Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to be a ‘moot’ issue, the dispute has been moot for several months but has nevertheless been carried forth by the Plaintiff at considerable ex-pense. . . .” (App. 24) This response was also hand delivered to the trial judge’s chambers. Upon com-mencement of the proceedings the following day, the Plaintiff reversed course and asked to withdraw her request for voluntary dismissal, made just 3 days be-fore, without explanation. The trial judge granted withdrawal of the motion without argument or com-ment and sought to begin the proceedings. (App. 29)

The Petitioner strongly objected. The transcript from the hearing shows the only issue before the court was proven to be moot by the Defendant and the Plaintiff was absolutely silent as to how her declaration of mootness just 3 days before could have become “un-mooted” on the day of trial. (App. 29-37) There can be no doubt the issue of mootness was squarely before the trial judge at the commencement

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of the hearing. Relevant quotes from the transcript include:

“You cannot allege in a document that an is-sue is moot and then un-moot it because you feel like it.” (App. 29)

“We hand delivered to your office . . . our re-sponse, where we admit that it is moot. . . .” (App. 31)

“Mr. Brown (Plaintiff ’s attorney) filed a re-quest for dismissal because the issue was moot. I filed a response saying we agreed the issue is moot.” (App. 32)

The Court: “Are you saying that an attorney can’t withdraw a pleading if they file it?” De-fendant’s Attorney: “No, I’m saying an attor-ney can’t represent to the Court that the issue he wanted decided is moot and then come in on the morning of trial and say, I withdraw it, it’s not moot, it is open for a de-termination at that point.” (App. 33)

“ . . . the issue that is before the Court right now is whether or not the request made by Mr. Brown (Plaintiff ’s Attorney) to dismiss the case should be granted because – well moot – on grounds of moot – ” (App. 34)

“Well, let me suggest to you then, the only is-sue the Court has before it today to decide is found in the complaint at Paragraph B, order that the minor child may apply to schools of his choice in order to determine whether or not he qualifies for admission and may be

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entitled to any scholarships. That is the only thing – and, Your Honor, remember in a de-claratory judgment it is – it is different from a motion to enforce. A declaratory judgment is a request by the Court to rule on a specific issue in controversy . . . there’s no breach of any contract at this point. John has not had gotten one bill from any school, so there’s no enforcement of any duty to pay.” (App. 34-35)

Plaintiff ’s attorney (Mr. Brown): “ . . . we made a motion to dismiss this thing now for moot and I told Mr. Schaeffer, we’ll file in September when we know how much tuition is. . . .” (App. 37)

In a subsequent hearing, the trial judge offered a series of specious theories as justification for pro-ceeding with the case, and clearly admitted the issue brought before him was indeed moot: “When Mr. Schaeffer and Mr. Brown informed me that even though the matter that day on my docket was really moot. . . .”

There is also no doubt the Petitioner presented the alleged constitutional deprivations to both appel-late courts with specificity. The appeal to the Mary-land Court of Special Appeals noted: “This case is about vexatious litigation, abuse of the legal process, clear judicial error, judicial bias, judicial overreach, and due process violations.” “He withstood 7 months of purely vexatious litigation and was denied all relief from the judicial system for this clear abuse of the legal process. Instead, he was faced with serious

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violations of his due process rights. . . .” The petition for writ of certiorari with the Maryland Court of Appeals stated: “This petition affects every Mary-lander. There could be no more important questions before this Court than those surrounding a citizen’s liberty interests and his due process right to stand before fair tribunals of law.” “The evidence in this case will demonstrate that both the Circuit Court and Court of Special Appeals . . . are not applying that settled law uniformly.” “Public perception that the law is applied correctly, and uniformly, is essential to a functioning democracy.” “There could be no question more important to the public interest in this state than whether a court can unlawfully exert power over that citizen, and whether the settled laws of this state are applied uniformly in the adjudication of disputes.” “The [Court of Special Appeals’] affirmation of the Circuit Court’s decision to proceed with a hearing when the only issue brought before the Court had been declared moot by both parties, and proven to be moot by a highly capable attorney at the com-mencement of the hearing, is in direct contravention to decades of settled law in this State, every other state, and Federal Law.” “Should these decisions and the [Court of Special Appeals’] affirmation of their correctness stand, the public can only conclude that courts in this state are allowed to apply settled law arbitrarily, and capriciously.” “As the highest Court in the State of Maryland, ensuring the public can trust that settled law will be applied uniformly and equita-bly, and not arbitrarily and capriciously, is of para-mount interest to all citizens. The Petitioner prays

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this Court grant the Writ of Certiorari, grant a stay of judgment while conducting a de novo review of the clear and substantial evidence in this case, vacate the June 5, 2014 Consent Order of the Circuit Court, and reassure the citizens of this State that settled law will be followed in the application of justice.” In the request for reconsideration, the Petitioner added: “With the exception of capital and habeas corpus cases, there can be no other type of case more in the public interest to review than one which alleges a court having taken action against a citizen in the clear absence of jurisdiction. While infrequent, when this Court is asked to review an opinion from the Court of Special Appeals which facially appears to contravene decades of settled law, it would seem incumbent upon this Court to intervene and reiterate the guidance its previous opinions have provided to ensure the citizens of Maryland are not wrongfully, or mistakenly, held to account before a tribunal that has no statutory or constitutional authority.” “In the history of jurisprudence in this State, no case can be found which provides greater clarity of the lack of a controversy before the Court than this case, as both parties had declared there was no controversy, and it was proven there was no controversy, prior to the commencement of the hearing. The Appellant has clearly shown the Circuit Court acted in the clear ab-sence of jurisdiction, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the legality of that action. The constitutional due process implications could not be more stark.” “Wherefore, as the Court of last resort in this state, the Appellant respectfully requests and prays this

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Court will [inter alia] [g]rant the petition for writ of certiorari to prevent the serious violation of a citizen’s constitutional rights and to prevent a gross injustice from standing.”

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

While extraordinarily infrequent, review of a state court judgment by this Court is not only worthwhile to protect a citizen’s constitutional rights, but neces-sary when appellate affirmation of serious constitu-tional violations, or lack of intervention, threatens to undermine the public’s confidence in the judiciary as a whole. Such are the circumstances which have been presented to this Court.

I. THIS COURT HAS A DUTY TO CORRECT

STATE JUDICIARIES THAT DEMONSTRATE A CLEAR DISREGARD FOR THE CONSTI-TUTIONAL RIGHTS OF LITIGANTS.

Clear and egregious deprivation of the most basic constitutional rights by a state judiciary is not “er-ror,” but rather conduct which militates the use of this Court’s supervisory authority provided by Con-gress. Designed in large part to safeguard a citizen’s liberty and abridgment of his rights by state govern-ments and state judiciaries, this Court has an inher-ent duty to intervene when it becomes apparent a state judiciary has not only failed to adhere to its own laws and constitution, but also those of the United

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States Constitution and the precedent of this Court. Such is the case here.

There is no need for this Court to delve far into the record. Substantial, clear and unrefuted evidence is present in both the Respondent’s Request for Vol-untary Dismissal, the Petitioner’s Response, and the transcript excerpt provided in the attached appendix. This evidence is sufficient to show the lower court in this case was facially without subject matter jurisdic-tion to proceed, and the order which emanated from such a hearing is void by law. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (“The validity of every judgment depends upon the jurisdiction of the court before it is rendered, not upon what may occur subse-quently.”).

Furthermore, any fair reading of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals’ opinion affirming the lower court’s jurisdiction leads to the inescapable conclusion it cannot be reconciled with settled law. First, the opinion suggests jurisdiction existed because the ex-plicit declaration of mootness made by the Plain- tiff herself magically disappeared when the motion containing that declaration was allowed to be with-drawn. This wrongly infers a party can confer juris-diction on a court to hear a moot issue, which a party inarguably cannot do. Furthermore, the opinion gives birth to a wholly separate and new issue, and one not brought forth by either party: payment for college. It is unfathomable that the appellate court not only proffered its own issue as being a “lingering out-standing controversy” to justify the lower court’s

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jurisdiction, but for that issue to be one declared by the Plaintiff herself as not being “mature,” and which was facially not ripe. (App. 8-9; App. 21) Disturbingly, these legal machinations are conspicuous.

Failure of the lower court or intermediate appel-late court to apply settled law equally, and Maryland’s highest court’s decision not to review the consti-tutional violations squarely presented to it, twice, violates both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See also Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights, Article 24 and Article 44.

Citations supporting black letter law that moot cases will not be heard, and that judgments rendered by courts without jurisdiction are void, would alone far exceed the space limitations of this petition. While not an inclusive list, a 60 year unbroken string of decisions in Maryland, which mirrors federal law on the subject, demonstrates the egregiousness of the lower court’s decision to proceed with the facially moot case. See Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 471 (1950) (Courts will not decide moot or abstract questions or render advisory opinions); Attorney Gen. v. A.A. County School Bus, 286 Md. 324, 327, 407 A.2d 749, 752 (1979) (Case is moot when there is no longer an existing controversy and no longer any remedy the Court could grant); Boyd’s Civic Ass’n v. Montgomery County, 526 A.2d 598, 609 (Md. 1987) (A controversy is justiciable if there are interested par-ties asserting adverse claims wherein a legal decision is demanded); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250

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(1996) (Case is moot when there is no longer an existing controversy for which the court can provide an effective remedy); Stevenson v. Lanham, 127 Md. App. 597, 612 (1999) (Well established that a contro-versy is not justiciable if it has become moot).

Maryland law clearly mandates dismissal in any declaratory judgment action devoid of a controversy: Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-409 states “ . . . a court may grant a declaratory judgment or decree in a civil case if it will serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the pro-ceedings and if an actual controversy exists between contending parties.” And Maryland Rule 2-324 states that “[w]henever it appears that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”

Not only did the intermediate appellate court disregard clear statutory law and decades of prece-dential authority set by itself and the Maryland Court of Appeals, it also disregarded substantial prec-edent supplied by this Court throughout its history which constitutes a clear and substantial violation of both the Due Process Clause (“It is axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’ ” Caperton v. AT Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 556 U.S. 868, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (2009), quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L. Ed. 942 (1955)) and the Equal Pro-tection Clause (“[I]f [the law] is applied and ad-ministered by public authority with . . . an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal

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discriminations between persons in similar circum-stances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Consti-tution.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). Article III Section 2 of the United States Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States only to “Cases” and “Controversies.” “[J]udicial power, as we have seen, is the right to determine actual con-troversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.” Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 250, 55 L. Ed. 246 (1911). “To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, ‘an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the com-plaint is filed.’ ” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (citing Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)). An “actual controversy” ceases to exist, and the underlying case becomes moot if it becomes “impossible” for a court, should it decide in favor of the plaintiff, to grant him any effectual relief whatever. Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895). “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869). The proposition that the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is void was made settled law by Lord Coke in Case of the Marshalsea, 10 Coke Rep. 68b, 77a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027, 1041 (K. B. 1612). Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).

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No soliloquy is needed to demonstrate how, in this case, the actions of the lower court in Maryland cannot be reconciled with settled state, federal and constitutional law. It is equally clear the Maryland Court of Special Appeals’ rationalization for the ju-risdiction of the lower court to proceed in this case has no legally supported foundation and would fall under the weight of any reasonable judicial scrutiny. Maryland and federal law have been unwavering in asserting that cases which are moot, or are not ripe, shall be dismissed, that parties cannot confer juris-diction upon courts, nor can courts confer jurisdiction upon themselves.

The evidence is incontrovertible this case was moot, there was no relief the court could grant that would provide the Plaintiff any relief, and the settled law clearly required dismissal. “From the very begin-ning . . . state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substan-tive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963). “Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system – for all people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, ‘stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court.’ ” Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891 (1956), quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S. Ct. 472, 84 L. Ed. 716 (1940). Proceeding in this action was a clear and

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egregious violation of due process and equal protec-tion. The decision by Maryland’s highest court to let stand such blatant constitutional violations without review or correction obligates this court to use its appellate jurisdiction and supervisory authority to uphold the fundamental protections provided by the constitution which have thus far been denied. Having been sworn to defend against this very type of infrac-tion, by a state, of federally guaranteed rights, this Court has a duty to intervene.

II. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN ISSUE OF EX-

CEPTIONAL AND CONTINUED IMPOR-TANCE TO THE FUNCTIONING OF OUR DEMOCRACY.

Trust in the judicial process and confidence in protections afforded by the constitution are requisite to a functioning democracy. When a state court makes clear it can, and will, act in the clear absence of ju-risdiction, and that action is upheld upon initial appellate review and deemed not worthy of review by the state’s highest court, tyranny is squarely in the public’s view. When clear and settled law is applied arbitrarily on the whim of those who wield the sword of justice, society’s confidence in the judicial process and the rule of law erodes. This will inexorably lead to an unwillingness of a population to subject itself to the authority of the system. “For, the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to

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be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

This Court need look no further than recent events in Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Mary-land to be reminded as to what happens when a citizenry’s perception of unfair and capricious treat-ment by those in authority seems prevalent, rises to an intolerable level, and appears to continue un-abated. So too, will society rebel against unchecked judicial hegemony by state judiciaries. It is incum-bent upon this Court to occasionally intervene and review state court judgments, especially when the actions of the state judiciary are overtly constitu-tionally intolerable. Demonstrating a willingness to intervene when states fail to uphold constitutionally guaranteed rights, however infrequently, will lead to a diminished need to do so in the future and help restore faith in the rule of law. The action, and in-action, of the Maryland judiciary here presents a prima facie case that state judiciaries believe they are immune from such intervention by this Court at the present time. This has led to the kind of despotic action present in this case and the unprecedented lack of trust the people currently have for govern-ment institutions.

The drafters of Maryland’s constitution them-selves recognized the danger to democracy should basic constitutional rights be violated. The Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights, Article 44 pro-vides that even during times of war, provisions of the

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Constitution of the United States, and of Maryland, apply, and any violation of them “is subversive of good Government, and tends to anarchy and despot-ism.” (bold and italics added)

Few things are more intolerable to a free people than a government taking action against its citizens absent the authority to do so. Few things are more dangerous to a functioning democracy than a citi-zenry’s perception their last option for redress from such a clear and unconstitutional assault on their liberty is not deemed worthy of consideration. While this Court understandably wrestles with complex questions of law, and focuses its limited judicial re-sources on high profile questions which the public salivates to have answered, the insidious devolution of the rule of law and egregious violations of consti-tutional rights by state courts necessitates the min-imal effort by this Court to fulfill its obligation as the sentinel of individual liberty and constitutional rights.

III. THE CLARITY AND EGREGIOUSNESS OF

THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS IS SUCH THAT A GVR ORDER IS APPRO-PRIATE.

It has been noted by this Court that as early as 1612, it was made settled law that the judgment of a court lacking jurisdiction is void. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990) referencing

20

Bowser v. Collins, Y. B. Mich. 22 Edw. IV, f. 30, pl. 11, 145 Eng. Rep. 97 (Ex. Ch. 1482).

It is equally settled that courts are not autho-rized to hear moot cases, notwithstanding four well known exceptions, none of which are applicable here. U.S. Constitution Article III Section 2; Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights Article 2 (Consti-tution of the United States shall be the Supreme Law of the State and Judges of the State shall be bound thereby); Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-409 (Declaratory judgment must have actual con-troversy).

A case cannot be more facially devoid of a live controversy than when both the Plaintiff and the Defendant in the case file formal motions declaring the only issue for which relief had been sought to be moot and request dismissal prior to trial. Despite significant efforts to highlight the state court’s lack of jurisdiction at the commencement of the trial, the judge elected to proceed. These circumstances are so extraordinary, there appears to be no case on record in which both parties to a suit declared the singular issue before a court moot and sought dismissal only to have a jurist proceed with the case.

Review of the clear, substantial, unrefuted and indisputable evidence, in the appendix alone, shows the issue was moot by any standard of proof. This leads to a series of inexorable conclusions: the Mary-land lower court acted in the clear absence of juris-diction, its order of June 5, 2014 which emanated

21

from that hearing is void, and both Maryland appel-late courts, one through affirmative action and one through inaction, have made the willful decision not to uphold the Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

--------------------------------- ---------------------------------

CONCLUSION

Recognizing the serious constraints on this Court’s judicial resources, the Petitioner recognizes he would have had a far greater chance of surviving a tour in the trenches during the Battle of the Somme in 1916 than having his prayer for certiorari an-swered by this Court. Yet the need for this Court’s intervention has far less to do with answering this citizen’s prayer for individual justice than protecting and preserving the public’s trust and confidence in this branch of government and reversing the overall decline in the people’s trust and faith in their demo-cratic institutions.

The Petitioner respectfully requests this Court issue a GVR Order vacating the June 5, 2014 Order of the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court of Mary-land for being void, as that court proceeded in the clear absence of jurisdiction on April 18, 2014.

In the alternative, egregious disregard for the uniform application of settled law by the Maryland judiciary, in violation of the Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection and due process under the law, warrants granting the Petitioner’s

22

request for certiorari to review this case on the evi-dence and the merits.

Respectfully submitted,

STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN Pro Se Litigant

App. 1

UNREPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 0719

September Term, 2014

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN

v.

JUDITH C. CHAMBERLAIN

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Wright, Reed, Alpert, Paul E. (Retired, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Opinion by Wright, J.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Filed: April 21, 2015

Appellant, Stephen Chamberlain (“Father”), and appellee, Judith Chamberlain (“Mother”), were granted a divorce in 2009 by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. As a part of the divorce proceedings, the par-ties entered into a Marital Separation Agreement (“Agreement”) that, among other things, contained provisions related to the responsibilities of each party

App. 2

to pay for the college education for their children, including their youngest child, John. As John began the college selection process, there was a disagree-ment between the parties as to which schools would be acceptable. This disagreement led to litigation that ultimately concluded with the parties orally agreeing on a payment scheme later contained in a consent order. In this appeal, Father challenges the consent order.

Question(s) Presented

Father asks this Court to consider the following questions:1

1. Did the circuit court have jurisdiction to hear this case?

2. Did the circuit court properly deny Fa-ther’s motion for a mistrial?

1 We have reworded the questions presented by Father in his brief

1. Did the Circuit Court have jurisdiction to try a case for which there was no live controversy?

2. Is the oral agreement made on the record on April 18, 2014 voidable due to duress, undue in-fluence, the lack of essential terms, and modifi-cation by the trial judge?? [sic]

3. Was it an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to sign a Consent Order 3 weeks after he was aware one party did not give his assent to the agreement?

App. 3

3. Did the circuit court properly enter the consent order?

We answer yes to all three questions and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

Facts

Father and Mother were married for 21 years when they were divorced in May 2009. In the months leading up to the divorce, the parties entered into the Agreement. The Agreement contained a provision, Paragraph 8, stating that the parties, along with their child, would form a consensus before applying to, or enrolling in, any college or university: “[Father] shall pay the costs of tuition, room and board, books, registration fees, and reasonable application fees in-cident to providing each Child with an undergraduate college education for four consecutive years of college. The selection of which college or university each Child shall attend shall be made by [Father], [Mother] and the Child, prior to application and prior to enroll-ment.”

The Agreement covered the parties’ three chil-dren. The two older children completed college with-out any apparent dispute over the provision in the Agreement. The issues in this case stem from the college selection process of the third child, John. Through June and July 2013, Father, Mother, and John exchanged several e-mails regarding potential schools for John, without apparent resolution, and this litigation ensued.

App. 4

Mother requested a hearing to allow John to ap-ply to colleges, beyond those to which Father agreed, in order to determine the possibilities of scholarships and to calculate the overall cost. Prior to the hearing, it was discovered that John had already applied to colleges without Father’s consent. Mother then filed a motion suggesting that the issue was moot. Father responded to that motion agreeing on the issue of mootness but requesting that his attorney’s fees be paid by Mother.

A hearing was scheduled for April 18, 2014. At the start of the hearing, it was revealed that Mother had withdrawn her motion regarding the issue of mootness. Father then challenged the extent of the proceeding since both sides had earlier agreed that the primary issue was moot, however, the circuit court accepted Mother’s withdrawal of her motion and began the hearing. After the presentation of some evidence, the court requested the attorneys’ presence in chambers telling the parties, “Maybe we can save a little time.” Following this recess for time in cham-bers, the parties came to a mutual agreement regard-ing the payment of John’s college expenses. The court instructed Father’s counsel, Mr. Schaeffer, to voir dire Father:

MR. SCHAEFFER: . . . Could you please stand up, Mr. Chamberlain? Mr. Chamber-lain, you’ve heard my recitation of the terms of settlement today, you’re not under the in-fluence of any alcohol or drugs or anything

App. 5

that might affect you anything that might af-fect your reasonable judgment, correct?

[FATHER]: No.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Can you confirm to the Court that you have heard and under-stand the terms of the agreement?

[FATHER]: Yes.

MR. SCHAEFFER: And can you con-firm to that you want the Court to incorpo-rate the terms of the agreement into a consent order that will be enforceable by the Court in the event of a breach by either of you?

[FATHER]: Yes.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Do you believe the terms under the circumstances, to be fair and reasonable?

[FATHER]: Yes.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Do you have any questions for me regarding the terms and conditions at this time?

[FATHER]: No.

MR. SCHAEFFER: And have you been generally satisfied with my services as you counsel throughout these proceedings?

[FATHER]: Yes, sir.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

App. 6

THE COURT: He’s entering into the consent order freely and voluntarily and af-ter being properly advised of his rights.

Following voir dire of Father, Mother and John were similarly examined and found, by the court, to be freely entering into a payment scheme. The general terms of the payment scheme were announced in open court and placed on the record.2

Several weeks after the April 18, 2014 hearing, but before the consent order was signed, Father filed a motion seeking to have a mistrial declared. Father argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction and that his acquiescence to terms of the payment scheme were made under duress and were, therefore, void. On June 5, 2014, the court denied Father’s motion and signed the consent order. This timely appeal followed.

Standard of Review

Generally, consent orders are not appealable. The Court of Appeals explained, “[t]he rule that there is no right to appeal from a consent decree is a subset of the broader principles underlying the right to appeal. The availability of appeal is limited to parties who

2 The payment scheme was that: Father would pay up to $14,000.00 per year towards John’s college obligations as set forth in the Agreement. Payment would be made to John upon a reasonable time after Father received the invoice from the school.

App. 7

are aggrieved by the final judgment. A party cannot be aggrieved by a judgment to which he or she acqui-esced.” Suter v. Stuckey, 402 Md. 211, 224 (2007) (internal citations omitted). But, “[i]f there was no actual consent because the judgment was coerced, exceeded the scope of consent, or was not within the jurisdiction of the court, or for any other reason con-sent was not effective, an appeal will be entertained.” Id. at 224 n.10 (citations omitted).

Md. Rule 8-131(a) provides for the scope of ap-pellate review of jurisdictional questions. In Himes Associates, Ltd. v. Anderson, 178 Md. App. 504, 526 (2009), this Court, “read Rule 8-131(a) to permit appellate review of the issue[ ] of . . . subject matter jurisdiction on the entire record.” This Court went on to state that, with respect to jurisdictional issues, “[o]ur standard of review is de novo: we decide ‘whether the trial court was legally correct[.]’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

With respect to the circuit court’s decision on a mistrial, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. “The decision to grant a motion for a mistrial is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. A de-nial of a motion for mistrial will only be reversed on appeal when there was clear prejudice to the defen-dant.” Alston v. State, 177 Md. App. 1, 6 (2007) (inter-nal citations omitted).

App. 8

Discussion

I. Circuit Court’s Jurisdiction

Father initially challenges the validity of the circuit court’s issuance of the consent order due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Fa-ther argues that the issue of whether his consent was required to apply to certain colleges was moot and cites Mother’s motion for voluntary dismissal where she too noted that the issue was moot.3 “A case is moot when there is no longer an existing controversy between the parties at the time it is before the court so that the court cannot provide an effective remedy. Generally, a moot case is dismissed[.]” Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250 (1996) (internal citations omitted).

Based on the record, both parties filed motions contending that the initial issue was moot; however, Mother withdrew that contention at the hearing. Re-gardless, mootness is a legal determination – a case is moot based on the facts, not the motions of the par-ties. In this case, the circuit court determined that there was a controversy upon which the court could provide an effective remedy. Notwithstanding John’s unauthorized applications, the issue of whether Fa-ther’s consent would be required in order to pay for

3 Mother initially asked the circuit court to interpret the terms of the Agreement to allow John to apply to colleges of his choice without Father’s consent. John applied prior to the court’s ruling, thus eliminating the need for the court to rule on whether Father’s permission was required at the application stage.

App. 9

college was a lingering outstanding controversy. In fact, the exact provisions of the agreement, upon which the application issue was based, also concerned the issue of the future payment of college expenses. The circuit court’s contractual interpretation of the provision would, thus, have provided an effective remedy to the question of the degree of involvement each party must have in the final college decision and any subsequent tuition responsibilities. Since there was a live controversy upon which the court could render an effective remedy, the case was not moot, and the court had subject matter jurisdiction.

II. Motion for Mistrial

Father next challenges the circuit court’s refusal to grant a mistrial. Father contends now, as he did in a May 15, 2014 motion considered by the court, that his agreement to the payment scheme on April 18, 2014, was voidable because it was made under duress, and that he was subject to undue influence. The court denied Father’s motion without explana-tion.4

As to Father’s contention, this Court defers as to the factual findings of the circuit court because it is

4 The fact that the court did not articulate its reasoning, does not provide a basis for error. Marquis v. Marquis, 175 Md. App. 734, 755 (2007) (We presume judges know the law and apply it “even in the absence of a . . . indication of having con-sidered it.”) (Citation omitted).

App. 10

the presiding judge that often has the best perspec-tive on the issue. See Jackson v. State, 164 Md. App. 679, 713 (2005) (“Because so much depends on the inherent ‘sense’ of justice of the trial judge, the only judicial figure who has his thumb on the actual pulse of the trial, the judge’s exercise of discretion in evalu-ating credibility is indispensable.”). This is par-ticularly true in this case. In his brief, Father avers that an audio recording of his acquiescence to the payment scheme shows that his answer “was made in an overtly distresses [sic] tone.” This argument is contrary to the circuit court’s finding of fact moments thereafter that Father was agreeing to the terms “freely and voluntarily and after being properly advised of his rights.” Having presided over the pro-ceeding during voir dire, the circuit court was in the best position to evaluate whether the parties were under duress. Based on our review of the entire record in this case,5 the circuit court’s ruling that the

5 The record contains an ex parte letter, drafted by Father and sent to the circuit court, regarding Father’s desire to move forward with the consent order as a pro se party. In this letter, Father does not claim that the agreement to the payment scheme is voidable due to duress or other factors. Rather, Father writes “I was placed in a position where a negotiated settlement to the matter occurred. The agreement to the payment scheme was made verbally before the Court, and it should be a simple matter to draft a Consent Order[.]” He goes on to describe his conduct in the proceedings as “fair, reasonable, and coopera-tive[.]” While not part of the docketed record, this letter further supports the court’s finding that there was no duress at the time of the agreement to the payment scheme.

App. 11

payment scheme was entered into freely was not clearly erroneous.

Father also contends that the agreement to the payment scheme was voidable because it lacked con-sideration. In his brief, Father argues that “[f]or-bearance to assert a claim which proves to be invalid is not consideration. . . . No reasonable person could believe the withdrawal of a vexatious lawsuit . . . could be valid ‘consideration.’ ” However, Maryland courts have held that “[c]onsideration is not always tangible. In the case of a consent judgment, the fact that ‘the parties give up any meritorious claims or defenses they may have had in order to avoid further litigation’ may serve as consideration.” Suter, 402 Md. at 225 (citation omitted). In this case, Mother and son, John, abandoned any chance to have Father exclusively fund John’s college education in an effort to end the litigation. Father’s obligation was limited to only $14,000.00 per year. This type of consideration is precisely, what is described by the Court in Suter.

III. Consent Order

Finally, Father argues that the circuit court erred in entering the consent order despite being aware of one party’s objection. To support his position, Father cites Dorsey v. Wroten, 35 Md. App. 359 (1977), where this Court reversed the circuit court’s refusal to allow one party to withdraw consent to an oral agreement prior to the judge enrolling the consent order. How-ever, there is a critical distinction between Dorsey

App. 12

and the instant case. Here, Father’s agreement to the terms of the consent order was made on the record, in open court, while in Dorsey, the appellant withdrew his oral consent to the settlement agreement before the final meeting with the trial judge, and both the trial judge and appellee had full knowledge that ap-pellant was not consenting to the decree two days before it was signed.

In Barnes v. Barnes, 181 Md. App. 390, 408 (2008), this Court examined the facts of Dorsey: “[i]n Dorsey, the Court determined that an agreement entered on the record in open court is distinct from a settlement agreement that is not entered on the record. There, the parties held ‘a “settlement type conference” in the judge’s chambers’ and, when they reached an agreement, the judge ‘requested that a consent decree be prepared and presented to him.’ ” (Citation omitted). Critical to this case, however, “when, as here, ‘the parties entered into an agree-ment in open court, which under Maryland law is binding upon the parties,’ intending that the court will subsequently reduce the agreement to a written order, the legal principles regarding consent orders are ‘equally applicable’ to the resulting order.” Id. at 409 (citation omitted). Specifically, the Court of Ap-peals has held, “[t]he fact that one of the parties may have changed his or her mind shortly before or shortly after the submitted consent order was signed by the court does not invalidate the signed consent judgment.” Chernick v. Chernick, 327 Md. 470, 484 (1992). It is pellucid that, based on the most relevant

App. 13

case law, the circuit court properly entered the Order despite Father’s post-agreement objection.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the consent order, entered by the circuit court on June 5, 2014, is valid and enforceable. We hold that the court did have jurisdiction to hold a hearing regarding the contractual language in the Agreement. Furthermore, we agree with the court’s finding that Father’s agree-ment to the payment scheme was made freely and voluntarily. Finally, we do not believe that the court improperly entered the consent order. For the afore-mentioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.

App. 14


Plaintiff

v.


Defendant

********

IN THE

CIRCUIT COURT

FOR

ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY

CASE NO.: C-09-139690

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

CONSENT ORDER

The parties appeared for a merits hearing on Plaintiff ’s Complaint to Enforce Marital Settlement Agreement and Consent Order of August 31, 2011, and for Declaratory Judgment before Honorable Paul F. Harris, Jr., on April 18, 2014. After certain argu-ment was heard and evidence placed on the record, the parties reached an agreement resolving all issues in this action, which is memorialized below in accor-dance with the transcript from the hearing.

WHEREFORE, it is this 5 day of June, 2014 by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the Defendant, Stephen D. Chamberlain, shall be responsible for contributing up to $14,000.00 per academic year toward his son, John Chamberlain’s (hereinafter John), college ex-penses. College expenses are defined as college tui-tion, room and board, books and registration fees for four school years. The Defendant may split his

App. 15

obligation between the two semesters of each aca-demic year. In the event that John’s college expenses, as defined above, are less than $7,000.00 per semes-ter after application of the Plaintiff ’s contribution as provided in the parties’ Consent Order Regarding Support, Attorney’s Fees and Other Relief dated August 31, 2011, and after application of any schol-arships, then the Defendant shall pay the total bal-ance due. By way of example, if John chooses to attend Virginia Tech, as he has advised is his in-tention, and his college expenses for the Fall semester total $19,000.00, the Plaintiff shall be responsible for $4,500.00 of those expenses, leaving a balance of $14,500.00, of which the Defendant will pay $7,000.00. However, if the minor child receives a scholarship/grant for $10,000.00 of the total $19,000.00 for the Fall semester and, the Plaintiff is responsible for $4,500.00 of those expenses, the Defendant is responsible for the remaining $4,500.00. In this sce-nario, if the $10,000.00 scholarship/grant John re-ceived was a one-time or one-semester-only award, the Defendant would be obligated for up to $9,500.00 for the Spring semester ($14,000-$4,500 = $9,500). Student loans, including Federal student aid or and any other form of tuition assistance which must be paid back to lender or grantor, either in whole or in part, will not be deducted from the parties obligations herein. John has applied to and has been accepted at Virginia Tech and the parties understand and agree that he has not received any scholarships for this upcoming school year, therefore, the Defendant’s obligation for the 2014/2015 school year shall be

App. 16

$14,000.00 or $7,000.00 per semester; and it is fur-ther

ORDERED, that the Defendant shall pay his contribution toward John’s college expenses by mak-ing payment to John Chamberlain for the full amount due for that respective semester. John shall e-mail or mail by way of regular mail, a copy of his college expense(s) invoice(s) or bill(s) and the Defendant shall provide a check for the full amount of his obliga-tion per this Order for that semester within no more than ten days of John e-mailing or mailing the in-voice. The parties have agreed between their counsel as to the e-mail and mailing address that all invoices will be sent and that in the event the Defendant has any change in e-mail or mailing address, he shall notify John via e-mail and regular mail immediately; and it is further

ORDERED, that in consideration for the above, the Plaintiff herby dismisses her Motion for Modifica-tion of Child Support with prejudice that the hearing currently set for May 29, 2014, is hereby cancelled; and it is further

ORDERED, that each party shall be reasonable [sic] for their own attorney’s fees and cost incurred in this matter and each party further waives any and all claims for attorney’s fees or reimbursement for any attorney’s fees or suit costs as claimed by the other party including any claim pursuant to Maryland Rule 1-341; and it is further

App. 17

ORDERED, that John is confirmed his under-standing of the terms of this Consent Order and has affirmed his willingness to be bound hereunder; and it is further

ORDERED, that all remaining provisions in the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement and Consent Order Regarding Support, Attorney’s Fees and Other Relief shall remain in full force and effect, except as modified herein; and it is further

ORDERED, that the hearings set before the court on the existing pleadings or motions are hereby CANCELLED; and it is further

ORDERED, that seeing that there are no out-standing court costs none are hereby assessed.

/s/ Paul F. Harris PAUL F. HARRIS, JR., Judge,

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

App. 18


v.


************

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

Petition Docket No. 133 September Term,2015

(Nos. 719 & 2594, Sept. Term, 2014 Court of Special Appeals)

ORDER

Upon consideration of the petition for writ of cer-tiorari to the Court of Special Appeals and the motion for stay of judgment filed thereto, in the above enti-tled case, it is

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the petition and the motion for stay of judgment be, and they are hereby, denied as there has been no showing that review by certiorari is desirable and in the public interest.

/s/ Mary Ellen Barbera Chief Judge DATE: May 27, 2015

App. 19


v.


************

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

Petition Docket No. 133 September Term,2015

(Nos. 719 & 2594, Sept. Term, 2014 Court of Special Appeals)

ORDER

The Court having considered the motion for re-consideration and the supplement filed thereto, in the above entitled case, it is

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, that the motion for reconsideration and the supple-ment be, and they are hereby, denied.

/s/ Mary Ellen Barbera Chief Judge DATE: July 27, 2015

App. 20

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MARYLAND FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY


Plaintiff

v.


Defendant

* * * * * * *

CASE NO. 02-C-09-139690

**************************************************

REQUEST FOR VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

(April 14, 2014)

Comes now the Plaintiff, Judith C. Chamberlain, by and through her attorneys, Hillman, Brown & Darrow, P.A., and Marietta B. Warren, and files this Request for Voluntary Dismissal, and states as fol-lows:

1. This matter is currently set for a one (1) day merits’ hearing on April 18, 2014 on Plaintiff ’s Com-plaint to Enforce Marital Settlement Agreement and Consent Order of August 31, 2011 and for Declaratory Judgment (hereafter referred to as “Complaint to Enforce”).

2. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Motion for Modification of Child Support with the understanding that both issues would be heard on April 18, 2014. Instead, on or about March 12, 2014, this Court entered an alternative Scheduling Order setting the child support matter for a merits’ hearing on May 29, 2014.

App. 21

3. Plaintiff filed her Complaint to Enforce in October of 2013 requesting an expedited hearing and determination regarding the parties’ child’s ability to apply to college before the expiration of his applica-tion deadlines.

4. Defendant in turn filed a Motion for Sum-mary Judgment and as a result, the procedural timeline of the case was attenuated. A hearing on the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was not held until January of 2014.

5. Defendant’s request for summary judgment was denied and this matter was subsequently set in for a merits’ hearing.

6. Since the filing of Plaintiff ’s Complaint to Enforce and since the January 2014 summary judg-ment hearing, the child has now both applied to college and been accepted to two (2) schools.

7. Given that the relief requested in Plaintiff ’s Complaint to Enforce is now moot and the issue involving each parties’ future obligation to contribute towards college tuition payments has yet to mature, there is no longer any need for the hearing currently set on April 18, 2014.

8. Plaintiff ’s counsel has advised Defendant’s counsel of their position on this matter and has provided Defendant’s counsel with a proposed Joint Stipulation of Dismissal which the Defendant has refused to sign.

App. 22

9. The Defendant has not made any counter-claim in this action.

10. Pursuant to Rule 2-506, Plaintiff requests that this Court enter an Order of Plaintiff ’s voluntary dismissal of the Complaint to Enforce so that the hearing on April 18, 2014 may be cancelled and the matter may proceed on the child support issue sched-uled to be heard May 29, 2014.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Honorable Court order that Plaintiff ’s Complaint to Enforce is hereby voluntarily dismissed and that the case shall remain open and proceed as scheduled on Plaintiff ’s Motion for Modification of Child Sup-port.

/s/ Marietta B. Warren Marietta B. Warren ([email protected])

HILLMAN, BROWN & DARROW, P.A.221 Duke of Gloucester Street Annapolis, Maryland 21401-2500 410-263-3131, (fax) 410-269-7912 Attorney for Plaintiff

[Certificate Of Service Omitted]

App. 23


Plaintiff

v.


Defendant

* * * * * * * * *

IN THE

CIRCUIT COURT

FOR

ANNE ARUNDELCOUNTY

Case No. 02-C-09-139690

DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S

REQUEST FOR VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

(April 17, 2014)

Stephen D. Chamberlain, Defendant, by his attorneys, Council, Baradel, Kosmerl & Nolan, P.A. and Kevin M. Schaeffer, in response to the Request for Voluntary Dismissal filed by the Plaintiff, Judith C. Chamberlain, states the following:

1. That the Plaintiff filed her “Complaint to Enforce Marital Settlement Agreement and Consent Order of August 31, 2011 and for Declaratory Judg-ment” (“the Complaint”) in September 2013 and, in Paragraph (b) of the ad damnum clause in the Com-plaint,1 the Plaintiff requested the Court to “Order that the minor child may apply to the schools of his choice, in order to determine whether or not he qualifies for admission and may be entitled to any scholarships.”

2. That, in support of her Request to voluntarily dismiss her Complaint filed on Monday, the Plaintiff

1 The only other relief requested in the ad damnum clause was for an expedited hearing and for attorney’s fees.

App. 24

states that the issue is now “moot,” presumably because the child, John Chamberlain, has gone ahead and applied to (and been accepted by) Virginia Tech without first obtaining the Defendant’s agreement to that choice despite the language of Paragraph 8 of the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement which pro-vides that the “selection of which college or university [the] Child shall attend shall be made by Husband, Wife and the Child, prior to application and prior to enrollment.”

3. That, while the Defendant does not dispute that John’s decision to file for admission to colleges before receiving the assent of his parents does render the issue on which the Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to be a “moot” issue, the dispute has been moot for several months but has nevertheless been carried forth by the Plaintiff at considerable expense to both parties in attorney’s fees and legal expenses, including both parties’ preparation for and attend-ance at a Motion for Summary Judgment hearing held on January 9, 2014.

4. That, according to the Plaintiff ’s credit card statements, attached hereto, an admission fee to Virginia Tech was paid by the Plaintiff on December 6, 2013; despite having charged the Virginia Tech admission fee on that date, when asked in Interroga-tories to specify the date of the application to Virginia Tech, the Plaintiff replied “Unknown” in her March 11, 2014 Interrogatory Answers. See attached Exhib-its A and B.

App. 25

5. That the Defendant has incurred over $15,000 in attorney’s fees since December 6, 2013, which would have been unnecessary had the Plaintiff merely dismissed the Complaint for mootness at that time rather than waiting until less than five business days before trial to do so.

6. That the dismissal of the Complaint, if granted by the Court, should be made conditional upon its dismissal with prejudice and upon the Plain-tiff ’s reimbursement to the Defendant of the attor-ney’s fees incurred by him since the date of John’s application to Virginia Tech on December 6, 2013.

WHEREFORE, Stephen D. Chamberlain, De-fendant, requests this Honorable Court to grant the Plaintiff ’s Request for Voluntary Dismissal, with prejudice, and order the Plaintiff to reimburse the Defendant his attorneys [fees] incurred since Decem-ber 6, 2013, and for such other relief as the Court may deem proper.

COUNCIL, BARADEL,KOSMERL & NOLAN, P.A.

By: /s/ Kevin M. Schaeffer Kevin M. Schaeffer

125 West Street, Fourth Floor P.O. Box 2289 Annapolis, Maryland 21404 (410) 268-6600 Phone (410) 269-8409 Facsimile Email: [email protected]

Attorneys for Defendant

App. 26

[Certificate Of Service Omitted]

[Exhibits Omitted]

App. 27

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

JUDITH C. CHAMBERLAIN,

Plaintiff,

vs.

STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN,

Defendant. /

Case Number: 02-C-09-139690

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

(Merits Hearing)

Annapolis, Maryland

Friday, April 18, 2014

BEFORE:

HONORABLE PAUL F. HARRIS, JR.

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff:

MARIETTA B. WARREN, ESQUIRE SAMUEL J. BROWN, ESQUIRE

For the Defendant:

KEVIN SCHAEFFER, ESQUIRE

* * *

App. 28

[3] PROCEEDINGS

(9:13 a.m.)

THE COURT: Let me call Chamberlain versus Chamberlain, it’s C-9-139690. Counsel, come up and state your name’s [sic], please.

MR. BROWN: Your Honor, Samuel J. Brown, B-R-O-W-N, and –

MS. WARREN: Marietta Warren, Your Honor, W-A-R-R-E-N.

MR. BROWN: – on behalf of Ms. Chamber-lain, who’s seated in the middle here, Your Honor.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Your Honor, Kevin Schaeffer, S-C-H-A-E-F-F-E-R, representing Mr. Chamberlain.

THE COURT: All right, gentlemen. Good morning.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Good morning.

THE COURT: This is on the docket for merits; is that correct?

MR. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And how long do you anticipate this is going to take?

MR. BROWN: We originally set it for half a day. I mean, I envisioned two witnesses. I think Mr. Schaeffer has one or you [sic] two.

App. 29

MR. SCHAEFFER: I have one.

MR. BROWN: One.

[4] MR. SCHAEFFER: But, Your Honor, a request for dismissal was filed by Mr. Brown on Monday. It was responded to by me yesterday. I am – I just got this morning about one minute before you came on the bench a four page document from Mr. Brown indicating that he wants the Court to ignore his request.

He alleged in the request for voluntary dismissal that the issue to be tried today was moot. Now he’s saying it’s – I guess he’s saying it’s not moot and he asked you to ignore his request for dismissal.

THE COURT: Are you withdrawing that request for dismissal?

MR. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So that puts us in a posture of back to the merits. What’s the issue?

MR. SCHAEFFER: Your Honor, if I could be heard on it. You cannot allege in a document that an issue is moot and then un-moot it because you feel like it. It is either moot or it isn’t moot.

MR. BROWN: Your Honor, if I –

THE COURT: I don’t know what that means. You can dismiss a case if you file a – any action can be dismissed by a person –

App. 30

MR. SCHAEFFER: But you can’t change the facts. He’s alleged, and we agree, that the issue to be decided by [5] the Court and there’s only one issue –

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHAEFFER: – and I will read it to you. The issue, if you look to the complaint filed by Mr. Brown, in the addendum [ad damnum] clause there are four requests, one is to set the matter in for expedited hearing, one is to – Section B, which is the only substantive request is to order that the minor child may apply to schools of his choice in order to determine whether or not he qualifies for admission and may be entitled to any scholarships. Paragraph C is to award the Plaintiff attorneys fees and court costs for having to pursue the matter and D, is such other and further relief.

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[6] MR. SCHAEFFER: Your Honor, to reiterate, the only substantive request here is – and I’m going to quote, “order that the minor child may apply to the schools of his choice in order to deter-mine whether or not he qualifies for admission and may be entitled to any scholarships.”

He has applied to schools of his choice without getting Mr. Chamberlain’s consent, which we have contended is required. But he’s gone ahead and done it anyway.

* * *

App. 31

[7] MR. SCHAEFFER: We hand delivered to your office – to your chambers yesterday at 4:20 –

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SCHAEFFER: – our response, where we admit that it is moot because John, the son, has already gone ahead and filed his application and been admitted to Virginia Tech.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHAEFFER: The issue we wanted to present to you was, that the issue has been moot since December 6th of 2013. That’s the date that John applied for application to what is apparently the school of his first choice, that being Virginia Tech.

So, our question to the Court was, if it was moot – if it’s moot because he applied to Virginia Tech, it was moot on December 6th, why did we have to – why did [8] Mr. Brown – why did Ms. Chamberlain, not Mr. Brown, but why did Ms. Chamberlain wait until four business days before this trial to decide that the issue was moot?

We tried to obtain information from Ms. Cham-berlain as to when John actually applied to Virginia Tech and as I – if you look at my response she an-swered unknown. She answered unknown as to when he applied to Virginia Tech in her answers to inter-rogatories on March 11th.

Well, in preparing for the hearing I went through copious records provided of her credit card bills and,

App. 32

in fact, she paid for his application on December 6th of 2013. This need not – we need not –

THE COURT: You know, I’m hearing all this in a vacuum, quite frankly. I have no idea what the agreement says. That’s why we’re here today.

Now, Mr. Brown, a very direct question. Are you proceeding with your original complaint?

MR. BROWN: Yes, we are, Your Honor. We talk –

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[11] THE COURT: Let’s put on some evi-dence.

MR. BROWN: I’m prepared to.

THE COURT: Let’s go. Let’s put on some evidence.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Your Honor, in my – if I can be heard?

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Mr. Brown filed a request for dismissal because the issue was moot. I filed a response saying we agreed the issue is moot.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHAEFFER: And now the issue is not moot? Is that –

App. 33

THE COURT: I guess it’s not moot. Nobody’s – there’s not been a legal determination as to whether it’s moot or not. I don’t know –

[12] MR. SCHAEFFER: Well, let me then, Your Honor –

THE COURT: Are you saying that an attorney can’t withdraw a pleading if they file it?

MR. SCHAEFFER: No, I’m saying an attorney can’t represent to the Court that the issue he wanted decided is moot and then come in on the morning of trial and say, I withdraw it, it’s not moot, it is open for a determination at that point.

THE COURT: So, how are prejudiced by this?

MR. SCHAEFFER: I’m prejudiced because I’m not here to try the case, I’m here to –

THE COURT: Wait a minute, Mr. Schaeffer, come on. As of Friday you didn’t do any preparation –

MR. SCHAEFFER: Your Honor, he re-quested – he requested –

THE COURT: – on this case – excuse me.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You didn’t do any prepara-tion on this case before Friday?

MR. SCHAEFFER: No, of course. Of course, we have.

App. 34

THE COURT: Okay. Then what’s your point?

MR. SCHAEFFER: But the issue – but the issue that is before the Court right now is whether or not the request made by Mr. Brown to dismiss the case should be [13] granted because – well moot – on grounds of moot –

THE COURT: I don’t have such a motion, he’s already withdrawn it. How can I rule on a motion that’s been withdrawn?

MR. SCHAEFFER: Okay.

THE COURT: Let’s proceed.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Your Honor, if we can though – and I know I’m – I know I’m trying the Court’s patience –

THE COURT: No, you’re not. You’re doing your job and I’m not faulting you for that. It’s just that I like to deal in what’s really at issue.

MR. SCHAEFFER: All right.

THE COURT: I don’t like side smoke screens.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Okay. Well, let me suggest to you then, the only issue the Court has before it today to decide –

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHAEFFER: – is found in the com-plaint at Paragraph B, order that the minor child

App. 35

may apply to schools of his choice in order to deter-mine whether or not he qualifies for admission and may be entitled to any scholarships. That is the only thing – and, Your Honor, remember in a declaratory judgment it is – it is different from a motion to en-force.

A declaratory judgment is a request by the Court [14] to rule on a specific issue in controversy.

THE COURT: I think it was presented though as alternative relief.

MR. SCHAEFFER: Your Honor, it is, but there’s no breach of any contract at this point. John has not had [sic] gotten bill one from any school, so there’s no enforcement of any duty to pay.

THE COURT: Well, I guess that’s up to Mr. Brown to tell me specifically what he wants me to consider today because I’m still not clear.

MR. BROWN: And that’s –

MR. SCHAEFFER: No, Your Honor, it is not –

THE COURT: We’ve been going on now for 15 minutes –

MR. BROWN: And Your Honor?

MR. SCHAEFFER: Your Honor, but here is – but here is – this is the danger here. The danger here is Mr. Brown has presented to you a specific issue, can John apply to schools to determine if he

App. 36

qualifies for a scholarship? That’s the issue the Court is determining today. I’m going to suggest to you that Mr. Brown is going to try to expand it well beyond the issue that he has raised as his declaratory judgment – as the issue he wants decided by the Court on declaratory judgment.

At the end of the case, Your Honor, if you look at [15] again at the Prayer B, the Court is going to answer yes or no and that is all that’s before the Court at this time, because that’s what a declaratory judgment does. It frames the issue for the Court’s determination.

MR. BROWN: Your Honor, I know the Court has heard a lot about this, but number one, we’ve been – and I apologize for saying this because I don’t like to say it. We’ve been sandbagged in this and it’s upsetting.

If you look at Paragraph 19 of our complaint, we ask the Court, basically, to enforce the agreement. That’s what we ask the Court to do. I called Mr. Schaeffer on Monday and I said, Kevin, he’s been accepted to college –

MR. SCHAEFFER: I’m going to object. I’m going to object to any discussions –

MR. BROWN: This is my argument.

MR. SCHAEFFER: – like this, Your Honor.

MR. BROWN: You know what? He sand-bagged us –

App. 37

MR. SCHAEFFER: I’m going to –

MR. BROWN: – and I’m upset about this because he – we made a motion to dismiss this thing for now for moot and I told Mr. Schaeffer, we’ll file in September when we know how much the tuition is so we can do it all at one time. The Court doesn’t like us to do that, to postpone a case until then. I told Mr. Schaeffer. Mr. Schaeffer originally agreed with me, let’s get rid of it.

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Documents

SCOTUS Petition Chamberlain v. Chamberlain