Industry has noted an increasing number ofblackouts and main engine failures

UK P&I CLUB

Risk Focus:Loss of power

UK P&I CLUBIS MANAGEDBY THOMASMILLER

Ships effectively out of control as a result of theseproblems have caused extensive damage to berths,locks, bridges, dolphins, navigational marks, loadingarms, cranes and gantries along with moored ships.Costly collision and grounding claims can similarly becaused by these failures.

It is no exaggeration to suggest that main enginefailures and blackouts tend to occur most regularly atthe point in a voyage where the ship is at its mostvulnerable. In confined waters or entering and leavingport, the stable loads which will generally prevail withthe ship on passage are disturbed. There is additionallysome evidence that compliance with the low sulphurfuel regulations and changing from one grade of fuel toanother has exacerbated these problems.

Reports from pilots, operating in emission control areaswhere fuel grade changes have been implemented,indicate that these problems have become quitewidespread, noting that ships regularly seem to beexperiencing power losses, invariably at critical times intheir manoeuvres and which are attributed to ‘fuelproblems’. In the Club’s recent Loss PreventionBulletin 785-09/11(fuel switching), Members werealerted to warnings from the US Coast Guard whichhad just enforced their own ECA, noting a markedincrease in incidents after vessels lost propulsion andhad linked many of these incidents to vessels operatingon marine distillate fuels.

Vulnerability of ships to such problems has also tendedto increase as a result of the ‘self-sufficiency’ of modernvessels, the provision of lateral thrusters tending topersuade operators to minimise their dependence upontug assistance in port waters. Thus, where in an earlierera a vessel experiencing mechanical difficulties wouldbe merely held safely in position by assisting tugs, asingle tug in attendance may not be able to sufficientlyintervene with a large ship suffering a blackout or mainengine failure at a critical point in the manoeuvres.

The consequences of main engine failures or blackoutsleading to steering gear failure can be little short ofdisastrous, in terms of the enormous third partyproperty damage claims which can result. An entire

Increasing numbers of main engine failure related incidents and accidents followingblackouts have led to a data collection exercise by the UK Club’s risk assessors and adetailed analysis of more than 700 claims which has given cause for concern.A significant number of these claims for third party property damage, many of which wereenormously expensive and in some cases amounted to millions of dollars could beattributed, directly or indirectly, to main engine failures or electrical blackouts.

canal system or waterway could be put out of action asa result of an out of control ship damaging a lock orbridge, while months of expensive inactivity could besuffered should a specialist berth with bulk loaders organtries be damaged by a ship. The costs of shipsrendered inactive as a result of third party damage canbe substantial as can all claims from collisions andgroundings attributable to such causes.

The Club’s analysis of more than 700 claims providesample evidence that these problems are not merelyanecdotal, as the graphical presentation of large thirdparty property claims (diagram 1) illustrates. Enginefailures, steering failures, failure of bow thruster orblackouts (which may well be connected) amounts to asubstantial percentage of the whole.

Evidence has been provided by a twelve monthexercise by the Club’s in-house assessors employing aquestionnaire during their routine ship visits, which wasdesigned to identify and highlight problemsexperienced aboard the Club’s entered vessels.Altogether, 249 ships’ crews were questioned duringthis investigation about their experience with blackouts,main engine failures and fuel switching problems.

Blackout

Engine Failure

Bowthruster

Steering failure

Crane failure

Wash

Weather

Rope failure

Fender contact

Pilot error

Shore person error

Shipside error

Tug influence

Anchor failure

Other

Other/Not known

Anchorfailure

Shipside error

Tuginfluence

Shore person errorPilot error

Fendercontact

Ropefailure

Weather

WashCrane failure

Bowthruster 1%Steering failure 1%Engine failure 4%Blackout 1%

1. Cause of large third party property claims

BlackoutsWhile there may be an understandable reluctance toadmit to having such a problem, with a total of 64 (26%)of chief engineers claiming that they had never had ablackout on board any ship, it is considered that this islikely to be understated. There were 22 chief engineers(9%) who reported that they had experienced morethan ten blackouts. The graphical representation(diagram 2) indicates that such problems are certainlynot unknown, with around three quarters of all chiefengineers questioned reporting blackouts.

reported as a result of starting bow thrusters and deckmachinery such as mooring winches or cranes, withinsufficient electrical power being available. It is clearlynot always realised that the starting current of electricalmotors can be several times the full ‘on load’ currentand starting large motors can sometimes causebreakers to trip and lead to blackouts. While manymodern ships have in-built safety features to preventthis happening, it is still a sensible precaution to haveroutines in place to ensure that adequate generatingpower is available before starting large electricalmotors.

A shortage of fuel supply to the generating enginesaccounted for 64 (16%) of reported blackouts, with ahigh proportion of these attributed to blocked fuelfilters.

Automation failure was blamed for 16% of blackouts,failure of control equipment 20% and mechanicalfailure 7% of those reported. There was, however, nonoteworthy reason provided for these failures.

Their answers on the causes of blackouts, which arethought to be fairly accurate, are similarly revealing andmay be listed thus:

● Automation failure(auxiliaries load control/sharing failure etc)

● Control equipment failure(eg. governor failure, defective trips for hightemperature cooling or low luboil pressure etc)

● Electrical failure(eg. overload, reverse power trip, preferential tripdevice failure etc)

● Lack of fuel(eg. blocked filters, water in fuel, fuel supply pipingand pump failures etc)

● Mechanical failure(eg. lack of compression, engine seizure, loss oflubrication, overheating etc)

● Human error

● Other causes

Out of a total of 400 reported blackouts, the highestnumber (90 or 23%) was attributable to human error.Several of these incidents were caused by proceduralerrors - ‘pressing the wrong button’ - and stopping ortripping an on-load generator.

A further 65 (16%) were caused by electrical failureand a notably high number of these blackouts were

Humanerror 23%

Controlequipmentfailure 20%

3. Cause of blackouts

Other

Mech

Lack of fuel

Electric

r

Cont equip

Human

Mechanical failure 6%Other causes 3%

Automation failure 16%

Electricalfailure 16%

Lack offuel 16%

None 26%

1 to 3 41%

4 to 6 21%

7 to 9 3%

10 + 9%

2. Number of blackouts as reported by chief engineers

Main generator

Main engine manoeuvring failuresThere was a perhaps understandable reluctance toreport main engine manoeuvring failures, with a highpercentage of engineers reporting fewer than fourfailures during their careers and a surprising 44%admitting to any failures at all. Nevertheless, there werea total of 249 such failures reported by the chiefengineers interviewed.

Depleted air bottles: Excessive numbers of engine starts/stops during manoeuvring will deplete pressure in the mainengine start bottles which can result in loss of control of thevessel at critical times, such as when docking, due to theengine failing to start.

Good start air pressure with safe operational limits marked

These failures were categorised as follows:

● Control equipment failure (eg. governor failure,load control failure, defective trips for hightemperature cooling or low luboil pressure etc).

● Electric failure (eg. loss of electrical power etc)

● Human error

● Lack of fuel (eg. blocked filters, water in fuel, fuelsupply piping and failure of pumps etc)

● Lack of starting air

● Mechanical failure (eg. reversal system failure,lack of compression, engine seizure, loss oflubrication, overheating, crankcase oil mist,scavenge fire, gearbox problems etc)

● Other causes

None 56%

1 to 3 31%

4 to 6 8%

7 to 9 2%

10 + 2%

4. Number of main engine manoeuvring failures as reportedby chief engineers

As is illustrated in diagram 5, control equipment failureaccounted for the greatest proportion of main enginemanoeuvring failures, this being mainly caused by thelack of or leakage of control air, along with othermalfunctions. Blackouts (as discussed previously)accounted for the next highest cause of electricalfailure. Of the 15% of mechanical failures, these wereattributed to defects with pneumatic valves, start airvalves and defects in reversing systems.

Lack of fuel accounted for 13% of failures, and as withgenerator failures, blocked filters were identified as themain reason for these. While 12% of manoeuvringfailures were attributed to a lack of starting air, it isimportant that the start air pressure is monitored whilethe ship is being manoeuvred and also vital that the pilotand bridge team are made aware of the maximumnumber of consecutive engine starts they can demand.Human error of various kinds accounted for a further11% of failures.

Low sulphur fuel problems

Of the chief engineersquestioned, 28 (11%)confirmed that theyhave experienced, orwere anticipating,problems complyingwith the low sulphurfuel regulations. (Seediagram 6).

It might however besuggested that theseare relatively early days,and the spread ofemission control areasrelatively limited. Stricter implementation of regulationsand an extending network of ECAs around theworld may well see the problems multiplying for thoseaboard ship.

Main air compressor

Other

Lack of air

Lack of fuel

Mechanical

Electrical

Cont equip

Human

5. Causes of main engine manoeuvring failures

Human error 11%

Controlequipmentfailure 29%

Lack of startingair 12%

Other causes 3%

Electrical failure 17%

Mechanicalequipmentfailure 15%

Lack offuel 13%

6. Number of chief engineers reporting problems complyingwith fuel regulations

Problems already encountered and reported to theClub’s assessors included that of supply and storage,difficulties with machinery operation, fuel compatibilitydifficulties, changeover problems, financial penaltiesand others. (See diagram 7).

Supply and storage problems were reported by thechief engineers of ten ships. While there is now said tobe widespread availability of low sulphur fuel aroundthe world at the major bunker supply ports, the costdifferential compared to high sulphur fuel is between$20 and $80 per tonne.

Storage problems have been reported on particularlyolder ships because of the lack of dedicated settling/service tanks for both types of fuel, difficulties beingencountered when changing from one grade of fuel toanother.

YES 11% Yes

No

NO 89%

Nine ships reported having problems with machineryoperation when operating on low sulphur fuel, whichincluded fuel oil lubrication of pumps and nozzles,sticking fuel pumps, generator starting problems, fueloil leakages and delayed pick up speed of engines.

Seven ships suffered compatibility problems betweenthe two fuel types, resulting in purifiers requiring morefrequent cleaning and filters becoming blocked. It isalso pointed out that if a vessel changes over fromhigher sulphur fuel (HFO), when MGO is introducedinto the system it may act like a solvent, releasing anyasphaltenes which then collect in the fuel filters/strainers and clog them.

Only four ships reported having any problems whenchanging over from one fuel type to another and onevessel reported that the changeover time had beenmiscalculated and the ship had been subsequentlyfined and detained. Another ship reported being finedafter the <1% sulphur fuel bunkered was found tocontain >1% sulphur when analysed.

It was reported that 60% of ships took up to 12 hours tochange the main engine over from one type of fuel toanother. However, this included many ships which wereoperating exclusively on low sulphur fuel. Some 28% ofships took between 12 and 24 hours to effect thechangeover and the remainder longer.

It was reported that 66% of ships had dedicatedstorage tanks for low sulphur fuels and if the ship isequipped with two day or service tanks, then therequirement for the changeover procedure will be verymuch reduced.

It is assumed that the one day or the service tank willcontain higher sulphur fuel (HFO) with the other tankalready filled with the required low sulphur fuel oil. Thus

the whole procedure will only require the isolation of thefeed from the HFO service tank and the flushing of thefeed pipeline to the engines from the low sulphur day orservice tank.

If the ship is equipped with only a single day or servicetank then flushing of the system will take very muchlonger, this procedure consisting of:

● Reducing or emptying as far as is possible thesettling tank of the previous HFO

● Flushing the pipeline to the settling tank and filling itwith low sulphur fuel

● Reducing or emptying as far as possible the day orservice tank

● Flushing the connecting pipeline from the settlingtank to the service or day tank with low sulphur fuelfrom the settling tank

● Filling the service tank with low sulphur fuel andcommencing to use this fuel before entry into theECA

Supplyproblems

Machineryoperation

7. Type of problems associated with low sulphur fuelregulations

Financialpenalties(fines)

Fuelcompatibility

Changeoverproblems

Other other

Lack of fuel

fuel

changeover

supply

Machin

fourty eightplus

fourtyeight

twentyfour

twelve

fourty eightplus

forty eight

twentyfour

twelve

8. Fuel changeover times for main engines

9. Fuel changeover times for generators

0-12 hours

12-24 hours

24-48 hours48 hours +

0-12 hours

12-24 hours

24-48 hours 48 hours +

It was reported that 19% of ships had required newequipment to be installed in order to run the engines orboilers and 28% had been required to carry more thanone lubricant. If engines are expected to operate forlengthy periods within an emission control area, thenthe lubricating /cylinder oils may need to be replaced bylow base number oils. The engine manufacturer’sguidance should be obtained about this matter.

Only 2% of ships considered that they had inadequatestorage capacity for the different grades of oils.

In order to run on low sulphur fuels, 10% of shipsreported that they needed to adjust the fuel pumps oftheir engines. Switchboard load out of balance

● Ensure that the starting air pressure is monitoredduring manoeuvring operations and that the deckdepartment appreciates the limitations of startingair availability

● During standby, run two (or more) generators inparallel whilst ensuring sufficient power availabilityshould one stop or trip. Monitor and balanceswitchboard power loads equally

● Test the astern operation of the main engine priorto arriving at the pilot station and, if practical,before approaching the berth

● Establish procedures to ensure that there isadequate electrical capacity available beforestarting up lateral thrusters, mooring equipment orother heavy equipment, bearing in mind thatsimultaneous starting of large electric motors willlead to a large power surge and possible overload

● Ships fitted with shaft generators should, whereappropriate, change over to to auxiliary generatorpower well before entering restricted waters andundertaking critical manoeuvres. Manufacturer’sguidelines should be followed and ship’s staffguided accordingly.

Recommendations to reduce the risk of powerlosses and blackouts

● Engine and boiler manufacturers should beconsulted for advice on operation with low sulphurfuel and the need for any equipment/systemmodifications

● Ensure correct maintenance of all equipment;engines, purifiers, filters, fuel systems and sealingarrangements

● Ensure fuel oil viscosity and temperature controlequipment is accurate and fully operational

● Ensure that system temperature and pressurealarms, fuel filter differential pressure transmittersetc are accurate and operational

● Ensure fuel changeover procedures are clearlydefined and understood

● Ensure that engineers are fully familiar with fuelsystems and main engine starting systems andestablish ‘failure to start’ procedures. Theseshould include familiarisation with operation locallyand from the engine control room

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Loss of power - the ‘Bowtie approach’

Hazard, threats and consequences: In the centreof the diagram, Loss of Power is identified as the‘hazard’ , while blue squares to the left identify a rangeof ‘threats’ , which, if not controlled, could cause aserious incident involving P&I claims and otherconsequences which can be seen in the red shape onthe far right of the diagram.

Controls: Between these extremities can be seen the‘controls’ which, if they work properly, will prevent theaccident happening and on the right hand side of thediagram, controls which will mitigate theconsequences.

Thus taking as an example the threat of Main EngineFailure (left hand side), controls which should be inplace to prevent this include system monitoring, testing

the engine before pilot and berth, the monitoring ofstarting air, good system maintenance, tests andmaintenance for the automation and control systems,good ‘failure to start’ procedures and training andfamiliarisation of staff.

Consequences: The consequences of an accident(right hand side)will be mitigated by the capability of thecrew to deal with an incident, good record keeping,emergency reporting and communication procedures,systems and procedures to maintain steering,emergency drills, clear abort procedures, recoverymeasures implemented by a well trained crew, tugavailability and anchor at the ready.

Threats: This example shows only one threat. A full‘Bowtie’ with all the threats can be provided on request.

What are we checking?

How effective is that control, are there failures just waiting to happen (latent)?

MAIN ENGINEFAILURE

Emergency drills

LOSSOF

POWER

LOSSOF

CONTROLTHIRD PARTY

CLAIMCapability of staff todeal with an incident

Good record keeping

Emergency reporting andcommunication procedures

Systems and proceduresto maintain steering

System monitoring

Testing the engine beforepilot and berth

Monitoring of starting air

Maintenance for theautomation and control

systems

Good ‘failure to startprocedures’

Training andfamiliarisation of staff

Hazard

▼

Threat

▼

Consequence

▼

Incident

▲

Controls(preventative)

▲

Good system maintenance

Clear abort procedures

Controls(mitigating)

▲

Tug availability andanchor at ready

Recovery measuresimplemeted by

well trained crew

‘Bowtie’ with one threat – Main engine failureAn example with a complete ‘bowtie’ can be seen overleaf

Complete ‘bowtie’ with a list of threatsCopies of this diagram at full size may be obtained from theUK Club – details on the back cover

UK P&I CLUBIS MANAGEDBY THOMASMILLER

For further information please contact:Loss Prevention Department, Thomas Miller P&I LtdTel: +44 20 7204 2307. Fax +44 20 7283 6517Email: karl.lumbers@thomasmiller.com