Operational guidance for preventing blackouts and main ... · Operational guidance for preventing blackouts and main engine failures. 3 INTRODUCTION 4 GLOSSARY ... and also vital

REDUCING THE RISK OF PROPULSION LOSS

Operational guidance for preventingblackouts and main engine failures

3 INTRODUCTION

4 GLOSSARY

5 POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF PROPULSION LOSS

6 POSSIBLE CAUSES OF PROPULSION LOSS7 POSSIBLE CAUSES OF MAIN ENGINE FAILURE7 POSSIBLE CAUSES OF ALTERNATOR FAILURE7 POSSIBLE CAUSES OF EMERGENCY GENERATOR FAILURE8 POSSIBLE CAUSES OF BLACKOUTS

9 RECOMMENDATIONS9 PREVENTIVE ACTIONS13 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

14 AREAS OF SPECIFIC FOCUS14 EMERGENCY GENERATOR

14 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK15 GENERAL

16 LOAD SHEDDING OR OTHER EQUIVALENT ARRANGEMENTS16 DEFINITIONS16 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK17 PREFERENCIAL TRIPPING SYSTEM

18 FEEDING BACK POWER FROM THE EMERGENCY SWITCHBOARD TO THE MAIN SWITCHBOARD

19 RECOVERY AFTER BLACKOUT20 ISM CODE

22 SUMMARY

23 CASE STUDIES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2


INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this booklet isto provide general guidance

and practical advice to marineengineers and ship owners onblackout and main engine failures,the risks associated with propulsionloss and the precautions tomanage these risks.

It is not intended to replaceofficial IMO regulations andguidance notes or any documentthat forms part of a vessel’ssafety management system.

Blackouts, propulsion limitations,total loss of propulsion and lossof steering capability are allserious incidents.

When they occur during navigationin non-congested waters, incidentssuch as these increase the riskto the vessel and personnel butrarely result in dangerous or life-threatening outcomes.

However, when they occur duringmanoeuvring in restricted areassuch as traffic lanes, whenentering or leaving port, or whena vessel is navigating close to acoast during heavy weather,these risks become critical andmay result in a major casualty.

3


Modernengine roomwith twomediumspeed mainengines

BLACKOUT

According to MSC.1/Circ.1464/Rev.1paragraph 6 (Interpretation ofSOLAS Chapter II-1 Regulations 42 & 43 paragraph 3.4), it means a “dead ship” condition initiatingevent. According to the BV RulesPart C Chapter 2 Section 1paragraph 3.29.1, a “blackoutsituation” means that the main andauxiliary machinery installations,including the main power supply,are out of operation but theservices for bringing them intooperation (e.g. compressed air,starting current from batteries,etc.) are available.

DEAD SHIP CONDITION

According to SOLAS Chapter II-1Regulations 3 paragraph 8 and toMSC.1/Circ.1464/Rev.1 paragraph3.1 (Interpretation of SOLASChapter II-1 Regulations 26paragraph 4), it is the conditionunder which the main propulsionplant, boilers and auxiliaries arenot in operation due to the absenceof power. In addition, no storedenergy for starting and operatingthe propulsion plant, the mainsource of electrical power andother essential auxiliaries isassumed to be available.

AVR Automatic Voltage Regulator

LSMGO Low Sulphur MGO

MGO Marine Gas Oil

SECA Sulphur Emission Control Area

STCW Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for seafarers

ULSMGO Ultra LSMGO

UPS Uninterruptible Power System

4

GLOSSARY

The main serious consequencesfor the ship that might occur asthe result of a blackout orpropulsion loss are contact,collision and / or grounding.

The consequences of third partyclaims may be substantial – intime, expense and reputation. Theimplications of propulsion lossmay be significant either affectingor stopping navigation altogetherin ports and their approaches, incanal systems, in waterways fordays, weeks and months. Claimsas a result of collisions, groundings,consequential pollution and ‘off-hire’, transhipment costs – all inaddition to any repair costs - aswell as claims from shore basedfacilities operators of loading anddischarge equipment and facilitiesare all likelihoods in the event ofdamage. Media and stakeholderinterests will all need to beaddressed.

51 On the top photo, the glass jar is here to highlight the degree to which the shell plating is set in.

POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF PROPULSION LOSS


Bottom damages as a consequence ofmachinery failures1

Main engine failures and blackoutswhich result in large claims tend tooccur when a ship is at its mostvulnerable. The stable electricalconsumption which is a characteristicof a ship during deep sea passageis replaced by more volatile orvariable consumption requirementsdue to additional load placed on theelectrical generation equipmentwhen the ship begins manoeuvringin more confined waters (e.g. by

starting supplementary machinerysuch as additional steering motors,starting and stopping bow thrusters,starting general service pumps,powering up hydraulic equipmentand running deck machinery).Compliance with the low sulphurfuel regulations and changes fromone grade of fuel to another hasadded to incidents of propulsionfailures and power interruptions.

The main causes of propulsion loss by the London P&I club members’ shipsand for which P&I investigation was required during the last five full P&Iyears are as follows:

POSSIBLE CAUSES OF PROPULSION LOSS


6

Fire

Other

Equipmentfailure

24%

17%

6%

Human Error

Insufficient orineffective

maintenance

29%

24%

BlackoutFuel oil poor quality orcontamination (e.g. fines, water orbacteria inside the tank)Insufficient attention to properfuel changeover procedure whenentering or exiting SECAFailure of starting air (insufficientpressure in the bottle). High orexcessive numbers of engine startsand stops while manoeuvring willdeplete pressure in the mainengine start bottles. This may leadto the engine failing to start with aconsequent loss of navigationalcontrol at critical times, such aswhen docking. It is important thatthe start air pressure is monitored

while the ship is being manoeuvredand also vital that the pilot and bridgeteam are made aware of themaximum number of consecutiveengine starts they can demand.Insufficient or ineffectivemaintenance of electronic andpneumatic control systems (forexample, filters in pneumaticcontrol systems are oftenneglected)Loss of control air pressureLoss of lubricationEngine automated shut down oreven slow down at a critical timeShaft intermediate bearing failureStern tube bearing failure

POSSIBLE CAUSES OF MAIN ENGINE FAILURE

POSSIBLE CAUSES OF ALTERNATOR FAILURE

POSSIBLE CAUSES OF EMERGENCY GENERATORFAILURE

Load share issuesLoss of exciter voltage due tofailure of diodes

Failure of AVR

7

Batteries in poor conditionFailure of starting systemSwitchboard selector switch not in “auto” start position

Fuel oil poor quality orcontamination Fuel oil starvation

8

Human errorControl equipment failures (e.g.governor failures, defective tripsfor high temperature cooling orlow lube oil pressures)Main engine failure whilst usingshaft generator (e.g. shaftgenerator tripping whilst autostart and load share of auxiliarygenerators inoperative)Automation failure (e.g. AVRdefect or auxiliary load control /sharing failures)Electrical failure (e.g. overload,reverse power trip orpreferential trip device failure)

Fuel issue, e.g.:- blocked filters - poor changeover procedures - failure to bleed the stand by filter

before putting it back in use- Poor quality (for instance,

water in fuel) - fuel supply piping and pump

failures (fuel starvation) - loss of air control supply to fuel

tank valvesMechanical failure, e.g.:- lack of compression - engine seizure - loss of lubrication - overheating - scavenge firesOther causes (e.g. fire in electricalpanel / main switchboard)

A significant number of blackouts are caused by electrical failures whenstarting bow thrusters and deck machinery - such as mooring winches orcranes - when insufficient electrical power is available. Awareness isrequired that the starting current of electrical motors may be several timesthe full ‘on load’ current. Starting large motors may trip breakers and lead toblackouts. Despite built-in safety features in modern ships to prevent suchan occurrence, it is a sensible precaution to establish routines to ensure theavailability of adequate generating power before starting large electricalmotors. Many modern ships have automation to ensure that before itemssuch as the bow thruster can be started there must be sufficient electricalcapacity available; however it is not unknown for the automation to fail.

POSSIBLE CAUSES OF BLACKOUTS

RECOMMENDATIONSREDUCING THE RISK OF PROPULSION LOSS

The following guidance is drawnfrom our experience and may be thedifference between an occurrenceof a problem being a minorproblem and a major casualty.

PREVENTIVE (considered to be good practice)

Ensure correct maintenance ofall equipment: engines (includingtheir control and automationsystems), purifiers, filters, fuelsystems and sealing arrangements.

Ensure that no maintenance iscarried out on filters and fuelsystems when on standby orapproaching restrictednavigational areas.

Ensure fuel oil viscosity andtemperature control equipmentis accurate and fully operational.

Ensure that all engineers areaware of how to isolate onecylinder on the main engine inthe event of failure, so that thisdoes not have to be stopped untilconvenient.

Wait for the results of tests onnewly supplied fuel oil to ensurethat the fuel is ‘on spec’ beforechanging-over to the new one.

It is recommended not to mixbunkers from two differentsuppliers in the same tanks.

Ensure water is regularly drainedfrom fuel oil tanks, in order toprevent water build up andcarryover in the fuel and to lessenthe risk of bacterial contamination/ microbial infestation. Removalof water or reducing its presenceto a minimum is the best methodto prevent microbial infestation.

Ensure that system temperatureand pressure alarms, fuel filterdifferential pressure transmitters,etc. are accurate, tested andoperational.

Ensure that engineers are fullyfamiliar with all engine roomsystems and their pipelines,including the changeoverprocedures from heavy fuel oil toMGO / LSMGO / ULSMGO andvice versa. Engineers should alsobe familiar with the method ofchanging from remote control tolocal control of valves andequipment.

Establish ‘failure to start’ /blackout procedures / checklistas well as emergency responsemanual / procedures / checklist /instructions. These should includefamiliarisation with operationlocally and from the engine controlroom, as well as information toensure control of the vessel’spropulsion when operating onemergency power.


RECOMMENDATIONS

Blackout / engine failure /emergency propulsion controldrills should be carried out atleast every quarter2 and it shouldrealistically simulate anemergency, in order for the crew tobe ready to respond to thesituation. To be well prepared,trained and practiced avoids panic.Such procedures should be partof the ship’s Safety ManagementManual (SMM) / System (SMS).

Ensure the manning level / teamcomposition in the engine(control) room is compliant withthe international (e.g. STCWconvention), national and localregulations when entering andleaving ports, manoeuvring or inhazardous situations.

Ensure that any loss of power and/orpropulsion incident is investigatedand a root cause determined, byproperly trained personnel.

Ensure the corrective actions ofa possible previous loss ofpropulsion / electrical powerhave been duly implemented inorder to prevent reoccurrence.

Ensure that weekly tests of theemergency generator are carriedout with the battery chargerdisconnected from the mains. Itis important to check the conditionof the batteries as there may be

no local indicator that informsthe crew that the batteries aredischarged. Electrically drivenstarter motors take power from thebatteries, however if the batteriesremain connected to the batterycharger during test starts of theengine this may be masking thefact that the batteries are unableto hold a charge. Batteriesshould be checked as part of theweekly routine.

Ensure that all means of startingthe emergency generator aretested and that all crew membersare familiar with them. It isrecommended that the startinginstructions for all means ofstarting of the emergencygenerator are posted in theemergency generator room sothat these can be referred to bycrew members.

Ensure that the emergencygenerator is operated on load asclose to the maximum capacityas possible, for at least one hour,every month3.

Ensure the starting air pressureis monitored by the watchkeepingengineers when manoeuvring andensure that the deck departmentis aware of the limitations ofstarting air availability.

2 Due to the more frequent change-over of crew (many who spend no more than four months on board), it is essential to carry out drills with each cohort of crew so that all are familiar with the procedures.3 The UK Marine Safety Agency in the Marine Guidance Note (MGN) 52 recommends that this is done weekly.

During manoeuvring operationsor when on standby, run two (ormore) generators in parallelwhilst ensuring sufficient poweravailability should one eitherstop or trip. Monitor and balanceswitchboard power loads equally.All watchkeeping engineersshould be trained in manuallyoperating load share, puttinggenerators on the board andtaking generators off the board.It is self-evident; however,practicing these techniquesshould be done regularly so thatthese are second nature.

Test the astern operation of themain engine prior to arriving atthe pilot station and, if practical,before approaching the berth.This test should be carried outon the fuel which the vessel willuse for manoeuvring (i.e. after

any changeover has been carriedout) and suitable entries made inboth the deck and engine roomlogbooks.

Establish procedures to ensure thatthere is adequate electrical capacityavailable before starting up lateralthrusters, mooring equipment orother heavy equipment, bearing inmind that simultaneous startingof large electric motors will lead toa large power surge and possibleoverload. A protective interlockprevents the bow thruster fromstarting or operating on onegenerator (but this can fail).

Tests of the lateral thrusters andmooring equipment should becarried out well before enteringrestricted waters and undertakingcritical manoeuvres.

Typical aircompressors on a vessel

Ships fitted with shaft generatorsshould, where appropriate, switchto auxiliary generator power wellbefore entering restricted watersand well before undertakingcritical manoeuvres. Manufacturer’sguidelines should be followed andship’s staff guided accordingly.

Engineers should change over tomanoeuvring mode and bestanding by in the Engine ControlRoom (ECR) prior to the vesselentering the port’s seawardapproaches. A nominated pointat which the machinery status isto be changed from sea mode tomanoeuvring mode or an end ofsea passage position should beincluded in the passage plan.

Over-current tests for the vessel’smain generator breakers have tobe carried out to the satisfactionof the classification societyduring periodic surveys.A regular thermographic surveyof the switchboard should becarried out to monitor for looseconnections or overheatingequipment.The alarm printer, where fitted,should be maintained correctly,such that the printout is legible,as this is often a valuable sourceof information regarding thecause of the blackout.

Digital and thermal images of a switchboard breaker fault

CORRECTIVE Master to follow the company SMSprocedures for loss of propulsion,often described in a stand-alonedocument called the “EmergencyProcedures Manual”.Position of the vessel and time needto be recorded accurately in the decklog book and in the engine log book.Anchors may have to be dropped inorder to reduce the ship’s speed.When manoeuvring in confinedwaters the anchors should be‘cleared’ for immediate use.Good and efficient communicationbetween the engine room and thebridge. The bridge and engineroom should exchange criticalinformation so that key personnelhave a full understanding of thesituation and can make informeddecisions. Each department mustquickly inform the other departmentof what they require, what ishappening at their station, whatproblems they are experiencing,and what risks are present. Ifbridge and engine roompersonnel do not exchangecritical information during anemergency, there is a risk thatkey personnel will not be fully aware of the situation andmay make ineffective decisions.

Crew member(s) may have to be sent to the emergency generatorroom in case this generator didnot automatically start and inorder to try to start it.Crew member(s) may have to be sentto the steering room in order to usethe emergency steering but themaster and deck officers shouldbe aware that this is less effectivewith the engine stopped and thevessel’s forward movement throughthe water is reduced belowsteerage speed.In order to restore power to themain switchboard during a blackout,the power from the emergencyswitchboard can be fed back tothe main switchboard (refer to therelevant section below).In case of an overload of current,the reset button may have to beused to reset the electricalbreaker after it has been trippeddue to an overload of current.It will probably be necessary tobring the engine to STOP in orderto enable the restart. Controlshould be taken by the engineroom until the power has beenfully restored.

RECOMMENDATIONSREDUCING THE RISK OF PROPULSION LOSS

AREAS OF SPECIFIC FOCUS


14

Regulatory frameworkAccording to SOLAS Chapter II-1regulations 42 & 43 paragraph3.1.2, where the emergency sourceof electrical power is a generator,it shall be started automaticallyupon failure of the electrical supplyfrom the main source of electricalpower and shall be automaticallyconnected to the emergencyswitchboard. The automaticstarting system and thecharacteristic of the prime movershall be such as to permit theemergency generator to carry itsfull rated load as quickly as is safeand practicable, subject to amaximum of 45 seconds. Unless asecond independent means of

starting the emergency generatingset is provided, the single source ofstored energy shall be protected topreclude its complete depletion bythe automatic starting system.

SOLAS Chapter II-1 regulations 42 & 43 paragraph 3.4 requiresthat for ships constructed on orafter 1 July 1998, where electricalpower is necessary to restorepropulsion, the capacity [of theemergency source] shall besufficient to restore propulsion tothe ship in conjunction with othermachinery, as appropriate, from adead ship condition within 30minutes after blackout.

EMERGENCY GENERATOR

15

MSC.1/Circ.1464/Rev.1 paragraph 6(interpretation of SOLAS ChapterII-1 regulations 42 & 43) states thatemergency generator storedstarting energy is not to be directly

used for starting the propulsionplant, the main source of electricalpower and/or other essentialauxiliaries (emergency generatorexcluded).

General

An emergency generator is fitted in case none of the vessel’s normalgenerator capacity is available forthe supply of electrical power. Asper the rules and regulations itshould be able to run for 18 hourscontinuously.

The emergency generator will notsupply power to all the equipment.Power will only be supplied tomachinery and equipment that arenecessary and of criticalimportance.

Emergency transformerLocal firefighting main panelFire detection system control cabinetNavigational light indicator panelE/R control consoleSmoke detection systemEmergency D/G room lightingUPS for C02 release alarm systemPublic address main unitBridge control consoleBattery charger & distribution board

M/E control system power supply unitBattery charger for rescue boatOne steering gear motorEmergency fire pumpEmergency fire pump room fanLocal fire fightingMain air compressorBreathing air compressorElevatorSome lighting

Examples of machinery fed through the emergency generator include 4:

4 It may differ from vessel to vessel and the crew should be fully aware of what is supplied from theemergency generator on their own vessel.



16

Regulatory frameworkAccording to SOLAS Chapter II-1 Regulation 54paragraph 2, the main source of electricalpower shall comply with the following:

Where the electrical power can normallybe supplied by one generator, suitableload-shedding arrangements shallbe provided to ensure the integrity ofsupplies to services required forpropulsion and steering as well asthe safety of the ship. In the case ofloss of the generator in operation,adequate provision shall be made forautomatic starting and connecting tothe main switchboard of a stand-bygenerator of sufficient capacity topermit propulsion and steering andto ensure the safety of the ship withautomatic restarting of the essentialauxiliaries including, wherenecessary, sequential operations.If the electrical power is normallysupplied by more than one generatorrunning in parallel operation, provisionshall be made (for instance by loadshedding) to ensure that, in case of lossof one of these generating sets, theremaining sets are kept in operation,without overload, to permit uninterruptedoperation of propulsion and steering,and to ensure the safety of the ship.

According to SOLAS Chapter II-1 Regulation 41paragraph 5.1.2:

The load shedding or other equivalentarrangements shall be provided toprotect the generators required by thisregulation against sustained overload.

Definitions

(MSC.1/Circ.1464/Rev.1 paragraph 4 > interpretation of SOLAS Chapter II-1Regulation 41 paragraph 5.1.2):

Primary essential servicesare those services which needto be in continuous operationto maintain propulsion andsteering.

Secondary essential servicesare those services which neednot necessarily be incontinuous operation tomaintain propulsion andsteering but which arenecessary for maintaining thevessel’s safety.

Services for habitability arethose services which need tobe in operation for maintainingthe ship’s minimum comfortconditions for the crew andpassengers.

LOAD SHEDDING OR OTHER EQUIVALENTARRANGEMENTS

17

According to the interpretation inMSC.1/Circ.1464/Rev.1 paragraph 4.9:

Primary essential services shouldnot be included in any automaticload shedding or other equivalentarrangements;Secondary essential services maybe included in the automatic loadshedding or other equivalentarrangement provided disconnectionwill not prevent services requiredfor safety being immediately availablewhen the power supply is restoredto normal operating conditionsServices for habitability may beincluded in the load shedding orother equivalent arrangement.

According to the interpretations inMSC.1/Circ.1464/Rev.1 paragraph 5.4.3 andIACS UI SC157 paragraph 2.3:

The load shedding should beautomatic.The non-essential services,services for habitable conditionsmay be shed and where necessary,additionally the secondary essentialservices, sufficient to ensure theconnected generator set(s) is/arenot overloaded.

According to BV Rules Part C Chapter 2Section 3 paragraph 2.2.18 (f):

On ships having remote control ofthe ship’s propulsion machinery fromthe navigating bridge, means areprovided, or procedures are in place,so as to ensure that supplies toessential services are maintainedduring manoeuvring conditions inorder to avoid a blackout situation.

Preferential tripping systemThe preferential trip is a part of theship’s generator protection system. It isthe electrical arrangement on shipswhich is designed to disconnect thenon-essential circuits (i.e. supplyingnon-essential load) from the mainbus bar in case of partial failure oroverload of the main supply.The non-essential circuits or loads onships are air conditioning, exhaust andventilation fans, and galley equipmentwhich can be disconnectedmomentarily and can be connectedagain after fault finding. The mainadvantage of preferential trip is that ithelps in preventing the operation ofmain circuit breaker trip and loss ofpower on essential services and thusprevents blackout and overloading ofgenerator.The preferential trip operates at timedintervals and the load is removedaccordingly. If the overload still persists,then an audible and visual alarm issounded. The preferential trip is animportant electrical circuit which helpsremove excessive load from the mainbus bar, thus preventing a blackout.The crew should be familiar with theequipment which is shed on theoperation of the preferential trip. Thisis often a multi stage process with firstand second stage tripping arrangedto shed load. The items are usuallyindicated on the switchboard to showwhat is shed for each level of trip.



18

In order to restore power to the mainswitchboard after a blackout, the powerfrom the emergency switchboard canbe fed back to the main switchboard.

According to the IMO circular MSC.1/Circ.1464/Rev.1 paragraph 3.1.2(interpretation of SOLAS Chapter II-1regulation 26 paragraph 4), wherethe emergency source of power isan emergency generator whichcomplies with regulation II-1/44,IACS SC185 and IACS SC124, thisgenerator may be used for restoringoperation of the main propulsion plant,boilers and auxiliaries where anypower supplies necessary for engineoperation are also protected to a similarlevel as the starting arrangements.

This can be accomplished by sheddingall nonessential load from the mainswitchboard i.e. fans, galley non-essentials etc. and closing thefeedback breaker thereby allowing

the emergency generator to powerthe main switchboard.

When ready to restore power to themain switchboard from the maingenerators, it will be necessary toopen the tie-in breaker in the controlroom. This will isolate the emergencygenerator from the main switchboard.It is now possible to close the maingenerator breaker, which will in turnopen the emergency generator breaker.To restore power to the emergencyswitchboard, crank the tie-in breakerand close. The feedback breaker(emergency generator room) will openand may be closed by pressing thepush button on the main switchboard.

Before back-feeding power from theemergency switchboard, breakersfor non-essential equipment mustbe opened in order to preventoverloading and tripping theemergency generator breaker.

FEEDING BACK POWER FROM THE EMERGENCYSWITCHBOARD TO THE MAIN SWITCHBOARD

Typicalswitchboardon amodernvessel

19

RECOVERY AFTER A BLACKOUT

During blackout and failure to startthe emergency generator the standby generators may be able to bemanually started possibly afterreset of trips. It is not unknown forship staff to concentrate too muchon starting the emergencygenerator but failing to recognisethat the auxiliary generators maybe available for start.

Before starting the generator set,start the pre-lubrication primingpump if the supply for the sameis given from the emergencygenerator; if not, then use themanual priming handle (providedon some auxiliary engines).

Start the generator and take it onload. Then immediately start the

main engine lube oil pump and mainengine jacket water pump as per theprocedure put forward in the SMSfor such recovery after blackout.

Reset breakers and start all theother required machinery andsystem. Then reset breakers thatare included in preferential trippingsequence (non-essential machinery).Again these start up proceduresshould be part of the SMS.

Once power has been restored on vessels with an “auto restartsequence” for electricalequipment, personnel should bedelegated to ensure that allessential equipment has startedand that other necessaryequipment has been restarted.

Topplatform of a largeslow speedmarineengine



20

The “International Managementcode for the Safe operation ofships and for pollutionprevention” (ISM code) at section9.1 requires that the SMS shouldinclude procedures ensuring thatnon-conformities, accidents andhazardous situations arereported to the company, areinvestigated and analysed withthe objective of improving safetyand pollution prevention.

We have mentioned under thesection on preventive actionsabove the importance of a rootcause analysis and theimplementation of the findings ofany investigation. This is arequirement of the ISM code.

Section 10 of this code, asamended, covers requirementsfor maintenance of the ship withthe below excerpts given tohighlight what the company andvessel staff should put in placefor main engine and electricalequipment maintenance and safeoperation :

10.1 The company should establishprocedures to ensure that theship is maintained in conformitywith the provisions of therelevant rules and regulationsand with any additionalrequirements which may beestablished by the company.

10.2 In meeting theserequirements the companyshould ensure that:1 inspections are held at

appropriate intervals;2 any non-conformity is

reported, with its possiblecause, if known;

3 appropriate corrective action is taken

Procedures should be developed toensure that maintenance, surveys,repairs and dry-docking are carriedout in a planned and structuredmanner with safety as a priority.

Maintenance procedures shouldinclude (amongst others) :- steering gear;- main engine and auxiliary

machinery;- emergency lighting

The company should arrange forinspections of its vessels to becarried out at regular intervals.These inspections should beexecuted in compliance with the

ISM CODE

21

appropriate procedures bycompetent and qualified personnel.

There should be procedures forreporting non-conformities anddeficiencies that should include atime scale for completion ofcorrective action. 10.3 The company should identify

equipment and technicalsystems the sudden operationalfailure of which may result inhazardous situations (i.e.critical equipment). The SMS should provide forspecific measures aimed atpromoting the reliability ofsuch equipment or systems.These measures shouldinclude the regular testing ofstand-by arrangements andequipment or technicalsystems that are not incontinuous use.

10.4 The inspections mentioned in 10.2 as well as themeasures referred to in 10.3should be integrated into the ship’s operationalmaintenance routine.

Once the critical systems have beenidentified, procedures should bedeveloped to ensure reliability ofthese systems or the provision ofalternative arrangements in the

event of sudden failure. Theprocedures implemented shouldinclude the regular testing ofstand-by systems in order to ensurethat one failure does not result inthe total loss of that criticalfunction. Maintenance routinesshould include the regular andsystematic testing of all suchcritical and stand-by systems.

Critical equipment listings mayinclude (amongst others) :- generators including

emergency generator;- steering gear;- fuel systems;- lubricating oil systems;- emergency stops and remote

closing devices;- communications systems;- main engine propulsion systems.

IACS have produced a nine pageguidance document entitled “IACSRecommendation 74 “A GUIDETO MANAGING MAINTENANCEIN ACCORDANCE WITH THEREQUIREMENTS OF THE ISMCODE”” and we wouldrecommend that this documentis made available onboard inaddition to this Guideline.

SUMMARYREDUCING THE RISK OF PROPULSION LOSS

22

Whether a blackout or loss ofpropulsion incident gives rise to $5 or $50 million claim dependsmainly on vessel location at thetime of the incident. However, aswe have said above, by investigatingall incidents properly and takingpreventive and corrective actions, it

is much more likely that when anincident does occur theconsequences will be muchreduced. We must all rememberthat if an incident has occurred inbenign conditions, it can and willhappen again when the conditionsare not so benign.

From our perspective it is considered that all propulsion loss incidentsshould be treated with the same level of urgency of investigation androot cause analysis; regardless of the overall severity of the situationexperienced. We note that a large proportion of propulsion lossinvestigations identify that the blackout or main engine failure has ahistory of previous occurrence; and that proper detailed root causeanalysis and near miss investigation could have prevented thesubsequent casualty.

CASE STUDIESREDUCING THE RISK OF PROPULSION LOSS

23

A.A converted ferry carrying out a harbour pleasure cruise with 400 revellers on a New Year’sparty, lost propulsion when thedrive coupling between thegearbox and the propeller shaftsheared causing a collision with a multi-million dollarmotor cruiser.

The converted ferry had beentaken out of service after manyyears. It was of an older designwith propellers at each end (i.e. a double ended ferry) and thecrew should have been able totransfer control to the otherend. It appears that no oneknew how to transfer control orthe crew lost situationalawareness due to a lack oftraining and practice.

The vessel was eventuallyassisted by some marine safetytugs that were setting upfireworks for New Yearcelebrations.

This is considered to be acollision caused by a lack ofproperly documented andprepared procedures. In additionthe value of proper induction /familiarisation of on-signingofficers and crew is also wellillustrated by this incident.

B.The vessel was using shaftgenerator in restricted waters.The engine room was on stand-by, as the vessel navigatedbetween buoys in a dredgedchannel proceeding up river.Approaching a much largervessel coming down river, thevessel moved towards the edgeof the channel. The interactionwith the bank resulted in themain engine slowing down. The decrease in main enginespeed was sufficient to causethe shaft generator breaker toopen, and a blackout occurred.The interaction with the bankpushed the bow of the vesselback across the channel at 90 degrees to the originalcourse. The larger vesselcoming down stream collidedwith the subject vesselamidships. The subject vesselsank closing the channel forseveral days until such time asthe vessel was refloated.

If the correct procedures hadbeen followed, i.e. twoalternators in operation duringstandby while in restrictedwaters, the casualty would havebeen avoided.

C.A vessel which used only marinediesel oil as fuel on boardbunkered at a port in NorthernEurope. At this port the vesselalso loaded a full cargo of grain.Shortly after departure the mainengine stopped due to blockageof the filters and failure of thefuel pumps (the alternators alsofailed). Investigation revealedsignificant quantities of water inthe fuel oil settling and servicetanks and heavy bacterialcontamination.

The vessel had to be towed toport where the fuel pumps werereplaced, the tanks, includingdouble bottom storage tanks,cleaned and treated with abiocide to remove thecontamination. This tookapproximately 10 days.

A root cause analysis identifiedthe failure of ship’s staff tooperate the purifier whentransferring fuel from thesettling to the service tank andthe failure to drain water on aregular basis from the serviceand settling tanks as thedominant causative factors.

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Documents

Operational guidance for preventing blackouts and main ... · Operational guidance for preventing blackouts and main engine failures. 3 INTRODUCTION 4 GLOSSARY ... and also vital