Ready for the Leap of Faith?Author(s): Jonathan DeanSource: The Brookings Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer, 1995), p. 2Published by: Brookings Institution PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20080564 .

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LETTERS

A Nuclear-Free World: Is It Plausible?

Whether one finds Michael MccGwire's goal of a nuclear

free world overly ambitious or

politically plausible, numerous

assumptions in his article

("Eliminate or Marginalize? Nuclear Weapons in U.S.

Foreign Policy," spring issue)

require further examination.

Two relate to vertical and

horizontal proliferation.

First, it may well be true

that "today's rather reassuring low-salience nuclear world"

will "inevitably" lead to a high-salience world if

Washington does not push for a world with no nuclear

weapons. But it is unclear

why this should be so. It seems

possible, perhaps even likely, that the nuclear weapons states

will gradually reduce their

nuclear arsenals still further

during the next few decades,

although stopping well short of zero. Certainly, this appears

today a far more likely prospect than a return to the enormous

Cold War nuclear arsenals that

MccGwire so rightly fears.

Second, the assertion that

"we will certainly face a world

of many nuclear states" if the

West does not change its

nuclear policies ignores a

variety of domestic, regional, and international disincentives

to proliferation, as well as a

host of other incentives that

fuel nuclear ambitions,

including bureaucratic rivalries, domestic impulses, and regional

dynamics. Without denying a link of some kind between the nuclear policies of the

nuclear weapon states and

the "Nth country" problem, MccGwire nonetheless relies

heavily?far too heavily, in my mind?on the influence that

the nuclear force postures of

the nuclear weapons states exert

on would-be proliferators.

Mitchell Reiss, Woodrow

Wilson International Center

Ready for the Leap of Faith? Michael MccGwire ("Elimi

nate or Marginalize?" spring

issue) makes a strong case for

the advantages to this country and the other nuclear weapon states of completely eliminating nuclear weapons, but his article

leaves me agnostic as to the

feasibility of this course during the 20- to 30-year period

MccGwire foresees.

Short of a nuclear catastro

phe, it is highly improbable that the governments of the nuclear

weapon states, especially the

United States, which would

have to take the lead in this

enterprise, will be willing in the

next two decades to take the

leap of faith in the future that

is required for a firm commit

ment to elimination. The main

reason for this caution is the

belief, which MccGwire him

self seems to share, at least in

part, that war, especially clashes

among the major powers, are

endemic and ineradicable.

Instead of asking these states

to commit themselves now

to completely eliminating their

weapons, we should seek to

persuade them to reduce their

nuclear arsenals to a low equal level (perhaps 200 warheads

each), folding the threshold nuclear states into this regime.

Weapons and fissile material

in these residual nuclear forces

would be separated from deliv

ery systems and stored on the

territory of the owner state

with protection against attack

by concealed weapons. This

approach makes residual arsenals

unusable for surprise attack but

does not require nuclear

weapon states to wholly

relinquish what to them is their

nuclear lifeline. A precondition would be vigorous improve ment of the nonproliferation

regime, as well as an increas

ingly effective worldwide

peacekeeping system composed of the United Nations and a network of regional security

organizations. If this system of a largely

denuclearized world works

for a generation, then it will

be time to urge eliminating all

nuclear weapons. We need to

articulate and support this final

stage of nuclear arms control

with just as much vigor as we

argue the case for elimination.

Jonathan Dean, Union

of Concerned Scientists

The Door Is Open H Michael MccGwire's recent

article ("Eliminate or Marginal ize?" spring issue) spotlighted the historic opportunity the

world has now to capitalize on recent positive changes in the international system and

reduce the risks that nuclear

weapons pose to the United

States and all other nations.

The collapse of the Soviet

Union swept away the bipolar

animosity of the Cold War and opened the door to more

cooperative relationships

among the great powers in

many areas, including arms

control and disarmament.

To build and strengthen this

emerging cooperative security

environment, the international

community should examine se

riously the question of whether

nuclear weapons can safely and securely be eliminated.

MccGwire argues correctly that the current situation, in which nuclear weapons are

relatively unimportant in world

affairs, could devolve into a

dangerous new era of prolifera tion and regional arms races

unless the international

community moves quickly to embrace the goal of a

nuclear-free world. Shifting from a world of multiple nuclear powers and nuclear

aspirants to a world without

nuclear weapons will require that formidable political,

technical, and diplomatic obstacles be overcome. But the

United States can significantly affect whether the world rises

to meet these challenges or

watches idly as the risk of a nu

clear exchange escalates rapidly. The United States should

take the critical first step in this disarmament process

by declaring clearly its own

commitment to the goal of

eliminating nuclear weapons.

Only when the United States

formally adopts the goal of

a nuclear-free world will the

necessary resources and high

2 THE BROOKINGS REVIEW

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