RAMON FABIE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.THE CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellant. Sanz & Opisso for appellees.

CARSON, J.:

FACTS:

The appellees are the owners in common of a large tract of land which forms a part of the estate known as theHacienda de Santa Ana de Sapa and which is inclosed between Calle Herran of the District of Paco and an estero known as Tripa de Gallina, and lying within the corporate limits of the city of Manila.

On the 26th day of November, 1909, the plaintiffs and appellees sought to obtain from the city of Manila a building permit authorizing the construction of a small nipa house upon the property in question. It was claimed that the purpose of the building was to serve as a guard house in which watchmen might be stationed in order to prevent the carrying away of zacate from the premises. The permit was denied by the city authorities on the ground that the site of the proposed building did not conform to the requirements of section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila, this provision is unconstitutional and in violation of the fundamental rights of the property owners ] that it constitutes an invasion of their property rights without due process of law. The lower court found in favor of appellees and declared the ordinance null and void,

ISSUE: WON the requirements of section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila CONSTITUTIONAL?

HELD

Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law, as the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.

We conclude that the proviso of the ordinance in question directing: "That the building shall abut or face upon a public street or alley which has been officially approved," is valid, and that the judgment of the lower court should be reversed, without special condemnation of costs. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

On September 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Soc-Gen contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take cognizance of it.ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.HELD: The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question.  This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: “All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. . . ..” The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself.  The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient time.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-9396.  August 16, 1956.]

MANILA MOTOR COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MANUEL T. FLORES, Defendant-Appellant.

 

D E C I S I O N

BENGZON, J.:

In May 1954, Manila Motor Company filed in the Municipal Court of Manila a complaint to recover from Manuel T. Flores the amount of P1,047.98 as chattel mortgage installments which fell due in September 1941. Defendant pleaded prescription:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 1941 to 1954. The complaint was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of First Instance saw differently, sustaining Plaintiff’s contention that the moratorium laws had interrupted the running of the prescriptive period, and that deducting the time during which said laws were in operation — three years and eight months 1 — the ten-year term had not yet elapsed when complainant sued for collection in May 1954. Wherefore said court ordered the return of the case to the municipal judge for trial on the merits.Defendant appealed, arguing principally that the moratorium laws did not have the effect of suspending the period of limitations, because they were unconstitutional

as declared by this court in Rutter vs. Esteban, 49 Off. Gaz. (5) 1807. He cites jurisprudence holding that when a statute is adjudged unconstitutional it is as inoperative as if it had never been passed, and no rights can be built upon it. 2

there are several instances wherein courts, out of equity, have relaxed its operation (cf. notes in Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations 8th ed., p. 383 and Notes 53 A. L. R., 273) or qualified its effects ‘since the actual existence of a statute prior to such declaration is an operative fact, and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored’ (Chicot County vs. Baster, 308 U. S., 371) and a realistic approach is eroding the general doctrine (Warring vs. Colpoys, 136 Am. Law Rep., 1025, 1030).”

Judgment affirmed, without costs.

Norton v. Shelby County - 118 U.S. 425 (1886)

The action of a minority of the justices of the peace of the County Court of Shelby County,

Tennessee, prior to May 5, 1870, did not operate as a ratification by the county court of the

previously invalid subscription of the county to stock in the Mississippi River Railroad Company,

and on and after that day, on which the new Constitution of Tennessee took effect, no

ratification could be made without previous assent of three-fourths of the voters of the county.

This suit was brought to enforce payment of twenty-nine bonds for $1,000 each issued by the

Board of Commissioners of Shelby County in payment of a subscription by the county to stock

in the Mississippi River Railroad Company. The form of the bond appears in the opinion of the

Court

This act was subsequently held by the Supreme Court of Tennessee to be unconstitutional and

invalid, and the board created by it to have had no legal existence. The board, however, before

it was so held had organized and had performed the functions of the County Court until

November, 1869

Before the Board of Commissioners abdicated, they ordered taxes to be levied to pay these

bonds, and the justices of the peace, upon resuming functions, received the money collected on

the tax and paid the interest on the bonds and paid the principal bonds maturing.

On the 5th May, 1870, a new constitution came into force in Tennessee, which contained the

following provisions:

"All laws and ordinances now in force and in use in this state not inconsistent with the

constitution shall continue in force But ordinances contained in any former constitution or

schedule thereto are hereby abrogated."

A large part of the payments of principal and interest above referred to was made after this

constitution came into force.

The court below ordered a verdict for the county, and from the judgment entered on such verdict

this writ of error was taken.

Churchill & Tait v. Rafferty

Facts

Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business, particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the Province of Rizal were removed upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue of the provisions of subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339.  

Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the billboards in question “ in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons.” Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after due investigation made upon the complaints of the British and German Consuls, the defendant “decided that the billboard complained of was and still offensive to the sight and is otherwise a nuisance.” 

Issue

1. Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate                                      exercise of the police power of the Government?

Held

The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well- recognized principle to further application. Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects, everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power. Judgment reversed.

STONE v. MISSISSIPPI.

The legislature of Mississippi passed an act, approved Feb. 16, 1867, entitled 'An Act

incorporating the Mississippi Agricultural and Manufacturing Aid Society.'

The Constitution of the State, adopted in convention May 15, 1868, and ratified by the people

Dec. 1, 1869, declares that 'the legislature shall never authorize any lottery; nor shall the sale of

lottery-tickets be allowed; nor shall any lottery heretofore authorized be permitted to be drawn,

or tickets therein to be sold.' The legislature passed an act, approved July 16, 1870, entitled 'An

Act enforcing the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi, prohibiting all kinds of

lotteries within said State, and making it unlawful to conduct one in this State.'

The Attorney-General of Mississippi filed, March 17, 1874, in the Circuit Court of Warren County

in that State, an information in the nature of a quo warranto, against John B. Stone and others,

alleging that, without authority or warrant of law, they were then, and for the preceding twelve

months had been, carrying on a lottery or gift enterprise within said county and State under the

name of 'The Mississippi Agricultural, Educational, By their answer the respondents admit that

they were carrying on a lottery enterprise under the name mentioned.

The court, holding that the act of incorporation had been abrogated and annulled by the

Constitution of 1868 and the legislation of July 16, 1870, adjudged that the respondents be

ousted of and from all the liberties and privileges, franchises and emoluments, exercised by

them under and by virtue of the said act.

The judgment was, on error, affirmed by the Supreme Court, and Stone and others sued out this

writ.

Judgment affirmed.

ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ [101 PHIL 1155; L-7995; 31 MAY 1957]

Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was passed. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was violated according to him.

Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.

U.S. Supreme Court

The prohibition of the manufacture out of oleaginous substances, or out of any compound

thereof other than that produced from unadulterated milk or cream from unadulterated milk, of

an article designed to take the place of butter or cheese produced from pure unadulterated milk

or cream from unadulterated milk, or the prohibition upon the manufacture of any imitation or

adulterated butter or cheese, or upon the selling or offering for sale, or having in possession

with intent to sell, the same, as an article of food, is a lawful exercise by the power to protect, by

police regulations, the public health.

Whether the manufacture of oleomargarine or imitation butter of the kind described in the Act of

the Legislature of Pennsylvania of May 21, 1885 (Laws of Penn. of 1885, p. 22, No. 25) is or

may be conducted in such a way or with such skill and secrecy as to baffle ordinary inspection,

or whether it involves such danger to the public health as to require, for the protection of the

people, the entire suppression of the business, rather than its regulation in such manner as to

permit the manufacture and sale of articles of that class that do not contain noxious ingredients,

are questions of fact and of public policy which belong to the legislative department to determine

.

The statute of Pennsylvania of May 21, 1885, "for the protection of the public health, and to

prevent adulteration of dairy products and fraud in the sale thereof" neither denies to persons

within the jurisdiction of the state the equal protection of the laws nor deprives persons of their

property without that compensation required by law, and is not repugnant in these respects to

the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The case is stated in the opinion.

LUTZ v. ARANETAGR No. L-7859, December 22, 195598 PHIL 148

FACTS: Plaintiff Walter Lutz, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Antionio Ledesma,sought to recover from the CIR the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of the CA567 or the Sugar Adjustment Act thereby assailing its constitutionality, for it provided for an increase of the

existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, alleging that such enactment is not being levied for a public purposebut solely and exclusively for the aid and support of the sugar industry thus making it void and unconstitutional.The sugar industry situation at the time of the enactment was in an imminent threat of loss and needed to bestabilized by imposition of emergency measures.

ISSUE: Is CA 567 constitutional, despite its being allegedly violative of the equal protection clause, the purpose ofwhich is not for the benefit of the general public but for the rehabilitation only of the sugar industry?

HELD: Yes. The protection and promotion of the sugar industry is a matter of public concern, it follows that theLegislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for itspromotion. Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed to fully play, subject only to the test ofreasonableness; and it is not contended that the means provided in the law bear no relation to the objectivepursued or are oppressive in character. If objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seenwhy the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made theimplement of the state's police power.

Gaston vs. Republic Planter, 158 SCRA 626Facts:Petitioners are sugar producers and planters and millers filed aMANDAMUS to implement the privatization of Republic Planters Bank, and for thetransfer of the shares in the government bank to sugar producers and planters.(because they are allegedly the true beneficial owners of the bank since they pay P1.00per picul of sugar from the proceeds of sugar producers as STABILIZATION FEES).The shares are currently held by Philsucom / Sugar Regulatory Admin.The Solgen countered that the stabilization fees are considered governmentfunds and that the transfer of shares to from Philsucom to the sugar producers would beirregular.

Issues: What is the nature of the P1.00 stabilization fees collected from sugar producers? Are they funds held in trust for them, or are they public funds? Are theshares in the bank (paid using these fees) owned by the government Philsucom or privately by the different sugar planters from whom such fees were collected?

RULING:PUBLIC FUNDS. While it is true that the collected fees were usedto buy shares in RPB, it did not collect said fees for the account of sugar producers. Thestabilization fees were charged on sugar produced and milled which ACCRUED TOPHILSUCOM, under PD 338.The fees collected ARE IN THE NATURE OF A TAX., which is within the power of the state to impose FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE SUGAR INDUSTRY. Theyconstitute sugar liens. The collections accrue to a SPECIAL FUNDS. It is levied notpurely for taxation, but for regulation, to provide means TO STABILIZE THE SUGARINDUSTRY. The levy is primarily an exercise of police powers

Association of Small Landowners vs Sec of Agrarian Reform

on November 22, 2010

The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and

owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked

by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were

declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D.

No. 27.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds

inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the

constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use

without just compensation.

They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she

promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article

XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small

landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other

requisites of a valid appropriation.

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly

acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to

the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to

sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of

sale may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to

sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the

power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of

the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to

the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as

in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

THE UNITED STATES vs LUIS TORIBIO, G.R. NO. L-5060, January 26, 1910 (15 Phil 85)

Facts:

Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the violation of sections 30 & 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. Evidence sustained in the trial court found that appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality where it was slaughtered. Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the animal but was not given one because the carabao was not found to be “unfit for agricultural work” which resulted to appellant to slaughter said carabao in a place other than the municipal slaughterhouse. Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under Act No. 1147 which states that only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be slaughtered.

Held:

The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the State may order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passers by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a conflagration; the slaughter of diseased‐ cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court.

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.

Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this "general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."

 Republic vs. La Orden De PP. Benedictinos De Filipinas,G.R. No. L-12792, February 28, 1961The Power of Eminent DomainTo ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Government drew plansto extend Azcarraga street from its junction with Mendiola street, up to the Sta. MesaRotonda, Sampaloc, Manila.The petitioner in this case is theRepublic of the Philippines through the Office of theSolicitor General ;and the respondent isLa Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, adomestic religious corporation that owns the San Beda College.Facts:To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Governmentdrew plans to extendAzcarraga St. (now Recto)from its junction with Mendiola St., up tothe Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To carry out this plan it offeredto buy a portionof approximately 6,000 square metersof a bigger parcel belonging to La Orden situatedon Mendiola St. Not having been able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner,the Government instituted an expropriation proceeding. OnMay 27, 1957the trial courtvalued the property in question atP270,000.00and authorized appellant to take immediatepossession upon depositing said amount. The deposit having been made with the CityTreasurer of Manila, the trial court issued the corresponding order directing the Sheriff of Manila to place appellant in possession of the property aforesaid.In answer, the herein appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the groundsthat: (1) the property sought to be expropriated is already dedicated to public use andtherefore is not subject to expropriation; (2) there is no necessity for the proposedexpropriation; (3) the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a different sitewhich would entail less expense to the Government and which would not necessitate theexpropriation of a property dedicated to education.The trial court granted the motion, holding that the expropriation was not of extremenecessity. Hence this present petition.Issue:Whether or not there is a genuine necessity for the exercise of the Power of EminentDomain.Held:It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for publicuse and upon payment of just compensation; that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine necessity therefor of a publiccharacter. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exerciseof the right of eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a genuine necessitytherefor.It does not need extended argument to show that whether or not the proposed opening of the Azcarraga extension is a necessity in order to relieve the daily congestion of traffic on

 

Legarda St., is a question of fact dependent not only upon the facts of which the trial courtvery liberally took judicial notice but also up on other factors that do not appear of recordand must, therefore, be established by means of evidence.The parties should have beengiven an opportunity to present their respective evidenceupon these factors andothers that might be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of factinvolved, namely, the need to open the extension of Azcarraga street to ease and solve thetraffic congestion on Legarda street.WHEREFORE,the appealed order of dismissal is set asideand thepresent case isremanded to the trial courtfor further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011

26 SCRA 620 (1969) (Constitutional Law – Eminent Domain, Expropriation, Just Compensation)

FACTS: Public petitioner commenced a suit against private respondent praying for the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to demand interconnection between the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT, so that the Government Telephone System could make use of the lines and facilities of the PLDT. Private respondent contends that it cannot be compelled to enter into a contract where no agreement is had between them.

ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a valid object for expropriation.

HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Republic may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation. The use of lines and services to allow inter-service connection between the both telephone systems, through expropriation can be a subject to an easement of right of way.

PLDT v. NTC 190 SCRA 717

In 1958, Felix Alberto & Co., Inc (FACI) was granted by Congress a franchise to build radio stations (later construed as to include telephony). FACI later changed its name to Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI). In 1987, ETCI was granted by the National Telecommunications Commission a provisional authority to build a telephone system in some parts of Manila. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) opposed the said grant as it avers, among others, that ETCI is not qualified because its franchise has already been invalidated when it failed to exercise it within 10 years from 1958; that in 1987, the

Albertos, owners of more than 40% of ETCI’s shares of stocks, transferred said stocks to the new stockholders (Cellcom, Inc.? – not specified in the case); that  such transfer involving more than 40% shares of stocks amounted to a transfer of franchise which is void because the authorization of Congress was not obtained. The NTC denied PLDT. PLDT then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the NTC.ISSUE: Whether or not PLDT’s petition should prosper.HELD: No.

1. PLDT cannot attack ETCI’s franchise in a petition for certiorari. It cannot be collaterally attacked. It should

be directly attacked through a petition for quo warranto which is the correct procedure. A franchise is a

property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. The determination of the

right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-

user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto. Further, for any violation of the

franchise, it should be the government who should be filing a quo warranto proceeding because it was

the government who granted it in the first place.

People v Fajardo G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958

J. B. L . Reyes

Facts:

 Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance that

prohibits the construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects

the grant of permission to the mayor.

After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline stationnear

the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied.  He continued with the constructionunder the

rationale that he needed a house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon.

He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing view.

He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the ordinance’s

constitutionality.

Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?

Held: No, petition granted.

Ratio:

The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary

and unlimited conferment.

Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may

be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should

have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities

cited above sustain this conclusion.

The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants

of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts

to a taking of appellants property without just compensation.

While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may eliminate

structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of

their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance

of the community.

Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To do

this legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any

reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the

property.

The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:

SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. — The municipal council shall have

authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:

x x x           x x x           x x x

(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be

constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a

fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos

for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under

the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.

Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established

fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed

or repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was

not conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c)