Republic v. CA

- The subject property was first owned by Santos de la Cruz who declared the same in his name under Tax Declaration- Subsequently, the subject property was successively bought or acquired by Pedro Cristobal

o They presented Tax Declarations as proof

- After Gil Alhambra died, his heirs extra-judicially partitioned the subject property and declared it in their names- On 5 July 1966, they executed a "Deed of Sale With Mortgage" deeding the subject property to petitioner-appellee,

the payment of which was secured by a mortgage on the property- After the sale, petitioner-appellee took possession of the subject property and paid the taxes due thereon- Due to losses, the property in question was cultivated only for a while- On 14 November 1986, petitioner-appellee filed a petition, which was amended on 17 July 1987, for the registration

and confirmation of his title over the subject property- Oppositor-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic, for brevity), filed its opposition

o Petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest have not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto

- The Heirs of de la Cruz and Kadakilaan Estate likewise filed their oppositiono Their predecessor-in-interest, Santos de la Cruz, is the "primitive owner" of the subject loto He, his heirs, and upon their tolerance, some other persons have been in open, peaceful, notorious and

continuous possession of the land in question since time immemorial- The Kadakilaan Estate contends

o By reason of its Titulo de Propiedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree 01-4, with approved plans registered under the Torrens System in compliance with, and as a consequence of, P.D. 872, it is the owner of the subject property

o Petitioner-appellee or his predecessors-in-interest have not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or earlier

- On 3 January 1991 Proclamation No. 679 was issued by the President of the Republic of the Philippines withdrawing the subject property from sale or settlement

- LC rendered judgmento Confirmed Democrito Plaza’s title over Relocation Plan 1059

- CA affirmed the decision of LC- Hence this petition

o According to petitioner, aside from mere tax declarations all of which are of recent vintage, private respondent has not established actual possession of the property

o Petitioner also alleges that the land in question had been withdrawn from the alienable portion of the public domain pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 679

- Proof that petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest have acquired and have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property for a period of 30 years under a bona fide claim of ownership are the tax declarations of petitioner-appellee's predecessors-in-interest, the deed of sale, tax payment receipts and petitioner-appellee's tax declarations

- They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property- The proclamation did not prohibit the registration of title of one who claims, and proves, to be the owner thereof

o Merely withdrew it from sale but still subject to actual survey and existing private rightso Registration does not vest title; merely evidence of title

- We have found that petitioner-appellee has proven his claim of ownership over the subject propertyo This does not contravene or negate the intention of the proclamation

- Petition is DISMISSED

Pleasantville Development Corporation v. CA

- Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land

- In 1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant- A TCT was then issued under his name- It was then that he discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had

taken possession thereof- It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T. Torres

Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of petitionero Under the Contract to Sell on Installment, Kee could possess the lot even before the completion of all

installment payments- After the preparation of the lot plan and a copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI through its employee, Zenaida Octaviano,

accompanied Kee’s wife, Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8- Unfortunately, the parcel of land pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his

residence, a store, an auto repair shop and other improvements on the lot- After failing to reach an amicable settlement, a complaint for ejectment was filed against Kee in the MTCC- Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI- MTCC ruled:

o The MTCC found that petitioner had already rescinded its contract with Kee over Lot 8 for the latter’s failure to pay the installments due

o The rescission was effected in 1979 before the complaint was institutedo The MTCC concluded that Kee no longer had any right over the lot subject of the contract between him and

petitioner. Consequently, Kee must pay reasonable rentals for the use of Lot 9, and, furthermore, he cannot claim reimbursement for the improvements he introduced

- RTC ruled:o Kee was a builder in bad faitho Assuming that he was a builder in good faith, nonetheless, guilty of unlawfully usurping the possessory right

of Jardinico over Lot 9 from the time he was served with notice to vacate said lot- He appealed directly to the SC, but referred back to the CA

o The appellate court ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the “mix-up” when he began construction

o It further ruled that the erroneous delivery was due to the negligence of CTTEI, and that such wrong delivery was likewise imputable to its principal, petitioner herein.

- Petitioner then filed the instant petition against Kee, Jardinico and CTTEI- W/N Kee was a builder in good faith- The roots of the controversy can be traced directly to the errors committed by CTTEI, when it pointed the wrong

property to Wilson Kee and his wife- Under the circumstances, Kee had acted in the manner of a prudent man in ascertaining the identity of his property

o Lot 8 is covered by a TCT different from that which covers Lot 9; Kee is then presumed to have knowledge of the metes and bounds of his property

o But as Kee is a layman not versed in the technical description of his property, he had to find a way to ascertain that what was described was Lot 8

o Hence, he was accompanied by a CTTEI employee, who declared that the land she was pointing at is Lot 8o There was no reason for Kee to be present during the geodetic engineer’s relocation survey as the final

delivery of subdivision lots was part of the regular course of business of CTTEI- Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or

flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee- At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was

not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8o Petitioner failed to prove otherwise

- Petitioner, to demonstrate bad faith, pointed to contractual breaches committed by Keeo Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state

of mindo These merely give rise to a cause of action

- Petitioner then points out the rescission of the contract between Kee and the formero This fact does not negate the negligence in the pointing of the wrong lot to Keeo This merely gives rise an action for unlawful detainer

- As for the petitioner’s liabilityo CTTEI is the agent of petitioner

o The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, done within the scope of his authority, and should bear the damage caused to third persons. On the other hand, the agent who exceeds his authority is personally liable for the damage

o CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate representative of petitioner when it made the delivery to Kee. In acting within its scope of authority, it was, however, negligent; should then be held liable for damages

- The rights of Kee and Jardinico vis-a-vis each other, as builder in good faith and owner in good faith, respectively, are regulated by law

- Kee and Jardinico have amicably settled through their deed of sale their rights and obligations with regards to Lot 9- Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED

o Kee was a builder in good faitho Petitioner and its agent are solidarily liable for damages due to negligence

Kasilag v. Roque

- The heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio commenced a civil case for the recovery of possession of the land and its improvements from petitioner, which was granted to Emiliana by way of homestead

- Petitioner alleged that he was in possession of the land and that he was receiving the fruits thereof by virtue of a mortgage contract between him and the deceased

- A year after the execution of the said deed, Emiliana was unable to pay the stipulated interests as well as the tax on the land and its improvements

o They then entered into an oral contract whereby she conveyed the to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not collect interest, attend to the payment of land tax, benefit from the fruits of the land and would introduce improvements thereon

- Thus, petitioner entered upon the possession of the land- The CA concludes thus:

o That the contract entered into by and between the parties, set out in the said public deed, was one of absolute purchase and sale of the land and its improvements

o It held the whole contract null and void and without legal effect as well as the subsequent verbal contract- The literal sense of the stipulations in the contract should be followed

o If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail

- The words used by the contracting parties in the deed clearly show that they intended to enter into the principal contract of loan in the amount of P1,000, with interest at 12 per cent per annum

o In other words, the parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness for P1,000 and the stipulated interest thereon

- Another fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than those indicated, is to the effect that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order should be separated from the valid and legal contract and when such separation can be made because they are independent of the valid contract

- In the contract, should Emiliana fail to pay the mortgage, she would execute a deed of absolute saleo This was however modified in that the petitioner would take possession of the land and would benefit by

the fruits thereof on condition that he would condone the payment of interest upon the loan and he would attend to the payment of the land tax

o This converted it into a contract of antichresis This being a real encumbrance burdening the land, this is illegal and void

- Hence, it was error to hold that the contract entered into was one of absolute sale and for holding that the contract is null and void

- Moreover, the petitioner was arguing that the CA erred in holding that the petitioner was a holder in bad faith in taking possession of the land and in taking advantage of the fruits thereof

o From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in section 116

o This being the case, the question is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable

ignorance may be such basis- It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of

the improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land

- In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116

o Hence, his ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith

o Therefore, the respondents are entitled to the improvements upon indemnifying the petitioner or compel the petitioner to buy the land by paying its market value

- The appealed decision is REVERSEDo The contract is valid and bindingo The contract of antichresis is null and void and without legal effecto Petitioner is a possessor in good faith

Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery Corp

- The "Compañia Agricola Filipina" bought a considerable quantity of rice-cleaning machinery company from the defendant machinery company, and executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price

o It included in the mortgage deed the building of strong materials in which the machinery was installed, without any reference to the land on which it stood

- The indebtedness was not paid, the mortgaged property was thus sold by the sheriff and was bought by the machinery company

- A few weeks thereafter, on or about the 14th of January, 1914, the "Compañia Agricola Filipina" executed a deed of sale of the land upon which the building stood to the machinery company, but this deed of sale, although executed in a public document, was not registered

- At or about the time when the chattel mortgage was executed in favor of the machinery company, the mortgagor, the "Compañia Agricola Filipina" executed another mortgage to the plaintiff upon the building, separate and apart from the land on which it stood, to secure payment of the balance of its indebtedness to the plaintiff under a contract for the construction of the building

o Upon failure of the mortgagor to pay, it levied the execution upon the building- At the time when the execution was levied upon the building, the defendant machinery company, which was in

possession, filed with the sheriff a sworn statement setting up its claim of title and demanding the release of the property from the levy

- The sheriff sold the property at public auction to the plaintiff, who was the highest bidder at the sheriff's sale- This action was instituted by the plaintiff to recover possession of the building from the machinery company- TC ruled in favor of the machinery company

o The company had its title to the building registered prior to the date of registry of the plaintiff's certificateo Relied on Article 1473

If the same thing is sold to many vendees, the ownership should transfer to the person who may have first taken possession in good faith

If it’s real property, it shall belong to the party who first recorded it in the registry If there’s no entry, then it shall belong to the person who first took possession in good faith

- The Court however rules that the property mortgaged is not personal but real property, considering that it was attached to the building of strong materials

- The ruling of the TC should be sustained on the basis of the third paragraph as herein respondent took possession of it first

- Having bought in the building at the sheriff's sale with full knowledge that at the time of the levy and sale the building had already been sold to the machinery company by the judgment debtor, the plaintiff cannot be said to have been a purchaser in good faith

o The subsequent inscription of the sheriff’s certificate of title must likewise be tainted with the same defecto Good faith does not merely relate to possession and title, but also to the inscription of the property

- One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith

- Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED

Banco Espanol Filipino v, Peterson

- The Spanish-Filipino Bank filed a complaint against the sheriff of the city of Manila and the other defendant, Juan Garcia for declaring that the execution levied upon the property referred to in the complaint, to wit, wines, liquors, canned goods, and other similar merchandise, was illegal

- Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that under the contract entered into on the 4th of March, 1905, by and between the Spanish-Filipino Bank and Francisco Reyes, the former, loaned to the latter the sum of P141,702 which, added to the amount of the loan, made a total of P226,117.38, Philippine currency

- That to secure the payment of these two sums and the interest thereon, the debtor, Francisco Reyes, by a public instrument executed before a notary on the aforesaid date mortgaged in favor of the plaintiff bank several pieces of property belonging to him, and pledged to the said bank part of his personal property

o That in the aforesaid deed of pledge it was agreed by and between the bank and the debtor, Reyes, that the goods should be delivered to Ramon Garcia y Planas for safe-keeping

- On the 19th of October, 1905, in an action brought in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila by Juan Garcia y Planas against Francisco Reyes and Ramon Agtarat

o Judgment was rendered against the last-mentioned two for the sum of P15,000 upon which judgment execution was issued against the property of the defendants, Reyes and Agtarap

- For the purpose of levying upon the property of the defendants, the sheriff at the request of Garcia, seized the goods which had been pledged to the bank, depriving the latter of the possession of the same

o Without the authority of the bank, Reyes could not dispose of the said goods- The said sheriff continued to refuse to return the same to the bank and insist that until the Court prohibits him, he

would proceed with the public auction and apply the proceeds to the satisfaction of the judgment rendered in favor of Garcia

- The defendant sheriff, Peterson and Juan Garcia accordingly asked that the action be dismissed and that it be adjudged that the plaintiff had no interest whatever in the property described in the complaint

- The court below entered judgment on the 4th of January, 1906, dismissing plaintiff's action and directing that the defendant recover from the Spanish-Filipino Bank

- Main issue is W/N the contract of pledge entered into by and between the Spanish-Filipino Bank and Francisco Reyes to secure a loan made by the former to the latter was valid, with all the requisites prescribed by the Civil Code having been complied with

- The contract in question complies with all the requisites provided in article 1857 of the Civil Codeo The property was pledged to secure a debt the date of the execution, the terms of the pledge, and the

property pledged, all of which appears in a public document, and the property pledged was placed in the hands of a third person by common consent of the debtor and creditor, under the supervision of an agent of the bank

- From the evidence introduced at the trial, both oral and documentary, it appears that a third person, appointed by the common consent of the debtor and creditor, was in possession of the goods pledged in favor of the bank under the direct supervision of an agent of the bank expressly appointed for this purpose

o Testimonies support the fact that Reyes did not continue with the possession of the goods after they had been pledged to the plaintiff bank

- The contract in question was, therefore, a perfect contract of pledge under articles 1857 and 1863o Conclusively shown that the pledgee took charge and possession of the goods pledged through a depository

and a special agent appointed by ito The owner, the pledgor, could no longer dispose of the same, the pledgee being the only one authorized to

do so through the depositary and special agent who represented it, the symbolical transfer of the goods by means of the delivery of the keys to the warehouse where the goods were stored being sufficient to show that the depositary appointed by the common consent of the parties was legally placed in possession of the goods

o The fact that the goods remained in the warehouse of Reyes is immaterial- The fact that the debtor, Reyes, procured purchasers and made arrangements for the sale of the goods pledged and

that the bills for the goods thus sold were signed by him does not affect the validity of the contract, for the pledgor, Reyes, continued to be the owner of the goods

- Judgment is hereby REVERSED; the plaintiff had a preferential right over that of the defendant Garcia

German Management and Services Inc v. CA

- Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan

- On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their property into a residential subdivision

- Finding that part of the property was occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused

- Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents

o forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without noticeo bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of private respondents by means of force,

violence and intimidationo trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject private respondents from their respective

farmholdings- The respondents then filed an action for forcible entry against the petitioner

o Alleging that they are the mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawano That they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some 12 to 15 years prior to the promulgation of PD

27o Petitioner deprived them of their property without due process of law

- MTC dismissed respondents complaint for forcible entry- RTC sustained the decision of the MTC- CA reversed the decisions of the lower courts

o since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession

- Petitioner’s MR was denied- Hence this appeal- Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject property, private

respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue

o Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate- In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private respondents were already

in possession thereof- Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such

evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case- It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet

possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror- The MTC and RTC rationalized their decision on the basis of the principle of self-help

o Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar

o When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property

- Petition is DENIED

Cuaycong v. Benedicto

- The issues in this case relate to the right of plaintiffs to make use of two roads existing on the Hacienda Toreno which is the property of the defendants

- One of these roads is referred to in the proceedings as the Nanca-Victorias road and the other as the Dacuman-Toreno road

- The allegations in the complaint with respect to the Nanca-Victorias road are that the appellees, Eduardo Cuaycong, Lino Cuaycong, and Eulalio Dolor, are the owners of a group of haciendas situated between the southern boundary of the Hacienda Toreno and the barrio of Nanca

o That more than twenty years the appellees and their predecessors in interest have made use of the Nanca-Victorias road, which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, openly, publicly, and continiously, with the knowledge of the owners of the said hacienda

o That on the fifteenth day of November, 1912, the defendants closed the road in question- Defendants in their answer averred that the road crossing the Hacienda Toreno, over which plaintiffs claim the right

of passage, is the private property of defendantso That they have not refused plaintiffs permission to pass over this road but have required them to pay toll for

the privilege of doing so- The court held that it was a public highway over which the public had acquired a right of use by immemorial

prescriptiono It was only in 1911-1913 that toll was being collected; apparently done to raise funds for its repair

- The question is whether this use was limited to the plaintiffs, and their tenants and employees, or whether it was, as held by the lower court, a use enjoyed by the public in general

- Plaintiffs produced 2 witnesses who testified with regard to the use of the road by the present and former owners and occupants of the estates of Bacayan, Esperanza, Alcaigan, Pusot, and Dolores for the transportation of the products of these estates to the town of Victorias, and of supplies and agricultural implements from Victorias to the haciendas, but neither of them testified expressly that any other use had been made of said road

o it may be reasonably inferred that the public made use of the road but such use did not extend beyond transportation of products and supplies and agricultural implements from Victorias to the haciendas

- Apart from the fact that there is no direct evidence to support the finding of the court concerning the general public use of the road in dispute, the record contains data strongly tending to show that when the complaint was filed, plaintiffs did not contend that the road was a public highway, but merely contended that they had acquired by prescription an easement of way across the Hacienda Toreno

- It also appears that the road has existed since 1885 but still did not prove that the road was a public highway- Although the defendants closed the Nanca-Victorias road in the month of February, 1911; nothing was done by them

to prevent the continuation of this restriction until December, 1912, when this action was commenced- It was thus concluded that

o The road has been in existence for 30-40 yearso No public funds have been spent for its construction or upkeep, but was worked on by laborers of the

owners of the haciendas and their predecessors-in-interesto The Nanca-Victorias wagon road, including that part of it which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, has for thirty-

five or forty years been used by the appellees and their predecessors in title for the transportation, by the usual means, of the products of their estates to their shipping points in or near the town of Victorias, and the transportation to their estates of all supplies required by them, and has been used by all persons having occasion to travel to and from all or any of the estates now owned by the appellees

o The use of the Nanca-Victorias road in the manner and by the person above mentioned was permitted without objection by the owners of the Hacienda Toreno until the year 1911, when they closed it, and began charging a toll

o The Nanca-Victorias road constitutes the only outlet from the estates of appellants to the nearest public road

- W/N the Nanca-Victorias road a public highway- The defendants are the owners of the Hacienda Toreno under a Torrens title

o It is admitted that there is no annotation on the certificate of title regarding the road here in question, either as a "public road" or as a "private way established by law,"

- There is no evidence, even remotely, tending to show that the road existed prior to the time when the property now known as the Hacienda Toreno passed from the State into private ownership

- The record fails to disclose any evidence whatever tending to show that the Government has at any time asserted any right or title in or to the land occupied by the road, or that it has incurred any expense whatever in its upkeep or construction

- The evidence shows that the repairs were made by the owners of the estates benefited by the road, and by their laborers, as a pure voluntary act for their own convenience and interest

- There being no evidence that the original use of the road by plaintiffs' predecessors was based upon any grant of the fee to the road or of an easement of way, or that it began under the assertion of a right on their part, the presumption must be that the origin of the use was the mere tolerance or license of the owners of the estates affected

- the claims of plaintiffs, whether regarded as members of the public asserting a right to use the road as such, or as persons claiming a private easement of way over the land of another must be regarded as resting upon the mere fact of user

o it was not shown that the road had been maintained at the public expense to show adverse possession by the government

- It is a fundamental principle of the law in this jurisdiction concerning the possession of real property that such possession is not affected by acts of a possessory character which are "merely tolerated" by the possessor, or which are due to his license

o Mere permission granted by the owner for people to cross his property does not equate to his relinquishment of his ownership

- Acts of a possessory character performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription

- We are, therefore, of the opinion, and so hold, that upon the facts established by the evidence it does not appear that the road in question is a public road or way

o Their use of the Nanca-Victorias road across the Hacienda Toreno was due merely to the tacit license and tolerance of the defendants and their predecessors in title

o That license was essentially revocableo The defendants were within their rights when they closed the road in 1911

- We are also of the opinion that plaintiffs have failed to show that they have acquired by prescription a private right of passage over the lands of defendants

- No evidence was shown to prove immemorial useo It is evident, therefore, that no vested right by user from time immemorial had been acquired by plaintiffs

- Judgment is REVERSED

Bishop of Balanga v. CA

- The parties do not dispute that the Roman Catholic Archbishop [sic] of Manila was the owner of a parcel of land covered by OCT No. 14379

- With respect to its rights over its properties in Bataan (inclusive of Lot No. 1272), the said church was succeeded by the Roman Catholic Bishop of San Fernando, Pampanga which was, likewise, succeeded by . . . Catholic Bishop of Balanga — registered as a corporation on 15 December 1975

- Prior thereto, or on 23 August 1936 the then parish priest and administrator of all the properties of the said church in the Municipality of Balanga Bataan, Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili, executed an Escritura De Donacion donating an area of Lot No. 1272 to Ana de los Reyes and her heirs, as a reward for her long and satisfactory service to the church

- Her acceptance of the donation, as well as her possession of the subject property, is indicated in the deed of donation, which deed, for unknown reasons, was refused registration by the Register of Deeds

o In 1939, Ana died- Nevertheless, before her death, she had given the subject property to her nephew who had been living with her, the

herein defendant-appellant [private respondent] who immediately took possession of the property in concept of owner

- Herein petitioner filed the instant complaint against him after more than 49 years after the deed of donation was executed

o Alleged that the respondent, w/o knowledge and consent of the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest, entered and occupied the subject property and that defendant refused to vacate the premises

- As his defense, defendant-appellant [private respondent] maintains that by virtue of the deed of donation of 23 August 1936 executed in favor of his predecessor-in-interest, he is the lawful owner of the subject property and the complaint states no cause of action as it was filed only to harass him

- After 10 months, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the instant action is barred by the statute of limitations

- Petitioner opposed alleging that the defense of prescription was not raised in a timely filed motion to dismiss- LC rendered judgment

o Defendant-appellant [private respondent] failed to present the necessary power of attorney executed by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila giving Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili the authority to execute the deed of donation

o The first 2 paragraphs of the Excritura de Donacion indicates that the parish priest . . . was only the administrator of all, hence, had no authority to dispose in whatever manner any of the properties of the Roman Catholic Church of Balanga, Bataan

o Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili was not authorized to, and could not validly, donate the subject loto Thus, the deed of donation he executed is unenforceable under Art. 1403 of the New Civil Code and

defendant-appellant [private respondent], as well as his predecessor-in-interest, never acquired ownership over the subject property

- CA ruled in favor of respondento Private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the subject property through acquisitive

prescription because the same having been duly registered under the Torrens systemo Nonetheless, respondent Court of Appeals ultimately ruled that under the doctrine of laches, the

consequence of petitioner's inaction for 49 years since the execution of the deed of donation, despite its apparently undeniable knowledge of private respondent's adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner from 1936 to the institution of the recovery suit in 1985, is that it has lost its rights to the subject property and can no longer recover the same

- Hence this petitiono Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,

by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier

The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a litigant whose claim or demand has become "stale", or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length of time

o Elements of laches Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation

complained of Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and

after he has an opportunity to sue Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the

right on which he bases his suit Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant

- Petition is DISMISSED