Author: Samantha Tan Piansay v David (1964)

Petition: Appeal from an order of CFI Manila Petitioners: SALVADOR PIANSAY and CLAUDIA V. VDA. DE UY KIM Respondents: CONRADO S. DAVID and MARCOS MANGUBAT Ponencia: Concepcion DOCTRINE: Regardless of the validity of a contract constituting a chattel mortgage on a house, as between the parties to the said contract, the same cannot and doesn’t bind third persons who aren’t parties to the aforementioned contract or their privies. FACTS:

1. Conrado S. David received a loan of P3,000 with interest at 12% per annum from Claudia B. Vda. de Uy Kim. For this loan, David executed a chattel mortgage on a house situated at 1259 Sande Street, Tondo, Manila.

2. The mortgaged house was sold at public auction and was sold to Uy Kim in the said foreclosure proceedings. Uy Kim then sold the said house to Marcos Mangubat.

3. Mangubat filed a complaint (Civil Case #29078) against David

in the CFI Manila, for the collection of the loan of P2,000 and the annulment of the deed of absolute sale executed by Uy Kim in favor of Salvador Piansay. (Note: It seems Uy Kim sold the mortgaged house to two people, Mangubat and Piansay)

a. Decision was rendered ordering David to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000 and dismissing the complaint to annul the sale, declaring the Piansay as rightful owner of the house.

b. CA reversed this decision saying David is the rightful owner of the house.

4. Thus petitioners instituted another civil case (Civil Case #47664) against David and Mangubat in CFI Manila wherein they claim Piansay is the lawful owner of the house.

ISSUE:

1. WoN the chattel mortgage and the sale between Uy Kim and Piansay were valid.

PROVISIONS: Art 416 of the Civil Code RULING + RATIO:

1. No. x Mrs. Uy Kim had no right to foreclose the alleged chattel

mortgage constituted in her favor, because it was in reality a mere contract of an unsecured loan.

o Even if the chattel mortgage was registered, since what was conveyed was in the nature of real property, the registration of the document in the registry of chattels is merely a futile act and produces no effect.

x She could not, in the same token, have sold it validly to Salvador Piansay.

x Regardless of the validity of a contract constituting a chattel mortgage on a house, as between the parties to the said contract, the same cannot and doesn’t bind third persons who aren’t parties to the aforementioned contract or their privies.

o As a consequence, the sale of the house in question in the proceedings for the sale of the house in the proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of said chattel mortgage, is null and void insofar as Mangubat is concerned and didn’t confer upon Kim as buyer in said sale, any dominical right in and to said house.

DISPOSITION: Appealed cases are affirmed with costs against petitioners.

Author: Danielle Marie C. Tan SIBAL V VALDEZ (1927)

Petitioner:Leon Sibal Respondent:Emiliano J. Valdez, Et. Al. Ponencia: Johnson, J. DOCTRINE: A crop raised on leased premises belongs to the lessee and in no sense forms part of the immovable. “Ungathered products” have the nature of personal property. In other words, the phrase “personal property” should be understood to include “ungathered products.” Crops, whether growing or standing in the field ready to be harvested, are, when produced by annual cultivation, no part of the realty FACTS: Plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of land. Plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and the interest corresponding thereto. However, Valdez refused to accept the money and to return the sugar cane to the plaintiff. Meanwhile, defendant argued that the sugar cane was personal property hence not subject to redemption. ISSUES: WoN the sugar cane is to be considered as Personal Property

RULING + RATIO: Yes, Sugar cane in the case at bar is to be considered as personal property. A crop raised on leased premises in no sense forms part of the immovable. It belongs to the lessee, and may be sold by him, whether it be gathered or not, and it may be sold by his judgment creditors. “Ungathered products” have the nature of personal property. In other words, the phrase “personal property” should be understood to include “ungathered products.” Crops, whether growing or standing in the field ready to be harvested, are, when produced by annual cultivation, no part of the realty Paragraph 2, Article 334 of the Civil Code interpreted by the Tribunal Supremo de Espana as that growing crops may be considered as personal property Sugar cane may come under the classification of real property as "ungathered products" in paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code, which enumerates as real property as "Trees, plants, and ungathered products, while they are annexed to the land or form an integral part of any immovable property." That article, however, has received in recent years an interpretation by the Tribunal Supremo de España, which holds that, under certain conditions, growing crops may be considered as personal property. (Decision of March 18, 1904, vol. 97, Civil Jurisprudence of Spain.) Thus, under Spanish authorities, pending fruits and ungathered products may be sold and transferred as personal property. Also, the Supreme Court of Spain, in a case of ejectment of a lessee of an agricultural land, held that the lessee was entitled to gather the Products corresponding to the agricultural year because said fruits did not go with the land but belonged separately to the lessee. And further, under the Spanish Mortgage Law of 1909, as amended, the mortgage of a piece of land does not include the fruits and products existing thereon, unless the contract expressly provides otherwise Chattel Mortgage Law recognizes growing crops as personal property Act 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully recognizes that growing

Author: Danielle Marie C. Tan crops are personal property. Section 2 of said Act provides that "All personal property shall be subject to mortgage, agreeably to the provisions of this Act, and a mortgage executed in pursuance thereof shall be termed a chattel mortgage." Section 7 in part provides that "If growing crops be mortgaged the mortgage may contain an agreement stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself properly to tend. care for and protect the crop while growing." The above provisions of Act 1508 were enacted on the assumption that "growing crops" are personal property. Personal property includes ungathered products; Paragraph 2, Article 334 of the Civil Code modified by Act 190 and 1508 Paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by section 450 of Act No. 190 and by Act No. 1508 in the sense that "ungathered products" as mentioned in said article of the Civil Code have the nature of personal property; or that in the sense that, for the purposes of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, "ungathered products" have the nature of personal property. In other words, the phrase "personal property" should be understood to include "ungathered products." In the case at bar, the sugar cane in question was personal property and was not subject to redemption. DISPOSITION: Judgement appealed is MODIFIED. The plaintiff and his sureties Cenon de la Cruz, Juan Sangalang and Marcos Sibal are hereby ordered to pay to the defendant jointly and severally the sum of P8,900.80, instead of P9,439.08 allowed by the lower court.

Author: Arcellana Rubiso and Gelito v Rivera

Petition: appeal by bill of exceptions Plaintiffs and appellees: Fausto Rubiso and Bonifacio Gelito Defendant and Appellant: Florentino Rivera Ponencia: Torres, J DOCTRINE: The requisite of registration in the registry of the purchase of a vessel is necessary and indispensable in order that the purchaser's rights are maintained against a claim by third persons. FACTS: 1. It was alleged in the complaint that the plaintiffs were the owners of a pilot boat Valentina stranded in Tingloy in Bauan, Batangas and Rivera took charge of the boat, claiming to be the owner, and plaintiffs thus unable to derive profit from it. 2. The boat is owned by "Gelito and Co" with co-partners Gelito for 2/3 share and Sy Qui for 1/3 share. Afterwards Gelito sold his share to Sy Qui. 3. Sy Qui then sold the boat to Rivera for 2500 pesos on Jan 4, 1915 and had it registered in the Bureau of Customs on March 17, 1915. 4. Then to enforce a payment of a certain sum of money, the boat was bought by Rubiso in a public auction on January 23, 1915 and had it registered in the Collector of Customs on January 27, 1915. 5. The complaint asks the defendant for indemnification and the delivery of the boat. ISSUE:

1. WoN Rubiso has a better right to the boat Valentina. PROVISIONS: Article 573 of the Code of Commerce: Merchant vessels constitute

property which may be acquired and transferred by any of the means recognized by law. The acquisition of a vessel must appear in a written instrument, which shall not produce any effect with respect to third persons if not inscribed in the registry of vessels.

RULING + RATIO: 1. YES.

x Even though Rivera was the first one who bought the boat, it was Rubiso who registered the vessel first in the office of the Collector of Customs. Rivera only registered the vessel on March 17, 1915 while Rubiso had it registered on January 27, 1915 in the same month of the purchase.

x With respect to the rights of the two purchasers, whichever of them who registered the vessel first is the one entitled by the protection of the law, which considers him the absolute owner of the boat and free from encumbrances and claims.

x Rivera is now considered a third person who was directly affected by the registration. Ships and vessels, whether moved by steam or sail, partake the nature of real property on account of their value in the world of commerce.

DISPOSITION: Judgment is affirmed with costs against appellant.

Author: Carlo Africa Philippine Refining Co. vs. Jar que

Petition: Appeal from judgement Petitioner: Philippine Refining Co. Respondent: Francisco Jarque Ponencia: Malcom, J. Doctrine: Vessels are considered as personal property under the civil law (Code of Commerce) and under the common law. Therefore since they are personal property they are subject to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. Failure to conform to the requirements of the said law makes the chattel mortgage unenforceable against third persons. FACTS:

1. Philippine Refining Co. and Franciso Jarque executed 3 mortgages on the motor vessels named Pandan and Zaragoza. These were recoreded as chattel mortgages but the first two mortgages did not append an affidavit of good faith. The third mortgage did but it was not registered in the customs house within the 30 day period prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Jarque on May 17.

2. A fourth mortgage was executed between Jarque and Aboitiz on

Zaragoza and was entered in the chattel mortgage registry also within the 30 day period before the commencement of insolvency proceedings on May 12.

3. The insolvency proceedings began on June 2 where Jarque was

declared as an insolvent debtor which resulted in the execution of all the properties for Jose Carominas.

4. The judge declined to order the foreclosue of the mortgages.

ISSUES: W/N the vessels are personal property which makes them subject to the chattel mortgage law W/N the mortgages on the boats are valid and therefore can be foreclosed.

RULING + RATIO: 1) Yes they are personal property making them subject to the Chattel Mortgage law. Vessels are considered as personal property under the civil law (Code of Commerce) and under the common law. Therefore since they are personal property they are subject to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. 2) No, the mortgages on the boats are not valid as the lack requirements provided by law and therefore they cannot be foreclosed. The Chattel Mortgage law requires a sufficient chattel mortgage to include an affidavit of good faith appended to the mortgage and recorded therewith. The absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and subsequent encumbrancers. Therefore this chattel mortgage in unenforceable against third persons.

Author: Ramirez US v Carlos (1911)

Petition: Appeal from a judgment of CFI Petitioners: United States Respondents: Ignacio Carlos Ponencia: Per Curiam DOCTRINE: The true test of what may be stolen (or what can be considered a personal property) is not whether it is corporeal or incorporeal, but whether, being possessed of value, a person other than the owner, may appropriate the same. FACTS: 1. Ignacio Carlos was accused of the crime of theft for stealing 2,273

kilowatts of electric current worth P 909.20, the property of Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company.

2. The court issued a warrant of arrest. He demurred and refused to enter a plea. He claims that what he did does not constitute and offense.

3. His counsel asserts that larceny applies only to corporeal property. The subjects of larceny are tangibles, movables, chattels, something that can be taken away, and some that had intrinsic value. Electricity is said to be an unknown force.

4. He was guilty and was sentenced to 1 year and 8 months and 21 days presidio correccional. From this, Carlos appeals.

ISSUE:

1. WoN electrical energy may be stolen PROVISIONS: x Art 416(3): Forces of nature which are brought under control by science.

RULING + RATIO:

1. YES. x In US v Genato, the defendant used a “jumper” to steal

electricity. It was ruled that even without ordinances, the right of ownership of electric current is secured.

x Electricity is no longer regarded as fluid, but its manifestations and effects, like those of gas, can be seen and felt.

x True test of what is the proper subject of larceny is not whether it is corporeal or incorporeal, but whether it is capable of appropriation by another than the owner.

x It is settled that illuminating gas may be the subject of larceny. Electricity, the same as gas, is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other personal property, and is capable of appropriation by another.

DISPOSITION: No error in holding that electricity is a subject of larceny.

Author: Carlo Africa United States v. Tambuntin

Petition: Appeal from judgement Petitioner: United States Respondent: Manuel Tambunting Ponencia: Malcom, J. Doctrine: There is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which renders it incapable of being feloniously taken and carried away. It s a valuable article of merchandise bought and sold like other personal property, susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being transported from place to place. FACTS:

1. Accused and his wife were occupants of the upper floor of a house where the Manila Gas Corporation installed apparatus for the delivery of gas.

2. Occupants who asked to install this vacated the same house and this the gas company disconnected the gas pipe and removed the meter.

3. However the company visited the house later on and found that gas was being used without the knowledge and consent of the gas company. It was being used by the accused and his wife for around 2 months as an iron pipe was inserted in the gap where the gas meter was formerly placed.

ISSUES: W/N the gas can be the subject of larceny. RULING + RATIO: 1) Yes gas can be the subject of larceny. There is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which renders it incapable of being feloniously taken and carried away. It s a valuable article of merchandise bought and sold like other personal property, susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being transported from place to place.

Involuntary Insolvency of Paul Strochecker vs. Ildefonso Ramirez

Paul Strochecker - Appellee Ildelfonso Ramirez - Creditor and Appellant William Edmonds - Assignee

Doctrine: Half-interest over a business is a movable property.

Facts:

1.) On March 10, 1919, Strochecker executed a mortgage in favor of the Fidelity & Surety Co. and registed in due time in the registry of property.

2.) On September 22, 1919 another mortgage was executed in favor of Ramirez and the mortgage was also registered in the registry.

3.) Ramirez claims preference on the mortgage on the following grounds:

A.) That the first mortgage of Strochecker with Fidelity & Surety Co. is not valid because the property which is the subject matter thereof is not capable of being mortgaged

B.) That the amount due the appellant is a purchase price, citing art 1922 of the Civil Code as support of his claims

C.) That his mortgage is but a modification of the security given by the debtor on February 15, 1919, that is prior to the mortgage exccuted in favor of Fidelity and Surety Co.

Issue:

1.) Whether or not Ramirez’ claim to the mortgage should be given preference over Fidelity and Co on the grounds of :

A.) That the first mortgage of Strochecker with Fidelity & Surety Co. is not valid because the property which is the subject matter thereof is not capable of being mortgaged

Held+Ratio: 1.) No. As to the first ground, the thing that was mortgaged to the corporation was described as a drug business known as Antigua Botica Ramirez. With regard to the nature of the property thus mortgaged, which is one-half interest in the business described, such interest is a personal property capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties in article 335 of the Civil code and may be the subject of mortgage. All personal property may be mortgaged.

Author: Mae Bulang CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY (2002)

Petitioner: Francisco Chavez Respondent: Public Estate Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation Ponencia: Carpio, J. DOCTRINE: The mere reclamation of foreshore or submerged areas by the PEA doesn’t convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. FACTS: On November 20, 1973 the government signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land. On February 4, 1977, President Marcos issued PD No. 1084 creating PEA tasked "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands” and later issued PD No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). On December 29, 1981, President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA." On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On November 29, 1996, Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997.7 Among the

conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.

On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement. On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.

Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."

ISSUES: WON the physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas make the land inalienable and disposable lands of public domain. PROVISION: Sec.3 Art. 12 of the Constitution, Title I and III of CA No. 141 RULING + RATIO: NO. Foreshore and submerged areas shall not be alienable unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only such an official classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition. DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The PEA and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.

Digest Author: Leiron Martija Republic v Court of Appeals (1997)

Petitioner: DIRECTOR OF LANDS, SOLICITOR GENERAL Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS, Mrs Morato et al. Ponencia: PANGANIBAN, J. DOCTRINE: Pursuant to CA 141, lands granted by the government through homestead patents are not to be brought under an encumbrance until the 5-year period has lapsed. Any contravention to this rule leads to the cancellation of the patent. FACTS:

1. Private Respondent Morato files for a registration for a free patent of land with the Government. The same grant her a Homestead Patent over a piece of land that partially covers the Calauag Bay.

2. Under CA 141, it is mandated that lands granted under the Homestead Act are not to be placed under any encumbrance for a period of 5 years. It also states the powers of the government to take back the land should this moratorium be unobserved.

3. Despite this, private respondent mortgaged a part of her newly

granted land to Co and Quilata for Php 10,000.00 The couple built a new house on their share. A part of the granted land was also leased to Advincula for php 100.00 a month. He built a warehouse with the agreement that the same would become property of Morato after the lease.

4. The Director of Lands sends investigators upon reports that the land was being subjected to encumbrances. They find the allegations to be valid, and subsequently revoke the Homestead Patent.

5. Private Respondent avers that the Director of Lands no longer has authority to revoke the patent because the land is no longer within the public domain. The Government hitches its defense on CA 141.

6. RTC finds for Respondent, CA for government. ISSUES: Is the land still public domain? Can the government revoke the patent?

RULING + RATIO:

1) NO x It is no longer public domain because it has already been granted to

Morato under the Homestead Patent, which is as indefeasible as a Torrens title.

o BUT!

x CA 141 is the law which governs land registration. o The government grants Homestead Patents to private

individuals in the hopes that it would promote the maintenance and growth of agricultural lands.

o The same law outlines conditions for keeping the lands, and the government’s power to take back the patents if the public purpose is not met.

x In a philosophical sense, it does not exactly become private land

(jura regalia) because the private citizen is not free to use it fully (moratorium on encumbrances)

o Within those 5 years, Morato had merely an inchoate right to the land. She could not yet dispose of it as she wished.

DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED.

Author: Joss P. Lanzar v. Director of Lands (1977)

Petition: Petition to Review on Certiorari CA Decision

Petitioner: RAMON LANZAR, Respondent: DIRECTOR OF LANDS and CITY OF ILOILO,. Ponencia: FERNANDEZ, J.

DOCTRINE:

Law of Waters: 'Lands added to the shores by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the water of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof FACTS:

1.) Ramon Lanzar filed a petition for registration of a title of a

parcel of land arguing that he is the owner thereof in fee

simple

2.) Director of Lands argued that the land is a foreshore which

meant that it forms part of public domain

3.) RTC ruled in favor of Lanzar explaining that the property has

been in the latter’s possession for more than 30 years

4.) CA reversed, explaining that the land being an accretion

formed by the action of the sea is public domain thereby not

being subject to appropriation

ISSUES:

1. WoN the title may be registered on the ground of 30 years of

adverse possession by Lanzar

RULING + RATIO: NO.

1. The shores and land reclaimed from the sea while they

continue to be devoted to public uses and no grant

whatsoever has been made of any portion of them to private

persons, remain part of the public domain and are of public

uses.

2. Until they are converted to patrimonial property by the State,

they are not susceptible of prescription as they are not within

the commerce of men.

DISPOSITION:

Digest Author: Alexi Calda

IGNACIO v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS (1960) Petitioner: FAUSTINO IGNACIO Respondent: DIRECTOR OD LANDS AND LAUREANO VALERIANO Ponencia: MONTEMAYOR DOCTRINE: Land formed by the action of the sea is property of the state. Until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation of ownership. FACTS:

1. Ignacio filed an application to registers his land (mangrove) with an area of 37,877 sq m located in Navotas, Rizal.

2. He amended his application by stating that he owned the

parcel of land through accretion.

3. Dir. Of Lands, Valeriano and Gutierrez opposed the application. Gutierrez withdrew his opposition.

4. The land actually adjoins a parcel of land acquired by Ignacio

through the government and a part which was formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of Manila Bay.

5. The Dir of Land on the other sought that the parcel of land is a

foreshore land, covered by the ebb and flow of the tide, thus forming part of the public domain.

ISSUE: WoN the land forms part of the public domain PROVISION: Art 4 of Law of Waters of 1866

ART. 4. Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof. RULING + RATIO: YES. Until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive department or the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation of ownership. DISPOSITION: Judgment affirmed.

Villarico vs. Court of Appeals Petition: Petition for Certiorari Petitioner: Spouses Teofilo C. Villarico and Maxima A Faustino Respondent: Honorable Court of Appeals, Rep. of the Philippines, and Marcos Camargo Ponencia: Purisima, J DOCTRINE: Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. Possession thereof, no matter how long, does not ripen into registrable title. FACTS: 1. On May 31, 1977, an application for confirmation of title was filed by the spouses, Teofilo Villarico and Maxima Villarico over a 1,834 square meter parcel of land in Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan. 2. They alleged to be the absolute owners of the property, having bought it from Teofilo’s father and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession thereof for more than 30 years. They allege that the land involved is not within the forest zone or government reservation. 3. The application for land registration was opposed by Marcos Camargo, who claims to be the real owner thereof. 4. The Government interposed its opposition, averring that the land in question is part of the public domain, within the unclassified area in Meycauayan, Bulacan per LC Map No. 637 dated March 1, 1927 of the Bureau of Forest Management, and not available for private appropriation. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the parcel of land is part of the public domain. PROVISION:

1. Art. 420 of the Civil Code RATIO/HELD:

1. Yes. The land in question is within the unclassified forest zone incapable of private appropriation. As stated by the Court of

Appeals, there has been no showing that a declassification has been made by the Director of Forestry declaring the land in question as disposable or alienable.

2. Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. Possession thereof, no matter how long, does not ripen into registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.

Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition is Denied and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22608 AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncements as to costs.

Digest Author: Anjo A. Alvañiz VILLANUEVA v. CASTAÑEDA, Jr. (1987)

Petitioner: FELICIDAD VILLANUEVA, FERNANDO CAISIP, ANTONIO LIANG, FELINA MIRANDA, RICARDO PUNO, FLORENCIO LAXA, and RENE OCAMPO. Respondent: HON. MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, VICENTE A. MACALINO, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor, San Fernando, Pampanga Ponencia: CRUZ, J. DOCTRINE:

A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. FACTS:

1. In the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street, a strip of land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what is commonly known as a talipapa is the subject of the petition.

2. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property.

3. The dispute goes back to 1961, when the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stags and sell in the above-mentioned place. A case was filed and the CFI of Pampanga issued a writ of preliminary injunction. While this case was pending, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality,” thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218, series of 1961. Four years later, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held that the land occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy.

4. The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were not evicted from the place; in fact, according to them they and the 128 other persons were in 1971 assigned specific areas or

space allotments therein for which they paid daily fees to the municipal government.

5. After an investigation conducted by the municipal attorney, respondent Vicente A. Macalino, as OIC of the office of the mayor of San Fernando, issued a resolution requiring the municipal treasurer and the municipal engineer to demolish the stalls in the subject place. The reaction of the petitioners was to file a petition for prohibition.

ISSUES: WON the petitioners have the right to occupy the subject land. PROVISION: Article 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. (not mentioned in the case) RULING + RATIO: None.

x A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. This is elementary.

x Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. They should have realized and accepted this earlier, considering that even before Civil Case No. 2040 was decided, the municipal council of San Fernando had already adopted Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, declaring the area as the parking place and public plaza of the municipality.

x Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract.

DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed.

Digest Author: Falgui Dacanay v. Asistio Jr (1992)

Petitioner: FRANCISCO U. DACANAY Respondent: MAYOR MACARIO ASISTIO, JR., CITY ENGR. LUCIANO SARNE, JR. of Kalookan City, Metro Manila, MILA PASTRANA AND/OR RODOLFO TEOFE, STALLHOLDERS AND REPRESENTING CO-STALLHOLDERS Ponencia: GRIÑO-AQUINO, J. DOCTRINE: Streets are for Public Use A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract. FACTS:

1. On January 5, 1979, MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Commission, designating certain city and municipal streets, roads and open spaces as sites for flea markets. Pursuant, thereto, the Caloocan City mayor opened up seven (7) flea markets in that city. One of those streets was the "Heroes del '96" where the petitioner lives.

2. In 1987, Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City, caused the demolition of the market stalls on Heroes del '96, V. Gozon and Gonzales streets. To stop Mayor Martinez' efforts to clear the city streets, stallowners filed an action for prohibition against the City of Caloocan, the OIC City Mayor and the City Engineer and/or their deputies (Civil Case No. C-12921) in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 122, praying the court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction ordering these city officials to discontinue the demolition of their stalls during the pendency of the action.

3. The court issued the writ prayed for. However, on December 20, 1987, it dismissed the petition and lifted the writ of preliminary injunction which it had earlier issued. The trial court observed that the Heroes del '96 street, V. Gozon street and Gonzales street, being of public dominion must, therefore, be outside of the commerce of man.

4. However, shortly after the decision came out, the city administration in Caloocan City changed hands. City Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr., as successor of Mayor Martinez, did not pursue the latter's policy of clearing and cleaning up the city streets.

5. Invoking the trial court's decision in Civil Case No. C-12921, Francisco U. Dacanay, a concerned citizen, taxpayer and registered voter of Barangay 74, Zone 7, District II of Caloocan City, who resides on Heroes del '96 Street, one of the affected streets, wrote a letter dated March 7, 1988 to Mayor Asistio, Jr., calling his attention to the illegally-constructed stalls on Heroes del '96 Street and asked for their demolition.

6. As the stallholders continued to occupy Heroes del '96 Street, through the tolerance of the public respondents, and in clear violation of the decision it Civil Case No. C-12921, Dacanay filed the present petition for mandamus on June 19, 1990, praying that the public respondents be ordered to enforce the final decision in Civil Case No. C-12921 which upheld the city mayor's authority to order the demolition of market stalls on V. Gozon, Gonzales and Heroes del '96 Streets and to enforce P.D. No. 772 and other pertinent laws.

. ISSUES: WoN public streets may be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan Manila Commission? PROVISION: Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code RULING + RATIO: NO. There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents' market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921 As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The Executive Order issued by Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians. DISPOSITION: Petition granted

Cebu Oxygen v. Bercilles Petitioner: Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Respondent: Judge Pascual Bercilles Ponencia: Concepcion, Jr., J. Digest Author: Gullas, J. DOCTRINE: Patrimonial Property Property of public dominion becomes patrimonial property of the state when no longer intended for public use or public service. The city council is the competent authority to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use. FACTS:

1. On September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, approved on October 3, 1968, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan. Subsequently, on December 19, 1968, the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding.

2. The lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest bidder

and on March 3, 1969, the City of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00. 3 By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the Court of First instance of Cebu to have its title to the land registered.

3. On June 26, 1974, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a

motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man. Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any private individual.

ISSUES:

I. Does the City Charter of Cebu City (Republic Act No. 3857) under Section 31, paragraph 34, give the City of Cebu the valid right to declare a road as abandoned?

II. Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the

patrimonial property of the City of Cebu, which may be the object of a common contract?

PROVISION: Civil Code Article 422: Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State Cebu City Charter Section 31. Legislative Powers. Any provision of law and executive order to the contrary notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the following legislative powers: (34) ...; to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed. RULING + RATIO:

I. YES. From the foregoing provision from the Cebu City Charter, it is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street.

a. The city council, it would seem to us, is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use.

b. Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the ordinance.

II. Yes. Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract

DISPOSITION: Ruling of the lower court denying petitioner’s application is set aside.

Laurel v. Garcia G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990

Petitioner,: SALVADOR H. LAUREL Respondents: RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary

Doctrine: The Roppongi lot is a property of PUBLIC DOMINION. The Roppongi property itself was specifically designated to house the Philippine Embassy. There is no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property is patrimonial, which respondents failed to show. Conversion of patrimonial property happens if the property is withdrawn from public use; Abandonment must be a CERTAIN and POSITIVE ACT based on correct legal premises.

Facts:

x Subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in

Japan acquired by the Philippine Gov’t. under the Reparation

Agreement entered with Japan as part of the indemnification to

the Filipino people for the losses in life and property and their

suffering during WWII. Other lots being:

� Nampeidai property (site of Philippine

Embassy Chancery)

� Kobe Commercial property (warehouse and

parking lot of consulate staff)

� Kobe Residential property (vacant residential

lot)

x The Reparation Agreement was valued at $550M payable in

20yrs to be fixed by both governments. The Reparation Law

prescribes the national policy on procurement and utilization

of reparations and development loans; those which belong to

the gov’t. and which may be availed of by private entities.

x The Roppongi property consists of the land and building for

the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy and as intended

became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the later was

transferred to Nampeidai, when the Roppongi building needed

major repairs. Due to the failure of the gov’t. to provide

necessary funds, Roppongi remained undeveloped.

x During the incumbency of President Corazon Aquino, a

proposal was made by former Philippine Ambassador to Japan,

Carlos J. Valdez, to lease the Roppongi property to Kajima

Corp., in exchange of the construction of 2 buildings in

Roppongi,1 in Nampeidai and the renovation of the Philippine

Embassy in Nampeidai. The President created a committee to

study the disposition or utilization of the gov’t. of the

properties in Tokyo and Kobe.

x The President issued E.O. 296, entitling non-Filipino citizens or

entities to avail of reparation capital goods and services in the

event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties were

mentioned in the Whereas clause. Amidst opposition by

various sectors, the Executive branch has been pushing in its

decision to sell the reparation properties starting with the

Roppongi lot.

x 2 petitions for prohibition were filed, seeking to enjoin

respondents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of

the Roppongi lot. A temporary restraining order was granted

by the court.

x In G.R. No. 92047, it compelled respondents to fully disclose

the basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the

Roppongi property and explain the proceedings which

effectively prevent Filipino citizens and entities from bidding.

x Supreme Court resolved to decide in favour of the 2 petitions

and enjoining respondents from proceeding with the sale of

the Roppongi property and made permanent the temporary

restraining order.

Provision:

CHAPTER 3

PROPERTY IN RELATION TO THE PERSON TO WHOM IT BELONGS

Art. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership. (338)

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (339a)

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property. (340a) Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. (341a)

Issue:

W/N the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the

Philippine Government?

Held:

No. The Gov’t cannot alienate said Roppongi property and others.

Ratio:

1. The Roppongi lot is a property of PUBLIC DOMINION.

The nature of the lot as property for public service is expressly

spelled out. It is expressly spelled out by the terms dictated in

the Reparation Agreement which bind both the Philippine and

Japanese gov’t. that these properties were assigned to the

government sector and that the Roppongi property itself was

specifically designated to house the Philippine Embassy. There

is no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is

convincingly shown that the property is patrimonial, which

respondents failed to show.

Under pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, Art. 419 states

that: Property is either of public dominion or of private

ownership. Art. 420 provides: The following things are

property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use,

such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges

constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others

of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State,

without being for public use, and are intended for some public

service or for the development of the national wealth. Under

art. 421: All other property of the State, which is not of the

character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial

property. Therefore the Roppongi property is correctly

classified under paragraph 2 of art. 420 as property belonging

to the State intended for some public service.

2. Property of public dominion is OUTSIDE THE COMMERCE OF MAN.

The Roppongi property is outside the commerce of man,

therefore it cannot be alienated by the gov’t. Its ownership is a

special collective ownership for general use enjoyment and for

the satisfaction of collective needs and reside in a social group.

The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person but

the citizens intended for the common and public welfare and

cannot be the object of appropriation.

3. Conversion of patrimonial property happens if the property is withdrawn from public use; Abandonment must be a CERTAIN and POSITIVE ACT based on correct legal premises.

The property no being used for a long time for actual Embassy

service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial

property and happens only when withdrawn from public use.

It continues to be part of the public dominion until there is a

formal declaration from the gov’t. to withdraw it from being

such. Abandonment can’t be definite under Art. 422. It cannot

be inferred from the non-use alone specially if it was

attributable to a lack of financial support to repair or improve

the property.