Ontheroadtonowhere? AutorickshawsinDelhi:TheSystem, ProblemsandRecommendations

AreportbySimonHardingandArshadHussain.PartoftheInformalLabourportfolioatthe AMANPublicCharitableTrust,NewDelhi.

AcknowledgmentsThankstoChandraKumarMahto,SobaranSinghRajput,O.MTiwariandRakeshTripathifortheir invaluablehelpinresearchingthisreport.WearealsogratefultoRakeshSood,RajendraSoniand alltheautodriverswhotooktimeoutfromtheirbusyworkingdaystotalktous. SpecialthankstoRakeshAgarwalforhisadvice,detailedcommentsandsupport. ThankstoJamalKidwaiandMadhuraChakrabortyfortheirediting,suggestions,translationsand constructivecriticisms. ThankstoConnorReynoldsforhisusefuladvice,suggestionsandresearch.

ContentsAcknowledgments ExecutiveSummary1 1.0Introduction6 2.0PolicyHistory9 2.1TwoKeyPolicies9 2.2TheImpactontheAutoSector14 3.0TheDrivers19 3.1Backgrounds20 3.2RenterDrivers22 3.3OwnerDrivers23 3.4CommonIssues29 4.0Unions35 4.1ThreeUnions35 4.2Strikes38 5.0ConclusionsandRecommendations40 5.1Recommendations41 5.1.1Issuenewpermits41 5.1.2Streamlinebureaucracyandcollateinformation41 5.1.3ProvideCredit42 5.1.4Encouragecooperativesandprivatecompanies43 5.1.5Encouragecompetitionamongstmanufacturers44 5.1.6MakeDelhiAutoFriendly44

ExecutiveSummaryInrecentmonthstheautorickshawandtheautodriverhavecomeunderfirefromthe DelhiGovernment.TheDelhiChiefMinister,SheilaDikshit,recentlycomplainedthat autodriverharassthepublicandthattheautorickshawwasnotagoodoption.The CM publicly expressed her desire to phase out the autorickshaw. After fifty year's service,thehumbleautodoesnotfeatureintheDelhiGovernment'sconceptionof a worldclasscity.HercommentsfoundmuchsupportamongstDelhi'smiddleclass,fed upofbothautorickshawsandautodrivers. AutodrivershaveaterriblepublicimageinDelhi.Theyareseenasrude,aggressiveand greedy:neverwillingtorunbythegovernmentapprovedfaremeter;oftenaskingforfifty toonehundredpercentabovethemeterfare.Sadly,thisreputationisnotundeserved. Autodriversoftenrefusepassengers,demandextortionatefaresandinstigateaggressive haggling. Their behaviour lends huge middleclass support to any plan, however untenable,toscraptheautoandplacethelivelihoodsofthecity'sonelakhautodrivers (andtheirfourorfivelakhdependents)injeopardy. ThisreporttakesthebadbehaviourofDelhi'sautowallahsasitsstartingpoint.Whydo onelakhpeopleactinthesameobjectionablemanner?Itcannotbethecasethatevery autodriverisafundamentallyaggressiveandgreedyperson.Theremustbeaneconomic andpoliticalsystemwhichinfluencestheirbehaviour;asetofstakeholders,regulations andpolicies,whichremainsoutsideofpublicconsciousness.Itisthissystem,whichthis reportaimstocaptureandbringintopublicview.Itattemptstoshowthatautodriversare not primarily responsible for overcharging passengers and the whole unpleasant experienceinvolvedintakingarideinanauto;ratheritisthesystemorstructurein whichtheyoperatethatislargelytoblame.Thesepoliciesandregulationshavecombined tocreateasysteminwhichnumerousstakeholdersintheautorickshawsectorareableto extractmoneyfromautodriversatwill,leavingthedriverunderhugefinancialpressure andlittleoptionotherthantoovercharge. Thisreportpresentsapictureoftherelationshipbetweenthemainplayers:ownerdrivers, renterdrivers,contractors,financiers,unionleaders,TransportDepartmentofficialsand theTrafficPolice,andthepolicieswhichmediatetheirinteractions.Itdoesthisthrough interviews,ethnographyandanalysisofpolicydocuments,existingsuccessfulRightTo Informationclaims,SupremeCourtrecordsandmediareports. ThereportopenswithananalysisoftwokeypoliciesoftheDelhiGovernmentandhow theyhavetransformedthecity'sautorickshawindustry:the1997caponthenumberof autopermits(anautocannotlegallyplythestreetswithoutapermit)inDelhiissuedby theSupremeCourt(SC)andtheCNGconversionorderof1998.Theanalysisstatesthat 1

thepermitcapcreatedagapbetweenthesupplyofautosandthegrowingdemandfrom Delhi'sincreasingpopulation.Ablackmarketforautopermitssoonemergedandthe priceofanautopermitrosedramatically.Justayearlaterownerdriverswereorderedto replacetheirautosorconvertthemtoCNGbyfittingexpensiveconversionkits.Unableto affordtheRs.2530000CNGkits,thousandsofownerdrivershadnooptionbuttosell theirautosandpermitstofinanciersatbargainprices,furtherfocusingpowerinthehands oftheconsolidatingfinancemafia.Thesepolicieshitrenterdriverstoo.Contractors doubledortrebleddailyrentstocoverthehighermaintenancecostsofthenewCNG engines,whilstthesurgingcostofanautoandpermitmadeownershipadistantdream.In themid90sanewautorickshawwithpermitcostaroundRs.1lakhfortheautoandafew thousandmoreforthepermit,taxesandadministrationcosts.Today,thenewautocostsa comparableamountbutthepermitisRs.3lakhs.Asaresultofthesetwopoliciesand theirunintendedconsequences,theautosectorofthemid90s(withitsprevalenceof ownerdriversandfinanciersandcontractorswithlimitedpower)hasmetamorphosedinto an industry in which the majority of drivers rent their vehicles and financiers and contractorsreign. Thefollowingsectionexaminesthelivesandlivelihoodsofdriversbothownersand renter.ItfindsthatthemajorityofdriversaremigrantsfromareasofUttarPradeshand Biharwhichsufferfromunemploymentandunderemployment.Bothownerdriversand renterdriversfacemountingfinancialstrain.Forrenters,increasingrentsmeanthatthey payhalfoftheirdailywagetothecontractorandhavelittlechanceofowninganauto. OwnerstypicallyrepayRs.715000permonthtofinanciersfromwhomtheypurchased their autos and permits. However, underhand tactics by financiers ensure that the repossessionoftheautoishighlylikely.Asapreconditionofgrantingtheloan,financiers requiredriverstosignblankcontracts,whichenablethemtomanipulateinterestrates, introducelatepaymentpenalties,denyownershipevenwhentheloanhasbeenfully repaidandeventotradetheloanpapersontheblackmarket.DealingswiththeTransport Departmentaddtothefinancialstress.Anautodrivermustcarrymultipledocuments withhimatalltimes.Obtainingthesedocumentsisfarfromeasyaseachrequiresan application,whichincludesalistofsupportingdocuments.Itisatimeconsumingand expensivetaskfordriverstoobtainallthedocumentsrequired(i.e.manymigrantsdonot have Delhi documents) and so drivers are often forced to submit an incomplete applicationandpayabribe.Awarethatmanydriversdonotpossessallthecompulsory papers,thepolicecanstopadriveratrandomandeasilyfindamissingdocumentabout which to issue a challan or demand a bribe. The extraction of money by financiers, contractors, Transport Department officials and the police erodes the driver's daily incometosuchanextentthatitisimpossibleforhimtorunbythemeterandmakea livingwagefromhistenhourshift. Sectionfouraddressestheparadoxofautounionsinthecity:therearearoundseventeen unions, which organise wellobserved strikes, yet collectively they have only a few 2

thousand members and enjoy little support amongst drivers. The report explains that manyoftheseunionsareasinglecharismaticindividualwithcontactsattheTransport DepartmentwhosetupadhocunionstolegitimisetheirtoutingbusinessatBurari. Some unionleaders havelinks with financiers andcallstrikes at their behest.These strikesareobservedoutoffearofhiredthugsratherthansupportforthecause. The reportconcludes byreiteratingthenumerous financialpressuresplacedonauto driversbyfinanciers,contractors,TransportDepartmentofficialsandthepolice.Itstates thatthepoliciesandregulationswhichgovernthesectorworkintheinterestsofthese latterpartiesattheexpenseofautodrivers.Thissituationultimatelyaffectsthegeneral public who face exploited and desperate autodrivers and badly maintained rented vehicles.Ratherthanabandontheautorickshaw,aseriesofreformsarenecessaryto produceaworldclassautorickshawservice,whichisbothasourceofgoodlivelihoods fordriversandacomfortableandaffordableexperienceforpassengers. Theserecommendationsare: Issuenewpermits: TheTransportDepartmentshouldfreelyissuenewpermitsoverthe counteratnominalcost.Thiswouldprovideabadlyneededincreaseinthenumberof autosinDelhi,movingsupplyalittleclosertotheburgeoningdemand.Thismovewould destroytheblackmarketinpermitsandcutthecostofanautoandpermitbyasmuchas Rs.3lakhs.Itwouldincreasethenumberofownerdrivers,improvevehiclemaintenance anddriverappearanceanddecreasethelikelihoodofovercharging.Renterdriverswould seerentsdecreaseandwouldthusbemorelikelytorunbythemeter. Streamlinebureaucracyandcollateinformation:Thenumberofcompulsorydocuments mustbecutasmustthenumberofsupportingdocumentsforeachapplication.Thetype ofsupportingdocumentsrequiredshouldalsobechangedasthecurrentsystemisoverly complexandworkstoextractbribesfrommigrantdriverswhodonothaveDelhipapers. Commerciallicences anddocumentationfromotherstates shouldbeacceptedbythe Transport Department. Applications forautorelated documents should behandled by postoronlineaswellasinperson,endingthecurrentinsistencethatdriversrepeatedly makethelongtriptoBurari. Whilstresearchingthisreportitbecameclearthattherulesandregulationspertainingto autorickshawswerescatteredacrossseveralsources,includingsomeeverchangingad hocoralrulesknownonlytothoseinsidetheAutorickshawUnitbuildingatBurari. Thiscreatesconfusionandwastesalargeamountoftimeasdriversdonotknowwhat documentstobringwiththemtoBurari.Moreover,theydonotknowifwhatisbeing demandedbytheTransportDepartmentofficialisthegenuinerequirementoranadhoc rule.Thesameholdsforpolicechallans,whichseemtobearbitrarilyissued,theamount andtheoffencedependingonthemoodoftheofficer.Thisasymmetryofinformation muststop.Allregulationsconcerningnecessarydocumentation,applications,procedures 3

andtrafficlawsshouldbecollectedinonebookandmadeavailabletodrivers(inHindi). Thiswouldstopthecurrentconfusion,savevaluableworkingtimefordriversandreduce theabilityofofficialsandthepolicetodemandbribes. Providecredit:Atpresentautofinanciersaretheonlyoptionforaspiringownerdrivers. Commercialbankswillnotlendtothembecausetheyarebadcreditrisksandtheyoften lackthedocumentationnecessarytomaketheloanapplicationinthefirstplace.State finance,whenithasbeenavailable,hasfailedtoreachdriversbecauseittoodemands manysupportingdocuments.TheDelhiGovernmentshouldprovideloanstodriversat softinterestratesandencouragecommercialbankstoprovidespecialpackagesforauto drivers.Thiswouldensurethattheownerdriverhasthemaximumpossiblechanceof repayingtheloanandactuallybecomingthelegalownerofhisvehicle. Encourageprivatecompaniesandcooperatives: Privatefirmsshouldbeencouragedto operate fleets of autorickshaws. Competition between firms would improve vehicle maintenance,driverappearanceandtraining,facilitatenewservices,bringdriversinto theformalsectorsandofferanimprovedpassengerexperience.TheDelhigovernment should limit maximum prices and ensure minimum standards, but should not issue licencesorquotas:businesspracticesandefficiencyshoulddecidethenumberofautos operated by eachfirm, rather than lobbying. Social enterprises and NGOs should be encouragedtoruncooperatives:eitherprovidingcredittodriversorrentingoutautoata fairrentalpriceorhiringdriversoncontractswithfixedmonthlywages. Encouragecompetitionamongstmanufacturers:BajajAutocurrentlydominatestheDelhi marketforautorickshawsandhasdoneformanyyears.Withoutcompetition,Bajajhas hadlittleincentivetoimproveitsproducts:itsfirstCNGpoweredautoswerepoorand, nearly a decade later, the new Bajaj RE 4S CNG is not a substantial improvement. EncouragingothermanufacturersofCNGautorickshawstoentertheDelhimarketwould providecompetitionforBajajandresultinbetter,safer,cleanerandmorecomfortable autorickshaws. Make Delhi autofriendly: Autorickshaws are an integral part of Delhi's public transport system: they compensate for the limited reach of the metro system by connectingstationswithhomes;theysupplementtheinadequatebusserviceandprovide aconvenientalternativetotheprivatecar.Theyhaveplayedthiscentralroleforthepast fiftyyears.However,Delhiisnotanautofriendlycity.Therearenomarkedautostands andnofacilitiesforautodrivers.Intheabsenceofclearlymarkedstands,legally,anauto drivermustbeperpetuallyonthemove,neveroncestoppingtorest,pickuppassengers, eatorusethetoilet.Thisisludicrous.TheDelhiGovernmentmustcreatealargenumber (asmanyas1000)markedautostandsatstrategiclocationsaroundthecapital:outside metro stations,busstations,officecomplexesandinmarkets.Basicfacilitiessuchas toiletsandcleanwatershouldalsobeprovided. 4

Delhi'sautorickshawsectorisindireneedofreform.Talkofbatteryelectrictaxisis misguided. The issue is one of regulation and management, not mechanics and technology.Theburdenofchangefallsonhigherauthorities:Highlevelpolicyreformis needed.ActionneedstobetakenbytheSupremeCourt,theDelhiGovernmentandthe Transport Department. Given a few well implemented policy changes Delhi's auto rickshawfleetcouldeasilybecomeaworldclasspublictransportservicefor1.5crore peopleandasourceofagoodlivelihoodfor1lakhdriverandtheir5lakhdependents.

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1.0IntroductionWhatdoyouthinkshouldbedonetocontroltheautomenace? TimesofIndia,Lettersheading,27/6/08 BeawarethatautorickshawsinDelhidonotgobythemetersodon'twasteyourtime arguingoverit WikiHowHowtohagglewithanautorickshawdriverinDelhi TheydrivelikeSchumacher,theyhagglerudelyandattimerefusetotakepassengers NewsIndia,28/10/09 Autodriversheldthecity'snoncarownerstoransom... IndianExpress,19/8/09 Hailing anautorickshaw inDelhiisaharrowingbusiness.Thefirstcoupleofautos usuallyspeedpass,ignoringyouroutstretchedarm.Thenextfewwillshowsomeinterest. Thedriverwillslowdownandstooptoseeyourfacefromundertheyellowhoodofhis machine.Buthewilldriveoffatthefirstmentionofthedestinationasifitweretheedge oftheearth.Finally,youwillfindanautowallahwillingtogowhereyouwanttogo. Thentheargumentstarts.Hewillstartbydemandingfiftytoonehundredpercentmore thantheofficialmeteredfare.Whydon'tyougobythemeter?Youask.Herefusesflatly. Afteraminuteofhaggling,whichwillprobablyinvolveyouwalkingawayandtheauto mandrivingafteryou,shoutinganimproved'final'price,yougetintothevehicle.Youare flustered,frustrated,stressedandpayingmorethanthemeteredrate.Whydoesgettingan autoinDelhihavetobesodifficult?Youaskyourself,whyaretheseautodriverssorude, greedyandaggressive?Andyouarenottheonlyone.Delhi'sautodrivershaveaterrible reputation. Theyarepilloriedinthepressasamenace:agroupofhooliganstobetackledand whippedintolinebystrict,oftenirrationalregulationsandstricterpolicing.Autosand autodriversarereportedasaproblemtobeovercome,whichreflectsthemoodofmost 6

middleclassDelhites.Sobadistheirpublicimagethatthecityisattemptingtotameits autodriversaheadofthe2010CommonwealthGamesbyorganisingEnglishclassesand lessons in courteous and friendly behaviour for autowallahs plying around Indira Gandhi Airport1 Their abrasive manners are taken as a hurdle on Delhi's path to becomingaworldclasscity.Inearly2010,theChiefMinisterstatedherdesiretophase outtheautorickshawentirely. TheinternetaboundswithhorrorstoriesaboutDelhi'sautorickshaws:frompassengers beingcheated,droppedoffinthemiddleofnowhere,milesfromtheirhomestoroadside argumentsandaggression.Rumoursoftheautomenacehaveevenpenetratedforeign travelsites,whichgivestepbystepguidesonhowtodealwiththeirdiscourteousand swindlingways2. Commonpubliccomplainsagainstautodrivers: Overcharging(notrunningbythefaremeter) Refusal(refusingtogoadestination) Parking(autosparkedinadisorganisedandillegalmanner) PoorDriving(unsafeonroad) Appearanceandmanners(scruffy,aggressiveandrude) Poorlymaintainedautorickshaws(uncomfortableandpolluting) Alloftheaboveareaddressedintherecommendationsinthefinalsection. Delhi'sautorickshawdriversarewithoutdoubtoftenabruptandgrasping.Butthisisnot theendofthestory.Wemustaskwhyaround1lakhdriversbehavethisway!Itcannotbe thecasethattheyareallunfriendlypeople!Theremustbearationalexplanationfortheir behaviour:Anexplanationthatinvolvesarangeofactorsacrossthewholeautorickshaw sectorandtheirvariousinteractions.Thisisthestartingpointofthisreport. ThisreportattemptstopresentabroadpictureoftheautorickshawsectorinDelhiin 20092010. It aims to explain how whole autorickshaw system works. There are numerousstakeholders:drivers,contractors,financiers,theTrafficPolice,theTransport Department,theautorickshawunionsandtransportpolice.Allarecoveredbythisstudy. In this sense this report fills a gap in the literature. There have been studies on the attitudesandlivelihoodsofthedriversthemselves3.Likewise,workhasbeendoneonthe environmentalimpactofautorickshawsandtheconversiontoCompressedNaturalGas

1 http://commonwealthgames2010.blogspot.com/2010/01/gurgaontaxiautodriverslearnenglish.html 2 http://www.wonderhowto.com/howtohaggleautorikshawdriverdelhi0107434/ 3 Roy,D(2003)OperatingonThreeWheels:TheAutoRickshawDriversofDelhi,Economic& PoliticalWeekly,18thFebruary.

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(CNG)in20004.Therehavealsobeenadmirableattemptstodocumenttheproblems facedbyautodrivers5,buttheseareoflimitedscopeandarenowdated.Aholisticreport is necessaryatthepresenttimebecausepolicymakersarediscussingchangestothe sector,includingtheabolitionoftheautorickshaw,whichdonottakeintoaccountthe biggerpicture:theautosystemorstructure. However, this author freely admits that there are considerable gaps in this report's coverageofthesectorowingtothelimitedtimeframeinwhichithasbeenproducedand alsothedifficultyofpiecingtogetherbothcurrentandpastautopoliciesfromanumber ofdisparatesources.Depthisoccasionallysacrificedforbreadth. This reportfallswithintheAMANTrust'sinformallabourprogramme.Theinformal natureoftheworkoftheautorickshawdriverdoesnotstemfromthefactthatitispartof an informal economy, which either lies outside the scope of state regulation, or is officiallysubjecttostateregulationbutneverthelessdoesnotoperateaccordingtothe rulesandlawsthroughwhichtheformalintentionofregulationisinscribed6.Onthe contrary,thepresenceofthestateanditsactorsitspolicemenanddepartmentsare writ large in the lives of drivers: there is much regulation albeit often ad hoc and inconsistent. Rather, auto driving can be considered part of the informal economy becausethedrivershavenowagesecurity,enjoynoemploymentbenefitsorsafetynets andhavenosignificantunionbodies. Thefollowingsectiongivessomebasicbackgroundinformationaboutthepolicyhistory ofautorickshawsinDelhiandafewpiecesoftechnicalinformationaboutthemachines themselves,theirnumbersandtheircapabilities.Thissectionconcludesthatthepolicy withthelargestimpactisthecaponthenumberofautosissuedbySupremeCourtin 1997.Thecapeffectivelycreatedahugeblackmarketinautopermitsandhandedcontrol ofthatmarkettoapowerfulautofinancemafia. Section three is based on forty semistructured indepth interviews with autodrivers carriedoutinMandawali(TransYamuna)betweenOctober2009andFebruary2010.The section addresses the personal and family backgrounds of drivers, their vehicle arrangements (rented or bought), their earnings and outgoings. It also explores the problemsfacedbythedrivers,includingissueswithpoliceandchallans,difficultiesin obtainingnecessarydocuments,licencesandbadgesandinteractionsbetweendriversand contractors(forrenterdrivers)andwithfinanciers(forownerdriverspayingoffloans). This substantial section contains information on financiers, their practices and our4 Bansal,M(2007)TheWinnersandLosersintheGreeningofDelhi'sAutoRickshaws,CityFix Reportavailableat:http://mumbai.thecityfix.com/winnersandlosersinthegreeningofdelhi %E2%80%99sautorickshaws/ 5 Faruqui,DandSud,R(2001)AutoRickshawsinDelhi:MurderbyRegulation,CSSResearch InternshipPaper,availableat:http://www.ccsindia.org/ccsindia/policy/live/studies/wp0002.pdf 6 HarrissWhite,B(2005)India'sSociallyRegulatedEconomy,QEHWorkingPaper133.

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attemptstocontactthem.ItalsocontainsadiscussionoftheTransportDepartment,its regulations,practicesandourfieldvisitstotheTransportDepartmentofficeinBurari, northDelhi. Theissueofunionsisaddressedinsectionfour,whichprovidesabriefrecenthistoryof theactivitiesofDelhi'sautounions.Theclaimsoftheunionsthemselvesarerepresented byinterviewswithfourunionleadersofdifferingpoliticalaffiliations.Themethodsused by these small and poorly supported unions to organise successful strikes are then discussed.Thesectionsfindsthatoverall,unionshavedonelittletoimprovethelotof autodriversandmostunionsarelittlemorethansmallgroupsoftoutswithconnections attheAutorickshawUnit. Thestudythenconcludesbybuildinganoverallempiricalpictureoftheautorickshaw systeminDelhi.Itreturnstothedriversandsuggeststhattheyareexploitedbyastructure ofwhichtheyaremerelythefirstrung.Thisstructurebenefitsfinanciers,contractors,the TrafficPolice,theTransportDepartmentandtoacertainextentunionsandisrigorously defendedbytheseinterestedparties.Finally,recommendationsaremadeastohowto reformthesectortoeliminatetheexploitationofdriversandpassengersandimprovenot onlythepassengerexperiencebutalsothepublicfaceofDelhi'smuchmalignedauto wallahs.

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2.0PolicyHistory 2.1TwokeypoliciesTherecenthistoryofDelhi'sautorickshawsectorhasbeendominatedbyanumberof keypolicydecisions,whichhaveseentheontheroadcostofanautorickshawspiral fromaroundRs.60,000inthemid1990stoaroundRs.4lakhstoday7.Thissectionbriefly outlinestheregulationofDelhi'sautorickshawfromthemid90stothepresentday.This analysisisbasedondrivertestimonies,informationfromunionleadersandNGOsinthe sectoraswellasdrawingheavilyonnewspaperreportsanddocumentsfromtheSupreme Court. A multiplicity of sources is necessary as official policies relating to auto rickshaws are erratically implemented and have unintended consequences. Official documentsdonottellthefullstory.Theanalysisgivenhereismeantasabroadoverview ofthetrajectorytakenbytheautosectorinthepasttwodecadesandthepolicieswhich are responsible for this shift. Subsequent sections will go into more detail about the grassrootsworkingsofcontemporaryautoindustryinDelhi. Beforeanythingfurthercanbesaidaboutautosandautopolicies,afewbackground detailsareneededregardingautodrivingandautoowning. TherearetwotypesofautodriverinDelhi:Ownerdriversandrenterdrivers.Owner driversowntheirautorickshaws.Theypossessthepermitfortheirvehicle.Theypayfor7 DuringfieldresearchinPaharganjinFeb2010ourresearcherwasofferedanewautoatRs.4lakhs.The pricehadbeenhigherinpreviousmonths,butrumoursoftheabolitionoftheSupremeCourt'scaphad depressedthepricebyaroundRs.50,000.

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fuel,maintenanceandhandletheofficialpaperwork.Bothautosandpermitsarebought fromautofinancierswhoaskforapercentageofthetotalcostoftheautoasanupfront paymentandofferthedriveraloanfortheremainingfigure.Thedriverthenpaysoffthe loan through a series of monthly instalments. Renterdrivers hire their autos from a contractorforeitherasingle1012hourshiftorforanentire24hourday,payingonlyfor thefuel.Thecontractorpaysformaintenance.Acontractormayownanythingfromtwo tothirtyorfortyautos.Itisestimatedthatcurrentlythemajorityofautodriversarerenter drivers8. In1997therewerearound83000autorickshawsinDelhi9forthepopulationofaround 1012m10.ThecostofanewautowasaroundRs.6090000.Adrivercouldrentanautofor a10hourshiftforaroundRs.50100.Newentrantstothesectorwereabletobuynew vehiclesandobtainthepermitwithouttoomanyproblems.Thepermitisthecrucial documentneededinordertoruntheautocommerciallyonthestreets(i.e.topickup passengersandtakefares).Onepermitallowstheholdertoownoneauto.Since1994an individualhasbeenabletoownmultiplepermits11.Newdrivinglicencesandcommercial badgeswerealsoeasilyavailablefromtheZonalOfficesoftheTransportDepartment. Amongstoursample,driverswhogottheirlicencesandbadgesbefore1997didnotreport anyproblemswiththeauthorities,forexamplehavingtopaybribesorwaitlongperiods fortheirdocumentstoarrive. It has beensuggestedbyoneNGOinthesectorandoneindependentstudythatthe prevalence of ownerdrivers was higher pre1997 than today12, a claim tentatively supportedbythisstudy. However, there are some consistencies between the pre1997 situation and the contemporary auto sector. Pre1997, auto contractors already held multiple permits purchasedfromthepreviousholderbutnotofficiallytransferredtothecontractor'sname. This allowed them to own large fleets of autorickshaws, but go unnoticed by the authorities.Autofinancierswerealsodoinggoodbusinessbyofferingdriversloansto buynewautos.Astoday,theyheldmultiplepermitslikethecontractors.Butunlikethe currentcircumstance,theinfluenceofbothgroupswascheckedbythecomparativelylow priceoftheautosandtherelativeeaseinobtaininganewpermit. Thissituationwouldsoonchangetothedisadvantagedriversandpassengers.8 Exactfiguresarenotavailable,buttheleadingNGOinthesectorclaimsasmuchas80%ofautosin Delhiarecurrentlybeingrentedbythedriver. 9 Roy,DandMohan,D(2003)OperatingonThreeWheels:TheAutoRickshawDriversofDelhi, EconomicandPoliticalWeekly,18/1/03.RoyandMohanpointoutthatthereisnoconcretefigurefor thenumberofautosinDelhi.Theypointtoofficialfiguresofcloseto90,000in1999,howeverthe figuremaybelowerasthisreferstopermitsasopposedtoautosontheroad. 10 BasedondatafromUNreportwhichestimatesthe2000populationat12.4m,availableat: http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup2001/WUP2001_CH6.pdf 11 ApolicybroughtinbytheBJP. 12 http://www.nyayabhoomi.org/auto_general/how_became_renters.htm

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Duringthe1990seffortsbegantoimproveairqualityinDelhi.Aseriesofpublicinterest litigationsintheSupremeCourt(SC)bylawyerandenvironmentalistM.CMehtaforced thestatetotackleairpollutioninthecapital.TheSCbecameanactiveplayerinthis campaign,passinganumberofairqualitylawsandputtingtheDelhiGovernmentunder pressuretoimplementthem:In1996heavilypollutingHcategoryindustriesinthecity wereshutdown,catalyticconvertersbecamecompulsoryin1995andstricteremission standardswereintroducedin1996and200013. Transportwasidentifiedasatargetforreformasthepercentageoftotalemissionsfrom vehicleshadrisenfrom23%in19701to72%in200114.Autorickshawscontributedto thisincreaseinvehicularemissionsasDelhi'sfleetwaspoweredbyheavilypolluting2 strokepetrolengines,whichhadchangedlittlesincetheautorickshaw'sintroductioninto DelhifromItalyin1957(thefirstautosweremadebyBajajAutounderlicencefrom ItalianfirmPiaggioin1950).Assuch,emissionsfrompublictransportbecameamajor policyfocus.Thisledtotwopolicieswhichhadamassiveimpactontheautosector: Firstly,onthe16th December1997followingagovernmentreportintothematter,the SupremeCourtdeclaredthatnonewautopermitswouldbeissued: 'Itwouldbeintheinterestofenvironment,tofreezethenumberofTSRs 15forthepresent atthelevelatwhichareactuallyinuseinthecity.We,therefore,directthattherewould benograntoffreshpermitsinrespectoftheTSR,saveandexceptbywayofreplacement ofanexistingworkingTSRwithanewone. (Paragraph9ofthe16.12.97SCorder) Thepermitfreezeeffectivelycappedthenumberofautosinthecity.Inorderforanew autotocomeontotheroad,anoldonehadtobescrappedandthepermittransferredto thenewauto.Thethinkingbehindthepolicywasthatthenumberofautosinthecity wouldbefrozenuntilamoreenvironmentallyfriendlyautorickshawcouldbeproduced ortheexistingmachinesmadelesspolluting. Secondly,on28thJuly1998,barelysixmonthsafterthecap,theSupremeCourtissued another orderstatingthatallpublictransportinDelhiwouldbeconvertedtorunon Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) by 1st April 2001. The order was based on the recommendationsoftheEnvironmentalPollution(PreventionandControl)Committee (EPCA) also called the Bhure Lal Committee, established by the Ministry of EnvironmentandForestsfortheNationalCapitalRegion(NCR)toinvestigatepoliciesto improve air quality. The CNG order included buses, taxis and autos; some 100,000 vehicles.Allpre1990autorickshawswouldbereplacedwithnewCNGautosby31st13 Narain,UandKrupnik,A(2007)TheImpactofDelhi'sCNGProgramonAirQuality,availableat http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=17476 14 UNEP(2006)CNGConversion:LearningfromDelhi,availableat:http://ekh.unep.org/?q=node/1737 15 ThreewheeledScooterRickshaw:theofficialnamefortheautorickshaw.

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March2000andallpost1990modelswouldbereplacedorconvertedby31stMarch2001. Therenewalofthedriver'spermitwoulddependuponsuccessfullyswitchingtoCNG. Forsomedrivers,thiscameasasecondfinancialblowinasmanyyears.Twoyears earlier, the compulsory replacement of all autorickshaws older than 15 years was enforced as part of a drive to get the oldest most polluting vehicles off the streets. Consequently,driversofoldautosboughtnewmachinesandstartedpayingofftheloans, onlytolearnthatthesenew2strokepetrolautorickshawswouldsoonneedanexpensive CNGconversionkit. TheCNGconversionpolicyranintooppositionandnumerousstrikeswerecalled.Some protestedagainsttheCNGconversion,includingalargestrikeinfavouroflowsulphur dieselasanalternative,whichwascalledbytwoprominentBJPpoliticiansin2001.There wasalsomuchunrestamongstsupportersofthepolicyasatthistimeDelhi'snetworkof CNGfillingstationswasinnowaycapableofmeetingthepotentialdemandforCNG:In July1998therewerejust9CNGfillingstationsinthecity16,thisfigurehadrisento68by April 2001, still short of the 15060 needed to keep the public transport system operational. Eventually the policy was implemented in 2001 after much delay and numerousextensionstothedeadlineforbusoperators. Despite the conversion of the entire autorickshaw fleet to 'environmentally friendly' CNG,thecapremainedinplace.Furthermore,thecapwasreviewedandextendedin 2004afteranEPCAreportclaimedthatthenewlyconverted2strokesandpurposebuilt 2strokeautoswerebothunacceptablypolluting,aclaimdisputedbyrecentresearch(see box1).AsofMarch2010,thecapremainsinforce. Thesepoliciescombinedtoproduceaverydifferentautorickshawsectortothesituation prevalentinthemid90s.

Box1: Thefourthpolicyshock?DelhiGovernmentbacktracks Asthefollowinganalysiswillexplain,thecap,CNGconversionandsalesbanhitauto drivershard.Thistriplewhammywasalmostjoinedbyafourthpolicy,whichwouldhave proveddisastrousfordrivers.AreportbasedonasuccessfulRightToInformation(RTI) claimbyNyayabhoomitheleadingNGOandsocialenterpriseinthefieldrevealsthe politicsbehindthisfourthpolicy,whichwouldhaveseen2strokeCNGautorickshaws olderthan10yearsreplacedwith4strokeCNGmodels. On 17th July 2006, the Delhi Government announced the 2stroke/4stroke shift. The rationalebehindthemovewasenvironmental2strokeenginesaremorepollutingthan 4strokes.ThismovecamedespiteanEPCAreportin2004whichstatedthat4strokes16 AccordingtoawritsubmittedtotheSupremeCourtthatmonth,whichcalledforthenumbertobe increasedto100.

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offerednosignificantenvironmentalbenefitsover2strokes. Replacement would have meant that drivers who had shelled out Rs.2530000 for a conversionkitjust45yearsago,wouldbefacedwithbillsofmultiplelakhsfornew4 stroke machines. The announcement of the policy raised the street price of an auto rickshawandpermitbyRs.65000overnight. ButhavingbeentoldthatthemovewouldbringnoenvironmentalbenefitsbytheEPCA, whywastheDelhiGovernmentsokeentopushthroughthescheme?Nyayabhoomi'sRTI presentsilluminatingevidence.TheirreportbasedontheRTIdetails anexchange of lettersbetweenRahulBajajofBajajAutoandSheilaDixshit,ChiefMinisterofDelhi. ThecorrespondencesuggestssthatthepolicyistheideaofRahulBajajwhowritesto Dikshit: we have recommended...the replacement of old 2stroke CNG retrofitted (converted)vehicleswithnew4strokeCNGvehicles.Thereplacementofconverted2 strokeCNGautoswouldopenupanewmarketforBajajAuto,whichhadpreviouslybeen closedbythecap.Bajaj'sinsistencethatthegovernmentneedstohelpensurethatthe vehicles are serviced at authorised dealerships represents another cash generator for BajajAuto. Intheend,thepolicywasneverimplemented.Theoppositionfrommultiplesources, withinandoutsidethegovernment,wastoostrong.Governmentdepartmentsopposedthe movewhilstNGOsandunionsjoinedforcestovehementlyprotestagainstthepolicy. Instead,thereplacementschemewasmadevoluntaryand2strokeCNGconvertedautos weregraduallyreplacedoverseveralyears,asdriverspreferredthepurposebuilt4stroke CNGmodels. Moreover, a recent study on emissions from autorickshaws in Delhi has found that harmfulemissionsfrom2strokeautorickshawsarearoundtentimesmorethanfrom4 strokes.ThisgoescontrarytotheEPCAreportof2004,whichthestudycritiques17.

2.2TheimpactontheautosectorThefreezeinautopermitscreatedazerosumgame:thetotalnumberofautoscouldnot increase. The city was adding 300400,000 new residents per annum (both natural increaseandmigration),butthenumberofautorickshawsstagnated:demandrose,yet supplywasartificiallyrestricted18.Thissituationbenefitedfinanciersandcontractors.17 Reynolds, C, Grieshop, A and Kandikar, M (forthcoming) Measuring Auto-rickshaw emissions to inform air quality policy, University of British Colombia, SIM-air Working Paper Series, 28-2009. 18 RoyandMohanstatethatbetween19962001thepopulationofDelhigrewby20%butthenumberof autosincreasedbyjust7%.Since2001,thepopulationhascontinuedtogrowquicklywhilstthenumber

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Forcontractors,thecapmeantthatthesupplyofrentalvehiclesremainedunchanged whilstthedemandfrompassengersincreased.Thedemandforrentalautosincreasedas newmigrantspouredintothecityfromBiharandUttarPradeshandsoughtworkinthe autosector.Thisprovidedscopeforrentincreases.Thevalueofthecontractorsassets, namelyhisautos,alsoincreaseddramatically(seebelow). Financierswereabletousethecaptodominatetheindustry.Autofinancierssellnotonly theautorickshawitself,butalsotheallimportantpermits.Withnonewpermitsbeing issued,theexistingstockofpermitsbecameavaluablecommodity.Havingsecuredlarge numbersofthesepermits,financiersbecamethegatekeeperstotheautosector. Asexpected,duetothecapthecostofanautowithapermitrocketedasfinanciersreaped thebenefit.Fig1(below)showsthepricespaidtofinanciersbydriversinoursamplefor thecombinedpackageofautoandpermitovertwodecades.Fig1showsthatthepriceof anautoandpermithasincreasedmassivelysincethecap. Theincreaseinthecostofenteringtheautorickshawsectorasanownerdrivercomesas aresultofthecap(andeventualdecreaseinnumbers)ratherthananysignificantincrease inthecostofautorickshawitself19.Thepriceofapermitandtheprocessoftransferring the permit from the false name into the name of the new ownerdriver is currently betweenRs.2.53lakhs:twiceasmuchasthevehicle.

ofautoshashardlychanged. 19 Rs.1.22isthefactorypricesforastandardBajajRES4CNGauto.Thefaremeter,taxandotherfitting bringthetotalpriceuptoaroundRs.1.35lakhs.

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Priceofautoandpermit(lakhs)5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

Fig1:Pricepaidforautoandpermitbydriversinterviewedaspartofthisstudy.The pricetouchedRs.5lakhsinSeptember2009,analltimehigh. ThesecondmajorpolicyshiftdiscussedabovewastheSCorderstatingthatallpost1990 autoswouldhavetobereplacedwithCNGfueledautosorfittedwithaCNGconversion kitbyApril2001.Theswitchhadseveralimpactsontheautosector. Contractors were largely able to absorb both the initial cost of conversion and the increasedmaintenancecostsoftheconvertedCNGengines.Thisexpenditurecouldbe recoveredbyraisingtherentalcost;passingthefinancialburdenontotherenterdrivers forwhomtheinitialriseinincomebroughtaboutbythecheaperfuel(CNGisaround 70%cheaperthanpetrol20)wasimmediatelyeatenupbyincreasedrents(seefollowing section). The conversion had the greatest effect on ownerdrivers. Conversion to CNG was compulsoryandthecostofaCNGconversionkitrangedfromRs.2530,000.Facedwith paying off monthly instalments to financiers, meeting their daily expenses and often remittingmoneytofamilymembersoutsideDelhi,manyownerdriverscouldsimplynot affordtoconverttheirautostorunonCNG.Manyownerdriverssoldtheirautosand permitstofinanciersandbecamerenterdrivers. FollowingtheCNGconversion,theofficialnumberofautosinDelhifellfrom83000to around55000. Thisreductionhappenedforseveralreasons.Firstly,83000wastheofficialnumberof autopermits,howevermanypermitholdershadscrappedtheirautosorlefttheprofession buthadnotinformedtheTransportDepartment.Thismeansthatthetruepreconversion20 http://www.embarq.org/sites/default/files/Monica_Bansal_Delhi_Paratransit.pdf

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figurewaslowerthantheofficialfigureof83000.Secondly,manydriverswerenotable to complete the paperwork necessary to obtain financial assistance from the Dehli Financial Corporation. Unable to afford the conversion without financial help, they scrappedtheirautos.Thirdly,giventhestallingandgeneralconfusionsurroundingthe conversion policy, many drivers thought that the conversion would either never be implementedorwouldbecontinuallypostponed.Thisattitudecausedinactivityandmany driverswerecaughtoutwhenthedeadlinewasenforced.Unabletoconvertbeforethe deadline,theirpermitswerecancelled.

Num ber of registered three-w heelers in Delhi 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 01991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Fig.2ThenumberofregisteredautorickshawsinDelhi.21 Thefreezeinnewpermits,theCNGconversionanditseffectsonownerdriversdidtwo things:reducedthenumberofautopermitsandconcentratedtheminthepossessionof financiers. Financiersthenturnedmanyautosbenaami,meaningthattheywereboughtandsoldby financiers withoutchangingthenames onthepermitfromtheoriginalholdertothe financierornewowner.Theimplicationsofthisareexploredinthefollowingsection.

Box2:21 EPCAReport9(Nov2004)ReportintotheincreaseinthenumberofthreewheelersinDelhi.

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Aboutthemachine:Theautorickshawconcept,CNGandBajajAuto. Theideabehindtheautorickshawissimple:anurbanpassengervehiclewiththesmallest roadfootprintpossible,minimalpurchaseandrunningcosts,asmallbuzzingengineand ultimatemanoeuvrabilitytoweaveinandoutoftraffic.Typicallypoweredbya150 300cc,78bhpengine,thelightweight350600kgmachinesarecapableamaximumof 60kmph,althoughtheyrarelygoabove40kph.Theycomeinpetrol,diesel,LPGand CNGvarieties,but(asexplainedabove)Delhi'sautofleetisnowentirelyCNGpowered. ThegreenandyellowcolourschemewasintroducedtomarktheCNGconversionin 2000. Delhi'sautofleetismostlysuppliedbyBajaj,whichhasanearmonopolyinthecity. Bajajhasbeenmakingthreewheelerforoverfiftyyears,butthecompany'sinexperience with CNG vehicles meant that its first CNG autos (2000) were unreliable and underperformedcomparedwiththeoldpetrolmodels.TheseearlyCNGmodelswere hurriedly designed and there was an immediate shortage of parts which made maintenancedifficult.Driversreportedsuddenbreakdownsinthewet,poorqualityshock absorbersleadingtopunctures,brokenwindscreensandevenrolls.Sadly,thenewBajaj RE4SCNG(2009)islittledifferent.Acomprehensivereviewbymotorindustrycritics revealedsimilarfaultsevenafternineyearsofdevelopmenttime22.Thisisnotentirely surprising.Giventhelackofcompetition,whatincentivedoesBajajhavetoimproveits product? Its customers (financiers and contractors) do not care too much about the quality,performanceorgeneralstateoftheautosthemselvesaslongastheymakemoney throughloansrepaymentsandrents(rentedautosareeasytospotastheyareoftenshabby and badly maintained). In 1997 and 2004 the Supreme Court ruled that the Bajaj monopoly was not environmentally friendly (as purpose build 4strokes offered no improvement on 2strokes, according to the EPCA report of 200423 24 a finding dismissedbyrecentresearch),yetthemonopolycontinues.Perhapsforreasonstouched uponinBox1. These two policies effectively handed control of the auto sector to financiers at the22 http://www.teambhp.com/forum/commercialvehiclesindia/60596testedbajajre4strokecngauto rickshaw.html 23 AccordingtoanEPCAReport9ReportontheIncreaseofthenumberofThreeWheelersinDelhi, datedNov2004. 24 Narain,UandKrupnik,A(2007)TheImpactofDelhi'sCNGProgramonAirQuality,available http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=17476.Narainand KrupnikstatethattheconversiontoCNGofautorickshawshasdonenothingtoreduceemissionfor certainharmfulgases.TheyfollowingtheEPCAreportinblamingpoortechnologyinearlyBajaj CNGmodels,namelypoorlyfittingpistonrings,whichallowoiltoleakintothecombustionchamber causingwhitesmoke.However,theauthorsdonotcarryoutanyemissionmeasurementsthemselves.

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expense of drivers (who either lost their autos, faced spiralling rental costs and exponentiallyrisingpurchasecosts)andthegeneralpublic,whose growing demandfor affordabletransportwasmetwithadecreaseinsupply. AccompanyingtheshifttoCNGwasanewwaveofofficialdocumentation.Theincrease incompulsoryofficialpaperworkhadtwonegativeimpactsondrivers:Firstly,official businessattheTransportDepartmentbecameharderandcostlier,givingrisetoaplethora ofmiddlemenwithspecialrelationshipswithTransportDepartmentofficials.Secondly, awarethatmostdriversdidnotpossessalltheofficiallyproscribedpaperwork,thetraffic policecouldnowstopadriveratrandomandeasilyfindanexcusetoissueachallanor demandabribe.Almostalldriversinoursamplewithtenyearsdrivingexperiencetold usthatdealingswiththeTransportDepartmentandthepolicehadbecomeconsiderably moredifficultinrecentyears. Thissectionhasbrieflydiscussedtwomajorpolicies,whichhaveaffectedtheautosector inDelhisince1997.Itthenattemptedtooutlinesomeofthemajorpowershiftswhich took place around those policies. It concluded that the balance of power shifted significantly towards financiers and contractors, with the former now controlling the sector. Transport Department officials and the police have also seen some benefits. Drivershavesufferedastheircostshaveincreaseddramatically,theirincomessqueezed andtheirprospectsforsocialmobilitystunted. Thefollowingsectionfocusesonthetestimoniesofthedriversthemselves.Ittalksabout their socioeconomic backgrounds, earnings, experiences, problems and opinions and attempts to raise the major issues in autodriving in Delhi today, as told by the protagoniststhemselves.Itseekstodevelopsomeofthethemesraisedinthissectionand illustratethemwithsomeempiricaldetails.

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3.0TheDriversThissectionisbasedonindepthinterviewswithautodriverscarriedoutinMandawali, EastDelhi,betweenNovember2009andFebruary2010.Theinformationhereisbroken downintothepersonaldetailsandbackground(outliningtheoriginsandsocioeconomic backgroundsofthedrivers),issuesaffectingrenterdrivers,issuesaffectingownerdrivers andissuesaffectingbothgroups.Thisanalysiswillbeprimarilyqualitativeasthesample size (37) is too small to carry out any meaningful quantitative analysis, yet is large enoughforthesameissuesandopinionstoconsistentlyrecur. Theinterviewsrevealagroupofunderprivilegedmenstrugglingtomeetthebasicdaily needs of their families, whilst suffering financial exploitation at the hands of both financiersandcontractorsandvirtuallyallrepresentativesofthestatewithwhomthey come into contact. Regulation in all its forms appears to work in the interests of financiers,contractors,theTransportDepartment,thepoliceandtoacertainextentunion leaders,asopposedtothedrivers,whoformthevastmajorityofworkersintheauto industry.

3.1BackgroundsAlmostallofthedriversinterviewedwereinthe3050agerange.Apartfromonedriver allhadafamily,usuallyconsistingofawifeandbetweentwoandsixchildren,ranging fromveryyoungtomarriedadults.Inmostcasesthedriverwastheonlywageearnerin thehouseholdwithhiswifedoingunpaiddomesticworkinthefamilyhome.Schoolage children were without exception in school. Several drivers lived in joint families consistingofatleastoneotherwageearner. Educationlevelsvariedwidely.5driversadmittedtobeingilliterate,whichsuggestslittle ornosignificantformaleducation.Anothertwodrivershadstudieduntilthe4 thstandard. Severaldrivershadstudiedupuntilthe8thand9thclasses.Therewerealsofourdrivers witha10thstandardeducationandsingledriverswith11thand12thstandardeducations.In oursample,thedriverswiththehigherlevelsofeducationarepredominantlymigrants whocouldnotfindajobbefittingtheirrelativelyhighstandardofschoolingintheirhome towns,inwhichgovernmentjobsarethesolealternativetoagriculturallabour.These governmentjobsrequireconnectionsandcontacts,whichmostdrivers'familiessimply didnothave.Ofthe5illiteratedrivers,Delhinativesareoverrepresentedwith2drivers. Caste has little significance amongst our sample. Drivers come from all caste backgrounds. There appears to be no relationship between caste and any other 20

informationcollected. Ofour37drivers,30aremigrants.Thisgroupshareonecharacteristic:theylefttheir homeareasasadultstoseekwork.Mostshareasecondunitingfeature:theymaintain strongtieswiththeirnativeplacesintheformoffamilyconnections,regularvisits,land ownership,remittancesandoftentheintentiontoreturn.Ofthesemigrantdrivers,10 werefromBihar,8fromUPandtheremainingdriverswerefromanumberofother northernstates(Jharkhand,HimchalPradeshandMadhyaPradesh).TheBiharidrivers wereallfromtownsinthenorthofthestate,somewithalongassociationwithmigration andtheprofessioninparticular(i.e.Motihari).

Box3: FromthePunjabtoBihar TheearlyexponentsofautorickshawsinDelhiwerealsomigrants.Inthe1960s70sthe main migrant group in Delhi was Punjabi. Having migrated to Delhi in the years followingthePartition,manyPunjabistooktoautodrivingasawaytomakealivingin theirnewhome.Asthedecadespassed,theyputdownroots,setupbusinessesandgained afirmfootholdinthecity.Slowlytheydriftedawayfromautodrivingintobetterpaid work. Theyweregraduallyreplacedinthedriver'sseatbyanewgroupofmigrants:theBiharis. Today,withintheautosector,theBiharisdrive,whilstthePunjabishavemovedupthe food chainandarenowmostlyinvolvedincontractingandfinancingautos.Thefew remaining Punjabi drivers are mostly elderly veterans of an earlier era in the auto rickshawworld.AyoungPunjabidriverisararesightnowadays. ThereplacementofPunjabiswithBiharishashadnumerouseffectsontheindustry,claim manylogtermDelhidrivers:Firstly,manyPunjabiscouldnotreturnhomeandsohadto standupforthemselvesandcarveanichewithinthecity,whereasmanyBiharidrivers cometoDelhitoworkhard,keepalowprofileandreturnhomericher:theyhavelittle stakeinthecity.ThismeantthattheoldPunjabidominatedautounionswerestronger andmorevocal.Secondly,asaconsequenceofstrongerunions(andthePunjabi'smore fierytemperament,someclaim),therewasconsiderablylessharassmentofautodrivers frompoliceandofficials.Today'sBiharidrivers,itisclaimed,acceptexploitationmore readilyandarelessinclinedtoprotestbecausetheyseetheirpresenceinthecityas temporary.

Amongst these migrant drivers a common generalisable pattern emerges. Family landholdings are typically small and cannot support increasingly large numbers of 21

dependents. Most migrant drivers have family landholdings of between 13 bighas. Unabletoliveofftheirlandalone,findingpaidemploymentisessential.However,their hometowns offer only unreliable, poorly paid agricultural work. This labouring work providesnoprospectofsocialmobilityandimprovinglivingstandards.Itmerelysuffices tosustainthesurvivalofthefamily.Theabsenceofdecentlypaidemploymentathome andtheexistenceofcontactsandnetworks(friendsandrelativesalreadyworkinginDelhi orhavingmigratedandsincereturnedhome)spursmigration.Inthissense,itcanbe ventured that the migration of the drivers in our sample has more to do with social mobilityandimprovingqualityoflifethanbaselinesurvival25. ManydriverscametoDelhiwithfriendsfromhomeorwithothermalefamilymembers. AconsiderablenumberhadfamilymembersalreadyworkinginDelhi,whoeasedtheir movetothecapital.Thesefamilyandregionalnetworksappeartoplayanimportantrole intheentryofthemigrantintotheautodrivingprofession.Typically,abuddingdriveris taughtthebasicsoftheprofession(howtodrivetheautoetc)bythecontact(almost alwaysabrother,familymemberorfriendfromtheirnativeplace,whoisalreadyplying anautoinDelhi).Thecontactwillthenrecommendthenewdrivertoanautocontractor and vouch for the new man's honesty and reliability. Contractors require such verbal testimoniesbeforetheyarepreparedtorentoutanautotoanewdriver.Thenewdriver thenbeginsdrivingarentedautoandhasafootholdintheprofession.Learninghowto manoeuvretheautoistheonlytrainingthedriverreceives.Hemustlearnwhateverelse heneedsonthejob. Thisprocesscanworkintwoways:Firstly,themigrantdriverarrivesandisinstantly introduced to the profession by his contacts and quickly begins renting an auto; or secondly,themigrantdriverfindsemploymentinDelhiandisonlyintroducedtoauto drivingwhenhegivesuptheoriginaljoborislaidoff.Inthislattergroup,thereappears to be a small but significant minority of drivers who were cyclerickshaw pullers or casual labourers who have 'graduated' into auto driving. There are also a number of driverswhosepreviouswagedjobsorindependentbusinessventureshadfailed.They then'fell'intotheprofessionasanemployment'safetynet'providedbytheirfriendsand familialcontacts26.Amongstthegroup'graduating'intoautodrivingfromlowerstatus jobs,familycontactsareseldommentioned.ItislikelythattheycametoDelhiwithout significantnetworkcontacts,butsuccessfullymadethesecontactsduringtheirtimedoing poorlypaidjobs. OfthemigrantdriversaroundonethirdhadrelocatedtheirfamiliestoDelhiandwere livinginrentedaccommodationinaffordableareas(predominantlyintheTransYamuna area). There is no identifiable keyfactor in determining familyrelocation decisions.25 Asistheconsensusinmuchmigrationstudiesliterature,thepoorestdonothavesufficientresourcesto migrate. 26 Onedriverwasdrivinganautoinordertopayoffdebtsincurredbythefailureofhisroadtransport business(duetonofaultofhisown).Anotherturnedtoautodrivingafterhissmalldeliverybusiness folded.

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Timeisnotanissue,itseems,astherearedriverswhohavebeeninDelhifor2030years buthavenotbroughttheirfamiliestojointhem.Equally,therearerelativenewcomers who have quickly reunified their nuclear families. Motivations for migration, whilst beyondthescopeofthisstudy,mayinfluencethisdecision:i.e.ifthemigrantintendsto workinthecity,earnmoremoney,reunifythefamilyandsevertieswiththenativeplace, followingthe neoclassical modelofmigration27; orifthe migrantworks inorder to rapidlyremitmoneyandaimstoreturnhomeasquicklyaspossibleonceagiventarget has been reached, in line with New Economic of Labour Migration theory 28. These motivationscanobviouslychangeovertime. Those drivers with families at home outside Delhi typically visited home every 34 months.AlmostallthesedriverssendmonthlyremittancesofbetweenRs.2500Rs.5000 aswellascontributinglargeramountsinemergenciesorforspecialoccasions.Some drivershaveevensoldautostopayformedicaltreatmentandfamilyweddings.

3.2RenterDriversThere are two main issues affecting the renterdrivers to whom we talked were the increasingcostofrentinganautoandthedwindlingchanceofeverbecominganowner. Highrents Autorickshawsarerentedoutbytheircontractorsintwoshifts:dayandnight.Theday shiftistypically7amto5pm(10hours).Thenightshiftthenrunsfrom5pmto7am(12 hours).Althoughthenightshiftis2hourslonger,bothshiftstypicallycostthesameas therearefewerpassengersatnight.Adrivermayalsorenttheautoforafull24hours period,usuallyworkingfor1618hours.Thecostofrentinganautoforeithershiftis betweenRs.250320.Driverstakingtheautofor24hourspaybetweenRs.300400.These ratesmaydecreaseifthedriverisknownbyandistrustedbythecontractor.Thedriver musthandovertheautotothenextdriverataspecifiedlocation,forexample,thelayby nearourfieldworkareainMandawali,EastDelhiisoneofmanyshiftchangesites.The needtoreturntotheshiftchangesitepunctuallyinordertohandtheautoovertothenext renterdriveroftenforcesdriverstorefusepassengerswantingtogotodistantareasas theyhurrybacktotheshiftchangelocations. Ina1012hourshiftadrivernormallyearnsaroundRs.450650intotal.Deductingthe autorentandRs.7080forCNGleavesatakehomeprofitofapproximatelyRs.120230 for1012hourswork.Thoseworking24hoursshiftsearnamodestamountmoreper27 Todaro,P(1969)AModelofLabourMigrationandUrbanUnemploymentinLessDeveloped Countries,AmericanEconomicReview,59,1. 28 Stark,OandBloom,D(1985)TheNewEconomicsofLabourMigration,AmericanEconomic Review,75,2.

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shift.Thismeansthataroundhalfthemoneytakenbyarenterdriverinhisshiftgoesto thecontractorasrent.Assuch,renterdriversspendroughlyhalftheirtimeontheroad meetingtheirrentalcostsandtheotherhalfearningforthemselvesandtheirfamilies. ThisleavesrenterdriverwithmonthlyearningsofbetweenRs.30008000(6shiftsper week). Asmentionedintheprevioussection,CNGisconsiderablycheaperthanpetrolataround Rs.22 per kg of CNG compared with Rs.47 for a litre of petrol. It is also more economical:akilogramofCNGreturnsmorekilometresthanalitreofpetrolandmodern fourstrokesaremoreeconomicalthanoldtwostrokeautos.Renterdriverspayfortheir ownfuel;thereforetheswitchtoacheaperfuelshouldhavehadalargepositiveeffecton theirincome.ButthishasnothappenedbecausethemaintenancecostsofCNGpowered autosarefarhigherthantheoldpetroldrivenmodels.Althoughthemaintenanceofthe autoisthedutyofthecontractor,nottherenterdriver,therenterdriversarebearingthe financialburdenofthehighermaintenancecoststhroughmassivelyincreasedrents.Pre CNGrentswerewellbelowRs.100.PostCNGrentsareRs.250320.Anyincreasein renterdriverincomebroughtaboutbycheaperCNGwasquicklyswallowedupbylarge increases in rents, which effectively insulated the contractors from the financial implicationsoftheshifttoCNGattheexpenseofhigherincomesfortherenterdrivers. Futureprospects Giventhelackofanysignificantincreaseinrenterdriverincomeandthecurrentpriceof anautoandpermit,thechanceofarenterdriverbecomingasuccessfulownerdriverare slim.Therenterdriversinoursamplespokeabouttherisingcostofdailyexpensesfood priceinflation,increasingrentsandthecostofsendingtheirchildrentoschool.Theysaid thattheirdailyincomesofaroundRs.200300hardlysufficedtocovertheseexpenses. Savingwasverydifficult.Thecurrentpriceofanautopluspermitpackage(Rs.4lakh) putsownershipfaroutofthereachofmostrenterdrivers.Withitgoesthepossibilityofa higherincomeandsocialmobility.

3.3OwnerdriversThemajorityoftheissuesspecifictoownerdriversarisefromtheprocessoffinancingan auto.Assuch,theinteractionsbetweennewownerdriversandfinanciersformthebasis ofthefollowinganalysis. Inordertopurchaseanautoandpermit,adrivermustapproachafinancier.Delhi'sauto financiersholdthebulkofautopermitsunderavarietyoffalsenames.Thecurrentprice ofanewautowithpermitisRs.4lakhs(asmuchasatopoftherangesmallcar29),which makesitalmostimpossibleforapotentialownerdrivertobuyanewautooutright(the pricemaybeloweriftheautoissecondhand).Instead,thedriverisaskedtomakean29 MarutiWagonRRLXIDUOBIIIisavailableinDelhiforRs.365085.44orjustoverRs.3.65lakhs.

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upfrontpaymentandtakeoutaloanfromthefinanciertocovertheremainingamount. ThisloancanbeanywherefromRs.14lakhsandisrepaidinmonthlyinstalmentsover the course of 13 years. Instalments range from Rs.600015000. Interest rates are normally 1618% flat, which translates into an effective interest rate (APR) of approximately34%.Oncetheloanhasbeenpaidoff,thepermitistransferredintothe driver's name and the vehicle is officially his. If the driver wants a new vehicle (as opposed to second hand) an old vehicle must be scrapped at an official Transport Departmentscrapyardandanofficialscrappagecertificateobtained.Onlywiththevalid scrappagecertificatecananewautobepurchasedfromthemanufacturerandthepermit fromtheoldscrappedautobetransferredtothenewvehicleandthenewowner.This processshouldnottakelongerthantwodays,butitnormallytakesuptotwomonthsdue toinefficienciesattheTransportDepartment. Theaboveprocessgivesrisetoseveralproblems,whichappeartojustifythetermauto mafia:Firstly,issuesinvolvingthepriceoftheautoandpermit,therepaymentschedule andinterestrates;secondly,shadycontractpracticesandthirdly,Jautos.Eachwillbe discussedinturn.

Box4: VisitingtheFinanciers Aspartofthefieldworkprocess,wedecidedtospeaktosomeautofinanciersinorderto coverallanglesandgivethemachancetoexplainandjustifytheiractivitiesfromtheir pointofview.WithacontactfromMandawali,wevisitedtwofinancierslocatedinthe Paharganjarea.Thefirstfinancierhadalongglassfrontedofficetoppedbyalargesign announcingthenameofthebusiness.Itwasclearthatthiswasafinancier'soffice.Our contacthadassuredusthatthiswasafinancier'sofficeandthatthemiddleagedmanina shirtsittingbehindthemaindeskwasthefinancier.However,afterexplainingourproject, the manbehindthedesktoldus thathewasnotafinancier.His business washire purchaseonly.HealsoassisteddriverswiththeirdealingswiththeTransportDepartment for a fee of just Rs.200. He was definitely not giving loans, he stated. Puzzled, we thankedhimforhistime,apologisedforthemisunderstandingandstooduptoleave. Beforewecouldleavetheoffice,amiddleagedladyenteredfromthestreet.Sheworethe brightcolours,silverjewelleryandbinditypicalofDelhi'sworkingclass.Shebrushed pastus,headingtowardsthefinanciersdesk.Withoutexplanationshehandedthemana wadofcash.Rs.9000,shesaid,ashetookitfromherwithoutceremonyorthanks.As ifitwasaregularoccurrence.Tous,standinginthedoorway,thislookedverymuchlike thisladyhadcometopaythemonthlyinstalmentonherhusband'sautoloan,whilsthe wasbusyplyingthestreets.Theoffice,thesign,theassurancesofourreliablecontact andthecolourfullydressedladyandthebundleofnotesallsuggestthatthemanwas 25

indeedafinancier,onlyhisprotestationstoldusotherwise.Welaterlearnedthathewasa middlemanoperatingatthebehestoftheactualfinancier.Hehandlescontracts,loans, instalmentsandreceipts,sotheownerdriverbelievesthatheistheactualfinancier. Weapproachedthesecondfinancierwithmorecaution.Thecoauthorenteredwithour contact,theformerposingasapotentialcustomer.Thefinancierofferedanewautofor Rs.4lakhs.HeaskedforRs.2lakhsupfrontandofferedtograntaloanfortheremaining Rs.2lakhsat16%withmonthlyrepaymentsofRs.9000. Autofinanciershaveapresenceinmanypartsofthecity,butclustersexistincertain areas.JheelintheTransYamunaisonesuchplace.Alargeautomarketsitsinthecentre ofJheel,anotherwisenondescriptworkingclasscolony.Someofthestreetsintheauto marketarelinedwithdozensofmechanicsshops.Here,autorickshawsinallstagesof dissectionsitonedgeoftheroadsurroundedbytools,parts,oilstainsandscoresof mechanicsingreasestainedclothes.Theoccasionalpristinevehiclestandsalone,plastic wrappingstillcoveringtheseatsandyellowhood.Somefinanciersaretobefoundhere, amongstthenoiseandexhaust,butmostlythesmallerplayers:tinygrubbyofficeswith crudehandpaintedsignscontaininglittlemorethanadeskandaledger.Thebigplayers aresetupinglassfrontedofficesjustaroundthecornerinthesurroundingstreets.Their professionallypaintedsigns,ACunits,tiledwalls,newfurnitureandwallmountedTVs illustratethesuccessoftheirbusinesses,whicharetypicallynamedafterreligiousfigures orbearPunjabinames.Thereisobviouslymoneytobemadeinautofinance.However, despite approaching a number of Jheel financiers with extreme caution, none were preparedtoimpartanyinformationregardingtheirbusinessesbeyondtheirbasicloan packages.Onceagain,thefinancierskeepsilent.Theyprefernottodiscussthenatureof theirdealingsforreasonsthatwillbecomeclearlaterinthissection.

Highprices Thehighcostoftheautoandpermitcombineswithhighinterestratestoputthenew ownerdriverunderextremefinancialpressure.OwnerdriversearnbetweenRs.600800 fora10hourshift(similartorenterdrivers,butownersdonothaverentalcoststomeet). Thisincomeisbarelyenoughtomeetdailyexpenses,automaintenancecostsandpay monthlyinstalments.Consequently,manyownerdriversworklongshiftsandstruggleto paytheirmonthlyinstalments. Contracts Inordertoobtaintheauto,permitandloan,thedrivermustsignacontractpreparedby thefinancier.However,manydrivershaveonlyafewyearsofeducation(oneowner driverinoursamplewasilliterate)andthereforecannotreadorunderstandthelong, 26

convoluted and deliberately difficult contracts prepared by the financiers, who are considerablybettereducated.Driversfromruralareasmaybeunfamiliarwithcontracts, business practices and sharp businessmen like financiers and can therefore be easily pressuredintosigning.Manyownerdriversinoursamplesimplysignedcontractswith financiers without reading them. Almost all are instructed by the financier to sign multipleblankcontractsasaprerequisiteforreceivingtheauto,permitandloan.These blankcontractsallowthefinancierstochangethetermsoftheloanatwill,givingthem completepoweroverthedriver.Theimplicationsforownerdriversofbeingunableto understand contracts and signing blank contracts are severe: Many fall victim to unforeseenlatepaymentclauses,whichrequirethedrivertopayalargeamountasa penaltyforthelatepaymentofonemonthlyinstalment.Thepenaltyisoftenasmuchas doublethescheduledinstalment(seeBox3).Withblankcontractsattheirdisposal,the financierhastheabilitytoincreaseinterestrates,changetherepaymentscheduleandeven denythedriverthevehicleoncethefullloanhasbeenrepaid.Theblankcontractalso makestheloan/contractintoacommoditytobetradedamongstfinanciers. Thedrivermayphysicallybeinpossessionofthevehiclewhilstpayingofftheloan,but hedoesnothavehisnameonthepermit.Thenameonthepermitisthenameofthe originalpermitholder(whomayhavegivenupdrivingormayevenhavedeceased). Sincethefinancierdoesnottransferthenameonthepermit,thisturnstheautobenaami registeredinthenameofsomeoneotherthantheowner.Promisesaremadebutthe permitisoftennevertransferred.Aslongastheautoisbenaamiandtheoriginalowneris not around, then the new owner driver is not the owner and is at the mercy of the financierandhisblankcontracts.Ifitbecomesnecessaryforthefinanciertotransferthe permitfromthenameoftheoriginalowner,thenhewillusethenameofhisemployees orapoorslumdwellerascover.

Box5: Thelatepaymentpenaltyandrepossessions Jai,50,boughthiscurrentautorickshawin2002.Backthen,theautoandpermitcost himjustRs.1.08lakhs.HepaidRs.20000upfrontandloanedtheoutstandingRs.80000 from the financier. Since then the fatherofthree has struggled to repay his monthly instalmentstothefinancierontime.Hehasbeenhitbyalatepaymentpenaltiessixor seventime.Thismeansthatheisstilltryingtorepayhisloanafull8yearslater,despite thefactthatthemultiplelaterepaymentpenaltiesmeanthathehasrepaidthefull amounttothefinancierseveraltimesover.Thecontractwassomethingofamysteryfor Jai:heisilliterate.Evenifhecouldread,hesays,thecontracthesignedwassolongthat itwouldhavetakenmanydaysforhimtoreadthrough. Subhirstilldoesnotownanauto.The50yearoldDelhitehastriedthreetimestobecome an owner but has seen his vehicle repossessed on each occasion. In 2001, he paid 27

Rs.15000upfrontandtookoutaloanofRs.75000fromafinancierforasecondhand auto.However,hefellbehindonhismonthlyrepaymentsandthefinancierrepossessed the auto.Helosttheupfrontpaymentandtherepaymentshehadsuccessfullymade. Undeterred,in2007,SubhirpaidRs.90000upfronttoafinancierandtookoutaloanof Rs.3lakhat16.6%onanewauto.Again,hefellbehindwithhisrepaymentsandalate payment penalty kicked in. In addition to the monthly repayment, the financier demandedRs.26000.Miredindebt,hewasunabletomeetboththemonthlypayments and the escalating late payment penalties, plus interest. Soon after, the auto was repossessedbythefinancier.Severalmonthslater,Subhirrepurchasedhisoldautofrom thesamefinancierunderthesameterms.Heiscurrentlystrugglingtorepaythemonthly repaymentsofRs.12000andfearshisautomayberepossessedforthethirdtime.With onlyfiveyearsschoolingSubhiradmitsthatheisnoexpertoncontractsandbusiness procedures.Hedidn'treadthecontractshesigned.Hecouldn't:theywereallblank.He wantstogiveupautodriving,butcannotbecausesince2001hehaspaidallhisspare incometofinanciersandhasnosavings. WhilsttheactionsofJaiandSabhirmayappearsomewhatnave,thesemenhavelittle formaleducationandlittleideaofbusinessandcontracts.Intheirsituation,thedesireto startearningmoreandafewreassuringwordsfromastreetwisefinancierareallthatis neededforthemtosignwhateverisputinfrontofthem.

As described above, contracts are used by financiers to ensure that the chance of repossessingthevehicleisashighaspossible.Oncerepossessed,thefinanciercanthen sellittoanewdriver,orperhapsevenbacktothepreviousdriver,asinthecaseof Subhir.ThereisevidencethatoneautoinDelhihasbeensoldtothreedifferentdrivers andsubsequentlyrepossessedfromeachoveraperiodoftime30. Afewdriversinoursamplehadsignedcontractswithfinanciersandsuccessfullybought autos.Thesedrivershadhigherlevelsofeducation(10thor11thclass)andhadworkedin decentjobsbeforeenteringtheautosector(i.e.pharmaceuticals,familybusinessesetc). Giventheireducationandslightlymoreaffluentbackground,thesedriversapproached autodrivinginastrategicmanner:rentingatfirsttolearnaboutthesectorandthen carefullyreadingthecontractsputinfrontofthembythefinancier.Thesefewsuccessful driversrealisedthatinordertorepaythefinancier,theautorickshawmustply24hours. Whilsttheythemselvesdriveoneofthetwodailyshifts,arelative(typicallyabrother) drivestheothershiftortheautoisrentedouttoatrustedfriend. JModels30 DatacollectedfromfinanciersaccountsbytheleadingNGOinthefieldaspartofaninvestigationinto thefinancemafia.

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MuchconfusionsurroundstheJmodelauto.Littleinformationispublishedabouttheir originandtheregulationsgoverningtheiruse.Thefollowinghasbeenpiecedtogether fromavarietyofsources. On16thDecember2002theTransportDepartmentfiledanapplicationintheSCcalling fortheissuanceofabatchofnewautopermits,temporarilyrelaxingthecap.TheSC agreed,rulingthat5000newpermitsshouldbeissued.TheseautosbeartheletterJin theirregistration. 750JautoswerereservedforScheduledCasteapplicants,375forScheduledTribes applicants,1350forOtherBackwardCastesand2525asanunreservedgeneralquota.All applicantshadtohavevalidlicencesandbadges.Thevehiclesinallcategoriesweretobe allottedtoownerdriversonlywithnoprovisionforsaleorrenting.Successfulapplicants weregivenaccesstosoftloansfromtheDelhiFinanceCorporationtopurchasenew autos. However, adherence to this policy has been inconsistent and there is much confusiontherulesgoverningJautos. However,therearealsostrongclaimsthatthemajorityoftheseJpermitswerecaptured byfinancierswhopaideligibledriversasmallsumtoapplyforthepermitsusingtheir names.SuccessfulapplicantsthenhandedovertheirnewJpermitstothefinancier.The permitsthereforeappearedtobeheldbypoorerdrivers,butwerereallyinthepossession offinanciers.EightyearslaterTransportDepartmentrecordsshowthatasmanyas350 individualsownmultipleJpermits,thusviolatingtheownerdriveronlypolicy 31.It appearsthatofficialregulationswerebentforthebenefitoffinanciersandcontractors. Driversarenotabletofloutregulationswithsuchease.TheuncertaintyregardingJ autoscausesproblemsfordrivers.FinancierscansellJmodelstounsuspectingdrivers andstarttakingmonthlyinstalments.Oncetheloanisfullyrepaidthefinanciermay claimthatitisimpossibletotransferthepermitintothenewdriver'sname,denyinghim theautoforwhichhehaspaid.Iftransferispossible,thenitisonlylikelytobegranted afteranamountispaidattheTransportDepartmentinadditiontoamorethanreasonable transferfee.TheboxbelowillustratestheconfusionoverJmodels.

Box6: BuyingaJmodel:Drivers'experiences Sorabwasdoingwell.Throughyearsofhardworkhehadmanagedtosuccessfullypay offtheloanonhisautoandgetthepermittransferredtohisname.Hisbrotherwasnot doingsowell,soSorabdecidedtobuyanautoforhim.InOctober2009,insteadofan upfrontpayment,heputuphisownautoascollateralforaRs.2.60lakhloanfroma financierforasecondhandautoforhisbrother.TheautowasaJmodel.Sorabinsists thatJmodelsaretransferableaslongasthedriverhasthecorrectpaperwork.Butthe31 InformationreceivedfromNyayabhoomifollowinganRTI.

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policedonotagree.TheycaughthiminNehruPlaceandissuedachallanforRs.3000for drivingaJautonotregisteredinhisname.Theyalsoillegallyconfiscatedthevehicle. Sureshdrivesillegally.It'sallhecandonowadays.In2008hepaidRs.2.55lakhforaJ modelauto:Rs.55000upfrontandaloanfortheremainingRs.2lakhs.However,after fourontimerepayments,SureshwastoldthatJmodelsarenontransferableandthat therewasnochanceofhimeverowningtheauto,evenafterrepayingthefullloan.After hearingthis,heconcludedthathewasbeingcheatedbythefinancierandimmediately stoppedrepayingtheloan.Hestilldrivestheautoit'shisonlysourceofincomeforhis familyoffiveschoolagedchildren.Buthedoessoillegally.Ifpulledoverbythepolice, hefacesahugechallanandthepossibleimpoundingofhisautowithlittlechanceofit beingreleased.

3.4CommonissuesThereareanumberofissuesthataffectdriversregardlessoftheirrentalorownership status.Theycametotheforetimeandtimeagainduringourfieldworkinterviewswith drivers.Theseareasare:thefaremeter,dealingswiththeTransportDepartment,traffic regulations pertaining to autorickshaws and treatment by the police. Each will be discussedbelow. TheFareMeter By lawDelhi'sautorickshawsmustrunbythemeter.This meansRs.10forthefirst kilometreandanadditionalRs.4.5foreverykilometrethereafter(lowforaMetrocity).A 25%nightchargeisalsoapplicablefrom11pm5am.Since2002,electronicmetershave beencompulsoryonallnewautos.Contrarytopopularbelief,theseelectronicmeters cannotbetamperedwithandwillsimplyceasetofunctionifinterferedwith(leadingtoa hefty repair bill). They are also unreliable and of poor quality. The meter is often genuinelybrokenasthedriverorcontractorroutinelydelayspayingtheRs.1000billfor itsrepair. Evenifthemeterisoperational,fewdriversarewillingtorunbyit.Thisrefusalisoften interpretedasgreedonthedriver'spartandcontributestothebadreputationoftheDelhi autowallah.Buttherealreasonbehindthereluctancetorunbythemeteristhat,ifthe driverweretorunbythemeteratalltimes,hewouldnotearnasufficientincometopay hisrentorloanrepayments,fuelcosts(andmaintenanceinthecaseofownerdrivers), paybribesandchallans(seebelow)andstillhaveenoughlefttofeedhisfamily. 30

AutorickshawUnitoftheTransportDepartmentatBurari TheAutorickshawUnitislocatedinBurari,northDelhi,around20kmfromthecity centre.Ithandlestheadministrationoftaxisandautorickshawsandcompoundhousing commercial vehicles confiscated by the Transport Department. All drivers must visit BurariatsomepointinordertoobtaintheannualFitnessCertificate,Permitrenewal,and PermitTransfersfortheirownorrentedvehicles.However,complyingwithrequirements isfarfromeasy.

Box7: OurdayoutatBurari TheAutoRickshawUnitoftheTransportDepartmentisanhourbyautofromthemiddle of town. Densely packed urbanity gradually gives way to wide highways, distant apartmentblocksanddustyprojectswithroughroadgridslaidoutamongstthescrubby vegetationandkidscricketgames.TheTransportDepartmentbuildingstandsinawalled offenclosurehalfakilometredownanaccessroadfromthemainhighway.Theroadis unpavedandlinedononesidebydhabas,photocopyshopsandphotoshops,ahundred autorickshaws queue on the opposite side, awaiting their annual Fitness Certificate check.Weenteredthroughgate4,nomorethanamansizedgapinthewall.Inside,the concreteshellwhichhousestheAutorickshawUnitstoodinthemiddleofthesquare compound,surroundedonallsidesbydryearth,afewbenchesandtheoddpieceof shadegrantedbyatreeorawning.Itwasearlyafternoonandtherewereseveralhundred men hanging around; taxi drivers, auto drivers and a number of better dressed taxi owners.Themensatonbenches,squattedonthegroundorstoodinpatchesofshade. Everyonelookedliketheyhadbeentherealongtimeandexpectedtobethereforquite some time still. A dozen or so drivers crowded around each of the dozen service windowstothefrontandrearofthebuildingtheonlypointofcontactbetweenthe Transport Department officials and the drivers. The main doors were shuttered. The Autorickshaw Unit appeared impenetrable, more like a fortress than a government service.Occasionallythebarreddoorswouldpartandoneortwomenwouldslipinside. Theatmospherewasoneofboredomtingedwithanger.Acrowdofmenroundedthe cornerandpressedupagainstthebarreddoor.Theyhadbeenwaitinginlineforfive hoursandthequeuehadnotmoved.TheyweredemandingtoseetheDeputyChief.Next tous,twomencomplainedthattheyhadwaitedallday,whilstseveralpeoplehadarrived afterthem,paidaRs.200bribetotheofficialsandhadtheirapplicationsprocessedinan hour. OnoursecondvisitweweregrantedanaudiencewiththeDC.Wewantedtoaskhim abouttheconfusionsurroundingtheregulationsandtogiveusthe'official'versionof events.ThesecurityguardunlockedthebarredgateandletusintotheAutorickshaw 31

Unitbuilding.TheDC'sofficeislarge,coolandwellfurnished.TheDCwassitting behind his desk reading the newspaper. We introduced ourselves and outlined our researchandtheareasaboutwhichwewouldliketoaskhim.First,hetoldusthathewas notallowedtotalktousandthatweshouldvisitanotherbureaucratinCivilLines.Then hebecameangryandtoldusthatwedidnothavetheauthoritytoaskhimsuchsilly questions.Finally,hepushedtheMotorVehicleRulebookacrossthetableatusandtold usthatitcontainedeverything.Gettingnowherewethankedhimforhistimeandleftno more knowledgeableabouttheregulations butsomewhatmoreawareoftheconduct, attitudeandsecrecyattheAutorickshawUnit.

TheregulationsgoverningautorickshawsinDelhiarecontainedintheMotorVehicle Actof1988,theCentralMotorVehicleRules,1989andtheDelhiMotorVehicleRules, 1993.Therearealsoanumberofotherwrittenandoralruleswhichareinternaltothe transportdepartment.Thiscausesmuchconfusionandambiguity. Anautodrivermustcarrythefollowingdocumentswithhimatalltimes:Commercial Licence,CommercialBadge,RegistrationBook,Permit,latestPollutionUnderControl Certificate(PUC),FitnessCertificate,MeterCertificate,RoadTaxandInsurance.Hereis abriefrunthroughsomeofthesedocuments: Toobtainacommerciallicenceallthatisrequiredisforthedrivertohaveheldavalid privatelicence(todriveacar)foroneyear.Thenthelicenceholdermustsimplysubmit proofofresidenceandpassamedicaltest.However,theTransportDepartmentdoesnot recogniselicencesfromotherstateswhenissuingcommerciallicences,eventhoughby law,everylicenceissuedfromanywhereinthecountryisvalidthroughoutthecountry. MigrantdriversmustthereforeobtainDelhilicencesbeforeapplyingforthecommercial licenceanadditionallaboriousstep.Obtainingproofofaddressmayalsobedifficult andcostlyifthemigrantdriverisrenting. After getting acommercial licence,the holdercan applyforacommercial badge by submittinganapplicationwithproofofaddress.TheTransportDepartmentforwardsthe applicationtotheDelhiPoliceforverificationoftheaddressandtheantecedent/criminal recordofthedriver.Often,abribeofRs.500ensuresapositivereportissentbacktothe TransportDepartmentbythepolice. TheAutorickshawUnitatBurarihandlesautorickshawpermits,butduetothecap,the rulesconcerningapplyingforanewpermitarelargelyirrelevant.Apermitisvalidfor5 yearsandthenitmustberenewed.Renewalrequiresaphotocopyoftheownerdriver's PANcardandhisBankAccountnumber.Transferofthepermitfromonenameinto another requires both the new owner and the old owner to appear at the Transport Departmentinperson,despitetherebeingnorequirementofthisinthelaw.Theold permit holder is seldom traceable (having sold the vehicle to many years ago). To 32

completethetransferralthenewownerhastopayabribeashecannotadheretothis unofficialoralrule.Thereisnosuchruleinplaceforthetransferofpermitsforprivate cars. EveryautomusthaveaFitnessCertificate(FC).ObtaininganFCforanewautorequires thefollowingdocuments:Form20,Form22,SalesCertificate21,InsuranceCertificate, LOIfromtheStateTransportAuthorityandafeeofRs.100fortheinspectionofthe vehicle.TorenewanexistingFCrequiresregistrationdocument,RoadTaxClearance from the Accounts Branch of the Transport Department, all of the previous year's PollutionUnderControlCertificatesandtheproscribedfees.TheFitnessTestitselfhas 17differentareaseachcontainingmanycriteria,someofwhichrelyontheopinionofthe tester as opposed to objective measurements (i.e. state of bodywork). Ownerdrivers seldomhaveall4previousquarterlyPUCcertificatesandmustthereforepayabribefor eachmissingPUC.DriverscaughtplyingwithoutaFCareliableforaRs.5000challan. ThePollutionUnderControlCertificate(PUC)isobtainedfromanumberofTransport Departmentaccreditedpollutioncheckingcentresacrossthecity.Thevehiclesemissions aremeasuredandthePUCcertificateissuediftheautopasses.ThetestingfeeisRs.35. OperatingwithoutavalidPUCmeansachallanofRs.900.AccordingtotheDelhiTraffic RulesanewautoneedsaPUCafteroneyearontheroadandtheneverythreemonths fromthenon. As explainedabove,therules governingapplicationsfordocuments andissuanceare opaqueandsubjecttoarbitrarychangesdependingonthemoodofTransportDepartment officials.Theyarescatteredacrossanumberofsourceswhilstmanyrulesareknownonly tothosewithintheAutorickshawUnitbuildingitself.EvenhardenedBurarihustlers admitthatmanyregulationsareadhoc,arbitraryandarekeptsecret.

Box8: Theautoscrapscandal Inordertobuyanewautorickshaw,anoldautohastobescrapped.It'saoneforone system:Thedrivertakeshisoldautototheonlyofficiallysanctionedprivatelyoperated scrap yard in Delhi, a 1000m/sq plot at Surajmal Vihar (with electricity and water providedfreeofcharge).TheSurajmalViharplantisownedbyaprivatecompanyand hasamonopolisticcontractwiththeTransportDepartmentonautorickshawscrappage. Attheplant,theautoisscrappedandthedriverreceivesRs.5000(downfromRs.7000a yearago)andaScrappageCertificate(thevitaldocumentneededtobuyanewmachine). Thisisaverygooddealforthescrappers.Theautoisnotsimplycrushed.Usefulspare partsaresalvagedandsoldandtheexpensiveCNGconversionkitisremovedandsoldon tocitiesfollowingDelhi'sCNGlead.RevenuefromthesparepartsandCNGkitfar exceedsRs.5000.

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Themonopolywasgrantedin2007.Sincethen19000autoshavebeenscrappedthisway, nettingtheprivatecontractoratidyprofit. In March2010unionleaderO.PTiwariandRakeshAgarwalofNyaybhoomifiled a successfulRightToInformationclaim.Fedupwiththeprofitsmadebythescrappersat theexpenseofdrivers,theywantedtoseethecontractsignedbythecontractorsandthe TransportDepartment.Theywantedtoreadthetermsofthemonopoly,togothroughthe smallprint.TheTransportDepartmentwasforcedtoadmitthatithadlostthefile containingthecontractcopyandothervitalpapers.Withoutacontract,thescrappage firmhadthefreedomtopaydriverswhattheywanted.

Thepoliceandchallans In recent year the attention of the police has been drawn increasingly towards auto drivers.Driversclaimthatduetothelargenumberofdocumentsneededtoplythestreets legallyandpedanticroadrulesregardingautorickshaws,itispossibleforapolicemanto stopanautodriveratrandomandthenfindareasontoissueachallan.Thisattention frequently becomes harassment as autodrivers are targeted for the most marginal of violations: incorrect uniform, wrong coloured lettering on the auto body and stoppinginanondesignatedarea(despitethefactthatmostofthe312designated parkingareasinthecityareunmarked)aresomeexamplesofthis.Sometimestheofficer willissueanofficialchallanandgiveareceipttotheunluckydriver,atothertimeshe willlookforabribe.Bribesareusuallysubstantiallylessthanthepotentialchallan.The driversclaimthatthisdecisiondependsonthemoodofthepolicemananddecreesby higherauthorities(i.e.tocrackdownonautosortoissueacertainnumberofchallansthat month).Moreexperienceddriversreportthatpoliceattentionandharassmenthasbecome moreintenseinrecentyears,inlinewiththeincreasingdifficultyofobtainingagrowing listofcompulsorydocumentsfromtheTransportDepartment.Harassmentisalsomore intense on national holidays (such as Republic Day) and in the days following auto rickshawstrikes(revenge,asonedriverputit). Thepoliceoftenworkinpairs:oneplaysbadcop,threateningissuingalargeofficial challanforsomeminoroffence;theotherthentakesontheroleofthegoodcopand offerstopersuadehiscolleaguetoforgetthechallaninexchangeforamuchsmaller bribe.Thegratefuldrivergladlypaysthebribe. Challansareunpredictable.Differentofficersissuechallansfordifferentamountsforthe same offence. Challan policy is also erratic. The challan for refusal (to take a passenger)increasedfromRs.90toRs.5000inonemove.Thepoliceseldomissuethefull challan;ratherusethisterrifyingfiguretoextractlargerbribes. Impoundingoftheautorickshawisalsoaconstantthreat.Severaldriversspokeofhaving 34

theirautosseizedbytheTrafficPoliceasthepermitwasnotinthenameofthedriver (Jmodels),despitethefactthatthisisnotlegalgroundsfortheconfiscationoftheauto undertheMotorVehicleRulesof1988.

Box9: Challanforasingleword AroundadozenautodriverswereparkedonMintoRoad,reportsRadheysham,whohas drivenarentedautosince2005.Hewasamongstthem.Theyweretakingabreakduring theirlongshiftswithoneeyeopenforpossiblecustomers,asdriversalloverthecitydo from time to time. Then the police arrived. After snooping around the vehicles, the officersnoticedthatmanyofthemhadthewordtaxiratherthanTSRwrittenintiny lettersacrosstheirnumberplates.Forthistinytechnicalmistakeinalanguagespokenby noneofthedrivers(madebysomeoneelsenoneofthedrivershadpaintedtheirown vehicles!)thepolicemenissuedeachdriverwithachallanofRs.1100.Althoughdriving withadefectivenumberplateincursachallanofjustRs.90. ProblemswiththepoliceandtheTransportDepartmentcombinedtomakeBaldev'slifea misery.Lastyear,hehadtoapplyforacommercialbadge,acompulsorydocument.He haddrivenwithoutthebadgeforyears,butincreasingpoliceattentionandanumberof challans fordrivingwithoutoneforcedhis hand.AfterpayingaRs.400bribetothe police to provide the proof of address required by the Transport Department, he completedhisapplicationandbeganthe15daywaitforhiscommercialbadgetoarrive. After15daysthebadgehadnotarrived.Anotherweekpassedanditstillhadn'tcome. DuringthistimeBaldevwasplyingthestreets,butwasbeingregularlychallanedforhis lackofabadge,despitehisprotestationsthathisapplicationwasbeingprocessed.The challansseriouslyreducedhisincome.AfterawhileBaldevhadtostopdrivingandwait forthebadgetoarrive.Itarrivedafter3months,duringwhichhisfamilyhadlivedoff theirmeagresavings.

These driver testimonies present a group of family men subject to exploitation by financiers,contractorsandtheauthorities.Theymustmeetthedailyexpensesoftheir families whilst paying as much as half their daily earnings to contractors as rent or struggling to meet the monthly loan repayments due to their financiers. Insufficient education leaves them vulnerable to exploitation by wily and powerful people in the financebusiness.Butwithoutrightownershiptheonlywaytoincreaseearningsinthe autoprofessionandautofinancierstheonlymeanstoachievethatgoal,driversrepeatedly fallpreytodubiousandoftenoutrightillegalcontractualpractices.Driversarealsoa convenient source of extra income for the traffic police and Transport Department 35

officialswhoeffectivelyextractbribesforignoringtrivialoffencesorperformingthe most basic of administrative services. Furthermore, in the case of the Transport Department,thesheernumberofdocumentsneededtodrivelegallyandthedeliberately cumbersomeproceduresthedrivershavetogothroughinordertogetthem,suggestthat theopportunitiesfordemandingbribesarebuiltintotheverystructureoftheregulations themselves.Withouttheselongwindedanddifficultregulations(demandingdozensof supporting documents), Transport Department officials would not be able to demand bribesasdriverswouldbeabletosubmitcompleteapplications. Piecingtogetherthefragmentsprovidedbythislimitedsurvey,itisapparentthatauto rickshaw drivers are not only victims of people, but of a regulatory system, which facilitatestheiractions.TheregulationonDelhi'sautorickshawsector,itappears,hasfor thepastdecadeworkedentirelyinfavourofthe200orsofinanciers(includingmiddle men),thenumerouscontractors,trafficpolicemenandTransportDepartmentofficialsat theexpenseofaround1lakhdrivers.Thecurrentregulatoryenvironmentensuresthat money percolates efficiently from the passengers and auto drivers on the street to financiers,contractorsandvariousemployeesofthestate. Whatarethedriversdoingtofightagainstthissystem? ThefollowingsectionlooksatautorickshawunionsinDelhi.Itattemptstounravelwhat atfirstappearstobeapictureriddledwithcontradictions.

4.0UnionsAutorickshawunionsinthecapitalareaconundrum.Therearemanyandtheyhavethe powertocallwellobservedstrikes,whichhavedisruptedtransportinthecitymanytimes inthepastdecade.Whenastrikeiscalled,thestreetsarealmosttotallyemptyofautos. Yetinthelastdecadethesestrikeshaveachievedlittleintermsofdriverwelfareandfew drivershaveanythinggoodtosayabouttheunions.Thissectionattemptstounravelthis confusingsituation:howandwhydounionsorganiseunbrokenstrikeswithoutdriver supportandwhydotheynotdeliverimprovementsfordrivers?Thefollowinganalysis 36

discussesthethreelargestunions,theiractivitiesandtheirpolitics. Therearearound17autorickshawunionsinDelhi.Alargenumberoftheseunionsare relativelynew,havingbeenfoundedinthelasttenyears.Theautorickshawstrikeof August2009wasreportedasacooperativeeffortbetweenthemajorityoftheseunions. However,only6areregisteredwiththeLabourCommissioner.InFebruary2010,we visitedtheleadersofthreeofthelargestregisteredautorickshawunionsinDelhiinorder tolearnabouttheiractivities,achievementsandpolitics.

4.1ThreeunionsDilliAutoRickshawSangh WemetDilliAutoRickshawSangh(DAS)leader,RajendraSoni,athisofficeopposite AjmerGate.Theunionwasregisteredin1969andcurrentlyhasamembershipinthe lowhundreds.TheDASofficeisalsotheDelhiheadquartersoftheBharatMazdoor Sangh (BMS), an umbrella organisation made up of 174 unions representing various trades.ItisaffiliatedwiththeSanghParivar,thegroupoforganisationsshepherdedby theHindunationalistRashtriyaSwayamsevakSangh(RSS).Thewallswereadornedwith numerousBMSpostersandbanners.Weweretheonlypeoplepresentintheofficeforour midafternoonappointment.TheBJP'sDelhiofficewasjustafewmetersawayacrossthe street.MrSoniisopenabouttheunion'saffiliationwiththeRSSbutclaimsthathisunion isnotpolitical.ItreceivesnofinancialsupportfromtheSangh;isfundedentirelyby membercontributions,althoughrunningauniononthecontributionsofjustonerupee permonthfromafewhundredlowincomemembers,withoutcontributionsfromother sources,wouldrequireruthless efficiency.Despiteits nonpoliticalstatus,MrSoni statesthathisunionenjoyedmoreinfluenceundertheformerBJPadministration.Ifa demandfromtheDASwasnotheededbytheBJPadministration,Soniwouldgotothe RSS directly, which would prompt the BJP to take notice. The current Congress administrationmeansthathisunionhaslessinfluence. HeclaimsthathewaspartofapanelwhichadvisedtheDelhiGovernmenttocapthe numberofautorickshawsin1998.Hesupportedthecapandcontinuestodoso.Thecap streamlinestheautorickshawsectorandmakesitharderforBiharimigrantstotakeover theprofession.HeblamesBiharisfortherisingcostofautosandpermits,tellingusthat theyarenaturallymeekandsubmissiveandareeasilyexploitedbyfinanciers. Whenaskedabouttheincreasingnumberofnewunions,individualsgraspingforpower andmembershipfees,hegiveslittleinformationofautorickshawpolicyortheproblems ofthecurrentregulatoryregime. WelaterlearnthatSonihasnoofficialpositionintheDAS,ratherheisthesecretaryof 37

theBMS(theparentorganisationoftheDAS). BharatiTipahiyaChalakSangh TheheadofficeoftheBharatiTipaheyaChalakSangh(BTCS)islocatedinanauto marketinDakshinpuri,southDelhi.Mechanicsandsparepartshopssurroundthetiny office, which has a desk and space for four people to sit. Our meeting with leader, SobaranSinghRajput,wasduringhisdaily57pmofficehoursandwewerejoinedby fiveorsixautodriverswhohadcometotalktoRajput,whohadjustreturnedfromthe AutorickshawUnitinBurari. TheBTCSclaimstobethelargestautorickshawunioninthecitywitharound1400 members.Itwasfoundedin1996.EachmembersupposedlypaysRs.30permonthas membership. The Communist Party (CP) also contributes Rs.60 per year for each member.TheCPprovidessupportfortheunionandpubliclybacksanystatementof actioncalledbytheBTCS.Rajputexplainsthattheunionwasoriginallyaffiliatedwith theCongressandhadgoodrelationswiththeformerTransportMinisterPervezHashmi. However,subsequentMinistershavenotbeensosympathetic(includingtheincumbent, ArvinderSinghLovely)andsotheBTCSshiftedtotheCP. Amongst the achievements of his union, Rajput claims the reversal of the Delhi Government's2006decisiontoscrapall2strokeCNGautorickshawsandreplacethem with 4strokes32. He says that union pressure played a significant role in forcing the governmenttothinkagain.Themovewouldhaveplacedownerdriversunderunbearable financialpressure. Rajputwillinglygivesalargeamountofinformationaboutthecurrentregulationsand practicesattheAutorickshawUnitandthedealingsoffinanciers.Hecritisesthelackof transparencyattheTransportDepartment.Thereisnodefinitivedocumentcontainingall regulations relating to autorickshaws, he states. Some regulations are contained in variousgovernmentacts,whilstothersaremerelyorallycommunicatedbetweenstaffat Burari.Inadditiontothelackofclarity,heclaimsthattheregulationsthemselvesunfairly penaliseautodriversandgivesnumerousexamples. WelearnfromothersourcesthatRajputowns4autorickshaws,whichherunsonrent. HeadmitsthathehascontactsattheAutorickshawUnitinBurariandusesthemto processthedocumentsandapplicationsofunionmembersquicklyforafee. BharatiyaKrantikariAutorickshawManch32 Theproposalwouldhaveseenall2strokeautosreplacedwith4strokesonenvironmentalgrounds despiteanEPCAreportfindingthatboth2strokeand4strokeBajajautosemitunacceptableamounts ofharmfulgases.Foranthoroughanalysissee: http://www.nyayabhoomi.org/auto_general/replacement.htm

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The Bharatiya Krantikari Autorickshaw Manch(BKAM) does nothavean office. Its leader,RakeshSood,meetsmembersunderasignbearingtheunion'snameonacorner inConnaughtPlace.Wewereearlyforthemeeting.Anumberofautosareparkednear thesign,awaitingSood,whoisonhiswayfromtheAutorickshawUnitinBurari.Upon arriving,Soodfreelyadmitsthatheactsasa'tout'attheTransportDepartment.Heuses his contacts to process applications and get documents for his 800 members for considerablyless thanothertouts (Rs.500600,rather than Rs.10001500,he claims). SoodisanRSSmemberandclaimsthatformerBJPadministrationpaidmoreattentionto thedemandsofhisunion,theclaimmadebyfellowRSSman,Soni.ButunlikeSoni,he opposesthe