Procedural HAZOP Study Report

AMEC Commercial

Procedural HAZOP Study Report STFC RAL MICE Hydrogen System 29 – 30 October 2012

To: STFC RAL MICE

Date: November 2012

From: AMEC

Your Reference: SF0005355 Issue 1

SF0005355 Issue 1 Page 2

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Title Procedural HAZOP Study Report - RAL MICE Hydrogen System Prepared for

STFC RAL MICE

Our Reference

SF0005355

Confidentiality, copyright & reproduction

This report is submitted by Energy, Safety and Risk Consultants (UK) Limited (hereafter referred to as AMEC) in connection with a contract to supply goods and/or services and is submitted only on the basis of strict confidentiality. The contents must not be disclosed to third parties other than in accordance with the terms of the contract. To minimise our impact on the environment, AMEC uses paper from sustainable sources

Contact Details AMEC Thomson House Birchwood Park Risley Warrington Cheshire WA3 6GA United Kingdom Tel +44 (0) 1925 252525 Fax +44 (0) 1925 254571 amec.com

Name Signature Date Author(s) Jon Watson

14/11/2012

Reviewed by Belinda Prescott

14/11/2012

Approved by Trevor Johnstone

14/11/2012


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Glossary

Acronym Meaning

DSEAR Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmosphere Regulations

HAZOP Hazard and Operability

LOPA Layers of Protection Analysis

MICE Muon Ionisation Cooling Experiment

MOM MICE Operations Manager

PLC Programmable Logic Controller

PPS Personnel Protection System

PSCL Pre-Sequence Check List

RAL Rutherford Appleton Laboratory

STFC Science and Technology Facilities Council

SQEP Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel

UCR University College Riverside


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Contents

Glossary 3

1 Introduction 5

2 Background 5

3 Purpose 5

4 Attendees 6

5 Documents 6

6 Scope 6

7 Methodology 7

8 Nodes 7

9 Guidewords 8

10 HAZOP Output 9

11 Issues 9

12 Summary 9

Appendix 1 Summary of Actions and Action Tracking Sheets 11 Appendix 2 HAZOP Output 51 Appendix 3 Record of Attendance Sheets 67


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1 Introduction A Procedural Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study was carried out on 29

th and 30

th October 2012

with regards to the operation of the Rutherford Appleton Laboratories (RAL) MICE (Muon Ionisation Cooling Experiment) liquid hydrogen system. The aim of this study was to consider and identify potential hazards and causes for operational problems, quality problems, and delays associated with the operations and determine further actions to reduce these.

2 Background RAL of the Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC) is constructing an experimental physics facility which includes a liquid hydrogen system. This hydrogen delivery system is part of the first (of three) MICE systems. A full HAZOP of the design of the hydrogen delivery system as a single entity was carried out in June 2006. Recommendations were identified and implemented where appropriate (including control systems and interlocks, protection against external hazards and planning for failure of major components), with a subsequent Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) study and a Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmosphere Regulations (DSEAR) risk assessment being completed. The design is now mature, as are the surroundings, and the facility is undergoing its R&D phase. The internal review committee gave a ‘green light’ for the liquid hydrogen R&D work in October 2011 but asked for a second HAZOP exercise to look at the operation of the system in the full experimental context.

3 Purpose The purpose of this Procedural HAZOP was to provide a review of the procedures detailed in the Operating Instructions to identify hazards and causes for operational problems, quality problems, and delays, with due consideration for the operation of the hydrogen delivery system within the context of the other surrounding operating facilities. Closure of all outstanding actions and issues from this HAZOP will facilitate the commencement of operation in Q1, 2013.


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4 Attendees The HAZOP II workshop was attended by a team of Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP) relevant to the engineering process being examined. Details of the attendees are provided in the table below, and a record of attendance is provided in Appendix 3.

* part-time attendance

5 Documents The following documents were utilised in the HAZOP process:

� MICEH2-TD-120417 - 'MICE Hydrogen System - Operating Instructions', S Watson, Issue 2, 27/07/2012;

� Briefing Note for RAL MICE Hydrogen System Operating Instructions HAZOP, 29-30 October 2012;

� Functional Specification for the MICE Personnel Protection System (Version 7.1);

� Principles of Accelerator Personnel Protection Systems, J Alexander, (Draft);

� Functional Operation of the MICE Searches (specifically covered within Node 2).

6 Scope The HAZOP scope was defined by the plant and processes detailed in the documents listed in Section 5, analysed in accordance with the nodes and guidewords listed in Sections 8 and 9 respectively. The relevant Pre-Sequence Check Lists (PSCLs), detailed in the Operating Instructions, were considered within the assessment of each node. ‘Helium Fill’ and ‘Helium Empty’ procedures were listed as nodes in the HAZOP Briefing Note, which was distributed to attendees prior to the study. However, the HAZOP attendees concluded that these are commissioning operations and not relevant for this HAZOP. These procedures were therefore removed from the scope. An additional node was added during the meeting (Node 9) to identify hazards and causes for operational problems, quality problems, and delays associated with the operation of the hydrogen delivery system within the context of the other surrounding operating facilities, and also to give due consideration to maintenance plans.

Name Company Role/Discipline 29th

Oct 30th

Oct

Trevor Johnstone AMEC Chairman � �

Jon Watson AMEC Secretary � �

Belinda Prescott AMEC Independent Expert � �

Steve Watson STFC Project Engineer � �

Phil Warburton STFC Electrical Designer � * �

Linda Coney UCR MICE Operations Head � �

Andy Nichols STFC Project Engineer � �

Gareth Baker STFC Safety, Health and Environment Group � �

David Haynes ISIS RAL Target Operations Group Leader � �

Gary Allen ISIS RAL Target Controls Group Leader � �

Stephen Jago STFC, ISIS Mechanical Engineer � �

Mike Courthold STFC Cryogenics and Control Systems Engineer � �

Stewart Greenall STFC MICE Hall Manager � �


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7 Methodology A Procedural HAZOP is an examination of an existing or planned operation (work) procedure to identify hazards and causes for operational problems, quality problems, and delays.

� Can be applied to all sequences of operations;

� Focuses on both human errors and failures of technical systems;

� Best suited for detailed assessments, but can also be used for coarse preliminary assessments;

� Flexible approach with respect to use of guidewords. For this Procedural HAZOP a structured examination of the Operating Instructions was undertaken by a multi-disciplinary team familiar with the facility, including a number of hydrogen experts. An independent Chairman and Secretary facilitated the discussions and recorded the output interactively on-screen. The HAZOP study was conducted following the nodes presented in Section 8, and using the guidewords presented in Section 9.

8 Nodes The HAZOP study was broken down into the following nine nodes, following agreement from the HAZOP team prior to commencement of the study:

1. System Checks

2. Access Control and Work Procedures

3. Vac Down Procedures inc PSCL4

4. Purge Procedures inc PSCL1 (He) and PSCL2 (H2)

5. Hydride Bed Charge inc PSCL3

6. Hydrogen Fill inc PSCL2

7. Hydrogen Empty inc PSCL2

8. Fault Procedures

9. Generic Interfacing Hazards and Maintenance Plans


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9 Guidewords Guidewords were used to guide and stimulate the brainstorming process and so discover process deviations with the potential to cause hazards or operational problems, quality problems, or delays. The guidewords used in this Procedural HAZOP study are listed below:

Guideword Meaning

Unclear Procedure confusing or ambiguous Step in wrong place Procedure will lead to actions out of correct sequence or

recovery failure Wrong action Procedure action specified is incorrect or not followed or

different action carried out instead Incorrect Information Information being checked prior to action is incorrectly

specified Step Missing Missing step, step too large requiring too much of the

operator Step unsuccessful Step not successfully carried out due to demands on

operator Interference effects from/to others Procedure following performance likely to be affected by

other personnel carrying out simultaneous tasks (usually when co-located)

Time Step carried out too early, too late Procedure Not available, not applicable or not followed Measurement Instrument failure, observation error Organisation Unclear responsibilities Communication Failed equipment, insufficient /incorrect information Personnel Lack of competence/training, too few or too many personnel Position Awkward placement leading to potential for error/omission Services Complete or partial loss External Effect The effect on the surrounding facilities or vice-versa


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10 HAZOP Output The output from the HAZOP study is provided in Appendix 2. For completeness, every guideword was considered for each node; however, not all guidewords identified a valid hazard or operability issue, and therefore nothing was recorded in the HAZOP tables against those particular guidewords. There were 37 actions identified, and these are collated in Appendix 1. Appendix 1 also presents the HAZOP Action Tracking Forms which are to be used to facilitate the process of satisfactory consideration (and implementation where appropriate) of the actions.

11 Issues The following general issues were identified at HAZOP. These have also been captured as actions (see Appendix 1), amongst others, and will therefore require tracking and resolution at a later date:

� It was acknowledged that the safe operation of the system is highly dependent on the knowledge and experience of the current hydrogen experts. Concern was raised about the current lack of succession planning for staff leaving the company, retirement, illness etc. leading to a lack of availability of expertise for continued safe operation.

� Various sections of the Operating Instructions require further detail to explain who to contact in the event of failures or parameters being outside of the normal operating range.

� General revisions of Operating Instructions’ detail and ordering may be required to improve clarity and ease of use by operators, thereby reducing the potential for human errors.

� In some instances the number of operators required for specific procedures needs to be specified to ensure that operations are conducted safely by a sufficient number of experienced personnel.

� Anti-static clothing and non-sparking tools need to be purchased for use during the charging procedure.

� The components in the hydrogen system need a well defined maintenance and calibration plan.

� Various interfacing issues were identified including the lack of engineered safeguards/procedures to protect against the hydrogen system being operated in conjunction with the magnets (immediately started following a maintenance period), and the potential for magnetic fields to affect both equipment gauges and the hydride bed.

12 Summary The Procedural HAZOP study provided a review of the procedures detailed in the Operating Instructions and identified various hazards and causes for operational problems, quality problems, and delays, with due consideration of the operation of the hydrogen delivery system within the context of the other surrounding operating facilities. The hazards and operational issues associated with the hydrogen delivery system can be reduced further by the satisfactory consideration (and implementation where appropriate) of the actions placed during this HAZOP. HAZOP Action Tracking Forms have been included in Appendix 1 to help facilitate this process.


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Appendices

Contents

Appendix 1 Summary of Actions and Action Tracking Sheets Appendix 2 HAZOP Output Appendix 3 Record of Attendance Sheets


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Appendix 1 Summary of Actions and Action Tracking Sheets

Action No.

HAZOP ID No.

Action Owner

1 1.1 Consider if the current isolation procedure for penning gauges is adequate.

SW

2 1.2 Consider revising the wording of Section 2.1 of the Operating Instructions to detail who to contact in the event of control panel screen failure.

SW

3 1.3 Consider the succession planning to ensure hydrogen expertise is available throughout the lifetime of the project.

AN

4 1.4 Review all process screens to ensure that there is no potential for colour-deficient personnel etc. to be unable to correctly read the screen. Also review the general ambiguity of red/green displays and the process state they indicate.

PW

5 1.5 Review the requirement for emergency lighting in the control room, in the event of failures such as loss of power supply.

SG

6 1.6 Consider implementing a procedure for checking of the system by independent personnel following maintenance.

SW

7 1.7 Operating Instructions to specify that the operator should contact the relevant expert where any operating parameters are found to be outside of the normal range.

SW

8 1.9 Ensure that all systems display parameters in the same units.

PW

9 1.10 Ensure that physical checks of the compressor are still specified in the Operating Instructions following relocation of the compressor.

SW

10 1.11 Review the positioning of the viewing port to facilitate checking of valve HV31.

SW

11 1.12 Review existing work and consider the retrofitting of filtration in the hydrogen bottle ventilation ductwork.

SW

12 1.13 Consider review of boxes indicating ventilation system state to minimise the potential for an operator to miss-read, as there may currently be too many.

SW

13 1.14 Revise operating instructions to ensure that references to figures etc are clear and correct (e.g. on the same page).

SW

14 1.15 Consider including full screenshots in the Operating Instructions.

SW

15 1.16 Review control panel operation and accessibility if doors are added.

PW


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Action No.

HAZOP ID No.

Action Owner

16 1.17 Consider the requirement for engineered protection for the operational phase of the facility.

PW

17 1.18 Consider reviewing the Operating Instructions to make clear that a specialist should be consulted upon identifying helium and nitrogen bottle pack pressure <100barg. Also clarify that <100barg indicates that the bottle pack is half empty.

SW

18 1.19 Specify in the Operating Instructions which operations require one/two/three operators, and if walkie-talkies are required etc.

SW

19 1.20 Consider if connection/unplugging of VG03 and VG06 are in the correct order in the Operating Instructions (sections 2.1 and 2.6).

SW

20 1.21 Consider installing a warning of potential for excessive pressure prior to operation of PV20.

PW

21 1.22 Provide a label indicating the requirement for operators to top-up the heater-chiller unit with Julabo Thermal H5 oil only.

SW/SG

22 2.1 Consider the potential interference of PPS with superconductor operations etc. when reviewing controlled access procedures.

LC

23 3.1 Consider installing a safety valve in the pipework downstream of the pump - to automatically close on loss of power, and open a bleed valve to the pump (line between turbo pump and backing pump).

SW

24 3.2 Review the requirement for sign-off procedures for future operations (e.g. checklists etc.).

SW

25 5.1 Review the Operating Instructions to include filling with argon after sufficient hydrogen is removed from the hydride bed.

SW

26 5.2 Review all PSCLs to ensure that they clearly state if ordering is of importance.

SW

27 5.3 Review and implement the purchase of anti-static clothing and non-sparking tools for use during the charging procedure.

SW

28 8.2 Consider the visibility of the Gas Detection Controller display in the final design.

SW

29 8.3 Consider the potential for oxygen depletion in atmosphere and in depressions (e.g. trenches) during use of liquid nitrogen (e.g. for magnet cooling).

MC

30 8.4 The procedure for informing operators that may be present in the MICE hall during a hydrogen detector alarm needs to be determined for long-term operation.

SW

31 8.5 The Operating Instructions need to specify the personnel responsible for collect and control of all keys to give access to the specified areas, during a 'prohibit access to areas at risk' (Section 5.2 of the Operating Instructions) - this is currently only stated in Table 4.

SW

32 8.6 Review the feasibility of the existing system for giving a "hall in controlled access" output for the PPS system.

PW

33 9.1 Ensure that all relief routes are venting to areas that are unoccupied, and away from systems with high hydrocarbon content.

MC


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Action No.

HAZOP ID No.

Action Owner

34 9.7 Consider solutions for preventing effects of magnetic fields on equipment gauges. Also consider if the presence of them enhances the fields (e.g. ferrous components).

MC

35 9.8 Consider the potential for magnetic fields to affect metals in the hydride bed.

MC

36 9.9 Consider the provision of engineered safeguards/procedures to protect against the hydrogen system being operated in conjunction with the magnets, immediately started following a maintenance period.

SW

37 9.13 Ensure that the components in the hydrogen system have a well defined maintenance and calibration plan.

SG


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Rutherford Appleton Laboratory R&D Hydrogen Delivery System

29 – 30 October 2012

HAZOP Action Tracking Form

HAZOP Action No. 1 By Steve Watson

Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider if the current isolation procedure for penning gauges is adequate.

HAZOP Action Response:

Response Made By Name (Print): Signature: Date:

Response Checked By Name (Print): Signature: Date:

Action Status (circle) Accepted Ongoing Rejected

Comments (include reasons for action rejection or 'Ongoing' classification):

Revised Action Response Due Date**


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29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider revising the wording of Section 2.1 of the Operating Instructions to detail who to contact in the event of control panel screen failure.








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29 – 30 October 2012


HAZOP Action No. 3 By Andy Nichols

Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider the succession planning to ensure hydrogen expertise is available throughout the lifetime of the project.








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29 – 30 October 2012


HAZOP Action No. 4 By Phil Warburton

Response Date

HAZOP Action: Review all process screens to ensure that there is no potential for colour-deficient personnel etc. to be unable to correctly read the screen. Also review the general ambiguity of red/green displays and the process state they indicate.








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29 – 30 October 2012


HAZOP Action No. 5 By Stewart Greenall

Response Date

HAZOP Action: Review the requirement for emergency lighting in the control room, in the event of failures such as loss of power supply.








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider implementing a procedure for checking of the system by independent personnel following maintenance.








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Operating Instructions to specify that the operator should contact the relevant expert where any operating parameters are found to be outside of the normal range.








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Ensure that all systems display parameters in the same units.








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Ensure that physical checks of the compressor are still specified in the Operating Instructions following relocation of the compressor.








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29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Review the positioning of the viewing port to facilitate checking of valve HV31.








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29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Review existing work and consider the retrofitting of filtration in the hydrogen bottle ventilation ductwork.








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29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider review of boxes indicating ventilation system state to minimise the potential for an operator to miss-read, as there may currently be too many.








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Revise operating instructions to ensure that references to figures etc are clear and correct (e.g. on the same page).








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider including full screenshots in the Operating Instructions.








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Review control panel operation and accessibility if doors are added.








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider the requirement for engineered protection for the operational phase of the facility.








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider reviewing the Operating Instructions to make clear that a specialist should be consulted upon identifying helium and nitrogen bottle pack pressure <100barg. Also clarify that <100barg indicates that the bottle pack is half empty.








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29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Specify in the Operating Instructions which operations require one/two/three operators, and if walkie-talkies are required etc.








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29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider if connection/unplugging of VG03 and VG06 are in the correct order in the Operating Instructions (sections 2.1 and 2.6).








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29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider installing a warning of potential for excessive pressure prior to operation of PV20.








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29 – 30 October 2012


HAZOP Action No. 21 By Steve Watson/ Stewart Greenall

Response Date

HAZOP Action: Provide a label indicating the requirement for operators to top-up the heater-chiller unit with Julabo Thermal H5 oil only.








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29 – 30 October 2012


HAZOP Action No. 22 By Linda Coney

Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider the potential interference of PPS with superconductor operations etc. when reviewing controlled access procedures.








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29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider installing a safety valve in the pipework downstream of the pump - to automatically close on loss of power, and open a bleed valve to the pump (line between turbo pump and backing pump).








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Review the requirement for sign-off procedures for future operations (e.g. checklists etc.).








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Review the Operating Instructions to include filling with argon after sufficient hydrogen is removed from the hydride bed.








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Review all PSCLs to ensure that they clearly state if ordering is of importance.








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Review and implement the purchase of anti-static clothing and non-sparking tools for use during the charging procedure.








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider the visibility of the Gas Detection Controller display in the final design.








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29 – 30 October 2012


HAZOP Action No. 29 By Mike Courthold

Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider the potential for oxygen depletion in atmosphere and in depressions (e.g. trenches) during use of liquid nitrogen (e.g. for magnet cooling).








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29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: The procedure for informing operators that may be present in the MICE hall during a hydrogen detector alarm needs to be determined for long-term operation.








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29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: The Operating Instructions need to specify the personnel responsible for collect and control of all keys to give access to the specified areas, during a 'prohibit access to areas at risk' (Section 5.2 of the Operating Instructions) - this is currently only stated in Table 4.








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29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Review the feasibility of the existing system for giving a "hall in controlled access" output for the PPS system.








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Ensure that all relief routes are venting to areas that are unoccupied, and away from systems with high hydrocarbon content.








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider solutions for preventing effects of magnetic fields on equipment gauges. Also consider if the presence of them enhances the fields (e.g. ferrous components).








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider the potential for magnetic fields to affect metals in the hydride bed.








AMEC Commercial


29 – 30 October 2012



Response Date

HAZOP Action: Consider the provision of engineered safeguards/procedures to protect against the hydrogen system being operated in conjunction with the magnets, immediately started following a maintenance period.








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29 – 30 October 2012


HAZOP Action No. 37 By Stewart Greenall

Response Date

HAZOP Action: Ensure that the components in the hydrogen system have a well defined maintenance and calibration plan.








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Appendix 2 HAZOP Output


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Node 1 - System Checks

I.D. No.

Guideword Deviation Cause Consequences Safeguards Action By Comments

1.1 Unclear 2.1 Manual check

Penning gauge is still connected to system.

Penning gauges are not ATEX rated.

- Consider if the current isolation procedure for penning gauges is adequate.

SW -

1.2 Unclear 2.1 Control panel failure

Control panel not responsive.

Unable to continue. May indicate PLC failures.

Contact relevant personnel.

Consider revising the wording of Section 2.1 of the Operating Instructions to detail who to contact in the event of control panel screen failure.

SW -

1.3 Personnel Expertise not available for full duration of project

Personnel leave project etc.

Expertise not available.

- Consider the succession planning to ensure hydrogen expertise is available throughout the lifetime of the project.

AN -

1.4 Personnel Personnel unable to understand screen

Personnel colour-deficient.

Failure to understand display screen and potentially perform incorrect/unsafe action.

- Review all process screens to ensure that there is no potential for colour-deficient personnel etc. to be unable to correctly read the screen. Also review the general ambiguity of red/green displays and the process state they indicate.

PW -

1.5 External effect

Loss of lighting in control room

Power supply failure to lighting units.

Unable to see keyboards, control panels etc.

- Review the requirement for emergency lighting in the control room, in the event of failures such as loss of power supply.

SG -

1.6 Unclear 2.2 Lack of checking procedure following maintenance operations

- - - Consider implementing a procedure for checking of the system by independent personnel following maintenance.

SW -

1.7 Unclear Operating parameters outside of normal range

Following a check personnel notice that the operating parameters are outside of the normal range.

Unable to safely continue process.

- Operating Instructions to specify that the operator should contact the relevant expert where any operating parameters are found to be outside of the normal range.

SW -


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I.D. No.


1.8 Interference effects

Other personnel in operating area

Maintenance requirements for other systems etc.

Potential hazard for operators.

PPS system. MOM (MICE Operations Manager) on-site has oversight of who is permitted to operate at any one time.

- - -

1.9 Communication

Incorrect readings on control panel

Inappropriate units displayed on equipment.

Potential for plant damage/personnel injury.

- Ensure that all systems display parameters in the same units.

PW -

1.10 Position Compressor checks changed

Compressor relocated. Compressor physical checks may be missed.

- Ensure that physical checks of the compressor are still specified in the Operating Instructions following relocation of the compressor.

SW -

1.11 2.3 Measurement

Check not carried out

Inaccessibility of viewing port may lead to valve not being identified as in wrong position.

Unacceptable pressure rise if valve HV31 is in wrong position.

- Review the positioning of the viewing port to facilitate checking of valve HV31.

SW -

1.12 2.4 Dust enters ventilation ductwork

Lack of filter on hydrogen bottle ventilation ductwork.

Potential for dust to enter ventilation ductwork. Potential for static accumulation in ductwork.

- Review existing work and consider the retrofitting of filtration in the hydrogen bottle ventilation ductwork.

SW -

1.13 Unclear Operator error Too many boxes for displaying ventilation system state.

Potential for operator to miss-read boxes.

- Consider review of boxes indicating ventilation system state to minimise the potential for an operator to miss-read, as there may currently be too many.

SW -

1.14 Unclear Operating Instruction figure references unclear

Lack of references to figures /incorrect references in text.

- - Revise operating instructions to ensure that references to figures etc are clear and correct (e.g. on the same page).

SW -


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I.D. No.


1.15 - - - - - Consider including full screenshots in the Operating Instructions.

SW -

1.16 - - - - - Review control panel operation and accessibility if doors are added.

PW -

1.17 - - - - - Consider the requirement for engineered protection for the operational phase of the facility.

PW -

1.18 2.5 Step Missing

Operator fails to change bottle pack when required

Operating Instructions regarding helium and nitrogen bottle packs minimum pressure before changing is unclear.

Failure to consult specialist prior to changing.

- Consider reviewing the Operating Instructions to make clear that a specialist should be consulted upon identifying helium and nitrogen bottle pack pressure <100barg. Also clarify that <100barg indicates that the bottle pack is half empty.

SW -

1.19 - - - - - Specify in the Operating Instructions which operations require one/two/three operators, and if walkie-talkies are required etc.

SW -

1.20 2.6 Step in Wrong Place

VG03 and VG06 are left unplugged

VG03 and VG06 are left unplugged following step in Section 2.1 in Operating Instructions.

No readings. - Consider if connection/unplugging of VG03 and VG06 are in the correct order in the Operating Instructions (sections 2.1 and 2.6).

SW -

1.21 Unclear Opening of PV20

Excessive pressure fed into turbo pump.

Turbo pump failure. Requirement to reinstall - financial implications.

- Consider installing a warning of potential for excessive pressure prior to operation of PV20.

PW -

1.22 2.7 Unclear Wrong top-up fluid used in heater-chiller unit

Operator tops up with water/wrong specification fluid.

Damage to equipment.

- Provide a label indicating the requirement for operators to top-up the heater-chiller unit with Julabo Thermal H5 oil only.

SW/ SG

-


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Node 2 - Access Control and Work Procedures

I.D. No.


2.1 Interference - - - - Consider the potential interference of PPS with superconductor operations etc. when reviewing controlled access procedures.

LC -


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Node 3 - Vac Down Procedures inc PSCL4

I.D. No.


3.1 Services Backflow of oil Power failure. Loss of power supply and vacuum leading to backflow of oil from pump. One-way valve does not withstand backpressure leading to oil backflow.

Main gatevalve (PV20) downstream of pump closes on loss of power - reduces contamination of system with oil.

Consider installing a safety valve in the pipework downstream of the pump - to automatically close on loss of power, and open a bleed valve to the pump (line between turbo pump and backing pump).

SW -

3.2 - - - - - Review the requirement for sign-off procedures for future operations (e.g. checklists etc.).

SW -


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Node 4 - Purge Procedures inc PSCL1 (He) and PSCL2 (H2)

I.D. No.


4.1 - - - - - - - This Node was reviewed by the procedural HAZOP team but no significant issues were identified with this part of the process.


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Node 5 - Hydride Bed Charge inc PSCL3

I.D. No.


5.1 4.5.1 Step Missing

- Filling of hydride bed with inert argon gas not covered in Operating Instructions.

Filling with argon gas would be required if system was required to remain unoperational for an extended period of time, or following shut-down of MICE.

- Review the Operating Instructions to include filling with argon after sufficient hydrogen is removed from the hydride bed.

SW -

5.2 - - - - - Review all PSCLs to ensure that they clearly state if ordering is of importance.

SW -

5.3 - - - - - Review and implement the purchase of anti-static clothing and non-sparking tools for use during the charging procedure.

SW -

5.4 Step in Wrong Place

Valve opened early

Regulator PR40 manually opened before at least 1bara reached.

Potential for ingress of air into system.

System never sub-atmospheric for long enough to cause a problem (except in the event of long-term leaks).

- - Greater risk of air-ingress expected during purging


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Node 6 - Hydrogen Fill inc PSCL2

I.D. No.




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Node 7 - Hydrogen Empty inc PSCL2

I.D. No.




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Node 8 - Fault Procedures

I.D. No.


8.1 5.1 - - - - - - The Traffic Light Display system provides local indication to operators of the system state in the MICE hall. However this is an additional safety system to provide secondary indication only and therefore is not considered safety critical. Failure of this system alone will not lead to a fault condition. For the final system Traffic Light Display will be available in three locations.

8.2 5.2 - - - - Consider the visibility of the Gas Detection Controller display in the final design.

SW -

8.3 - - - - - Consider the potential for oxygen depletion in atmosphere and in depressions (e.g. trenches) during use of liquid nitrogen (e.g. for magnet cooling).

MC -


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I.D. No.


8.4 - - - - - The procedure for informing operators that may be present in the MICE hall during a hydrogen detector alarm needs to be determined for long-term operation.

SW -

8.5 - - - - - The Operating Instructions need to specify the personnel responsible for collect and control of all keys to give access to the specified areas, during a 'prohibit access to areas at risk' (Section 5.2 of the Operating Instructions) - this is currently only stated in Table 4.

SW -

8.6 - - - - - Review the feasibility of the existing system for giving a "hall in controlled access" output for the PPS system.

PW -

8.7 - - - - - - - Current operations will be re-worded for shift worker instructions.


AMEC Commercial

Node 9 - Generic Interfacing Hazards and Maintenance Plans

I.D. No.


9.1 - Helium leak Cold helium leak from quenching magnet systems.

No impact on hydrogen control system. Freezes water vapour in surrounding air. The release is therefore visible to operators.

Controlled access. Ensure that all relief routes are venting to areas that are unoccupied, and away from systems with high hydrocarbon content.

MC Magnet system and focussing coil etc will be subject to a full HAZOP before operation.

9.2 - Hydrogen Hydrogen operations. Hydrogen hazards. Hydrogen system is fully contained and segregated from the hall. Controlled access.

- - -

9.3 - Magnetic fields High magnetic fields. Potential for proximity switches to be affected by magnetic fields.

Proximity switches on valves (air operated) are planned to be replaced with microswitches

- - -

9.4 - Magnetic fields High magnetic fields. Electromagnetic control valves (actuators) used for air operations may be adversely affected by magnetic fields.

Electromagnetic control valves (actuators) used for air operation are planned to be protected from fields - to ensure that electromagnet is not overwhelmed by fringe field

- - -


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I.D. No.


9.5 - Magnetic fields High magnetic fields - effect on operators.

Magnetic fields may adversely affect operator health.

Operator training to inform operators not to place head or trunk near to magnet High magnetic fields are not expected in passageways - only in close proximity to magnets

- - -

9.6 - Magnetic fields High magnetic field. Metal toe cap boots - potential to stick to floor.

Protective footwear to be clearly specified for areas subject to strong magnetic fields.

- - -

9.7 - Magnetic fields High magnetic field. Pressure gauges etc may be affected by magnetic field.

No sensitive equipment located in areas of high magnetic field. Use caution when reading gas bottle gauges - consider that they may not be accurate. Air operated valves are not affected by magnetic fields.

Consider solutions for preventing effects of magnetic fields on equipment gauges. Also consider if the presence of them enhances the fields (e.g. ferrous components).

MC Wider programme currently considering fringe fields, impacts on equipment and potential solutions.


AMEC Commercial

I.D. No.


9.8 - Magnetic fields High magnetic fields. Rare earth metals present in hydride bed - potential adverse effects of magnetic field.

- Consider the potential for magnetic fields to affect metals in the hydride bed.

MC -

9.9 - Magnetic fields Maintenance on magnet system - potential for presence of ferrous material in vicinity of magnets. Magnets then started immediately following maintenance.

Potential for the ferrous material to become projectiles under magnetic field operation following maintenance.

The hydrogen system should not be exercised (i.e. hydrogen in absorber) in conjunction with any magnets in cooling channel immediately following a maintenance period. Controlled maintenance procedures.

Consider the provision of engineered safeguards/procedures to protect against the hydrogen system being operated in conjunction with the magnets, immediately started following a maintenance period.

SW -

9.10 - Dropped object Object dropped between Verostek plate and magnet.

Object will most likely stick to the Verostek plate.

Operating and maintenance procedures - operations in the vicinity of active magnets is prohibited.

- - Small gap and therefore event is highly unlikely.


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I.D. No.


9.11 - - - - - - - The system is a registered pressure system and components etc. will therefore be subject to regular testing and maintenance.

9.12 - - - - - - - The ventilation system will need to be on an LEV test schedule.

9.13 - Maintenance plans

- - - Ensure that the components in the hydrogen system have a well defined maintenance and calibration plan.

SG -


AMEC Commercial

Appendix 3 Record of Attendance Sheets


AMEC Commercial

RAL MICE Hydrogen System Procedural HAZOP Date: 29

th October 2012

Location: STFC, RAL, Didcot.


AMEC Commercial

RAL MICE Hydrogen System Procedural HAZOP Date: 29th October 2012 Location: STFC, RAL, Didcot


AMEC Commercial



AMEC Commercial
