APPENDIX - C HAZOP SESSION SUMMARY TABLES...APPENDIX - C HAZOP SESSION SUMMARY TABLES WIPP RH PSAR DOE/WIPP-03-3174 APPENDIX C Table 1- 72B HAZOP Table C-2 January 23, 2003 Study Node

WIPP RH PSAR DOE/WIPP-03-3174 APPENDIX C

C-1 January 23, 2003

APPENDIX - CHAZOP SESSION SUMMARY TABLES


Table 1- 72B HAZOP Table


Study Node Event No.

Deviation Causes Consequences Existing Safeguards Actions orRecommendations

Total Rank(Cons.,Freq )

Radiological Rank(Cons.,Freq)

Comments

1 - Receipt of RH Waste

1 - 1 Highcontaminationfound duringsurvey

Human Error-Spread of contaminationby shipperduring loading

Potential forminimal exposureto personnel

Shipping Container- DOTType B certified;Radiological Controlprocedures;ALARA (As Low AsReasonably Achievable)Program;Worker training;WAC controls;Emergency Responseprocedures

No Actions orRecommendationsIdentified (NAI)

1,4 Facility Worker -1,4

Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - 1,4

Radiologicalhazard only

1 - 2 Incorrectinformation onshipping papers

Human Error Potential toexceed allowablestorage time;Potential releasedue to gasgeneration;Potential forminimal exposureto personnel

WIPP Waste InformationSystem procedures;Radiological Controlprocedures;Worker training;WAC controls;

NAI 1,4 Facility Worker -1,4

Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - 1,4


1 - 3 Excessivestorage time -Cask is left instorage toolong

Human Error;EquipmentFailure;Extendedstorage atgenerator

Potential releaseof radioactivematerial due togas generation

Worker training;Waste handling procedures;WIPP Waste InformationSystem procedures;Safety Analysis Report forPackaging (SARP) restrictions


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - 1,4


1 - 4 High radiation- Directradiologicalexposure

Human Error;IncorrectRadiologicalWork Permitinformation;Waste materialshifts duringshipment

Potential for directradiologicalexposure tofacility workers;

Radiological Controlprocedures (EPD’s);Worker Training;ALARA Program;Dosimetry;Cask design includingshielding


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - NA








Comments


1 - 5 Loss of control- Transportercrashes throughgate due tohigh speed

Human Error;EquipmentFailure -Transporterbrake systemfails

Potential todamage the accessgates;Potential todamage sectionsof the facility;Potential forworker injury orfatality

Drivers are trained, andqualified for proper transporteroperation;Transporter is equipped withemergency brakes;Transporter maintenanceprovides for reliableequipment function;Access road has a 90 degreeturn immediately prior toapproaching the main accessgate, minimum speedsachieved;Access roads are level

R-1 Verifyimplementation oftransport truckdriver trainingprogram

4,4 NA Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident(impact). Norelease ofradiologicalmaterial ispostulated in thisevent.

1 - 6 Truck fire(inside Sitegate)

Human Error; Improper orinsufficientmaintenance;Vehicle impact;Equipmentfailure;Diesel fuel ontruck; Unknownignition source

Potential forsmoke to bedrawn into WHBby ventilationsystem;Potential loss ofexhaust filtration;Potential forworker injury;Potential fordisruption ofprocessingactivities

Road cask design - MeetsDOT Type B shippingcontainer certificationrequirements;Emergency ResponseProcedures;Fire loading/ combustiblecontrol program;Vehicle maintenance andinspection program

R-2 Verifycombustiblematerial controlprogram is in place.

2,4 NA Facility workerinjury couldresult fromsmoke inhalation(smokeinhalation).







Comments


1 - 7 Truck firefollowed by anexplosion(inside Sitegate)

Human Error; Improper orinsufficientmaintenance;Vehicle impact;Equipmentfailure;Diesel fuel ontruck;Unknownignition source

Potential forworker injury orfatality;Potential forsignificantdisruption ofprocessingactivities;Potential forsmoke to bedrawn into WHBby ventilationsystem;Potential loss ofexhaust filtration

Fire loading/ combustiblecontrol program;Waste Acceptance Criteria(WAC) restrictions on wastematerial;Emergency ResponseProcedures;Vehicle maintenance andinspection program;Road cask design - MeetsDOT Type B shippingcontainer certificationrequirements

A-1 Verify that atransport vehicleinspection programis in place

A-2 Verifycombustiblematerial controlprogram is in placeand evaluateadequacy.

A-3 Verify that theDOT testingperformed tocertify road caskbounds theexplosion scenario

4,4 NA Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident(explosion).

1 - 8 Trailer in otherthan properlocation -Traileroverturns

Human ErrorEquipmentFailure

Potential fordamage to roadcask;Potential for fire; Potential forworker injury orfatality.

WIPP Site speed limits;Transporter driver training;Waste handling procedures;Guard rails; Road cask design - MeetsDOT Type B shippingcontainer certificationrequirements

R-1 Samerecommendation asfor 1-5. Verifyimplementation oftransport truckdriver trainingprogram

4,4 NA Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident(impact). Norelease ofradiologicalmaterial ispostulated.

1 - 9 Less thanadequatePreventivemaintenance - Landing gearfailure

Human Error Shipping caskfalls off truck;Potential forworker injury orfatality.

Shipping cask design;Truck maintenance andinspection program

R-3 Verifyimplementation ofpreventivemaintenance andinspection programfor trucks

4,4 NA Worker injuryor fatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident. Norelease ofradiologicalmaterial ispostulated.







Comments


2 - Transfer to RH Bay

2 - 1 Truck in otherthan properlocation - truckhits anddamagestornado doorhindering doorclosure

Human Error;EquipmentFailure

Potential forsignificantbuilding damage;Potential forconsiderableprocess down-time;Potential forworker injury orfatality

Waste handling procedures;Cask handling procedures; Operator training;Limited truck speed;Shipping cask design

NAI 4,4 NA Worker injuryor fatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident. Norelease ofradiologicalmaterial ispostulated.

2 - 2 Truck in otherthan correctposition resultsin fire watertrench covercollapse

Human error;Mechanicalfailure

Loss of trailerstability;

Shipping cask design; Wastehandling procedures; Driver training

R-4 Evaluatedesign of fire watertrench cover forsupport capability

NA NA

2 - 3 Loss of control- Crane impactwith road cask


Potential to injurefacility worker;Potential for slightdamage to RoadCask

Limited crane speed;Crane operator training; Craneoperating procedures;Crane design;Cask design - cask meets DOTType B shipping containercertification requirements;Preventive maintenanceProgram for crane

NAI 2,4 NA Industrial hazardonly







Comments


2 - 4 Diesel fire ontrailer jockey(<1475�F; <30min.)

Human Error; Improper orinsufficientmaintenance;Vehicle impact;EquipmentFailure;Diesel fuel ontrailer jockey;Unknownignition source

Potential forsmoke to bedrawn throughWHB byventilationsystem;Potential loss ofexhaust filtration;Potential forworker injury;Potential fordisruption ofprocessingactivities

Road cask design - MeetsDOT Type B shippingcontainer certificationrequirements;Emergency ResponseProcedures;Fire loading/ combustiblecontrol program;Vehicle maintenance andinspection program

R-2 SameRecommendationas for 1-6. Verifycombustiblematerial controlprogram is in place

R-5 Addcombustibleloading limits forRH bay to FHA(Fire HazardsAnalysis)

2,4 NA Facility workerinjury couldresult fromsmoke inhalation(industrialaccident).

2 - 5 Diesel fire ontrailer jockeyfollowed by anexplosion

Human Error; Improper orinsufficientmaintenance;Vehicle impact;Equipmentfailure;Diesel fuel ontrailer jockey;Unknownignition source

Potential forsmoke to bedrawn throughWHB byventilationsystem;Potential loss ofexhaust filtration;Potential forworker injury orfatality;Potential forsignificantdisruption ofprocessingactivities

Emergency ResponseProcedures;Fire loading/ combustiblecontrol program;Vehicle maintenance andinspection program;Road cask design - MeetsDOT Type B shippingcontainer certificationrequirements

A-4 Verify that atrailer jockeyinspection programis in place

A-2 Same Actionas for 1-7. Verifycombustiblematerial controlprogram is in placeand evaluateadequacy.

A-3 Same Actionas for 1-7. Verifythat the DOTtesting performedto certify road caskbounds theexplosion scenario

4,4 NA Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident(explosion).







Comments


3 - Cask preparation

3 - 1 Loss of control- Crane impactwith road caskSee 2-3

Human Error; MechanicalFailure

Potential damageto cask duringremoval of impactlimiter;Potential forworker injury

Limited crane speed;Crane operator training; Cranehandling procedures;Crane design;Cask deign - Cask meets DOTType B shipping containercertification requirements;Preventive MaintenanceProgram for crane


3 - 2 Cask droppedduring cranelift

Human Error (1)hold downs notreleased, (2) hitobstacle, (3)catch rigging oncar and tips thecar overMechanicalFailure -Crane/Rigging

Potential forsignificantdamage toequipment;Potential forworker injury orfatality.

Limited crane speed;Limited lift height;Crane operator training; Craneoperating procedures;Crane design;Cask deign - Cask meets DOTType B shipping containercertification requirements;Preventive maintenanceprogram for crane

NAI 4,4 NA Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident.

3 - 3 High airactivity -Airbornerelease duringcaskpreparationactivities(includes:1)Head spacegas sampling(outer)2)Removingouter lid3)Head spacegas sampling(inner)4)Installinginner lid Pintle

EquipmentFailure - Leak incanister (O-ring);Human error -Canister notproperlydecontaminatedprior toplacement inroad cask

Potential forminimal workerexposure;Potential spread ofcontaminationinto facility

Air sampling procedures;Radiological Controlprocedures;ALARA Program;Waste handling procedures


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite -NA








Comments


3 - 4 Crane dropsouter lid ontocask

Human Error;EquipmentFailure - Crane

Potential damageto cask;Potential damageto inner container(ICV) lid;Potential damageto outer lid sealingsurface;Potential forsevere workerinjury

Cask design;Crane operator training;Waste handling procedures;Cask (ICV lid) design;Lifting fixture design


4 - Cask transfer to unloading room

4 - 1 Over-speed -Impactinvolvingtransfer carwith road casktransfer carstays on rails

Human Error;EquipmentFailure;foreign object onrails

Potentialproductiondowntime;Potential fordamage toequipment;Potential forsevere workerinjury

Transfer car design;Rail design;Cask design;Operator training;Waste handling procedures;Limited transfer car speed


4 - 2 Road casktransfer carderails and fallsover

Human Error -Failure toreplaceremovable railsat caskunloading roomentry;Foreign objecton rails

Potential forproductiondowntime;Potential forworker injury orfatality

Road Cask transfer car design;Cask/canister design;Operator training;Waste handling procedures;

NAI 4,4 NA Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident.







Comments


5 -Road cask transfer to shuttle car

5 - 1 Road caskdropped in thecask unloadingroom

Human Error;EquipmentFailure - Crane

Potential forproductiondowntime;Potential forequipmentdamage; Potentialfor worker injuryor fatality

Cask/canister design;Operator training;Waste handling procedures;Room design limits height oflift

R-6 Evaluate theHVAC (Heating,Ventilation, and AirConditioning) DP’s(DifferentialPressures) withroad caskunloading roomdoor open.

A-5 Verify thatoperatingprocedures excludepersonnel fromroom during casktransfer for workerprotection

4,4 NA Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident.

5 - 2 Road caskdropped intotransfer cellthrough thefloor port

Human Error;EquipmentFailure(mechanical);Control LoopFailure-PLC(ProgrammableLogic Control)

Potential forproductiondowntime;Potential forequipmentdamage;Potential forworker injury orfatality.

Cask/canister design;Operator training;Waste handling and transfercell procedures (entryrestrictions);Interlocks involving floorvalve, shuttle car, crane(protects against worker error);Impact limiter on canister;Shuttle car design

R-6 SameRecommendationas for 5-1: Evaluate the HVACDP’s with roadcask unloadingroom door open.


5 - 3 Equipmentperforms inother thandesired mode -Shield valveinterlocks failsuch that bothshield valvescan be open atthe same time

EquipmentFailure;Control LoopFailure-PLC(ProgrammableLogic Control)

Potential for airflow reversal(minimal)

Periodic functional checks ofcontrol loop

NAI NA NA







Comments

C-10 January 23, 2003

5 - 4 Excessivemovement -Shuttle carmoves whileroad cask isbeing loweredinto shuttle car

Human Error;EquipmentFailure;Control loopfailure

Potentialequipmentdamage;Potential forprocessing delays

Operator training related totransfer operations;Periodic functional checks ofcontrol loop;Shuttle car/crane interlock;Road cask design - MeetsDOT Type B shippingcontainer certificationrequirements

R-7 Evaluate thisscenario andconsider potentialneed for otherengineeringsafeguards

NA NA

5 - 5 Lack ofattention -Individual fallsthrough roadcask unloadingroom floor port

Human Error Potential forworker injury orfatality.

Transfer procedures;Operator training/qualificationprogram

R-8 Install restraintat floor valveopening


5 - 6 Floor valvecloses too soon(Sooner thanrequired time)

EquipmentFailureControl LoopFailure-PLC(ProgrammableLogic Control)

Potential damageto cask;Potential damageto crane ropes;Potential damageto floor valve

Hoist interlock;Cask Design;Periodic functional checks ofcontrol system

NAI NA NA No release ofradioactivematerial







Comments

C-11 January 23, 2003

6 - Move cask to position in transfer cell - remove inner lid

6 - 1 Shuttle failurecauses cask todrop to transfercell floor (Lackof equipmentintegrity)

EquipmentFailure;Metal fatigue;failure toperform periodicmaintenance

Potential forproductiondowntime;Potential forpersonnelexposure causedby inner lidcoming off;Potential forworker injury orfatality.

Shuttle and shuttle supportdesign; Limited access into TransferCell;Shuttle operation procedures;Operator training;Cask and canister design

R-9 VerifyPreventiveMaintenanceProgram is in placefor shuttle

R-10 Evaluatedynamic forces onshuttle car inengineering design


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite -NA

Worker injury orfatality couldresult fromindustrialaccident. Potential forminorradiologicalimpact to facilityworker

6 - 2 Equipmentperforms inother thandesired mode -Floor valve atroad caskunloadingroom fails toclose

EquipmentFailure - floorvalvemalfunction;Control LoopFailure-PLC(ProgrammableLogic Control)

Potential for airflow reversal(minimal);

Periodic functional checks ofcontrol loop;Preventive Maintenanceprogram for floor valve


6 - 3 Drop of innerRoad Cask lidon canister

Human Error;Control LoopFailureMechanicalFailure

Potential minordamage tocanister

Canister design (DOT 7AType A certified container);Pre-operational checks; Preventive MaintenanceProgram


6 - 4 Other thandesiredposition -shuttle moveswhile removingRoad Caskinner lid

MechanicalFailure;Human error;Control loopfailure

Potential forminor equipmentdamage

Shuttle operation procedures;Operator training;Shuttle car/crane interlock








Comments

C-12 January 23, 2003

6 - 5 Incorrectposition ofshield valves (valves closesooner thandesired)

EquipmentFailure;Control LoopFailure-PLC(ProgrammableLogicController)

Potential damageto cask;Potential damageto crane ropes;Potential damageto floor valve;

Hoist interlock;Cask design


7 - Load canister into facility cask

7 - 1 Excessivemovement -Shuttle moveswhile crane is lifting canister

MechanicalFailure;Control LoopFailure

Potential fordamage to shuttle;Potential breachof the canister;Potential spread ofcontamination;Potential for directradiologicalexposure topersonnel;Potential forworker injury orfatality.

Grapple hoist interlock;Limited access into TransferCell;Pre-operational checks; Preventive MaintenanceProgram for shuttle andcontrol equipment;Waste handling procedures;RH area ventilation system -HEPA (High EfficiencyParticulate Air) filtration

R-11 Reviewcanister and shuttlecar designs andcontrol loop designto ensure potentialfor inadvertentmovement isaddressed


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4

Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident. Potential forradiologicalimpact tofacility, and toreceptors onsiteincluding infacility andoffsite.

7 - 2 Canister isdropped whilebeing liftedinto facilitycask; canisterfalls back intoroad cask oronto transferroom floor

Human Error;EquipmentFailure - Crane,grapple;Control LoopFailure;

Potential breachof canister;Potential spread ofcontamination;Potential forsignificantdamage to facility;Potential forconsiderableconsequences tooffsiteindividuals;Potential for significant processdowntime forrecovery;Potential forworker injury orfatality.

HEPA filtration;Waste handling and craneoperation procedures;Operator training;Weight interlock on grapple;Shielding for workers; Impactlimiter on canister;Pre-operational checks forcrane and control equipment;Preventive MaintenanceProgram for crane equipmentand control equipment;Limited access into transfercell


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4

Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident. Potential for radiologicalimpact to offsite







Comments

C-13 January 23, 2003

7 - 3 Canister dropafter lifting intofacility cask,canister fallsonto transfercell shieldvalve.

Human Error;EquipmentFailure - Crane,grapple;Control loopfailure;

Potential fordamage toequipment

Canister design;Waste handling and craneoperation procedures;Operator training;Control panel shielding forworkers; Facility cask shielding;Pre-operational checks forcrane and control equipmentoperation; PreventiveMaintenance Program forcrane and control equipment


7 - 4 Equipmentperforms inother thandesired mode -Telescopingport shieldretracts duringtransfers

Control LoopFailure

Potential for directradiologicalexposure topersonnel

Control loop interlock;Fail safe design of port shield;Pre-operational checks;Preventive MaintenanceProgram;Shielding for operator atcontrol panel


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - NA


7 - 5 Uncontrolledlift raises shieldbell exposingcanister

Control LoopFailure


PLC interlock with facilitycask top shield valve;Pre-operational checks; Preventive MaintenanceProgram;Shielding for operator atcontrol panel


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - NA


7 - 6 Shield valves(2) close oncanister(sooner thandesired)

Control LoopFailure

Potential breachof canister;Potential spread ofcontamination;Potential for directradiologicalexposure topersonnel;Potential forradiologicalimpact offsite

HEPA filtration;Pre-operational checks ;Preventive MaintenanceProgram;Shielding for workers;Control loop interlocks;Torque limiters on close ofshield valves;Differential pressuresmaintained by HVAC system

R-12 Evaluateimpact of closingshield valve whilemoving shuttle carto monitoringposition in transfercell

R-13 Evaluateadequacy of recoveryprocedures


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4








Comments

C-14 January 23, 2003

7 - 7 Facility casklower shieldvalve openswhile canisteris sitting on it(at other thandesired time)

Control LoopFailure

Potential to dropcanister to transfercell shield valve;Potential forequipmentdamage;Potential for productiondowntime

Lower shield valve interlockwith grapple position andweight;Interlock with transfer cellshield valve;Lock pins;Pre-operational checks; Preventive MaintenanceProgram for controlequipment;Canister design


7 - 8 Highcontaminationon road caskafter canisterremoved

Human Error-Contaminated atshipping site;Canister breach(loss of primaryconfinement)

Potential forspread ofcontamination tofacility;Potential forcontamination ofpersonnel

Shipping criteria;HEPA filtration;Transfer cell design;Radiological controlprocedures;Cask head space sample takenduring Road Cask preparationstep


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - NA

Radiologicalhazard only. Minimal impactto facility andworkers

7 - 9 Wrong canisterID with respectto shippingpapers

Human Error -Generator SiteError

Operational delay(Negligibleimpact);Potential toexceed storagetime limits forcanister

WIPP Waste InformationSystem procedures


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - NA








Comments

C-15 January 23, 2003

7 - 10 Hydraulic fluidfire

Leak ofhydraulic fluidfrom facilitycask rotatingdevice;UnknownIgnition Source

Potential fordamage to facilitycask and otherequipment (airhose, powercables);Potential adverseimpact toventilationsystem;Potential forgeneration of toxic fumes;Potential workerinjury from smokeinhalation

Limited quantity(approximately 40 gallons) of hydraulic fluid;Smoke alarms;Sprinkler system;Evacuation plan for FacilityCask loading room;Emergency exit from FacilityCask loading room;Sump in room

R-14 Addcombustibleloading limits forwaste handlingbuilding to FHA


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4

Facility workerinjury couldresult fromsmoke inhalation(industrialaccident). Minimalpotential forradiologicalimpact.

7 - 11 Incorrectsequence -Cask is rotatedto horizontalposition beforeshield valvesare closed withgrapple stillattached

Control LoopFailure


Interlocked to grapple hoistposition;Grapple design will notrelease;Physical restraints to keepcanister in place;Pre-operational checks forcontrol system;Preventive MaintenanceProgram for control system;Shielding for operator atcontrol panel

R-15 Verifyrotating equipmentdesign willprecluderadiologicalexposure as a resultof this event.


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite -NA


7 - 12 Excessivemovement -Facility caskrotates freelyduring rotationto horizontalposition

Human Error;MechanicalFailure

Potentialequipmentdamage

Pre-operational checks forrotation equipment function;Mechanical design of facilitycask transfer car preventsover-rotation;








Comments

C-16 January 23, 2003

7 - 13 Unwantedmotion -Facility casktransfer carmoves whilerotatingFacility Cask

Human Error;MechanicalFailure

Potentialequipmentdamage

Motion interlocks;Equipment handler training;Operating procedures forFacility cask handling;


8 - Facility cask loaded onto conveyance

8 -1 Facility casktransfer carmoved whileturntablemisaligned(movement atincorrect time)

Human ErrorEquipmentFailure

Potentialequipmentdamage -turntable, facilitycask transfer car;Potential forprocess downtime

Mechanical design of transfer car;Limited speed;Operator Training;Transfer car movementprocedures;Pre-operational checks;Preventive MaintenanceProgram


8 - 2 Cask loadingroom doordamaged fromimpact offacility casktransfer car

Human Error;EquipmentFailure - Facilitycask drivemechanism

Potential delay ofprocess;Potential forconsiderabledamage to facility;Potential to losedifferentialpressure in someareas of facility;Potential for airflow reversal

Operator Training/Procedures;Preventive MaintenanceProgram


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - 1,4

Minimalradiologicalhazard couldexist as the resultof the air flowreversal if thereis contaminationpresent in thefacility

8 - 3 Incorrectconveyanceposition -Conveyancemisalignmentat the collarslab

Control LoopFailure;Equipmentfailure

Inability to loadfacility cask caronto conveyance;Potential fordamage to pivotrails;Minor equipmentdamage

Pre-operational checks; Preventive MaintenanceProgram;Equipment design;Equipment Inspection program








Comments

C-17 January 23, 2003

8 - 4 Incorrectconveyanceposition -Conveyancepositioned atstation, facilitycask droppedinto shaft

Human Error Major damage toshaft;Potential breachof container;Potential formajor release ofradioactivematerials;Potential forsignificantradiologicalexposure topersonnel;Potential forconsiderableimpact offsite;Potential workerinjury or fatality

Pivot rail stops;Car stops;Training/ProceduresShift to HEPA filtrationPhysical barriers-shaft gates;Limited speed of Facility casktransfer car;Redundant verification ofequipment readiness;Pivot rails interlocked to hoistposition (hardwired);Cask unloading room doors


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4

Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident(dropped cask). Radiologicalrelease wouldlikely beextensive

8 - 5 Farther thandesiredposition -Facility casktransfer carover- traveledontoconveyance

Human Error Potentialequipmentdamage

Power cable length is limited;Facility cask movementprocedures;Pivot rail alignment;Door interlocks;Automatic stop - Facility casktransfer car








Comments

C-18 January 23, 2003

8 - 6 Loss of brakeson conveyancewhile loadedwith facilitycask -Conveyancedrops to bottomof waste shaft

EquipmentFailure -Brakesystem

Major damage toshaft; Potential breachof container;Potential formajor release ofradioactivematerials;Potential forsignificantradiologicalexposure topersonnel;Potential forconsiderableimpact offsite;Potential workerinjury or fatality

Brake system design;Hoist equipment inspectionprogram;Pre-operational checks;Preventive maintenanceprogram on hoist includingbrake system


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4

Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident(droppedconveyance withcask). Radiologicalrelease wouldlikely beextensive

8 - 7 Less thandesired stability- Facility casktransfer car notlatched toconveyance

Human Error Potential damageto shaft andconveyance;Potential forprocess downtime

Operator training; Operatingprocedures;Drive train requires power tomove - (gear driven)


9 - Facility cask transfer to disposal room

9 - 1 Incorrectsequence -Pivot rails notlowered whiletrying to moveFacility casktransfer carfromconveyance

Human Error Potential forminor damage totransfer car andconveyance;Potential forminor damage topivot rails

Operator Training;Conveyance operatingprocedures

NAI NA NA No release ofradiologicalmaterials







Comments

C-19 January 23, 2003

9 - 2 Incorrectposition -Misalignmentof conveyancewith pivot rails

Human Error Potential forminor damage totransfer car andconveyance;Potential forminor damage topivot rails

Operator Training;Conveyance operatingprocedures


9 - 3 Derailment ofFacility casktransfer car

EquipmentFailure - Rail;Foreign objecton rails

Potential to turncar over;Potentialequipmentdamage- facilitycask and/or rail;Considerableoperatingdowntime;Potential workerinjury or fatality

Preventive MaintenanceProgram for rails;Operator training program;Transfer car design;Operating procedures - limitedspeed of transfer car;Cask design

NAI 4,4 NA Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident. Norelease ofradiologicalmaterials.

9 - 4 Loss of control- ForkliftimpactsFacility caskwhile inprocess oflifting cask

Human Error;EquipmentFailure - Forkliftbrakemalfunction

Potential to turntransfer car over;Potentialequipmentdamage- facilitycask and/or forklift;Potential forconsiderableprocessdowntime;Potential workerinjury or fatality

Forklift operator training;Preventive MaintenanceProgram for forklift (includesbrake system);Cask design - limits caskdamage


9 - 5 Forklift dropsfacility cask

Human Error;Forkliftcollision;EquipmentFailure - forklifthydraulicsystem, structural failureof fork tines.

Potential forcanister breachPotentialequipmentdamage - facilitycask, rail, and/orforklift;Potential workerinjury or fatality

Preventive MaintenanceProgram on forklift;Forklift inspection program;Waste transit notificationprogram;Forklift operator training;Operating procedures;

A-6 Verify Facilitycask integrity in theevent of a cornerdrop


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4

Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident.







Comments

C-20 January 23, 2003

9 - 6 Loss of control- Forkliftcollision -general (Nodrop of Facilitycask)

Human Error -Other vehiclescollide withforklift;Mechanicalfailure

Potentialequipmentdamage;Potential facilitydamage;Potential fordamage toundergroundventilationsystem;Potential workerinjury or fatality

Traffic controls underground;Forklift training program;Operating procedures;Waste transit notificationprogram;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on forklift;Facility cask design


9 - 7 Diesel fire onforklift

Diesel fuel leak;UnknownIgnition Source

Potential fordamage to Facilitycask and canister;canister breach;Potential forsignificant radiologicalexposure topersonnel;Potential workerinjury or fatality

Vented canister;Fire suppression system (onforklift);Underground ventilationsystem;Rescue program;Mine worker training;Mine evacuation plan

A-7 Verify that thefire response planaddresses this event

R-16 Investigatethe hydrogengeneration (throughradiolysis) in thevicinity ofemplacementactivities


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4

Worker fatalitycould occur asthe result of thefire (industrialsafety issue). Radiologicalimpact could beconsiderable dueto facility casknot beingqualified for fire.

9 - 8 Diesel firefollowed byexplosion

Diesel fuel leak;UnknownIgnition Source

Potential forradiologicalexposure topersonnel;Potential fordamage to facilitycask and canister;Potential forcanister breach;Potential workerinjury or fatality;Potential forsignificantdamage to facility;Potential forsignificantadverse impact tofacility operations


A-7 Same Actionas for 9-7. Verifythat the fireresponse planaddresses this event

R-16 Samerecommendation as for 9-7.Investigate thepotential forhydrogengeneration (through radiolysis)in vicinity ofemplacementactivities


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4

Worker fatalitycould occur asthe result of theexplosion(industrial safetyissue). Radiologicalimpact could beconsiderable dueto facility casknot withstandingthe impact







Comments

C-21 January 23, 2003

10 - Canister emplacement in borehole

10-1 Loss of control- Forklift dropsFacility caskontoemplacementequipment


Potential fordamage toemplacementequipment;Breach of thewaste cannister, PersonnelExposure,Release to theenvironment,Potential forprocessing delays

Equipment design NAI 4,4 Facility Worker -4,4

Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4

10-2 Hydraulicfluid/diesel fuelfire

Hydraulic fluidor diesel fuelleak;UnknownIgnition Source

Potential forradiologicalexposure topersonnel;Potential fordamage to facilitycask and canister;Potential forcanister breach;Potential workerinjury or fatality





Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4

Worker fatalitycould occur asthe result of thefire (industrialsafety issue). Radiologicalimpact could beconsiderable dueto facility casknot beingqualified for fire







Comments

C-22 January 23, 2003

10-3 Hydraulicfluid/diesel fuelfire followedby anexplosion

Hydraulic fluidor diesel fuelleak;UnknownIgnition Source;

Potential forradiologicalexposure topersonnel;Potential fordamage to facilitycask and canister;Potential forcanister breach;Potential workerinjury or fatality;Potential forsignificantdamage to facility;Potential forsignificantadverse impact tofacility operations





Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4

Worker fatalitycould occur asthe result of theexplosion(industrial safetyissue). Radiologicalimpact could beconsiderable dueto facility casknot withstandingthe impact

10-4 Incorrectposition -Shield collarmisalignmentwith facilitycask

EquipmentFailure;Control LoopFailure


Control loop design;Multiple position sensors;Multiple level sensors;Pre-operational checks; Preventive MaintenanceProgram for emplacementequipment;Emplacement equipmentdesign;Operator Training; OperatingProceduresPhysical lock between shieldcollar and Facility cask;Control panel indicatoridentifies misalignment


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - NA

Radiologicalhazard only. Aminimalradiologicalexposure hazardcould exist inthis event







Comments

C-23 January 23, 2003

10-5 Shield valve onemplacementequipment isclosed oncanister duringemplacementprocess (mis-positionedshield valve;movementsooner thandesired)

Control LoopFailure;Mechanicalfailure onemplacementequipment

Potential damageto canister;Potential breachof canister;Potential releaseof radioactivematerial;Potential for directradiologicalexposure topersonnel;Potential foradverse impactoffsite

Shield valve control interlocks;Torque limiter on shield valvemotor;Shift to HEPA filtrationControl panel indicator signalsshield valve problem;Radioactive material confinedby emplacement equipment;Pre-operational checks; Preventive MaintenanceProgram for emplacementequipment


Onsite Worker - 2,4

Offsite - 2,4

Radiologicalhazard only. This event couldresult inconsiderableradiological impact to facilityworkers

10-6 Mis-alignmentof canister as itis moved intoborehole

Human Error;EquipmentFailure-Emplacementequipmentsettles andresults inmisalignment;EquipmentFailure - levelindicatormalfunction

Potential damageto canister;Potential breachof canister;Potential damageto emplacementequipment;Potential releaseof radioactivematerial;Potential directradiologicalexposure topersonnel;Potential foradverse impactoffsite;

Operator training;Waste handling (emplacement)procedures;Stall pressure limit on ram;Emplacement equipment isbraced;Polyethylene liner installedinto borehole to reduce frictionand limit potential forinterference with canisteremplacement; Shift to HEPA filtration


Onsite Worker - 2,4

Offsite - 2,4

Radiologicalhazard only. This event couldresult inconsiderableradiological impact to facilityworkers

10-7 Roof Collapseduringemplacementactivities

Room walls,roof shift

Potential forworker injury orfatality;Potential fordisruption ofprocessingoperations;

Facility cask design;Canister design;Emplacement equipmentdesign;Motion detectioninstrumentation;Emergency responseprocedures;Room inspection program

NAI 4,4 NA Worker injury orfatality couldoccur as theresult of the roofcollapse (miningsafety issue); noradiologicalrelease isexpected.







Comments

C-24 January 23, 2003

11- Decontamination Activities1) Receipt2) Cask prep3) Canister transfer (worst case)4) Post emplacement

11-1 Highcontamination -Surfacecontaminationfound duringnormaloperation

Loss of primaryconfinement;Human Error-Spread of contaminationby shipperduring loading

Potential spread ofcontamination andairborneradioactivity toworker

Radiological Work Permit;Worker training;Personal ProtectiveEquipment;Shift to HEPA filtration


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - 1,4

Radiologicalhazard only. Aminimalradiologicalexposure hazardcould exist inthis event

12 - CH/ RH Interface

12-1 Equipmentperforms inother thandesired mode -CH/RHconveyanceloading doorsopen at sametime

Human Error -Interlocks whichpreventsimultaneousopening of doorsare inadvertentlybypassed;Control loopmalfunction

Potentialdiversion ofexhaust paththroughunderground vs.through RHHVAC system

HEPA- UndergroundWorker training;Waste handling procedures;Preventive MaintenanceProgram for controlequipment;Scheduling of CH and RHoperations


12-2 Loss of control- Undergroundtransportingvehiclecollision

Human Error-Other drivers runinto forklift;Mechanicalfailure

Potentialequipmentdamage;Potential facilitydamage;Potential fordamage toundergroundventilationsystem;Potential workerinjury or fatality

Traffic controls underground;Forklift training program;Waste handling procedures;Waste transit notificationprogram;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on vehicles








Comments

C-25 January 23, 2003

12-3 Loss ofventilation (ventilationrequirementsbetween RHand CHprocesses arenot maintained)

Human Error-ImproperbulkheadalignmentEquipmentFailure - Failureof exhaust fans;Utility Failure - Loss of power

Potential toshutdownoperations

Underground ventilationsystem alignment procedures; Worker training;Preventive MaintenanceProgram for ventilation systemequipment;Redundant exhaust fans;Evacuation plan


13 - General Facility operation - NPH, External events

13-1 Seismic Event(Design BasisEarthquake)

Earthquake Potential formajor disruptionof facilityoperations;Potential damageto cask and/orcanister;Potential breachof canister;Potential for lossof site utilities;Potential torelease radioactivematerial;Potential forradiologicalexposure to offsitepersonnel;Potential for fire;Potential forexplosion;Potential forworker injury orfatality

Waste Handling Buildingdesigned for DBE;Emergency Response Plan;Recovery Plan;Road cask design - meets DOTType B shipping containercertification requirements;HVAC system shutdownswitch


Onsite Worker - 4,3

Offsite - 4,3

Worker injury orfatality couldoccur as theresult of theearthquakealone. Radiologicalimpact wouldlikely beextensive.







Comments

C-26 January 23, 2003

13-2 Tornado(Design BasisTornado)

Tornado Potential fordisruption ofprocessingoperations;Potential to losesite utilities;Potential forworker injury orfatality;Potential for fire;Potential forexplosion

Waste Handling Buildingdesigned to withstandtornados;Emergency responseprocedures;Recovery Plan;Weather monitored by CMR(Central Monitoring Room); Road cask design - meets DOTType B shipping containercertification requirements;

NAI 4,4 NA Worker injury orfatality couldoccur as theresult of thetornado.

13-3 Loss of Facilityventilation

Human Error-ImproperbulkheadalignmentEquipmentFailure -Failureof exhaust fans;Loss of electricalpower;Loss ofcompressed air


Worker training; Ventilationsystem operating procedures;Preventive MaintenanceProgram for ventilation systemequipment;Redundant Exhaust fans;Evacuation plan;Backup diesel generators;Redundant air compressors


13-4 Loss of power NPH -Earthquake,tornado,lightning, highwinds, etc.;Vehicle impact;Power fromcommercialsupplier is lost

Potential loss offilteredventilation;Potential loss ofhoist

Backup diesel generators;Redundant power feeds;Response procedures; Workertraining








Comments

C-27 January 23, 2003

13-5 Loss of FireProtection(includesdetection andsuppression)

NPH;Loss of 180,000gallon fire waterstorage tanks

Potential inabilityto detect andsuppress fires

Design and construction of firesuppression system;Two on-site fire water storagetanks containing 180,000gallons (One storage tankcapacity sufficient for DBF);Two fire pumps, one electricaland one diesel, available;On-site fire truck and firefighting equipmentAll fire related systems,training, inspection, andtesting are in accordance toNFPA (National FireProtection Association) andNEC regulationsInspections and functionaltests of system performed on aperiodic basis24 hour battery backup for firedetection system available inWHB;24 hour fire brigade

NAI NA NA Ranking wouldbe significantonly if therewere a fire eventand the detectionand suppressionsystems wereinoperative. Otherwise, lossof the detectionand suppressionsystems has noimpact.

13-6 Range Fire Lightning;unknownignition sourceGas pipelineexplosion

Potential todisrupt siteoperations;Potential forsmoke to enter themine shaft;Potential forundergroundevacuation;Potential forsmoke to enterfacility buildings;Potential forfacility damage

Emergency responseprocedures;Fire break installed;Fire fighting capabilityEmergency response team;Fire fighting training;24 hour fire brigade

NAI 2,4 NA Industrialaccident only. Potential for arange fire havinga direct impacton the WHBsuch that aradiologicalrelease wouldoccur is minimal







Comments

C-28 January 23, 2003

13-7 AircraftCrashes IntoWHB

Personnel error;Equipmentfailure

Major damage to WHB;Potential for fire;Potential forworker injury orfatalityPotential formajor release ofradioactivematerial;Potential forconsiderableradiologicalexposure topersonnel

Physical location of site isremote;Air space above facility is notpart of normal flight patterns;Physical size of WHB


Onsite Worker - 4,1

Offsite - 4,1

This eventwould havemajorradiological andnon-radiologicalimpact. However, theevent is beyondextremelyunlikely anddoes not requireaccidentanalysis. Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident.

13-8 Gas PipelineExplosion

Loss of pipeintegrity, sparkNatural gasexplosionRange Fire

Potential for firePotential for off-site personnelinjury or fatalityPotentialenvironmentalconcernPotential foradverse mediaattentionPotential to stopsite operations

WHB is located one mile fromnearest pipeline. Damageradius from recent explosionsis a few hundred feet


Onsite Worker - 0,4

Offsite -0,4

The offsitepersonnel wouldhave to be in theright location atthe wrong time,and the chancesof that occurringare the same asthey are for theaverage citizen.







Comments

C-29 January 23, 2003

13-8 Cold WeatherNaturalVentilationPressure resultsin changes toair balance(Undergroundventilationsystem)

Cold weathercaused NaturalVentilationPressure (NVP)

Potential todisrupt wastehandlingoperations;Potential to, in theevent of anaccident involvingrelease ofradiologicalmaterial, spreadairbornecontamination tothe environment;Potential to causedeterioration ofbraking andelectronic systemsfor the waste shafthoist duringprolongedexposure to saltPotential for wasteshaft hoist to fail;Potential forworker injury

Operator training andqualification;Waste shaft hoist systemdesign;Operating procedures;Air balance and flow tests;Shaft pressure monitoring;Alarms to indicate adverse airpressure conditions;WIPP ventilation simulatorused for guidance;Underground ventilationremote monitoring controlsystem (monitors air flows andd/p’s and enable CMR operatorto adjust vortex to controlflow)Mine weather stations tomonitor natural ventilationpressure(temp, relativehumidity and barometricpressure);Isolation of mine splits;Backup power available tooperate fans for flow throughthe panel area

NAI 3,4 NA There would beno radiologicalhazard as theresult of the coldweather NVPevent unlessthere wasalreadycontaminationpresent in themine. Injury toworker related toindustrial miningsafety.







Comments

C-30 January 23, 2003

13-9 Hot WeatherNaturalVentilationPressure resultsin changes toair balance(Undergroundventilationsystem)

Hot weathercaused NaturalVentilationPressure (NVP)


Operator training andqualification;Waste shaft hoist systemdesign;Preventative maintenanceprocedures;Air balance and flow tests;Monitoring at bulkhead 309;Bulkhead 309 redesign(recent) to pressurize thechamber between the walls ofthe 309 bulkhead using fans;Procedures to maintaindifferential pressures in themine;WIPP ventilation simulatorused for guidance;Underground ventilationremote monitoring controlsystem (monitors air flows andd/p’s and enables CMRoperator to adjust vortex tocontrol flow)Mine weather stations tomonitor natural ventilationpressure(temp, relativehumidity and barometricpressure);Isolation of mine splits;Backup power available tooperate fans for flow throughthe panel area;Alarms to indicate adverse airpressure conditions

NAI 3,4 NA There would beno radiologicalhazard as theresult of the hotweather NVPevent unlessthere wasalreadycontaminationpresent in themine. Injury toworker related toindustrial miningsafety.







Comments

C-31 January 23, 2003

14 - Storage Mode

14-1 Boreholeshrinks overtime beforepanel closes,crushingcanister

Salt aroundborehole shiftsand seals aroundcanister

Potential breachof canister;Potential releaseof radioactivematerial;Potentialpersonnelexposure;Potential spread ofcontamination toadjacent areas;

Shift to HEPA filtration;Room closure system;Canister design


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - 1,4

Radiologicalhazard only; aminorradiologicalexposure hazardfor facilityworkers.

14-2 Buildup ofexplosive gasin closed room

Generation ofMethane, orHydrogen gasfromTransuranic(TRU) wastematerial exceedsexpected values

Potential toexceed VOCemissionthresholds perRCRA/NMED(ResourceConservation andRecovery Act/New MexicoEnvironmentalDepartment)Potential for fire;Potential forexplosion;Potential torelease radioactivematerial;Potential forpersonnel injuryor fatality;

Panel Closure systems;Backfill (limits propagation);Closed panel isolated fromventilation;Waste Acceptance Criteria;Shift to HEPA filtration


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - 1,4

Worker fatalitycould occur asthe result of anexplosion(mining safetyevent). Radiologicalexposure hazardis expected to beminimal.


Table 2- 10-160B HAZOP Table

C-32


Deviation Causes Consequences Existing Safeguards Actions Total Rank(Cons., Freq)


Comments

1. Cask Receipt and Transfer to RH Bay

1A-1 Higher thanexpectedcontamination is found wheninspectingtrailer and 10-160B Cask atthe gate prior toentry on site

Shipmentdiscrepancy;Movement ofwaste duringtraveling.

Potential forminimal exposureto facility worker

Survey at the gate -Radiological Controlprocedures;Shipping Container - DOTType B certified;WAC Requirements;Inspection and survey intransit;Personnel ProtectiveEquipment.

No ActionsIdentified (NAI)


Onsite Worker -NA

Offsite - NA


1A-2 ShippingManifestDiscrepancy

Human error Potential for lossof production;Possible return ofshipment

WIPP Waste InformationSystem Procedures;Radiological Controlprocedures;Worker training;WAC controls.

A-1 ) Check withtransportation toverify proceduresfor checkingmanifest prior andduring transport

1,4 NA Note: Check theProgramImplementationGuide with theStates - RebeccaWalker or JeffWinkle.

1A-3 Excessivestorage time -Cask is left instorage toolong

Human error;Equipmentfailure;Extendedstorage atgenerator

Potential releaseof radioactivematerial due togas generation

Worker training;Waste handling procedures;WIPP Waste InformationSystem procedures;Safety Analysis Report forPackaging (SARP) restrictions.


Onsite Worker -NA

Offsite - NA


1A-4 High radiation- Directradiologicalexposure

Human error;IncorrectRadiologicalWork Permitinformation;Waste materialshifts duringshipment

Potential for directradiologicalexposure tofacility workers

Radiological Controlprocedures (EPD’s);Worker Training;ALARA Program;Dosimetry;Cask design includingshielding; Inspection andsurvey in transit.


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - NA







Comments

C-33

1A-5 Loss of control- Transportercrashes throughgate due tohigh speed

Human error;Equipmentfailure -transporter brakesystem fails

Potential todamage the accessgates;Potential todamage sectionsof the facility;Potential forworker injury orfatality

Drivers are trained, andqualified for proper transporteroperation;Transporter is equipped withemergency brakes;Transporter maintenanceprovides for reliableequipment function;Access road has a 90 degreeturn immediately prior toapproaching the main accessgate, minimum speedsachieved;Access roads are level.

NAI 4,4 NA Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident(impact). Norelease ofradiologicalmaterial ispostulated in thisevent.

1A-6 Tractor trailertruck fire(inside Sitegate andoutside ofWHB)

Human error; Improper orinsufficientmaintenance;Vehicle impact;Equipmentfailure;Diesel fuel ontruck; Unknownignition source

Potential forsmoke to bedrawn into WHBby ventilationsystem;Potential loss ofexhaust filtration;Potential forworker injury;Potential fordisruption ofprocessingactivities

10-160B Cask design - MeetsDOT Type B shippingcontainer certificationrequirements;Emergency ResponseProcedures;Fire Loading/ CombustibleControl Program;Vehicle Maintenance andInspection Program.

NAI 2,4 NA Facility workerinjury couldresult fromsmokeinhalation.






Comments

C-34

1A-7 Tractor trailertruck firefollowed by anexplosion(inside Sitegate andoutside WHB)

Human error; Improper orinsufficientmaintenance;Vehicle impact;Equipmentfailure;Diesel fuel ontruck;Unknownignition source

Potential forworker injury orfatality;Potential forsignificantdisruption ofprocessingactivities;Potential forsmoke to bedrawn into WHBby ventilationsystem;Potential loss ofexhaust filtration

Fire Loading/ CombustibleControl Program;Waste Acceptance Criteria(WAC) restrictions on wastematerial;Emergency ResponseProcedures;Vehicle Maintenance andInspection Program;10-160B Cask design - MeetsDOT Type B shippingcontainer certificationrequirements.

NAI 4,4 NA Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident(explosion).

1A-8 Trailer in otherthan properlocation -Traileroverturns

Human errorEquipmentfailure

Potential fordamage to cask;Potential for fire; Potential forworker injury orfatality.

WIPP Site speed limits;Transporter driver training;Waste handling procedures;Guard rails; 10-160B Cask design - MeetsDOT Type B shippingcontainer certificationrequirements.

NAI 4,4 NA Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident(impact). Norelease ofradiologicalmaterial ispostulated.

1A-9 Less thanadequatepreventivemaintenance - Landing gearfailure

Human error Shipping caskfalls off truck;Potential forworker injury orfatality.

Shipping cask design;Truck maintenance andInspection Program.

NAI 4,4 NA Worker injuryor fatality couldresult from theindustrialaccident. Norelease ofradiologicalmaterial ispostulated.






Comments

C-35

1B-1 Fire watertrench gratefails and trailershifts as thetrailer backsinto RH Bay

Human error Potential forequipmentdamage;Potential to dropthe cask in the RHBay;Potential forpersonnel injury

Procedures and training;Spotters; Trailer and caskdesign; Cask design canwithstand up to 40ft.

NAI 4,4 NA IndustrialHazard Only

No cask breachdue to design of10-160B Cask.

1B-2 Diesel fireinvolvingtractor trailertruck(<1475�F; <30min.)

Human error; Improper orinsufficientmaintenance;Vehicle impact;Equipmentfailure;Diesel fuel ontrailer jockey;Unknownignition source

Potential forsmoke to bedrawn throughWHB byventilationsystem; Potentialloss of exhaustfiltration;Potential forworker injury;Potential fordisruption ofprocessingactivities

10-160B Cask design - MeetsDOT Type B shippingcontainer certificationrequirements (withstand fire<1475�F; <30 min.);Emergency ResponseProcedures;Fire Loading/ CombustibleControl Program;Vehicle Maintenance andInspection Program

NAI 4,4 NA No cask breachdue to design of10-160B Cask.

1B-3 Diesel fireinvolvingtractor trailertruck followedby anexplosion

Human error; Improper orinsufficientmaintenance;Vehicle impact;Equipmentfailure;Diesel fuel ontrailer jockey;Unknownignition source

Potential forsmoke to bedrawn throughWHB byventilationsystem; Potentialloss of exhaustfiltration;Potential forworker injury orfatality; Potentialfor significantdisruption ofprocessingactivities

Emergency ResponseProcedures;Fire Loading/ CombustibleControl Program;Vehicle Maintenance andInspection Program;10-160B Cask design - MeetsDOT Type B shippingcontainer certificationrequirements (withstand fire<1475�F; <30 min.)

NAI 4,4 NA Worker injury orfatality couldresult from theexplosion(industrialaccident).

No cask breachdue to design of10-160B Cask.






Comments

C-36

1B-4 Loss of controlof truck

Human error;Equipmentfailure

Potential forequipmentdamage.Potential forpersonnel injury.Potential forfacility damage.

Preventive MaintenanceProgram;Procedures and training;Trailer and cask design


1B-5 RH Bay fire Diesel fuel fire;Electrical fire;Hydraulic fire

No radiologicalrelease;Potential forpersonnel injury;Potential forfacility damage.

Thermal detectors;Building construction FireRating Type 2 non-combustible;Cask design;Procedures and training;Fire suppression;Emergency Response;Firewater trenches wouldcollect the diesel fuel and keepthe diesel fuel from spreading;Fire Loading/ CombustibleControl Program

A-2) Verify theamount of dieselfuel available.

4,4 NA

1B-6 While movingcompressed gascylinders in RHBay, cylinderfalls - rupturesand impactscask

Human error;Gas Cylinderfailure

Potential forfacility damage; Potential forpersonnelinjury/fatality;Potential to breachdrum on CH side;Potential foronsite and offsiteConsequences;Potential todamage andbreach 72B or 10-160B.

Procedures and training;Limited number of cylinders(2);Limited movement ofcylinders;Special cart;Cylinder design

A-3) Verify caskdesign for missileimpact.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4






Comments

C-37

2. Remove the Upper Impact Limiter in RH Bay

2A-1 Pinch pointsduring removalof ratchetbinders

Potential forpersonnel injury


2C-1 Impact limiterdropped ontocask

Crane failure;Mechanicalfailure;Human error;Equipmentfailure

Potential fordamage to impactlimiter.Potential forpersonnel injury.No release.Potential forequipmentdamage.

Training and Procedures;Crane design;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on crane;Design of rigging;Frequent crane inspections;Cask design to withstandweight of impact limiter.


2E-1 Surfacecontaminationon cask andimpact limiter -Directradiologicalexposure

Seal failure;Human error

Potential forfacility workerexposure.Potential forspread ofcontamination.Potentialoperationaldelays.

Training and Procedures;Cask design.


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - NA

3. Remove the Cask from the Trailer in RH Bay

3ABCDEFG-1

Pinch pointsduring removalof cask fromthe trailer



3H-1 Drop caskwhile liftingfrom trailer


Potential forfacility damage.Potential forequipmentdamage.Potential forpersonnelinjury/fatality.

Training and Procedures;Crane design; PreventiveMaintenance Program oncrane;Design of rigging;Frequent crane inspections;Limited lift height; Limit cranespeed; Cask designed towithstand drop up to 40ft.







Comments

C-38

3H-2 Contaminatedwater in bottomimpact limiter

Human error;Caskcontaminatedduring shipment.

Potential forspread ofcontamination

Procedures; Impact limiterdesign (drain in the bottom)

R-1) Survey thebottom of the caskbefore moving thecask.A-4) Verify draininstalled in theimpact limiter.


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - NA

RadiologicalHazard Only

3I-1 Cask droppedduring cranelift to RoadCask TransferCar (RCTC)


Potential forfacility damage;Potential forequipmentdamage;Potential forpersonnelinjury/fatality

Training and Procedures;Crane design;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on crane;Design of rigging; Frequentcrane inspections; Caskdesigned to withstand a dropof up to 40 ft.


4. Remove Cask Lid in Cask in CUR

4A-1 Possible spreadofcontaminationwhileequalizingpressure inCask


Potential forfacility workerexposure;(Radiological andhazardous);VOCs;Potential forspread ofcontamination

Training and Procedures - Pre-operational tests andpreventive maintenance ontools; Radiological surveys;HEPA filter tools;WAC - vented drumsrequirement;

R-2) Verify thatHEPA filtrationtools haveprocedures inplace.


Onsite Worker - 1,4

Offsite - NA

No airbornerelease expecteddue to HEPAfilter on thetools.

4ABC-1 Pinch pointswhileloosening boltsand connectionrigging








Comments

C-39

4D-1 Cask falls offof RCTC in RHBay while lid isloose

Derailment;Vehicle impact;Shield doorimpact

Potential for lossof production (CHand RH);Potential forbreach of drums;Potential for directradiologicalexposure tofacility worker;Potential for on-site consequence;Potential for off-site consequence;Potential forspread ofcontamination;Release ofhazardousmaterial;Potential forfacility andequipmentdamage

Design of transfer car, shielddoors, cask, rails;Emergency ResponseProcedure;Limited speed on transfer car;DOT Type A Drums;Ventilation system;Training and Procedures;Nuclear coating on floor;ARMs and CAMs.

A-5) Calculationnote needed toverify validity ofRCTC derailment.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4

4E-1 Pinch pointswhile closingCaskUnloadingRoom ShieldDoor








Comments

C-40

4F-1 Shield plugdropped ontostored WIPPCanister in HotCell


Potential forbreach of canisterand drums;Potential forspread ofcontamination;Offsite and onsiteconsequences;Potential forrelease ofhazardous waste;Potential to shutdown operations

Training and Procedures;Facility design;Ventilation systems;CAMs; Emergency ResponseProcedure;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on crane; Cranedesign;Frequent crane inspections;Shield door crane interlocksmitigate direct radiationexposure and/or spread ofcontamination.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4


4G-1 Cask liddropped ontothe cask anddrums in CUR


Potential forbreach of canisterand drums;Potential forspread ofcontamination;Potential foroffsite and onsiteconsequences;Potential forrelease ofhazardous waste;Potential to shutdown operations.

Training and Procedures;Facility design;Ventilation systems;CAMs;Emergency ResponseProcedure;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on crane; Cranedesign;Frequent crane inspections;Shield door crane interlocksmitigate direct radiationexposure and/or spread ofcontamination.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4


4H-1 Cask liddropped ontothe storedwaste in theHot Cell


Potential forbreach of canisterand drums;Potential forspread ofcontamination;Potential offsiteand onsiteconsequences;Potential forrelease ofhazardous waste;Potential to shutdown operations.

Training and Procedures;Facility design;Ventilation systems;CAMs; Emergency ResponseProcedure; PreventiveMaintenance Program oncrane; Crane design; Frequentcrane inspections; Shield doorcrane interlocks mitigate directradiation exposure and/orspread of contamination.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4







Comments

C-41

5. Unload the Cask in the CUR

5BD-1 Lifting fixturedropped ontothe drums inthe CUR


Potential forbreach of drums;Potential foronsite andpotential foroffsiteconsequences;Potential forrelease ofradiological andhazardous waste;Potential to shutdown operations;Potential forspread ofcontamination.

Training and Procedures;Facility design;Ventilation systems;CAMs; Emergency ResponseProcedure;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on crane; Cranedesign;Fixture design; Frequent craneinspections; Shield door craneinterlocks mitigate directradiation exposure and/orspread of contamination.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4


5CE-1 Drum carriagedropped whilelifting due tocarriage gettingcaught andover stressingfixture orbasket in theCUR

Mechanical/equipmentfailure (fixture,sling, etc);Human error

Potential forbreach of drums;Potential forspread ofcontamination;Potential foroffsite and onsiteconsequences;Potential forrelease ofhazardous waste;Potential to shutdown operations;Hot Cell andunloading roomcontaminated.

Fixture design;Drum carriage design;Crane design;Training and Procedures;Ventilation; EmergencyResponse Procedure;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on crane; Frequentcraneinspections.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4







Comments

C-42

5CE-2 Drum carriagedropped insidethe Hot Cellonto storedwaste


Potential forbreach of canisterand drums;Potential forspread ofcontamination;Potential foroffsite and onsiteconsequences;Potential forrelease ofhazardous waste;Potential to shutdown operations.

Fixture design;Drum carriage design;Crane design;Training and Procedures;Ventilation; EmergencyResponse Procedure;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on crane; Frequentcrane inspections.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4

5CE-3 Broken HotCell window

Human error(crane, otherequipmentfalling intowindow);Equipmentfailure;Nitrogen - overpressurizedbladders inwindow

Potential for lossof shielding tofacility worker;Potential forpersonnel injury

Training and procedures;Preventive maintenance oncrane and windows (N 2

bladders in windows havepressure relief valves); HotCell leaded glass on outerlayer


Onsite Worker -NA

Offsite - NA

6. Reinstall Cask Lid in the CUR

6B-1 Cask liddropped ontothe cask in theCUR


Potential forfacility damage.

Training and Procedures;Facility design;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on crane; Cranedesign; Frequent craneinspections.

NAI NA NA

6B-2 Cask liddropped ontothe storedwaste in theHot Cell

Same as event4H-1






Comments

C-43

6B-3 Broken HotCell window(internalimpact)

Same as event5CE-3

6D-1 Shield plugdropped ontostored WIPPCanister in HotCell

Same as event4F-1

6E-1 Pinch pointswhile openingCaskUnloadingRoom ShieldDoor



6F-1 Pinch pointswhile movingthe RCTC outto the bay toreinstall lid



6G-1 Pinch pointswhileconnectingrigging



6H-1 During casksurvey - higherthan expectedcontaminationfound in RHBay

Human error;Contaminationon inside ofcask, lid, anddrum carriages(when present)

Potential forfacility workerexposure;Potential for lossof production.

Radiological controlprocedures and training;Radiological monitoringequipment (CAMs);WAC requirements


Onsite Worker -NA

Offsite - NA


6KLMNOPQ-1

Pinch pointswhilereinstallingprimary casklid








Comments

C-44

7. Reinstall the Cask on the Trailer in RH Bay

7AEFGHIJKL-1

Pinch pointswhilereinstalling thecask on thetrailer



7BCD-1 Cask droppedwhile liftingfrom the RCTCin RH Bay

Same as event3H-1

IndustrialHazard Only

Cask does notcontain TRUwaste drums.

8. Reinstall the Upper Impact Limiter in RH Bay

8ABCDE-1 Pinch pointswhilereinstalling theupper impactlimiter on thecask



9. Move Empty WIPP Canister into Hot Cell and Prepare WIPP Canister

9-1 Fire in Hot Cellwhilecontainingstored waste

Electrical short Potential forequipmentdamage;Potential to shutdown operations;Potential for drumbreach; Potentialfor onsite andoffsiteconsequences;Damage to HotCell.

Fire Loading/ CombustibleControl Program;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on electricalequipment in the immediatearea; Hot Cell design;Combustible loadinginspections; Procedures &Training; Limited ignitionsources

R-3) Verify FHAcovers Hot Cell


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4







Comments

C-45

9-2 Fire/Explosionin Hot Cellwhilecontainingstored waste

Flammable gasgeneration indrum and ignites(metal to metalcontact causesspark)

Potential for drumbreach;Potential foronsite and offsiteconsequences;Damage to HotCell.

WAC - no flammable items indrum; Certificate ofCompliance - Limits on gasgeneration and limited storage;Shield door closed in the CURand/or Shield plug in Hot Cellis in place.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4


9-3 Crane drops offof ceilingsupports in HotCell

NaturalPhenomenon -Seismic andTornado;External Events -Loss of power;Equipmentfailure

None - event isprevented by DBEand DBTqualifications ofcrane

Crane is DBE and DBTqualified

NAI NA NA Event preventedby DBE and DBTqualifications

9-4 Gas cylinderimpacts the HotCell window(externally -from theOperationGallery)

Cylinder fallsover andbecomes amissile

Potential for lossof shielding toworker; Personnelfatality; Potentialfor facilitydamage.

Cylinders are chained to cartor wall; Training andprocedures; Cylinder and capdesign; Hot Cell windowdesign; PreventiveMaintenance Program


Onsite Worker -NA

Offsite - NA

Facility assumesno breach ofdrums

9-5 Shield plug liftfixture fallsover in the HotCell

Hit with crane,load on craneimpacts window,or equipment.

Potential forbroken window(loss of shielding);Potential foronsite/offsiteconsequences;Potential forfacility workerexposure;Potential forPersonnel injury

Training and procedures;Ventilation system; Hot Cellleaded glass (outer layer)


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4






Comments

C-46

9-6 External fire toHot Cell

Hydraulic fuelfire;Fire in the cranemaintenanceroom; Electricalfire

Potential to formtoxic gas fromneoprene;Industrial hazardsfrom a fire.

Fire brigade - fire protection;Fire Loading/ CombustibleControl Program;Training and procedures;Fire detection in OperationGallery (outside of Hot Cell);Sprinkler system;Hot Cell design;Ventilation.

A-6) Verify gallerycombustibleloading withfacility FPE.

2,4 NA IndustrialHazard Only

Concretestructureprevents firefrom spreadingto Hot Cell

9-7 Criticality inthe Hot Cell

NA NA NA A-7) Need toupdate criticalityanalysis to addressthis deviation.

NA NA HAZOP did notaddresscriticality, butwill beaddressed inseparateevaluation.

9-8 Mishandling ofHEPA Filter

Human error Potential forfacility workerexposure

Training and procedures forfilter change-out; PersonalProtective Equipment; Bag-outprocess for HEPA filterchange-out


Onsite Worker -NA

Offsite - NA

Covered as partof MaintenanceProgram

9-9 High Radiation- Directradiologicalexposure

Human error;Workerinadvertentlyenters an areawhere wastehandling ishappening.(Transfer Cell orHot Cell)

Potential forfacility workerexposure

Training and procedures;Administrative controls forlock and key;ARM indicators in the HotCell and Transfer Cell;.


Onsite Worker -NA

Offsite - NA







Comments

C-47


Human error; Inadvertent entryinto CUR whileCUR shieldvalve is open while loading aWIPP Canisterinto the shuttlecar from the HotCell

Potential forfacility workerexposure(minimal) fromHot Cell

Training and procedures;Facility design (no streamingpath).

R-4) Add interlockbetween CURshield valve andHot Cell shieldvalve


Onsite Worker -NA

Offsite - NA


No directradiation


Human error;Inadvertent entryinto FacilityCask LoadingRoom whileTransfer Cellshield valve isopen whileloading a WIPPCanister into theshuttle car.



R-5) Add interlockbetween TransferCell shield valveand Hot Cell shieldvalve.


Onsite Worker -NA

Offsite - NA


No directradiation






Comments

C-48


Workerinadvertentlyenters the cranemaintenanceroom while HotCell is inoperation andopens the shielddoor



NAI NA NA Comment:Worker canphysically enterCraneMaintenanceRoom duringoperationwithoutexposure withCraneMaintenanceRoom shielddoor closed, butwould typicallyenter the CraneMaintenanceRoom duringabnormaloperations or forroutinepreventivemaintenance (nowaste in HotCell).

No exposurefrom Hot Celldue to Interlockwith cranemaintenanceshield door onhigh radiationmonitor in HotCell.






Comments

C-49


Human error;Inadvertentlyopening CUR shield door withwaste inside HotCell; Permissivecircuit accidentlyleft in the onposition

Potential forfacility workerexposure.

Interlock between the grappleand CUR shield door;Permissive circuit to openshield door; Administrativeprocedures.

R-6) Add interlockbetween CURshield door andshield plug


Onsite Worker -NA

Offsite - NA

9AC-1 Empty WIPPCanisterdropped ontostored waste inthe Hot Cell

Human error;Equipment;failure;Grapple failure

Potential forbreach of canisterand drums;Potential forspread ofcontamination;Potential foroffsite and onsiteconsequences;Potential forrelease ofhazardous waste;Potential foroperational downtime.

Training and Procedures;Facility design;Ventilation systems;CAMs; Emergency ResponseProcedure;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on crane;Crane/grapple design;Frequent crane inspections;Weight of empty WIPPCanister limits damage tostored waste (1800 lbs.);Inspection that CUR shielddoor (since shield door can beopen if plug is in place); Shieldplug in Hot Cell is in place;Shield door crane interlocksmitigate direct radiationexposure and/or spread ofcontamination.

A-8) Verify weightof empty canister.

R-7) Addprocedure to verifyshield door closedin the CUR duringHot Cell activities.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4

Note: EmptyWIPP Canistersgo through CUR.







Comments

C-50

10. Unload Carriage Units in Hot Cell

10A-1 Puncture drumin the Hot Cellwith PAR®manipulator


Potential forbreach of drum;Potential forspread ofcontamination;Potential foroffsite and onsiteconsequences;Potential forrelease ofhazardous waste;Potential foroperational downtime.

Training and Procedures;Facility design;Ventilation systems;CAMs; Emergency ResponseProcedure;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on PAR®manipulator equipment andcontrols; Crane design;Inspection of shield doorclosed in the CUR; Shield plugin Hot Cell is in place Shielddoor crane interlocks mitigatedirect radiation exposureand/or spread ofcontamination.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4


10B-1 While liftingthe drum, drumlid comes off inthe Hot Cell

Human error;Equipmentfailure; Drum lidfailure

Potential for drumbreach (1 drum);Potential forspread ofcontamination;Potential for lossof production;Potential foronsite and offsiteconsequences.

Training and procedure;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on crane;Drum design;Drum inspection;WAC;Ventilation;Shield door closed in the CUR;Shield plug in Hot Cell is inplace.


Onsite Worker - 3,4

Offsite - 3,4






Comments

C-51

10BF-1 While liftingthe drum, dropdrum in the HotCell

Human error;Equipmentfailure (sling)

Potential foronsite and offsiteconsequences;Potential forspread ofcontamination;Potential for drumbreach (drop ontop of otherdrum).

Training and Procedures;Facility design;Ventilation systems;CAMs; Emergency ResponseProcedure;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on crane; Cranedesign;Frequent crane inspections;Shield door closed in the CUR;Shield plug in Hot Cell is inplace; Shield door craneinterlocks mitigate directradiation exposure and/orspread of contamination.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4


10C-1 Higher thanexpectedcontaminationfound on swipe- mishandlingby RCT

Human error;Equipmentfailure(Glovebox leak)

Potential forspread ofcontamination;Potential forfacility workerexposure.

Training and procedure;Glove box design;Inspection of gloves;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on Glovebox.


Onsite Worker -NA

Offsite - NA


10D-1 Radiationexposureduring theprocess oftaking swipesor glove boxoperations

Gloveboxinterlock failure

Worker exposureto Hot Cell viaglovebox.

Interlocks prevent openingboth doors (on Gloveboxdrawer) at the same time;Glovebox design;Training and procedures;Glovebox not in normalstreaming path.


Onsite Worker -NA

Offsite - NA


10D-2 Pinch points inglovebox,hands inglovebox,operator opensthe gallery sideshield plug

Human error;Maintenanceactivity

Potential forpersonnel injury.

Pressure pad (HotCell/Glovebox controls)interlock with shield plug;Training and procedures;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on Glovebox;Configuration of equipmentcontrols.







Comments

C-52

11. Prepare WIPP Canister for Disposal

11D-1 Fire in the HotCell

Heat generatedby weldingcauses ignitionof combustiblesinside canister

Potential foronsite/offsiteconsequences;Potential forspread ofcontamination;Potential forfacility damage;Potential forequipmentdamage.

Robotic welder design;WAC (no flammable material);(i.e.: two mechanical failuresto cause accident);Storage limits on waste (LFL);Lid design;WIPP Canister design;Training and procedures;Ventilation;Fire Loading/ CombustibleControl Program;Thermal detector;Shield door closed in the CUR;Shield plug in Hot Cell is inplace.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4


11D-2 Explosion inthe Hot Cell

Ignition offlammable gasesin canister headspace duringweldingactivities

Potential for drumbreach;Potential fordamage to HotCell; Potential forloss of shieldingto facility worker;Potential foronsite/offsiteconsequences;Potential forworker fatality;Potential forspread ofcontamination.

Limited storage time in the HotCell; Training and Procedures;Canister lid design; PreventiveMaintenance Program onwelder; WAC (no flammablematerial); Vented drums andcanister; Ventilation;Shield door closed in the CUR;Shield plug in Hot Cell is inplace.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4






Comments

C-53

11D-3 Halogenatedhydrocarbonsaccumulate inWIPP Canisterhead space andweldingactivityproducesphosgene gas(toxic) in theHot Cell

Chemicalreaction toultraviolet light

Potential onsiteexposure to toxicgas.

Ventilation system dilutes;Training and procedures;Canister design;WAC.

A-9) Verifyrequirements aboutallowable levels ofhalogenatedhydrocarbons in thedrum.

A-10) Verify thehazardous chemicalinventory in thewaste.

3,4 NA Ventilation flowrate will dilutethe gas.

Requires furtherAccidentAnalysis

11F-1 Loaded WIPPCanisterdropped in theHot Cell

Canister lidfailure;Grapple failure;Welding failure;Human error;Shear cranecables

Potential forbreach of canister;Potential forbreach of drums;Potential forfacility damage;Potential foronsite/offsiteconsequences;Potential forspread ofcontamination;Potential forfacility workerexposure

Grapple design;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on crane;Training and procedures(welding);Canister design;Lid design;Robotic welder design;Shield door closed in the CUR;Shield plug in Hot Cell is inplace.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4


12. WIPP Canister Transfer to Shuttle Car in Transfer Cell

12D-1 Loaded WIPPCanisterdropped in theHot Cell

Same as event11F-1

NAI






Comments

C-54

12E-1 Drop theloaded WIPPCanister intothe TransferCell

Equipmentfailure;Human error;Lid failure;Welding failure

Potential forbreach of canisterand drums;Potential to spreadcontamination;Potential foroffsite/onsiteconsequences;Potential forfacility damage;Potential forshuttle cardamage;Potential to shutdown RHoperations.

Guide tubes;Training and Procedures;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on crane;Design of shuttle car (designedto shear away and absorbimpact);Impact limiters on the floor;Design of lid.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4


12E-2 Hot Cell shieldvalveinadvertentlycloses on WIPPCanister andshears thecanister

Mechanical-electrical failureor controlsystem failure

Potential forbreach of drums;Potential to spreadcontamination;Potential foroffsite/onsiteconsequences;Potential forfacility damage;Potential to shutdown RHoperations.

Crane and Hot Cell shieldvalve interlock;Torque limiter on shield valvemotor;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on shield valve andcontrols;Design of canister.

A-11) Checkdesign of WIPPcanister.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4







Comments

C-55

12E-3 Inadvertentmovement ofcrane(east/west)while loweringWIPP Canisterinto TransferCell

Mechanical-electrical failureor controlsystem failure;Human error

Potential forbreach of drums;Potential to spreadcontamination;Potential foroffsite/onsiteconsequences;Potential forfacility damage;Potential forshuttle cardamage;Potential to shutdown RHoperations.

Crane and shield valveinterlock;Torque limiter on shield valvemotor;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on crane;Design of canister;Emergency stop in crane.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4


12E-4 Inadvertentmovement ofthe shuttle carwith the WIPPCanisterpartiallylowered

Mechanical-electrical failureor controlsystem failure(shuttle carfailure); Humanerror;Interlock failure(shuttle car isinterlocked withshield valve).

Potential forbreach of drums;Potential to spreadcontamination;Potential foroffsite/onsiteconsequences;Potential forfacility damage;Potential forshuttle cardamage;Potential to shutdown RHoperations.

Variable speed drive motorcontroller (limits motor currentand stops motor when shuttleis obstructed);Preventive MaintenanceProgram on shieldvalve/shuttle car interlock;Canister design;Drive train on shuttle car -belts will slip;Interlock between shuttle carand shield valve.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4







Comments

C-56

13. Move WIPP Canister into Position in the Transfer Cell

13ABCD-1 WIPP Canistermoved intoposition in theTransfer Cell

Same as events5-3 through 5-6 -6-1, 6-2, and 6-5in DOE/WIPP-00-2305

14. Load WIPP Canister into Facility Cask in the Transfer Cell

14ACDEFGHI-1

Load WIPPCanister intofacility cask inTransfer Cell

Same as events7-1 through 7-13in DOE/WIPP-00-2305

NAI

14B-1 Robotic armdamages WIPPCanister duringcontaminationsurvey

Equipmentfailure (Roboticcontrol failure)

Potential forbreach of drums;Potential to spreadcontamination;Potential foroffsite/onsiteconsequences;Potential forfacility damage;Potential forshuttle cardamage;Potential to shutdown RHoperations;Potential damageto Robotic arm.

Robot design (device is notstrong enough to penetrate thecanister);Collision detector;Force limiter on swipe arm.


Onsite Worker - 4,4

Offsite - 4,4






Comments

C-57

15. Facility Cask Loaded onto Hoist

15ABC-1 Facility cask toHoist

Same as events8-1 through 8-7in DOE/WIPP-00-2305

NAI

16. Facility Cask Transfer to Disposal Room

16ABCD-1 Facility cask toH.E.R.E.

Same as events9-1 through 9-8 in DOE/WIPP-00-2305

NAI

17. Cask Emplacement in Bore Hole

17ABCD-1 H.E.R.E. toEmplacement

Same as events10-1 through 10-7 in DOE/WIPP-00-2305

NAI

18. CH/RH Interface (covered by DOE/WIPP-00-2305)






Comments

C-58

19. Storage Mode (covered by DOE/WIPP-00-2305)

20. Natural Events

20-1Loss ofconfinement inRH Bay due toseismic event(lid is loose oncask)

Seismic event Potential formajor disruptionof facilityoperations;Potential damageto cask and/orcanister; Potentialbreach of drumsdue to loose casklid in RH Bay;Potential for lossof site utilities;Potential torelease radioactivematerial; Potentialfor fire; Potentialfor explosion;Potential forworker injury orfatality; Potentialfor breach ofdrums; Potentialfor onsite/offsiteconsequences;Potential forfacility workerexposure.

Waste Handling Building isDBE qualified;Crane is DBE qualified;Emergency Response Plan;Recovery Plan; 10-160B Caskdesign - meets DOT Type Bshipping container certificationrequirements;HVAC system shutdownswitch; Hot Cell is DBEqualified.

A-12) Verify theMezzanine designis DBE qualified.


Onsite Worker - 4,3

Offsite - 4,3

Worker injury orfatality couldoccur as theresult of theearthquakealone. Radiologicalimpact wouldlikely beextensive.

20-2 Full facility fire Seismic Potential forbreach of drums;Potential foronsite/offsiteconsequences;Potential forfacility workerexposure.

Waste Handling Building DBEqualified;Crane is DBE qualified;PAR® is DBE qualified;Hot Cell is DBE qualified.


Onsite Worker - 4,3

Offsite - 4,3






Comments

C-59

20-3 Loss ofconfinementdue toTornado.

Tornado Potential forbreach of drumsdue to loose casklid in RH Bay ;Potential foronsite/offsiteconsequences;Potential forfacility workerexposure;Potential fordisruption ofprocessingoperations;Potential to losesite utilities;Potential forworker injury orfatality; Potentialfor fire; Potentialfor explosion;Potential forbreach of drumsin Hot Cell.

Waste Handling Building DBEand DBT qualified;Emergency ResponseProcedures; Recovery Plan;Weather monitored by CMR(Central Monitoring Room); 10-160B Cask design - meetsDOT Type B shippingcontainer certificationrequirements; Hot Cell is DBTqualified.

A-13) Verify shielddoor is DBTqualified.


Onsite Worker - 4,2

Offsite - 4,2

Worker injury orfatality couldoccur as theresult of thetornado.

20-4 Range Fire Lightning;unknownignition sourceGas pipelineexplosion

Potential todisrupt siteoperations;Potential forsmoke to enter themine shaft;Potential forundergroundevacuation;Potential forsmoke to enterfacility buildings;Potential forfacility damage

Emergency ResponseProcedures;Fire break installed;Fire fighting capability;Emergency response team;Fire fighting training;24 hour fire brigade

NAI 2,4 NA Industrialaccident only. Potential for arange fire havinga direct impacton the WHBsuch that aradiologicalrelease wouldoccur is minimal






Comments

C-60

20-5 Cold WeatherNaturalVentilationPressure resultsin changes toair balance(Undergroundventilationsystem)

Cold weathercaused NaturalVentilationPressure (NVP)

Potential todisrupt wastehandlingoperations;Potential to, in theevent of anaccident involvingrelease ofradiologicalmaterial, spreadairbornecontamination tothe environment;Potential to causedeterioration ofbraking andelectronic systemsfor the waste shafthoist duringprolongedexposure to salt;Potential for wasteshaft hoist to fail;Potential forworker injury

Operator training andqualification;Waste shaft hoist systemdesign;Operating procedures;Air balance and flow tests;Shaft pressure monitoring;Alarms to indicate adverse airpressure conditions;WIPP ventilation simulatorused for guidance;Underground ventilationremote monitoring controlsystem (monitors air flows andd/p’s and enable CMR operatorto adjust vortex to controlflow)Mine weather stations tomonitor natural ventilationpressure(temp, relativehumidity and barometricpressure);Isolation of mine splits;Backup power available tooperate fans for flow throughthe panel area

NAI 3,4 NA There would beno radiologicalhazard as theresult of the coldweather NVPevent unlessthere wasalreadycontaminationpresent in themine. Injury toworker related toindustrial miningsafety.






Comments

C-61

20-6 Hot WeatherNaturalVentilationPressure resultsin changes toair balance(Undergroundventilationsystem)

Hot weathercaused NaturalVentilationPressure (NVP)


Operator training andqualification;Waste shaft hoist systemdesign;Preventative maintenanceprocedures;Air balance and flow tests;Monitoring at bulkhead 309;Bulkhead 309 design topressurize the chamberbetween the walls of the 309bulkhead using fans;Procedures to maintaindifferential pressures in themine;WIPP ventilation simulatorused for guidance;Underground ventilationremote monitoring controlsystem (monitors air flows andd/p’s and enables CMRoperator to adjust vortex tocontrol flow)Mine weather stations tomonitor natural ventilationpressure(temp, relativehumidity and barometricpressure);Isolation of mine splits;Backup power available tooperate fans for flow throughthe panel area;Alarms to indicate adverse airpressure conditions

NAI 3,4 NA There would beno radiologicalhazard as theresult of the hotweather NVPevent unlessthere wasalreadycontaminationpresent in themine. Injury toworker related toindustrial miningsafety.






Comments

C-62

21. Common Events

21-1 Loss of Facilityventilation

Human error-ImproperbulkheadalignmentEquipmentfailure -Failureof exhaust fans;Loss of electricalpower;Loss ofcompressed air


Worker training; Ventilationsystem operating procedures;Preventive MaintenanceProgram for ventilation systemequipment;Redundant Exhaust fans;Evacuation plan;Backup diesel generators;Redundant air compressors


21-2 Loss of power NPH -Earthquake,tornado,lightning, highwinds, etc.;Vehicle impact;Power fromcommercialsupplier is lost

Potential loss offilteredventilation;Potential loss ofhoist

Backup diesel generators;Redundant power feeds;Response procedures; Workertraining; Fail-safe design ofcranes, hoist.







Comments

C-63

21-3 Loss of FireProtection(includesdetection andsuppression)

NPH;Loss of 180,000gallon fire waterstorage tanks

Potential inabilityto detect andsuppress fires

Design and construction of firesuppression system;Two on-site fire water storagetanks containing 180,000gallons (One storage tankcapacity sufficient for DBF);Two fire pumps, one electricaland one diesel, available; On-site fire truck and fire fightingequipmentAll fire related systems,training, inspection, andtesting are in accordance toNFPA (National FireProtection Association) andNEC regulationsInspections and functionaltests of system performed on aperiodic basis24 hour battery backup for firedetection system available inWHB;24 hour fire brigade

NAI NA NA Ranking wouldbe significantonly if therewere a fire eventand the detectionand suppressionsystems wereinoperative. Otherwise, lossof the detectionand suppressionsystems has noimpact.

21-4 Loss of PlantAir

NPH; Loss ofpower;Mechanicalfailure

Unable toopen/close CURshield door;Facility downtime.

Interlock between CUR shielddoor and grapple preventsmovement of waste whileshield door is open.

NAI NA NA Shield door failsas is during aloss of plant air.

If shield door isopen upon lossof plant air, waste can not bemoved with thegrapple due tothe interlock. Nohazardouscondition exists,therefore, on aloss of plant air.






Comments

C-64

21-5 Loss of Facilityheating causesloss ofshielding viaHot Cellwindows

Loss of power;Mechanicalfailure

Potential forfacility workerexposure.

Preventive MaintenanceProgram on Facility heating;Redundant ventilation trains(design);10-stage sequence heater;Emergency management lossof power;Drums on floor stacked 1-highare below streaming path;Training and procedures.


Onsite Worker -NA

Offsite - NA

Note: Below 50degrees formonths(extended periodof time). Loss ofcooling is not aproblem -temperature willnot go below 50degrees due toheat sink of thebuilding.

22. External Events

22-1 AircraftCrashes IntoWHB

Personnel error;Equipmentfailure

Potential formajor damage to WHB;Potential for fire;Potential forworker injury orfatality;Potential formajor release ofradioactivematerial;Potential forconsiderableradiologicalexposure topersonnel

Physical location of site isremote;Air space above facility is notpart of normal flight patterns;Physical size of WHB


Onsite Worker - 4,1

Offsite - 4,1

This eventwould havemajorradiological andnon-radiologicalimpact. However, theevent is beyondextremelyunlikely anddoes not requireaccidentanalysis. Worker injury orfatality couldresult from thisindustrialaccident




Comments

C-65

22-2 Gas PipelineExplosion

Loss of pipeintegrity, sparkNatural gasexplosion;Range Fire

Potential for fire;Potential for off-site personnelinjury or fatality;Potentialenvironmentalconcern;Potential to stopsite operations

WHB is located one mile fromnearest pipeline. Damageradius from recent explosionsis a few hundred feet

NAI 2,4 NA Risk associatedwith this event issimilar to that ofthe generalpublic,furthermore thenearest gaspipeline isapproximatelyone (1) milefrom siteboundary.

22-3 Vehicle crashfrom CH to theRH Bay(Forkliftcrashes throughthe roll updoor)

Human error;Mechanicalfailure

Potential to loseDP between RHBay and CH Bay;Potential forfacility damage;Potential forpersonnel injury(see WIPP SAR).

Training and procedures;Preventive MaintenanceProgram on CH/RH vehicles;Design of forklift (dead manswitch);Design of lid;Design of cask.


WIPP RH PSAR DOE/WIPP-DRAFT-3174 APPENDIX C

C-66 January 23, 2003

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Documents

APPENDIX - C HAZOP SESSION SUMMARY TABLES...APPENDIX - C HAZOP SESSION SUMMARY TABLES WIPP RH PSAR DOE/WIPP-03-3174 APPENDIX C Table 1- 72B HAZOP Table C-2 January 23, 2003 Study Node