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THERE seems to be broad agreement among certain political
quarters that the power sharing
arrangement in Zimbabwe has been but a national disaster. This
is a view regularly articulated at
home and abroad even by some of the key leaders in the coalition
arrangement, the Government of
National Unity.
However, despite its seemingly dismal performance, the coalition
government has helped prevent
further politically-motivated violence, stabilised the country
economically and prevented inevitable
national implosion.
Zimbabwe witnessed improvement in a number of key health, social
and other development
indicators. From the start, the coalition partners appreciated
the arrangement was transitional; a
short-term agreement to enable the country to enjoy respite from
some of its challenges.
However, the transitional arrangement should not be used to
stifle Zimbabwes return to full
democratic normality. One of the critical ingredients to the
return to full democracy is prevention
and mitigation of politically-motivated electoral violence in
all its varied forms before and after
elections.
Factors that initiate, fuel and maintain the vicious cycle of
political violence are multifaceted,structural, intersecting and
systemic. For the coalition arrangement to come to a sustainable
end,
the country needs to conduct credible elections within a
reasonable timeframe.
However, elections are by their nature an uncertain and
competitive political process. When political
stakes are high, as in the case of Zimbabwe,
politically-motivated violence tends to dominate the
electoral process. The political landscape in the country,
before and after Independence, has largely
remained fraught with intolerance and hostility to diverse
political opinions and free debate.
Before Independence the Rhodesian armed forces, law enforcement
apparatus, civil service and all
state machinery were highly partisan and rallied blindly behind
the Rhodesian Front.
On the other hand, during the war the key liberation movements
experienced an ugly struggles
within the struggle scenario that unfortunately spilled into
post-Independent Zimbabwe. The ugly
consequence of this intolerance has done more harm to the
country and has served but one purpose
sullying the sacrifices of our heroic freedom fighters.
Political violence leads to loss of life, property, and
fracturIsation of families, communities and
permanent disruption to traditional safety nets. Despite the
ugly consequences of political violence,
it seems Zimbabwe is not adequately prepared to deal with
another potential wave of electorally-
motivated violence.
Political violence in general and electoral violence in
particular is predominantly a reflection of
widespread poverty and lack of social services, catastrophic
unemployment levels and depleted trust
in public institutions.
In the past, political violence in Zimbabwe and elsewhere in
Africa involved use of brute physical
force, threats and intimidation. The violence tended to be
largely but not exclusively, targeted at
potential candidates, electoral officials or objects of the
electoral process like ballot boxes and
facilities. It also entailed harassment, breaking up of
opposition meetings and denying smaller
political parties access to state resources.
Currently, for most politicians in the coalition government,
politics and contestation for political
office is largely a life and death situation.
As some analysts have observed, violence during elections,
whether perpetrated by the incumbent,
opponents, or both, is a clear sign of weak institutionalisation
of the African state and fragmented
identity of the nation.Violence is perpetrated by both the
incumbent political leaders as well as by oppositional actors. It
is
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not the proportion or degree that matters, but the fact that in
Zimbabwe, for example, violence has
been and continues to be promoted covertly and overtly by all
political actors. An impartial,
pluralistic and capacitated media would play an important role
in critically analysing political
statements and exposing politicians salivating for hate
language.
It is most unfortunate that key political actors in the country
seem to have perfected their talents for
using violence-packed language; language that promotes
disharmony, hatred and enmity.
Political violence in Zimbabwe is initiated and galvanised
particularly by the political elite who want
to hold on or attain political power whatever the cost.
Zimbabweans of divergent political persuasions should look
forward to a time when electoral
violence cannot be used as a weapon to gain power or when
political disputes would be settled
amicably.
The state has the responsibility of protecting all its citizens
regardless of their political views. Police
need to always act in a non-partisan and professional manner by
avoiding selective application of
the law.
Violence weakens national cohesion, increases national
inequalities and disparities, fuels suspicion,degrades the
reputations of citizens at home and abroad, depletes national pride
and
innovativeness, feeds braindrain, widens the horizons of
impunity and ultimately depresses voter
turnout as well as participation in democratic processes.
Paul van Tongeren and Kai Brand Jacobson provide an interesting
framework useful in enhancing
understanding, preventing and mitigating electoral violence in
Zimbabwe. Critical ingredients of the
framework are the need to ensure that any underlying causes of
electoral violence are mapped. The
mapping should begin at least 24 to 48 months before elections.
They also suggest that at all levels
in a country, there should be a time-tested, coherent
infrastructure for peace and mediation.
The two electoral experts say social media should be harnessed
with a view to raising national
awareness on the cost of violence, its long-term impact as well
as reporting incidents of electoral
irregularities as they occur. They recommend that adequate and
comprehensive electoral training
should be provided to members of the police and other security
services to enable them to respond
non-violently to incidents of political violence.
The role of law enforcement agencies before, during and after
elections is to prevent violence,
provide intelligence and investigate such incidences whenever
they occur and to apprehend
offenders and hand them over for prosecution.
The judiciary needs to be effective, impartial and reliable. To
combat impunity, the judiciary should
not only be seen to be dispensing predictable justice, but
should also work in sync with other state
organs, civic actors, national level actors and even
international judiciary mechanisms.
The electoral management body should be robust and prompt in
dealing with electoral complaints
and act in an impartial manner. Simultaneously, the question of
impunity has to be aggressively
tackled at all levels beginning with leaders of all political
parties, candidates and other stakeholders,
cascading to the lowest levels.
The approach to permanently dealing with political violence
should entail multi-agency, multi-
sectoral and multi-level strategies. Dealing with political
violence without dealing with other forms
of violence endemic in our schools, institutions of higher
learning, families and communities would
be a waste of scarce national resources.
Raising violence awareness and training should be mainstreamed
in the school curriculum, training
of armed forces, the police and all tertiary institutions so
that there is a ubiquitous understanding ofviolence, its forms,
manifestations and mitigation. This is how violence can be stemmed
and
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stamped out.
Madzikanga is a Zimbabwean academic. He writes in his personal
capacity. E-mail:
[email protected]
