Political Violence Final Draft

8/2/2019 Political Violence Final Draft

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Political Outcomes

Tactics of Islamic Opposition Groups

Larry Anthony

[email protected]

Expected to graduate in December 2012

Major in Political Science and HistoryMinor in Arabic

mailto:[email protected]





1

-Intro-

At the beginning of the year 2011, the Arab world witnessed an unprecedented measure

that took scholars and the world by surprise. The overthrow of the Tunisian‟s dictator and the

spillover to its neighbor Egypt led to what would be termed the “Arab Spring”. Fed up with

corruption, high unemployment rates, inflation and complete neglect of individual freedoms

these governments were toppled by mostly peaceful means. This was not the first time in the

Arab world that revolution of one sort or another occurred. Several revolutions occurred after

WWII, throwing off the shackles of years of colonial rule. Many of the uprisings had similar

elements that led to the initial ousting of the puppet governments that were installed by Western

colonial powers. Largely the Arab world was swallowed up by military coups. The 1952

revolution in Egypt was led by General Gamal Abdul Nasser against the monarchy of King

Farouk. The factors that led to the coup were the role of the nation in the Middle East, liberal

movements, tensions between the military and the government and the tactics of the country‟s

opposition groups. The components involved with the 2011 uprising were almost identically the

same.

By comparing the post-colonial revolution of 1952 against King Farouk and the “Arab

Spring”, what was the outcome or outcomes that set these two events apart? With the ousting of

King Farouk in 1952 there was a notion of a United Arab Republic propagated by Abdul Nasser

but the ideology of Pan-Arabism did not come to full fruition. Instead what occurred was the

rise of a series of dictators that ruled by corruption within the government that led to the

repression of the country‟s people. The people‟s revolution in Tahrir Square again brought the

hope of real change in the region, which spread like wildfire at the wake of the toppling of the

government in Tunisia. The tactics of opposition groups have impacted and shaped the

outcomes of many of the region‟s revolutions. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt specifically



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played a part in both revolutions. Did the tactics used in either the revolution of 1952 or the

uprising of 2011 have a significant effect on the political outcome? Does the outcome of

revolutions differ with the shift in tactics used by opposition groups?

-Literature Review-

Tarek Osman‟s book, Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak and Steven A.

Cook‟s book, The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square, covers the key elements

that lead to political revolutions. The liberal movement according to Osman, “…incorporated a

commitment to capitalism — from respect for private ownership to free trade and open markets.

The accumulated wealth and the emergence of a …middle class... [resulted] for the first

time…[in] active social groups [that were] detached from any religious or political backing.”1

Osman and Cook outline these key elements, liberal movements, government/military relations,

nation‟s role in the Middle East and tactics of opposition groups, that contributed to the rise of

the Middle East revolutions. In regards to Islam and the opposition groups, Osman and Cook

craft the unique elements of these groups and the tactics used. Cook comments that, “The issue

of Islam and politics is deeply controversial…in which concepts like jihad, salafism, and

Wahhabism have become familiar, if not entirely well-understood, terms for many. Yet it is

important to underscore that Islam is a critically important cultural and political touchstone that

has helped shape Egypt and the modern Middle East.”2 To understand the development of

political society in the Middle East there is no way feasibly to side step the influence of Islam.

Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam, and Democracy, tackles the issue of Islamism, its

spread and appeal to the youth. The wealth disparity and the mobilization of the youth are

important components of the tactics executed by Islamic opposition groups. Ibrahim warns in



3

his essay that, “The Islamic factor in all this should be studied with deserved care. It should not,

however, be exaggerated, mystified, or metaphysicalized. The majority of American specialists

on the Middle East who subscribed to „modernization‟ theories in the 1950s and 1960s have

tended to ignore Islam as a salient social force.”3 Islamic opposition groups easily recruit the

mobilization of the youth and wealth disparities between social classes. When societies ignore

the lower rungs within it opposition groups serve as an outlet for action and the prospect of real

change when no other viable resource is available. Ibrahim writes, “The most adversely affected

by this state of affairs have been the young and ambitious members of the lower-middle

class…As this substratum and the lumpenproletariat have grown in size and have become more

disenfranchised, Islamic activism has also grown in size and propensity for violence.”4

As Saad

Ibrahim describes here the tendency towards violence that exists when fringe segments of

Islamic groups should be looked at further. The inclination towards violence is one tactic, but as

research shows a change in tactics must take place in order to have a more direct effect on the

political outcome.

Mona El-Ghobashy in her article, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim

Brotherhood” , addresses this shift in tactics taken by Islamic opposition groups. El-Ghobashy

argues, “The fevered attention accorded Islamist groups by Western policymakers, Arab state

elites, and some academics exaggerates their perceived threat (to democracy, Western interests,

stability, or „national identity‟) and organizational capabilities and includes clear thinking on

how they are shaped by their institutional political environment.”5

The change in tactics and the

role adapted by Islamic opposition groups as political actors, as further explained by El-

Ghobashy, in the course of this paper will be analyzed to predict the political outcome of

revolutions.



4

After looking at the change in tactics of Islamic opposition groups from tactics used to

overthrow the government to that of integrating them into the political realm, this paper will

examine the implications of their participation in the political realm. Scholars such as Michael

Rubin author of “The Road to Tahrir Square”, John R. Bradley author of “Arabian Nightmare” ,

and Eric Trager author of “The Unbreakable Muslim Brotherhood: Grim Prospects for a Liberal

Egypt”, argue that Islamic opposition groups can have no decisive role in the promotion of

democracy. Bradley states that Islamist groups really do not want power, but instead “what they

need is a government sufficiently biddable to allow them to impose their cultural tyranny — and

to succeed, they don‟t need majority support. All the Islamists require is to be louder, more

forceful and better organized than their opponents.”6

Bradley argues in his piece that instead

what will occur is another theocracy in a region ripe for the permanency of Islamic fascism. 7

Dietrich Jung‟s “Unrest in the Arab World”, Tariq Ramadan‟s “The Arab Revolution”

and Nathan J. Brown and Amr Hamzawy‟s “Arab Spring Fever” support the idea of the political

necessity of Islamic opposition groups. Brown and Hamzawy state that semi authoritarian

regimes have allowed for some level of participation in the political sphere. The authors‟

comment, “Opposition groups have been allowed to operate and participate in legal politics.

And even if opposition groups are often divided between weak armchair secular movements and

more broadly based but less clearly democratic Islamist movements, they have still been able to

gradually expand their representation in the political process.”8 The switch in tactics of one of

political participation from tactics of violence will in fact affect the political outcome of

revolutions.

Jung, Brown and Ramadan‟s articles deal with the support of the United States and the

West. Support from the United States and the West can significantly affect the tactics of Islamic



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opposition groups. With the cooperative support of Western powers and effort to be inclusive,

the participation of these groups in politics will in time produce a political outcome of fair

democracy that is conducive to the aims and temper Anti-Western sentiment. On the other hand,

according to the authors Rubin, Bradley and Tager, the complete withdrawal of support and

keeping the Islamic opposition groups at arms-length will fuel negative sentiment and will

continue to flame hostilities to the West and America. This will also result in the change in a

political outcome. What I hope to show is that the changing role of Islamic groups into the realm

of public policy will in fact nurture some form of free government, and that in the end the United

States will need to reach out with a supporting role.

From the literature sources mentioned above I derived the elements that led to the 1952

revolution and the uprising of 2011 in Egypt. These factors or elements are the same in both

scenarios. The tactics of opposition groups, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, I believe is the

deciding variable that shaped the political outcomes of the 1952 revolution, the tactic of

violence, though not publically supported was championed by the Egyptian army in their coup

against the monarchy that aided in destabilizing the existing regime. After the coup, the new

government led by Abdul Nasser outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood. Finding themselves

isolated the Muslim Brotherhood entered into the Egyptian political sphere. The premise of the

study will demonstrate that the switch in tactics from one of violence to one of political

engagement will in fact result in a political outcome different from the one seen in 1952‟s coup.

The political outcome that I am predicting is one of profound democratic change in the region.



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-Theory-

The two case studies mentioned above will shed light on how the tactics of the Muslim

Brotherhood will affect or have affected the political outcomes of the revolutions. To understand

each case this paper will examine both the variables that were favorable to the military coup of

1952 and the elements that led to the uprising of 2011 or the “Arab Spring.” The struggle of

wills between the government and the military on economics and politics is decisive. The

military is a separate entity and has its own hierarchical structure. This is an interesting scenario

where the regional government has no authority over the mechanisms of the military. Due to the

fact that the military does not answer to a civilian official such as seen in most Western countries

coups are easily devised if relations between the government and the military sour. The liberal

movements serve as another factor. This plays in with the role of modernity in the regions and

whether the government in power champions or rallies against such movements that promote

capitalism and aspects of Western culture that call for reform. The testable or independent

variable is the tactics of opposition groups. Political participation, violent acts conducted by

groups on the fringe and whether or not Western powers support their new role in the emerging

government will shape the final outcome. Opposition groups are affected by other variables that

have a direct or indirect result in the tactics used (i.e. the nation‟s role in the Middle East or

nationalism). Additionally opposition groups have the ability to use elements such as wealth

disparity and disenfranchised youth for recruitment which will affect political outcomes that

resulted from revolutions. Specifically the tactics of the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots

will be analyzed to determine the political outcomes that will either arise in some form of

functioning democracy or lead in to another authoritarian regime.



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The flow chart below demonstrates the variables (liberal movements,

government/military relations, nation‟s role in the Middle East and tactics of opposition groups)

that led to the revolutions of 1952 and 2011. Each variable will be discussed and will be shown

its relevancy to the revolutions. The three variables under tactics of opposition groups (the effect

of nationalism, wealth disparity, and the mobilization of the youth) have an effect on the tactics

that opposition groups' use and this will be explored when discussing their tactics.

Liberal Movements

Nation's Role in the Middle East

Government/Military Relations

Tactics of OppositionGroups

•The effect of nationalism

•Wealth Disparity

•Mobilization of the Youth

Military Coup of 1952/ 2011 Uprising (TheArab Spring)



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-Liberal Movements-

Modernity is the ingredient that propels liberal movements. Liberation of a nation‟s

economics opens up to free markets and international trade. With this results the flow of money

and the rise of a middle class. Wealth begins to further develop society and the people want

more participation in the political process. The increase of wealth in a country results in the

population in the rural areas to move to the city in search for opportunity. The open market also

brings in new ideas and life styles. Different expressions start to appear in the media, the arts,

education and the political process. The import of consumer goods is not the only thing that

arrives into the country but also alternative views on the political process. Political and social

groups form. Either these groups find their way into mainstream politics or people begin to call

for reform. In turn if demands are not met violence and opposition is stirred up. If the people

feel that they are not being heard or the government resorts to repressive strategies violence can

occur.

-Nation’s Role in the Middle East-

Hegemonic status or the lack thereof plays a significant factor in the outcome of national

revolutions. The Middle East is a region that has lacked a strong leader that has stepped to the

front to pave the way for other nations. The approach that political groups and the government

may take on hegemonic status can diverge. The direction that any particular groups or

politicians wish to go with a nation‟s supremacy within a region can lead to uneasy tensions and

schisms may occur.



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-Government/Military Relations-

The military in the Middle East plays an interesting role in the region. A country‟s

military usually consists of its own structural authority and does not answer to any civilian

politician in the government. The military stands as an entity on its own. If the military

perceives that the government is taking the country down a road that is not favorable to its future

or its people then the leading officers may stand in opposition and attempt to thwart the goals of

the politicians. If the government refuses to change its political aims the military can take

matters into its own hands and remove the government in power.

-Tactics of Opposition Groups-

An interesting aspect in the Middle East region is the presence of religious opposition

groups. The role of Islam in the Middle East has great influence over the hearts and minds of its

adherents and can shape the policies of the heads of state. Tactics of Islamic opposition groups

can have a dramatic effect on the political outcome of revolutions. Opposition groups have

resulted in the use of violence against what they perceived as a threat to Islamic norms or

practices. In some cases the consequences can be varied, either the government has given in to

their demands or met with the same forceful opposition in return.

Forceful reprisal has not been the only means in which the government has used and

political measures have been implemented as well where certain opposition groups are outlawed

completely. Tactics of Islamic opposition groups have the ability to shape all other factors

presented in this model. The tactics that Islamic opposition groups have used has been violence

in order to persuade a government/ regime to change political policies and recently the shift to

political participation in order to have a more direct means to influence policy. These strategies



10

contrived have variables that have a direct or indirect impact such as the effect of nationalism,

wealth disparity and the mobilization of the youth. Their tactics is the variable that will be

examined and it is the difference in tactics of these opposition groups that can affect the future of

the political situation of a country.

-Case of the 1952 Revolution-

Prior to the coup of 1952, Egypt was still wrangling over the last remaining remnants of

British occupation. Osman comments, “Egyptians had traditionally been compelled to accept

whatever political and cultural orientation was forced upon them; now they were taking the lead

in choosing their society‟s identity, direction and frame of reference.”9

Osman continues, “The

emerging Egyptiansim was an amalgamation of the views of spirited movements, political

leaders, activist groups and clandestine cells, all trying to shape a fluid situation.”10 This wave

of change brought about the influx of many of the factors that would make Egypt ripe for

revolution. The decaying Ottoman Caliphate and the emerging ethnical identities of its

providences that the Empire once held sway was also diminishing.11 This gave Egypt an

interesting position to the rest of the region of the Middle East because Egypt served as the

gateway to Europe. Osman states that, “The modernization and exposure to Europe…led to

sophisticated political thinking which aimed to install democracy and true representation in

Egypt.”12 The drafting of the 1923 constitution set up the monarchy as a constitutional one with

a functioning parliament.13

Egypt became the first independent nation with a working

constitutional government.14 Egypt began serving as a beacon for change in the Middle East that

had been under colonial rule for years to one of a region independent ready to stand on its own

and seen as a potential regional hegemony.



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Al-Wafd, Egypt‟s dominant political party represented the liberal views that were

prevailing across the landscape of a new Egypt.15 Al-Wafd found itself with uneasy tensions

with the Palace of the ruling family of Muhammad Ali that had been established in 1801 with

permission of the Ottoman Caliph in Istanbul, Turkey.16 The tension was a result of upholding

the 1923 constitution.17

Osman describes, “The new political system [was] not perfect, but it did

introduce genuine constitutionalism, political pluralism, cross-class participation in the political

process and enshrined democracy and civil freedoms.”18 Tensions had mounted between the

Palace and the Egyptian army over political involvement in the appointment of members to the

board of directors of the Officer‟s Club, which is exclusively a military function. This

disagreement and the benevolence by the Al-Wafd on the issue became “a symbol of a wider

contest over Egypt‟s political future.”19

The rise of Islamic groups such as the Salafis, the establishment of the Muslim

Brotherhood and attempts at Al-Azhar (Islamic University in Cairo) to put forth a more forward

looking approach to Islam were several examples of the growth of Islamic groups in the region

and Egypt in particular.20 Established in 1926 by Sheikh Hassan al Banna, the Muslim

Brotherhood became the dominant Islamic group in Egypt.21 The decision for the Brotherhood

to resort to violence occurred after WWII but the arming of the Brotherhood occurred during the

full scale of the war with the full knowledge of the Egyptian army through then Second

Lieutenant Anwar Sadat.22 After the establishment of Israel, al Banna declared jihad against the

new state of Israel in 1948. Under Egypt‟s Prime Minister Nuqrashi, he declared the Muslim

Brotherhood illegal in November of that same year on the accusation that the Brotherhood was

attempting an “imminent revolution”.23

The Brotherhood then resorted to the tactics of violence

and key members in Nuqrashi‟s government were assassinated,”…there was random violence



12

against British personnel and interests, and two Cairo cinemas were bombed…”24

The back and

forth fighting between the Egyptian government and the Muslim Brotherhood resulted in the

murder of Prime Minster Nuqrashi and Brotherhood founder al Banna.25

The political instability

in Egypt, the military defeat in Palestine in 1948 and the underhanded dealings between the

Muslim Brotherhood and the army became apparent.26

General Gamal Abdul Nasser seized the

opportunity and with public support threw down the monarchy, dissolved parliament and

established military rule.27

Relations between the new Egyptian government under Nasser and the Muslim

Brotherhood went south over the motives of the Officer‟s Club in the coup. Nasser went on a

massive propaganda campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood and a failed assassination

attempt on Nasser by Brotherhood member Abdel Latif was the final nail in the coffin. 28 Cook

writes that, “For the remainder of the Nasser period, the Brothers were either underground or

imprisoned. In the short run, this rendered the Islamists a relative nonfactor in Egyptian politics,

but the showdown between the Officers and the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954 and the subsequent

consolidation of the regime would have a profound impact on Egyptian politics for decades to

come.”29 The relationship between the two groups was over and Nasser took all means

necessary to dispose of the Brotherhood all together.

The tactic of committing acts of violence in fact turned against the Muslim Brotherhood.

Once seen as a force for reform and change, the Muslim Brotherhood had resorted to

paramilitary tactics and the military they aided in installing to power turned against them. The

same violence that was used to topple and destabilize the previous government when turned on

Abdul Nasser himself nearly brought a devastating blow to the Brotherhood‟s existence. The

political outcome was seen as one of reform but violence begets violence and one regime bent on



13

achieving its own self-centered interests through that medium can only bring a country into the

grips of a tyrant.

The historical reference to 1952‟s revolution is to show the factors in play that brought

about the coup‟s inception and execution. The role of violent tactics that were used by the

Muslim Brotherhood demonstrated the negative outcomes of their effects, the Brotherhood was

branded an outlaw organization and the political outcome was one of a semi authoritarian

regime. Understanding the role of each element will lead into the scenario that led to the

2011uprising. The next section will discuss the tactics used and the shift of tactics to one of non-

violence by opposition groups.

-A Change in Tactics-

Before looking at the change of tactics of the Muslim Brotherhood, I will consider the

factors that influence the tactics of Islamic opposition groups as well as the fringe element.

Recruitment strategies are focused amongst students and recent university graduates.30 Ibrahim

states,

In the absence of a credible, secular national vision, and effective means to repel external

encroachment, Islamic movements exert a strong attraction. To enhance the present and

future socioeconomic prospects of the middle and lower classes, and to galvanize theimagination of the educated youth and give them a sense of being essential parts of a

grand design, Islamic militancy offers the alternative.31

Islamic groups provide the avenue that society in the Middle East lacks and the strong emphasis

on religion in the region makes the appeal to such groups favorable. The influence that the youth

and wealth disparity can have on tactics of Islamic opposition groups vary. The conditions that

were prime for violent means taken by the Brotherhood were the presence of a foreign power,

“soaring migration from rural areas to serve the war efforts of the Allies, rising inflation,



14

immediate postwar unemployment [which] all contributed to wide-spread social discontent.”32

The Muslim Brotherhood thus served as a channel for this overwhelming vexation. As the 1952

coup proved the violence that was used brought the Brotherhood‟s near elimination. The

nation‟s role in the Middle East saw prospects for the establishment of a true Shariah model of

government in the region. Egypt establishing itself as a hegemony in the region giving

motivation to Islamic opposition groups that the country will be the example of how an

functioning Islamic state should appear and set the example for other countries in the Middle

East to adopt their model. The role of nationalism is viewed by Islamists, the Muslim

Brotherhood being no exception, as negative and is preached against.

Saad Eddin Ibrahim states that the tactics of the Muslim Brother occurred in three phases.

First was advocacy and organization building during the period of the late 1920s to the 1940s. 33

Second was the phase of violence used by the Muslim Brotherhood during the monarchy and

into Nasser‟s revolution.34

The third phase started in the 1970s and extends to the present day.

This is the phase or tactic of political participation. Ibrahim states that, “It was this latter phase

which caused several splits in the Muslim Brotherhood. The splinter groups were to extend and

continue their violent confrontations with the state and/or society over the last two decades.”35

The Muslim Brotherhood has distanced itself from the agendas of these violent factions whose

main objective is to sever the head of the regime and bring it down completely.36

The Muslim

Brotherhood‟s aim is to change the political structure from the inside out and not by revolution.

The Brotherhood‟s introduction into politics was not through direct elections at first. The

Nasser government and following the regime of Anwar Sadat had outlawed the Brotherhood but

some tolerance was shown. Ghobashy states that,

The thaw in state-[Brotherhood] relations begun under Sadat continued under the regime

of Husni Mubarak, but there was no question of legalizing the Muslim Brothers, only de



15

facto toleration. Not content to assert their presence merely through their newsletter…or

financial social welfare activities, the [Brotherhood] began to develop the sedulouselectioneering strategy that would become a centerpiece of their self-preservation.37

An alliance was formed by the popular party Al-Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood in 1984.

The Brotherhood served as a popular base for the Wafd party. In turn, Al-Wafd served as the

political outlet for the Brotherhood.38

The Muslim Brotherhood officially entered into the

political arena and was making huge gains in the Egyptian government.

-Case of the “Arab Spring”-

The phenomenon of the “Arab Spring” has baffled scholars. No one predicted the fall of

Hosni Mubarak ‟s regime. To understand the factors at work that sparked the uprising are

similar to the 1952 revolution I will examine the roles of liberal movements, the nation‟s role in

the Middle East, government/military relations and the tactics of opposition groups in the context

of their historical unraveling that led to the movement in Tahrir Square. The elections of 2010 of

the People‟s Assembly showed growing dissatisfaction with the politics of the day.39 The

elements that led to the ousting of the regime under Mubarak is in all actuality discontent over

the military coup of 1952.40 Cook states, “They revolted against a regime…that Mubarak

inherited from Sadat who had inherited it from Nasser. It was a system that was founded in the

ideological and power politics of the early 1950s, when the Free Officers discovered they could

dispose of their opponents through undemocratic laws, rules, regulations, and decrees.”41 The

increase on the price of food, the corruptive practices by Mubarak‟s dominant political party (the

National Democratic Party), the rigged elections of the Shura and People‟s Assembly elections,

according to scholars, may or may not have had a hand in the 2011 uprising.42



16

Interesting to note is the minimum involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood and their

tactics in the uprisings. Cook writes that, “As for the Brotherhood, there was no evidence at all

that they were behind the uprising. Rather, they were behind the curve, only committing

themselves to the protests on Friday the twenty-eight — three days after the demonstrations

began.”43

The protests were rife with members of the political opposition; the National

Association for Change, Kifaya!, April 6 Youth, the Wafd, The Tagammu, Nasserists, Ayman

Nour‟s al Ghad and including the Muslim Brotherhood.44 What this represents is a more

inclusive political opposition instead of violent tactics used against the regime. The people

poured into Tahrir Square as a united people speaking with one voice.

The liberal movements involved were the protests themselves. Many diverse groups of

the opposition showed up in mass to protest the elections of the People‟s Assembly in which

Mubarak‟s political party, the NDP, received the majority of the vote.45 As the protests moved

to Tahrir square the involvement of the military was one of keeping peace, but as the numbers of

protestors swelled and as the protests turned violent when pro-Mubarak supporters entered Tahrir

Square the army decided that security and stability were at stake, the military aligned on the side

of the protestors.46 The nation‟s role in the region is not clearly mentioned in the sources but it

must be understood that Egypt has been the leading hegemony for decades but the movement of

the “Arab Spring” was the movement of the people not of a particular group or organization.

The tactics of the Islamic opposition groups were lest noticeable in the 2011 uprising. The

Muslim Brotherhood took its place amongst other opposition groups in the protests and after the

protests had begun. The violent Islamic factions over time have had no significant sway in the

years following the decision of the Muslim Brotherhood to enter the political arena. At most

they are seen as a nuisance and distanced by the Muslim Brotherhood. What can be concluded in



17

the political outcomes that can be ascertained by the tactics of the Muslim Brotherhood in wake

of the “Arab Spring” is one of a passive approach. The movement was completely spurned by

the unrest of the people and the burning desire for change.

-Implications and Conclusions-

From looking at the two case studies of the revolution of 1952 and the People‟s Uprising

in 2011 it can be seen that tactics used by Islamic opposition groups have some effect on

political outcomes but marginal at best. The study shows that Islamic opposition groups are not

the sole factor to determine political outcomes after revolutions but works in concert with the

factors of liberal movements, the nation‟s role in the Middle East and government/military

relations. The government/military relations‟ element was the decisive element in the 1952

revolution. The Egyptian army under Abdul Nasser used the other factors including the violent

tactics of the Muslim Brotherhood to take advantage of the instability of the monarchy and

government that led to his successful coup. In the case of the “Arab Spring” the role of the

Muslim Brotherhood toke a significant backseat. The liberal movements seen in the

mobilization of other political opposition groups is the driving force of the toppling of Hosni

Mubarak‟s regime.

Understanding the role or the lack thereof by Islamic opposition groups, many scholars

are trying to predict the future political outcome of Egypt. Eric Trager comments that the

Muslim Brotherhood is to run its candidates “in just under half of all constituencies.”47

Trager

continues, “[Since the outlawing of the Mubarak‟s political party the National Democratic Party

in April of 2011], no other party will have anything close to the network of committed supporters

that the Muslim Brotherhood has.”48 Michael Rubin and Eric Trager gave a grim pessimistic



18

look at any real future for Egypt as long as the Muslim Brotherhood has any stake in the political

outcome. Rubin explains that the Muslim Brotherhood together with Mubarak was able to crush

out any possibility of true democracy.49

Scholars such as Tariq Ramadan have argued to exasperate the role of the Muslim

Brotherhood only further alienates the West and America from the political dynamics shaping

Egyptian politics. Ramadan writes, “The Muslim Brotherhood must be full partner in the

process of change —and will be, if a minimally democratic state can be established in Egypt.”50

According to Ramadan for the Western powers to shun the Islamists is in fact not heading the

voice of the people on the grounds of “the Islamist threat.”

51

The West and United States in

particular have been the habit of supporting dictators because they serve their interests. The

results of this has not been led to popular appeal in the Middle East to the West which has had a

long history of imperialistic rule in the region. Jung comments that, “Instead of producing series

of articles about the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, we need to know about the potentials of the

countries…Captured by the alleged importance of Islam, many observers have disregarded large

fields of societal interaction in which religion…only plays the role of a dependent variable.”52 In

Brown‟s article, he states that pushing out Islamists is no way to ensure the region is

democratized.53

It is imperative that the United States and the West should show a desire to

strengthen and heal the relationships that it has with the Middle East, for it to support the people

who have struggled so long to have their voice heard and be a true supporter of democracy.

1Tarek Osman, Egypt On The Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak , (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 32-33.

2Steven A. Cook , The Struggle For Egypt: From Nasser To Tahrir Square, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011),

16.3

Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy: Critical Essays, (Cairo: The American University of Cairo Press,

2002), 1.4

Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy, 77.



19

5Mona El-Ghobashy, "The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood," International of Journal of

Middle East Studies, 37, no. 3 (2005): 374.6

Nightmare: Talk Of An 'Arab Spring' for Democracy is Dangerously Premature. An Islamist Takeover of the Middle

East is Just As Likely," The Spectator : 13.7 Nightmare: Talk Of An ‘Arab Spring’ for Democracy is Dangerously Premature, 13.

8

Nathan J. Brown and Amr Hamzawy, "Arab Spring Fever," The National Interest Online: 56,http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.libraries.smu.edu (accessed September 24, 2011).9

Osman, Egypt On The Brink , 27.10

Osman,, Egypt On The Brink, 27.11

Osman, Egypt On The Brink, 26.12

Osman, Egypt On The Brink ,26.13


Osman, Egypt On The Brink , 25-26.15



Osman, Egypt On The Brink, 31.18




, Cook , The Struggle For Egypt: From Nasser To Tahrir Square 27.22

Cook , The Struggle For Egypt: From Nasser To Tahrir Square, 31.23

, Cook , The Struggle For Egypt: From Nasser To Tahrir Square, 35.24




, Cook , The Struggle For Egypt: From Nasser To Tahrir Square 39.28



, Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy, 16.31

, Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy, 27.32

Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy, 25.33Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy, 56.

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