Pipeline Safety Management

UK Operators views on working with the Regulator

Pipeline Safety Management Pipeline Safety Factors which affect pipeline safety Management and Legislation Current & future issues Working with the Regulator

What is Pipeline Safety?

PSR: Purpose is to ensure the safe management and operation of pipelines.MAHPs identify hazards, evaluate risks, systems in place to manage risks at all stages of the life cycle

Safety: risk of pipeline failure must be ALARP. Integrity must ensure pipeline is fit for purpose to meet operational needs with adequate safety margin

Integrity: Quality and condition

PipelineFailures-UK

Yarm - 1971

Bushey Heath - 1984

Palaceknowe - 1993

Pipeline Failures - UK

PipelineFailures-USA

Edison, New Jersey, 1994

Carlsbad, New Mexico, 2000

Greenville, Texas, 2000

Sandy Springs, Georgia, 1998

Pipeline Failures - USA

Pipeline Incident Statistics

Repair 4 0.75

Leaks Major 0.045

Total 0.6 (0.48) 0.33

Ruptures (0.046) 0.011

Casualties 0.16 (0.0) 0.0

IncidentFrequency per 1000km years

Benchmark UKOPA

Overall Incident Frequency

Leaks per 1000 km.yr

Period Egig Ukopa

1970 to 1993 0.57 0.34

1970 to 1998 0.48 0.28

1994 to 1998 0.21 0.06

Pipeline Safety Conclusions:

Pipelines are safe Need to use relevant data to evaluate risks UKOPA database is relevant to UK pipelines Data is sparse, so predictive techniques are required

to predict failure frequency

What Affects Pipeline Safety?

Most Common Failure Mechanisms: Corrosion Fatigue 3rd Party Activity (external interference) Material & construction defects Natural events (ground movement)

UKOPA Fault Database

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UKOPA Fault Database

What affects pipeline safety?

Conclusions: Failure mechanisms are known Risk of Failure must be predicted Management systems must target risk to

ensure it is ALARP

Management and Legislation

Controls for reduction of risk of failure Operator Management Systems Pipeline Safety Legislation

Engineering Management

IntegrityDamage Mechanism

Design Construction

Awareness, information, surveillance andSupervision procedures.

InspectionCond. Monitoring

Pressure Cycle countingInspection

SurveillanceStrain monitoring

O&M

InspectionQATesting

Material/ConstructionDefect

Standards &Specifications

RouteWall thicknessProtectionDepth of cover

3rd Party Activity

CoatingC.P.

InspectionCorrosion

Fatigue S-N Criteria

Special Procedures,Reinstatement

Route, StressGround Movement

PIPELINE SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Hazard Identification

Trainingand

Competencies

HS&ESafetyMngt

Performance Data and Fault Reports

Integrity(Control &

Maintenance)

EngineeringRequirements

RiskEvaluation

Risk Levelsand

Mitigation

I&SRisk

Audit

Roles & Responsibilities / Procedures & Instructions

Accidents and

Incidents

Reviewand

Revise

PIPELINE SAFETY MANAGEMENT

Hazard IdentificationHS(G)65

Trainingand

Competencies

HS&ESafetyMngt

Performance Data and Fault Reports

Integrity(Control &

Maintenance)

RiskEvaluation

Risk Levelsand

Mitigation

Accidents and

Incidents

Reviewand

Revise

Planning &Implementation

EngineeringRequirementsPolicy

Roles & Responsibilities / Procedures & InstructionsOrganising

I&SRiskMonitoring

Audit

Operator Systems

Management Systems

Design OperationInspection

and Maintenance

RecordsEmergencyProcedures

Modifications

Constructionand

Commissioning

Trainingand

Competency

Standards, Specifications, Tech. Procedures, Instructions

PIPELINES SAFETY REGULATIONS 1996MAPD

Safety Management

Management Systems

Design OperationInspection

and Maintenance

RecordsEmergencyProcedures

Constructionand

CommissioningPoliciesand

Procedures

Rolesand

ResponsibilitiesModifications

Trainingand

Competency

Standards, Specifications, Tech. Procedures, Instructions

Audit Arrangements

Management and Legislation Conclusions:

PSR 96 provides a framework to secure the safety of pipelines throughout their life cycle, taking into account different levels of hazard.

PSR 96 provides a goal setting regime which enables selection and development of different approaches to achieve a safety level.

Current and Future IssuesAmendments to PSR 96 (Testing of pipeline emergency plans, absolute vs reasonably practicable duties)EU Pipeline Safety Instrument (LUP legislation, information to the public)

Hence we need an open relationship with the Regulator in order to develop a practical legislative framework which maintains the existing safety record

Working with the Regulator Current and future issues are open to

interpretation There is no established compliance record

So we need: Common understanding Reasonable, practical approach Transparency

Issue: Testing of Pipeline Emergency Plans

Regulator requirements:

Demonstration that plan is adequate

Operator concerns:

Requirements are open to wide interpretation

Joint Work (Operators/LAs/HSE):Define ScopeIdentify preferred method of testingDevelop ACoP

Issue: One Call System

Operator concerns:

Reg 15 is not effective

Regulator requirements:

Compliance with Reg15

Joint Work:Develop effective method to reduce 3rd party hitsDevelop efficient and cost effective implementation routeInvolve all buried service operators

Issue: Pipeline Risk AssessmentOperator concerns:

Not consistent use by all parties of methodologies and data

Regulator requirements:

Validated methodologies and data

Joint Work:Agree consistent and transparent methodologies(risk and ALARP)

Agree use of representative dataAgree transparent criteria

Issue: Land Use PlanningRegulator requirements:

Public safety

Operator concerns:

Decisions not transparent and may not be justified

Joint Work: Risk based consultation zones for all products Transparent, justified inner, middle and outer zones Clear evaluation of allowed/not allowed developments, including risk and economic factors.

Issue: Provision of Information Operator concerns:

What information to whom and how?

Security

Regulator requirements:

Public awareness and safety

Joint Work:Identify information and parties Agree mechanism for provision of informationRecognise security issues

Working with the Regulator Conclusions

MHSC Working Group on Pipelines (WGP) now allows forum for discussion and joint working

WGP Working Party Risk Assessment is developing a programme of work for consideration

HSE provides advice and input to UKOPA Working Groups

Future? Open discussions and joint work to establish agreed/accepted

approaches/methodologies/data for all aspects of pipeline legislation Common understanding of base issues Mutual respect for Regulator and operator positions

Pipeline Safety ManagementPipeline Safety ManagementWhat is Pipeline Safety?Pipeline SafetyWhat Affects Pipeline Safety?What affects pipeline safety?Management and LegislationManagement and LegislationCurrent and Future IssuesWorking with the RegulatorIssue: Testing of Pipeline Emergency PlansIssue: One Call SystemIssue: Pipeline Risk AssessmentIssue: Land Use PlanningIssue: Provision of InformationWorking with the Regulator