Pink - Reply to Goetz

8/12/2019 Pink - Reply to Goetz

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Mind ssociation

Reply to GoetzAuthor(s): Thomas PinkSource: Mind, New Series, Vol. 107, No. 425 (Jan., 1998), pp. 215-218Published by: Oxford University Presson behalf of the Mind Association

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Reply to GoetzTHOMASPINK

According o Goetz,I opposeanIdentityhesisaboutdecisionand nten-tion rationality-andI do sobyclaiming hatdecisionsand ntentions rebothmeans-endustifiable ndpurposive.Goetz'saccountof mywork smisleading.He conflatestwo distinctIdentitytheses:one about whatrationallyjustifiesorming particularntention o act,and he otherabouthowourpsychological tatesmotivateus to forma particularntention oact(see Pink1996,Ch.5 andespeciallyp. 142).The thesis aboutjustifications,J-Identity, ays thatjustifications ornow decidingor intending o do A are identicalwithjustifications ordoingA,whichconsist nturn nthelikelihood hatdoingA wouldfurtherdesirableends E. Thisthesis is opposed o the claimthatdecisions andintentions remeans-endjustifiable,rjustifiedas meansto ends, that s,to theclaimthatdecisionsor intentionso do A are ustifiedby thelikeli-hood thatnowdecidingorintending o doA wouldfurther esirable ndsE. The thesisaboutmotivesor,as I also termthem in thebook,reasons,R-Identity,ays thatthepsychological tatesthatmotivateone to intendto do A are identicalwith those thatwould latermotivateone to do A,which consist nturn n desires orendsE andbeliefs thatdoingA wouldormightfurtherE. This thesis is opposed o theclaimthatdecisionsandintentionsarepurposive,or motivatedas means to ends,thatis, to theclaimthatdecisionsorintentionsodoAaremotivated y desires orendsE combinedwithbeliefs thatnowdecidingorintending o do A would ormightfurther hoseendsE.I now claimthat,with someimportant xceptions,decisionsand nten-tionsaregenerallymotivated on-purposively.utI do claimthatnever-thelessdecisionsand ntentions re neverycasemeans-endustifiable.R-Identitys in mostcasestrue,butJ-Identitys ineverycase false(see Pink1996,Ch.8 andespeciallypp.231-44; alsoPink1997,pp.270-75).Goetzwantsto claim thatdecisionsare notmeans-endustifiable;butthat heyarestillgenerallypurposive.Let us considerhesetwoclaims nturn.It is in fact unclear hatGoetzreallydoesthink hatdecisionsarepur-posiveas I understandurposiveness. orwhat,in Goetz'sview, showsthatdecisionsarepurposives the factthat:Mind, Vol. 107. 425 . January 1998 t Oxford University Press 1998

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216 Thomas Pink[a]sI indicatednthepreviousparagraph,ecisionsaremadeforreasons. p. 212)

But this is to fail to understandhe term purposiveness s I use it:to pickout those occurrences n our lives which arenot only motivated forwhich we not only have our reasons-but which are motivated s meansto ends,bybeliefsastowhatendsthoseoccurrenceshemselveswouldormight further. omeonewho thinks,as I do, thatR-Identity s generallytrue,canaccept hatdecisionsand ntentions remotivated, ndsothatwehaveourreasons orthedecisionswe take.Buttheycan consistently enythatdecisionsorintentions regenerallypurposive.A parallel:desiresto doA canbe formed orreasons,such as on thebasisof desires or endsE andbeliefs abouthowdoingA wouldfurtherE.Butthatdoesn'tmakedesirespurposive.Wedon'tformdesiresas meansto ends, on the basis of beliefs aboutwhat ends formingthose desireswouldfurther.I argued hat decisions and intentionsaremeans-end ustifiable,byappealing o their use as action-coordinators.y decidingandformingintentionsnadvanceaboutwhichactionswe shallperform,we settleand

so leaveourselvesknowingnadvancewhichactionswe shallbeperform-ing in the future.Thatmeansthatwe cancoordinate urpresentactionswith those futureactions.Decisionmaking herebyhelpsensure hattheactionswhich we performn thepresentand nearer uturearejustifiedgiven, andso matchor areappropriateo, the actionswhich we will beperformingn themoredistant uture.Decisions oactenableus to coordinate uragency hroughimeby set-tlingin advancehow we shall be acting.But they only do that f they doensurea continuingmotivationo act as decided-a motivationwhichwillpersistuptothe time for action.Now if thedecision operform particu-lar action s not likely enough o ensurea continuingmotivationo act asdecided-if forexample here'sa riskthatwe mightabandon hatpartic-ulardecisionthrough omesubsequent hangeof mind-then no matterhow desirable he ends furthered y the action n question, t mightstillnot be rationalo decideto performt.Action-coordinatoryustificationsfortakinga particular ecisiondependon thatparticular ecision'seffi-cacyas a reliablemotivator f the actiondecidedupon-a consideration

thathasto do with ends furthered y taking hatparticular ecision,andnot simplywith ends furtheredy theactiondecidedupon.So deciding operform particularctionA is a means-endustifiableoccurrence.What s Goetz'sargument gainstme? In hisview, action-coordinatoryneeds ustifyat besttakinga decisionone way or the otheraboutwhetherto do A.Theycannever ustify particularecisions,such as deciding pe-cifically o doA.Whyso?Supposet seemsthataction-coordinatoryon-



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Reply to Goetz 217siderations upportdecidingto do A in particular, n the grounds hatdecidingnotto doA is anunreliable ction-motivator:here'sa riskthatadecisionnot to doA mightbe abandonedhrough subsequenthangeofmind,so thatnowdecidingnotto doAwon'tof itselfsettleverydefinitelywhether rnottheagentwill endupdoingA.Insucha case,Goetzclaims,it is alwayspossible to supplementhe inadequateaction-determiningpowersof a decisionnot todo A withvarious ormsof self restraint, uchas gettingyourfriends o preventyou from everdoingA: one's friendscould tie one Ulysses-like to a mast,or otherwiseimmobiliseone. Inwhich case, each of decidingto do A or-when thussupplemented-decidingnot todoA, is anequallyreliablemeansof settling utureaction,andso anequallyreliableaction-coordinator.hequestionof whichdeci-sionis rational anthenbe settledsimplyby comparinghejustificationsfor the actions to be decidedbetween:thatis, doingA comparedwithrestraining-oneself-and-not-doing-A.o therationality f particulareci-sions to act can after all be explained n termsof the rationalityof theactions o be decidedbetween,andsomething ikeJ-Identitys true.There s a veryeasyreply o Goetz'sargument. hereneedbeno avail-ablesupplementary eansof self-restrainto rendera decisionnotto doA as reliablean action-coordinators its alternative. ace Goetz, in mydiscussionof Dan'scase,I didn't failto realise hatsuchmeanscouldbeavailable. justsupposedheyweren'tavailable, stheymightwellnotbe.Wedon'talwayshavefriends bleandwillingto tieustomasts,oroth-erwise mmobiliseusagainstactingon somefuture hangeof motivation.Inwhichcase,action-coordinatoryonsiderations ill provide omejus-tification,albeitnotnecessarily onclusive, ortaking hedecisionwhichis themorereliableaction-motivator,ndsothemorereliableaction-coor-dinator.

Thereis anotherargumentwhich I produceagainstJ-Identity,andwhichGoetzclaimsto refute.Thearguments this.If J-Identitys true,thenanyincrease njustifications orlaterdoingA-that is, anyincreasein the likelihood hatdoingA wouldfurther esirable nds- constitutesa correspondingncrease n one'sjustificationornowintendingo doA.Ex hypothesi,the two sets of justificationsare identical.But therearemanycases wherethe increase njustification or laterdoingA comesfromthefactthatanintentiono doA hasnowbeenformed.Given hatInowintend o doA,mydoingofA ispreplanned ndso will likelybepre-cededby preparationshatwill enhance hebenefit romdoingA. Ontheotherhand,sincemy intentions likelyto leadto all thesepreparations,that ncreaseshelikelycostof notdoingA (lostdeposits,disappointmentetc.).Yet, nsuchcases,thisaddedustificationordoingA surelypresup-



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218 Thomas Pinkposes the factthatthe intentiono do A is nowbeingheld:it doesn'taddto one'sjustificationor nowholding t.Goetz thinks hat n such a case there s an increase n my justificationfor now intending o doA, just as J-Identitywouldpredict.Granted,heconcedes,Imaynot haveaddedustificationorhavingbynowformedanintentionto do A; but then that'sto do with the past, somethingI'vealreadydoneandnolongerhave heoptionofnotdoing,andso notwithinthescope of J-Identitys Goetzunderstandst.But,inGoetz'sview,thereis still addedustificationormy nowcontinuingo intend odoA-some-thingI do still havetheoptionof notdoing.

But suppose,as Goetzsuggests,we do clearlyunderstandmy nowintendingo doA as what I still havean optionof notdoing:my goingon intending, ightnow, inthewhollyimmediateuture,o do A. Then,Imaintain,t is still falsethatadded ustification orlaterdoingA impliesadded ustificationor(inthis exactsense)nowintendingo doA. GiventhatI havefonned theintention o do A,and ntentions rerelatively ta-ble, I am likely to retainmy intention ome way intothe futureandsosooneror later begin preparing or the doing of A. Hence, as alreadyexplained,my havingformed he intentionproducesan increase n thelikely desirabilityof doing A. But this increase n myjustification fordoingA still presupposes, nd so doesn'tadditionallyustify, thatrightnow,intheimmediate uture ndbefore haveyetmadeanypreparations,I do go on intending o do A. Goetzhasdone nothing o defusethisargu-mentagainstJ-Identity.Department of Philosophy THOMAS PINKKing s College LondonStrandLondonWC2R2LSUK

REFERENCESGoetz, S. 1998: Reasons or Formingan Intention:A Replyto Pink .Mind,106,pp.205-13.Pink,T. 1991: Purposiventending .Mind,100,pp343-59.Pink, T. 1996: ThePsychology of Freedom. Cambridge:CambridgeUni-versityPress.Pink, T. 1997: Reason and agency . Proceedings of the AristotelianSociety, please nsertvolumenumber), p. 263-80.


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