PEACE AND SRATEGIC STUDIES IN AFRICA L1

• In essence the module explores geo-strategic- geo-politics in Africa.

• Simplified version of home concept-, which is pre-occupied with self-survival.

• ABC is the environment (friends and enemies) also symbolises threats and opportunities.

709.1

• Strategy has to define the objectives and the means to achieve the objectives and interests.

• Action basis is established hence the strategic interests• • • STRAT- pursue• EGEN- achieved• Goals to be pursued and goals to be achieved

709.2

• Historical audit of the African Continent • Communalism• Slavery• Colonialism• Nationalism and struggle for Independence• Neo-colonialism, Neo-liberalism• Globalisation

709.3

• CONCEPTUALISING PEACE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES• PEACE• the state prevailing during the absence of war • harmonious relations; freedom from disputes; "the roommates lived in peace

together" • the absence of mental stress or anxiety • the general security of public places; "he was arrested for disturbing the peace" • a treaty to cease hostilities; "peace came on November 11th"

wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn • The concept of peace ranks among the most controversial in our time. Peace

undoubtedly carries a positive connotation; almost nobody admits to opposing peace; world peace is widely seen as one of the most noble goals of humanity. Various groups, however, differ sharply about what peace entails, how best to achieve it, and even if peace is truly possible. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace

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• Peace is commonly understood to mean the absence of hostilities. Other definitions include freedom from disputes, silence, harmonious relations, or inner contentment and serenity, as the meaning of the word changes with context.

• Peace as an absence of violence or of evil; presence of justice

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• Strategy• How strategy operates in an environment is determined

by pscychological, economic, information, propaganda and military mind and how these can be used to achieve particular objective in particular- Clauswitz, Mao tse tung, jomini, von molke, marx and engels.

• Strategy is a plan of action and can be found in any life situation. USE OF FORCE TO ACHIVE OUR OBJECTIVES.

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• How strategy operates in in the maintanance of permanent peace or how it will ameliorate tensions- individual level, group level, ethnic group, association’s level.

• Conflict is almost inevitable and is not necessarily a bad thing. What are mechanim that can address this to achieve permanent peace.

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• According to Frazer strategy defines the aim which should be political and political aim derived from a series of objectives which however different chart a coherent path determined by resources. Real strategy defies quantification because it is a systematic process that is political, economic, military and diplomacy. Thus all thinkers will run short.

• All the factors depends on environment- peasant economies and these keep on changing.

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• The distinctive identity of strategic studies stems from its focus on military strategy. Strategy can be broadly be defined as the art or science of shaping means so as to promote ends in any field or conflict. For strategic studies means to be shaped are military ones.

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• Strategic studies is mostly about the use of force within and between states some sub state entities like separatists or national liberation or terrorist revolutionary groups are substantial enough to register in the game of nations.

• Strategy in more specific sense has been defined as the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfills ends of policy’ exploiting military force so as to attain given objects of policy’ the relationship between military power and political purpose.

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• While it is true that states may threaten each other with war on purely military grounds that each is a potential attacker of the other, the threat and the use of force usually bespeak grounds for rivalry rooted considerations for power, status, ideology and wealth.

• Relations amongst independent actors always contain the possibility of conflict over political, economic and social issues and sometimes these conflicts result in the use of force.

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• The history of strategic thinking can usefully be set against the backdrop of the revolution in military technology. Before the nuclear age strategic thinking was about how to fight and win wars. Strategists from classical times times like Sun Tzu, Thuycdides, though 19th century- Jomini, Clausewitz, Mahan, Fuller. Hart., Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchell were all concerned with fighting. AND it is alive in works of theorists like Mao Zedong and Che Guevara.

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• Advanced military technology has spread throughout the international system in three ways:

• 1. Physical and political expansion of those possessing it;

• 2. By the transfer of weapons from those capable of manufacturing them to those not

• 3. By the spread of manufacturing capability to ever more centers of control.

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• Major disagreements exist about both the extent and the character of the problem posed by military means, and consequently Strategic Studies is not under strong pressure to take a highly critical view of itself. These disagreements can be described along two dimensions. The first is how serious the problem of military means is in itself. The second is how tractable the the problem is in the sense of whether anything can be done about it.

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• Those who see the problem as serious are mostly worried about the danger of war- the more arms the more war occurs and if war does not occur it will act as a catalystThe view that the military means are not in

themselves serious lies with deterrence.

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• Economic evolution from past to present- Clausewitz never thoght they was industrial revolution.

• Changing in technological, information, diplomatic, sanctions, economic, military and if you are to attatch value.

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• HISTORY OF STRATEGIC THOUGHT• • Between 1945-55 strategic theory was built

characterized by unrefined ideas about, offensive and defensive, deterrence and aggression, massive retaliation and limited war the surprise attack and arms race.

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• 1956-1985 perceived as period of high strategic theory. It was the golden age of nuclear deterrence. Arms control crisis management and limited war. The perception was with nuclear and cold war co-existing with Mao’s guerilla warfare. But was criticized on ideological and moral grounds. The new cold war of the I970s resuscitated debate on issues of limited nuclear war, ballistic missiles defence and nuclear black mail.

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• The 1980s gave birth to alternative security focus on common security, nuclear freeze, military confidence, building democracy and disarmament détente from below and alternative security orders but that focus was abandoned because of Gorbachev revolution in soviet union. What emerged was Kenneth Booth called late strategic studies 1985 to 1990. That shift was informed by the threat of bipolar confrontation into multi-polar conflict resolution. The eradication of a super power as well as growing irrelevance of nuclear strategy. An d we now live in the age in which security is taking center stage.

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• Fukuyama- the end of history and war if states become liberal democracies BUT Seebury and Codevilla- argues that survival if nations and military forces is still an available option.

     Neo-realist theory- the strategic theory begun to focus on strategic culture and it was an attempt to divest the security debate of its ethnocentric focus during the golden age. Comparison of USA AND USSR’S STRATEGIC Alliance were undertaken by such authors as Maguire1987-91, Meyer and Syder 1990 and the was a strong epistemology formation of this era.

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     There emerged a feminist critique of male defence indentities. There also emerged the New Agenda constituting denuelism, reasonable sufficiency, the political conception of security, self confidence measures, crisis prevention, dealignment, unilateralism, demilitalisation, non intervention and non offensive. The end OF cold war brought the danger of nuclear proliferation elsewhere.

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     Waltz prevented the proliferation of weapons. The arms race theory recognized the interface between weapons and old debates on strategic and continued with navy. People questioned Reagen’s strategies-anti-ballistic defense. There was increase in literature on arms control. The numerical balance shifted to confidence building and crisis management

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     Macnamara still believed in crisis management as central to strategy. Others recognized the decline of nuclear diplomacy at the heart of the complex. The debate pro-nuclear moralist and the volley of anti-nuclear opponents and this in still inclusive.

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   Kull link between liberal democracy and peace as well as formulation of regime security theory. Increasingly popular was the search for security with rather than others. Ideas on civilian based defence and possibility of nuclear free world. The European agenda was shifting and redefined in the terms of economic stability, nationalism, migration and political development. This was informed by wars in the Gulf and internal conflicts in Africa and preoccupation was with conflict prevention, peacekeeping and resolution.

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     The current realist debate will give way to earlier studies, history language, comparative politics, culture and subjection. Strategy is likely to abandon European security and nuclear deterrence among super power and embrace questions of intervention, destruction of weapons of mass destruction, conventional warfare, regional alliance peace keeping, disarmament and nuclear deterrence in north-south context as well as nuclear ambitions versus nuclear taboos.

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     The end of cold war has regarded as the success of liberal democracy and the unfettered play of market forces IMF, WB, WTO, are gladiators of globalisation ethic- democracy, human rights and good governance. They peddle the ethics under the influence of USA. Democracy and liberal triumphalism are key issues in the world and and are dominant theoretical frameworks in international issues. Not seeable is the general crisis surrounding the cold war era. Colonial freedom, self determination, oppression. Inn global theory is security too fluid and asymmetrical paradigm. The major theories about the nature of the global phenomenon are changing due to complexities which exist on the ground, human disaster, political chaos and paralysis.

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     There is need to change strategy to meet new challenges. The dangers associated with the change is indeed important they must define new crisis of modernity. Efforts need to be made to indentify African scholarship to bring commonness to achieving security in Africa.

     Globalism, pruralism, regime theory, structuralism, political economy and neo-realism- there so much varied in global system such that reductionist theories are increasingly becoming irrelevant.

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• Arms Control• Arms control is an all encompassing term that relates to

those restrictions that are imposed on the production, development, stockpiling, proliferation, and usage of small arms and light weapons, conventional weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and nuclear weapons. Arms control is typically pursued by means of diplomatic approaches and instruments, such as international treaties, agreements, as well as regional and sub-regional protocols. Arms control can also be achieved by means of national legislation and policy.

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• In general, the aim of arms control instruments and practices are to limit, reduce and prevent the proliferation and misuse of weapons, ammunition, explosive devises (such as bombs, missiles and landmines) and weapons technology. In addition, there are a number of arms control agreements that seek to minimise the destructive consequences of armed violence and war, especially with respect to civilians and the environment (such as the Geneva Conventions).

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• Historically, the enforcement of arms control agreements has been challenging and problematic. The reason for this is that the enforcement and effectiveness of these agreements are dependent on the commitment and consent of the participants to these agreements to abide by the terms of these agreements. When a nation no longer wishes to abide by the terms of an arms control agreement, they tend to either covertly circumvent the terms, or terminate their participation in the agreement. More recent arms control agreements have included more rigorous measures to enforce the terms of the agreement, as well as verify the compliance of those states that are party to the agreement.

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• Disarmament• Disarmament includes a range of processes and measures by

which the holdings, stockpile and supply of weapons (including arms, ammunition and explosive devices) to states, non-state groups and individuals are reduced or destroyed. Disarmament measures typically include: weapons collection initiatives; weapons destruction and disposal programmes; decommissioning of weapons systems; arms embargoes; as well as weapons moratoriums and prohibitions. Disarmament initiatives generally take place following a prolonged period of armed conflict, such as civil war, but have also taken place in countries without an immediate history of armed conflict.

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• The fundamental aim of a disarmament process is to reduce the destabilising and destructive impact of weapons on the state, society and the environment. In this respect, a successful disarmament initiative can contribute to building confidence and stability in a situation characterised by tension and uncertainty.

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• Terrorism• Terrorism is not a new phenomenon or threat to human security

in Africa. The ISS acknowledges that the concept “terrorism” means different things to different people, explaining the inability of academics, policy makers and others to come up with a single definition of a phenomenon that is not new to human history. A possible reason for this inability probably is a result of the changing nature of and motivation for terrorism. Despite this inability to provide a single acceptable definition, the ISS agrees to the definition of a “terrorist act” as provided by the OAU / AU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism or the Algiers Convention:

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• Article 1(a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:

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• i. Intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or

• ii. Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or

• iii. Create general insurrection in a State.

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• Article 3(i) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts.

• (ii) Political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other motives shall not be a justifiable defence against a terrorist act.

30 Organised Crime

• ‘Organised crime’ is a concept that appears to have established itself in criminology, although it has not yet received universal legislative acceptance or wide judicial recognition in Southern Africa. Be that as it may, it is not in serious dispute that organised crime is a global challenge. It is also accepted that linkages have long been established among criminals working in different countries in the region and beyond. The absence of a definition of organised crime, however, can create gaps and ambiguities. For law enforcement agencies and crime researchers, it tends to make it difficult to find information with which to put together a picture by which to assess the threat emanating from organised crime.

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• Organised crime is significant and planned criminal activity, which involves several persons acting jointly, or at least with a common purpose, to commit a crime or a series of crimes, motivated by the prospect of direct or indirect material benefit. The persons involved may be human beings or corporate bodies.

• Misconceptions occasionally arise from historical or ideological associations of organised crime with structured syndicates. It is not necessary for the criminals to be organised or associated in a formal or informal structure.

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• Money LaunderingMoney laundering is often closely linked to organised crime.

It denotes all ceilings with the proceeds of unlawful activities. The conventional view is that money laundering follows a traceable pattern, comprising:

       the placement stage, where the proceeds of crime are secreted in or deposited, on the understanding that they will be mixed with lawful assets;

       layering, where the proceeds are transferred or modified; and

       the integration stage, where the proceeds are handed back to the criminal or his agent for consumption or other use.

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• In reality, not every act of money laundering neatly follows that pattern. Proceeds of crime may sometimes be directly invested without placement or layering. The stages outlined are not cumulative elements of money laundering, in the sense that they should all exist before the offence may be deemed to have been committed. The commission of any one of them can be money laundering.

•

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• Since 2002 the Institute for Security Studies has been studying the nature and scale of money laundering in east and southern Africa. The findings of the study are periodically published in newsletters, surveys and monographs. The programme is committed to continue to assist state and non-state institutions to detect and control money laundering in the region.

35Evolution of strategic doctrineSouth Africa

why do state embark on independent Nuclear strategy’There is difference between Nuclear for peaceful

process and transferring it for weapons /offshorePresident De Klerk 1989 ordered the suspension of

South Africa Nuclear programme and in 1991 acceded to NPT as a result 1992 begun to recent international inspection from AEC. 1993 De Klerk acknowledges that south African had produced nuclear weapons which he argued that had not completed.

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• 25km outside Pretoria at Pelindaba• Why Produce Nuclear weapons• Lies in assessing its strategy since 1960s• As decolonisation characterised imperial and colonial

relations in the 1970s. The African national power continued in the opposite direction. Consolidating colonial previliges for African population. Consolidating military power suppress indigenous as well as neiggbouring states.

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• AIMS AND OBJECTIVES     TO bring western governments to the aid of the

southern African country in the event of communist inspired forces in Southern Africa. Declare or demonstrate the availability of nuclear weapons.

     To develop a phase of uncertainty neither acknowledge or deny Nuclear capability or knowledge

     If threatened could get support of other nuclear members either east or west

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• Rapid decolonisation had brought challenges to the regime internally and internationally.

• Internally- Africans’ call for independence Sharpsville massacres and banning of the ANC. Creating homelands deploying forces within and outside.

• External- to create a buffer states Rhodesia, Portuguese east Africa and Zaire

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• Defence expenditures escalated • 1960-61 44 Million rand• 1962 72 million rand• 1975 948 million rand• After 1977 total strategy being embarked upon

was in billions dollars and the figures are unreliable

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• Man power increased 1972-3 48 000• 1977 110 00• 1977 220 000• By de Klerk’s time it was morethan ½ a million• It was organised into 3 categories. • 1.       permanent force• 2.       citizen force• 3.       national service

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• Key lessons learn in 1977 was that the regime could not continue increasing manpower but to undertake an independent nuclear programme as the economy was suffering.

• The collapse of the Portuguese colonies had a strategic implication for south Africa. It resulted in in the Lusaka agreement in which Zambia and Mozambique agreed to root out colonialism and racism.

• Preverence of Cuban and USSR forces led south Africa to actually deploy forces in Namibia.

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• South Africa’s peaceful nuclear use begun in the 1950s with assistance from abroad.

• Infrastructural resources support were there and this led to a dedication to security.

• 1961 Pelindabe Nuclear RESEARCH phase 1. REACTOR WAS COMMISSIONED

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• Egypt• Egypt to develop nuclear energy, was a welcome

contribution to a much-needed grand vision for the role of Egypt in the region.

• Although Egypt, as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is perfectly entitled to develop nuclear energy, it is not entitled to develop nuclear weapons unless it withdraws from the NPT.

• There were suggestions in the past that Egypt might withdraw unless Israel accepted a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. But Egypt renewed the NPT without getting anything from Israel in return.

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• Egypt's desire to build a 1,000 megawatt nuclear power plant near El-Dabaa, on the country's Mediterranean coast, is growing. Such a decision comes in a period in which the development of nuclear energy is one of the main themes on the international agenda, above all because of the international tension linked to North Korea's recent nuclear weapon test and Iran's controversial nuclear research program. The Middle East is one of the regional diplomatic theaters where concerns about a potential nuclear arms race are growing.

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• Egyptian nuclear weapons and the appropriate delivery means (air, land and submarines) would introduce a new strategic doctrine in the region. It would replace the current Israeli blackmail doctrine of Unilaterally Assured Destruction with the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).

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• The MAD doctrine means that if Israel were to threaten Egyptian national existence, Egypt would be in a position to do the same. This would render war between the two countries unthinkable and would introduce different strategic calculations in the region affecting Israel's bullying behaviour.

• There would simply be no stakes worth fighting for when the only certainty of going to war is the mutual assured destruction of the two countries.

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• To argue that Israel is a democracy and can be trusted with responsible behaviour whereas the Arabs cannot is a basically racist argument. It is also not supported by the historical record of Israeli lawless behaviour in the region.

• In a frank admission of the contradictions and hypocrisy of American support for this line of thinking the New York Times wrote: "Rattling windows in Nevada to warn the world that Washington still has the bomb seems particularly perverse when the US is trying to persuade nuclear have-nots to stay out of the bomb making business."

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• Greater instability in the Middle East could have more or less direct effects within Egypt itself. The leadership in Egypt, therefore, runs the risk of losing power. At the moment, the only political actor in Egypt that is able to take power is the Muslim Brotherhood. If Egypt were to be led by Islamist forces, it could pose a serious challenge to U.S. influence in the Middle East and to the security of Israel. This would have a deep impact on the regional balance of power.

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• When viewed as a whole the literature of strategic studies displays a persistent uncertainty about what constitutes the central problem of the subject matter. From one perspective, the problem was the security of states in anarchy. From another the problem was increasingly the whole system of military rivalry itself.