Pakistani Civil Service

ASIAN JOURNAL Or PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION VOL 19 .NO 2 (DECEMBER 1997) 321-364

PAKISTAN: A CIVIL SERVICE INAN OBSOLESCING IMPERIAL TRADITION

GARTH N. JONES

Pakistan inherited a civi I service with a long and illustrious history, a product of twogreat imperial civilisations. The civil service is a cultural artifact which is nowcaught in transitional time. Pakistani leaders recognise this public issue. They havesought to introduce personnel reforms; the consequences have been uneven. Thisarticle addresses these and related aspects It concludes that Pakistan must reinventits constituent civil service.

The Jewel in the Crown1

On December 12, 1911, the Grand Coronation Durbar was held inDelhi before an assembly of some 80,000 people.2 King George ofBritain presided over this spectacle where both great officials of stateand protected princes of the Indian Empire paid homage to enthrone-ment of the new King-Emperor. Even Indian opponents to the British-Indian empire enthusiastically joined in this popular occasion. Neverdid imperial rule appear to be more secure.

In a brief five decades following the disastrous events of the 1857Great Indian Revolt, the British government consolidated its authorityover the entire subcontinent. The British monarch was regarded as the

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emperor. Princes and persons of rank were expected to give allegianceand loyalty to the imperial crown.3

India was undergoing socio-economic transformations. Vast irri-gation works in the Punjab were being carried out. A complex ofrailroads were constructed. A great highway system was launched.This included rebuilding the Moghul Empire Grand Trunk Roadstretching from Calcutta to Peshawar. India was almost completelysurveyed and mapped out. Social infrastructure was strengthened byeducation, health, and famine relief services. Welfare of the masseswas enhanced. Across India a massive building programme of publicfacilities had occurred. Communication was facilitated by an ex-panded postal service and an extensive telephone and telegraphsystem.

The fundamentals of constitutional government were being intro-duced, including protection of civil liberties along with forms of localgovernance. A vigorous free press emerged, with a large number ofnewspapers and journals published in both English and vernacularlanguages. Political parties in a secular context were evolving.

The remarkable accomplishment of that five decade period fol-lowing 1857 would never have been possible without first bringingabout political closure in this critical area. The British rulers showedunusual sagacity. Against a history of seven hundred years dating backto the Magna Carta of 1215, it appeared that at last there had occurreda triumph of rational thought and imposed universal order. Thedebilitating effects of race, ethnicity, and religion were confined, andbeing diminished, within a rationally conceived administrative state.The British held few compunctions about the efficacy of the newadministrative state; and this context passed on unfettered into Paki-stan's political future.4 The administrative state represented a superiorform of socio-wisdom. For only by this modern institution could ademocratic and humane society based on social compassion be fash-ioned. The arm which made this possible was a remarkable civilservice where 1500 men ruled over 400 million people in a region thesize of Europe with even a greater diversity.

These men were products of their time and place. In attitude andbehaviour they were of the gentry, born to rule as officers andgentlemen. With organisational skill, they fundamentally confined

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power of the state within an elaborate civil service constituent whichlegally and politically was incorporated into the tradition of Britishconstitutional monarchy. As loyal subjects of the Crown, the uppercivil service officers were constitutional agents clothed with legalprotections. Exercise of political power through the constraints ofconstitutional law was the mandate of public administrators, and notthe application of normative principles of managerial practice. Theupper civil service was a professional class ordained and trained torule.5

Pakistan accepted its constitutional tradition.6 As Green, Kellerand Wamsley explain, "common good, agency, and state" comprisethe factors in the political foundation of public administration.7 InPakistan these factors take on inordinate importance where the civilservice, through the powers and actions of an administrative state,constantly advances to the public social and moral choices that defineand redefine the common good. Civil service officers within theimperial tradition were expected to live exemplary lives; contributingin effect to the formation of constructive habits and good character.Sustained argument and deliberation within and without the civilservice constituent was fostered in an on-going constitutive processwhich was extremely difficult to carry out in the subcontinent's highlysegmented and fragmented society. Yet this civil service managed tolive aloof from the masses but at the same time maintain constructiveworking relationships with them. Great effort was made to understandhistorical nuances of localities, with district officers in their officiallogs rendering extraordinary accounts. Heroic saga arises in how theseofficers dealt with dacoity (outlawry) and other disruptive elements.They knew how to confront and confine civil unrest.

Time has caught up with the imperial tradition. Substantial valueshifts have occurred demanding substantial changes in Pakistan'ssocial systems that consequently affect subsystems such as the na-tion's public administration. The thought of Pakistan's two leadingfounders, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (Quaid-i-Azam) and Liaquat AliKhan, has sorely been tested. They were not religiously minded, beingsecularists within the British constitutional tradition. Their objectivewas to establish a nation-state for Muslims living on the subcontinentand not an Islamic state for the believers. They understood the

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contradictions inherent in founding a state based on religion. Theybelieved that Pakistan should be a modern state, and not one con-strained by strict obedience to scriptural injunctions. Their viewpointclashed with that held by Islamic fundamentalists. As the late MaulanaAbul Ala Maududi, founder of the fundamentalist Jama'at-i-Islami,stated: "An Islamic state is an ideological state. Only those whoespouse the ideology can run the state."8

Ruling in the name of the Crown, even under Commonwealthstatus, has become a different matter than ruling in the name of arepublic. With independence in 1947 Pakistanis became citizens, nolonger subjects of the Crown. This political divorce alone required amajor shift in the political foundation of governance. Out of circum-stance of history that value shift did not occur.9

Pakistan achieved its independence as an accident of politicaldefault. The British simply quit India, leaving behind its near two-hundred-year history. The Hindu majority did not have the politicalwherewithal to stop the splintering away of the Muslim ummah(communities) ringing the northern and eastern tier of the subconti-nent. Turbulent times called for stern rulership which the imperial civilservice was admirably prepared to carry out. For several decadesPakistan functioned no more than as a torn remnant in a once greatempire.

The imperial civil service may be effective in dealing with expe-diencies but not with socio-economic change and development. Inorganisational terms excessive concentration of power and authorityin the central government must give way to constructive devolutionand autonomy. For only under such a political circumstance is itpossible for a market economy to function, let alone flourish. Such aswith other new nations, Pakistan tried its planned economy whichbasically failed. With all of its political risks, Pakistan has no choicebut to liberalise its socio-economic being.10 To accomplish this newstate of affairs, a substantially different political foundation will berequired. The government must be more open and democratic. Theconstitutive dimension must take on the qualities of citizenship ratherthan those of subject. Public administration with its critical componentof personnel management must assume new meaning and character.

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"Sikar" (Ruler) and "Hakim" (Lawgiver)11

Pakistan's inherited civil service has along and illustrious history. Theservice' s values are buried deep within individual psyches and infusedwidely throughout the public organisational domain. The civil serviceis a cultural artifact.

Throughout Pakistan's existence, considerable attention has beengiven to reforming the civil service but with little success.12 Intechnicalities the civil service is well described but in system dynam-ics poorly understood. The best indicators upon which to base such aconclusion is that in spite of horrendous obstacles, within and without,Pakistan not only survives but progresses. Except for the impossiblejuridical domain of East and West Pakistan, its leaders have controlledstrong fissiparous tendencies, maintaining a sense of nationhood. Asa multi-ethnic state, Pakistan has not splintered away, such as the casewith Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union.

A modern army with a long regimental tradition has played thecritical role in holding together factious groups and regions.13 Thecivil service has played an equally important role in carrying outdevelopment programmes. Both the military and the civil servicework together in a superordinate fashion, arising above primordialstruggles but yet penetrating deep into communal localities and ethnicgroups. For the masses the civil service represents the government,with factious political parties remaining outside of core power.

With uncanny understanding strategically placed officials havebeen able to live within factious groups but they never become a partof them. The observation of a leading scholar of the civil service, HughTinker, written over three decades ago still applies. He describes theservice as a "souring pyramid" with a "refinement of calculatedgradation" incorporating "both the Hindu caste system and the Eng-lish class system."14 The civil service has been compared to theMandarin order but that is not entirely an apt characterisation. TheChinese mandarinate was an open system in which a brilliant villageboy could enter and make his way up the hierarchy via examination.For the Imperial Raj class and caste imposed barriers on such open-ness. The entrance examination was a rigorous one but its content wasselectively confined to British upper class institutions with its classadmission requirements.

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It would be a mistake to use the Weber's heuristic notion ofbureaucracy to sort out organisational perplexities of Pakistan's civilservice. It is not a bureaucracy in the classical sense. It is far toocomplex, with far too much history, to be relegated to such a simplecharacterisation. The civil service is a professional model of publicadministration which builds on a political rather than a technicalrationale of collective action. Its constituent character is to be foundin this pragmatic reality.

Groundings of the Pakistan Civil Service

In Pakistan the civil service comprises essentially the public adminis-trative profession. Lateral entrance has been sporadic; and when triedit has virtually been of no consequence. The civil service may becharacterised as a career system. Its groundings are subtle but substan-tial. They profoundly induce the form and composition of the constitu-ent character. Included are both the normative and constitutive dimen-sions which define distinctive roles, technical competencies, person-nel structures, and organisational culture and behaviour.15

1. The Normative Dimension - The ideal of the Pakistani state, withboth its British and Islamic underpinnings, is to strive for a democraticand humane society, with a full measure of socio-economic justice.The process by which society achieves this ideal will be through theagency of the state. Its successive five-year development plans invokeobligations to formulating the end of a common good and developingessential relationships between the rulers and ruled through theinstitutional presence of the state. The first three development plansparticularly emphasised the critical role of sound public administra-tion which was too narrowly conceived within managerial technicali-ties rather than its more crucial political role. The central planningprocess, preempted by technocratic economists, basically overlookedthe place of an articulated common good which gives attention toregime values, public morality processes with its critical features ofrule by law, political consensus-building, quick responsiveness, andeffective agenda-building and awareness. At the same time the impor-tance of agency (the ruled) was neglected, if not misunderstood. Here

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attention must be given to exercise of authority and power, building ofpublic trust, insuring responsible participation, and subordination ofgovernment institutions marked by shared powers and autonomyinherent in the popular will.

Within Pakistan's rich history may be found normative and moralknowledge for a more responsible articulation of the common goodwhere both the rulers and the ruled may play more constructive roles.l6

Behind the social structure of "caste" and "class" is the obligation ofdharma, a Sanskrit term. All social relations take on the character ofduty. For some who are ordained, the duty is given with fairness andjustice. Normative and moral knowledge resting on duty provides theessential direction and inherent obligation for the practice of publicmanagement.

2. The Constitutive Dimension - This is essentially, but not entirely,a British historical graft onto a reconstituted Mughal tradition. Com-mon good, agency, and state form a constitutive dimension of the civilservice grounding. The constitutive dimension is employed in twoperspectives. The civil service forms a constitutive part of the govern-ment, and exists legally and politically within an inherited Britishconstitutional tradition. It serves as a constitutional agent. The civilservice is heavily involved in the political ways of Pakistani society.Through its actions the civil service presents Pakistanis with politicaland moral choices. It is the principal role model for the formation ofhabits and character. The upper civil service constitutes the "steelframe" of government. Its integrity is necessarily sustained by adher-ence to the constitutional principle. Over time a cardinal feature ofpre-entry education and training of civil servants has been an indoctrina-tion in British constitutionalism.

Pandemics in the Civil Service Constituent

Pandemonium characterises Pakistan's political life.17 Muslim re-gions ringing the strategic northern rim of the Indian subcontinentgreatly feared living in an new nation-state dominated by secularistHindus. These regions were poorly prepared for self-rule. For overtwo centuries they were sapped by invidious conflicts: differences of

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competing religious sects, racial prejudices of white and brown,struggles of caste and outcaste, and historical linguistic differences.Behind these controversies was the more emotional issue of cultureand civilisation, or the fundamental rules governmg life. HistoricIslam had never experienced a reformation reconstituting it for tran-sition to contemporary time. Islam's great attribute may be found in itsresistance to cultural ingestation of the Brahminical tradition; but ithas paid a high socio-cultural cost in this centuries-old defensivestruggle, never being in a position to reconstitute its being as apowerful influence or to renew its once great history .

Pakistani rulers, at least until Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88), took seriouslythe ideal of its founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Quaid-i-Azam) thatPakistan will be a modern nation-state. Through its technocraticplanning mechanism, it has sought to carry out massive social mobi-lisation, even to the extent advanced by political scientist Karl W.Deutsch.18 However, its leaders have never been able to master thecomplexities of mass politics which provides the means to move on toa modernising economy and polity. Ethnic strife and conflict have toooften thwarted good intentions for the common good. Over time thepolitical consequence has been a tightening of authoritarian rule. Inpejorative terms scholars of development have characterised Pakistanas a Garrison, Praetorian, or Bonapartist state.19 Power and authorityare excessively concentrated by constitutional law in the centralgovernment, the district remains the fundamental unit of administra-tion, the secretariat system with its establishmentarian charactercontinues, and the complex cadre or service structure binds togetherthe administrative organisation.20

In administrative behaviour the entire civil service constituentfunctions as a large authoritarian family drawing its values from anentrenched agrarian society. From the lowest to the highest levelsthose in charge behave not only as supervisors and managers but alsoas social exchangers and benefactors, and usually in the baradaritradition.21 Cynicism runs deep in this authoritarian family, character-ised by persistent and sarcastic criticism. The civil service is deemedsick, inflicted with "clientelism, incrementalism, arbitrariness, impe-rialism and parochialism."22 Excessive narcissism is evidenced.

In spite of its wasteful economy of history, the basic social fabric

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of Pakistan remained unchanged. Even the violent deaths of its twoinfluential leaders, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) and his nemesisGeneral Zia ul-Hq (1977-88), did not modify the social ways.23

Pakistan's groundings for constituting a nation-state with a fullmeasure of freedom, equality, and progress are constantly beingfrustrated. As a consequence the civil service rules through its imperialinherited structures which have obsolesced into an establishmentariancharacter. The secretariat system which is based on the premise of aseparation between policy and implementation is extremely entrenchedin the administrative state. The secretaries continue to play a predomi-nate role. Policy-making is considered a general function fit only forpersons educated in the English liberal tradition. The technical person-nel, for example, engineers and medical doctors, who supposedly donot have the breadth of knowledge and skill to deal with complicatedpolicy matters, continue to occupy a second-class status in policy-making and governance.

Increasingly, administrative practice has taken on a corporateform. As Nasir Islam observes, the secretariats are powerful entities.The secretaries"enjoy powers akin to the Chief Executive Officer(CEO) in corporate organization."24 While under the official Rules ofBusiness, they are technically advisors to ministers, often they are themore influential figures in the decision process. Shafik H. Hashmiaffirms: "(I)n Pakistan there has been a government of Secretariesmost of the time."25

Loyalty to a Higher Order

The British Raj astutely understood the concourse of power-buildingin communal subcontinent which constituted pledging individualloyalty to a higher order (polity). Power naturally flowed upward inthat it depended upon the compliance of subordinates, and it was notproduced by posturings and commands of superiors. On the otherhand, legitimacy invariably flowed downward as a consequence ofscholar-officials who worked out the rules of civil propriety. Thereexisted a reciprocal response between the rulers and the ruled, withgrand occasions and rituals given as pretensions of power.

The British-Indian army exemplified this extraordinary achieve-ment. For the "common folk" enlistment in the army provided a way

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towards gaining two rewards highly prized in their life's affairs:honour and land. The oft-used word izzat summed it up: honour,esteem, and status. Class and caste along with face were involved.Face meant a person of worth, both in private and public relations,being able to give grand entertainments in the marriage of one'sdaughter, holding a position of magistrate, and winning a graduatedegree from a prestigious university.26

The civil service followed the same pattern. With the developmentof expansive hydraulic works in the late nineteenth and twentiethcenturies, the imperial Raj gave vast tracts of land to those persons ofbirth who pledged loyalty to the Crown. Maintaining patterned orderin retaining pledges to the higher polity or collectivity often involveddevious devices of bribery, coercion, and threats. Pakistan's massivehydraulic complex and spurred industrial growth, the old rules ofmobilising power and legitimacy, obsolesced. The nation's decision-makers faced the difficult problem of developing new reciprocalarrangements. The response has been a fractured revival of paternal-istic behaviour. Partition (1947) and the Afghanistan-Soviet war(essentially 1980s) along with a four-decade surge in populationgrowth created a massive displacement of people wl 10 find themselvesoutside of established communal groupings. Hence they are essen-tially pariahs, an issue which Pakistan has never senously confronted.Nevertheless, the revival of paternalistic power characterises transi-tory Pakistan. Within this revival the family takes on extraordinaryimportance, and it is the model for all social relationships. To under-stand Pakistan's civil service it becomes imperative to know thefamily values of its diverse individual cultures. It would be a gravemistake to regard the basal values of the civil service constituentwithin a paradigm of a monolithic Islamic order.

Within the establishmentarian character of Pakistan's civil serv-ice, the personnel system becomes a powerful means for shaping andreshaping individual behaviour to fit its family-like culture. It isessentially a "career order" which is based upon rank of position. The"order" is intensely infused with the social values of izzat.

The Establishment Division

The mainspring of the Pakistan Administrative State is the Establish-330

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merit Division. Through its control of a compact personnel system, theEstablishment Division exercises inordinate authority throughout theentire organisational apparatus. Basically it functions as the strategicapex of the administrative state and profoundly influences perform-ance of the technical cores of function/line agencies. In selective waysit exercises command-like authority over the entire personnel sys-tem.27

With the objective of selecting public personnel on the basis ofmerit along with insuring social equity and fairness, the Governmentof India Acts of 1919 and 1935 established the autonomous PublicService Commission.28 Until the advent of the Bhutto regime, thispersonnel entity was fully incorporated into the Pakistan govern-ment.29 Under his administrative reforms of the 1970s the PublicService Commission was shifted as an agency attached to the Estab-lishment Division, thus losing its independent standing. Its primaryactivity consists of administering recruitment examinations and re-lated matters.

The Establishment Division is charged with the maintenance ofthe establishmentarian character of the administrative state, which itsecures by the skilful play of "brokerage" politics - the determinationas to who gets the best and worst of jobs along with other rewards.Within its concentrated authority the Establishment Division exer-cises tight control over core personnel functions including theirprocesses of execution and follow-up.

Decision-making within the Pakistan civil service is a slow andarduous process. In a strict sense there is virtually no possibility fornon-programmed decision-making. As a consequence key decision-makers wrestle daily with stacks of thick files tied together with twinewhich are maintained by masses of poorly educated clerks who workunder miserable conditions.

Since the civil service continues to be heavily influenced by thenotion of class and caste, there exists a rather dismal view of humannature. Human beings are basically untrustworthy. The redeemingfeature is that civil servants with solid educational experience havecounteracted this sorry state of humanity by introducing rationalityand system flow into the conduct of administrative governance. Thisethos is platonic in both spirit and intent. Man is guided by reason. Yet

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it was the pragmatic situation more than the philospohical view thatshaped the imperial civil service. The game of rulcrship with all itsugly features of playing off one faction against another requiredconcrete rules. Imperial organisation and administration were built ondistrust rather than trust, since by their diverse nature personalobligations basically rest on birth - to kin, ethnic group, religious sect,and region. In Pakistan safarish is a strong social value. Those instrategic positions are obligated to secure appointments of friends andkin in the civil service, as well as using their influence in securingspecial privilege.30

Law and Its Institutional Filters

In conservative thought the British Raj placed inordinate confidencein the law and its basic institutions as system filters in regulating inputsinto the personnel system. Sanctions in a peculiar administrative usagetake on extreme importance. This is best exemplified in the complexprocess of making financial expenditures. An approved budget haslittle meaning since each line item expenditure must later be sanc-tioned by some higher official, usually someone in the external financeagency. With this sort of administrative mechanism in place, thestrategic apex of the civil service constituent, mainly the Establish-ment Division, was able to use carefully formulated law and its basicinstitutions in controlling system transactions of the core personnelfunctions and their related activities. Paradoxically, a constructivefeature of Pakistan political life is the independence of the judiciary in"righting" grave injustices and insuring political responsibility. Thisincludes not only preserving institutional integrity of the personnelsystem but also protecting individual rights of abused public employ-ees.31

Psycho-Cultural Dynamics of Personnel Transactions

Pakistanis have a "knack" of becoming entrapped in their owncreations. They never seem able to escape "Plato's Cave," livingwithin a psychic prison.32 A great deal of this behaviour may beexplained within terms of Pakistan's tight social segmentation33

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infused with pervasive narcissism.34 As Lucian Pye writes:

... leaders see themselves as peculiarly virtuous and are dis-trustful of others because they suspect that those others do notappreciate their superior worth. Leaders, in short, need thereassurance of admiring followers. The followers are in theirway equally dependent as they seek the security of either anunderstanding guru or an idealized brotherhood.35

The belief in the grandeur of the state with a strong sovereign providesa comfortable context in the "rewards of narcissism."

Pakistani leaders can speak from the basis of religious truth sinceIslam was a faith with well-defined characteristics: a creed, a book,and a brotherhood. The book is the Koran with its precise rulesgoverning all aspects of life. The brotherhood is the concept that allpeople have their essence in Allah. Hence all those who believe in thefaith stand equal before Allah.

The Islamic concept of din, or religion as a whole way of life,provides a respect for authority along with each individual's place insociety. As an absolute set of rules, it applies to all people. ForMuslims total conformity is expected, and deviants are seen as anabomination to nature and Allah. From this belief is found the Muslimsense of unity in the universe.

In Islam there can be no clear separation between sacred andsecular authority. Everything is governed by an all-pervasive religion.The ideal of the Islamic state is that every act government carries outwill implement the words of God as recorded in the Koran. Leadersglorify government causing them to act in the authority of Allah. TheCaliph or sovereign becomes the representative of Allah, to whomalone belongs all the power and authority. Laws of the state areexpected to be manifestations of "higher religious laws."

Found in Islam is an ambiguity between authoritarian rule in thekhilafah and popular democracy in the form of a common brotherhood(ummah). Decision-making should reflect the well-being of the ummahcarried out through a full measure of consultation (shura). The Islamicstate should be a popularist society, a "perfect democracy."

The socialisation process of Pakistani Muslims reinforces the

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Islamic views of authority and power. According to Pye the patternproduces "a type of narcissism not too different from the (Indian)Hindu." However, the "ambivalence toward authority is based onconflicting sentiments between a demanding 'brotherhood' (umma)rather than a stern father."36 He notes the predominate role of themother in a situation where there is little contact with the father. At theage of five or so years the male child is suddenly taken from his motherto spend the entire day in Islamic school. He must make his own way.The discipline is often harsh, the intimidations of the older childrenfrequent. The psychological ties to the brotherhood are forged.37 If thechild is a son of an elite family, he will be sent to Atchison College inLahore (sometimes called Chiefs College) which was founded duringthe British Raj upon the tradition of the English public school. Oftenhe will be waited upon by two or more family servants.

The educational process will yield basically the same results. Theywill gain a sentiment of superior worth but yet distrustful of others whohave not been so "virtuously" trained and educated. They will seek thereassurance of admiring followers who are equally dependent uponthem including often their livilihood. The landlord tradition is deeplyentrenched in Pakistan.38

Found in this socialisation process are a number of pathologicalproblems, which are traceable to the ambivalence in the exercise ofauthority. In this regard, Ijaz Hussain Bataliv, advocate of the Su-preme Court and West High Court in Lahore, makes an insightfulobservation:

... in our families, there is no democracy ... from the verybeginning (children) start hating authority ... Speaking inpsychological terms, our relationship with the administrator isthe relationship of a child who hates the authority of his fatherbecause it is always misused without understanding the child'sreactions.39

Ijaz has identified the most nagging problem in Pakistanis' adminis-trative behaviour which is often displayed in excessive moralisation(lecturing) and incestuous-like aggression. As personnel managementmoves its transactions onto final organisational resul ts and/or impacts,

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the ethos of paternalistic authority increasingly inhibits rigorousevaluation against firmly held standards of performance. The person-nel agency may initiate a position classification scheme, for example,but it will have little relevancy when ascriptive behaviour (lookingright) is more important than prescriptive behaviour (doing right).

Managerial Modes for Action

In Western thought on personnel management, from its moral philoso-phy to contemporary psychology, the emphasis has been on the virtuesof independence and autonomy, the assumed requisites for self-realisation and healthy personal development. Dependency is con-ceived mainly in negative terms, associated with immaturity andineffectual social institutions. Yet when dependency is examined inthe Pakistan context, and its larger subcontinent setting, it reveals anumber of constructive features. The psychology of dependencyprovides a potential for fostering cooperation and strong bonds forteam-work. Acceptance of conformity and commitment within groupsmakes it easy to suppress egotistical behaviour and develop smoothworking relationships. Leadership is clearly identifiable and within aproperly designed organisation it can be held accountable. The keyqualification is that leadership takes the form of supportive relation-ships where the subordinates feel they are being well protected andtheir self-interests fairly addressed.

Leaders are expected to assume the ancient role of Mai-Papism(Mother-father). They are also expected to be men of principle andgood character. With supportive leadership and knowledgeable man-agers, risk-taking within a collectivity become possible. The notion ofcollective goods is well understood. Thus rewards for superior per-formance may take into account this social value. Conflict resolutionlargely becomes an issue between competing groups. Internally, eachgroup gives positive value to the sentiments of loyalty and obedience.

Conservatism and Reform

Pakistan is a conservative society. Its pattern and dynamics arereflected in periodic reports on administrative reform (see Table 1).

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Table 1

Major Reports on Administrative Reform in Pakistan Since 1948

Chairman/Author Title of report Date reported

M Munir,Chief Justice

R. Egger,US/AID Expert

B Gladieux.Ford Foundation

G. Ahmad,Police Service ofPakistan

A.R. Cornelius,Chief Justice

K.H. Meer,Establishment Minister

Anwar-ul-Haq,Chief Justice

Pay & Services Commission

The Improvement of PublicAdministration in Pakistan

Reorganisation of PakistanGovernment for Development

Administrative Reorganisationof Pakistan

Pay and Services CommissionReport, 1959-62

Administrative ReformsCommittee Report

The Civil Services CommissionReport

1949

1953

1955

1961

1962

1973

1981

All of these reports essentially cover only the civil service constituentsince here resides the principal depository of authority. With itsplatonic infusion and paternalistic orientation, a high level of moralconduct for the civil service is ethically imposed. Pakistan may be arecent accident of history but its idealism is captured in the works ofits ethnic poets - foremost is Sir Muhammad Iqbal who in the openingsentence of his epic poem, The Mysteries of Selflessness, exclaims:"You who were made by God to the Seal of all the peoples of the earth... Why are you fallen now so far astray ... ?"40

A theme in nearly all these investigations on reform was thepervasiveness of corruption. Pakistanis have not shied away from this

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issue, although they have not been too successful in dealing with it. Itis generally believed that bureaucratic corruption has increased con-siderably over the years.

Contesting Conservative Values

Pakistanis confront administrative problems in pragmatic ways. Al-though the Pakistani Muslim Strongly resists Hinduism, theBrahmanical tradition with its genius for order and continuity remainswithin the ethos of the civil service. None of the official reports hasever proposed completely discarding its highly stratified civil service.

In implementing its programmes of socio-economic progresspreference in Pakistan has been given to a grand strategy of gradualismwith carefully utilised tactics of incremental change. The assumptionprevailed that the fundamental character of the civil service wassound. In terms of reform only systemic measures were necessary toenhance the capacity of the administrative state. These systemicchanges were essentially conceived products of the upper civil serviceconstituent including its judicial component. The fullest confidence inthis strategic approach occurred in the early years of the Ayub Khanera (1958-69).

As a professional officer trained in the Sandhurst tradition, AyubKhan approached reform in rational and logical terms. With his Pathanpride, he had confidence in the civil service constituent not only toreform itself in the application of new technocratic skill but also tocontinue the imperial tradition of carrying out massive public works.He was cosmopolitan in outlook, holding virtually no reservations inutilising large numbers of technical advisors, mainly Americans.During his regime an effort was made to incorporate principles ofAmerican public management into Pakistani practice. The adminis-trative state as a bureaucratic polity was hardly questioned.

Fickle time caught up with Ayub Khan. Surging contentiousnessfuelled mainly by the government's massive efforts in socio-eco-nomic uplift which was heavily funded by American Foreign Aidpaved the way for his downfall.41 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, with his fallelection victory, took over the government on December 20,1970.With the ascent of the left in the Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP), and

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under the guise of Islamic socialism, Bhutto's reform quickly assumeda radical character. Nationalisation of basic industries and financialinstitutions occurred. Bhutto understood that the administrative struc-ture would not serve his political designs. He and his lieutenantsdistrusted the civil service constituent, especially the elite CivilService of Pakistan (CSP). One of his first acts was to remove from theupper civil service a number of officers who were prominent in theformer Ayub Khan government. To consolidate his power in the officeof Prime Minister, Bhutto stripped away the power of upper civilservants to make independent decisions. They were held answerableto the executive head of the government, that is, to the prime ministerand his ministers. However, these political acts proved futile. System-atically the senior CSP officers with their superior organisational andmanagerial skills rooted in old political interests reclaimed the strate-gic positions in the upper power structure. Vigar Ahmed, former CSP,as Cabinet Secretary boasted that he was the second most powerfulman in the government, next to President Bhutto.

Both the constitutions of 1956 and 1962 retained provisions of theRaj's organic act that gave recourse to the courts when civil servants'rights were violated. For example, a civil servant could only beremoved from the service before the age of retirement (usually fifty-five years) if the hiring authority could successfully charge that theperson under scrutiny had not fulfilled the terms of his employmentwhich was a difficult legal matter to prove. In contrast, Bhutto's 1973constitution did not contain any such legal guarantees.

In an address to the nation on August 20, 1973 on the state of hiseconomic reform, Bhutto criticised a vital aspect of the civil serviceconstituent's lore. He stated that:

It is often averred that the bureaucratic apparatus is a neutralinstrument which can be bent to any kind of policy. But thisneutrality is mythical. The bureaucracy itself is a powerfulvested interest, concerned more with its own good than withthe good of the public.42

Earlier he had publicly stated that:

(In) a democratic state where government is popularly elected,338


with its main aim the improvement of the condition of thecommon man, the question of exploitation by the state does notarise.43

Within this context he makes his most serious charge against the civilservice constituent:

No institution in the country has so lowered the quality of ournational life as to what is called Naukarshahi. It has done so byimposing a caste system on our society. It has created a classof Brahmins or mandarins, unrivalled in its snobbery andarrogance, insulated from life of the people and incapable ofidentifying itself with them.44

A sort of irony exists in Bhutto's attempts to transform the civilservice constituent. Following the long imperial tradition, he ap-pointed an in-house government body which was chaired by K.H.Meer, Establishment Minister without Portfolio. This body reviewedthe past work of administrative reform commissions and committeesalong with other materials. It then issued its own report entitledAdministrative Reforms Committee Report, 1973. The report ad-dressed five major issues:

1. Unification of service structure;2. Eradication of corruption;3. Reorganisation of recruiting arrangements;4. Secretarial and departmental reorganisation; and5. Field administration.

Only items 1 and 3 which pertained to the civil service constituentreceived serious attention. In the terms of contemporary personnelprinciples it is hard to fault the Bhutto initiatives. The service structurebased on four classes (I, II, III, and IV) and cadre labels (CSP and soon) was unwieldy and not responsive to the administrative needs ofprogressive government. The generalist CSP cadre had not performedwell, affected by "licentious passions and vices." Yet this cadreconstituted the best depository of scarce managerial talent.

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With the zeal of a prophet-priest Bhutto set out TO systematicallydemolish ancient things "grown false and idolatrous." He was notsuccessful, but possibly he did succeed in "bending the steel frame."45

The complicated service structure was modified. Bhutto stressed theneed of incorporating specialists into principal decision-making posi-tions - "scientists, engineers, doctors, economists, statisticians." A"people's government cannot condone a system which elevates thegeneralist above the scientist, the technician, the professional expert,the artist, or the teacher."46 Bhutto relentlessly struck at the vitals ofthe civil service constituent. He abolished the cadre associationswhich provided for influential networking. His control over theEstablishment Division was enhanced, while the protective powers ofthe semi-independent federal and provincial Public .Service Commis-sions were diminished. A new system of lateral entry was institutedwhere entrants were not required to satisfy the once rigorous admis-sion requirements. Between 1973-77 over 1,300 persons were re-cruited under these relaxed provisions primarily benefitting relativesand associates of cabinet ministers, and those recommended byprovincial governors and Pakistan Peoples' Party leaders.

With excessive political intervention and virtually no legal protec-tion against coercion and arbitrariness, the integrity of the civil servicewas greatly compromised. The innovative reforms advanced by theMeer Committee were abandoned. On July 5,1977, Bhutto was forcedout of power by the military. He was later hanged for high crimesagainst the state. General Zia-ul-Haq became the martial law admin-istrator.

Radical transformation of the civil service constituent had failed.Its historic supremacy, however, was diminished and its hallowedcharacter tarnished. Technical aspects of personnel practice wereintroduced including job/position classification and a more equitablecompensation structure.

Returning to Pragmatic Values

With its return to its third martial law administration under the chargeof General Zia-ul-Haq, the civil service constituent reclaimed itsstrategic power position. In 1978 the Zia government appointed a

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reform commission under the chairmanship of Anwarul Haq, a mem-ber of the Qadiani sect and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.This commission made several important recommendations to im-prove the public service structure, particularly in placing specialists instrategic positions and the induction of military officers into the civilservice. No other serious actions were taken. Zia's government wassingularly interested in seeking legitimacy through Nizam-i-Islam(Islamisation) of society.

Neither Zia or Bhutto was able to successfully bring about reformas "prophet-priests." The grounding fundamentals so essential informulating a progressive national-state remain tremulous, withnaukarshahi very much evidenced but in a shaken form.

The imperial tradition of complex rank classification continuedbut possibly in a more egalitarian way. Formerly, it consisted of fourhorizontal categories with little mobility among them. They weredesignated as Class I, II, III, and IV. In the federal civil service ClassI was vertically organised into twelve cadres, known as the CentralSuperior Services,47 which contained hundreds of individual posi-tions. Two of these services, The Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) andthe Police Service of Pakistan (PSP), were called the All PakistanServices. Members of these two services could be posted to seniorpositions at all levels of government and semi-autonomous bodies.Other services were unifunctional cadres such as the Foreign Service,the Audit and Account Service, the Taxation Service, and the Informa-tion Service. If a person was not a member of one of these services, hewas treated almost like a pariah such as an instructor at one of thenational training institutions.

The most intense criticism levelled against this classificationsystem was the elitist character of the generalist CSP Cadre. The cadrerestricted entry by rigorous competitive examination, never filling itsquota, and reserving key positions throughout the government for itsmembers. As a consequence they secured all sorts of preferencesincluding quick promotions, higher pay scales, and lucrative perqui-sites. The specialist/functional cadre officers often found themselvesin subordinate positions to CSP officers. This created serious moraleproblems.

The intricate stratification was abolished by the Bhutto govern-

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ment. However, the intent of class and cadre was maintained. TheCentral Public Services were classified on functional lines into seven-teen ocupational groups. The former positions reserved for the CSPcadre were placed into three different occupational groups. The fieldadministration posts were classified into the new District Manage-ment Group (DMG). Most positions in the Central Secretariat wereallocated to the Secretariat Group. A new Tribal Areas Group (TAG)was created to administer federally controlled tribal territories. Threedifferent account services were grouped into one Accounts Group.The excessively complex and archaic scheme of some six hundred payscales was abolished. It was replaced by a unified pay scale of twenty-three grades. The CSP/DMG group appears to have re-emerged as arelatively influential factor in the revamped civil service constituent.Most of the senior positions of government remain filled by membersof this grouping.

In many ways the 1973 reforms represent only a change innomenclature. The positions were not categorised and placed intooccupational groups as a result of job/position analysis and evaluation.No entrance qualifications were established for any of the groups.Lateral entry to the public service took on a "spoils character," and wasvirtually abolished under the Zia administration. Promotion to keypositions between the generalists and specialists continues as a con-tentious issue. Involved are problems of social equity, motivation,morale, and efficiency. Pakistan's periodic efforts to reform its per-sonnel system probably represent no more than the case of form overfunction. However, there have been serious infusions for enhancingthe quality of the public service. In subtle ways "function" could bemoulding "form."

Infusions

Pakistan's efforts at reforming its civil service constituent have beendisappointing. Application of sound principles of personnel manage-ment has encountered stiff resistance. Two findings of organisationaltheory provide insight into this disturbing circumstance. First, organi-sational mortality declines with age. Second, organisational perform-ance does not improve with age.48 The civil service constituent is an

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ancient social organisation. It persists yet performs inadequately. Ithas obsolesced to an inertial or institutionalised state. In character it ishighly compartmentalised and segmented.

The civil service constituent, however, is not an island in itself. Itdraws vital sustenance from ethical values based on moral duty andobligation which define how public employees and their servicedclienteles should behave. As core beliefs they are guidelines whichaffect individual attitude and motivate people to perform.

Political authority evidences itself best in the rhetoric of topleaders that provide linkages between broadly shared values andspecific policy choices. Both values and policy choices articulatedmust also be contrasted with those being rejected. Pakistan's founderMuhammad Ali Jinnah (Quaid-i-Azam), educated within Britishconstitutional history, understood well this process. Unfortunately, hedied soon after independence. Ayub Khan pursued an extremelyrational approach to socio-economic development but social groupsbeing bypassed became impatient, demanding a more equitable share.In several important ways the progressivism introduced by Ayub inthe upper civil service failed. Zulfikar ali Bhutto capitalised on thismoment of social frustration and sought to transform the civil serviceconstituent. He never successfully contested the fundamental valuesand policies, although some modifications were made. With hismilitary background, General Zia-ul-Haq preferred the old order ofaffairs, even though inducted into the upper level were militaryofficers. For him reforming the civil service constituent was not apriority issue. The same is the case for his successors, including therecently deposed Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto.

As a consequence of Pakistan's uneven history of administrativereform, along with the increased politicisation of the upper echelonsof the bureaucracy, it becomes difficult to draw linkages betweenshared values and policy choices. The matter is complicated by anexcessive concentration of political authority in the secretariat organi-sation which segments itself into a self-serving entity. The upper civilservice maintains an imperial aloofness, with a guru-like mentality.

The subject at hand is compounded by the deplorable state ofsocial science in Pakistan. Unlike the British Raj whose intellectually-driven officers turned to university-based scholars for critical infor-

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mation, no such possibility exists in Pakistan. Social science research,except for economics, is politically a suspect matter.49

Pushing aside these complexities and difficulties, linkages be-tween shared values and public personnel policy and practice may bediscerned, as shown by Figure 1. The civil service constituent reflectsvery much Pakistan's political reality and uneven progress. Pakistan'spersonnel system is in an incomplete but evolving state.

Over the last few decades, Pakistan has faced three major agency(ruled) demands which are incorporated into its civil service constitu-ent. These are, first, reconciling demand for an Islamic polity withdemand for a secular polity; second, integrating parochial regionalinterests within the context of a modern nation-state; and third,correcting unequal levels of institutional and political development.50

In personnel practice Pakistan has given preference to generalists,retained the cadre system of organisation, based position on rankhierarchy, and maintained a command structure of authority which isconcentrated in the secretariat system. Nearly all of t he core personnelfunctions are consolidated in the Federal Establishment Division.

Systemic Measures for Change

As incorporated in Figure 1, five measures for systemic change maybe identified which more or less will obtusely affect the being of thecivil service constituent. These are: first, the presence of an importantcomplex of institutions for public service training; second, the wide-spread use of employment quotas and ethnic preferences; third,rationalisation between generalists and technocrats in staffing keypositions; fourth, provision for lateral appointment and movement ofpersonnel; and finally, fostering of Islamic principles in daily admin-istrative affairs. The establishment of a Unified National Pay Scalebroke down a great deal of the social inequalities once existing in thecivil service. Hence this legal act provides institutional strength fordevelopment of viable systemic measures. However, the factor of newtechnology remains essentially unaddressed.

Institutions for Public Service Training

Since its earliest days, Pakistan was faced with an acute shortage of344

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professionally and technically educated and trained personnel. For thecivil service, this was particularly a serious matter where after inde-pendence former British Indian Civil Service (ICS) officers wereretained in strategic positions, including the Secretary of the Estab-lishment Division.

The educational policy of the British was oriented towards pro-ducing an elitist class.51 Consequently, competitive examination forrecruitment to the superior services reflected this educational biaswhich included general science, mathematics, European literature,and modern and classical languages. Sanskrit and Arabic were twonon-European subjects. The examinations were taken in the Englishlanguage. The content and the process of the recruitment examinationwere never seriously challenged, although in the public arena theywere sometimes criticised.

Some students of political development assert that this form ofeducation and socialisation resulted in estrangement between elitesand masses. This was possibly a simplistic observation. While theBritish educational experience fostered a sentiment of superiority, atthe same time it provided for a cosmopolitan outlook, with heavycredence given to intellectual thought. For illustration, a commonstrand in both British and Indian Muslim social life was an apprecia-tion of poetry, which at times bonded together two otherwise hostile"peoples." The last Governor of the British Raj Northwest Province,Sir Olaf Caroe (1946-47), could recite in the Pashtu language theimmortal poems of Khushal Khan Khatak with the best of the Pathans.52

British traditional higher education had its strengths in buildingcharacter, confidence, and competency.

Pakistan inherited as well the imperial practice dating back to theearly 1800s in providing pre-service training in selected institutionsfor young probationers.53 Prior to the administrative reforms of 1973,the probationers were separately trained under programmes carriedout by their assigned cadres. The length and content of training eachservice varied, but the rationale of education and socialisation wasbasic in all of the programmes. Presently, all probationers in thefederal cadre are trained at one integrated institution.

However, the legacy of the past was not swepi away. The CivilService Academy (CSA) followed closely the tradition of the British

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Raj's Haileybury College. The main purpose was to socialise theprobationers into the "grand tradition" of the bureaucracy rather thanimpart technical knowledge and skills. CSP probationers were re-quired to be proficient in horseback riding, were given membership inthe exclusive Lahore Gymkhana Club, and attended mess nightswhere formal attire was required, and often important officials andforeign guests were invited. The ethos was one of training for rulershipin the imperial tradition. In descending order were found also theFinance Services Academy and the Police Training Institute. Thesetwo institutions tended to replicate the CS A. Probationers to the lesserprestigious services received diluted or no pre-service training.

Arranged marriage is commonplace in Pakistan society, withthose young superior service probationers considered to be "prized"catches. Undergoing probationary training was an expensive proposi-tion which was beyond the financial resources of many middle-classfamilies. Hence early in their careers many young probationersbecame victims of opportunistic landlords and industrialists whoprovided sums of money to purchase formal attire and cover otherexpenses. Early in their careers these "bought" probationers would berequired to make "paybacks."

Rigid boundaries within and without each cadre were maintained.Seniority, a matter of great importance in a person's career, wasestablished on the basis of where one was placed in his batch of peers.Subsequent superior or inferior performance could not significantlymodify this relationship. The service associations were typically wellorganised and took active roles in preserving the service tradition. Theonly social organisation which clearly cut across them was the OldBoys Clubs of British universities, mainly those of Oxford andCambridge. A masters degree from a British institution in itselfconveyed status and prestige, and often this fact appeared on businesscards along with designation of the service (CSP).54

Under the Bhutto reforms an integrated pre-service training pro-gramme was instituted. Greater attention was given to training inspecific skills and knowledge. Carefully fostered elites were pre-served but in a more egalitarian form. The British dinner jacket formess nights was replaced by traditional attire. The ethos of rulershipwas more tightly contextualised within traditional Islamic norms of

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the subcontinent. Nevertheless the bureaucratic value of guardianshipand distrust of "people" politics continued.

Bhutto's reform initiative for integrated training was not adopted.Largely as a consequence of foreign technical assistance, mainly fromthe United States, in 1950 and early 1960, Pakistan established acomplex of in-service training institutions.55 The pi incipal ones werethe National Institutes of Public Administration (NIPA) at Karachiand Lahore, the Pakistan Academy of Rural Development at Peshawar(PARD), and the Pakistan Administrative Staff College (PASC) atLahore which was the apex of all training institutions. Other servicesalso had their own training institutions. The training was conducted ona full-time basis, and usually scheduled when a person was in a careertransition. NIPA and PARD training was designated for mid-levelmanagers whereas the PASC serviced upper managers and execu-tives. This latter institution was a residence facility which providedgood amenities for its trainees.

In operating ethos the in-service training institutions reflected thebureaucratic and social segmentation inherent in Pakistani social life.The NIPAs were more egalitarian with their training programmescrossing organisational and service lines, whereas the AdministrativeStaff College was an elitist institution designed for a small number ofselected individuals.

At the time of independence, management education in Pakistan'sinstitutions of higher learning did not exist. Hence there was an urgentneed to remedy this deficiency. The NIPAs were established in theearly 1960s to infuse American management principles and practicesinto Pakistan's public service. They may therefore be regarded asinstitutions of organisational expediency. If Pakistan's institutions ofhigher education should ever develop quality programmes in manage-ment, then the need for the NIPAs would be greatly diminished, withconstructive on-the-job training programmes established to meetspecific programme needs.56 After three decades, this expectation wasnever adequately met. The NIPAs have expanded in number to servicethe Peshawar and Quetta regions while on-the-job training pro-grammes remain poorly developed.

In contrast the PASC drew its inspiration from the British experi-ence, namely its Administrative Staff College located at Henley-on-

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Thames. Trainees were heavily drawn from the generalist and finan-cial services. Its facilities reflect the status and prestige of the superiorservices, somewhat like those of the former CSA.

Unlike the NIPAs the PASC places priority on policy issues andanalyses. Its organisational focus centers on the federal and provincialsecretariats. It is not a remedial institution but rather it seeks to equipits clientele with a better understanding of evolving policy issues. Inbroad terms the NIPA programmes are more oriented in how to get thejob done and the PASC in how to determine the right job or direction.For both institutions the task is to rejuvenate selected civil servants byremoving them from the daily demands of the workplace.

One of the main problems with this comprehensive training effortwas that the upper civil servants did not take in-service trainingseriously. However, this has changed when completion of trainingcourses became a basic criterion for promotion.

Employment Quotas and Ethnic Preference

Following the practice of the British Raj, recruitment to the middle andupper-management levels was initially based upon the principle ofmerit - ascertained on the basis of written examinations, interviews,and in appropriate instances individual performance records. Early inPakistan's existence the principle of merit was modified by reservingposts in both the federal and provincial government for special groups.This was initiated because of a small number of East Pakistanis,mainly Bengalis, in the federal bureaucracy. Under the Bhutto regimeprovision was made for lateral recruitment to posts within the centralsecretariat and elsewhere. One study shows that in 1980 only 10 percent of the posts in the federal government were filled on the criteriaof merit. The remaining 90 per cent were distributed on weightedcriteria of population of the provinces, tribal areas, and the federal areaof Islamabad.57

In the words of Charles Kennedy, "Pakistan could be described asthe archetypal quota state ..."58 As a survival expediency to amelioratethe divisive tendencies of ethnic diversity, substantial unequal re-gional development, and unbalanced institutional growth and devel-opment, there evolved early on a complex system of regional and

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vested interest quotas for recruitment to federal and provincial gov-ernments and semi-autonomous government enterprises. These havesince been extended to include student admission to educationalinstitutions. Quotas have been set aside for representatives to legisla-tive bodies. They are employed to (1) introduce remedial or compen-satory measures for identified disadvantaged persons ranging fromthose of regional linguistic groups to children of widows and non-Muslim minorities, and (2) provide some measure of proportionalrepresentation ranging from linguistic regions to gender. In politicalpractice preferential quotas have become a form of patronage -providing through the political process a means to reward some groupsand punish others. Under both the Bhutto and Zia regimes, politicalappointments, especially of a lateral character, were used to place inkey positions persons who were sympathetic with the government'spolicies.

Vested groups such as the military, organised professionals, andsportsmen (mainly those athletes of reputation in field hockey andcricket) have managed through provisions of quota systems to securespecial advantages for themselves along with their spouses andprogeny.

Possibly quotas have reduced divisive tendencies and broughtsome measure of national integration. The sunk costs, however, havebeen high. The most serious is the compromise of the merit principle,with its more than one hundred years of history Many exceptionalyoung individuals have been excluded from the public services. Largenumbers have opted out of the recruitment examinations. Since 1977the Federal Public Service Commission has found difficulty fillingvacancies by competitive examination. This situation has been exac-erbated by the complexity of the personnel process which results inlong delays in establishing eligibility for appointment and tendering ofappointments. Sizeable amounts of scarce resources have been utilisedto administer the complex quota system.

The system's operation reinforces Pakistani' s impression of wide-spread bureaucratic corruption, especially in the area of lateral ap-pointment where competitive examination has either been bypassed orsimplified. With lesser qualified persons appointed or promoted tokey positions, morale in the civil service has been affected. While this

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personnel practice may have improved regional representation in theorgans of government, it has reinforced invidious distinctions amongthe ethnic groups and regions. The use of quotas and ethnic preferencewas conceived as a short-term measure by which to achieve greateremployment equity and national commitment. Every body of publicinquiry has recommended its elimination or at least phase-down. Thecontrary has occurred with quotas in themselves becoming vestedrights or entitlements of a sort spreading and deepening in bureau-cratic practice.

A subject scarcely addressed in Pakistan's pragmatic search forpublic equity is the latent socio-religious issue of Islamic sectarian-ism. In the broader context of Sunni versus Shia orthodoxy, Pakistanileaders have managed to secure a surprising degree of equanimity. Inthe narrower context of Islamic sects, serious problems of divisivenesshave surfaced.

A difficult problem emerges in the treatment of non-Islamicminorities. As Leonard Binder writes, the Koran and the Hadiths areadament that "an infidel should never exercise authority over aMuslim."'59 Some kinds of minorities never fit. They are intolerableand insoluble. For Islam they are heretics. Reactions to such individu-als and their followers historically have been quick and drastic. Thosedeviate socio-religious groups that survived have been reduced to anon-Muslim status, with a separate theology accessible only to theirinitiates. In the Middle East the Alawites and the Druze are prominentexamples. The Bahais in Iran represent another anathema to tradi-tional Islam.

A paradox, however, arises between the letter of the Islamic legaltradition and the history of Muslim-India. Under the Mughals non-Muslims occupied strategic positions in both the civil and militarybureaucracies. It could be claimed that the Mughal empire (from thesixteenth to the eighteenth century) was the first secular state in theworld. A person's religious faith was not an important factor inholding high offices of state. Positions in finance were normally heldby Hindus. The Rajput with an illustrious military tradition com-manded Muslim troops.

Pakistan followed this practice of appointing non-Muslims to highgovernment posts. Included were Britishers as well as citizens of the

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new state including Christians, Hindus, and Parsis. This illustrioushistory firmly articulated by the nation's founders has been undersevere attack. By martial law provision issued on April 26, 1984, thecontroversial Ahmadi sect was designated as non-Muslim. With thisact the government imposed draconian-like measures on the beliefsand practices of this socio-religious group (jama 'ar).6° Its leaders fledabroad to safe haven in Great Britain, in effect abandoning their onceflourishing centre at Rabawah located in the Punjab province.

A sense of tragedy prevails for this reformist Islamic sect. At thetime of partition (1947) they opted to move from India to Pakistan,desiring to become part of the new Islamic Republic of Pakistan.Unlike their more orthodox members, the Ahmadis accepted Westerneducation and produced a number of outstanding persons, includingone Nobel prize winner in physics. They were attracted to publicservice including the military. Their successes brought resentment inthe orthodox communities. Since the earliest days of Pakistan, Ahmadishave experienced violence, persecution, and murder. Their positionbecame increasingly tenuous under Zia's Islamisation programme.The state character was increasingly defined within the terms ofIslamic fundamentalism. Conformity to belief and practice was pre-scribed by government. Equity and social justice were framed in newlegal concepts, with the notion of equality being reinterpreted.

But one aspect did not change. The government sought to pursueequity through its conventional systems of quotas and ethnic prefer-ence. While the Ahmadi population numbers three or more million,the government records only 63,675 Ahmadis. One seat is reserved forthe Ahmadis in the National Assembly. The Ahmadis are now her-etics. As one Muslim scholar, Ameerali, writes: "Neither the Bahaisnor the Ahmadis can exist without being persecuted under a Sunni orShia state. Their salvation under contemporary politics lies in achiev-ing a separate state of their own;"61 but within the rich Mughaltradition this may not prove to be the case.

Staffing Key Positions: Technocrats and Generalists

No aspect of public organisation is so difficult to resolve as theworking relationships between the specialist/technocrats and the

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generalist/managers.62 While this applies to all levels and componentsof organisations, it is especially nagging at the strategic apex wheretechnical expertise of productive work to be performed must mesh intothe capacity to resolve competing political demands.63

Management as a legitimate subject and discipline is basically alate nineteenth and early twentieth century American product. Itemerged as a consequence of accelerated industrialisation and urbani-sation which required large-scale, complex organisations. There areessentially no management problems in agrarian societies such as atthe time of the British Raj. There are, however, a lot of politicalproblems in the Laswellian sense of who gets what, how, when, andwhere. Hence administrative politics takes on inordinate importancesince this is the way where the "most" is to be "gotten."

With the emergence of the administrative state, the purview ofgovernment expanded to include the production of goods and services.Its technical operating core was transformed.64 Managing the techni-cal core of the new transformed organisations must primarily be theresponsibility of technocrats and not generalists. For Pakistan this hasnot typically been the case. From hospitals to electrical power plants,generalists in civil service rank have dominated the strategic apex ofmany technically driven organisations. In the civil service distur-bances of 1968-69 the technocrats, mainly physicians and engineers,openly contested their subordinate position to the generalists. Duringthe Bhutto reforms in 1973 they fought for more reserved posts in thecentral and provincial secretariats and the strategic apex of largepublic enterprises. A decade later in the 1980s they were againagitating for greater recognition.65

Under Pakistan's administrative state which was heavily fundedwith foreign aid, a case could be made that the strategic importance ofthe technocrats had greatly increased. To manage Pakistan's hydraulicsystem, the largest irrigation system in the world, takes personseducated and trained in extraordinary technical expertise. Generalistscannot adequately perform.

While in recent years there has been improved accommodationbetween technocrats and generalists, the issue is far from beingresolved. Most jobs in bureaucracy have both their technical andpolitical dimensions. In most organisations the technical considera-

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tion is inversely related to echelon level. The higher ihe echelon levelthe lower the importance of technical factors in contrast to the politicalfactors. This fact is structured into Pakistan's bureaucracy with itssecretariat system which could be one of its strengths.

The issue of technical versus political management is complicatedby the extreme difficulty in preparing and securing political managers.In other words: "Can political management be taught?" There is noquestion about technical management. It can be taught. Found here isthe so-called difference between soft science against hard science.Political management falls into the former and not the latter category.At best it represents a form of distilled wisdom gained out of meaning-ful experience. Of these two contending aspects quality politicalmanagement is more critical since through its policy process itdetermines the feasible. In contrast technical management is con-cerned with carrying out the detailed activities of projects and pro-grammes. Here is found the delicate problem of management of meansagainst management of ends which requires the accommodation oftwo different kinds of mind-sets.

Pakistan administrative reform has never confronted this vitalissue. Admitting a few technocrats into a few strategic positions in anestablishmentarian system is not the appropriate means by which tomobilise meaningful science and technology in vital governmentoperations. Rank based on technically designed jobs is the only wayto insure that technical skills and knowledge may be infused andutilised properly in technologically driven organisations. This re-quirement means that Pakistan will have to revise and revamp its entireeducational establishment, recruitment examination and promotionsystem, and career patterns. It must as well take a hard look at itssociety.

In addition technocrats in their mid-career would have to beconverted into political managers rather than generalists in their earlycareers forced into technocratic moulds. In the 1960s Americantechnical assistance offered a solution to this critical matter which wasrejected. Instead Pakistan sought to pursue a practice of expediencywhere a few technical-type civil servants would be appointed tosecretariat and upper management posts - in effect maintaining thestatus quo.

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Lateral Recruitment and Movement

The opening-up of the bureaucracy to lateral recruitment and move-ment was a major feature of Bhutto's administrative reform.66 InAugust 1973 lateral recruits were appointed to the revised servicestructure with its newly created occupational groups. Over the nextfive years a total of 514 lateral appointments were made, with themajority drawn from within the government. Of these appointments,48 military officers were laterally recruited.

From its inception this programme encountered problems, withthe Establishment Division finding it difficult to place the new lateralrecruits. Under the subsequent Zia regime lateral recruitment was firstcurtailed and finally abandoned, with the exception of the induction ofselected military officers into the civil bureaucracy.

With its cadre system and dominance by the generalists, it wasinevitable that this programme would fail. Yet its process was accel-erated by compromise in the merit principle and the appointment ofmany persons with marginal qualifications. Training programmes totransform technocrats into political managers were never initiated,since this is not a feature of Pakistan's career development. Techno-crats who reach strategic positions remain few in number.

With the secretariat system intact, it was virtually impossible forlateral recruitment such as in the United States to take place at thestrategic apex level of management. Ministers and related politicalofficials continued to draw their staff from career civil servants whooperated as politicians-for-hire.

Bhutto's notion of the need to infuse "new blood" in the personnelsystem had merit. Pakistan could not find a way by which to accom-plish it without seriously weakening the civil service.

Islamic Revival

Over the last two decades Pakistan has experienced Islamic revivalistmovements.67 The minority Shias have been politicised.68 Islamisingsocial and political discourse throughout Pakistan's government hasoccurred. Islamic activism has impacted Pakistan's venerable buttroubled judicial system, although the fundamentals of the British Rajbody of law and courts remain intact.69

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Pakistan scholars generally agree that although the civil serviceappears more Islamic in character, basically little change has resulted.The old personnel values remain solidly in place, being both theproducts of the civil service constituent as well as its driving forces.Possibly Islam as a conservative tradition works to the preservation ofth old conservative personnel constituent. As for a few illustrations, ata macro-level Islamic values support the current monopoly of power.The same exists for a centralised, hierarchical structure. Jobs areconceived in simple terms. There is a tendency towards a singleservice. Values about work focus on tradition. Measurement is feared.Legal protection is stressed. Involved is inspection and control.Values about employees are not yet clear. The current practice ofsystem indifference continues which includes foims of appraisal,sanction, and ranking.

New Technological Expertise

In Pakistan's quest for a responsible civil service constituent the mostcrucial aspect remains unaddressed. A modern state during this globalage rests upon mobilisation of professionals and from them arisespower in the highest degree.70 Professionals are today's principalpower-brokers, since they have quick access to knowledge. Ramifica-tions for Pakistan's future will be far-reaching. To move into thisemergent world, its civil service constituent must undergo a wholesaletransformation. It is not a matter of value adjustments but one of valueshifts. In the search of Pakistan's current time there appears to be anabysmal silence about how information technology will drive thefuture.

Possibly the best answer to this question may be found in thespectacular economic growth of Confucian East Asian societies. AsSamuel Huntington wrote in his thought-provoking book, The ThirdWave: Democratization in the Twentieth Century, "Confucian de-mocracy may be a contradiction in terms, but democracy in a Confu-cian society need not be."71 In a reverse sense the same may be said ofIslamic societies. Egalitarianism and voluntarism are central themesin Islam, but in practice no Islamic country has sustained a fullydemocratic system for any period of time except possibly Turkey.

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Pakistan' Civil Service

Concluding Remarks

Pakistan is a political product following the worldwide transitions ofWorld War II. Its civil service dates back two hundred or more years.It is a cultural artifact infused with basal values which can best beunderstood in its constituent dimension. Pakistan's civil service isboth a very modern and a very ancient institution.

Pakistan leaders may wish to pursue the establishment of a fullymodern state but realising this ideal has become frustrated by anobsolescing imperial tradition. The impact of structure on behaviourhas profoundly influenced Pakistan's personnel practices. Socio-organisational segmentation has fostered excessive narcissistic be-haviour.

Structure communicates values through an institutional filteringprocess. As Marshall McLuhan has demonstrated, the medium is themessage.72 What people learn about themselves and their value to anorganisation is not what the organisation says to them but rather whatthey experience with members of that organisation. What they essen-tially experience is structure. Here is found the cultural genius of theBritish-Raj imperial tradition. The rulers understood their constitutiveagency, or agencies, and designed their structures to sustain imperialrule.

However time has changed. Structures that once talked to peopleand helped to shape them now pose considerable problems. Somesalient issues here are: How are roles organised? (Are job descriptionsemployed? To what degree of specificity?); who gains access to whatroles? (Male or female? One ethnic group or another?); what getsrewarded? (Performance or other considerations?); and how aredecisions made? (On the basis of consensus, fiat, or in private deals?)

In imperial time these and related questions on personnel matterscould be quickly resolved. This is not the case now. Messagescommunicated by structure are more powerful than any statementissued by top leadership. Research supports the notion that jobs playa significant, even a pivotal, role in shaping human behaviour. Herevalues become the critical factors since in institutional pattern theygovern the allocation of personnel resources and determine who getsthe rewards.

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A chronic problem of Pakistan's civil service has been disparitiesof opportunity. Some effort has been made to correct the situationthrough an institutional quota system. The cost in morale and perform-ance has been heavy.

In assessing Pakistan's efforts in personnel reform at least fivecategories of behaviour should have been addressed, since they arecentral to the healthy dynamics of a developing organisation. Theseare self-esteem, aspiration, commitment, diversion, and indifference.Unfortunately, these vital factors have not been given serious atten-tion, with great emphasis given to the maintenance of the status quo.

Compounding Pakistan's reform efforts have been the resurgenceof Islamic revivalism. What this means in Pakistan's future is difficultto ascertain. To date it has possibly been a major factor, consciouslyand unconsciously, in the maintenance of Pakistan's conservativetradition. Paradoxically, it could eventually become the force whichwill drive Pakistan to reinvent its constituent civil service, whichwould in holistic terms encompass new values about macro-levelrelations such as competition and market incentives, about structuressuch as decentralisation and flat organisation, about work such asconsumerism and ability, and about employees such as needs anddevelopment. With this sort of reinvention personnel administrationcould realise its promise of treating employees as assets that would benurtured and protected. The era of ruler and ruled would vanish and thedream of Pakistan would be more fully realised.

NOTES

1. Title of the first novel of the Raj Quartet by Paul Scott, published in 1966 byWilliam Morrow and Company of London.2. See J Allen et al., The Cambridge Shorter History of India (Delhi: S. Chand andCo., 1964), especially Chapter 19, "Political Developments, 1910-19."3. Ibid. In the great Durbar of 1876 the title Empress of India was imposed. Withthis political act, the Indian princes were included as members of the empire.4. As to the present day complexities and contradictions, see PartaChatterjee, TheNation and its Fragments: Colonial and Post Colonial Histories (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1993) and Peter Van Der Veer, Religious Nationalism:Hindus and Muslims in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

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5. A substantial body oi'hterature exists on this subject which never quite gets atthe essence of the matter. Although written in the context of the American society,the following provides conceptual insights: Charles Derber, William A. Schwartzand Yale Magrass, Power in the Highest Degree, Professionals ana'the Rise of'aNewMandarin Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). Also see PhilipWoodruff, The Men Who Ruled India (London. Jonathan Cape, 1964), two volumes.6. Critical to this discussion are the seminal notions on value shifts such ascontained in Henry J. Aaron, Thomas E. Mann and Timothy Taylor, eds., Values andPublic Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994); Helen Ingramand Steven Rathgcb, eds., Public Policy for Democracy (Washington, D C . TheBrookings Institution, 1993), and Montgomery Van Wart, "The First Step in theReinvention Process. Assessment," Public Administration Review 55 (September/October 1995): 429-38.7. See Richard T. Green, Lawrence F. Keller and Gary L. Wamsley, "Reconstitut-ing a Profession for American Public Administration," Public AdministrationReview 53 (November/December 1993): 516-248. Quoted in Ervin I.J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern Nation State (Cambridge-Cambridge University Press, 1965), p.212.9. As to time incongruencies, see Garth N. Jones, "Pakistan's Personnel Admin-istration in 'Disjointed Tiome'," Journal of Third World Studies 11 (1, Spring,1994): 44-76.10. In the fullest sense sec Charles H. Kennedy, ed., Pakistan 1992 (Boulder,Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), and Charles H. Kennedy and Rasul Bakhen Rais,eds., Pakistan 1995 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), especially. ShafikH. Hashmi's Chapter 3 "Privatization Policy."11. These two terms are employed in the usage common to British-Indian time. AsHugh Tinber explains in his India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis (New York:Frederick A. Praeger, 1962) on p. 158, "The humble man often still addresses a civilservant as Sirkar (ruler) or Hakim (lawgiver). The government, personified in theOfficial, is the source of all things. It is the fount of blessings, so that British rule wasoften called Mai-Pap, or Mother-Father rule."12. See Garth N. Jones, "Public Personnel Administration in Pakistan: Clashing ofIdeas," published in two parts, The Chinese Journal of Administration 55 (February1994): 111-37 and 56 (August 1994): 69-100.13. Following the British Raj practice, the Pakistan Army draws heavily upon thePathans of the Northwest Frontier, once called the sword of the Indian Empire. Ona more selective basis Punjabis have been heavily employed See Donald L.Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, California: University of CaliforniaPress, 1985), especially P.626 et seq. and Stephen Cohen, The Pakistan Army(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1984).14. See his India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis (New York: Frederick A.Praeger, 1962), p. 158.15. Indebted in concept to Green, Keller, and Wamsley, "Reconstituting a Profes-sion for American Public Administration," especially p.519-20.

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16. The writings of American scholar Ralph Braibanti are particularly insightfuland useful. Fortunately, editor JameelurRehman Khan collected them together, withan excellent introduction. See his Evolution of Pakistan's Administrative System,The Collected Papers of Ralph Braibanti (Islamabad: Pakistan Public Administra-tion Research Centre, O & M Division, 1987).17. Indebted in concept to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandemonium: Ethnicity inInternational Politics (New York: Oxford University Press. 1993).18. See his "Social Mobilization and Political Development." American PoliticalScience Review 55 (September 1961 )• 493-514 and Nationah sm and Social Commu-nication (Cambridge, Massachusett: MIT Press, 1953).19. See Robert Laporte, Jr., "Succession in Pakistan: Continuity and Change in aGarrison State," Asian Survey 9 (November 1969): 842-61. Khalid bin Sayeed,Politics in Pakistan (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1980), Chapter 3, "Bhutto'sPopulist Movement and the Bonapartist State"; William L Richter, "PersistentPraetonanism: Pakistan's Third Military Regime," Pacific Affairs 51 (Fall 1978):406-26; and "Pakistan: Out of the Praetorian Labyrinth," Current History 85 (March1986): 113-16 and 136-37; and Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rushed, eds., Pakistan:The Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian State (London:Zed Press, 1983)20. See Nasir Islam, "Pakistan" in V. Subramanian, ed., Public Administration inthe Third World (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), pp.68-101.21. See Khalid bin Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: HoughtonMifflin Co., 1967), especially Chapter 6, "Bureaucracy and Political and EconomicDevelopment." Baradari basically means an endogamous group of families. Insocial action Baradari behaviour has many characteristics of caste.22. See the quotes of the 1979 Civil Service Commission report cited by Robert LaPorte, Jr., "Administrative Reform and Evolution of the Administrative System ofPakistan," in Krishna K. Tummala, ed., Administrative Reform and Evolution of theAdministrative Systems Abroad (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America,1982), p.127 etseq. Representative of such public expression is contained in Hasan(Nazim) Habib, Babus, Brahmins and Bureaucrats (Lahore Peoples' Publishing,1973).23. Bhutto was hanged for high crimes on April 4,1979, and Zia was killed August17, 1988 in an unsolved air disaster.24. See his "Colonial Legacy, Administrative Reform and Politics: Pakistan 1947-87," Public Administration and Development 9 (June/August 1989): 279.25. See his "Social Development Planning, Management and Implementation inPakistan," in C.N. Padungkarn, ed., Social Development Alternatives: Concept andPractice in Asian and Pacific Countries (Nagoya, Japan: United Nations Centre forRegional Development, 1987), p.78.26. See Tinker, India and Pakistan, Chapter 7, "The Public Services."27. See Jones, "Public Personnel Reform in Pakistan."28. See Syed Giasuddin Ahmed, Bangladesh Public Service Commission (Dhaka,Bangladesh: University of Dhaka, 1990), particularly Chapter 2, "Public ServiceCommssion in British India."

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29. See ibid., particularly Chapter 3, "The Public Service Commission in Pakistan."30. See Nasir Islam, "Pakistan" in V. Subramanian, Public Administration in theThird World (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990): 69-101, and Ralph Braibanti,"Reflections on Bureaucratic Corruption," Public Administration 40 (Winter 1962):357-61.31. See Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," in JosephPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1963): 360-441.32. Sec Garcth Morgan, Images of Organization (Newbury Park, California: SagePublications, 1986), especially Chapter 7, "Exploring Plato's Cave, Organizationsas Psychic Prisons."33. See Inayatullah, "Internal and External Factors in the Failure of NationalIntegration in Pakistan," in Stephanie Neumann, ed , Small States and SegmentedSocieties: National Political Integration in a Global Environment (New York:Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp. 102-20; and Stanley A. Kochanek, Interest Groupsand Development (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), Chapter 2 "PoliticalCulture." Also see Rosabeth Moss Kanter, The Change Masters (New York' Simonand Schuster, 1983), especially pp.28-36; and Garth N. Jones, "Education andTraining in Public Administration: Transference of Segmenting OrganizationalBehavior," The International Journal of Public Administration 14(2, 1991): 197-235.34. As to pathological consequences, see Christopher Lasch, The Culture ofNarcissism, American Life in the Age of Diminishing Expectations (New York:W.W. Norton & Co., 1979); Michael M. Harmon, "The Responsible Actor as'Tortured' Soul," Administration and Society 21 (November 1989): 283-312;Robert Jackall, "Moral Mazes: Bureaucracy and Managerial Work," HarvardBusiness Review 61 (September-October 1983): 118-30; Michael A. Diamond,"Bureaucracy as Externalized Self-System, A View from the Psychological Inte-rior," Administration and Society 16 (August 1984): 195-214 and "OrganizationalIdentity: A Psychoanalytic Exploration of Organizational Meaning," Administra-tion and Society 20 (August 1988): 166-90; and Michael A. Diamond and SethAllcorn, "Role Formation as Defensive Activity in Brueaucratic Organizations,"Political Psychology 7 (4, 1986): 709-31.35. See his Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority(Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), Chapter5, "The South Asian Subcontinent. Hindu and Muslim Power and Rewards ofNarcissism," p. 157. Also see O.P. Dwi vedi, "Administrative Heritage, Morality andChallenges in the Sub-Continent since the British Raj," Editor's Introduction,International Review of Administrates Services 9 (June/August 1989): 245-52;and O.P. Dwivedi and R.B. Jain, "Bureaucratic Morality in India," InternationalPolitical Science 9 (3, 1988): 205-14.36. See his Asian Power and Politics, p. 156.37. lbid.,v.\57.38. ZulfikarAli Bhutto's childhood gives credence to the pervasiveness of this kind

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of narcissistic behaviour in Pakistan. See Shahid Javid Buiki, Pakistan UnderBhutto, 1971-72 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), especially pp.83-90. For apioneer work touching upon this aspect, see Muneer Ahmad, The Civil Servant inPakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1964).39. See his "The Nature of Public Interest," in Inayatullah and Anwar TahmaspKhan, eds., Administrator and the Citizen (Lahore: The National Institute of PublicAdministration, 1965), p.31, There appears to be no empirical research on thissubject. However, according to some reports, the murder of father and/or son doestake place such as the common belief concerning the case of Nawab Kalabagh,Governor of West Pakistan under Ayub Khan, who was of his principal politicallieutenants.40. Translated by AJ. Arberry and published by John Murray of London, 1953.41. See Shahid Javed Burki, "Ayub" s Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation," AsianSurvey 12 (March 1972): 201-12.42. Ibid.43. Quote found in W. Eric Gustafson, "Economic Reforms under the BhuttoRegime," Journal of Asian and African Studies 8 (July/October 1973), p.256.44. Ibid.45. See S.J. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-77 (New York: St. Martin's Press,1980), p. 100, and Nasir Islam, "Colonial Legacy, Administrative Reform andPolitics: Pakistan 1947-1987," Public Administration and Development 9 (1989):271-85.46. Ibid.47. See Garth N. Jones, "Public Personnel Reform in Pakistan," The ChineseJournal of Administration 55 (February 1994): 111-37 and 5ft (August 1994): 69-110.48. See Marshall W. Meyer and Lynne G. Zucker, Permanently Failing Organiza-tions (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1989).49. See Shafik H. Hashmi, ed., The State of Social Science in Pakistan (Islamabad:Quaid-Azam University, 1989).50. See Charles H. Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford UniversityPress, 1987), Chapter 1, "The Context and Characteristics of Pakistan's CivilBureaucracy "51. See Shaukat Ali, Nation Building, Development and Administration: A ThirdWorld Perspective, second revised edition (Lahore, Pakistan S. Aziz Shah Publish-ers, 1988), especially pp.14-16.52. See Sir Olaf Carve, The Pathans: 550 BC-AD 1957 (New York: St. Martin'sPress, 1965).53. See Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, especially Chapfer 5, "Recuntment tothe Federal Bureaucracy."54. See Garth N. Jones, "Interest Groups and the Political Process," in Shafik H.Hashmi, ed., The Governing Process in Pakistan, 1958-69 (Lahore: Aziz Publishers,1987), especially pp.302-3, and Ralph Braibanti, "The Higher Bureaucracy ofPakistan," in Braibanti, ed., Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British

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Imperial Tradition (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966), especially pp.250-51.55. Pakistanis have published a great deal about their training institutions, espe-cially in the 1960s and early 1970. An insightful observation was never published.It was written by M.B.A. Abbas, CSP, when he was a Senior Specialist at the EastWest Centre. See his Public Administration Training in Pakistan: A Retrospect andAn Outlook for the Future, prepared for the Second International Conference on theProblems of Modernization in Asia and the Pacific, August 9-15,1970, (Honolulu,Hawaii: East-West Center, 1970, Mimeographed). For detailed descriptions of thisperiod, sec Md. Anis-u-zaman, ed., Training for Public Service (Dacca: NationalInstitute of Public Administration, 1969).56. This was the underlying rationale of the 1960s US/AID contract with the Schoolof Public Administration, University of Southern California.57. See Fazal Ur Rahim and Agha Iftikhar Husain, "The Civil Service System inPakistan" in Amara Raksastaya and Heinnch Siedentopf, &As.t Asian Civil Services:Development and Trends (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Pacific Development andAdministration Centre, 1980), p.324. Also see Mohammad Mohabbat Khan andHabib Mohammad Zafarullah, Recruitment and Selection in the Higher CivilServices of Bangladesh: An Overview, SICA Occasional Papers Series, SecondSeries No. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Section on International and Comparative Admin-istration, American Society for Public Administration, 1984).58. See his "Policies of Preference in Pakistan," paper delivered at the annualmeeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August30-Septcmber 2, 1984, p.l (offset). Kennedy is the preeminent scholar on thissubject. This section relies heavily upon his published works. See his Bureaucracyin Pakistan, 1987, especially Chapter 8, "The Quota System of Regional Represen-tation in the Federal Bureaucracy;" Chapter 3, "Policies of Redistributional Prefer-ence in Pakistan," in Neil Nevitte and Charles H. Kennedy eds., Ethnic Preferenceand Public Policy in Developing States (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publish-ers, Inc., 1986); "Policies of Ethnic Preference in Pakistan," Asian Survey 24 (June1984): 688-703; and "Analysis of the Lateral Recruitment Program to the FederalBureaucracy of Pakistan, 1973-79," Journal of South Asian and Middle EasternStudies 3 (Summer 1980): 42-65.59. Sec his Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley University of CaliforniaPress, 1963), especially pp. 88 et seq.; and Koran 3:24, 113,5:56.60. See Garth Jones, "Equity in Pakistan's Public Service. The AhmaddiyyatIssue," Asian Journal of Public Administration 9 (June 1987): 74-97; and CharlesH. Kennedy and Garth N. Jones, "Public Service Equity in Pakistan," in Krishna K.Tummala, cd., Equity in Public Employment Across Nations (New York: UniversityPress of America, 1989), pp. 103-32. Also see Tayzab Mahamud, "ProtectingReligious Minorities: The Courts Abdication" in Kennedy and Rais, Pakistan 1995,pp.83-102.61. Personal letter dated September 18, 1985.62. To simplify matters the terms managers and administrators are used inter-changeably.

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63. The notion of strategic apex is derived from Henry Mintzberg, Structure inFives: Designing Effective Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,Inc., 1983), Chapter 1, "Foundations of Organizational Design."64. See Garth N. Jones, "Credentiahng Public Managers: Costs of Amateurs TooHigh," Public Administration Quarterly 9 (Spring 1985): 55-X3.65. See Charles H. Kennedy, "Technocrats and the Generalist Mystique: Physi-cians, Engineers, and the Administrative System of Pakistan," in Yogendra K.Malik, ed., Politics, Technology, and Bureaucracy in South A\ia (Leiden, Nether-lands: E.J. Brill, 1983): 98-121; and Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, Chapter 7,"Technocrats and Generalists."66. See Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, Chapter 6, "The Lateral RecruitmentProgramme "67. See Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "Organization in Islamic Movements" in Kennedyand Rais, Pakistan 1995, pp.61-82.68. See Afak Haydar, "The Politicization of the Shias and Development of theTehrike-e-Nifaz-e-Figh-e-Jafaria in Pakistan" in Kennedy, Kckistan 1992, pp.75-94.69. See, for illustration Charles H. Kennedy, "Presidential-Prime Minister Rela-tions: The Role of the Superior Courts" and Mahmud, "Protecting ReligiousMinorities" in Kennedy and Rais, Pakistan 1995, pp.17-30 and 83-102, respec-tively.70. See Derber, Schwartz and Magrass, Power in the Highest Degree, 1990.71. Published by University of Oklahoma Press. See p.31072. See his Understanding Media. The Extensions of Man (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964).

Garth N. Jones is Professor Emeritus in Public Policy and Organi national Theory at theUniversity of Alaska Anchorage. He is grateful to a number of persons who shared theirresearch and insights. He would particularly like to thank Robert Abramson and ShafikHashmi who read the entire manuscript. Special acknowledgment must be given to JanetBurton whose professional word processing and editorial skills wen' invaluable.

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Pakistani Civil Service