127

Mission Impossible?Some Notes on Journalistic Shortcomings

in the Coverage of War and Terrorism

LARS W. NORD & JESPER STRÖMBÄCK

Institute for Democratic Communication, SE-851 70Sundsvall; lars.nord@mh.se, jesper.stromback@mh.se

The outcome of the war in Iraq in the spring of2003 surprised almost nobody, except perhaps theIraqi Information Minister. However, the differentphases of the conflict, through to the day of the an-ticipated US-allied victory, surprised almost every-one, even the most distinguished observers, such ashighly qualified political and military analysts.

Yes, the Americans and the British won the war,but not in the expected way. At first, during the be-ginning of the war, there were small-scale attacks in-stead of the much-expected “big bang”, US troopswere on the ground more rapidly than expected andthere were also serious unpredicted military clasheswith ordinary Iraqi troops. Finally, the much-fearedconfrontation with the troops of the RepublicanGuard and the presumed bloody street fighting inthe centre of Baghdad never actually took place.

As with other wars of our time, the war in Iraqwas not only a battle of weapons, but also a battleof opinions. The world community was deeply di-vided on the necessity of a war in Iraq to stop thesupposed production of weapons of mass destruc-tion. As an alternative, the UN Security Councilwas promoting the idea of continued weapon in-spections by UN officials. A few countries sup-ported the war, though most states argued for apeaceful solution sanctioned by the UN.

In situations such as this, war propaganda playsan important role in portraying the conflict and thewar in the most favourable way for each side. Thepropaganda strategies are most often oriented to-wards the media arena, as the media provide themain source of information for citizens today. Thus,

studies of media coverage of wars and other crisesare essential for understanding the opinion forma-tion processes occuring during dramatic events.

Forthcoming academic research on media cover-age of the war in Iraq will surely answer importantquestions about how journalists and editors handledforeseeable outcomes and the highly unpredictablechain of events: Were professional standards in re-porting achieved? Was the public well informedabout the development of the war? Were the newsdepartments open-minded in telling their audiencesabout the problems of evaluation of conflictingstatements and contradictory news stories?

Until this research on media coverage of the warin Iraq is completed, there are good reasons to re-consider the role of professional journalism in crisescommunications. Why is it sometimes successfuland why does it sometimes fail? In this article, wewill thus examine the challenges facing professionaljournalism and its core values during times of warand terror. We do so by introducing a model for ana-lysing the media’s ability to cover different seriouscrises, and we test our thesis using empirical datafrom two earlier dramatic events, the terror attacksin the US on September 11, 2001 and the outbreakof the war in Afghanistan in October 2001. In thelast section, we discuss the possibility of analysingthe conflict in Iraq in the same way.

The Noble Art of War Reportingand Its Not-so-Noble EnemiesWars and war-like situations undoubtedly pose hugeand different challenges for news reporting. First ofall, much of war reporting relies on political andmilitary sources, whose incentives are often tocover up the truth and manipulate media reporting.

128

From a historical context this is nothing new, asa war without propaganda is unthinkable. Propa-ganda is necessary to mobilize the people against anevil enemy and to provide arguments as to why thewar is the best solution to a nation’s problems. Theword “propaganda” may seem obsolete in post-modern and individualistic Western societies, butpropaganda is a complex concept (Ellul 1973).There is agitatorial propaganda of the kind we oftensee in totalitarian states, with mass demonstrations,tributes to single-party leaders and systematic sup-pression of opposing views and groups. There isalso, however, social propaganda focused on build-ing common values and consensus and alienating de-viating arguments. Social propaganda is often lessarticulated, but can be very effective when con-ducted by governments utilizing public relations ex-perts, who in turn use modern communication tech-nology. Thus every state, totalitarian or democratic,uses different types of propaganda before the war(to prepare and mobilize), during the war (to con-fuse and encourage) and after the war (to justify and“write history”).

The continuous existence of propaganda in timesof war is a challenge for every media organization,as it makes criticism of sources, balanced news se-lection and editorial independence more difficult toachieve. Most studies of the subject confirm as-sumptions about biased news reporting, asymmetri-cal reliance on sources and neglected areas of cover-age. Also, most scientific research reports on mediaactivities during war doubtless support the oft-men-tioned expression that “the first causality of war isthe truth” (Nord & Strömbäck 2002; Riegert 2002;Zelizer & Allan 2002; Bennett & Paletz 1994;Kennedy 1993; Hadenius & Stür 1992; Hvitfelt &Mattsson 1992; Nohrstedt 1992; Hallin 1986).

However, some conflicts have been covered withmore journalistic quality than have others. The ob-stacles to war reporting may exist in every case, butthey can be easier or more difficult to overcome de-pending on the prevailing circumstances with regardto political viewpoints and/or professional pre-mises.

To start with, the political perspectives on aconflict may vary. There are conflicts that are cov-ered by the rules of international law and there arealso conflicts that are extremely controversial in thisregard. When the political elite are united and in fa-vour of a war, the likelihood of patriotic reportingin national media will increase (Rosen 2002; Kalb1994). On the other hand, if the political elite are di-vided on this issue, the national media will prob-ably describe the conflicting positions more care-

fully and cover the war more comprehensively(Bennett 1994).

The American political scientist Daniel C. Hallinstudied war reporting in Vietnam in what is prob-ably the most important research on the relation be-tween media and political elite positions (Hallin1986). Hallin noted a dramatic change in Americanmedia coverage of the war, from more docile jour-nalism at the beginning to more critical reportinglater on when there was growing opposition to thewar on the part of a variety of domestic politicalgroups. According to Hallin, there are differenttypes of conflicts in society and the ability of themedia to cover these conflicts varies. Consensus or“legitimate controversy”, to use Hallin’s term, ap-plies to situations that are easier for the media tocover than are conflicts in which one or more partsare outside the political establishment.

Hallin refers to the nation-state state in hisworks, but his conclusions could also be applied atthe international level, as news reporting is nowa-days global in nature. If the international commu-nity is unified and in favour of a war, the reportingwill likely deviate dramatically from how it wouldtake shape in a a situation where powerful nationsdisagree about the necessity of the war. Wars in thename of the United Nations and with the support ofresolutions from the Security Council are probablyreported in a somewhat different way compared towars initiated by single countries and questioned bymany other countries. Another conclusion with re-gard to the globalization of news is that patrioticnational media coverage may be less decisive if in-ternational TV channels and the Internet are able tocross national borders and thus allow other per-spectives on the events.

The quality of war reporting is, however, notonly a matter of political consensus or controversy.There are also, inevitably, internal factors of pro-duction within media organization – factors of greatimportance for the quality of media coverage(McNair 1998; Shoemaker & Reese 1996). In warreporting it is relevant to ask where journalists areworking, when journalists are publishing the resultsof their work and, perhaps most importantly, howjournalists are working within the media organiza-tion.

The first question about where the journalistsare based may appear to be trivial, but it is never-theless an essential element in ensuring objectiveand balanced reporting. A net of correspondents onboth sides of the battlefield increases the possibili-ties for comparing military statements and for com-plementing official declarations with personal field

129

reports or new perspectives on current events. Theability of journalists to move freely within a con-flict is one of the key factors for independent andadequate reporting. Most modern wars are, how-ever, marked by the opposite conditions for mostjournalists. All wars, since the Vietnam War 30years ago, have been difficult for the media to coverin a professional manner, as journalists are subjectto severe military restrictions, which regulate allmedia activities. The journalists have been obligedto follow well-directed press conferences far wayfrom the war zone or to join well-organized and su-pervised tours to the frontier. Another feature of themodern war is a mixture of censorship and self-regulation, which obviously also obstructs fair andbalanced news reporting.

Second, there are obvious reasons to evaluatematerial published by a journalist that is about thewar and for the public. Publishing once involved astruggle to print or broadcast breaking news everyday, but nowadays involves instant breaking news.Historically, war journalism appeared in newspa-pers and broadcast news with stories about yester-day’s actions. A considerable time passed betweenevents and news, which gave news departments areasonable chance to confirm new facts, completestories and analyse the recent development fromdifferent perspectives. There was plenty of time toexplain the whole situation and evaluate differenttestimonies.

Today, the leading feature of reporting is 24-hournews production. TV channels are producing newsall the time, and websites on the Internet are up-dated instantly (Seib 2001). The latest news be-comes an old story very quickly. The instant de-mand for news influences journalistic practices inmany ways. It may even be problematic when noth-ing substantial happens, the media then has newsholes that have to be filled with something. That“something” may more often than not be non-events or pseudo-events or commentaries involvinglarge amounts of speculation. The increased compe-tition, spurred on by more market-driven media or-ganizations, especially tabloid newspapers andcommercial TV stations, tends to produce less seri-ous journalism and more sensational news(McManus 1994; Underwood 1993). When recur-rent deadlines are obsolete and everyone seems tobe online all the time, high quality reporting, espe-cially about dramatic events, is less likely to occur.

The American media researchers Bill Kovachand Tom Rosenstiel describe, in their book WarpSpeed, how the pressure for news has created amixed US media culture with some distinct features.

This involves less complete and more fragmentedjournalism, the increasing power of sources in newsreporting, decreased importance of professionaljournalistic values and commentaries replacing in-formation. The authors explain the development interms of a new situation where news departmentshave to fill the void in the 24-hour news cycle, buthave insufficient economic resources for gatheringthe news (Kovach & Rosenstiel 1999: 60).

Finally, apart from where and when, war report-ing is naturally a matter of how to report.

Evaluation and criticism of sources is of greatimportance, as is the ability of media professionalsto verify and follow up statements from differentgroups involved in the conflict. There are reasons tobelieve that opportunities for adequate reporting in-crease if media routines already exist and that it ispossible for the media to make adequate prepara-tions.

It may be possible to look at previous mediaroutines in cases where there have been similarevents, and media professionals may also be ac-quainted with these types of crises. If journalistscan refer to other events and recognize significantpatterns of the conflict, they will presumably bemore successful in scrutinizing and questioning offi-cial views. On the other hand, if the reporters face acompletely new crisis in which there are no mediaroutines to follow, fewer possibilities will exist forhigh quality reporting. In this situation, there is agreater risk of circulating false information and con-fusing news reporting.

Of equal importance is the possibility for mediaorganizations to make adequate preparations beforethe outbreak of a war or a crisis. If the event can beanticipated, news departments can change their pri-orities, time schedules and working procedures inorder to improve the coverage of the forthcomingevent. Experts can be alerted and contacts can be es-tablished within independent news sources. When aconflict starts with no notice, however, journalistshave limited opportunities to check facts and valuepartisan statements, at least at the outset.

No two crises are identical, and as regards mediacoverage of a crisis, we think the ability to give ad-equate information to citizens is dependent both onthe existence of media routines and on the ability ofthe media to make adequate preparations. Thegreater the opportunity to prepare and to use exist-ing routines, the more likely it is that citizens willbe adequately informed. In accordance with this, itis possible to consider four types of crises with re-gard to which the media’s ability to inform differssignificantly (Figure 1).

130

Type I represents a kind of crisis that we havenever heard about before and have no possibility toforesee. The Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine in 1986is perhaps the best example, but the killing of Presi-dent John F. Kennedy in 1960 and that of theSwedish Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986 couldalso fall into this category.

Type II and Type III represent situations wherethe quality of journalism is usually higher, but stillfar from excellent. In Type II a new crisis developsthat the media have been able to prepare for. Theoutbreak of the Gulf War in 1991 is a good example.This new kind of war was difficult to cover and agreat deal of disinformation occurred. However,preparations eliminated some of the problems.Type III-crises, on the other hand, happen sud-denly, but have happened ”before”. Airplane acci-dents, earthquakes and floods definitely belong tothis category.

Finally, Type IV represents a kind of crisis thatpresents the media with few problems. The situa-tion is possible to prepare for (such as sending cor-respondents to a war region and consulting politicalexperts), and there are media routines for thesekinds of events. As a result, media coverage of aType IV-crisis is more often characterized by jour-nalistic professionalism. The American invasion ofSomalia – where TV crews waited for the marines toreach the shores for their ”live” reports from thewar scene – is probably a good example here.

To sum up, both the existence of media routinesand the possibility to make adequate preparationsshould influence the quality of war reporting (Nord& Strömbäck 2002).

Given all these considerations, it is clear that “thenoble art” of war reporting could be described as

something of a “mission impossible”. However, thereare strong indications that media coverage of crisesdoes differ in many ways dependent on the prevail-ing conditions. Sometimes there is neither time toprepare for a forthcoming event nor a chance to leanon existing journalistic routines, and sometimes crisesare both foreseeable and recognizable. There are goodreasons to believe that journalistic quality should begenerally better in the first situation, with better useof reliable sources, less speculating and less biased re-porting. Thus, to test this argument, this article com-pares two cases: Swedish media covarage of the ter-ror attacks on September 11 and of the outbreak ofthe war in Afghanistan in 2001. The terror attacks arestudied as they represent the most surprising and un-expected news imaginable, if not in over-dramatizedHollywood productions. The war in Afghanistan, onthe other hand, is examined as this war outbreak wasexpected by the news media and is indeed similar instructure to other modern wars. Thus, the questionis: did Swedish media cover the war Afghanistanmuch better than they did the terror attacks on Sep-tember 11?

Empirical DataThis case study focuses on three main researchquestions. First, how did the Swedish media reportthe terror attacks against the US on September 11,2001 and during the subsequent five days? Second,how did the Swedish media report the US attacks inAfghanistan on October 7, 2001 and during the sub-sequent five days? Third, how did the reporting ofthese events differ with respect to the use ofsources, speculations and anti-American and anti-Muslim reporting?

Figure 1. Media and Crises, four typical cases

Media PreparationsBad Good

Type I Type II(New and (new, but

Bad surprising expectedevents) events)

MediaRoutines

Type III Type IVGood (surprising events (expected events

which have which havehappened before) happened before)

131

The data used in the present study include allnews journalism related to the terror attacks in theUS and the US attacks in Afghanistan in the fourmain newspapers and the three main televisionnews shows in Sweden. For the television newsshows, the main show each day was chosen, whilefor the newspapers, the supplements were ex-cluded.

Two of the newspapers, Dagens Nyheter andSvenska Dagbladet, are traditionally broadsheetnewspapers, though Svenska Dagbladet is tabloid inform. The other two newspapers, Expressen andAftonbladet, are up-scale tabloids in both their formand journalistic style. One of the television newsshows, TV4 Nyheterna, belongs to a commercialstation, while the other two, Aktuellt and Rapport,are part of the public service broadcasting company(Sveriges Television, SVT) in Sweden. In bothcases, the first five days of reporting were chosen.Because the newspapers, with one exception(Aftonbladet), did not report about the events on theday they happened, while the news programmescould report in real-time, the time periods includedin the study depend on the medium. For the news-papers, the first five days of reporting occurred be-tween September 12-16 and October 8-12, respec-tively, while for the television news, the periodswere between September 11-15 and October 7-11,respectively.

All news articles and news features in the above-mentioned media that explicitly referred to eitherthe terror attacks or the US attacks in Afghanistanwere chosen for study. The material was examinedusing quantitative content analysis.

Swedish Media in TransitionThe design of this study allows us not only to com-pare the media reporting of two similar but non-identical events, but also to compare journalism indifferent media characterized by different traditions.This is occurring in a time marked by media conver-gence, an expanding news system, real-time newsand growing commercialization of the Swedishmedia system.

Since the end of the 1980s, the Swedish mediasystem has gone through major structural changes(Hadenius & Weibull 1999; Strömbäck 2000; Djerf-Pierre & Weibull 2001). Before that time, no privatetelevision or radio stations were allowed. The mar-ket for newspapers was stable and profitable. In1990, surveys showed that 81 percent of the Swed-ish population read a morning newspaper at leastfive days a week (Eriksson 2002:193-211).

On New Years Eve in 1987, however, the publicservice monopoly in television was broken for thefirst time by the private channel TV3, broadcastingfrom London. Two years later another private cablechannel started broadcasting, and in 1991 the firstprivate terrestrial television in Sweden (TV4) re-ceived permission to start broadcasting. Two yearslater, the public service radio monopoly was bro-ken, which means that Sweden, similarly to mostother countries in Western Europe, now has a mixedpublic service/private-system in television and ra-dio.

The 1990s in Sweden was a period of economicdownturn, causing major problems for the newspa-pers, which lost both advertisers and readers. Theworst year was 1996, when readership dropped to71 percent. In an international comparison this isstill a high percentage, but the change in readershipforced the newspapers to cut down on staff and de-velop new strategies to compete in the context of adeepening struggle to survive and maintain profit-ability. One effect was that the Swedish newspa-pers, according to observers, became increasinglymarket-driven (Hvitfelt 1999, 2002; Hultén 1999;see also McManus 1994; Underwood 1995). Foreconomic reasons, several regional newspapers alsomerged or entered into different kinds of partner-ships (Alström & Nord 2002). Another change isthat foreign media companies now own parts of dif-ferent Swedish newspapers, and that the links be-tween the newspapers and the political parties,whose influence used to be very strong in theparty-press-model, have now generally disap-peared.

Traditionally, the broadsheet papers and thepublic service broadcast news are known for thequality of their coverage of public affairs, while thecommercial news media and particularly the tab-loids are generally considered to be more market-driven and oriented towards infotainment. Recentresearch, however, indicates that there seems to be aconvergence of the journalism in these differentmedia (Strömbäck 2001).

One theory that is relevant in describing thechanges that have taken place within Swedish jour-nalism is a theory regarding a certain kind of medialogic, first developed by Altheide and Snow, butfurther elaborated upon by other scholars. Accord-ing to the former, ”media logic consists of a form ofcommunication, the process through which mediapresent and transmit information. Elements of thisform include the various media and the formats usedby these media. Format consists, in part, of howmaterial is organized, the style in which it is pre-

132

sented, the focus or emphasis on particular charac-teristics of behaviour, and the grammar of mediacommunication” (Altheide & Snow 1979:10).

Building on this and on theory developed byHernes (1978) and Asp (1986), Strömbäck has ar-gued that the concrete expressions of this medialogic are certain storytelling-techniques. The sub-stantial storytelling techniques that follow fromthis media logic are simplification, personification,polarization, intensification, as well as concretion,stereotyping and enhancement (Strömbäck 2000).

In a time marked by a surplus of informationand a deficit of attention, there has been increasingcompetition among the different news media forpeople’s attention. One result is that the newsmedia have come to adapt to this media logic to alarger extent than before. This has led to a journal-ism that often tends to interpret rather than de-scribe, speculate rather than stick to known facts,that blurs the line between straight reporting and so-called ”news analysis”, and gives the journaliststhemselves a more prominent position within thenews (Strömbäck 2001; Nord & Strömbäck 2002;Djerf-Pierre & Weibull 2001).

These features of modern Swedish journalismcan be found not only in the commercial TV newsand in the tabloids, but also in the public servicenews and the broadsheet papers – although not nec-essarily to the same extent. Whether the former hasadapted to the latter or vice-versa is an empiricalquestion that still awaits a definitive answer. Mostobservers, however, would agree that there is a con-vergence and that it is the growing commercializa-tion that drives the changes observed in journalisticcontent (Strömbäck 2001; Hvitfelt 2002; Nord &Strömbäck 2002).

To conclude, there are reasons to believe that in-creased media competition generally affects newsreporting, encourages media logic elements and de-

creases journalistic quality with respect to criticismof sources, reliance on facts and non-partisan re-porting. However, journalistic quality may varywith opportunities for media preparation and theexistence of media routines in each case. If thepreparations are good and the routines are wellknown, the risks for lower quality in reporting maynot entirely vanish, but they are nevertheless re-duced.

Within this theoretical framework, patterns ofSwedish media coverage of the terror attacks in theUS and the war in Afghanistan will now be investi-gated.

Perfect NewsTo start with, it is obvious that the terror attacksagainst the US were a much bigger news event forthe Swedish media than were the US attacks in Af-ghanistan. In total, 482 news articles and 179 newsfeatures were published about the terror attacks,while 272 news articles and 76 news features werepublished about the US attacks in Afghanistan. Inboth instances, the tabloids devoted more space tothe events than did the broadsheet papers. At thesame time, the public service news shows broadcastmore features about both events than did the com-mercial TV4 Nyheterna (see Table 1). The main ex-planation for this pattern is that the commercialnews show is shorter than the news shows in thepublic service channels.

In a cynical sense, the news about the terror at-tacks against the US was perfect news, even for theSwedish media. It fit perfectly with the criteria thatSwedish media are found to employ when judgingthe newsworthiness of different events. Accordingto professor in journalism Håkan Hvitfelt, theprobability that something will become news in-creases 1) if it concerns politics, economics or

Table 1. Number of Articles and News Features about the Terror Attacks in the US and the US Attacks inAfghanistan

Dagens Svenska TV4Nyheter Dagbladet Expressen Aftonbladet Rapport Aktuellt Nyheterna

(BS) (BS) (T) (T) (PS) (PS) (C) N

Terror attacksin USA 110 102 127 143 65 74 40 661

US attacksin Afghanistan 63 49 77 83 28 33 15 348

Sum 173 151 204 226 93 107 55 1 009

Note: BS=Broadsheet, T=Tabloid, PS=Public Service, C=Commercial.

133

crime, 2) if there is a short geographical or culturaldistance, 3) if it pertains to events and conditionsthat 4) are sensational or surprising, 5) about elitepersons, 6) and can be described sufficiently sim-ply, but 7) are important and relevant, 8) that takeplace within a short period of time or as part of anestablished theme, 9) with negative elements, 10)and with established authorities as sources (Hvitfelt1985:215-216).

One other important explanation for the differ-ence in coverage concerns the availability of pic-tures. The terror attacks against the US were uniquenot only in themselves, but also in that they couldbe witnessed live across the globe and in that im-portant parts of the events that followed were pho-tographed and recorded on video. In contrast, dur-ing the war in Afghanistan, there was a lack of pic-tures and during the first five days of the war noSwedish journalists managed to get into Afghanistanto report what they saw.

Sources in the NewsWhen almost five hundred news articles are pub-lished and almost two hundred news features arebroadcast within just five days – as in the case ofthe terror attacks – without any possibility for thenews organizations to prepare beforehand, there isan obvious risk that quantity will push qualityaside. The demand and striving for fast news maycompromise the demand and striving for correctnews.

In Swedish journalism, there are certain ethicalguidelines and traditions concerning the use ofsources. One such guideline, by no means unique toSweden, is that journalists should always use twoseparate independent sources, especially if the’facts’ being reported may be controversial. There isalso a tradition that the use of anonymous sourcesshould be restricted. Furthermore, there is a tradi-tion that the news should include balancing sources(Spelregler för press, radio och TV 2001; Fichtelius1997; Sahlstrand 2000; Leth & Thurén 2000:22-36). This last guideline is considered especially im-portant in times of crisis, war or other instanceswhen the news may otherwise take sides in a con-flict.

Normatively speaking, surveys have shown thatthe three most important tasks for the Swedishmedia, according to the journalists themselves, are1) to present information that can help citizens tofreely and independently form their own opinions,2) to be a watchdog against those in power and au-thorities, and 3) to give visibility to different opin-

ions and cultural expressions (Strömbäck 2001; seealso Melin 1991; Djerf-Pierre 2001). Each of thesejournalistic virtues may be compromised in a situa-tion where there is great pressure on the news or-ganizations to report, when there is a shortage oftime and where there is a lack of consideration ofthe context of what is being reported. The last con-dition refers to a situation where, for example, jour-nalists do not see any underlying conflicts that mayexist and that are not immediately apparent.

To see whether this was the case in the mediacoverage of the terror attacks against the US and theUS attacks in Afghanistan, we studied the percent-age of articles and news features that explicitly in-cluded at least one anonymous source. In this case,only individuals count as a source, which meansthat if a news article referred to an institution suchas ”the FBI” or ”the American government”, thatwill count as an anonymous source. We also studiedhow many quoted or mentioned sources were usedon average. The results are shown in Table 2.

The results show that anonymous sources wereused much more frequently in coverage of the terrorattacks than in coverage of the US attacks in Af-ghanistan. In the latter case, the results also showthat the extent to which anonymous sources wereused varied between the different media types. In-terestingly enough, the news media that most fre-quently included anonymous sources was DagensNyheter, a newspaper that in Sweden is tradition-ally considered to feature journalism of the highestquality.

Obviously, these results cannot be explained bystructural factors such as media category (TV vs.newspaper), media type (tabloid vs. broadsheet pa-pers) or ownership (private vs. public service). In-stead, explanations must be found either at an edi-torial or individual level. Regarding the difference inuse of anonymous sources between the two events,however, the explanation may be that, in the case ofa war, journalists are generally conscious of the factthat wars are fought not only with weapons, butalso with propaganda. That is a lesson they learnedduring both the Gulf War in 1991 and the war inKosovo in 1999. Thus, journalists were much morecritical of their sources and less willing to risk be-coming a party to the war by uncritically reportingwhat anonymous sources say.

The results in Table 2 also show that the numberof sources used varies between the different typesof media and between coverage of the terror attacks,on the one hand, and coverage of the US attacks inAfghanistan, on the other. On average, more sourceswere used in coverage of the terror attacks than in

134

coverage of the US attacks in Afghanistan. In thelatter case, in three of the media studied, the articleson average included less than two sources. That isremarkable, given a) the principle of using twoseparate independent sources, and b) the fact thatwhat we are counting here is number of sourcesused, not whether they are independent of eachother.

Besides the number of sources used, it is alsoimportant to note what kind of sources the differentmedia used. Because it is the sources that providemuch of the information that journalists transmit tothe audience, the use of different types of sourcesinevitably has consequences for journalistic content(Sahlstrand 2000; Gans 1980; Shoemaker & Reese1996). Thus, Table 3 shows how frequently differ-ent kinds of sources were used in coverage of thetwo events.

The results show that in coverage of the terrorattacks against the US, American and Swedish elitesources were the two most frequently used sources.Following these were the victims of of the terror at-tacks, including the relatives, friends and colleaguesof those who died due to the terror attacks, and insome cases even those who actually died. The lattermay sound strange, but the explanation is that insome articles and news features, quotes that weresaid to come from passengers in the hijacked planesor persons who died in the World Trade Centerwere included as if these people were still alive.This is an example of how the media sometimes

dramatizes the news in a way that blurs the distinc-tion between fact and fiction.

As can be seen from Table 3, even in coverage ofthe US attacks in Afghanistan, the two most fre-quently used source types were American andSwedish elite sources. Afghani elite sources were,relatively speaking, less commonly used.

What is also notable is the absence of spokes-persons for the United Nations as sources. Eventhough this was and is an international conflict inwhich the United Nations has an important role toplay and where its views are important for the le-gitimacy of American military action, Swedish jour-nalism failed to report on the views and declara-tions from the United Nations.

These results indicate that there was a bias in themedia coverage of these two events, which ulti-mately favoured the American side of the conflict.These results should not, however, be seen as an in-dication that the Swedish media were intentionallybiased in their selection of sources. The explanationis more likely that American elite sources – as wellas Swedish elite sources – were more accessiblethan, for example, Afghani elite sources.

Another likely explanation is that Swedish jour-nalists in their reporting were very dependent onAmerican news media and their reporting. In manycases, it is obvious that what on the surface ap-peared to be original reporting from the Swedishjournalists, were actually re-writes of articles ornews features from various American media. That is

Table 2. Use of Sources in the Coverage of the Terror Attacks against the US and the US Attacks in Af-ghanistan

Media coverage of Media coverage ofthe terror attacks against USA the US attacks in Afghanistan

Percentage of Percentage ofarticles/news Average number articles/news Average number

features which of quoted or features which of quoted orincludes at least mentioned sources/ includes at least mentioned sources/ one anonymous news article or one anonymous news article or

source news featur source news featur

Dagens Nyheter (BS) 54 2,8 43 2,2

Svenska Dagbladet (BS) 56 3,3 26 1,9

Aftonbladet (T) 50 3,3 29 1,9

Expressen (T) 49 5,2 13 1,8

Rapport (PS) 49 3,0 29 3,6

Aktuellt (PS) 53 2,9 30 2,3

TV4 Nyheterna (C) 50 3,1 13 2,4

Average percentageor number of sources 52 3,4 26 2,3

Note: BS=Broadsheet, T=Tabloid, PS=Public Service, C=Commercial. Numbers of sources and percentages have been rounded off.

135

the case particularly in coverage of the terror at-tacks. However, if one judges from explicit refer-ences in the articles and news features, the mediastudied used other media as sources in no more thanten percent of their coverage of the terror attacksand in 26 percent of the news features about the USattacks in Afghanistan (see Table 4).

In coverage of the terror attacks, differentAmerican media besides CNN were used as sourcesin 10 percent of the articles and eight percent of thenews features. But as noted, because Table 4 onlyshows how often different media were explicitlyused as sources, this is without doubt an underesti-mate. In coverage of the US attacks in Afghanistan,

Table 3. Types of Sources Used in Coverage of the Terror Attacks against the US and the US Attacks inAfghanistan (%)

Media coverage of Media coverage ofthe terror attacks against USA the US attacks in Afghanistan

Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of Percentage ofnews articles news features news articles news features that includes that includes that includes that includesdifferent types different types different types different types

of sources of sources of sources of sources

American elite sources 40 42 35 46

Afghani elite sources 4 4 18 26

Pakistani elite sources 1 4 8 12

Palestine elite sources 2 4 3 1

Israeli elite sources 2 2 0 0

Swedish elite sources 23 22 32 32

Spokespersons for countrieswithin the European Union (EU) 8 7 8 3

Spokespersons for EU-institutions 1 1 1 0

Spokespersons for United Nations 1 0 3 4

American or Afghani victims 13 10 2 8

Eye-witnesses 5 4 2 5

Ordinary Americanor Afghani citizens 8 10 4 6

N 482 179 272 76

Note: Percentages have been rounded off. Included in the different ”elite”-categories are politicians, experts and military spokespersons.

Table 4. Percentage of Articles and News Features that Explicitly Use Other Media as Sources

Media coverage of Media coverage ofthe terror attacks against USA the US attacks in Afghanistan

Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of Percentage ofnews articles news features news articles news features

that uses that uses that uses that usesdifferent media different media different media different media

as sources as sources as sources as sources

CNN 8 3 3 4

Other American media 10 8 6 0

Al-Jazeera 0 0 3 26

Afghani media 0 0 3 0

International news bureaus 8 3 8 13

Other Swedish media 6 1 1 0

N 482 179 272 76

Note: Percentage has been rounded off.

136

Al-Jazeera was explicitly used as a source in 26percent of the news features. In most instances,however, only pictures from Al-Jazeera were used.

The fact that the Swedish media largely used for-eign and international media as sources, even thoughthey did not always explicitly state this, raises aquestion concerning the credibility of the news. Thereason is that every time journalists choose or areforced to rely on other media instead of doing theirown original reporting, there is a risk that disinfor-mation and errors will keep circulating throughoutthe news pages and news shows. Several examplesfrom coverage of the terror attacks illustrate this(Leth & Thurén 2002). For example, on the firstday of reporting, one could learn from the Swedishmedia that a bomb had exploded outside the StateDepartment, a report that later proved to be incor-rect. Another example is that, on September 13, theSwedish media reported that five fire fighters hadbeen found alive in the ruins of the World TradeCenter, which also proved to be incorrect.

In a situation of confusion, time pressure and alack of reliable information, it is especially impor-tant for readers and viewers that the factual infor-mation provided by the media is correct. If onemedia outlet relies too much on another medium –which is also under stress and lacks reliable facts –for information, the risk that factually incorrect in-formation will spreadis obvious and one of the mainreasons why the media should rely primarily ontheir own original reporting. If this is not possible,

they should at least state clearly where they haveobtained their information, whether it is from othermedia or other types of sources. In this respect, theSwedish media often failed, which made it harder forreaders and viewers to separate fact from fictionand information from disinformation.

Moreover, the results so far also show thatSwedish journalism actually often failed to fulfil thejournalistic virtues journalists themselves theoreti-cally hold as very important. While this may be un-derstandable given the chaotic situation that charac-terized the terror attacks and their immediate after-math and given the lack of access to Afghanistanduring the US attacks, it is no less important – dur-ing situations such as these – for journalists to actas responsible gatekeepers. The use of two separateindependent sources, the task of providing reliableinformation and acting as a watchdog are no less im-portant in times of crisis and war. On the contrary,it can be argued that these journalistic virtues aremore important during such times than under moreordinary conditions.

The Occurrence of SpeculationsIn this study, we also examined how frequentlythree kinds of speculations occurred in coverage ofthe terror attacks and how frequently three otherkinds of speculations occurred in coverage of theUS attacks in Afghanistan. The results are dis-played in Table 5.

Table 5. Occurrence of Speculations in Coverage of the Terror Attacks against the US and the USAttacks in Afghanistan (%)

Specul- Specul- Specul- Specul-ations about ations about ations about Specul- ations about Specul-the number those how the US ations about future ations

of dead responsible might the number development aboutdue to the for the respond to of dead due in the war future

terror terror the terror to the US in Afgha- attacksattacks attacks attacks attacks nistan terror N

Dagens Nyheter (BS) 11 27 20 10 27 18 173

Svenska Dagbladet (BS) 22 28 15 10 16 20 151

Aftonbladet (T) 12 30 12 12 17 27 226

Expressen (T) 13 27 17 10 20 25 204

Rapport (PS) 18 20 25 21 32 18 93

Aktuellt (PS) 22 24 24 12 24 18 107

TV4 Nyheterna (C) 19 35 22 20 47 13 55

Average 17 27 19 14 26 20

Note: BS=Broadsheet, T=Tabloid, PS=Public Service, C=Commercial. Percentages have been rounded off. Speculations are defined as statements aboutreality based on ‘facts’ that do not yet exist.

137

The results show that speculations of differentkinds were rather common, and that it is obviouslywrong to view modern journalism as merely de-scriptive. This is particularly true regarding specu-lations about who might have been responsible forthe terror attacks and how the war in Afghanistanmight develop, both of which occurred rather fre-quently. The results also show, once again, that it ishard to generalize from structural factors when try-ing to explain journalistic content. As before, nei-ther media type (TV vs. newspaper) nor media cat-egory (tabloid vs. broadsheet papers) nor owner-ship (private vs. public service) can explain thesepatterns.

Furthermore, these results illustrate how facts,interpretations and speculations intermingle even inwhat are seemingly ordinary news articles or newsfeatures, which helps to contribute to a blurring ofthe line between fact and fiction. This blurring is ex-acerbated by the fact that it may often be hard todetect speculations when the texts are not readcarefully. The speculations were often reported as ifthey were facts.

Partisan Supporters or NeutralObservers?In the Swedish debate following both the terror at-tacks and the war in Afghanistan, the Swedish mediawere accused of being too pro-American and tooanti-Islamic in their coverage. In an attempt tostudy whether this criticism is warranted, this

study sought to discover how often different rhe-torical figures were featured in the news articles andthe news features. By rhetorical figures we mean theuse of certain stereotypical descriptions of reality,such as ”Muslims are fanatics” – or the rebuttal ofsuch stereotypical descriptions. In both cases, therhetorical figure is part of the journalistic content,because, for example, an argument that Muslims arenot fanatics would not be made without the as-sumption that they might be considered fanatics.

The usage of these stereotypical descriptionsmust not be explicitly stated. If, for example, oneMuslim is portrayed as a fanatic and at the same timeit is implicit that he or she is acting as a representa-tive of Muslims in general, then this is counted as aninstance of the rhetorical figure ”Muslims as fanat-ics” occuring in the article.

In this study the occurrence of six rhetorical fig-ures was examined. The results are shown in Table 6.

The table shows several results. One pattern isthat the occurrence of these rhetorical figures was,generally speaking, larger in coverage of the terrorattacks than in coverage of the US attacks in Af-ghanistan. Perhaps this is a reflection of the factthat journalists had more time to prepare their cov-erage of the attacks in Afghanistan than that of theterror attacks, and that the debate about coveragemade them conscious of the risk of portrayingMuslims in an unjustifiable and unfavourable way.

A second result is that the occurrence of theserhetorical figures, to some extent, mirrored the un-derlying events. So, for example, the anti-Muslim

Table 6. The Occurrence of Different Rhetorical Figures in Coverage of the Terror Attacks against theUS and the US Attacks in Afghanistan (%)

Media coverage of the Media coverage of theterror attacks against the US US attacks in Afghanistan

News articles News features News articles News features

The Muslim world is a threatto Western societies 10 4 6 4

Muslims are fanatics 19 13 3 3

Muslims are oppressed bythe Western world 5 2 4 13

The US is the defender of freedomand democracy 10 8 6 1

The US is an oppressor of the poorin third world countries 5 3 3 7

The US acts as a self-appointedworld police force 14 14 6 5

N 482 179 272 76

Note: Percentages have been rounded off.

138

rhetorical figures were more prominent in coverageof the terror attacks, where Muslim individualswere actually responsible for the attacks, than wasthe rhetorical figure ”Muslims as oppressed by theWestern world,” which occurred more often in cov-erage of the war in Afghanistan, where Muslimswere, to some extent, actually the targets of the US-led attacks.

If one counts the total number of anti-Muslimand anti-American rhetorical figures, the former oc-curs in 170 news articles and news features, whilethe latter occurs in 128. The inference from this isthat the coverage was, to some extent, biased againstMuslims and the Islamic world. If, however, westudy whether these rhetorical figures gain supportor are rebutted, we find that particularly the rhe-torical figure ”Muslims are fanatics” was criticizedmore often than it was supported. If we considernot only the occurrence of, but also the degree ofsupport for these rhetorical figures, the resultsshow that, generally speaking, it is not warranted toaccuse the Swedish media studied of having been bi-ased against Muslims.

Of course there are examples of articles that,perhaps inspired by Samuel P. Huntington’s theoryabout future clashes of civilization (Huntington1996), portrayed Muslims as fanatics in extremelystereotypical ways, and the Muslim world as athreat to the Western world. On balance, however,those articles and news features were exceptions.Overall, there is no reason to claim that the pictureof Muslims in the Swedish media was particularlynegative or that the coverage was particularly pro-American.

ConclusionsFor anyone following the Swedish debate about thejournalistic coverage of the terror attacks against theUS and the US attacks in Afghanistan, the conclu-sion must have been that the main problem was thatthe Swedish media were too pro-American and tooanti-Muslim.

What our study has shown is that such conclu-sions are largely unfounded. The main problem wasnot any ideological stand towards the US, Afghani-stan or Muslims. There is little support for the no-tion that there was a particularly strong, if rela-tively unconscious, right- or left-wing bias in thenews.

What the study has shown can be summarizedas follows. First, the use of anonymous sources wasrather frequent, particularly in coverage of the ter-ror attacks. Second, American elite sources and, to a

lesser extent, Swedish elite sources dominated thecoverage. Third, the average number of quoted ormentioned sources was rather low, particularly con-sidering that we have studied not whether thesources used were independent of each other, butonly the number of sources used. However, if sev-eral parts of the media did fail to provide twosources or slightly more per news article or newsfeature, then it is highly unlikely that they suc-ceeded in using two separate independent sources.

Fourth, the study has shown that the Swedishmedia largely relied on the American media assources, but did not explicitly tell the readers andthe viewers the extent to which this was the case.Fifth, the occurrence of speculations was very com-mon in all the media studied.

These are some of the concrete empirical findings,and they point to a sixth finding. Namely that it is al-most impossible to explain these results by lookingat structural factors such as media ownership (pri-vate vs. public service), media type (TV vs. newspa-per), media category (tabloid vs. broadsheet) orstructural position in the audience market (elitemedia vs. popular media). This indicates that there isindeed a growing media convergence, not only in atechnical sense, but also as regards journalistic con-tent in the different types of media. If we are to ex-plain the differences between the different types ofmedia, we must therefore study the editorial or indi-vidual level of the news organizations.

What this indicates, in turn, is that all media areaffected by the growing competition for people’sattention, that all media are increasingly market-driven, and that they all seem to rely more on thisparticular media logic than was previously the case.

One result is that the line between fact and fic-tion is sometimes increasingly hard to discern, dueto the frequent use of speculations, the blending ofstraight reporting and commentary, and the use ofstory-telling techniques following from this medialogic – techniques such as personification, simplifi-cation and enhancement. This is especially truewhen the news concerns events that involve limitedscope for media preparations and a lack of mediaroutines.

The basic assumption of this article – concerningthe importance both of preparations and of routinesfor journalistic quality – has been supported tosome extent by empirical data form the case studyof coverage of September 11 and Afghanistan. Forexample, the appearance of anonymous sources wasmuch more frequent in terror reporting, as was thatof negative stereotypes of Muslims in news stories.However, there were no significant differences in

139

the occurrence of speculations in the two cases. Oneexplanation for the better quality of the news re-ports about Afghanistan is the fact that the wargave less “perfect news”. Half the number of sto-ries and features during the first five days gives lessspace for over-dramatization and the replacement ofprofessional journalistic norms. As an explanationfor news quality, media preparations and media rou-tines seem to be at least as important as opportuni-ties for “live” reports and the existence of “good”photo opportunities. Generally speaking, the rela-tively prepared war correspondents around the Pa-kistani border did a better job than did most of theconfused local TV news crews a few blocks awayfrom the World Trade Centre in South Manhattan.

The differences in media coverage of the terrorattacks and the war in Afghanistan were also sub-stantial enough to raise the question of whether it isrelevant in media research to compare coverage ofthese kinds of events. Undoubtedly, modern terroractivities and modern warfare challenge modernmedia reporting in quite different ways.

War, in present circumstances, is fairly easy forthe media to recognize. There are at least two par-ties to a conflict and they are usually engaged in anintensive and well-recognized propaganda war aswell as the ongoing military war. Nowadays, alsouneven propaganda resources often characterizewars, in that the only existing superpower in theworld, the United States, has much better informa-tion channels, as well as the capacity and the possi-bility to influence the global media in particularways. However, awareness of this superpower su-periority also makes the media more cautious.Many media organizations seem to have learned alesson from the 1991 Gulf War, with regard towhich they were heavily attacked for their biasedand uncritical pro-Western reporting.

With respect to terrorist acts there are no suchlessons to be learned, as these acts are, by their verynature, somewhat surprising deviations from nor-mality and not a foreseeable development, as aresome wars. The empirical data presented in this ar-ticle support this conclusion. The number ofanonymous sources was much greater in the terrornews as was the frequency of negative stereotypesof Muslims and Islam. Thus, the war in Afghani-stan was covered as a normal conflict between well-defined political actors and this aspect seems tohave made traditional professional journalism moreeffective. On the other hand, the new elements ofthe conflict and the basic confusion surrounding theterror attacks resulted, generally speaking, in lowerjournalistic quality in articles and the TV news.

No two crises are identical, and as regards mediacoverage of crises, we think the ability to give ad-equate information to citizens is dependent both onthe existence of media routines and on the media´sability to make adequate preparations. The greaterthe opportunity to prepare and to use existing rou-tines, the more likely it is that citizens will be ad-equately informed. Thus this case study of leadingmedia organizations in Sweden shows that coverageof the war in Afghanistan was of generally betterjournalistic quality than was coverage of the terrorattacks in the US.

This brings us back, finally, to the remarks in theintroduction of the article about the recent war inIraq in spring 2003 and its mixed character as bothan expected and an unexpected event. Is it reason-able to assume that Swedish media coverage in thiscase would be more like the Afghanistan case withmany “lessons learned”, or were there too manysurprising events, making the coverage more likethat of the terror attacks?

The War in Iraq– Both Easy and Difficult to Cover?The war in Iraq is now over and media reportingabout the war will probably be of significant inter-est for media and communication researchers inforthcoming years. It is essential to compare thecoverage of this war with studies from other warsand to draw conclusions based on the existence ofsimilar patterns or significant differences in the re-porting. There is also a need for more research abouthow increased media competition affects the con-tent in the different media forms, including broad-sheet dailies, tabloids, public service broadcast com-panies and commercial TV stations and the Internet.The war in Iraq undoubtedly represents another in-teresting case study of the functions of professionaljournalism under external and internal pressure.

The model for analysing media’s ability to covercrises proposed in this article may also be useful instudies on coverage of the war in Iraq. As men-tioned initially, this war was characterized by an ex-pected outcome after a much less expected chain ofdramatic events. Given these facts, the media’s abil-ity to cover the war in a professional manner mayhave varied during different phases of the conflict.

These assumptions have yet to be examined, butthe war in Iraq is hard to categorize as belonging toonly one of the four types of conflicts previouslydescribed in this article. Yes, media preparationswere obviously satisfactory, as the American mili-tary build-up had been going on for months before

140

the first attack. News departments definitely hadtheir working plans and background stories readyfor a long period of time. These facts, as well as thepredicted outcome, support the expectation of highquality war reporting in this case.

On the other hand, during the war many eventsdeveloped in unexpected ways. Reporters preparedto report about “business as usual” suddenly had toproduce new stories about CIA-initiated missile at-tacks, American prisoners of war and a battlefield de-velopment nobody had foreseen. The routine cover-age of the war should have been disturbed by this al-most endless chain of unpredictable events, and thusresulted in some war reporting of lower quality.

There were new elements in this war comparedto the war in Afghanistan and the intervention inKosovo, but the breaking news in Iraq was hardlyof the same magnitude as was that about September11. Perhaps the Iraqi case represents mixed per-spectives on media behaviour in crises and on theprerequisites for good reporting. If this is the case,war reporting from Iraq should be carefully ana-lysed day by day and be related to the war devel-opment. We believe that, in this case, war reportingwill prove to have been somewhat better on dayswith fewer surprises emerging from the battlefieldor in the press briefing rooms.

References

Alström, Börje & Nord, Lars (2002) Expedition Mång-fald. Stockholm: Carlssons.

Altheide, David L. & Snow, Robert P (1979) MediaLogic. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Asp, Kent (1986) Mäktiga massmedier. Studier i poli-tisk opinionsbildning . Stockholm: Akademi-litteratur.

Bennett, W. Lance & Paletz, David L. Red.(1994) Takenby Storm. The Media, Public Opinion and USForeign Policy in the Gulf War. Chicago: Univer-sity of Chicago Press.

Djerf-Pierre, Monica & Weibull, Lennart (2001) Spe-gla, granska, tolka. Aktualitetsjournalistik i svenskradio och TV under 1900-talet. Stockholm: Prisma.

Djerf-Pierre, Monica (2002) ”Skjutjärn, pedagog ellerhantverkare”. In Ghersetti, Marina (ed.) Journa-list 2000. Göteborg: JMG/Göteborgs Universitet.

Ellul, Jacques (1973) Propaganda – The Formation ofMen’s Attitudes. New York: Vintage Books.

Eriksson, Therese (2002) ”Vanans makt – tidningsvanor2001”. In Holmberg, Sören & Weibull, Lennart (red.)Det våras för politiken. Göteborg: SOM-institutet.

Fichtelius, Erik (1997) Nyhetsjournalistik. Tio gylleneregler. Stockholm: Utbildningsradion.

Gans, Herbert J (1980) Deciding What’s News. A Studyof CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, News-week and Time. New York: Vintage.

Hadenius, Stig & Weibull, Lennart (1999) Massmedier.Press, Radio & TV i förvandling. Stockholm: Al-bert Bonniers Förlag.

Hadenius, Stig & Stür, Elisabeth (1992. Hopp ochfruktan. Om prognoser i några svenska medierunder Irakkonflikten. Stockholm: Styrelsen förPsykologiskt Försvar.

Hallin, Daniel C (1988) The ”Uncensored War” – TheMedia and Vietnam. Berkely: University of Cali-fornia Press.

Hallin, Daniel C (1994) We Keep America on Top of theWorld. London: Routledge.

Hernes, Gudmund (1978) ”Det medievridde samfunn”.In Hernes, Gudmund (red.) Forhandlingsøkonomiog blandningsadministrasjon. Olso: Universitets-forlaget.

Hultén, Lars J (1999) Orden och pengarna. Om kampoch kapitulation i journalistiken. Stockholm: Na-tur och Kultur.

Huntington, Samuel P (1996) The Clash of Civilizationsand the Remaking of World Order. New York: Si-mon & Schuster.

Hvitfelt, Håkan (1985) På första sidan. En studie inyhetsvärdering. Stockholm: Beredskapsnämndenför Psykologiskt Försvar.

Hvitfelt, Håkan (1999) ”Politik som såpopera”. InHvitfelt, Håkan & Karvonen, Lauri: Den svalademokratin (ed.) Sundsvall: Demokratiinstitutet.

Hvitfelt, Håkan (2002) ”En ny medievärld”. In På vägmot medievärlden 2020. Journalistik, teknik, mark-nad, In Hvitfelt, Håkan & Nygren, Gunnar (ed.)Lund: Studentlitteratur.

Hvitfelt, Håkan & Mattsson, Karin (1992) Gulfkriget –ett mediedrama i två akter. Stockholm: Styrelsenför Psykologiskt Försvar.

Kalb, Marvin (1994) A View from the Press. I: Bennett,W. Lance & Paletz, David L. (ed.) Taken by Storm.The Media, Public Opinion and US Foreign Po-licy in the Gulf War. Chicago: University of Chi-cago Press.

Kennedy, William V (1993) The Military and the Me-dia. Why the Press Cannot Be Trusted to Cover aWar. Westport: Praeger.

Kovach, Bill & Rosenstiel, Tom (1999) Warp Speed.America in the Age of Mixed Media. New York:Century Foundation.

Kovach, Bill & Rosenstiel, Tom (2001) The Elementsof Journalism. What Newspeople Should Know and

141

the Public Should Expect. New York: CrownPublishers.

Leth, Göran & Thurén, Torsten (2000) Källkritik förInternet. Stockholm: Styrelsen för PsykologisktFörsvar.

Leth, Göran & Thurén, Torsten (2002) 11 september2001 – en undersökning av informationsförmed-ling och åsiktsbildning i svenska medier. Stockholm:Institutet för Mediestudier.

McManus, John H (1994) Market-Driven Journalism.Let the Citizen Beware? Thousand Oaks: SagePublications.

McNair, Brian (1998) The Sociology of Journalism.London: Arnold Press.

Morge, Sara & Modh, Malin (2002) Terrorns dag i medie-rna. Nyhetsförmedlingen dygnet efter attackerna den11 september. Stockholm: Styrelsen för Psykologisktförsvar.

Nohrstedt, Stig-Arne (1992) Utanför poolierna. I: Nord-lund, Roland (red.) Svenskarna, medierna ochGulfkriget. Stockholm: Styrelsen för PsykologisktFörsvar.

Nord, Lars & Strömbäck, Jesper (2002) Tio dagar somskakade världen. Stockholm: Styrelsen för Psyko-logiskt Försvar.

Rosen, Jay (2002) September 11 in the Mind of AmericanJournalism. I: Zelizer, Barbie & Allan, Stuart (ed.)Journalism after September 11. London: Routledge.

Sahlstrand, Anders (2000) De synliga. Nyhetskällor isvensk storstadsmorgonpress. Stockholm: JMK/Stockholms Universitet.

Seib, Philip (2001) Going Live. Getting the News Rightin a Real-Time Online World. New York: Rowman& Littlefield.

Shoemaker, Pamela J. & Reese, Stephen D (1996) Media-ting the Message. Theories of Influences on MassMedia Content. New York: Longman.

Spelregler för Press TV Radio (2001) Stockholm: Pres-sens Samarbetsnämnd.

Strömbäck, Jesper (2000) Makt och medier. Om sam-spelet mellan medborgarna, medierna och de poli-tiska makthavarna. Lund: Studentlitteratur.

Strömbäck, Jesper (2001) Gäster hos verkligheten. Enstudie av journalistik, demokrati och politisk miss-tro. Stockholm/Stehag: Brutus Östlings bokförlagSymposion.

Underwood, Doug (1995) When MBAs Rule the News-room. New York: Columbia University Press.

Zelizer, Barbie & Allan, Stuart (ed.) (2002) Journalismafter September 11. London: Routledge.