MIGRATIONPOLICYPRACTICE ISSN 2223-5248

Contents

Joint Managing Editors:• SolonArdittis(Eurasylum)• Frank Laczko (InternationalOrganizationforMigration–

IOM)Editorial Advisers:

• JoannevanSelm(Eurasylum)• Karoline Popp (InternationalOrganizationforMigration

–IOM)Editorial Assistants:

• ValerieHagger(InternationalOrganizationforMigration–IOM)

• SusanParker(InternationalOrganizationforMigration–IOM)

Editorial Committee:• AderantiAdepoju(HumanResourcesDevelopment

Centre,Lagos,Nigeria) • RichardAresBaumgartner(EuropeanAgencyforthe

ManagementofOperationalCooperationattheExternalBordersoftheEuropeanUnion–FRONTEX,Warsaw)

• PeterBosch(EuropeanCommission,Brussels)• JuanCarlosCalleros(StaffOfficeofthePresidentof

Mexico)• JeffCrisp(UNHCR,Geneva) • AnitaDavis(AustralianDepartmentofImmigrationand

Citizenship,Canberra)• HowardDuncan(Metropolis,Ottawa,Canada)• NeliEsipova(GallupWorldPoll,NewYork)• Araceli Azuara Ferreiro (OrganizationofAmericanStates

–OAS,Washington,D.C.)• PhilippeFargues(MigrationPolicyCentre–MPC,

Florence)• BeataGodenzi(SwissAgencyforDevelopmentand

Cooperation,FederalDepartmentofForeignAffairs,Bern)

• Sandra Harder (CitizenshipandImmigrationCanada–CIC,Ottawa)

• ChrisHedges(UnitedKingdomBorderAgency–UKBA,London)

• JenniferMcDonald(Passport,ImmigrationandCitizenshipAgency,MinistryofNationalSecurity,Jamaica)

• IrenaOmelaniuk(GlobalForumforMigrationandDevelopment–GFMD)

• SankarRamasamy(DepartmentofLabour,NewZealand)

• DilipRatha(WorldBank,Washington,D.C.)• CécileRiallant(EC-UNJointMigrationandDevelopment

Initiative,Brussels)• NandKishoreSingh(MemberoftheIndianParliament,

NewDelhi)• SimonTonelli(CouncilofEurope,Strasbourg) • AdrianavanDooijeweert(DutchAdvisoryCommitteeon

MigrationAffairs–ACVZ,TheHague)

PublishedjointlybytheInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)andEurasylumLtd.www.iom.int/migration-policy-practice

Introduction..............................................................2SolonArdittisandFrankLaczko

Unlockingthepotentialofmigrationforinclusivedevelopment............................................................3EvaÅkermanBörje

Willapost-2015developmentframeworkacknowledgemigration?..........................................6AnnaKnollandNielsKeijzer

Movingintherightdirection?AssessingprogressinDoha:Migrationinclimatechangenegotiations..............................................11DariaMokhnacheva,SieunLeeandDinaIonesco

Ideasof‘home’and‘returnhome’involuntaryreturnmessaging–Acontemplationontheimpactofpassageoftimeandsenseoffailureonasylum-seekers’engagementswithvoluntaryreturninIreland............................15LiamCoakley

Rebuildinglivesandlivelihoods:Haiti’slongroadtorecoverythroughskillsdevelopmentandtrainingforinternallydisplacedpersons........19AmyRhoadesandLeonardDoyle

A Bimonthly Review by and for Policymakers Worldwide

Editorial Board

Participants in a Project 16/6 training course in Haiti learn coretechnical and practical skills in earthquake-resistant construction.©Photo:AmyRhoades.

Vol.III,Number1,February2013–March2013

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Introduction

Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko1

WelcometotheninthissueofMigration Policy Practice. This issue covers a range of policyareas, includingmigrationanddevelopment,

migrationandclimatechange,assistedvoluntaryreturnandissuesofinternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs)inHaiti.

Thefirsttwoarticles,byAmbassadorEvaÅkermanBörjeandbyAnnaKnollandNielsKeijzer,discussanumberofcurrentissuesinmigrationanddevelopmentpolicy.Ambassador Eva Åkerman Börje, Chair of the GlobalForumonMigrationandDevelopment(GFMD),outlinesSweden’s priorities and proposals for the coming18 months of the GFMD Chairmanship. She stressesthat threesignificantprocesseswill convergeandhaveimplicationsforhowmigrationisaddressedinthecomingdevelopment agenda, namely: the second High-levelDialogueonInternationalMigrationandDevelopmentintheUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyinOctober2013;the follow-up to theCairo InternationalConferenceonPopulation and Development in 2014; and the globalpreparationsofthepost-2015developmentagenda.Allthreeoftheseprocesseswillprovideanopportunitytocontributetogreaterconvergenceandpolicycoherenceintheareaofmigrationanddevelopment.

The second article, by Anna Knoll and Niels Keijzer,reviews the current deliberations on a possible post-2015 global development framework. It also exploresthe question of how migration could feature in sucha framework. The article stresses that internationaldevelopment policy debates have frequently failedto acknowledge that migratory choices of individualstocrossbordersareoftenat leastas importantasthelarge conventional development interventions. A firstoptionforapost-2015globaldevelopmentframeworkwould thus be to have a stand-alone goal related tomigrationwith single targets and indicators.A secondoption would be to reflect separate (sub-)objectivesformigrants andmigrant populations under thematicdevelopmentgoalsandtargetssuchashealth,gender,education or others. A third optionwould be to viewinternationalmigrationasacross-cuttingissuerelevantfor several aspects of development and requiring themainstreamingofmigrationat various levels – locally,nationallyandglobally.

1 SolonArdittis isManagingDirectorof EurasylumLtdand FrankLaczko is Head of the Migration Research Division at IOMHeadquartersinGeneva.Theyareco-editorsofMigration Policy Practice.

The third article, by Daria Mokhnacheva, Sieun Leeand Dina Ionesco, provides an overview of the roleof migration policy in the context of climate changenegotiations under the United Nations FrameworkConvention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) frameworkfor climate change adaptation. It also examinesdevelopments at the eighteenth session of theConferenceofthePartiestotheUNFCCC(COP18),heldinDohain2012,inrelationto‘lossanddamage’issues;and explains how the inclusion of migration mattersin loss and damage raises challenges to and createsopportunities for advancing migration on the overallinternationalclimatechangeagenda.

The fourth article, by Liam Coakley, explores howasylum-seekers currently registered in Ireland’s ‘directprovision’ system feel about the prospect of assistedvoluntary return to their countryoforigin. Thearticleshows that migrants currently awaiting a decision ontheirapplicationforrefugeestatusinIrelanddonotseevoluntary returnasanattractiveoption.Organizationsactiveinthefieldofvoluntaryreturnshouldthusinvestmoretimeintryingtounderstandhowasylum-seekersremember and imagine their ‘home’; how migrantsconstruct allegiances while in their host country; andthe importance of community-based allegiances withfellowmigrants.

The last article, by Amy Rhoades and Leonard Doyle,discusses Project 16 Neighbourhoods/6 Camps inHaiti. This project, which began in October 2011and is being implemented by IOM, the InternationalLabour Organization, the United Nations Office forProject Services and theUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,undertheguidanceoftheGovernmentofHaiti,isapilotschemefocusedongivingrentalsubsidiesto IDP families to facilitate the voluntary emptying ofsixlargetentcampsinPort-au-PrinceandthereturnofIDPs to their 16neighbourhoodsoforigin. Key to thisintervention is the support given for the reintegrationofIDPsbyincreasingtheiraccesstobasicservicesandincome-generatingactivities.

WethankallthecontributorstothisissueofMigration Policy Practiceandencouragereaderstocontactuswithsuggestionsforfuturearticles.

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Unlocking the potential of migration for inclusive development Eva Åkerman Börje1

TheGlobalForumonMigrationandDevelopment(GFMD) is a unique intergovernmental processthat has annually gathered approximately

160 States since 2007. It was created after the 2006United Nations High-level Dialogue on InternationalMigration andDevelopment to fill a real need amonggovernments and other stakeholders. It providesa platform to discuss measures to enhance thedevelopmentimpactofmigrationandmobilityatglobalandnationallevels.TheGFMDhasaddresseddifferentaspectsofmigration,includingwaystofacilitatelabourmigration,mechanisms to lower the transaction costsformigration, safeguardmigrants’ rights and enhanceprotectionmechanisms. Closer collaborationwith civilsociety, work with diaspora organizations and effortstoengagetheprivatesectorindevelopmentoutcomeshave further broadened the agenda to involve bothState and non-State actors. An increasingly importantcomplementtotheState-ledGFMDisthecivilsociety-led process, which runs in parallel and culminates ina jointmeetingwith theStatesat theCommonSpacesessionoftheGlobalForumitself.

The GFMD has made an important contribution togreatercooperationbetweendevelopinganddevelopedcountries. Recommendations stemming from theGFMD process have included formulating nationalpolicy and action plans to promote the synergiesbetween migration and development. Efforts haveincluded mainstreaming migration into developmentpolicies,with the ultimate goal of includingmigrationin broader national development planning processesandintheformulationofcountrystrategiesforbilateraldevelopmentcooperation.

Sweden holds the Chairmanship of the GFMD fromJanuary2013toJune2014,underthejointguidanceof the Minister for Migration and Asylum Policy,MrTobiasBillström,andtheMinister for InternationalDevelopment Cooperation, Ms Gunilla Carlsson. TheChairmanshiptakesplaceatasignificantpointintime.AthoroughassessmentoftheGFMDprocesstookplacein2010–2012.Itoutlinestheachievementsofthefirstsixyearsandoffersrecommendationsaimedatrealizingacommonvisionforthenextphase.Sweden’sprioritiesandproposals for thecoming18monthsbuildon the

1 AmbassadorEvaÅkermanBörjeistheChairoftheGlobalForumonMigrationandDevelopment.

Forum’s gradual progress and achievements and areanchored in the recommendations of the AssessmentReport. Sweden has three clear objectives: a moredevelopment-focused Forum, amore dynamic Forum,and a more durable Forum. Given the considerableimpact of migration on development outcomes, apriority for Sweden is to strengthen the developmentdimension of the GFMD and the participation ofdevelopmentpractitioners.

Thecomingtwoyearsmarkanimportantperiodfortheglobal debate on migration and development. Duringthe Swedish Chairmanship, three significant processesconverge which have implications for how migrationis addressed in the coming development agenda,namely:thesecondHigh-levelDialogueonInternationalMigration and Development in the United NationsGeneral Assembly in October 2013; the follow-up tothe Cairo International Conference on Population andDevelopment in 2014; and the global preparations ofthepost-2015developmentagenda.All threeoftheseprocesses provide an opportunity to contribute togreater convergenceandpolicy coherence in theareaofmigrationanddevelopment. Sweden,as theGFMDChair,hasanimportantroletoplaytopromoteasolidrecognition of the contributionmade bymigration torealizing the current and future development goals.Linked to this is theneed to includepolicy coherenceinthepolicydiscussionsbothatthenationallevelandglobally,asthisisakeypartofmainstreamingmigrationintothedevelopmentagenda.Acrucialsteptowardsthisgoal is to encourage the engagementof developmentpractitionersbothintheState-ledandthecivilsocietypartoftheGFMDprocess.

Aspects ofmobility discussed at theGFMDare highlyrelevant to many stakeholders who may address thecausesand consequencesofmigrationacross abroadspectrumwithoutactuallyfocusingonmigrationassuch,for example: investments in emerging markets, skillsmatching,jobcreationandentrepreneurship,women’sempowerment, integration, poverty alleviation, healthand education. Understanding howmobility (whetherbychoiceornecessity)affectsotherareasisimportantfor the development and implementation of effectivepolicies. The reportRealizing the Future We Want for All laysthefoundationsforUNeffortstodevelopanewframeworktobuildontheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs). The reportestablishes that thekey challengefortheUNpost-2015developmentagendaisensuring

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thatglobalizationbecomesapositiveforceforeveryonein theworld,both for currentand futuregenerations.Fourkeydimensionsarehighlighted:inclusiveeconomicdevelopment, inclusivesocialdevelopment,peaceandsecurity,andenvironmentallysustainabledevelopment.In addition, the importance of a number of enablersof this development is noted. Migration, which is aconcrete expression of globalization, is identified asoneoftheenablersofdevelopment.Thisenablerhashuge development potential, for individual migrantsandtheirfamilies,fortheircountryoforiginandforthecountryofdestination.

Since the MDGs were adopted in 2000, the globalpopulationhasgrown,primarilyinlow-andlower-middle-incomecountries,by1billiontoatotalof7billion.Everyseventhperson isamigrant,byvirtueofhavingmovedeither outside their country of birth (214 million) orwithin their own country (750 million). This has alsoled to steady urbanization, with the result that morethanhalfof theworld’spopulationnow lives inurbanareas.Itisestimatedthat1billionofthesepeoplelivein slumareas.Aroundhalf of allmigrants arewomenand their contribution to development, and theirparticular needs, have been acknowledged only inrecentyears.Population increasesandmigrationhavedirect impacts on development. The positive aspectsincludealargerworkingpopulationandhighergrowth,whilethenegativeimpactsincludegreatercompetitionfor scarce resources, leading tohigherunemploymentand social challenges.Global imbalances are reflectedin large youth populations in low-income countriesand a labour shortage in themajority of high-incomecountries due to ageing populations. Thesemigrationpatterns contribute to increasing mutual dependenceand a need for cooperation on global challenges inwhich the boundaries between traditional categoriessuchasSouth/Northand source/destinationcountriesarebecomingincreasinglyblurred.

Thefrequentviewthatmigrationisamatterofmovingfromone place to another,where themigrant settlespermanently, has also proven increasingly inadequatetodescribemodernmigrationpatterns.Circularityhasincreasingly set its stamp on migration. People movebetween countries, sometimes for longer periods andsometimes for shorter periods, and make significantcontributionstodevelopment.Manypopulationgroupsresiding permanently outside their country of originmaintain connections anddevelop their contactswiththat country. These diaspora groups often contributeactively to their countries of origin through transferof knowledge and investments via their contacts andnetworks.When these countries of origin are low- orlower-middle-income countries, the contribution toreducingpovertycanbeconsiderable.

Thereareanumberofconcreteandpotentialenablingeffects of migration on development. Migration has

importanteffectsonfundamentaleconomicconditionsrelated to labour markets, income levels, incomedistribution, financialmarkets, trade and investments.The primary means through which migration has animpactonsuchconditionsincludefinancialremittances,labour mobility and circular migration, transfer ofskills and knowledge, and the international networksof migrants and diaspora, which facilitate trade andinvestment. Adequate legal frameworks for migrationare often necessary to enable the positive outcomesand minimize the negative effects. In order to moresystematically assess how such migration factors canenabledevelopmentoutcomes,theyneedtobebetterintegratedintothebroaderdevelopmentagenda.

Migrationcancontributetopovertyreductionandbetteraccess to education and health services. Migrationcan diversify household risks, can contribute to jobcreationandsteady incomesformorepeopleandcanincrease gender equality by enablingwomen to enterthe labourmarket and becomemore self-reliant. Thepotential to attain a higher income throughmigrationis also of great importance for social development.Remittances sent to familybackhomeusually help tocoverthedailyconsumptionneeds,whichcanin itselfcontributetotheMDGtoeradicatepovertyandhunger.Remittances are, in addition, often invested in health,educationandaccommodation.Suchinvestmentsoftencomewith important impacts on theMDGs linked toeducationandhealth.Thishasparticularlybeenfoundtobethecaseinsituationswherewomendecideontheuseofremittances.Sectorswithcriticalskillsshortagescanbenefit from the transferof skills throughcircularmigration and return (so-called ‘brain gain’ and ‘braincirculation’). The migration experience can empowerwomen,bothasindividualsandasagroup,byhelpingthem to enter the labour market and earn higherincomes. The transfer of values and ideas broughtaboutbymigration(so-called ‘socialremittances’)alsomeansthatmigrationcanfacilitateachievingthegenderequalityambitionsintheMDGs.

All of these are positive development outcomes.However, such positive outcomes are not automatic.There remainmanydownsides tomigration, includingsocial tensions within families and within societies.Migrantscanbedeniedtheirrights.Theycanbeabusedand exploited by migrant smugglers, traffickers andunscrupulousemployers,andexorbitantfeescanreducetheir potential savings and investments. Householdscan become dependent on foreign sources of incomeand less motivated to seek or prepare domesticopportunities. Policy frameworksmaynot be adaptedto take full advantage of the potential ofmigrants tocontribute to development. Governments, therefore,needtounlockthepotentialofmigrationfor inclusivedevelopment. This is the overarching focus of theSwedish GFMD Chairmanship. Coherent development

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policiesthatfullyincorporatemigrationasanenablingfactorarebetterequippedtomaximizethebenefitsandminimizethedownsidesofmigration.Governmentsthatensure the protection and empowerment ofmigrantscanhelpthemseeksafeandgainfulopportunitieswhichalsobringvaluabledevelopmentoutcomes.

Sweden is interested in promoting inclusive economicdevelopment. Remittances, labour migration andcircularformsofmobility,labourmarketmatchingandthediasporanetworksthatstimulateentrepreneurship,trade and investments can all contribute to positivedevelopmentoutcomes.Similarly,Swedenwouldliketohighlighttheimportanceofinclusivesocialdevelopmentby improvements in thecontributionofmigrationandremittances to education, health, job creation andgenderrelations.Theempowermentofmigrants,socialprotection and insurance are key issues in this regardthatcanunlockthepositiveeffectsondevelopment.

The GFMD has established its value as a mechanismto develop trust and partnerships across national and

functionalboundaries.TheSwedishChairwillcontinueto work closely with our government counterpartsin the coming 18 months to ensure that the GFMDprocesscancontributesubstantially toongoingpolicydebates onmigration anddevelopment. Similarly,wewill continue to engagewith civil society to ensure adialogue on areas of common interest and a closeworking relationship with the GFMD process globallyandat thenational level. It isourambition that,asaresult of our joint efforts, the effects ofmigrationonthe various development goals will be considered toagreaterextent in thedevelopment surveys,analysisand strategies for different countries. It could alsoresult inmonitoringandevaluationclarifying towhatextent or in what manner migration has contributedto the attainment of different development goals.Ultimately,itisbyacknowledgingtheindividualagencyofeachmigrant,andthecircumstancessurroundinghisorhermobility, thatwecanbegintodeveloppoliciesandpracticethatwillunlockthepotentialofmigrationforinclusivedevelopment.

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Will a post-2015 development framework acknowledge migration? Anna Knoll and Niels Keijzer1

International development policy is approaching acrossroads.WiththeMillenniumDevelopmentGoal(MDG) framework expiring in 2015, the discussion

onwhatcouldreplaceorrefreshthesegoalshasgainedmomentum.Thedeliberationsonapossiblepost-2015global development framework have already broughtforwardarangeofelementstoconsider,manyofwhichseeking to respond to perceived shortcomings of theexistingMDGs.

Migration was not included in the original MDGframework, despite the references in the MillenniumDeclarationandclear–andatthattimewell-known–potential ofmigration for achieving theMDGs. Therehave been increasing calls for the next framework togobeyondthepartialhumandevelopmentfocusoftheMDGstowardsinclusiveandsustainabledevelopment.In addition to substance, the means for the newframework should go beyond official developmentassistance and involve a broader set of instrumentsand development enablers (see EU, forthcoming; UN,2012a, 2012b; Brandi, 2012; Jones, 2012). This articlethussetsouttofirstpresentsomecompellingreasonswhy internationalmigration is fundamentally linkedtodevelopmentandwhymobility,especiallyopportunitiesandconditionsforinternationallabourmigrants,shouldbepartofapost-2015globaldevelopmentframework.Subsequently, it will explore the question of howmigrationcouldfeatureinsuchaframework.

Globally, there are around 214 million internationalmigrants, the great majority of which crossedinternational borders in search of better employmentopportunities.About70percentoftotal internationalmigrants are born in the South (UNDESA, 2012).2 International migration is not restricted to people

1 AnnaKnoll isa JuniorPolicyOfficerat theEuropeanCentre forDevelopment Policy Management (ECDPM) in Maastricht, theNetherlands. Niels Keijzer worked for the ECDPM as DeputyProgramme Manager until December 2012 and is presentlyworking as a researcher at the German Development Institute(DIE). This article is based on a shorter blog version: “Can weafford to ignore migration post-2015?”, ECDPM Talking Points,27July2012,whichisavailablefromwww.ecdpm-talkingpoints.org/can-we-afford-to-ignore-migration-post-2015/. The viewsexpressedinthisarticlearethoseoftheauthorsonly,andshouldnotbeattributedtoanyotherpersonorinstitution.

2 Thesenumbersbuildondataofmigrant stockand reflectonlypart of the picture of mobility as they do not capture short-termmovement such as cross-border trade or seasonal labourmigrationwhichareequallyrelevantfordevelopment.

from low-income countries moving to high-incomeones seeking work. South–South migration has beenincreasingandisbelievedtobeassignificantasSouth–North movements. While a considerable proportionof migration takes place within regions, the majorityof migrants from the South have moved beyondtheir immediate region of birth (UNDESA, 2012). Inaddition, North–South migration, such as outflows ofyoung Spanish and Portuguesemigrants to Angola orArgentina, has increased following the deepening ofEurope’s economic crisis, thus reversing the historicaltrendoflabourflowsbetweenthesecountries,atleastintheshortterm(Reuters,2012;Lipczak,2012).

Potentially larger benefits than from aid and free trade

Internationaldevelopmentpolicydebatesfrequentlyfailtoacknowledgethatmigratorychoicesofindividualstocrossbordersareoftenatleastasimportantasthelargeconventional development interventions. Internationalmobilityofpeopleisofteninitselfpartoftheprocessof development for them and their families. Peopleescape poverty as the very result of moving places(ClemensandPritchett,2008).Moreover,internationallabour migration plays an important role for thedevelopment of societies and countries. In Haiti,benefits from remittances sent home by migrantsamounttonearly20percentofGDP–morethantwicetheearnings from thecountry’sexports. Similarly, thereductionofincomepovertyinNepalfrom42percentto26percentin15yearswasnotmainlyduetoforeigndirectinvestments,ortoofficialdevelopmentassistance,butrathertooutwardlabourmigrationandremittances(EU,forthcoming;AdhikariandSijapati,2012).

Researchhasshownthatthereareenormouspotentialglobal economic gains from international movementsof labour, but these are yet to be fully realized. AsClemenspointsout,thegainsofsubstantiallyloweringbarriers to labour migration have been estimated torange from50percent to150percentofworldGDP(Clemens,2011).Forthecitizensofpoorcountries,thiscouldmeanbenefitsofUSD305billionayear–abouttwice as much as combining estimated annual gainsfromfulltradeliberalization,foreignaidanddebtrelief(Pritchett,2006).Beyondthedirecteffectsonpovertyreduction,internationalmigrationandremittanceshavehad positive effects on education, health and gender-equality(EU,forthcoming).

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In countries of destination, labour migrants oftenperform important functions, fill skill gaps or labourshortages and thus contribute significantly to theeconomy. In Thailand, for example, the immigrationof lower-skilled labourhascontributedtoGDPgrowthandThainationalswereabletofindbetteremploymentopportunities as immigrants have taken up the so-called ‘dirty, difficult and dangerous’ jobs (Martin,2007).InmostOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationand Development (OECD) countries “immigrants havemadeanimportantcontributiontoemploymentgrowthduringthepastdecade”(OECD,2009:12).

Yet,onecannotignorethatinternationalmigrationmayalsoentailnegativeimplications,whichneedtobetakenseriously and often require further policy actions tominimizethem.Beyondthepossiblenegativeeffectsofbraindrainandlostlabour,recentresearchhaslookedatthecomplexsocialandpsychologicalimplicationsandeffects onwell-being. New social phenomenamay beassociatedwithhighlevelsofemigration.InNepal,forexample,thepredominanceofmalelabouremigrationhas been affiliated with increasing divorce andelopement (EU, forthcoming). Other studies observesomenegative effects on the psychologicalwell-beingof childrenbecauseof theoutwardmigrationof theirparents (Graham and Jordan, 2011). The social andeconomicimpactofimmigrationindestinationcountriesin the South as well as Northern countries shows anuanced and strongly context-dependent picture.Whilemanyempiricalstudiesobserveaneconomicnetbenefitforcountriesofdestination,thesebenefitsmaynotbeequallydistributedandsomeparticulargroupsinsocietymaybedisadvantagedintheshortterm(EU,forthcoming). In addition, some concerns have beenraisedaboutnegativesocioeconomiceffects, includingthe deterioration of social cohesion, xenophobictendencies and strains on the capacity of receivingdeveloping countries to provide additional servicesto immigrants (suchashealth care)or toput inplaceintegrationpolicies.

As thedevelopmental gainsof internationalmigrationare arguably enormous and labour migration mostlyconstituteschoicesindividualsmake,thenegativeeffectsof international migration should not be counteredby introducing restrictions. The best policy responseshouldratherbetotakeemergingphenomena,suchaschildrenwithmigrantparents,intoaccountanddesignpolicies to respond to them adequately to minimizenegativeeffects.

Looking ahead – the implications of trends beyond 2015

There are good reasons to assume that pressuresonworldwide labourmigration flowswill rise in thefuture. Demographic developments in the upcomingdecades are characterized by growing labour forces

in developing countries (increasing from 2.4 billionto 3.6 billion in 2040). This may result in risingunemploymentwithin these countries and contributetowideninggapsineconomicopportunitiesavailabletopopulationsof richerandpoorer countries. The resultwillbeagrowingdemandforaccesstolabourmarketsincountrieswithbetteropportunities(Koser,2010).

Parallel to the growth of the labour force in somedevelopingcountries,agrowingnumberofdeveloped,developing and emerging countries are experiencingpopulationageinganddecliningworkforces.Countriesthatarecurrentlypoorbutonadevelopmentpathmayin the future compete for labour with today’s richercountries. China, for example, is soon likely to aspireto attract international labour migrants against thebackgroundofitsageinganddecliningworkforcewhileitseconomyisgrowing(Bruni,2011).InOECDcountries,thepositiveroleofmigrationinmaintainingthesizeofthelabourforceisexpectedtobecomemoreimportantinthefuture,especially intheEuropeanUnion(OECD,2012).Moreover,climatechangeandthedisruptionoflivelihoodsdependentonecosystemswillforceworkerstosearchforemploymentabroadandwillthusbeanotherdriverofmigrationinthedecadestocome.Thisiswhymigrationasadevelopmentissueisnotonlyrelevantindiscussionsonapost-2015framework,butalso in theongoingnegotiationson theSustainableDevelopmentGoals which the Rio+20 outcome document linked tothepost-2015discussions.

The role of migration in a post-2015 agenda

Although in termsof substance the case for includingmigration in a post-2015 framework is strong, it isless clear how this could be done in a meaningfulway. The likelihood of this taking place depends onthe course of the overall discussions on the post-2015 agenda; whether a new agenda will focus onpovertyeradicationorabroadervisionofinclusiveandsustainabledevelopment;andwhether itwillapply toallcountriesorfocusmainlyonthepoorest.Oneshouldnot,however,regresstoapassivemodebywaitingtosee whether migration could be ‘accommodated’, asmigration can play a strong role in determining theoutcome of the overall direction and vision of theframework. Depending on the direction chosen, anumberofcomplementaryoptionscanbeidentifiedastohowmigrationcanfeatureinapost-2015agenda.

A first option is to have a stand-alone goal relatedto migration with single targets and indicators. Thiswould certainly give prominence to the contributionof migration to poverty reduction and development.Following the language of the United Nations (UN),suchagoalcouldbeabout“enhancingthebenefitsofinternationalmigrationformigrantsandcountriesalikeanditsimportantlinkstodevelopment,whilereducingits negative implications” (UN, 2012b). This is still a

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only at the national level, but also for the UN familywheretheGlobalMigrationGroup–anefforttobringvarious UN agencies together to coherently work onmigration and development – has not fully achievedthe level of coordination necessary for a seriousmainstreaming(seeNewland,2010;Betts,2010).

A combination of the three options presented here,namely having a specific goal, making other goalsmigration-sensitiveormainstreamingmigration,wouldprovideforacompellingfourthoption:AnMDG8-typegoalofaglobalpartnershiponinternationalmigration.In thespiritofgoingbeyondaid, thiswould includeastepping-up of the policy coherence for developmentcommitments made (e.g. during the 2010 UnitedNationsHigh-levelPlenaryMeetingontheMillenniumDevelopment Goals) with regard to internationalmigration. Global partnerships could, for example,explore possibilities to better match labour migrantswith labour market needs on an international scale(EU,forthcoming),concludenewandmorepredictablelabour migration and mobility schemes, push for arights-basedagendaformigrants,implementthe“5x5”objective for remittances, link mobility opportunitiesto disaster risk reduction for vulnerable countries(Murray and Williamson, 2011) and integrate civilsociety,migrant associations and theprivate sector inthose partnerships. The Global Forum on MigrationandDevelopmentandtheUNgovernanceonmigrationanddevelopment issuescouldbestrengthened in thiscontext.Thecrucialchallengehereisthedegreetowhichgovernmentsarepreparedtoformglobalpartnerships,whattypeofpartnershipswillrealisticallyemergeand,equallyimportant,toensurethatgovernment’swillliveuptotheircommitments.Afterall,MDG8ondevelopingaglobalpartnershipfordevelopmentwaswidelyseenasoneofthegoalsagainstwhichtherehasbeenleastprogressandevenabacksliding(UN,2012c).

The way forward

Despite the promising references onmigration in theUnitedNations SystemTask Team report on the post-2015 agenda, improving opportunities and conditionsfor labourmigrants is still, however, far frombeingatthetopofthedevelopmentagenda(Green,2012).Withthe political sensitivities surrounding it, particularlybut not only among OECD members, we may onceagain observe that policymakers prefer not to factorinternational migration explicitly into a new globalframework on development. Despite the potentialof international migration for development and thereduction of global inequalities, in the last couple ofyears, changes in immigration policies of receivingcountries, especially in the North – but increasinglyin the South – have restricted labourmobility and, attimes, the rights enjoyedbymigrants. Costs for thosewilling to migrate remain high and the conditions inwhichmigrantworkerslivearefrequentlycharacterized

broadformulationandadequatetargetsandindicatorswouldneedtobe identified.Whileonecould imaginehavingtargetssuchasreducingthecostsofmigration,admitting a certain number or quota of internationalmigrants or ratifying the International Convention ontheProtectionoftheRightsofAllMigrantWorkersandMembersofTheirFamilies(adoptedin1990,ratifiedby46 countriesasof2012)and the International LabourOrganization Conventions concerningmigrantworkers(Convention Nos. 97 and 143), it is less clear howexactly the achievement of such migration targets asends in themselvesrelates to the improvementof thedevelopmental impact of migration. Measuring thislink would require further measurement evaluationand monitoring and makes the task overly complex.Moreover there could be a risk that the post-2015agendawill become overloadedwith toomany otherstand-alonegoals,whichwouldcompromisetheclarityandfocusoftheframework,whichhasbeenoneoftheMDGs’mainstrengths.

A second option would be to reflect separate (sub-)objectivesformigrantsandmigrantpopulationsunderthematicdevelopmentgoalsandtargetssuchashealth,gender, education or others. This seems a feasibleoptioninthecontextoffightinginequalitiesthatweregiven attention in the MDGs. Focusing on vulnerablegroups,suchasmigrants,andmeasuringtheirprogresswithregardtocertaingoalswouldbeastepintherightdirection in reducing inequalities. Yet, while perhapsimprovingthesituationofmigrantsincertainareas,sucha linkwouldneglectmanyaspectsof the interrelationbetween migration and development which could bepositivelyharnessedfordevelopment.

TheUnitedNationsSystemTaskTeamonthePost-2015Development Agenda has proposed a third option,which is to viewmigration and fair rules ofmigrationgovernanceasakeyenablerfordevelopment.Suchanoptionviews internationalmigrationasacross-cuttingissue relevant for several aspectsofdevelopmentandrequires the mainstreaming of migration at variouslevels – locally, nationally and globally. In concreteterms, thismeans that,when focusing on achieving acertaingoal,thepotentialcontributionofinternationalmigration and the possible constraint posed by suchmobilitytowardsthatgoalwouldbetakenintoaccountwhen designing policy strategies. Such an approachdoesmostjusticetothefactthatinternationalmigrationis relevant for a wide range of development factors(UN, 2012a) and that its developmental impactmuchdepends on the context. However, this approach alsomay ‘awaystream’ internationalmigration if there arenocleargoalsandtargetsdesignedtomonitorprogressof such a commitment. Furthermore, as for othermainstreaminggoals, the institutionalmechanisms forsuch an approach would need to be in place, as thisrequires the capacity to coordinate between variousunits,ministries and different dossiers. This holds not

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by hazardous work environments, discrimination andinsecurity.

Awareofthedifficultiesofnegotiationsoninternationalmigration, some argue that it is politically unfeasibleand too contentious to have international migrationincludedunderthepresentcircumstancesand inviewof the tight negotiation framework. Yet, the questionis whether a meaningful development agenda canreally ignore issues of such fundamental relevance todevelopment. The development community shouldkeep in mind that the volume of remittances by farexceedsofficialdevelopmentassistanceflowsandthatmigration is relevant forawiderangeofdevelopmentgoals. For politicians in developed countries, it maybecome increasingly costly to ignore the fact thatlabour immigrants will be needed in the future tosustain economic activity on current levels; for thisreason,migration can be a key component of a truly‘global framework’ for post-2015 – possibly includingthe Sustainable Development Goals. Moreover, evenmodestchanges incountries’ immigrationpoliciescanhaveahugeimpactonpeopleinpoorcountries,withoutbearingsubstantialpoliticalriskathome(Barder,2012).

While the preparations for the post-2015 agendaprovide an opportunity to raise awareness and bringattentiontotheoutlinedissues,thoseworkingtowardsadvancing the migration and development nexusat the international level need to take into accountcurrent realities and carefully think about strategiesof engagement in order to identify the politicallysensitive debates and ensure greater commitment tothe mainstreaming agenda. Perhaps more researchis requiredon the political economyofmigration anddevelopment policies and incentive mechanisms inordertobreakthecurrentdeadlocksthroughpoliticallyacceptablesolutions.3

Thiscalls forgoing ‘beyondaid’andfocusingonothermeans to achieve development goals. Internationalmigrationdoes andwill continue tohave a significantpositiveimpactonpovertyreductionanddevelopment–animpactthatanymeaningfulpost-2015developmentframework and true global partnerships should nolongerignore.

3 ArecentpaperbydelaCroixandDocquierexploressuchincentivemechanisms.Whilestillbeingarathertheoreticalanalysis,suchresearchcanprovide insights forpractical translation(seede laCroixandDocquier,2013).

References

Adhikari,R.andB.Sijapati2012 Nepal case study for the European Report on

Development.PresentationgivenattheValidationWorkshop, 16 July 2012, Kathmandu. Availablefrom http://sawtee.org/presentations/ERD_Case%20Study_July%2016_Final.pdf.

Barder,O.2012 Ismigrationreallytootoxic?GlobalDevelopment:

ViewsfromtheCenter,13July.Availablefromhttp://blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2012/07/is-migration-too-toxic-for-development.php.

Betts,A.2010 Migration governance: Alternative futures.

World Migration Report 2010 backgroundpaper,InternationalOrganizationforMigration,Geneva.

Brandi,C.2012 GG2022 – Key ingredients for the post-2015

developmentagenda.Global Policy,29November.Available from www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/29/11/2012/gg2022-key-ingredients-post-2015-development-agenda.

Bruni,M.2011 China’s new demographic challenge: From

unlimited supply of labour to structural lack oflabour supply: Labour market and demographicscenarios 2008–2048. Center for the Analysis ofPublicPolicy.

Clemens,M.2011 Economics andemigration: Trillion-dollar bills on

the sidewalk? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3):83–106.

Clemens,M.andL.Pritchett2008 Income per natural: Measuring development as

if peoplematteredmore than places. Center forGlobalDevelopment,WorkingPaper143.

delaCroix,D.andF.Docquier2013 An incentive mechanism to break the low-skill

immigration deadlock. Unpublished researchpaper. Available from http://perso.uclouvain.be/david.delacroix/pdf/global-migration-fund.pdf.

EuropeanUnion(EU) Development in a Changing World: Elements for

a Post-2015 Global Agenda (working title). 2013EuropeanReportonDevelopment(forthcoming).

Graham,E.andL.Jordan2011 Migrantparentsandthepsychologicalwell-being

of left-behindchildren inSoutheastAsia. Journal of Marriage and the Family,73(3):763–787.

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Green,D.2012 WhyismigrationaCinderellaissueindevelopment?

Oxfam:FromPovertytoPower,11July.Availablefromwww.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=10831.

Jones,A.2012 Report on the Consultation Process on “Towards a

Post-2015 Development Framework”.FinalReport,EuropeanUnion.Availablefromhttp://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/millenium-development-goals/documents/12-12-06_report-final.pdf.

Koser,K.2010 Introduction: International migration and global

governance.Global Governance,16(3):301–315.2012 Assessing the impact of migration policies on

economic and social development. In: Global Perspectives on Migration and Development. GlobalMigrationIssues,Vol.1:173–184.

Lipczak,A.2012 Indignado generation finds happiness abroad.

Presseurop, 19 April. Available from www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/1831501-indignado-generation-finds-happiness-abroad.

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to Thailand: Towards policy development.InternationalLabourOrganization,Bangkok.

Murray,R.andS.Williamson2011 Migration as a tool for disaster recovery: A case

study onU.S. policy options for post-earthquakeHaiti. Center for Global Development, WorkingPaper 255. Available from www.cgdev.org/files/1425143_file_Murray_Williamson_disaster_recovery_FINAL.pdf.

Newland,K.2010 The governance of international migration:

Mechanisms, processes and institutions. Global Governance,16(3):331–343.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)

2009 International Migration Outlook 2009. OECD,Paris.

2012 Economy: migration starting to rebound, saysOECD. Available from www.oecd.org/migration/economymigrationstartingtoreboundsaysoecd.htm.

Pritchett,L.2006 Let their People Come: Breaking the Gridlock

on Global Labor Mobility. Center for GlobalDevelopment,Washington,D.C.

Reuters2012 Biting crisis drives Portuguese to Brazil, Angola.

ReutersFeature,14March.Available fromwww.reuters.com/article/2012/03/14/portugal-emigration-idUSL5E8E8BV120120314.

UnitedNations(UN)2012a Realizing the Future We Want for All: Report to

the Secretary General. United Nations SystemTask Team on the Post-2015 United NationsDevelopmentAgenda,UN,NewYork.

2012b Draft resolution on international migration anddevelopment (A/C.2/67/L.15/Rev.1), adopted attheSixty-seventhsessionoftheGeneralAssembly,Second Committee, under agenda item 22(b):Globalisationand interdependence: internationalmigrationanddevelopment.

2012c The Global Partnership for Development: Making Rhetoric a Reality. MDG Gap Task Force Report2012,UN,NewYork.

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs(UNDESA)

2012 Migrants by origin and destination: The roleof South–South migration. Population Facts,

No.2012/3,UNDESAPopulationDivision,NewYork.

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Moving in the right direction? Assessing progress in Doha: Migration in climate change negotiationsDaria Mokhnacheva, Sieun Lee and Dina Ionesco1

Introduction

The linkagesbetweenmigration,theenvironmentandclimate change have received increasing internationalattention in recent years. Themigration–environmentnexushasbeendiscussedindiversecontexts–humansecurity, disaster risk reduction, human rights anddevelopment – yet surprisingly has not been givenenough attention at international negotiations undertheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange (UNFCCC). Migration was mentioned for thefirst time in the climate change negotiation texts in2010,18yearsafterthenegotiationsbegan.

CountriesagreedupontheUNFCCCin1992asameansto limit the rising global temperature by reducingemissions and to provide means to cope with theadverseeffectsofclimatechange.Theimpactsofclimatechangeon livelihoodshave significant implications forforced migration; simultaneously, migration can bea way for the most vulnerable populations to adaptto negative environmental changes. Human mobilityis one of the many dimensions of climate changewhichmustgaingreaterpreponderanceintheclimatechangenegotiations.The topic isundoubtedlygainingincreased interest at the policy, research, media andgeneralpubliclevels,directlybenefitingfromagreaterawarenessoftheoverallsocialandhumandimensionsofclimatechange.

Climate change is about people’s choices asmuch asabouttheirlackofopportunitiestochoose.Consideringmigration in the climate change context is a matterof ensuring that safe, voluntary and well-plannedmigrationcanbeanoption,andthatpeoplewhodonotwanttomovefromregionsaffectedbyclimatechangehaveaccess toalternative livelihoodsandsolutions toadapttotheirchangingsurroundings.

This article first provides a brief review of wheremigration currently stands in the context of climatechangenegotiationsundertheUNFCCCframeworkfor

1 This articlewas producedbyDariaMokhnacheva (IOMProjectSupportOfficer, specializing inmigrationand lossanddamage)and Sieun Lee (IOM Junior Research Officer, specializing inmigration and adaptation), and coordinatedwith Dina Ionesco(IOM Policy Officer, specializing inmigration, environment andclimatechange).

climatechangeadaptation.Second,andasamainfocus,the article examines developments at the eighteenthsessionoftheConferenceofthePartiestotheUNFCCC(COP18),held inDoha inNovember2012, in relationto ‘loss and damage’ issues. The article explores howmigration and loss and damage concepts interrelate;and explains how the inclusion of migration in lossand damage issues raises challenges to and createsopportunities for advancing migration on the overallinternationalclimatechangeagenda.

Doha: Limited advancement on migration in adaptation plans

Migration was formally introduced to the negotiationtextin2010intheagreementsreachedatthesixteenthsession of the Conference of Parties (COP 16), heldin Cancun, Mexico. Paragraph 14(f) of the CancunAgreements calls for Parties to take “measures toenhanceunderstanding, coordinationandcooperationwith regard to climate change induced displacement,migration and planned relocation,where appropriate,at the national, regional and international levels” toenhanceactiononadaptation.2Thisanchoredmigrationin the text, acknowledging the relation betweenmigrationandclimatechangeadaptationandprovidingcommongroundfordiscussion.

In the last two years, at COP 17 in Durban (2011)and COP 18, negotiations continued on improvingadaptation planning efforts and strengthening theadaptivecapacitiesofthemostvulnerablecountriesinthemedium termand long term.National adaptationplanscanbeanappropriatetooltointegratemigrationconcerns into adaptation planning,3 and, as agreed inDurban,theGreenClimateFundwouldfundadaptation,thus making activities under the aforementionedparagraph 14(f) eligible for funding.However, COP 18concluded with no advancement on this paragraph,thus reflecting that, while human mobility and thesocialdimensionsofclimatechangearegaininggreatervisibility, migration must be advocated to increase

2 For the full text, see http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=4.

3 International Organization for Migration (IOM) submission totheUNFCCC concerningdraftdecisions23and24of -/CP17ofthe national adaptation plans. Available fromhttp://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/smsn/igo/85.pdf.

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its mainstreaming into climate change adaptationstrategies.

TheIOMsideeventatCOP18,entitledHowtoIntegrateMigration into Adaptation Strategies and Planning,4

provided a forum to discuss the evidence on the linkbetweenmigrationandadaptationandhowtodirectlyimplement the aforementioned paragraph 14(f). Atthis event, it was clearly reconfirmed that, althoughmigrationinthecontextofclimatechangeisacomplexphenomenon, if planned thoroughly and in advance,migration can be an adaptation strategy to reducevulnerabilities of populations, and that environmentalmigration should be considered in the broad contextofmigrationmanagementpolicies.Another importantpoint made was that the ever-increasing number ofpublicationswhichhasstrengthenedtheevidencebasemustbepromotedandsharedto informpolicymakersandinfluencedecision-makingandtoraisetheprofileofmigrationinadaptationframeworks.

Doha: Progress in integrating migration in loss and damage issues

One of the notable achievements of COP 18was theprogress made on the issue of ‘loss and damage’,another area where considerable attention should begiventomigration.

Arelativelyrecenttopicontheclimatechangeagenda,loss anddamagewas formallymentioned for thefirsttimewithin the UNFCCC framework at the thirteenthsession of the Conference of the Parties (COP 13),held in Bali in 2007.5 Awork programme on loss anddamage was then established under the CancunAdaptation Framework, and further strengthenedat COP17 inDurban,with the objectiveof improvingtheunderstandingoflossanddamageassociatedwithclimatechangeinvulnerabledevelopingcountries.Thework programme established the basis for a series ofworkshopsandmeetingstopreparerecommendationsforCOP18along three thematicareas: assessing risk,exploringexistingandpotentialapproachestoaddressloss and damage, and determining the role of theUNFCCC in this context. The scope and definition oftheconceptwerethusdevelopedandrefinedatexpertmeetingsinthelead-uptoCOP18in2012.

4 For information on the side event, the publicationslaunched in Doha and key messages, see www.iom.int/cms/climateandmigration.

5 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.13, paragraph 1(c)(iii), requests Partiesto explore “means to address loss and damage associatedwith climate change impacts in developing countries that areparticularlyvulnerabletotheadverseeffectsofclimatechange”(FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1).

TheLossandDamageinVulnerableCountriesInitiative,setupby theGovernmentofBangladesh–whichhasbeen responsible for the lossanddamagenegotiationprocesssince2011–generallydefinedlossanddamageas“theactualand/orpotentialmanifestationofclimateimpacts that negatively affect human and naturalsystems”,whichcaneitherberepaired(damage)ornot(loss).6Assuch,theintroductionofthisconceptintothenegotiationsisanacknowledgmentbytheinternationalcommunity that mitigation and adaptation effortsalonearenotenoughtopreventallthenegativeeffectsof climate change on society and the environment.Therefore, the negative outcomes will have to beaddressedandmanaged.Discussionsatexpertmeetingsatthebeginningof2012,whichfocusedondefinitionsand conceptualization, further clarified the scope ofclimate impacts, with a general consensus to includebothsudden-andslow-onsetevents.Theimportanceofacknowledging non-economic losses and damagewasalsoemphasized,thusintroducingecological,socialandcultural aspects into the agenda alongside economicaspects.

Despitetheprogressmadethroughout2012inassessingandunderstanding this topic, thedecision adopted atCOP 18 pointed to the need for further research andworktoenhancetheunderstandingoflossanddamage.7

Theconceptthusstillofferssomeflexibilityintermsofdefinitionandinterpretation,asmembercountriesandotherkeystakeholderscontinuetoexplorethesubject.

Meanwhile, the current understanding of loss anddamageandthepresentworkingcontextprovideaclearopportunitytoadvancemigrationonthe internationalclimatechangeagenda.

Linking the two: impacts of loss and damage on migration

The interpretation of the link between migrationand loss and damage is manifold. Perhaps the mostevident aspect of this nexus is the impact of loss anddamageonhumanmobility.Ontheonehand,lossanddamagecancausemigration:lossofarablelandcausedby desertification or soil degradation – or long-termdamagetotheagriculturalpotentialcausedbyfloodsordroughts–can,forexample,forcefarmerstomigratetocitiesinsearchofalternativesourcesofincome.Lossofhabitableland,forexampleonsmallislandsexposedto

6 DefinitiongivenbytheLossandDamageinVulnerableCountriesInitiative, as citedby theClimateandDevelopmentKnowledgeNetwork (see http://cdkn.org/2012/09/loss-and-damage-from-defining-to-understanding-to-action/?loclang=en_gb).

7 Paragraph 7 of Draft decision -/CP.18: Approaches to addressloss and damage associated with climate change impacts indeveloping countries that are particularly vulnerable to theadverseeffectsofclimatechangetoenhanceadaptivecapacity.Availablefromhttp://unfccc.int/files/meetings/doha_nov_2012/decisions/application/pdf/cmp8_lossanddamage.pdf.

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sea-levelriseorincoastalareassufferingfromerosion,inevitablyforcespeopletomovetootherareas.Thesearejustafewexamplesofeconomicorenvironmentallossanddamagewhicharelikelytocausemigration.

On the other hand, loss and damage may have theoppositeeffectonmobility,leavingpeoplewithoutthemeans to adopt migration as an adaptation or evensurvival strategy, or tomove to less vulnerable areas.Forinstance,poorhouseholdsinareaspronetosudden-onsetdisastersorslow-onsetenvironmentaldegradationmay be trapped as the degradation of environmentalconditions destroys their assets. The number of such‘trapped’people is in factexpected to increase in thefuture,8 and their inability to migrate will most likelyresult in further loss and damage to these vulnerablehouseholdsandtocommunitiesatlarge,unlesseffortsaremade locally to adapt to climate change,diversifyincomesandreducedependencyontheenvironment.

Migration through the lens of loss and damage

The likelihood of increased loss and damage in thecontext of trapped populations does not, however,mean that migration automatically prevents loss anddamage.Infact,anotherwaytoconsidertheconnectionbetweenmigrationandlossanddamageistoconsiderloss and damage resulting frommigration induced byclimatechange.Forced,unpreparedmigrationresultingfrom sudden negative effects of climate change (suchas destructive cyclones or flash floods) may entailpermanent abandonment (and therefore loss) ofimmovablepropertyandassets,lossofjobsandsourcesofincome,anddisruptionofsocialtiesatthehouseholdorindividuallevel.

At a broader community level, sudden, unmanagedmass population outflowsmay lead to short- or long-term economic, social and cultural losses, and morebroadly to lossanddamage in termsofdevelopment.More concretely, migration-induced loss and damagemaytakeseveralforms,suchaseconomicdeclineduetooutflowsofhumancapital,weakeningofsocialsupportnetworks,orpotentialdisruptionofbasicservicessuchas education or health. In addition, because forceddisplacement is inevitably an undesirable outcome, itcould even be considered in itself as a type of social,economic and even cultural loss or damage to localandnational economicand social systems, and to thecommunitiesleftbehind.

Accordingly, if we approach this question from theoppositeangle,preventingforcedmigrationinducedby

8 See Migration and Global Environmental Change. Final ProjectReport, The Government Office for Science, London, 2011,Chapter 2, p. 54. Available from http://bis.gov.uk/foresight/our-work/projects/published-projects/global-migration/reports-publications.

climatechange,assistingandprotectingforcedmigrantsand facilitatingmigration for trapped populations andvulnerablecommunitiesatlargeareexamplesofpositiveadaptationstrategiesthatcouldcontributetopreventingorreducing lossanddamage. Inmorepractical terms,there isaneedtoframeforcedmigrationasatypeofloss and damage and to design approaches, policies,institutional arrangements and financial mechanismsto prevent forced migration, assist preventive andadaptivemigrationandprovideinsurancesolutionsandcompensation mechanisms for the loss and damageincurredbyindividuals,communitiesorgovernmentsifforcedmigrationtakesplace.

Still a long way ahead

COP18fullyrecognized,forthefirsttime,theneedforenhancedactiontoaddress lossanddamageresultingfromtheadverse impactsofclimatechange, includingtheprovisionoffinancialsupporttoaffecteddevelopingcountriesbydevelopedcountries,andtheestablishmentofrelevant institutionalarrangementsatCOP19.9Thiscould have very tangible implications for the effortsto address climate-induced migration, provided thatmigration,anddisplacementinparticular,isrecognizedfullywithinthelossanddamageframework.

Despitethefactthatmanyaffectedcountries(particularlyleastdevelopedcountries)andspecializedorganizations(suchasIOM,theUnitedNationsUniversity,theInternalDisplacementMonitoringCentreandtheOfficeof theUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)10 have stressed the importanceof addressingmigrationanddisplacementwithinthelossanddamageagenda,efforts to include the topic in the negotiations havebeen only partially successful and progress is slow inthis area. Although migration was initially mentionedseventimes intheCOP18negotiationtexts, thetopicwas brought down to a single paragraph in the finaldecision, which acknowledged the need to study thesubject further.11While this is certainly a positive andencouragingsign,itisalsoanindicationthatmigration

9 See Draft decision -/CP.18: Approaches to address loss anddamage associated with climate change impacts in developingcountriesthatareparticularlyvulnerabletotheadverseeffectsofclimatechangetoenhanceadaptivecapacity.

10 See the joint submission by the Office of the United NationsHighCommissionerforRefugees,theUnitedNationsUniversity,the Norwegian Refugee Council and its Internal DisplacementMonitoringCentre,theSpecialRapporteuronthehumanrightsof internallydisplacedpersonsand IOMtotheSubsidiaryBodyfor Implementation’s work programme on loss and damage(19 October 2012). Available from http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/smsn/igo/106.pdf.

11 Seeparagraph7(a)(vi) ofDraftdecision -/CP.18:Approaches toaddresslossanddamageassociatedwithclimatechangeimpactsin developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to theadverseeffectsofclimatechangetoenhanceadaptivecapacity,which acknowledges the further work for “Enhancing theunderstandingof:…Howimpactsofclimatechangeareaffectingpatternsofmigration,displacementandhumanmobility”.

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is still not seen as an areaof priority in global effortsandactionforadaptationtoclimatechange.Hence,thiscalls formoreevidenceandabetterunderstandingofmigrationinthecontextofclimatechangewithregardtolossanddamageinparticular.

Conclusion

Parties adopted the “Doha Climate Gateway” at theend of COP 18 which includes agreements on a newcommitmentperiodunder theKyotoProtocol, aworkplan toadoptauniversal climateagreementby2015,scaled-upfinanceandapathwaytoraiseambitionsforactiontoreducetheadverseeffectsofclimatechangeandtopushforgreaterinternationalcooperation.

Challenges still lie ahead in terms of mainstreamingmigration into the climate change adaptation plansat the local, national and international levels and forthe further advancement ofmigration in the contextofadaptationor lossanddamage,especially in terms

of funding. The establishment of the new fundingmechanism, the Green Climate Fund, holds somepromise for securing financial commitments fromdeveloped countries to be channelled intomigration-related adaptation projects in developing countriesas funding opportunities remain limited in theAdaptation Fund. The agreement on the GreenClimateFund specifies thata considerableamountofthe new multilateral funding will be made availablefor adaptation projects, programmes and policiesusing thematic funding windows, which could createopportunitiesformigrationprojectsinthenearfuture.12

Althoughmigrationhasjustcrossedthestartinglineattheclimatechangetalks,withtheadvancementofthemigration agenda on loss and damagewe can expectParties to raise migration and discuss its implicationsand the opportunities it presents. Further delay insolution design and action in this area may result ingreaterlossanddamageforsocietyineconomic,socialanddevelopmentterms.

12 See Decision 3/CP.17: Launchining the Green Climate Fund.Available from http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf#page=55.

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Ideas of ‘home’ and ‘return home’ in voluntary return messaging – A contemplation on the impact of passage of time and sense of failure on asylum-seekers’ engagements with voluntary return in IrelandLiam Coakley1

Introduction

While the number of migrants applying forrefugee status in Ireland has declinedsignificantly since the high point reached

in2002, thenumberof asylum-seekers still housed inIreland’s network of ‘direct provision’ accommodationcentreswas4,750at theendof2012.2 For some, thisperiodoftheirliveswillendinsuccessandtheywillbegranted the right to live andwork in Ireland. For themajority,however,theirapplicationswillendinfailure.Success rates among those seeking refugee status inIrelandareverylow.

Ireland’s final sanction against these ‘failed’ asylum-seekers is deportation. Historically, Ireland has notdeported significant numbers of immigrants. Only298 ‘failed’ asylum-seekers were deported to theircountry of origin in 2012, with a further 120 or sobeingdeportedtotheircountryoforiginonthebasisofEuropeanUnion(EU)removalordersortoanotherEUStateundertheDublinIIRegulation.3However,aswithdirectprovision,thisprocess isseentobeessentialtothecontinuedintegrityofIreland’simmigrationsystemand is likely to remain inplace. Indeed,as recentlyas2 January 2013, Alan Shatter, Ireland’s Minister forJustice, Equality and Defence, called for an increasedemphasistobeplacedontheeffectiveenforcementofdeportationordersin2013.

This article draws on data produced during a recentresearchproject(Coakley,2011)thatsoughttoexplorehow asylum-seekers currently in Ireland’s directprovision system feel about the prospect of assistedvoluntary return to and reintegration in their countryof origin – an option offered to asylum-seekers, aslongastheyarenotalreadyinreceiptofadeportationorder, and favoured by successive Irish Governments

1 Liam Coakley is Programme Coordinator of the Masters inContemporary Migration and Diaspora Studies, at UniversityCollegeCork,Ireland.

2 InformationfromtheIrishNaturalisationandImmigrationServicewebsite: www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/Immigration%20in%20Ireland%20–%202012%20in%20Review.

3 Ibid.

as a humane and cost-effective alternative to forcedrepatriation.4 This researchwas commissioned by theInternationalOrganizationforMigration’sDublinoffice(IOMDublin)andfundedbytheEuropeanReturnFundand the Department of Justice and Equality of theGovernmentofIreland.

Although this research is partial, it demonstrates thatmigrants awaiting a decision on their application forrefugeestatusinIrelanddonotseevoluntaryreturnasanattractiveoption.Rather,thevastmajorityprefertoremain resident in Ireland, in thehopeof achieving apositive outcome to their application, at some futurepoint – an outcome that seems unlikely, for most. Amajorityofasylum-seekers simplydonotengagewiththeideaofvoluntaryreturnuntilitistoolateandtheyhavealreadyreceivedadeportationorder.

IOMDublinisactiveandeffectiveinthisfield,butoneorganizationcanonlydosomuch.Thereisaclearneedfor significantly increased cooperation from all otherstakeholdersactiveintheIrishmigrationlandscape.Thisis unlikely to happen, however. Elements of the non-governmental immigrant advocacy sector have beenparticularlyslowtoengagewiththeideaofreturn.

Thereisaconsequentclearneedforstakeholdersintheassisted voluntary return and reintegration process tomaximizetheeffectivenessoftheirprimarymessagingso that all potential beneficiaries are informed aboutthebenefits thatcanaccrue for themandso that thepotential formisinformation isminimized. This articleconsiders the effectiveness of one particular aspectof this messaging process – the conceptualization ofvoluntary return as a mechanism by which asylum-seekerscan‘returnhome’.Datafromtherecentprojectaredrawnuponand learning is shared in thehopeofcontributing to thecontinuing formulationofeffectivereturnpoliciesattheinternationallevel.

4 IOMDublinhashostedarangeofdifferentreturnprogrammesoverthe10yearssincetheirinceptionin2001.Returndestinationsebbandflow,with somecountriesoforiginbeingmorevisibleinsomeyearsthaninothers(seeQuinn,2009:16),butmigrantswhohaveavailedthemselvesofthisservicehavemostlyreturnedtolocationsinEurope,sub-SaharanAfricaandSouthAmerica.

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Specifically, I argue that it is unadvisable to presentassisted voluntary return as an opportunity to returnhome, as many potential beneficiaries of suchprogrammesnolongerhavethesameaffinitywithhomethey had when they left. It is particularly erroneousto conceptualize returnas amethodof cancelling thedisplacement brought about bymigration as, inmanyinstances,amigrant’splaceoforiginmaynolongerbedesirabletohimorher.Thiscanbeespeciallypertinentinsituationswhere,asSwardstates(2009:3),potentialreturneesmay face discrimination as a result of theirreturnstatus.Manyasylum-seekerssimplyhavenoclearunderstandingofwherehomeisandwhathomemeans.Thisisbecausetheyhavemovedandhavechangedand,forthem,‘home’haschangedaswell.

Insupportofthiscontention,thebelowsectionspre-senttwoshortempiricalexamplesfromIreland:(a)con-siderationof the impact of thepassageof timeon anasylum-seeker’ssenseofhome;and(b)considerationoftheimpactofamigrant’spotentialsenseoffailure.

Passage of time undermines the connection asylum-seekers have with their original ‘home place’

Asylum-seekers can spend many years subject to theworkingsofIreland’sassessmentprocess.Peoplesimplymoveonand changeover this spaceoftimeand thisresults in a loss of connection with their country oforigin.

Inthisinterviewexcerpt,Nick,5anasylum-seekerfromWest Africa, demonstrates that he still identifieswithhisbirthcountry’sheritage.However,theexperienceoflifeinIrelandhaschangedhisoutlook.Inthisway,thethoughtofreturnhomeisalientohim.Hestates:

Youhaveseentheoutsideworldandyouhaveseenadifferentthing,sotoyouandsomebodylikeme,whothinks,who looksat things and saysno,no,no. It isnot going tobe right in thiswayandbecoming veryexposed forme.When I read the [countryoforigin]news I do actup. I say, look this is not theway it issupposed to. We have seen this thing. The outsideworld.Howitworks.Whycan’t itwork inthisway. Igetveryagitated,veryangrylookingatthis.Whycan’titbe.Ipraythatthisisnotthewaythatitshouldgo.

Thisisacommonandimportantexperience.Inthislight,it is reasonable for Black andGent (2006:20) to statethatitisinherentlymistakentoconceptualizereturnasaprocessthatre-establishesequilibriuminthesystembytakingsomeonewhoisoutofplaceintheirhostsocietyandreturningthemhometotheirrightfulcountry.While

5 Pseudonymsareusedthroughoutthispaper.

the asylum-seekers who participated in this researchmayindeedbeexperiencingdifficultiesinIreland,theyareequallyexperiencinga lossofconnectionwiththespecificitiesoflifeintheircountryoforigin.

The way in which Ghanem (2003:15) addressesthe psychosocial aspects of return supports thisanalysis when she calls into question the validity ofconceptualizationsthatseektopositthereturnprocessin terms of repatriation ‘home’. Although nationalidentitycanbeaverypowerfulconnectiontoapastlifewhen living as amigrant, inmany instancesmigrantsdevelopdifferentexpectationswhiletheyareaway.AsNickgoesontostate:“Onedaychangesyourlife.Onedayyouareout from that countryandcomingout tothisplace–yourlifehaschanged.”

In this regard, ideas of home and belonging are bestnot seen as static or universal in nature but ratheras contested and multiple (e.g. Bialczyk, 2008:12)and liable to change over time in response to newexperiences and understanding. Migrants seekinginternational protection fully orientate themselvesand their aspirations to life in their host country andmay indeed come to see their country of origin as aforeign place irrespective of the exact nature of theirstatus,or their likely success inbeinggranted refugeestatus.Carol,afocusgroupparticipantfromWestAfrica,certainlypositsherreluctancetothinkaboutreturninthesetermswhenshestates:“WhatdoIhave,whatdoIhave? I’ve lostall theconnection tohome.” Inmanysuch instances, articulations of home simply do notresonate with the individuals concerned, and returnmessagesthatharnesssucharticulationsinevitablyfallondeafears.

A sense of failure discourages people from re-engaging with their ‘home place’

Manypeoplestrugglewithideasofsuccessandfailure.The fact that they have been resident in a Westerncontext,oftenforaprolongedperiodoftime,andhavenot achieved what they hoped for, weighs on manymigrants’minds.ManyparticipantsinIreland’sassistedvoluntaryreturnandreintegrationresearchparticularlyworry about how they will be perceived should theyarrivebackhome.The thoughtofgoinghomeempty-handedfeaturesinmanynarratives.Feelingsoffailureand shame are common, as themigrant anticipates alossofselfduringthereturnprocessbecauseofhisorherlackofeconomicsuccessbeingmappedontohisorhersenseofself-worth.Eddie,aparticipantfromWestAfrica,makesthefollowingillustrativestatementinthisregard:

Togobackisafailureandashameonthewholefamily.If you tell them that things are not going well theywouldn’tbelieveyou.Theaccusationofbeing lazy is

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abigthing.Theycanonlygohomedead.Theydon’twanttofeel theshame.Therearefamiliesthathavesoldeverything,theirhouse,toensurethatthepersongets to Europe. They are investing in that person sothat they’re even a pressure. They will only acceptreturniftheyhaveexhaustedeveryotherpossibility.

Thispotentialsenseoffailurecanbefurtherexacerbatedininstanceswhereamigrantmayhaveborrowedmoneyto fund his or her movement. Some people simplycannotreturntotheircountryoforiginbecausetheydonothavethemoneytorepaythedebtstheyincurredincoming to Ireland. Jack,anexperiencedplumber fromNigeria, is one such person. Despite stating that hecannotgohometoNigeriabecauseoffearofviolence,JackspeaksstronglyabouthisneedtostayinIrelandsothathecanrepayhisdebt.Hestates:“MeandmywifecostmeEUR14,000tocomehere.Alotofmoney.Abigmoney.Itookaloanfromthebank.Wefeelbad.Thatiswhywearestillwaiting,maybewewillworkandstarttopayourmoney.”Interestingly,heendsratherlamelyby stating “I cannot go back because of the politicalproblem as well.” It is a matter of course that manymigrants utilize an agent to facilitate theirmovementfromtheirsendingcountrytotheirdestinationcountry.Sums of many thousands of dollars regularly changehands in such transactions. This will inevitably add afurtherlayerofdifficulty,andimmigrantscontemplatingreturnmay verywell be prompted to remain in theirdestination country rather than return to face asignificantdebt,evenonewhichismostlikelyowedtoaclosefamilymemberorbloodrelative(e.g.Strandetal.,2008).AsRuben,VanHouteandDavidssuccinctlystate(2009:908):“Returnmigrationisnotalwaysaprocessofgoinghome.”

Discussion

Ideasof ‘home’ and ‘returnhome’ canhave a role toplay in the operationalization of assisted voluntaryreturnbut– in lightof thedatauncoveredduring theIrish research – only if such concepts are presentedin a manner that is significantly more nuanced thanstatements to theeffect that returnwill automaticallyfacilitatethemigrant’sre-engagementwithhome.

Ultimately, assisted voluntary returnand reintegrationmessagingneeds tobepresented in innovativeterms.Contrarytomanycurrentpatterns,returnhomeshouldnotbepresentedasaclosingofthecircle–asthoughreturnrepresentsanormalcourseofactionintheeventof difficulties being encountered during a migratoryexperience, or as though return represents a returnto equilibrium in the migrant’s life, after a period ofinstabilitycausedbymigration.Thisconstructionsimplydoesnottakeaccountof thefact that, formany,timehas moved on; they have changed and their socialandeconomicnetworksintheircountryoforiginhavealmost certainly changedaswell.Whilepeoplewouldlike to think that they could reintegrate easily, most

appreciatethatthiswillbeaverydifficultthingtodo.Inthisregard,presentingreturnasanaturalclosureisinsultingtotheintelligentmigrant,anditdoesnotwork.Migrantsknowthatreturnisnotaneasyprospectand,contrarytomuchcurrentoperationalliterature,thatitrepresents their failure tosettle inaWesterncontext.Thiswillespeciallybethecasefortheeconomicpath-findingmigrantoreconomicmigrantwhohasmigratedaspartofafamilyorcommunityresourcestrategy.

The idea of return home is probably not problematicin itself. Difficulties arise fromwhat going back homerepresents,namelyfailure.This isapowerfulelement.Notonlyinitself,butalsobecauseoftherelationshipithaswiththeoriginalimpulsetoleave.Migrantsleaveforabetterlife.Toreturnistoadmitthattheyhavenotbeensuccessful;therefore,togobackisconsideredasgoingbacktoapoorerlife.Itisveryimportantthereforethatassisted voluntary return and reintegrationmessagingshould break this binary opposition inherent inmanymigrationbiographies.Specifically,organizationsactiveinthisareaandchargedwiththeoperationalizationofassistedvoluntaryreturnandreintegrationprogrammesmust counter the paired idea that people migrate inthehopeofabetter life,and that to return thereforeequateswith an acceptanceof going back to aworselife.

Todothis,amoreproactiveconceptualizationofreturnisneeded.Simply invitingasylum-seekers togohome,wherelifewillbegoodagain(becauseitishome)presentsfartoofacileapicturehere.Rather,organizationsactiveinthisareaneedtopresentanimageoftheindividual’sability to succeed at home – as opposed to thelikelihoodofcontinueddifficultyasanasylum-seeker.Inthisregard,returnhomeshouldnotbepresentedasareturn to the default setting, but rather as somethingnewthatholdsopportunitiesfortheindividual(anewphaseofaperson’smigratoryexperiencemaybe).Keyto thedeliveryof thismessage is tounderstandwhatasylum-seekers need and how to encourage them toengagewith the ideaof return through this filter, notsimplythroughtheuseofapassivecatchphrase.

Conclusions

Far too high a proportion of the asylum-seekers whoparticipatedinthisresearcharelivinganinstitutionalizedexistence. The vast majority focus on their hopes fora life in Irelandandareveryclosedtotheprospectofvoluntary return to their country of origin. Increasedoutreachandmoreproactiveinformationprovisionareneeded at every level of the migration managementprocess.Thereisaclearneedtoeducatemigrantsaboutthefullrangeofoptionsavailabletothem.

Specialistserviceproviders,suchasIOM,canonlydosomuch.Afarwiderrangingengagementwiththeideaofreturnisneeded.Migrantadvocacyorganizationshaveastrongroletoplayhereaswell.Thereisasensethat

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manyof theseorganizationsdonot fullyembrace theidea of return to a country of origin or the fact thatoftentimes return represents a viable option for anindividual.Amoreintegratedengagementwithreturn,basedontheprinciplesofpartnership,wouldconstituteausefuldevelopmentforallinthisregard.

Inallthis,however,conceptualizationsof‘returnhome’needtobenuanced.Specifically,tobeeffective,thosechargedwiththepresentationofreturnneedtoexaminehow migrants actually see themselves vis-à-vis theircountryoforigin.Itwouldbepointlesstotalkofhomeorevenofnationalcommunitygroupstopeoplewhomaynotactuallyengagewiththeideaofhomeatall.Todothis(andthereforetofindoutabouttheinternalizationofhome),organizationsactiveinthisareaneedtoinvesttime in trying to understand: (a) how asylum-seekersremember and imagine their home; (b) howmigrantsconstruct allegiances while in their host country (e.g.arenationaldiasporicallegiancesimportant?);and(c)ifcommunity-basedallegianceswith fellowmigrantsareimportant.

References

Bialczyk,A.2008 ‘Voluntary Repatriation’ and the Case of

Afghanistan: A Critical Examination. RefugeeStudiesCentre,WorkingPaperNo.46,UniversityofOxford.

Black,R.andS.Gent2006 Sustainable return in post-conflict contexts.

International Migration,44(3):15–38.

Coakley,L.2011 Where do I go from here? The leading factors

in voluntary return or remaining in Ireland. InternationalOrganization forMigration, Ireland,Dublin.

Ghanem,T.2003 When Forced Migrants Return ‘Home’: The

Psychosocial Difficulties Returnees Encounter intheReintegrationProcess.RefugeeStudiesCentre,WorkingPaperNo.16,UniversityofOxford.

Quinn,E.2009 Programmes and Strategies in Ireland Fostering

Assisted Return to and Reintegration in ThirdCountries. Research paper, The Economic andSocialResearchInstitute,Dublin.

Ruben,R.,M.VanHouteandT.Davids2009 What determines the embeddedness of forced-

returnmigrants?Rethinking the roleof pre- andpost-return assistance. International Migration Review,43(4):908–937.

Strand,A.etal.2008 Return in Dignity, Return to What? Review of the

Voluntary Return Programme to Afghanistan.CMIReport2008:6,Chr.Michelsen Institute,Bergen,Norway.

Sward,J.2009 AssistedVoluntaryReturn (AVR):AnOpportunity

forDevelopment?DevelopmentResearchCentreonMigration,Globalisation andPoverty, BriefingNo.20,UniversityofSussex,Sussex.

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Rebuilding lives and livelihoods: Haiti’s long road to recovery through skills development and training for internally displaced personsAmy Rhoades and Leonard Doyle1

Out of the rubble and destruction created bythedevastatingearthquakeof January2010 inHaiti,young internallydisplacedpersons (IDPs)

arebeinggivenanopportunitytostartafreshthroughtargeted skills development and trainingprogrammes.Formany,thisistheirfirsttimeinsideaclassroom.WhilethisinterventionhasofferedalifelinetoIDPswhohavebeenlanguishingforovertwoyearsintentcampsacrossPort-au-Prince,farmoreareleavingthecampswithouttheresourcesandskillsnecessarytorebuildtheirlives,their communities and their country. The need toexpandtrainingandlivelihoodprogrammesinthewakeofdisasterisimperativeforlong-termrecovery.

A country’s most important resource is not its rawmaterialsor itsgeographical locationbuttheskillsofitspeople.(UNESCO,2010)

In October 2012, the United Nations Educational,ScientificandCulturalOrganization(UNESCO)releasedthe Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2012: Youth and skills: Putting education to work.Thisannualreportassesses theglobalprogressmadetowards thesix goals within the Education for All (EFA)mandate.2

For the first time since the establishment of the EFAgoals in2000,thisreportfocusesongoal3oftheEFAmandatewhich relates to promoting learning and lifeskillsforyoungpeopleandadults.However,theresultsarediscouraging;anoverallsummaryofgoal3suggeststhat few gains have been made. The UNESCO reportnotes that: “[goal 3] has not received the attention itdeservesfromgovernments,aiddonors,theeducationcommunityor theprivatesector–and it isnowmorecritical thanever.” (UNESCO,2012).This isparticularlytrueinemergencyresponsedespiteits importanceforsustainablerecoveryandeconomicresilience.

1 Amy Rhoades is a consultant with the International LabourOrganization in Hispaniola and Leonard Doyle is Head of theOnline Communications Unit at the International OrganizationforMigrationinthePhilippines.Partsofthisarticleareextractedfrom Rhoades’ research paper entitled Displaced futures:Internallydisplacedpersonsandtherighttoeducation,availablefrom www.right-to-education.org/sites/r2e.gn.apc.org/files/displaced_futures.pdf.

2 The six EFA goals established at the World Education Forumin Dakar in 2000 covered the following: (1) expanding earlychildhoodcareandeducation;(2)providingfreeandcompulsoryprimaryeducationforall;(3)promotinglearningandlifeskillsforyoungpeopleandadults; (4) increasingadult literacyby50percent;(5)achievinggenderparityby2005andgenderequalityby2015;and(6)improvingthequalityofeducation.

While it is encouraging to see policy being followedbypractice inanemergency,UNESCO’sassertionthat:“[Education] is thereforenowseenasthefourthpillarof humanitarian assistance to victims of conflict andof natural disasters, alongside nourishment, healthservices and shelter” (UNESCO, 2003) remains aworkinprogress.

Currently, the bulk of educational humanitarianassistance is directed towards primary educationas reflected in both political priorities and resourceallocation.AsurveyconductedbytheWomen’sRefugeeCommissionfoundthateducationprogrammesbeyondtheprimarylevelarefewandfarbetweeninemergencyresponseandrecovery(Women’sRefugeeCommission,2007). However, considering the rising rates of youthunemployment, the huge costs to society and theeconomyresultingfromanunskilled labourforce,andthehighrateofreturnonresourcesallocatedtoyouthtraining, incorporatingskillsdevelopmentprogrammesasacentral tenetofhumanitarianassistance isawiseinvestment. This attention is particularly relevant foradolescent and youth IDPs, many of whom have notbeenaffordedadequateeducationalopportunitiesatayoungage.3

Project 16 Neighbourhoods/6 Camps

AsaresultoftheJanuary2010earthquakeinHaiti,over200,000peoplewerekilledandanother1.5millionwereleft homeless. Not only did people lose their homesand livelihoods, but in many cases schools were alsodestroyed.According to government estimates, in theeasternregionofHaiti,whichcomprisesmorethanhalfoftheschoolfacilitiesnationwide,over80percentofschoolsweredestroyedorseriouslydamaged.Technicaland vocational education and training facilities werealsohardhit,with8outof9publictraininginstitutionsandall11oftheprivatetraininginstitutionsbeingeitherdestroyedorseriouslydamaged. Intotal,4,268school

3 Education beyond the primary level is referred to in Article 13of the InternationalCovenantonEconomic, Social andCulturalRights.TheUnitedNationsCommitteeonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRightselaboratesonthisprovisioninGeneralComment13,notingthatsecondaryeducationandtechnicalandvocationaleducation form part of the right to education as they areconsidered “the foundations for life-long learning and humandevelopment”andshouldbeextendedtothosewhohavenothadadequateeducationalopportunities(documentE/C.12/1999/10).

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facilities were destroyed or seriously damaged (Haiti,MinistryofEducationandTraining,2011).Thisdamagewas a major setback to an already under-performingeducationalsystem.

Eighteen months later, as a result of political andpolicyparalysis,anestimated634,000peoplewerestillinternally displaced, living in tent camps throughoutthe Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Out of thisemergedProject16Neighbourhoods/6Camps(16/6),apilotprogramme focusedongiving rental subsidies toIDP families to facilitate thevoluntaryemptyingof sixlarge tent camps in Port-au-Prince and the return ofIDPs to their 16neighbourhoodsoforigin. Key to thisintervention was supporting the reintegration of IDPsbyincreasingtheiraccesstobasicservicesandincome-generatingactivities.

Project 16/6 began in October 2011 and is beingimplemented by the International Organization forMigration(IOM),theInternationalLabourOrganization(ILO),theUnitedNationsOfficeforProjectServicesandthe United Nations Development Programme, undertheguidanceoftheGovernmentofHaiti.Byemployingtheexpertiseofvariousinternationalagencies,Project16/6 has been able to provide more comprehensiveassistancetoitstargetconstituents.AsIOMworkedtoregister families in tentcamps, identify thevulnerableandsecuredurablehousingsolutions,theILOsoughttodeveloptrainingprogrammestoreinforcecompetenciesand provide greater economic opportunities to IDPswithintheframeworkofProject16/6.

In Haiti, only 22 per cent of the population reachessecondary school; formal vocational training issparse and costly, thereby limiting its availability tomost Haitians. Given the low levels of educationalattainment, illiteracy is a serious challenge in thecountry.Anestimated55percentofthepopulationisfunctionally illiterate (Haiti,Ministry of Education andTraining, 2011). Not only does this constrain personaldevelopment and economic opportunities, it alsoconstrainssectoralandnationalgrowthpotentialduetoalackofqualifiedworkers.

Responding to these educational constraints,Project 16/6 developed an earthquake-resistantconstructiontrainingcurriculumadaptedtothetargetpopulation.EntitledApprendre pour Reconstruire Ayiti Solide (Learning to Rebuild a Solid Haiti – APRAS),the curriculum adopts a highly practical trainingmethodology and incorporates the use of referencemanuals to explain earthquake-resistant buildingtechniques for semi-skilled masons, carpenters andmetal workers. APRAS trainingmanuals are primarilyillustrative, using clear images and colours to explaineach step of the construction process. The APRAScurriculumisservingasabasisfortraining60trainersand 1,500 construction workers. Once these trainers

and construction workers have received Ministry ofEducation and Training certification, they becomeinvolvedintheconstructionofhomesforreturningIDPswithinthetargetedneighbourhoodsofProject16/6.

In addition to training in the construction sector,Project 16/6 is engaging IDPs through vocationaltraining programmes in targeted economic sectors.TheextensiveexperienceoftheILOinmanycountriesreveals that technicalskillsalonearenotsufficient forintegration into the labourmarket (ILO, 2011). This isparticularly true in developing country contexts suchasHaiticharacterizedbyhigh levelsofunemploymentand a largely informal economy. To bridge thisgap, the curriculum includes a weighty emphasison developing skills to increase employability andentrepreneurial capacities. Furthermore, given thesocialandeducationalprofileof targetedparticipants,thecurriculumintegratesrelevanttopicstoreinforcelifeskillsanddecreasevulnerabilityofIDPs.

The training programmes in Project 16/6 employ amodularmethodology,representingadivergencefromthetraditionalone-totwo-yeartrainingprogrammesinHaitiwhichrequireamedium-tolong-termcommitmenton the part of training participants. By contrast, thetargeted modular courses allow training participantsto acquire within a short time frame of 36 traininghoursaspecificsetofdirectlyapplicablecompetenciesthat facilitate greater access to the labour market.Furthermore, a modular structure better respondsto the production needs within target communities,supporting the broader objective of local economicdevelopment.

Thebenefitsofprovidingskillsdevelopmentandtrainingprogrammes extend beyond the intended learningobjectives and potential economic empowerment ofIDPs.Thefollowingsectionexplorestheauxiliarybenefitsthat training and skills development programmesprovide to IDP populations and illustrates why sucheducationforIDPsiscrucialforlong-termrecovery.

Education for empowerment

Duringdisplacement, newdaily risks existwhere theydidnotexistpreviously.IncreasedhealthandsanitationconcernsregularlyemergewithinIDPcommunities.Byintegrating highly relevant topics into the curriculum,educationandtrainingprogrammesinIDPcommunitiescanimprovethequalityoflifeandindeedsavelives.

Education on topics such as basic sanitation, diseaseprevention and nutrition are important to promotebehaviourchangeandan improvedstandardof living,especially among displaced populations where largenumbersofpeopleare living in closequarters.Owingto high instances of rape in emergency situations,raising awareness about HIV/AIDS and other sexually

21

transmitted infections is particularly important.Maternal health is also highly relevant as estimatessuggest that as many as 25 per cent of women andgirls of reproductive age living in camps are pregnant(Martone, 2010). Such education not only decreasesthe rateofmotherand infantmortality, italso resultsin healthier babies and fewer pregnancies over thecourse of a lifetime. Furthermore, integrating disasterrisk reduction education that teaches IDPs how torespondinemergenciessuchasearthquakes,floodsandlandslidescananddoessavelives.Whilethetechnicalaspects of disaster risk reduction are channelled vianationalandlocalgovernments,thereisalsoanurgentneedtoeducate IDPcommunitiesandtherebyensurethat behaviour change accompanies the technicalassistance.Thistopicbecomesparticularlycrucialasthefrequency and severity of natural disasters increasesacrosstheglobe.

Research has also shown that displaced personsexperience a range of emotions from confusion toanger to fear and despair following exposure to anemergency.4Womenandyoungpeopleareparticularlysusceptible to psychological trauma. The involvementin education and training programmes can serve toalleviate the long-term impact of such trauma. In his2008reportfocusingondisplacedpersons,theUnitedNationsSpecialRapporteuron theRight toEducation,VernonMuñoz, asserts that: “Educationmitigates thepsychosocialimpactofconflictanddisastersbygivingasenseofnormality,stability,structureandhopeduringatimeof crisis, andprovidesessentialbuildingblocksforsocialreconstructionandfutureeconomicstability.”5

Beyondgivingstudentsanindividualizedsenseofhopeanddirection, trainingand livelihoodprogrammescanalsoplayavitalroleinthecommunityasawhole.Thebreakdownof socialnetworks, tollon local leadershipand loss of social services are all by-products ofdisplacement, resulting in decreased communityresilience. Educational programming can and shouldserve as a catalyst to engage and empower displacedcommunities.

Education for prevention

Educationalsoactsasadeterrenttoinvolvementinhigh-riskbehaviours,particularlyamongyouth.Researchhasdemonstrated that where education is not available,individualsaremoresusceptibletorecruitment,eitherforced or voluntary, into illegitimate activities such asgangs,thesextradeorforcedlabour(Women’sRefugeeCommission,2007).

4 VernorMuñoz,UnitedNationsSpecialRapporteuron theRightto Education, report on the right to education in emergencysituations(documentA/HRC/8/10of20May2008).

5 Ibid.

An area of particular concern is the increasedsusceptibility of IDPs to recruitment into gangs,particularly among male youth. In post-earthquakeHaiti, tent camps became a breeding ground for theresurgence of gangs and criminal activity, particularlysexualviolence.6Twofactorsthatcontributetoextremevulnerability to gang recruitment are poverty andsocialdislocation,suchthatdisplacedyouthandthoseseparatedfromtheirfamiliesareparticularlyvulnerable.

Gangs often offer a home and a community to thosewho join their ranks. For IDPswho have recently lostjust that, such anoffermay seem irresistibly enticing.In interviews conducted with soldats (young gangmembers)fromthestreetsofPort-au-Prince,veryfewwereenrolledinschoolatthetimeofrecruitment.Theycitetheelementofprotectionwhilelivingonthestreetsaftertheearthquakeasoneoftheprimaryreasonsforjoining a gang. Ironically they eachwear rosaries of adifferent colour to indicate with which gang they areaffiliated.7ManyIDPswhohavelostfamilymembersandhomes,orhavebeenvictimsofviolence,oftenbelievethattheyhavenohopeorfutureandthusbecomemorewillingtojoingangs.

Globally, human trafficking is on the rise. Researchhas shown that, in emergency situations, the collapseof rule of law, rising criminality and weak protectionmechanisms, combined with vulnerability due todisplacement, make IDPs a highly targeted group fortrafficking(Klopcic,2004). Insuchsituations,traffickerspreyparticularlyondisplacedwomenandchildren,usingtheincreasedlevelsofvulnerabilitytotheiradvantagefor exploitative purposes. Traffickers often presentvictims with an opportunity to improve their social,economicorpoliticalsituationinmoredevelopedcitiesor countries.While suchanofferbeforedisplacementmight not have been appealing, IDPs may feel theyhavenoviablealternativeandrespondaccordingly.Therealityuponarrival,however,isnotthefreshstarttheywerepromised.

In Haiti, traffickers not only recruit vulnerable youthintothesextrade,butthetraffickingandsaleofyoungpeopleasrestaveks,aformofdomesticservitudewidelyconsidered asmodern-day slavery, has alsoflourishedin the post-earthquake context. Many young peoplewere separated from or lost their parents or primarycaregiversasa resultof theearthquake,makingthemprime targets for traffickers. Considered one of theworstformsofchildlabour,itisestimatedthattherearemorethan225,000youngpeoplelivingasrestaveks in

6 TolearnmoreaboutIOMworktocombatsexualviolenceinthetentcampsofPort-au-Princeandtotreatvictims,seetheshortvideoMovingoutoftheShadows,availablefromwww.youtube.com/watch?v=imH2om2bDYY.

7 Personalcommunication,August2012.

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Haiti.8 Theproblem is exacerbatedby a failure by theGovernmentofHaititoactivelycondemnthepractice,which issometimesseenasaculturalphenomenoninHaiti.

Enrolment in education and training programmes isa mitigating factor that decreases vulnerability andthe likelihood of getting caught up in activities suchas gangs, the sex tradeor forced labour. It representsasymbolofchangeandaninvestmentinthefuture.Itservesasalifelineforthosewhohavelosteverything.Eveninsituationsofrecurringdisplacement,educationisoneitemthatindividualsareabletocarrywiththemwherever they go. In recognition of this, education isoftennamedby leaders of displacedpopulations as apriorityneedfortheircommunity.Infact,communitiesranktheneedforeducationandskillsasahigherprioritythan food, water,medicine and even shelter inmanycases(Martone,2010).

Intersectionality

Tofullyunderstandtheproblem,itisvitaltorecognizethe intersection between poverty, illiteracy andvulnerabilitytoemergencies.Oftenitisthosewiththeleast resources who are the most affected. AlthoughglobaldemographicstatisticsforIDPsisanareainneedof greater development, national surveys conductedin States with high IDP populations demonstrate thatthose living in poverty, ethnic minorities and womenare disproportionately affected by displacement(IDMC, 2011). Incidentally, these are the exact samesectors of the population among which low levels ofeducation attainment prevail (UNESCO, 2010). Thisintersectionalityfurtherdemonstratesthetremendousneed for education and training programmes in IDPcommunities.Primaryeducationoffersgreatvalue,butinitselfwillnotprovidedisplacedpersonswiththetoolsneeded to navigate this transitional time and prepareforrebuildingtheirlivesafterresettlement.TheUnitedNations Committee on Economic, Social and CulturalRightsemphasizesthispointbynoting:

As an empowerment right, education is the primaryvehiclebywhicheconomicallyandsociallymarginalizedadultsandchildrencanliftthemselvesoutofpovertyand obtain the means to participate fully in theircommunities.Educationhasavitalroleinempoweringwomen, safeguarding children from exploitativeand hazardous labour and sexual exploitation,promoting human rights and democracy, protectingtheenvironment, andcontrollingpopulationgrowth.Increasingly,educationisrecognizedasoneofthebestfinancialinvestmentsStatescanmake.9

8 Formore informationon the restavek systemandProject 16/6activitiestocombatchildslavery,seeILO,2012.

9 Document E/C.12/1999/10 of 20 May 2008, referred to infootnote3.

OverlookingtheeducationalneedsofyouthandadultIDPsfurtherperpetuatesthemarginalizationcreatedbyintersectionality andneglects anopportunity tobreakthe cycle of poverty. Skills development and trainingneedtobeintegratedintothehumanitarianassistanceframeworkasvitalcomponentsoftherecoveryprocess.Trainingprogrammesnotonlyofferasenseofpurposeandstabilitytodisplacedpersons,buttheyalsoprovidecriticalskillstoprepareIDPstosustainablyrebuildtheirlives,theircommunitiesandtheircountries.

References

Haiti,MinistryofEducationandTraining2011 Plan Opérationnel 2010–2015: Vers la Refondation

du Système Educatif Haitien.MinistryofEducationandTraining.

InternalDisplacementMonitoringCentre(IDMC)2011 Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends

and Developments in 2011.IDMC,Geneva.

InternationalLabourOrganization2011 A Skilled Workforce for Strong, Sustainable and

Balanced Growth: A G20 Training Strategy. ILO,Geneva.

2012 Slaveryinafreeland. ILONewsroom,29August.Available from www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/features/WCMS_187879/lang--en/index.htm.

Klopcic,A.2004 Traffickinginhumanbeingsintransitionandpost-

conflict countries. Human Security Perspectives, 1(1):7–12.

MartoneG.2010 An unexpected lifeline. In: Even in Chaos:

Education in Times of Emergency (K.M.Cahill,ed.).TheCenterforInternationalHumanCooperation,p.89.

United Nations Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization(UNESCO)

2003 Education in Situations of Emergency, Crisis andReconstruction.Workingpaper,UNESCO,Paris.

2010 Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2010: Reaching the marginalized.UNESCO,Paris.

2012 Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2012: Youth and skills: Putting education to work.UNESCO,Paris.

Women’sRefugeeCommission2007 UntappedPotential:DisplacedYouth.FactSheet.